



Thomas Gale (1636–1702),
author of the first printed edition of the *Periphyseon*

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VOLUME XIII

IOHANNIS
SCOTTI ERIVGENAE
PERIPHYSEON
(*De Diuisione Naturae*)

LIBER QVARTVS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ON THE OCCASION of the second Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies (Laon, 7–12 July 1975), Professor John J. O'Meara approached me about the possibility of completing the work which Inglis Patrick Sheldon-Williams (1908–1973) had begun, namely a critical edition of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* for *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*. I appreciated the confidence which Professor O'Meara had in my ability, but, at the same time, I was aware of the demands that such a huge undertaking would make. After some reflection I accepted Professor O'Meara's kind invitation, but with the understanding that I would not concern myself with Book III, already prepared by Sheldon-Williams, and that the task of translating the Latin text of Books IV and V into English would not be my responsibility (Professor O'Meara had already kindly offered to prepare the translation). The project to edit books IV and V of the *Periphyseon* was announced in *Speculum* LIII (1978), p. 212. It is my great pleasure, after many delays and much labour, to offer to scholars a Latin text with commentary of the fourth book of the *Periphyseon*.

My first duty is to thank those who have helped me, and, above all, to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC), which generously funded this project between the years 1986 and 1988, in particular by providing a grant which enabled me to appoint research assistants who could help me in the arduous task of collation. It is greatly to the credit of Canada, and of SSHRCC in particular, that public monies could be found to support research of this nature on Eriugena. I am deeply grateful.

Prior to the funding of the project by SSHRCC, I had already completed a substantial amount of work, by having identified the principal manuscripts, visited several times the libraries in which they are preserved (Avranches, Bamberg, Cambridge, Rheims, and Paris), produced a preliminary transcription of the most important of them, and, above all, worked out the principles on which the edition would be established. Accordingly, when I first applied to SSHRCC for support, the principles and methods of edition had already been determined.

In my original application I requested funds to support one research assistant. I had in mind, even then, the appointment of Dr Mark Zier, who had previously attended my seminars in Toronto on Eriugena, and who was exceptionally well qualified for the task. However, between the time of the application and the notification of the award, Dr Zier's personal circumstances had changed so that, whereas I had

anticipated having him as a full time research assistant, his changed circumstances enabled him to work half time only. In this situation I decided to offer a second, half time, appointment to someone who would make up for the hours which had previously been envisaged for Dr Zier (with the corollary, that the original full-time research assistantship would henceforth be divided between the two research assistants). Dr Lesley Smith accepted this second, part-time, position. Accordingly, it is my pleasure to acknowledge here the help I received from Dr Mark Zier and Dr Lesley Smith.

Under my supervision Dr Smith transcribed the text of *Periphyseon IV* from the following manuscripts: Cambridge, Trinity College O.5.20 (*M*), Bamberg, Staatliche Bibl. Phil. 2/2 (*J*), Paris, Bibl. nat. Lat. 12964 (*P*) and 12965 (*F*). Moreover, by using a concordance, Dr Smith was able to locate references for a great number of the passages which I had previously identified as biblical quotations. I thank Dr Smith warmly for this assistance.

Dr Zier transcribed the text of *Periphyseon IV* from Rheims, Bibl. mun. 875 (*R*), carefully distinguishing the Irish minuscule script of *i*¹ from the Caroline minuscule of the main scribes, and attempting wherever possible to recover the first version of *Periphyseon IV* beneath manuscript erasures. Dr Zier was also responsible for the installation of the software programme (Nota Bene III) which has been used to enter the Latin text with its various apparatuses. The enormous amount of work undertaken by Dr Zier in this respect is fittingly recorded on the title-page.

My work as editor has been first to check the transcriptions made by Dr Zier and Dr Smith against the manuscripts, and then – the editor's proper duty – to establish the Latin text of *Periphyseon IV* with its accompanying *apparatus criticus*. I have also been responsible for composing the *apparatus fontium*, though I should add that Dr Smith shared with Dr Zier the task of entering both apparatuses in the word processor. The accompanying Commentary was both composed and entered by me, but I should like to acknowledge the help given me by Dr Zier towards improving the English of several notes, and of Fr Joseph Wey CSB in revising the English of the whole.

Although it was my first duty to thank SSHRCC and the two research assistants whose services its funding secured, it would be unfair to omit mention of the many colleagues, former students, and friends who have generously contributed to the project: Guy H. Allard, Michael Idomir Allen, Werner Beierwaltes, Virginia Brown, Peter Drönke, Paul Edward Dutton, Louis Holtz, John Magee, Brigid O'Doherty, István Perczel, James Reilly, Audrey Stimpson, Brian Stock, Edward Synan, and Joseph Wey. Special mention must be made of two great scholars, now deceased, the late Bernhard Bischoff and Dom Maïeul Cappuyns,

O.S.B.(d. 1968). The former was always ready to answer my questions about the Carolingian manuscripts of the *Periphyseon*. The personal notes left by the latter have been helpful, particularly his personal copy of Floss's edition, enriched with a selection of variants. Like Traube, Cappuyns had dreamt of a 'genetisch-kritische Herausgabe' of the *Periphyseon*, that is, an edition which would clearly illustrate all the stages in the evolution of the text. In order to fulfil this dream, Dom Cappuyns took a copy of the Floss edition (PL cxxii), unbound the volume and pasted onto both sides of each page large pieces of paper. In these enlarged margins, he copied variants of some of the principal manuscripts, distinguishing them by different colours: red ink for Rheims 875 (*R*), green ink for Bamberg Phil. 2/1 (*B*) and Phil. 2/2 (*J*), and pencil for other manuscripts. Although I collated afresh all the manuscripts used in the present edition, the privilege of having at my disposal the working copy of so great an Eriugenian scholar as Dom Cappuyns has been a valuable stimulus throughout.

I am also greatly indebted to Professor Michael Lapidge, whose interest in my edition has been, from beginning to end, a precious encouragement. In addition to giving timely and judicious advice, he also contributed generously to the improvement of the text. Finally, I wish to thank Professors Máirtín Ó Murchú and Pádraig de Brún for bearing patiently with my long delays. I wish to express special thanks to Professor John J. O'Meara, author of the English translation, who not only entrusted me with this edition, but whose thoughtful suggestions were always valuable. In the end, however, complete responsibility for the edition, its accompanying apparatuses and Commentary, and above all for the errors contained in them, must rest with the editor himself.

Édouard Jauneau

ABBREVIATIONS

- Capp M. Cappuyns. 'Le *De imagine* de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Érigène', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965), 205–262.
- CCSG Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca, Turnhout.
- CCSL Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina, Turnhout.
- CCCM Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Mediaevalis, Turnhout.
- CNRS Centre national de la Recherche scientifique, Paris.
- Comment. in eu. Joh.* Jean Scot, *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*. Introduction, Texte critique, Traduction, Notes et Index de Édouard Jauneau, SC 180 (1972).
- CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna.
- Études érigéniennes* E. Jauneau, *Études érigéniennes* (Paris 1987).
- Floss *Johannis Scoti Opera quae supersunt omnia ad fidem italicorum, germanicorum, belgicorum, franco-gallicorum, britannicorum codicum partim primus edidit, partim recognouit Henricus Josephus Floss*, PL 122 (1853).
- Forbes *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni, Basilii Magni fratris, Quae Supersunt Omnia* in unum corpus collegit, ad fidem codd. mss. recensuit, latinis uersionibus quam accuratissimis instruxit et genuina a suppositiis discreuit Georgius H. Forbesius, Tomus Primus (Burntisland, 1855).
- Gale [Thomas Gale, ed.] *Joannis Scoti Erigenae De Diuisione Naturae Libri Quinque Diu Desiderati. Accedit Appendix ex Ambiguis S. Maximi Graece et Latine*, Oxonii, e Theatro Sheldoniano, anno MDCLXXXI.
- GCS Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte, Leipzig–Berlin.
- GNO *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, ed. W. Jaeger, H. Langerbeck, H. Dörrie, H. Hörner, Leiden.
- Jeau *Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugena latinam interpretationem nunc primum edidit Eduardus Jauneau*, CCSG 18 (1988).
- MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica.
- MGH, PLAC Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini.
- OED The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1989).
- PG J. P. Migne, ed. *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca*.
- PL J. P. Migne, ed. *Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina*.
- SC Sources Chrétiennes, Paris.
- Schenkl *Sancti Ambrosii Opera. Pars prima qua continentur libri Exameron, de paradiso, de Cain et Abel, de Noe, de Abraham, de Isaac, de bono mortis* recensuit Carolus Schenkl, CSEL 32,1 (1897), pp. 263–336.
- Steel *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium I (qu. I–LV) una cum latina interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Eriugena iuxta posita* ediderunt Carl Laga et Carlos Steel, CCSG 7 (1980).
- TU Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Leipzig.

INTRODUCTION

I. THE THEMES OF PERIPHYSEON IV

Whoever takes up Book IV of the *Periphyseon* for the first time cannot help being struck by the solemnity of the opening passage. It seems as though the author, returning to his work after an extended interruption, feels the need to reassure his readers. Eriugena makes a point of stating that this fourth book of his philosophical dialogue is indeed the continuation of the preceding ones. Although he gives the work a new title – *Physiologia*, or 'Discourse on Nature'¹ – his subject remains the same. The Nature to which he refers is that which lies beyond being: 'the uncreated creative Cause of all things which are and all things which are not, the sole principle, origin, and universal source of all' (741C). This uncreated Cause is altogether superessential (ὑπερούσιος, beyond being) in its nature and co-essential (ὁμοούσιος) in its three Persons. Eriugena then proceeds to an impassioned affirmation of Christian Trinitarian doctrine (742B–C) in the form of a citation from Epiphanius of Salamis (d. 403). This eloquent profession of faith in the mystery of the Holy Trinity is soon to be followed by a profession of faith in the mystery of the Incarnate Word (745A–746C), also borrowed from Epiphanius. A modern reader will probably see these quotations as mere digressions, digressions, however, which may suggest that Eriugena, fresh from his discovery of Epiphanius, could not refrain from quoting him even out of season. The ninth-century reader may well have had the same impression; after the second lengthy quotation from Epiphanius, the Disciple remarks, not, I think, without irony: 'This excursus, though it seems to wander far from our subject matter, is nevertheless useful for those who seek to understand Holy Scripture'.²

Between the two quotations from Epiphanius we find a brief synopsis (743B–C) of the two previous books of the *Periphyseon*. The purpose of this synopsis is to underscore the continuity of the work. In this, Eriugena follows the example he has set in Books II and III, which he also began with a summary of the preceding books (523D–525C; 619A–D). Careful to point out how Book IV builds on the earlier ones, Eriugena also hastens to show how it differs: its subject matter is far more difficult. The reader who has perused the first three books is like a mariner who has sailed as yet along the coast and must now

¹See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 1.

²'Transitus iste, quamuis longius proposito uideatur recessisse, utilis tamen est uolentibus sanctam scripturam intelligere' (*Periphyseon* IV, 746C).

face the high sea and its dangers. This sea is Holy Scripture, in the words of Maximus the Confessor, 'the boundless ocean of the sayings of the Spirit'.³ In Book IV, our author proposes to expound Genesis texts that bear on several very delicate subjects: man's creation, the earthly paradise, the forbidden fruit, the serpent, the temptation, the fall, etc. Here, the route is difficult in the extreme: there are so many bends and turns to negotiate, so many shoals and reefs lying in wait to bring to grief the exegete who would venture into dangerous waters (743C–744A). Nonetheless, the Irish seamen, Master and Pupil, are undeterred, and the Disciple exclaims: 'Let us set sail, then, and put out to sea.' Confident in God's clemency, which guides their bark, and in the gentle breath of the Holy Spirit, which fills the sail, the two mariners are sure of arriving safely at the port which they seek.

Their philosophical voyage had in fact begun in Book III (690C) with its commentary on the first verse of Genesis. Together, Books III and IV form a treatise on the six days of creation and call to mind the hexaemeral literature of the Fathers. Although Book IV continues exactly where Book III left off, with the commentary on the sixth day of creation (Gen. 1,24), the solemnity of its opening lines, as noted above, suggests a fresh departure. When Eriugena began Book IV, he thought that it would be the last and wrote: 'This fourth book begins by contemplating the work of the sixth day of creation and goes on to consider the return of all things into that Nature which neither creates nor is created; let it be the last' (*finem constituat*; 743C). It seems evident that when Eriugena wrote these lines, he did not plan to write a fifth book. In his mind, the *Periphyseon* would be articulated as four books, an ordering that matched the fourfold division of Nature.⁴ Curiously enough, a few lines after the remark stating that the fourth book would be the last (743C), we are told that owing to the difficulty of the subject, a full treatment will make a fifth book necessary. It is remarkable that the words announcing that a fifth book would extend the fourth (*suique prolixitate cogente in quintum librum porrectus*; 744A) are absent from Version II (represented by manuscripts *R*, *M*, and *H*). These words now appear only in Version IV (represented by manuscripts *F*, *J*, and *P*). Although they were probably introduced into Version III, we cannot be certain of this, since a manuscript witness of Version III survives for Books I, II, and III, but not for Books IV and V. It is impossible to say who was responsible for the addition, but this

³ τῷ ἀπείρῳ πελάγει τῶν λογίων τοῦ πνεύματος (Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, 'Introductio', ed. C. Laga and C. Steel, CCSG 7, p. 18,25 and p. 19,20–21).

⁴At the beginning of Book III (619D–620B) Eriugena said clearly that a logical sequence demanded (*consequentia...exigit*) that the first division of Nature be dealt with in the first book, the second in the second book, and the third in the third book.

much is clear: in Version III of Books I, II, and III, the added layer of references to a fifth book stems from the Irish hand known as *i*².⁵

Whoever introduced the expansion *suique prolixitate cogente in quintum librum porrectus* overlooked the need to adjust the immediate context. The preceding remark about the fourth book as the last remained untouched, and the inattentive revision resulted in a contradiction. Once he announced a fifth book (744A), the reviser should have deleted the statement that the fourth book would be the last (743C), but he did not.

The evidence suggests that after an interruption whose duration and circumstances are unknown, Eriugena returned to his work hoping to complete his exposition of the procession (or division) of Nature, and also to elucidate its return (or reunification) within the limits of a fourth and last book. Nevertheless, the immediate subject matter, the creation of man, led to such extended digressions and lengthy quotations that the author had to admit near the end of the present Book IV that four books would not suffice. The abundance of material required a fifth. Eriugena then turned back to the opening pages of Book IV, and he personally, or someone working under his direction, inserted the phrase: 'Because of its length, this fourth book will have to be extended to make a fifth.' It is noteworthy that the word *prolixitas* that appears in the 'initial' justification for a fifth book (744A) also figures in Eriugena's concluding explanation in Book IV (860A–B) of his failure to realize his plan as promised.

Considered together, the two passages suggest that the *Periphyseon* was conceived originally as a work in four books.⁶ This division of the text had the advantage of revealing by its very structure the fourfold division of Nature. The added fifth book may well be an 'accident' of the process of composition, but a revealing and fortunate one. On the one hand, Eriugena himself made it necessary; he always preferred meandering detours to shortcuts.⁷ On the other hand, the subject matter – the creation of man, in the first instance – warranted careful and lengthy consideration. By abandoning his original plan to include both the creation of man and the universal return in a single, final book, Eriugena quite rightly seized the opportunity to devote an entire book to each of these major themes.

Book IV of the *Periphyseon* is a treatise on man (*De homine*). It falls, as noted above, within the hexaemeral tradition of Biblical

⁵On the four versions of the *Periphyseon* and the Irish hands *i*¹ and *i*² at work in the manuscripts of Eriugena, see chapter II of this Introduction.

⁶Cf. G. Schimpf, *Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena im Rahmen des Wissenschaftsverständnisses seiner Zeit. Eine Einführung zu Periphyseon*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 23 (Münster, 1982), p. 215.

⁷É. Jeauneau, 'La prudence et la lenteur', in *Quatre thèmes érigéniens* (Montréal–Paris, 1978), pp. 79–87; repr. in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris, 1987), pp. 275–283.

commentaries whose focus was the first chapters of Genesis. Its principal sources are the works of Fathers devoted to this subject matter: notably, Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* (which Eriugena calls *Exameron*), Ambrose's *De paradiso*, and Gregory of Nyssa's *De hominis opificio*. Nevertheless, Eriugena's anthropology is not based solely on patristic authority. He has too much regard for human reason to discard its help in a domain of such importance. His use of dialectic is much in evidence throughout Book IV, and this 'Mother of the arts' is even herself at one point the object of a stirring encomium (749A).

As is well known, the dialogue of the *Periphyseon* is articulated by two Neoplatonic themes: that of procession (*processio*) and that of return (*reditus*).⁸ For Eriugena, procession corresponds to the 'division' of Nature; it represents movement from the one to the many, 'from that Nature which creates and is not created to that Nature which is created and also creates, and then to that Nature which is created and does not create'. Likewise, return corresponds to 'reunification'; it represents movement from the many to the one, 'from that Nature which is created and does not create to that Nature which neither creates nor is created'. In this twofold process of movement, man occupies a central, pivotal place. If, in the words of Étienne Gilson, the *Periphyseon* is a vast philosophical epic,⁹ the turning point of the work is to be found in Book IV. Such is the importance of this book.

It is not my purpose here to summarize the arguments of *Periphyseon* IV. Others have done it, and done it well.¹⁰ My aim is, rather, to invite the reader to take up the text, to follow the intricacies of Eriugena's thought. No second-hand account, however good, can be a substitute for this, and any summary would risk serving as an excuse to avoid the text. Yet, were I asked to condense the message of Book IV into a single formula, I should probably choose the phrase of Gregory of Nyssa quoted by Eriugena himself: 'Man, that noble thing and name, the image of God's nature'.¹¹ Perhaps, as he wrote these words, the bishop of Nyssa recalled the lines of Sophocles: 'Many wonders there are, and yet none is more wonderful than man.'¹² But whatever may have been the attraction of Greek

⁸É. Jauneau, 'The Neoplatonic Themes of *Processio* and *Reditus* in Eriugena', *Dionysius* 15 (1991), pp. 3–29.

⁹É. Gilson, *La philosophie au Moyen Age, des origines patristiques à la fin du XIVe siècle*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1947), p. 222.

¹⁰G. Schrimpf, *Das Werk des Johannes Scottus*, pp. 215–227; J. J. O'Meara, *Eriugena* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 121–135; W. Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leiden, 1991).

¹¹Ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μέγα καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὄνομα, τὸ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀπεικόνισμα (Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 21[20], PG 44, 200D–201A; ed. Cappuyns, p. 243,3; quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 821C).

¹²Πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδ' ἄνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει (Sophocles, *Antigone* 332–333).

culture – and we have good reason to think that it was strong for Gregory – the bishop of Nyssa was anxious to stress the superiority of Holy Scripture: 'Then God said: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness . . . So God created man, in the image of God he created him.' (Gen. 1,26–27)¹³. These verses of Genesis sound the leitmotif of the treatise of the Cappadocian Father which is known to us as *De hominis opificio*, and was known to Eriugena by the more evocative title, *De imagine*. The theme of man's grandeur, dignity and nobility cannot, however, mask the presence of its counterpart, the theme of his misery. The Bible teaches the greatness of man, while daily experience bears out his wretchedness. Yet with the help of Scripture, it is possible to reconcile doctrine and experience. The greatness of man is to have been created in God's image and to be destined to be the equal of angels. The misery of man is to have chosen through his own fault to be the equal of beasts. These are the key themes of Gregory's *De imagine*, and they pass undiminished into the *Periphyseon*. Remarkably, Eriugena understood the essence of Gregory's thought despite the numerous misunderstandings that mark his Latin translation of the Greek original. From Gregory he borrows the ideas that form the backbone of *Periphyseon* IV, but his borrowings are no servile imitation. He deftly combines them with other ideas and citations gleaned from Augustine, Ambrose and Origen. Above all, Eriugena remains a profoundly creative thinker in his own right, even when he seems to depend heavily on his sources. For him, an argument from authority does not in itself constitute a definitive argument: its validity must be tested and confirmed by reason: 'Authority proceeds from true reason, but reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not need to be confirmed by the assent of any authority. For it seems to me that true authority is nothing else but the truth that has been discovered by the power of reason and set down in writing by the Holy Fathers for the use of posterity'.¹⁴

Although Book IV of the *Periphyseon* has the appearance of a Biblical commentary, dialectic plays a privileged role in the exposition. This discipline, which Augustine had defined as *peritia disputandi*,¹⁵ and which Eriugena defines as *bene disputandi scientia*, concerns genera and species.¹⁶ Its principle lies in the order of nature and, ultimately,

¹³Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 17[16], PG 44, 177D–180A; ed. Cappuyns, p. 232, 5–21; quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 793C–794A.

¹⁴*Periphyseon* I, 513B–C; trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae* VII (Dublin, 1968), p. 199.

¹⁵Augustine, *Contra Cresconium* I,xiii,16 (PL 43, 455).

¹⁶*Periphyseon* V, 869A.

in God himself, the creator of all things. Eriugena finds a confirmation of this divine origin of dialectic in the Bible itself: 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul in its *genus*, cattle and reptiles and beasts of the field after their *species*' (Gen. 1,24). 'From this', he concludes, 'we can see that the art which concerns itself with the division of genera into species and the resolution of species into genera, and which is called dialectic, is not the product of human invention, but was implanted in nature by the Originator of all the arts'.¹⁷ Dialectic and scriptural authority are thus complementary. Scripture gives dialectic its authority; dialectic assists in the interpretation of Holy Scripture.

The dialectic at work in this treatise on man is likely, however, to disconcert the modern reader. Far from using logic to resolve the contradictions that are inherent in man's nature, Eriugena uses it to reveal and highlight them. He does so because he views these very contradictions as the clearest sign of man's greatness. Eriugena's anthropology seems to anticipate the paradoxes of Blaise Pascal: 'The greatness of man is so evident, that it is even proved by his wretchedness'.¹⁸ As we know, Pascal insists strongly upon the contradictions of human nature: 'Man is neither angel nor brute'.¹⁹ Not unlike Eriugena, however, he sees in these contradictions a sign of man's grandeur: 'What a chimera then is man, what a novelty, what a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy! . . . Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself . . . Learn that man infinitely transcends man'.²⁰ In fact, Eriugena has cast Book IV of the *Periphyseon* as a series of paradoxes, which he manipulates with virtuosity. We note here just a few of them.

First, the word 'man', taken as the subject of a proposition, can be followed by predicates which are contradictory. For instance, one can rightly say: 'man is an animal (*animal*)' and 'man is not an animal'; 'man is animal (*animalis*)' and 'man is not animal'; 'man is spiritual (*spiritualis*)' and 'man is not spiritual' (755A). Now, according to Aristotelian logic, if one of two contradictory propositions is true, the other is necessarily false. Yet in the present case, both propositions are true at one and the same time. This puzzles the Disciple, and, referring to the lessons in logic which he had previously received from his Master, he candidly asks: 'Why, then, did you say that two

¹⁷ *Periphyseon* IV, 748D–749A.

¹⁸ 'La grandeur de l'homme est si visible qu'elle se tire même de sa misère' (Pascal, *Pensée* 409, in *Oeuvres de Pascal*, ed. L. Brunschvicg, vol. XIII (Paris, 1904), p. 310).

¹⁹ 'L'homme n'est ni ange ni bête, et le malheur veut que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête' (Pascal, *Pensée* 358, ed. L. Brunschvicg, p. 271).

²⁰ 'Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! . . . Connaissez donc, superbe, quel paradoxe vous êtes à vous-même . . . Apprenez que l'homme passe infiniment l'homme.' (Pascal, *Pensée* 434, ed. L. Brunschvicg, pp. 346–347).

contradictory propositions concerning the same subject cannot be false or true at the same time, but if one is true, the other must be false, for instance, if someone were to say of one and the same subject: "this animal is a horse", "this animal is not a horse"? For now you seem to say that, in the case of man, contradictory propositions can be simultaneously true: "man is an animal", and "man is not an animal" . . . And why is this so only in the case of man, and not with any other animal, because with the latter it is absolutely true that it is an animal, and absolutely false that it is not an animal?²¹ The Master only needs to ask a simple question of his puzzled Disciple: 'Do you believe that any animal except man was created in the image of God?' The response is: 'Certainly not'.²² The reason why 'man' can take contradictory predicates is that man, and man alone, has been created in the image of God. Just as we can affirm as well as deny of God that He is goodness and truth, because God transcends every affirmation and every negation (757D–758A), we can also maintain that man at one and the same time is and is not animal, because, as Pascal says, 'man infinitely transcends man'. Here, Eriugena advances a remarkable paradox. The theme of man – that 'web of contradictions', at which philosophers have always marvelled – coalesces with the theme of man as God's image. Of all creation, man is the only creature formed in the image of God, and the only one about whom we can formulate contradictory judgements. Far from considering this a deficiency, Eriugena views it as an eminent mark of superiority, something like the created reflection of divine transcendence

To consider another paradox: man knows his existence, but does not know his essence. A succinct formulation of Eriugena's *cogito* is found in the Book IV of the *Periphyseon* (776B–C). In reading Eriugena one may be reminded of Descartes. The two *cogito*'s, however, differ markedly. Descartes discovers in his *cogito* not only that he exists, but also that he is a being whose very nature it is to think. His inquiry results in a twofold certitude: first, 'I know that I am', and second, 'I know what I am', to wit, a substance whose nature it is to think.²³ Eriugena's probing has a rather different outcome: first, 'I know that I am', and second, 'I do not know what I am'. In other words, through the Cartesian *cogito*, man may learn both his existence and his essence. Through Eriugena's *cogito*, man may learn his existence, while his essence remains inaccessible and unknowable.

²¹ *Periphyseon* IV, 757B–C. See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 51.

²² See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 52.

²³ 'je connû de la que j'estois une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, & qui, pour estre, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ny ne depend d'aucune chose materielle' (Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode*, Quatrieme Partie; *Oeuvres de Descartes publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery*, vol. VI (1956), p. 33, 3–7).

In this, man resembles God, for God is undefinable and unknowable. No one can answer the question: *Quid sit Deus?* No one, not even God himself, for were there an answer, it would imply that God is a 'something' (*quid*), that he can be circumscribed by a definition, and consequently, that he is not absolutely infinite.²⁴ Were man able to know his own nature perfectly, were he able to know not only that he is, but also what he is, he would be a less faithful image of his creator, the unknowable God. These are all views which Eriugena borrows from Gregory of Nyssa,²⁵ but which he expresses forcefully in his own right. He succeeds in demonstrating how an apparent weakness is in fact an advantage. If man is a mystery to himself, so be it. Therein lies his greatness, for to be undefinable is somehow to participate in the divine infinity.

Let us now consider a third paradox. On the level of elementary logic, man is but a species of the genus 'animal': he was created among the animals. Yet considered from a higher perspective, the situation is actually reversed. Rightly understood, the text of Genesis (1,14) teaches 'not that man was brought forth in the genus of the animals, but rather that every genus of animal was brought forth in him'.²⁶ In this too, man resembles God. Just as God contains in himself the primordial causes, so human nature contains in itself causally and primordially (*causaliter et primordialiter*) the concepts (*notiones, notitiae*) of all created realities.²⁷ It goes without saying that when Eriugena speaks of 'man' (*homo*), he means 'human being', not 'male'. Moreover, he means a human being brought to fullest perfection, that perfection which had been planned for man and would have been his, had he not sinned. Such perfection will be realized fully in the whole of mankind (*generaliter*) when, at the end of time, all things are restored to their primordial purity, although this has already been accomplished in one instance (*specialiter*) in the risen and ascended Christ: 'For in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible' (Col. 1,16).²⁸ Eriugena thus situates his anthropology within the framework of a Christology. But one would be wrong to think that this anthropology dissolves the individual into the universal, for the author of the *Periphyseon* also

²⁴See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 79.

²⁵See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 82.

²⁶*Periphyseon* IV, 774B. See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 91. For a fuller treatment of the question, see C. Steel, 'La création de l'univers dans l'homme selon Jean Scot Érigène', C. Wenin, ed., *L'homme et son univers au Moyen Âge*, vol. I (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986), pp. 205–210.

²⁷*Periphyseon* IV, 748C. See *Notes on Text and Translation*, nn. 20 and 24.

²⁸*Periphyseon* V, 913A–B. The text from Colossians is also cited by Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 194–197, and XXXVII, 91–93 (CCSG 18, pp. 27 and 183; PG 91, 1077D–1080A and 1308D). Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 641A–B; II, 537A–B.

dares to assert: 'One man – I say one single individual – is greater than the whole visible world'.²⁹

The division of human nature into two complementary sexes poses a problem which is dealt with at length in *Periphyseon* IV. Here too, Eriugena follows the example of Gregory of Nyssa for the manner in which he poses and attempts to solve this problem. His endeavour is not an idle one, because the distinction of the sexes is a division lying at the heart of human nature, and this division must be reconciled with the Biblical teaching that man has been created in God's image. God, however, is without division (*simplex*). How can his image be divided? The solution proposed by Eriugena, and Gregory of Nyssa, risks baffling the modern reader,³⁰ but it should not be passed over just because it is difficult. Once again, we find a paradox, a formulation which contradicts common opinion (*δόξα*) and challenges received ideas. Eriugena's protracted discussion of the division of the sexes culminates in a remarkable conclusion: 'Man (*homo*) is better than sex.'³¹ Nothing contradicts more clearly than this axiom the assumptions that underlie most modern debate on this subject.

As we have noted, Eriugena's treatise takes the form of a commentary on the first chapters of Genesis. His exegesis is chiefly allegorical. There is no place in it for history before the fall: it would be idle to attempt to situate the first chapter of Genesis within the context of a universal chronology. Likewise, the earthly paradise is not a place, and it would be pointless to attempt to place it on a map. This paradise is none other than human nature itself in its primordial integrity and purity. Adam represents the mind; Eve, corporeal sense; the serpent, carnal delight. To develop this extreme allegorical exegesis and to provide for its defence, Eriugena naturally seeks allies; he turns to those Fathers of the Church who commented on Genesis before him.³² Augustine was prominent among them, and was in fact the most eminent figure in the Latin tradition. Eriugena quotes abundantly from his *De Genesi ad litteram*. Yet despite his citations and genuine respect for Augustine, Eriugena distanced himself from the African bishop's conception of the earthly paradise, which had been expressed in the following terms: 'I am not unaware

²⁹'Verissima quippe ratio incunctanter nos docet unum hominem, et singulariter unum, maiorem esse uniuerso mundo uisibili, non mole partium, sed armoniae rationabilis naturae dignitate' (784C).

³⁰For a fuller treatment of the question, see É. Jeuneau, 'La division des sexes chez Grégoire de Nysse et chez Jean Scot Érigène', in *Eriugena, Studien zu seinen Quellen*, Vorträge des III. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums, Freiburg im Breisgau, 27.–30. August 1979, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1980), pp. 33–54; repr. in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris, 1987), pp. 343–364.

³¹'Homo melior est quam sexus' (*Periphyseon* II, 534A). 'Inferior est sexus homine' (*Periphyseon* V, 893D).

³²G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988).

that concerning paradise much has been written by many, but their opinions fall more or less into three categories: of which one is of those who hold that paradise is only to be understood in a corporeal sense; the second, of those who say it is only spiritual; the third, of those who believe that it is both, that is to say, now corporeal, now spiritual. And to be brief, I confess that it is the third opinion that I favour.³³ Augustine's middle way dissatisfied Eriugena. To be sure, he uses many of Augustine's ideas, agreeing, for instance, with his view of the tree of life as a symbol of Christ.³⁴ Nevertheless, he finds no need that the spiritual paradise – the only one of interest to him – should depend upon a concrete paradise that is supposed to have existed in time and in space. If there is no need for an earthly paradise existing in time and in space, why not dispense with it? Thus, Eriugena skirts a component of Augustine's teaching, but he does so with the greatest circumspection. He makes no frontal attack on the bishop's position, but attempts rather to draw it closer to his own.³⁵ In the end, however, he is still obliged to admit that Augustine favours the existence of a material as well as a spiritual paradise,³⁶ an unacceptable thesis. To complete his philosophical odyssey, he must therefore seek other mentors: Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor, and, above all, Ambrose of Milan. The *De imagine* of Gregory of Nyssa supplies arguments used to support the thesis that the trees of paradise and paradise itself are to be understood in a spiritual sense,³⁷ and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* of Maximus the Confessor provide an allegorical explanation of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.³⁸ Yet Eriugena's most precious ally is Ambrose. Because Eriugena senses that the allegories of the Greek Fathers may puzzle his Latin readers, he turns to Ambrose as a familiar ally and advocate, a Latin Father whose thinking closely follows Greek sources and models.³⁹ Eriugena is, in fact, mistaken about the sources of Ambrose's *De paradiso*, but his error is a fairly minor one: he believes that Ambrose drew his allegorical interpretation of paradise from Origen,⁴⁰ but according to modern scholarship,

³³*De Genesi ad litteram* VIII,1 (CSEL 28,1, p. 229; PL 34, 371), quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 814B.

³⁴*Periphyseon* IV, 823B. See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 251.

³⁵See J. J. O'Meara, 'Magnorum Virorum Quendam Consensum Velimus Machinari' (804D). Eriugena's Use of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* in the *Periphyseon*', in *Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen*, Vorträge des III. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums. Freiburg im Breisgau, 27.–30. August 1979, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1980), pp. 105–116.

³⁶*Periphyseon* IV, 844A.

³⁷*Periphyseon* IV, 821D–822A.

³⁸*Periphyseon* IV, 842B–843A.

³⁹*Periphyseon* IV, 816D–817A.

⁴⁰*Periphyseon* IV, 815C.

Ambrose followed Philo Judaeus.⁴¹ Thus, while Eriugena's theory on the division of the sexes comes from Cappadocia via Gregory of Nyssa, his highly allegorical exegesis of creation in *Periphyseon* IV stems from Alexandria via Ambrose. However, Origen does appear in Book IV, in as much as his allegorical exegesis of the 'coats of skin' (Gen. 3,21) is contained in a citation taken from Epiphanius of Salamis, and Eriugena prefers this allegorical exegesis of Origen to the literalist exposition of Epiphanius himself.⁴² Nevertheless, Origen is never directly cited in Book IV. We must await *Periphyseon* V to find lengthy quotations from the writer whom Eriugena calls 'that supreme commentator of Scripture'.⁴³

Just as Book IV of the *Periphyseon* is remarkable for the boldness of its Biblical exegesis, the subtlety of its dialectic, and the originality and profundity of its philosophical speculations, so too is it remarkable for its literary excellence. The dialogue between Master (*Nutritor*) and Disciple (*Alumnus*) is witty, closely knit, and vigorous. Eriugena even presents a sub-dialogue, a sort of dramatic episode in which the Master, as if conducting a prosecution, questions Adam about his sin, while Adam mounts a defense based on the Epistle to the Romans and patristic authorities.⁴⁴ This conscious anachronism seems ironical in intent. Yet the prize for irony goes to God himself. According to Eriugena, it was irony that prompted God to say: 'It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him' (Gen. 2,18). The division of the sexes occurred so that man would not be alone. Thus, literally understood, the Genesis text – 'It is not good that the man should be alone' – contradicts the axiom we noted above, that is to say, that man is better than sex. The words of Scripture (Gen. 2,18) are not, then, to be understood literally. Rather, we must admit that in uttering them, God made use of that figure of speech which the grammarians call irony: *Diuina ironia!* In imitation of this divine example, Eriugena takes the opportunity to display his own brand of irony in many passages of *Periphyseon*.⁴⁵

Book IV of the *Periphyseon* also includes some striking images which remain graven in the reader's memory long after the book has been put aside. The most outstanding are surely those which concern Scripture and its exegesis according to the spiritual sense. Holy Writ is likened to a dangerous sea for the exegete-mariner,⁴⁶ and sometimes

⁴¹See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 223.

⁴²*Periphyseon* IV, 818B–D.

⁴³*Periphyseon* IV, 818B.

⁴⁴*Periphyseon* IV, 845B–846D.

⁴⁵É. Jeauneau, 'Jean Scot et l'ironie', in *Jean Scot écrivain*, ed. G. H. Allard (Montréal–Paris, 1986), pp. 13–27; repr. in *Études ériugeniennes* (Paris, 1987), pp. 323–337.

⁴⁶See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 10.

to a thankless landscape to be cultivated.⁴⁷ Eriugena has not invented these metaphors, but in taking them from the Fathers, he has put them to exceptionally good use. While the images of the seaman on turbulent water and of the worker on a thankless plot express the formidable demands of scriptural exegesis, another symbol, that of the iridescent fan of the peacock, emphasizes the esthetic satisfaction of contemplating the Bible's spiritual meanings.⁴⁸ This latter comparison fascinated the Argentinian author, Jorge Luis Borges, who recognized both its originality and its power.⁴⁹ Eriugena was indeed alive to the beauty of forms. We sense this in his description of a splendid vase 'made of pure gold and set with most precious jewels, endowed with the loveliest form'.⁵⁰ This Irishman was not merely a dialectician, as quick to elaborate arguments as he was slow to conclude them. He was a connoisseur, and could indeed appreciate the beautiful objects which were to be found at the court of Charles the Bald.⁵¹ When he describes Nature as that 'splendid fountain from which streams gush forth and flow into a variety of forms',⁵² the graceful miniatures depicting the fountain of life in Carolingian Gospelbooks come readily to mind.⁵³

Earlier in the present chapter, I have said that it was not my purpose here to summarize the doctrine of *Periphyseon* IV, nor is it my purpose to catalogue its literary merits. To conclude my remarks with the words of Eriugena himself, I would simply observe that 'this book contains many other things which the attentive reader will discover on his own'.⁵⁴

⁴⁷See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 11.

⁴⁸See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 27.

⁴⁹'Conviene recordar aquí a Escoto Erigena, que dijo que la Escritura es un texto que encierra infinitos sentidos y que puede ser comparado con el plumaje tornasolado del pavo real' (J. L. Borges, *Siete noches* (Mexico-Madrid-Buenos Aires, 1980), p. 10; see also p. 101). Much before the year 1980, however, in a work entitled *Discusión*, the prologue of which is dated Buenos Aires 1932, Borges had mentioned Eriugena's peacock: 'Origenes atribuyó tres sentidos a las palabras de la Escritura . . .; Juan Escoto Erigena, un infinito numero de sentidos, como los tornasoles del plumaje del pavo real' (J. L. Borges, *Obras completas. Discusión* (Buenos Aires, 1957) [repr. 1961, 1964], p. 59, n. 2). I am indebted for this reference to Professors Leonardo Tarán and John Magee, whom I warmly thank.

⁵⁰*Periphyseon* IV, 828B.

⁵¹See *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 258, and P. E. Dutton, 'Evidence that Dubthach's Priscian Codex Once Belonged to Eriugena', in H. J. Westra, ed., *From Athens to Chartres* (Leiden, 1992), pp. 20-25.

⁵²*Periphyseon* IV, 750A.

⁵³P. A. Underwood, 'The Fountain of Life in Manuscripts of the Gospels', in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 5 (1950), pp. 41-138.

⁵⁴... et multa alia quae studiosus praesentis operis lector inueniet' (Eriugena, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, Epistula ad Karolum regem 56-57; CCSG 18, p. 4).

II. THE MANUSCRIPTS

The present edition of the fourth book of the *Periphyseon* is based on the following manuscripts:

- F = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Latin 12965 (s. ix⁴)
- H = Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale, 230 (s. xii³)
- J = Bamberg, Staatliche Bibliothek, Phil. 2/2 (s. ix⁴)
- M = Cambridge, Trinity College, O.5.20 (s. xii²)
- P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Latin 12964 (s. ix⁴)
- R = Rheims, Bibliothèque municipale, 875 (s. ix³)

For the two last manuscripts, I have retained the sigla *P* and *R* used by Sheldon-Williams. For the manuscripts Paris, Lat. 12965 and Bamberg, Phil. 2/2, I have determined my own sigla, since neither of these manuscripts was used by Sheldon-Williams. The siglum *F* follows the usage of Heinrich Joseph Floss in his 1853 edition,⁵⁵ while *J* is entirely my own. For the Avranches manuscript, the simple letter *A* might seem to be natural and appropriate, and is in fact the siglum assigned by Sheldon-Williams in his Introduction to *Periphyseon* III,⁵⁶ even though his edition itself refers to the manuscript as *Avr.* Nevertheless, it is proper to avoid the siglum *A* because Floss used this letter to designate Thomas Gale's 1681 edition of the *Periphyseon*, which was itself based on the Cambridge manuscript.⁵⁷ Sheldon-Williams's inconsistent treatment of sigla also extended to the Cambridge manuscript, which is cited as *Cam* in his edition of *Periphyseon* III, but as *T* in his Introduction. The modern history of both the Avranches and the Cambridge manuscripts dictated the use of wholly new sigla. At my suggestion, T. A. M. Bishop agreed to assign the letter *H* to the Avranches manuscript.⁵⁸ He has also agreed that the siglum *M* should be used for the Cambridge manuscript in recognition of the fact that it was produced at Malmesbury under the

⁵⁵The ms. Paris, Lat. 12965 is listed by Floss as *Codex ms. S. Germani 830*: PL 122, 439-440.

⁵⁶*Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon (De Diuisione Naturae) Liber Tertius*, edited by I. P. Sheldon-Williams with the Collaboration of Ludwig Bieler, *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae*, XI (Dublin, 1981), p. 23.

⁵⁷PL 122, 439-440.

⁵⁸T. A. M. Bishop, 'Periphyseon: An Episode in the Tradition', in *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 7 (1980), 411-426; Id., 'Periphyseon: The Descent of the Uncompleted Copy', in D. Whitelock, R. McKitterick and D. Dumville, eds., *Ireland in Early Mediaeval Europe: Studies in Memory of Kathleen Hughes* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 281-304.

supervision, and with the scribal participation (pp. 46–56) of William of Malmesbury (d. 1143).⁵⁹

All of the above manuscripts of *Periphyseon* IV have been summarily described by Sheldon-Williams in the Introduction to his edition of Book I.⁶⁰ It is unnecessary to repeat this information here. However, several new manuscripts have come to light since the publication of Book I. Intensive study of the already-known witnesses has also vastly improved our understanding of the manuscript tradition. It is appropriate to summarize the advances made in both these areas.

A. Manuscripts of the *Periphyseon* recently discovered

None of the manuscripts which have recently come to light contains the complete text of the five books of the *Periphyseon*, but I think it useful to mention them here:

1. *Periphyseon* I appears in the twelfth-century manuscript Admont (Austria), Stiftsbibliothek 678: *Sepe michi cogitanti diligentiusque . . .* (f. 1r) . . . *fige limitem libri. Sat enim est in eo complexum* (f. 62r). The work is titled: *Dialogus de sancta trinitate* (f. 1r). Peter Classen identified the unascribed *Dialogus* as the first book of Eriugena's *Periphyseon*.⁶¹ The text is that of the last version, as represented by manuscript *P*.
2. An eleventh-century piece of parchment associated with a Clairvaux manuscript (Troyes, Bibl. mun. 2019) contains a fragment of *Periphyseon* I, 495B–499B: *adiuncta corpus efficit perfectum . . . perspicio nam et ex aliorum* (ed. Sheldon-Williams pp. 156,13–164,25). The text is that of the last version, as represented by manuscript *P*. The fragment now bears the shelfmark Troyes, Bibl. mun. 3311. It was discovered and published by André Vernet.⁶²
3. The twelfth-century manuscript Bruxelles, Bibliothèque royale 11080–81 (Van den Gheyn 1159), ff. 4–7, contains three extracts from *Periphyseon* III, formerly misidentified as text

⁵⁹Guillaume de Malmesbury, premier éditeur anglais du *Periphyseon*, in 'Sapientiae doctrina'. *Mélanges de théologie et de littérature médiévales offerts à Dom Hildebrand Bascour O.S.B.* (Louvain, 1980), pp. 148–179 (repr. *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 490–521).

⁶⁰*Johannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon (De diuisione Naturae) Liber Primus*, edited by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, with the Collaboration of Ludwig Bieler, *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae VII* (Dublin, 1968), pp. 10–26. The reprint (Dublin, 1978) has not added new information.

⁶¹Peter Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg. Eine Biographie mit einem Anhang über die Quellen, ihre Handschriftliche Überlieferung und ihre Chronologie* (Wiesbaden, 1960), p. 434.

⁶²A. Vernet, 'Fragment d'un manuscrit du *Periphyseon* de Jean Scot (XIe siècle)', in *Jean Scot Erigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, ed. R. Roques (Paris, 1977), pp. 101–107; repr. in A. Vernet, *Études médiévales* (Paris, 1981), pp. 129–135 and p. 659.

from Calcidius' Commentary on the *Timaeus*.⁶³ André Vernet identified them before World War II, but only reported them in 1975 in a paper delivered at Laon.⁶⁴ They preserve text from *Periphyseon* III, 723B–724B; 727D–731C; and 732B–734B: *diuina auctoritas rationes rerum . . . quod solus Plato legitur fecisse; sunt qui dicunt elementa . . . qui utrique extra se sunt; sed redeamus ad . . . recta ratione cognoscitur* (ed. Sheldon-Williams, pp. 262,26–264,26; 274,7–282,15; 284,6–288,11).

4. Fragments containing passages from *Periphyseon* III and IV have been discovered on two leaves (s. xi/xii) formerly used in the binding of a printed book: Soest (Germany), Stadtarchiv und Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, 2 Y 2.16 (*Canones concilii prouincialis Coloniensis*, Cologne, 1538). The folios are now kept separately as Soest, Stadtbibl. Fragment 34. They measure 21.5 × 14 cm, written 32 lines per page.⁶⁵ The first folio contains *Periphyseon* III, 736C–739D: *posse affirmant . . . multa memoria* (ed. Sheldon-Williams, pp. 294,3–300,23). The second folio contains *Periphyseon* IV, 747A–749C: *terra non sit . . . in penna pauo-* (below, pp. 12,17–18,18). The text is that of the second version, represented by manuscripts *HRM*. These fragments were kindly drawn to my attention by François Dolbeau.⁶⁶

The history of the *Periphyseon* has also been enriched by the discovery of two entries in monastic library catalogues that escaped the notice of Dom Cappuyns:⁶⁷

1. A Lobbes catalogue (s. xi/xii) includes: [no. 111] *Liber peryphison Vol. I*.⁶⁸
2. A seventeenth-century library inventory from the priory of Souvigny (west of Moulins) includes the following entry: *H. Sermones 26 S. Augustini de diuersis. Item de Musica, mutilum opus cuius initium desideratur. Item Phisica authoris incerti ubi*

⁶³J. Van den Gheyn, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque royale de Belgique*, vol. II (Bruxelles, 1902), p. 182: *Chalcidius in Timaeum Platonis*.

⁶⁴A. Vernet, 'Fragment d'un manuscrit du *Periphyseon* de Jean Scot (XIe siècle)', in *Jean Scot Erigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, ed. R. Roques, p. 104; repr. in A. Vernet, *Études médiévales*, p. 132.

⁶⁵B. Michael, *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Wissenschaftlichen Stadtbibliothek Soest* (Wiesbaden, 1990), p. 250. I wish to thank the Director of the Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek of Soest, who kindly provided me with photographs of Fragment 34.

⁶⁶Letter of Professor François Dolbeau of April 15, 1991.

⁶⁷M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain–Paris, 1933), pp. 183–188.

⁶⁸F. Dolbeau, 'Un nouveau catalogue des manuscrits de Lobbes aux XI^e et XII^e siècles', in *Recherches augustinienes* 13 (1978), p. 22; 14 (1979), p. 200.

multa inserta graeca uocabula. Incipit: 'Saepe mihi cogitanti diligentiusque quantum uires suppetunt inquirenti' (Ms. Paris, Bibl. nat. Lat. 13071, ff. 135–137v).⁶⁹

No less significant for a more accurate picture of the influence exerted by the *Periphyseon* is the evidence of medieval anthologies (or *florilegia*) that contain extracts of Eriugena's masterpiece. Sheldon-Williams singled out one of these *florilegia* in 1968.⁷⁰ Gérard Mathon had earlier discovered this text and published it; it is found in a late ninth-century manuscript, Valenciennes, Bibl. mun. 167.⁷¹ More recently a second *florilegium* has been discovered by John Marenbon in an early tenth-century manuscript, Paris, Bibl. nat., Lat. 13953.⁷² These discoveries suggest that 'the influence of John Scottus's masterpiece, the *Periphyseon*, was far more pronounced in the years immediately following its composition than was once believed'.⁷³

B. A better understanding of the manuscript tradition

More important, perhaps, from the point of view of an editor of the *Periphyseon*, is the remarkable progress made in our knowledge of the Eriugenan autographs, progress for which we are chiefly indebted to the late T. A. M. Bishop.⁷⁴ Bishop's has been the most important contribution to the subject since the work of Ludwig Traube and Edward Kennard Rand. In 1906, Traube was the first to draw the scholarly attention to the autographs of Eriugena. He recognized the importance of a variety of additions, corrections, subtitles, etc., written in Irish script in several manuscripts of Eriugena's works, especially the manuscript Rheims, Bibl. mun. 875. He was quick to conclude that all of them had been written by Eriugena himself. In his enthusiasm, he went so far as to exclaim: 'Therefore we know the hand of John from the manuscripts of his works . . . I think that what makes this hand so dear and clear to me is not simply the joy of having made the discovery; it is as if I were seeing it before me, like the hand of Erasmus

⁶⁹This catalogue has been edited by W. Cahn in *Bulletin de la société d'émulation du Bourbonnais* 53 (1966), pp. 98–103. Father Raymond Etaix kindly drew my attention to this entry.

⁷⁰*Johannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber primus . . .*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968), p. 14 (the manuscript is wrongly cited as 'Valenciennes 169').

⁷¹G. Mathon, 'Un florilège érigénien à l'abbaye de Saint-Amand au temps d'Hucbald', in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 20 (1953), pp. 302–311.

⁷²J. Marenbon, 'A Florilegium from the *Periphyseon*', in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980), pp. 271–277; Id., *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 171–172. Dr Marenbon discovered this *florilegium* on February 17, 1977.

⁷³J. Marenbon, 'A Florilegium from the *Periphyseon*', p. 271.

⁷⁴T. A. M. Bishop, 'Autographa of John the Scot', in *Jean Scot et l'histoire de la philosophie*, cit., pp. 89–94.

which, in his portrait by Holbein, writes the Commentary on Mark's Gospel'.⁷⁵ Not long after writing these words Traube died on 19 May 1907.⁷⁶ His study of Eriugena's autographs would have remained in his files and perhaps been lost, had not one of his students, E. K. Rand, undertaken to publish it.⁷⁷ In this study, however, Traube failed to notice that the various additions, corrections, subtitles, etc., which he had observed in the manuscripts of Eriugena's works, were attributable, not to one, but to two clearly distinct Irish hands. No doubt the great palaeographer would have reached this conclusion himself, had he not been overtaken by death. A few years later, it was Rand who first noticed the difference. He called these two hands *i*¹ and *i*², and went on to propose that neither was the hand of Eriugena.⁷⁸

If Rand was correct in distinguishing two Irish hands – and he was – four hypotheses are theoretically possible:

Hypothesis 1: neither *i*¹ nor *i*² is Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis 2: both *i*¹ and *i*² are Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis 3: *i*² is Eriugena's hand.

Hypothesis 4: *i*¹ is Eriugena's hand.

The first hypothesis, as we have said, was proposed by Rand in 1920. The second hypothesis was held by Sheldon-Williams in his edition of *Periphyseon* I.⁷⁹ The third hypothesis was once favoured by the late Bernhard Bischoff and for a time held by myself.⁸⁰ The fourth hypothesis is that which T. A. M. Bishop concluded to be the most likely of all.⁸¹ Of course, a fifth position is possible, that which could

⁷⁵'Also wir kennen die Hand des Johannes aus den Codices seiner Werke . . . Ich glaube, es ist nicht nur die Freude des Entdeckers, die mir diese Hand lieb und deutlich macht, als sähe ich sie vor mir, wie die des Erasmus auf dem Bilde Holbeins, die an der Paraphrase des Markus schreibt' (L. Traube, [Introduction to] E. K. Rand, *Johannes Scottus*, in *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters* I,2 (Munich, 1906), p. ix).

⁷⁶L. Traube, *Rückblick auf meine Lehrthätigkeit*, ed. G. Silagi (Munich, 1988).

⁷⁷L. Traube, *Palaeographische Forschungen*, V. *Autographa des Johannes Scottus*, ed. Edward Kennard Rand, *Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse* 26, I (Munich, 1912).

⁷⁸E. K. Rand, 'The Supposed Autographa of John the Scot', in *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 5 (1918–1923), no. 8 (13 October 1920), pp. 135–141 (with 11 plates).

⁷⁹'The second (argument against Traube's theory) assumes that Eriugena invariably wrote in the same hand, but this need not have been the case' (*Johannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber primus*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968), p. 8).

⁸⁰Jean Scot, *Commentaire sur l'évangile de Jean*, Sources chrétiennes, vol. 180 (Paris 1972), pp. 75–77.

⁸¹'On the evidence so far reviewed – the review is far from complete – *i*¹ seems to be identifiable as the autograph of John the Scot' (T. A. M. Bishop, 'Autographa of John the Scot', p. 94).

recommend itself from Newton's dictum: 'Hypotheses non fingo'.⁸² As an editor of *Periphyseon* IV, I think it wise to hold this position, at least temporarily, reserving for a more specific study a discussion of the aforesaid hypotheses.⁸³ However, a few points must be considered as firmly established. First, the distinction between the two Irish hands *i*¹ and *i*² is indisputable. Consequently, the second hypothesis is untenable, for no competent palaeographer would admit that the same person wrote in two different ways, at one time as *i*¹, at another as *i*². On the other hand, palaeographers generally agree that the first hypothesis is not as certain as Rand once thought. Finally, it should be noted that Bernhard Bischoff, after defending the third hypothesis for a time, finally rallied to the fourth, namely that of T. A. M. Bishop.⁸⁴

A further and important aspect of Bishop's contribution has been to clarify the stemmatic relationships between the ninth-century manuscript of Rheims (*R*) and two twelfth-century manuscripts which contain the second version of the *Periphyseon*, namely Cambridge, Trinity College O.5.20 (*M*) and Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale 230 (*H*). The collation I have made of the various manuscripts on which the present edition is based has convinced me that Bishop's views are right. In order to understand this point, it may be helpful to recall that the *Periphyseon* has come down to us in various forms. What are we to call these forms? Neither 'versions' nor 'recensions' corresponds exactly to what we find in the manuscripts, because the text of the *Periphyseon* was frequently reworked either by Eriugena himself or by his 'secretaries', and it is impossible to assign a date to each of these various revisions. To give but one example, on folio 285v of *R*, a long note which begins in the top margin and continues down the left margin, is made up of four layers [768A]. Layer I (*Nec ueeor eos . . . circa substantiam*) and Layer III (*ibi siquidem simplex . . . partium superans*) are written in Caroline minuscule by two different scribes. Layer II (*ex his quae per generationem . . . nihil horum est*) and Layer IV (*dum de ea . . . negat quid esse*) were written by *i*¹. These different layers, each of which completes the idea of the previous one and does not necessarily require further explanation, were added

⁸²Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica: De Mundi Systemate Liber Tertius, Scholium Generale*, 530,14 [*The Third Edition (1726) . . . Assembled and Edited by Alexandre Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen*] (Cambridge, MA, 1972), p. 754.

⁸³A study of Eriugena's autographs, prepared by Édouard Jauneau and Paul Dutton, will appear in the series *Autographa Medii Aevi* sponsored by the Fondazione Ezio Franceschini and published in Turnhout by Brepols.

⁸⁴See Bernhard Bischoff's remarks in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, ed. R. Roques, p. 94.

successively.⁸⁵ If one were to envisage *i*¹ and the Caroline scribes responsible for these four layers as working at the same time, on the same day, and at the very same hour, the phenomenon would be inexplicable. In simple fact, folio 285v of *R* is like a canyon on whose wall distinct strata of composition appear, and what these strata reveal is that Eriugena returned to the revision of his work in repeated onslaughts. How many onslaughts? It is difficult to say. And because it is difficult, or more precisely, impossible to say, it is practical to distinguish roughly four 'stages', as Sheldon-Williams has done. In this, I follow my predecessor, although my four versions do not coincide with his four stages, which are:

Stage I. 'An essay in dialectic, perhaps abandoned before completion'.⁸⁶

Stage II. *Periphyseon* A (Manuscript *R*)

Stage III. *Periphyseon* B (Manuscript *B*)

Stage IV. *Periphyseon* C (Manuscript *P*)

Since no manuscript of an 'Essay in dialectic' has survived, an editor cannot make practical use of such a supposition. On the other hand, it is important to stress the fact that manuscript *R* contains at least two versions. Consequently, it seems sensible to follow T. A. M. Bishop,⁸⁷ and to distinguish the four following versions:

Version I. *Versio Rhemensis ante correctionem*

Version II. *Versio Rhemensis post correctionem*

Version III. *Versio Bambergensis*

Version IV. *Versio Parisiensis*

Version I is represented by the original text contained in the manuscript Rheims, Bibliothèque municipale 875 (*R*), before enlargements and corrections were added either by *i*¹ or by *i*² or by Caroline scribes.

Version II is represented by the manuscript Rheims, Bibliothèque municipale 875 (*R*), including the aforesaid enlargements and

⁸⁵*Periphyseon* IV, 768BC (below, p. 64,10–20). See M. Zier, 'The Shape of the Critical Edition of *Periphyseon* IV', in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo. L'organizzazione del sapere in età carolingia, Atti del XXIV Convegno storico internazionale, Todi 11–14 ottobre 1987*, ed. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), pp.495–497 [487–498].

⁸⁶*Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber primus*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968), pp. 5–6.

⁸⁷T. A. M. Bishop, 'Periphyseon: The Descent of the Uncompleted Copy', in D. Whitelock, R. McKitterick and D. Dumville, eds., *Ireland in Early Mediaeval Europe*, pp. 286–289.

corrections, and by the original text of the manuscript Bamberg, Phil. 2/1 (*B*), before additions and corrections were entered by i^2 . Version II is also to be found in the following manuscripts: Avranches, Bibliothèque municipale 230 (*H*); Cambridge, Trinity College 0.5.20 (*M*, pp. 57–256 only); and Soest, Stadtbibliothek, Fragment 34. Another witness of Version II is the *Clavis Physicae* of Honorius Augustodunensis.⁸⁸

Version III is represented by the manuscript Bamberg, Phil. 2/1 (*B*), including the additions and corrections entered by i^2 .

Version IV is represented by the manuscripts Paris, Lat. 12964 (*P*) and 12965 (*F*) and by Bamberg, Phil. 2/2 (*J*).⁸⁹ Version IV is also found in several manuscripts containing either the first book of the *Periphyseon* only, or the first book together with part of the second (as far as 568B; ed. Sheldon-Williams, p. 96,11), such as: Admont 678; Bern, Burgerbibliothek 469; Cambridge, Trinity College 0.5.20, pp. 1–56 only; Escorial P III 4; London, British Library, Add. 11035; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Lat. 1764. Version IV incorporates all the changes of the previous versions, together with certain corrections and additions which may or may not be authentic.⁹⁰

This detailed information is needed if one is to understand what can be expected from the manuscripts available for an edition of the fourth book of the *Periphyseon*. First of all, it should be noted that there is no manuscript containing this book in Version III, since the sole witness for this version, namely MS Phil. 2/1 of the Staatliche Bibliothek of Bamberg (*B*), contains only *Periphyseon* I–III. Version IV is represented by three manuscripts, *F*, *J*, and *P*. Version I and Version II are also represented by three manuscripts, *H*, *M*, and *R*, the most important of which is *R*, a working copy contemporaneous with the author. In this important manuscript, however, the text of Book IV is incomplete: it breaks off at 855D (below, p. 264,10). Although relatively late (twelfth-century), manuscripts *M* and *H* are valuable; they are the only witnesses for the end of Book IV (855D–860C) and for the whole of Book V in Version II. The manuscript Cambridge, Trinity College O.5.20 (*M*), gives us two texts: that of Version IV for Books I and II, as far as 568B (pp. 1–56), and that of Version II, for Books II (568B–620A), III, IV, and V (pp. 57–256). Manuscript *H* (Avranches, Bibl.

⁸⁸Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis Physicae*, ed. Paolo Lucentini (Rome, 1974), pp. xxxii–xlili.

⁸⁹Although *J* (Bamberg, Phil. 2/2) shares physical similarities and a long common history with *B* (Bamberg, Phil. 2/1), which contains *Periphyseon* I–III, the manuscripts are witnesses to two different textual versions: *B* transmits Version III, and *J* Version IV.

⁹⁰I share entirely the opinion of Sheldon-Williams on this point: 'There are also a number of interpolations in the P-text, none of which is demonstrably authentic, and some of which are plainly unacceptable' (*Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber primus*, p. 6).

mun. 230) reproduces that portion of *M* which contains the second version of the *Periphyseon*. Written in the second half of the twelfth-century, *H* is noticeably later and unquestionably less accurate than *M*. For instance, in *Periphyseon* IV, 784A (below, p. 102,6), we find in *M* above the rare word *specilla* a suggestion for an alternative reading: *uel ulo*. An alert scribe would have understood that the suggested alternative reading for *specilla* should be *speculo*. Such was not the case for the copyist of *H* (or for the copyist of the exemplar copied by *H*), who wrote: *specillulo*. Similarly in 849D (below, p. 250,17) we find in *M* above the adjective *amplexarum* a suggestion for an alternative reading, *uel per*. Again, an intelligent copyist would have understood that the suggested alternative reading ought to be *perplexarum*. In *H*, however, we read *peramplexarum*. From these and similar instances one might be tempted to view *H* as a copy (direct or through an intermediary) of *M*.⁹¹ Nevertheless, some words omitted in *M* are contained in *H*, and *H* sometimes agrees with *R* against *M*. For instance, in 742C (below, p. 2,16), the word *substantiae*, present in *H* and in *R*, is lacking in *M*. In 743C (below, p. 4,19) *H* shares with *R* the reading *extremam*, whereas *M* has *extimam*. From these and similar features T. A. M. Bishop concluded that *M* (pp. 57–256) and *H* are twin copies (*gemelli*) of a lost exemplar (η).⁹² Concerning their relative merits, he added: 'Very much the worse copy, *H* is an independent witness and is sometimes right where *M* was originally wrong and remains uncorrected'.⁹³

In Sheldon-Williams's edition of *Periphyseon* I–III, *H* and *M* were not used except for a few pages in Book III, where the original Version II text of *R* was replaced with Version IV in the thirteenth century.⁹⁴ Sheldon-Williams was certainly entitled to proceed as he did, for the twelfth-century manuscripts are less reliable than the ninth-century manuscript *R*. Nevertheless, *M* and *H* are not entirely without interest. Although the two manuscripts generally agree with the corrections introduced into *R*, either by Irish (i^1 and i^2) or by Caroline hands, in a few (admittedly rare) cases they seem to

⁹¹'Da brevi saggi di collazione A (Ms. Avranches, Bibl. mun. 230) sembra risultare copia di Tb (Ms. Cambridge, Trin. Coll. 0.5.20)' (P. Lucentini, ed. *Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis Physicae* (Rome, 1974), p. xlii, n. 1). Such was also the opinion I expressed in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris, 1987), p. 505.

⁹²T. A. M. Bishop, 'Periphyseon: An Episode in the Tradition', in *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 7 (1980), 411–426; Id., 'Periphyseon: The Descent of the Uncompleted Copy', in D. Whitelock, R. McKitterick and D. Dumville, eds., *Ireland in Early Mediaeval Europe*, pp. 281–304.

⁹³T. A. M. Bishop, 'Periphyseon: An Episode in the Tradition', in *Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society* 7 (1980), p. 421.

⁹⁴*Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber Tertius*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1981), pp. 176–202.

ignore additions or corrections entered by i^2 .⁹⁵ It is difficult to say whether this phenomenon should be ascribed to the carelessness of the copyists or may be interpreted as indicating that the exemplar from which M and H were copied represented a stage of the text prior to its final revision in R .⁹⁶ However, since H and M are the sole witnesses for the end of Book IV and the whole of Book V in *Version II* of the *Periphyseon*, I have judged it useful to note some, if not all, of their more characteristic variants in the critical apparatus.

A few words may be added here concerning the three witnesses for the last version (*Version IV*), namely F , J , and P . Manuscripts J and F contain only Books IV and V of the *Periphyseon*, while P has all five books in an incomplete and often incorrect copy. As physical objects, J (Bamberg, Staatliche Bibliothek Phil. 2/2) and F (Paris, Bibl. nat., Lat. 12965) share a number of common features. On the whole, J represents a less developed stage of the text.⁹⁷ This will be shown more clearly in the edition of the fifth book of the *Periphyseon*. However, the collation and study of J and F have established that both derive from a common exemplar. Together, they represent the earliest and best tradition of the final version of Books IV and V. Manuscript P (Paris, Bibl. nat., Lat. 12964), on the other hand, emerges as an error-ridden derivative of F , with no connection to J . Yet significantly, many errors in P are impossible to explain if one assumes that the scribe copied directly from F , such as omissions *per homoeoteleuton* which span page breaks in F , or the erroneous resolution in P of abbreviations not found in F . Although the inclusion of P as a witness for Book IV is readily justified as a point of continuity with the work of Sheldon-Williams, there are also sound textual reasons for collating P . Both J and F were corrected by contemporary hands, and their respective correctors usually restored them to a common reading. Nevertheless, some emendations in F depart from J in the corresponding passages, because F was corrected twice: initially, against its exemplar, and somewhat later, independently. The first level of corrections passed into P , while the second did not. The readings of P thus reveal the text of F after the first layer of contemporary correction. Consequently, the consensus of F and P sometimes helps us to restore the readings of the exemplar

⁹⁵For instance, words added by i^2 in the margins of R – *bono* (f. 330r), *sensibilis* (f. 331r) – are absent in manuscripts H and M ; see below, p. 188,4 and 190,21. Again, subtitles added by i^2 in manuscript R (ff. 296r, 296v) are absent in manuscripts H and M ; *ibid.*, p. 98, l. 37 and 100, l. 32.

⁹⁶If manuscripts H and M reflect a stage of the text prior to its final revision in R , these manuscripts could supply us with readings belonging to this prior stage. See for instance: *formaui/plasmaui* (p. 172,37) and *fixis/fixi* (p. 258,14), and *Notes on Text and Translation*, n. 27.

⁹⁷L. Smith, 'The Manuscript Tradition of *Periphyseon* Book 4', in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo*, ed. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò, pp.499–512.

of F and J . While F and J remain the best and earliest witnesses to their version (*Version IV*), P offers a number of valuable clarifications and appears to attest to the existence of a lost intermediary.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, whatever the quality of these three manuscripts may be, they do not allow us to distinguish with certainty between possibly genuine alterations made by the author himself (or someone working under his supervision) in the final revision of the work, and other changes that unauthorized 'editors' may well have introduced on their own in the late ninth century.

III. THE EDITION

The old editions of the *Periphyseon*, that of Thomas Gale, published in Oxford in 1681,⁹⁹ and that of Heinrich Joseph Floss, published in volume 122 of the *Patrologia Latina* of J. P. Migne in 1853,¹⁰⁰ have the disadvantage of offering the reader a conflated text, i.e., a text in which the different versions of the *Periphyseon* were mixed.¹⁰¹ Both editors combined readings found in the manuscripts, quite unaware of the fact that these manuscripts represented different versions of the text. They may be forgiven this because, in their time, the manuscripts that allow us to distinguish between the various versions, namely R and B , had not yet come to light.¹⁰² Today, however, this mixed type of edition is inadequate to the needs of scholarship. The progress achieved by palaeographers concerning the manuscript tradition of the *Periphyseon* has made possible a new type of edition that will reveal not only the text in its final form, but also in its development, in Traube's words 'eine genetisch-kritische Herausgabe'.¹⁰³ Of course, we cannot reconstruct the evolution of the *Periphyseon* with absolute precision, because Eriugena was continuously modifying his text, and as one can easily imagine, he did not take the trouble to date each

⁹⁸These conclusions are based on a study of F , J and P prepared by Michael Idomir Allen who, as a research assistant to the *Periphyseon* Project, examined the three manuscripts in Bamberg and Paris during April 1991. Michael Allen plans to publish this study (with a stemma) in the future.

⁹⁹*Joannis Scoti Erigenae De Divisione Naturae Libri Quinque Diu Desiderati. Accedit Appendix ex Ambiguis S. Maximi Graece et Latine*, Oxonii, e Theatro Sheldoniano, anno MDCLXXXI.

¹⁰⁰The Preface is dated Bonn, September 21, 1852: *Bonnae XI. Cal. Octobris MDCCCLII* (PL 122, p. xxviii).

¹⁰¹'L'éditition du livre IV du *Periphyseon*', in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo. L'organizzazione del sapere in età carolingia. Atti del XXIV Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 11–14 ottobre 1987*, ed. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), pp. 469–486.

¹⁰²A. Schmitt, *Zwei noch unbenützte Handschriften des Joannes Scotus Erigena (Programm des königlichen neuen Gymnasiums in Bamberg für das Schuljahr 1899/1900)* (Bamberg, 1900); H. Loriguet, *Catalogue des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France*, vol. 39: *Reims*, II,1 (Paris, 1904), pp. 191–192.

¹⁰³L. Traube, *Palaeographische Forschungen. V. Autographa des Iohannes Scottus*, ed. E. K. Rand, *Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse* 26,1 (Munich, 1912), p. 5.

change he introduced into his work. As explained above, we can distinguish four basic levels in the development of the *Periphyseon*. It must be understood, however, that these four levels – or versions, as we call them – are by no means the equivalent of four editions in the modern sense of the word. The *Periphyseon* was a fluid text, always *in fieri*. The manuscripts bear witness to this fluidity. If we are unable to match the illusory movement of the cinema, we are able to set out, as it were, four still frames on which such movement might be thought to depend. Each 'version' represents a stage in the advancing construction of Eriugena's work. It is to the credit of Sheldon-Williams to have, for the first time, undertaken the arduous task of providing the reader with an edition which takes into account the different versions. He had the satisfaction of bringing to completion the publication of Book I in 1968, and Book II in 1972. He had prepared Book III, which was published after his death (10 October 1973), but without being corrected by him.¹⁰⁴ As with every human work, the edition of Sheldon-Williams has its limitations and imperfections. These have been pointed out in several reviews,¹⁰⁵ and a new editor must give serious consideration to them. Nevertheless, the editor of Book IV has decided not to break abruptly with the style of the previous volumes, in order to preserve continuity, but also in deference to the memory of Sheldon-Williams. One must not forget the French proverb: 'La critique est aisée, mais l'art est difficile'.¹⁰⁶ In all sincerity, I must confess that I am filled with admiration for a man who, in his sunset years, did not hesitate to take upon himself a colossal task. His edition marks an important stage in the knowledge and interpretation of the *Periphyseon*. The present edition tries to be as faithful as possible to the spirit that animated the editor of the three first books. It has been necessary, however, to abandon some of his techniques. I should like to say briefly why.

In order to help the reader to recognize the readings of the various versions of the *Periphyseon*, Sheldon-Williams made use of several

¹⁰⁴See John J. O'Meara's *Foreword* in *Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber Tertius*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1981), p. v.

¹⁰⁵P. Lucentini, 'La nuova edizione del *Periphyseon* dell' Eriugena' in *Studi medievali*, 3ª Serie 17 (1976), pp. 393–414. See the reviews by John Marenbon, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 33 (1982), pp. 601–608, and by Giulio d'Onofrio, *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni* 50 (1984), pp. 155–164.

¹⁰⁶A recent article is a good illustration of this proverb: Aidan Breen, 'Iohannes Scottus, *Periphyseon*: The Problems of an Edition', in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 91 (Dublin, 1991), pp. 21–40. This study not only adds new critiques to those formulated by the earlier reviewers, but also offers a sample (208 lines) of how the future edition of *Periphyseon* IV ought to look. This sample, however, contains a number of readings that are incorrect: for instance, at l. 86 *sperire* for *aperire*; at l. 90 *in uiam* for *inuiam*; at l. 145 *factus* for *factum*; at l. 199 *es* for *ex*, etc. To be brief about the proposed apparatus, I observe that both *H* and *M* read *sirtium*, not *surtium* (l. 72), and that the solecism *crucifixarent* (l. 178) is supported by no manuscript.

typographical devices: square brackets, angle brackets, and italics for what he called 'Eriugena's supposed autograph', small type for 'additions to the text found in *P* only'.¹⁰⁷ An almost unanimous complaint has been made by scholars against these devices, particularly against the brackets, which, according to them, encumber the reading of a text already difficult, without affording any evident assistance toward its comprehension. It has been my impression that this complaint was shared by the majority of the users of Sheldon-Williams's edition. Consequently, I thought it wise to yield to the majority, but I am sure that there will be a minority of users who will support Sheldon-Williams's brackets and italics, and complain of their absence in the edition of *Periphyseon* IV. I shall explain later how to compensate for this absence. For the moment, let me say that it is imprudent to rely entirely on Sheldon-Williams's brackets and italics in order to identify 'Eriugena's supposed autograph'. In fact, the editor of the first three Books of the *Periphyseon* was often mistaken in his identification of the various forms of handwriting to be found in the manuscripts. First of all, and we have said this earlier, he does not distinguish between the two Irish hands (*i*¹ and *i*²) at work in *R* and in *B*. Secondly, and this is more surprising, he confuses Irish and Caroline hands, sometimes listing as Insular what is unquestionably Caroline,¹⁰⁸ sometimes listing as Caroline what is clearly Insular.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, if the absence of Sheldon-Williams's brackets in *Periphyseon* IV is deplored, their presence in *Periphyseon* I, II, and III should not be considered as being of a great help, since they are largely unreliable. Nevertheless, the reader of the present edition of Book IV will not be entirely without assistance in distinguishing between the first versions of the *Periphyseon* and the final one. He will, however, find this assistance in the critical apparatus, and not in the text itself. There, the various additions and corrections attributable to Irish hands are distinguished from those

¹⁰⁷*Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber Primus*, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin, 1968), pp. 33–34.

¹⁰⁸Here are a few examples, taken from *Periphyseon* I, ed. Sheldon-Williams, in which passages singled out as 'Eriugena's supposed autograph' are, in fact, written in Caroline script: *Similiter . . . incorporea est* (p. 132, 6–12; *R*, f. 49r); *Item . . . splendet* (p. 146, 25–31; *R*, f. 54r); *Si igitur . . . subsistit* (p. 152, 17–30; *R*, f. 56r–56v); *Nam et eorum . . . intelligitur est* (p. 166, 29–168, 3; *R*, f. 60v–61r); *Ibi . . . sint* (p. 170, 22–27; *R*, f. 62r). The same confusion may be observed in *Periphyseon* II, ed. Sheldon-Williams: *altiori . . . sumus* (p. 4, 9–11; *R*, f. 81r); *dei . . . suasam* (p. 70, 3–7; *R*, f. 101r); *Nam . . . considerabitur* (p. 116, 12–20; *R*, f. 114v).

¹⁰⁹Here are also a few examples of Insular script not detected in Sheldon-Williams's edition. In *Periphyseon* I, p. 48, 11, the words *puram* and *atque immediatam*, added by *i*¹ (*R*, f. 7r), are printed as if they were in Caroline script. In the same volume, p. 60, 6, the enclitic *-que*, added to *quomodo* by *i*¹ (*R*, f. 14v), is not reported as such. The same phenomenon is observed in *Periphyseon* II, where the words *uidelicet* (p. 14, 20), *quam* (p. 24, 10), *sibi* (p. 24, 21), *responsa* (p. 84, 3), *ergo* (p. 104, 10) were all written by *i*² (*R*, ff. 83v, 86v, 105r, 111r). The confusions are still more in evidence in *Periphyseon* III.

attributable to Caroline scribes; the Irish hands themselves, i^1 and i^2 , are carefully distinguished from one another. In *Periphyseon* IV, the role played by i^1 in correcting and enlarging the text is undoubtedly more important than that played by i^2 . Accordingly, in order to help the reader to recognize quickly and surely words or letters written by i^1 , these words or letters have been printed in boldface in the critical apparatus. The changes introduced by i^2 , are also recorded in the critical apparatus, but they have been printed in standard type.

The editor of *Periphyseon* IV, however, has been handicapped in comparison with the editor of the previous books: he lacked a manuscript witnessing to the third version. When, in the fourth version, he found additions and corrections which were not in the second, he could not decide whether these additions and corrections were common to the third and to the fourth versions, or belonged to the fourth only. Sheldon-Williams was able to do this, because he had at his disposal manuscript *B*, which contains the text of the third version for the three first books of the *Periphyseon* and which, like a strainer, allowed him to separate the additions and corrections which are common to Versions II and III from those which are to be found in Version IV only. In the case of *Periphyseon* IV, we have no such strainer. The small type used by Sheldon-Williams in the previous books to single out the additions proper to the fourth version could not be used here.

Thus, the editor of *Periphyseon* IV was faced with a problem which his predecessor did not have. He knew that, in some instances, the text of Version IV has certainly been corrupted, but the manuscripts at his disposal did not allow him to distinguish the text of the fourth version from that of the third. Indeed, it seems undeniable that some of the changes introduced in Version IV (as represented by manuscripts *F*, *J*, and *P*) are unauthentic. The editor was well aware of this, but did not have sufficient manuscript evidence to pronounce a sentence of unauthenticity against them. The fact that the fourth version of *Periphyseon* IV contains unauthentic passages can be observed more readily in quotations from Greek authors than anywhere else. In the case of doctrinal or grammatical corrections, it is difficult to say positively whether they are authentic or not, even if the corrected text is, to our taste, inferior to the uncorrected one. We know that writers, not unlike painters, may damage their work under the impression that they are improving it. The case of corrections introduced in the Latin translation of Greek texts is different. Here we have firm ground for our judgement. With the exception of Dionysius the Areopagite, we do not know what Greek manuscripts Eriugena had at his disposal, but in spite of this, we are often able to decide which of two translations – corrected or uncorrected – is the better. I have shown elsewhere that in many passages of Eriugena's translation of the *Ambigua ad Iohannem*

of Maximus the Confessor, the revised text is less faithful to the Greek than the first draft.¹¹⁰ In such cases, we can be certain that the reviser was not Eriugena. The same may be said of the lengthy quotations from Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* which appear in Book IV of the *Periphyseon*: in some places the first translation (contained in *H*, *M*, and *R*), which was more or less correct, has been replaced by another (contained in *F*, *J*, and *P*), which is definitely less accurate, if not perfectly unintelligible.¹¹¹ In such cases, it is clear that the translation of the Greek text has been corrected by incompetents, that is to say, revisers who did not know Greek. But, if the Carolingian revisers of the *Periphyseon*, who knew no Greek, did not hesitate to correct Eriugena's translations from Greek, why should they have refrained from correcting his thought? Here again, in the absence of a witness to Version III it is impossible to determine with certainty the instances in which they did so.

In such a quandary, what options were open to the editor of *Periphyseon* IV? He could trust his own judgement to determine which additions and corrections belong to the third version, and which to the fourth. But this would be tantamount to adding a new conflated text to those produced by the old editions. He could edit the second version (manuscripts *HMR*) and relegate the variants of *FJP* to the limbo of the critical apparatus. But this would unbalance the whole edition of the *Periphyseon*, because the readings of the fourth version have been included in the basic text of Sheldon-Williams' edition of Books I, II and III, although they are in small type. Moreover, the result of this solution would be to exclude from the text some additions which probably belong to the third version and may well have been introduced by i^2 , such as the words *suique prolixitate cogente in quantum librum porrectus* (p. 6,1–2) for instance. The only solution which avoids both editorial subjectivity and inconsistency is probably to base the edition of *Periphyseon* IV on the text of *Version IV*. This is the solution which I have chosen. The consequence of this choice is that, in some instances, the edition gives the worse readings, while the better are to be found in the critical apparatus. I have tried to compensate for the disadvantages that such a solution entails. First, in the critical apparatus, whenever the readings of Versions I and II are better, they are singled out by the phrase *rectius ut uidetur*. Second,

¹¹⁰ *Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugena latinam interpretationem*, CCSG 18, pp. lix–lxiii; 'Jean Scot traducteur de Maxime le Confesseur', in *The Sacred Nectar of the Greeks: The Study of Greek in the West in the Early Middle Ages*, ed. M. Herren and S. A. Brown, King's College London, Medieval Studies, 2 (London, 1988), pp. 257–276; 'Jean Scot Érigène: grandeur et misère du métier de traducteur', in *Traduction et traducteurs au Moyen Âge*, Colloque international du CNRS, IRHT, 26–28 mai 1986 (Paris, 1989), pp. 99–108.

¹¹¹ See the critical apparatus of the present edition.

in the *Notes on Text and Translation*, the reasons for this preference are set forth. In this way, although the present edition reproduces the text of the fourth version of *Periphyseon* IV, the reader will have access to the former versions through the critical apparatus.¹¹²

Version I is represented by the basic text contained in the manuscript Rheims 875 (*R*), before enlargements and corrections were added either by *i*¹, by *i*², or by a Caroline scribe. Often, the first version is inaccessible to us. In order to reconstruct this first version in its entirety, one would have to be able, not only to eliminate the additions introduced in the margins, above the lines, and over erasures, but also to recover every single word that has been erased. This is impossible. We can, indeed, read clearly, or guess with some probability, many of the words that have been erased, but if we fail to recover even a single erased word, this suffices to prevent a reconstruction of the original sentence. However, each time it has been possible to recover the text of Version I, this text has been recorded in the apparatus under the siglum *R*⁰.

Version II is formed by the aforesaid original text of *R*, but including all the enlargements and corrections added to it. When these changes have been written by the Irish hand *i*¹, they are recorded in the critical apparatus under the siglum *R*¹. When they have been introduced by the Irish hand *i*², they are recorded under the siglum *R*². When they have been introduced by Caroline scribes, they are recorded under the siglum *R*^x. Occasionally, two other manuscripts – Cambridge, Trinity College O.5.20, pp. 57–256 (*M*) and Avranches, Bib. mun. 230 (*H*) – have been reported in the apparatus as witnesses to the second version. In the *Notes on Text and Translation*, the edition of the *Clavis Physicae* by Paolo Lucentini has also been reported as a valuable witness to Version II of the *Periphyseon*.¹¹³ As explained above (p. xxxvi, 9 sqq.), it is impossible to reconstruct Version III for Book IV.

Special attention has been paid to the quotations from the Greek Fathers, because it is in these quotations that incompetent revisers caused the most serious damage in Version IV of the *Periphyseon*. The critical apparatus mentions readings borrowed from Eriugena's translation of the *De imagine* of Gregory of Nyssa according both to its edition by Dom Cappuyns¹¹⁴ and to the manuscript Paris, Bibl. nat., n.a.l. 2664 (*C*). The apparatus also mentions readings borrowed from Eriugena's translations of two works of Maximus the Confessor, the

¹¹²I am preparing for the *Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis* an edition of the *Periphyseon* which will try to realize the 'genetisch-kritische Herausgabe' recommended by Ludwig Traube.

¹¹³Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis Physicae*, ed. Paolo Lucentini (Rome, 1974).

¹¹⁴M. Cappuyns. 'Le *De imagine* de Grégoire de Nyse traduit par Jean Scot Érigène', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 32 (1965), pp. 205–262.

Ambigua ad Iohannem and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*.¹¹⁵ In order to allow the reader to judge which of the two versions (II or IV) is more faithful to the Greek text, I have sometimes quoted the latter in the apparatus. When a more detailed explanation on the subject is needed, the reader will find it in the *Notes on Text and Translation*.

All subtitles printed in the margins of the edition belong to Version IV, but the reader must be warned that they are lacking in *R*. I did not think it necessary to mention this fact in the apparatus. Manuscript *R* has six subtitles only, all entered by *i*². They are found in the margins of this manuscript (ff. 274v, 296r, 296v, 323v, 336v, 357r), and are recorded in the apparatus of the present edition: pp. 30,19; 98,37; 100,32; 170,26; 206,8; 260,5.

Perhaps a few words should be added about spelling. Although I have tried to retain the spelling of the manuscripts, I have not reported purely orthographical variants, such as: *quattuor/quatuor*, *compositum/compositum*, *immerito/inmerito*, *elimenta/elementa*, *condicio/conditio*, etc. I have also spelled out the prefix *prae*, even where the manuscripts have *pre*. However, in the case of the final diphthong *ae*, I have scrupulously retained the spelling of the manuscripts. Each time I have departed from this rule, it is mentioned in the apparatus. Otherwise, the reader may rest assured that the diphthong *ae* printed in the present edition corresponds to the same diphthong (either spelled out or expressed by a cedilla placed beneath the *e*) in manuscript *R*. It is worth noting that in this manuscript the Irish hand *i*¹ often made a diphthong of the simple *e* written by the Caroline scribes.¹¹⁶ If the hypothesis that *i*¹ is the hand of Eriugena is correct, this would mean that Eriugena paid considerable attention to diphthongs. Therefore, their removal from his works, a practice which certain modern editors have adopted, may make Eriugena's prose appear more 'medieval', but at the cost of rejecting the author's own spellings.

Édouard Jeuneau

¹¹⁵*Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugena latinam interpretationem*, CCSG 18 (Turnhout–Louvain, 1988); *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones ad Thalassium . . . una cum latina interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Eriugena iuxta posita*, CCSG 7 and 22 (Turnhout–Louvain, 1980 and 1990).

¹¹⁶Examples of this practice are to be found in manuscript *R*: ff. 275v, line 15 (*procliuaeque*); 276r, line 8 (*controuerxae*); 277v, line 17 (*aestimarin*); 286r, line 14 (*ydrax*); 289v, line 2 (*intelligendae*); 290r, line 7 (*formulae*); 293r, line 17 (*saepae*) etc. See the present edition on pages 34,10; 34,22; 40,18; 68,15; 78,31; 80,27; 90,35.

DESPITE the inevitable constraints involved in such a proceeding, I have based *in pietate* the translation of *Periphyseon* IV, given here, on that made by I. P. Sheldon-Williams (using Floss's text) and left on his death in 1973. My views on Sheldon-Williams's translation are set forth in G.-H. Allard, ed., *Jean Scot Écrivain* (Montreal-Paris 1986) 115-128. Sheldon-Williams's translation of *Periphyseon* IV and V has been so much adjusted by me for that given in *Periphyseon* (Montreal-Washington 1987), and now especially to take account of É. Jeauneau's new edition of the Latin text of Book IV, that I must accept main responsibility for the present translation. Although I have greatly reduced (after the first few paragraphs) the amount of capitalization and archaisms (especially in Scriptural quotations) employed by Sheldon-Williams, I have not altered the punctuation to the same extent: in this punctuation especially Sheldon-Williams's affinity with Eriugena is seen. É. Jeauneau adverts (Introduction xxxvii) to a particular feature of his edition: 'in some instances it gives the worse readings, while the better are to be found in the critical apparatus'. In such cases I have followed the 'better' readings as likely to be of more use to the reader in English.

John J. O'Meara

KEY TO IDENTIFICATION OF VERSIONS

Version I

The text of Version I is represented in the apparatus by **R** (when the manuscript has not been corrected) and by **R⁰** (when the manuscript has been corrected).

Version II

The text of Version II is represented in the apparatus by the following sigla: **R¹** (**R** when corrected by *i*¹), **R²** (**R** when corrected by *i*²), and **R^x** (**R** when corrected by any ninth-century hand other than *i*¹ or *i*²). This version is also represented by the later witnesses **H** and **M**.

Version III

The text of Version III cannot be isolated from that of Version IV in Book IV.

Version IV

The text of Version IV (represented by **F**, **J**, and **P**) is the text reproduced in the present edition. It is not necessarily and always the best. The reader is encouraged to compare it with that of Versions I and II. For reasons explained in the Introduction, access to these versions may be obtained through the critical apparatus only. I should like to give some examples of the typographical conventions used to document the readings of Versions I and II.

Example 1 (cf. below, p. 6, l. 7)

Apparatus:

peruenturi] **R¹**, uenturi **R⁰**.

The reading of **R⁰** (Version I) was 'uenturi'. The reading of **R¹** (Version II) is 'peruenturi'. The boldface indicates that '**per**' has been added by the Irish hand *i*¹. In this case, we have access to the two versions: 'uenturi' (Version I), 'peruenturi' (Version II).

Example 2 (cf. below, p. 12, l. 14)

Apparatus:

totum scilicet] *partim p<ost> ras<uram>*, *partim sup<er> l<ineam>* **R¹**.

The boldface indicates that '**totum scilicet**' has been written by *i*¹. But the fact that it has been written partially over an erasure prevents a reconstruction of the text of Version I in its entirety. In this case, we have access to Version II, but not to Version I.

Example 3 (cf. below, p. 34, l. 1)

Apparatus (two entries):

a. **loetiferis delectationibus**] *partim p(ost) ras(uram), partim sup(er) l(ineam) R¹, amoribus R⁰*

b. **ingurgitet**] *p(ost) ras(uram) R¹*

The boldface indicates that '**loetiferis delectationibus ingurgitet**' has been written by *i*¹. In the case of the first entry in the apparatus (a), we have access to the two versions: 'amoribus' (Version I), 'loetiferis delectationibus' (Version II). But in the case of the second entry (b), we are not able to recover the word (or words) which *i*¹ erased and replaced by 'ingurgitet'. In this case, the full reading of Version I cannot be ascertained.

Example 4 (cf. below, p. 14, l. 20)

Apparatus:

fixus patibulo] *patiens HMR*.

The text of the edition (Version IV) reads 'fixus patibulo', Versions I and II (represented by manuscripts *H*, *M*, and *R*) read 'patiens'.

Example 5 (cf. below, p. 34, l. 12)

Apparatus (two entries):

a. actu et scientia] *actam uitiis R*

b. purgatam] *quam add. H, M (m(anus) rec(entior) suppl(euit) sup(er) l(ineam) . . .)*

Since *R* is reported without qualification, versions I and II are identical. On the other hand, a twelfth-century addition (*quam*) above the line in *M* generates an adulteration of Version II. The critical apparatus allows a reconstruction of these successive layers:

Versions I/II: 'secundum bonam uoluntatem diuina gratia praeuentam, actam, uitiis purgatam, uirtutum ornamentis redimitam'

Altered text of Version II: 'secundum bonam uoluntatem diuina gratia praeuentam, ac tam uitiis purgatam quam uirtutum ornamentis redimitam'

Version IV: 'secundum bonam uoluntatem diuina gratia praeuentam, actu et scientia purgatam, uirtutum ornamentis redimitam' (my emphasis)

Example 6 (cf. below, p. 250, l. 31)

Apparatus:

(carnal)es] *corr. R², carnaliter R⁰*

The parenthesis highlights what is common between two versions. *i*² has altered only the ending of the original 'carnaliter' (Version I), to give 'carnales' (Version II).

Example 7 (cf. below, p. 134, l. 2)

Apparatus:

gloria] *gratia CHMR Capp (236, 35) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco χάρις: PG 44, 188C11)*.

The reading of Version IV (*FJP*) is 'gloria', but the reading of Version II (*HMR*) is 'gratia'. The latter also appears in the ms. Paris, Bibl. nat., n.a.l. 2664 (*C*), and in the edition (based on the ms. Bamberg, Staatliche Bibl., Patr. 78) by M. Cappuyns, 'Le *De imagine* de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Érigène', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 32 (1965), 205–262. The apparatus notes the corresponding word in the Greek text (*PG 44, 188C11*) as χάρις. The Latin 'gratia' (Version II) is a more faithful translation for χάρις than 'gloria' (Version IV). The critical apparatus suggests that here the reading of Version II is better than that of Version IV; hence the remark 'rectius ut uidetur'.

SIGLA CODICUM

- C** = Paris, Bibl. nat., n.a.l. 2664
F = Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 12965
H = Avranches, Bibl. mun. 230
J = Bamberg, Staatsbibl., Ph. 2/2 (*olim* HJ.IV.6)
M = Cambridge, Trinity College, O.5.20 (James 1301)
P = Paris, Bibl. nat., lat. 12964
R = Rheims, Bibl. mun. 875

R⁰ = original Caroline text of **R**, when superseded by correction

R¹ = corrections and enlargements in **R** by the Irish hand *i*¹

R² = corrections and enlargements in **R** by the Irish hand *i*²

R^x = any ninth-century correction or addition to **R** by a hand other than *i*¹ or *i*²

All subtitles printed in the margins of the edition belong to *Version IV*; they are lacking in **R**. The few subtitles found in **R** are noted in the apparatus.

TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Incipit
quartus
ΠΕΡΙ
ΦΥΣΕΩΝ

PERIPHYSEON

LIBER III

ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑ-
ΛΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙ
naturarum

NVTRITOR. Prima nostrae physiologiae intentio praecipuaque 741C
materia erat quod ΥΠΕΡΟΥΣΙΑΔΕΣ (hoc est superessentialis)
natura sit causa creatrix existentium et non existentium omnium, 5
a nullo creata, unum principium, una origo, unus et uniuersalis
uniuersorum fons, a nullo manans, dum ab eo manant omnia,
trinitas coessentialis in tribus substantiis, ANAPXOC (hoc est sine
principio), principium et finis, una bonitas, deus unus, ΟΜΟΥΣΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙ
et ΥΠΕΡΟΥΣΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙ (id est coessentialis et superessentialis). Et, ut 10
ait sanctus Epifanius, episcopus Constantiae Cypri, in ΑΓΚΥΡΑΤΩ
sermone de fide: *Tria sancta, tria consancta, tria agentia, tria coagentia,*
tria formantia, tria conformantia, tria operantia, tria cooperantia, tria
subsistentia, tria consubsistentia sibi inuicem coexistentia. Trinitas haec 742C
sancta uocatur: tria existentia una consonantia, una deitas eiusdem essentiae, 15
eiusdem uirtutis, eiusdem subsistentiae, similia similiter aequalitatem gratiae
operantur patris et filii et sancti spiritus. Quomodo autem sunt, ipsis
relinquitur docere: “Nemo enim nouit patrem nisi filius, neque filium nisi
pater, et cuiuscunque filius reuelauerit”; reuelatur autem per spiritum sanctum.
Non ergo haec tria existentia aut ex ipso aut per ipsum aut ad ipsum in 20
unoquoque digne intelliguntur, sicut ipsa reuelant, ΦΩΣ, ΠΥΡ, ΠΝΕΥΜΑ
(hoc est lux, ignis, spiritus)?

Haec, ut dixi, ab Epifanio tradita, ut quisquis interrogatus quae tria
et quid unum in sancta trinitate debeat credere, sana fide respondere 743A
ualeat, aut ad fidem accedens sic erudiatur. Et mihi uidetur spiritum
pro calore posuisse, quasi dixisset in similitudine: lux, ignis, calor. 26
Haec enim tria unius essentiae sunt. Sed cur lucem primo dixit, non
est mirum. Nam et pater lux est et ignis et calor; et filius est lux,
ignis, calor; et spiritus sanctus lux, ignis, calor. Illuminat enim pater,

18–19 Matth. 11, 27.

12–22 EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 67 (GCS 25, p. 82, 2–12; PG 43, 137C–140A).

Incipit . . . ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΝ] incipit quartus M, om. HR 3 ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙ
FJP, lege ἀνοκεφαλαίωσις 3 NVTRITOR] scripsi, N codd. 3 physiologiae] physiologiae
HMP, physeologiae R 4 quod] p. natura transp. HMR 4 ΥΠΕΡΟΥΣΙΑΔΕΣ] codd.,
ὑπερουσιώδης Gale (p. 160), ὑπερουσιότης Floss (PL 122, 741C) 8 hoc est] mg. R¹
9 ΟΜΟΥΣΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙΟΙ] codd., lege ὁμοούσιος 10 et] R¹, om. R⁰ 11 ΑΓΚΥΡΑΤΩ]
anchurato MR, ancorato H 12 de fide] Glo(ssa): Ita enim uocatur sermo eius
de fide ΑΓΚΥΡΑΤΟC, id est procuratus mg. add. FJP 12 agentia] actiua HMR
13 formantia] formatiua HMR 13 operantia] operatiua HMR 13 cooperantia]
cooperatiua HM 15 eiusdem] eiusdemque HM 16 eiusdem uirtutis eiusdem] om.
HM 16 subsistentiae] substantiae HR, om. M 16 similiter] ex simili HMR 17 sunt]
om. HM 24 debeat] debet HM 29 spiritus sanctus] sanctus spiritus transp. R

PERIPHYSEON

BOOK IV

Beginning of
the Fourth
Book of the
Periphyseon

NUTRITOR. The aim and principal theme of our Philosophy of 1
Nature (1) was Firstly to prove that the uncreated creative Cause
of all things which exist and all things which do not exist, the sole
Principle, Origin, and universal Source of all, Which Itself proceeds
from nothing while from It proceed all things, the Trinity which
in three Substances is co-essential, and Which, Itself ἀναρχος (that
is, without beginning), is the Beginning and the End, the one
Good, the one God ὁμοούσιος and ὑπερούσιος (that is, co-essential
and superessential), is in fact an ὑπερουσιώδης (or superessential)
Nature (2). For as St. Epiphanius, the Bishop of Constantia in
Cyprus, says in his *Ancoratus*, or Discourse on Faith: ‘The three Holies
have a common holiness, and the three Agents a common activity:
the three Designers design in unity and the Three Workers are three
who work as One, and the Three Which subsist have a subsistence
common to all Three, each existing for the sake of the others. This
is called the Holy Trinity, in which there are Three who exist – one
accord, one Deity of the same essence, of the same power, of the
same subsistence – who, being alike, likewise operate an equality of
grace, that of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But how
they are What They are we must leave to Them to teach us. “For no
one has known the Father save the Son, and no one has known the
Son save the Father, and him to whomsoever the Son has revealed
Himself”: and this revelation is brought about through the Holy
Spirit. Therefore (3) these three Existents – Existents from Himself,
through Himself or to Himself – are perceived duly as They reveal
Themselves, Φῶς, Πῦρ, Πνεῦμα’ (that is Light, Fire and Spirit).

Such, as I say, was the teaching of Epiphanius to supply an orthodox
answer to the question: What ought we to believe about the Three in
the Holy Trinity, and what about the One? and to instruct those who
seek after faith. And it seems to me that he was employing the allegory
of Light, Fire and Heat, substituting Spirit for the last. These three are
of one essence. It need not worry us that he puts Light before Fire:
for the Father is Light and Fire and Heat, and the Son is Light and
Fire and Heat, and the Holy Spirit is Light and Fire and Heat. For
the Father illumines, the Son illumines, and the Holy Spirit illumines

illuminat filius, illuminat spiritus sanctus: ex ipsis enim omnis scientia et sapientia donatur. Vrit pater, urit filius, urit spiritus sanctus, quia simul nostra delicta consumunt, et nos uelut holocaustum quoddam per ΘΕΩCIN (id est deificationem) in unitatem suam conuertunt. Calificat pater, calificat filius, calificat spiritus sanctus, quia uno eodemque caritatis aestu et nos fouent et nutriunt, ac ueluti ex informitate quadam imperfectionis nostrae post primi hominis lapsum, in uirum perfectum, in plenitudinem aetatis Christi educant. Vir autem perfectus est Christus, in quo omnia consummata sunt, cuius aetatis plenitudo est consummatio salutis uniuersalis ecclesiae, quae in angelis et hominibus constituta est.

In secundo libro de natura creata et creatrice disputabamus, quam in principiis rerum (id est in primordialibus causis) subsistere diximus; nam et ab una omnium causa, quae est summa bonitas, cuius proprium est omnia de non existentibus in existentia sua ineffabili uirtute producere, creatur. Caetera uero quae post eam sunt participatione sua creare non cessat.

Tertius liber disputat de natura creata et non creante, hoc est de effectibus extremis primordialium causarum, qui rerum omnium extimam obtinent proportionem; motus enim progressionum uniuersitatis in eis desinit, non habens inferius egredi, quia in corporibus constitutus est. In quo libro etiam de primordialibus causis multa considerauimus, deque deo eiusque imagine in animo et ratione et sensu, et de quali nihilo facta sunt omnia, et quomodo uerbum dei unigenitum et facit omnia et in omnibus fit. Pauca quoque de operibus primae intelligibilis septimanae usque ad sextum diem tractauimus.

Quartus hic ab operibus sextae propheticae contemplationis de conditione uniuersitatis inchoans, reditum omnium in eam naturam quae nec creat nec creatur consideraturus finem constituat. Cuius difficultas diuersorumque sensuum occurus atque colluctatio tantum terroris nobis incutit, ut in comparatione ipsius tres praecedentes libri, instar plani pelagi fluctuumque serenitate absque ullo naufragio nauigabilis, tutum legentibus meatum praebere uideantur; ipse uero tortuosis anfractibus inuius, obliquitate sententiarum procliuius, tractibus syrtium (hoc est incognitae doctrinae ductibus) periculosus,

8 Eph. 4, 13.

9-11 Cf. *Periphyseon* V, 994B-D. 995C-D. 25-27 *Pauca de*: ista uerba, tituli uice, Scottorum libris haud raro inscripta fuisse notauit B. Bischoff, *Mittelalterliche Studien* I, Stutgardiae 1966, p. 217.

16 post eam] postea HM 20 extimam] extremam HR 20 proportionem] portionem HM 23-24 in animo . . . et sensu] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 26 sextum] quintum HMR 30 constituat] constituet HMR 31 occurus] R¹, cursus R⁰ 31 colluctatio] corr. R¹

(that is to say, all wisdom and knowledge are the gifts of all Three): the Father burns, the Son burns, and the Holy Spirit burns (for together They burn away our transgressions and transmute us, a burnt offering, by the action of θεωσις or deification, into the Unity which is Theirs): the Father warms, the Son warms, and the Holy Spirit warms (for with one and the same heat of love They cherish us and nourish us, and so lead us forth from the kind of formlessness of our imperfection, which was the result of the transgression of the First Man, 'to the perfection of man when the era of Christ shall be fulfilled'). Now, the perfection of man is Christ, in Whom all is consummated: and the fulfilment of His era is the consummation of the universal salvation of the Catholic Church, which is established among angels and among men.

In the Second Book we considered the nature which creates and is created, and decided that it subsists in the principles of things, that is, their primordial causes. For this nature on the one hand is created by that single universal Cause and supreme Goodness, Whose property it is by Its unspeakable Power to lead all things forth from non-existence into existence; and on the other hand does not cease to create the things which come after It, by means of their participation in It.

The Third Book treats of the nature which is created but does not create, that is to say, of the ultimate effects of the primordial causes. These hold the lowest rank of nature, for the devolution of the universe ceases with them, having no further place whither to descend, for it is now established in the realm of corporeal objects. But in this book we also gave considerable attention to the primordial causes and to God, to His image in mind, reason and sense (4), and we enquired what kind of nothing that was from which were made all things (5), and how it could be that the Only Begotten Word of God both makes all things and is made in all (6). We also briefly discussed the works of the First Intelligible Week, up to the Sixth Day (7).

Now we come to the Fourth Book which starts with the works of the Sixth Prophetic Meditation of the creation of the universe, goes on to consider the Return of all things into that Nature which neither creates nor is created, and so might bring our work to its conclusion (8). The difficulty of this part of our theme, the conflict and clash of different interpretations, I find so formidable that in comparison to it the first three books seem like a smooth sea upon which, because of the calmness of the waves, readers could sail without fear of shipwreck, steering a safe course. Now, however, we enter upon a voyage where the course has to be picked from the mass of tortuous digressions, where we have to climb the steep of obscure doctrines, encounter the region of the Syrtes, that is to say, the dangers of the currents of unfamiliar teaching, ever in immediate danger of shipwreck from

subtilissimorum intellectuum, instar cautium latentium nauesque repente frangentium, caliginositate naufragiis promptus, suique prolixitate cogente in quintum librum porrectus. Diuina tamen clementia ducente et gubernante, prosperoque flatu diuini spiritus nostrae nauis carbasum implente, tutum inter haec rectumque iter 5 carpentes, ad portum quem petimus leni cursu liberi atque illaesi peruenturi sumus.

ALVMNVS. Tendenda uela nauigandumque. Accelerat nanque ratio perita huius ponti, nullas ueretur minas undarum, nullos anfractus syrtesue cautesue formidat, cui delectabilius est in abditis 10 diuini oceani fretibus uirtutem suam exercere, quam in planis apertisque otiosa quiescere, ubi uim suam non ualet aperire. In 744B sudore enim uultus sui panem suum (dei uidelicet uerbum) iussa est uesci, terramque sanctae scripturae, spinas et tribulos sibi germantem (hoc est diuinorum intellectuum exilem densitatem) 15 colere, studiumque sapientiae spernentibus inuiam, assiduis theoriae gressibus lustrare, *donec inueniat locum domino, tabernaculum deo Iacob*, hoc est, donec ad ueritatis contemplationem, quam lapsu primi hominis perdiderat, frequenti litterarum diuinarum laboriosoque studio, ducente et adiuuante et cooperante et ad hoc mouente 20 diuina gratia, redeundo perueniat, perueniendo diligit, diligendo permaneat, permanendo quiescat.

N. *Dixit quoque deus: Producat terra animam uiuentem in genere suo, iumenta et reptilia, et bestias terrae secundum species suas, et caetera.* 744C *Producat, inquit, terra animam uiuentem.* Ac si aperte diceret: Producat 25 terra animal uiuens. Ille siquidem tropus, qui dicitur CYNEKΔOKH (hoc est conceptio), in diuinis eloquiis usitatissimus est: quae forma locutionis totum a parte, et partem a toto concipit. Solet itaque sancta scriptura totum animal animae solummodo uocabulo significare. In Actis apostolorum: *Eramus, inquit, in naui ducentae* 30 *septuaginta animae*; siquidem animae non erant sine corporibus. Item

12–14 Gen. 3, 19. 14–16 Gen. 3, 18. 17 Ps. 131, 5. 23–24 Gen. 1, 24. 30–31 Act. 27, 37.

26–28 AVGVSTINVS, *De doctrina christiana* III, xxxv, 50 (CCSL 32, pp. 110–111; PL 34, 86). *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* I, cxvii, 4 (CCSL 33, pp. 43–44; PL 34, 578).

2–3 suique . . . porrectus] *om. HMR* 4 clementia] gratia *HM* 6 leni] *p. ras. R¹*
7 peruenturi] *R¹*, uenturi *R⁰* 8 ALVMNVS] *scripsi, A codd.* 8 tendenda] sunt *add. HM*
8 nanque] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 9 huius] *om. HMR* 9 undarum] *om. HMR*
9 nullos] *corr. R¹* 12 ubi] *p. ras. R¹, ut R⁰* 13 dei . . . uerbum] *om. HMR* 16 colere] *om. HMR*
16 studiumque] *R¹*, studium *R⁰* 17 domino] domini *HMR* 18 ad] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰*
19 litterarum] *litterarum R¹, litterarum R⁰* 20 mouente] monente *HM* 21 redeundo] *corr. R¹*
21 diligit] *deligat R¹* 23 terra] *corr. R¹* 26 sinedoche *HM, lege συννδοχή*
28 et partem] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰* 28 concipit] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰*

the obscurity of the subtlest intellects, which like concealed rocks may suddenly split our vessel: and the length of this course is such that we must extend it even into a fifth book (9). Nevertheless, with the mercy of God as our captain and steersman and our sails filled with the propitious wind of His Divine Spirit, we shall pick through all these dangers the true and safe course, and reach the harbour which we seek, free and unhurt after a smooth voyage.

ALUMNUS. Let us spread sail, then, and set out to sea. For reason, not inexperienced in these waters, fearing neither the threats of the waves nor divagations nor the Syrtes nor rocks, shall speed our course: indeed she finds it sweeter to exercise her skill in the hidden straits of the ocean of Divinity than idly to bask in smooth and open waters, where she cannot display her power (10). For in the sweat of her brow is she to get her bread (that is, the Word) – so she is commanded – and to till the field of Holy Scripture, prolific as it is of thorns and thistles (that is, a thin crop of interpretations of what is divine) (11), and to follow with the unflagging steps of investigation the study of wisdom, closed to those who spurn it, ‘until she find the place for the Lord, the tabernacle of the God of Jacob’, that is to say until, the grace of God leading and helping and aiding and moving her (12) by frequent and assiduous study of the Holy Scriptures, she may return and reach again that which in the Fall of the First Man she had lost, the contemplation of Truth; and reaching it she may love it, and loving it she may abide in it, and abiding in it she may there find her rest.

N. ‘God also said: Let the earth bring forth the living soul in its 3 genus, cattle and reptiles and the beasts of the field according to their species’, etc. ‘Let the earth bring forth the living soul’: that is to say: Let the earth bring forth the living animal. This figure of speech, very common in the Scriptural writings, is called synecdoche or *conceptio*: for the concept of the whole is implied in the naming of the part, or that of the part in the naming of the whole (13). So the word soul by itself frequently in the Scriptures signifies the whole animal. Thus in the Acts of the Apostles it is said: ‘We were in the ship two hundred and seventy souls’; the souls, of course, were not there without the

in Genesis: *Omnes animae domus Iacob, quae ingressa est in Aegyptum, fuere septuaginta quinque*. In euangelio, ex carne totus homo uocatur: *Et uerbum caro factum est, hoc est, uerbum factum est totus homo, carne, anima, menteque subsistens*. Et alibi: *Spiritus quidem promptus est, caro uero infirma, carnis uocabulo totam suam humanitatem significans, spiritu uero sanctum spiritum, promptum quidem, et corroborantem se ad redemptionem humani generis in difficultate passionis*. Quem spiritum, crucis patibulo fixus, patri commendauit dicens: *Pater, in manus tuas commendo spiritum meum*. Ac si dixisset: spiritum a me et a te procedentem in manus tuas commendo, quoniam impassibilis est, donec solus carni compatiar, qui solus carnem accepi et caro factus sum. Non quod et ipse passibilis sit secundum diuinitatem, sed quod in eum humanitatis, quam solus acceperat, passibilitas et passio et mors refertur, humanitatisque, quam sibi in unitatem substantiae assumpserat, compassus est. Ideoque quia compassus, non immerito dicitur et uere dicitur passus; non enim separata est in passione una substantia uerbi et hominis.

Et ut certius corroboratum auctoritate perspicias, audi praedictum Epifanium in sermone de fide: *Semel, inquit, mortuus est pro nobis, sustinens pati pro nostris passionibus, semel gustauit mortem, mortem autem usque ad crucem. Volens pro nobis uerbum in mortem uenit, ut mortem interimeret. Verbum caro factum est, non patiens in deitate, compatiens autem cum humanitate in impassibilitate. Passio autem sibi deputata est, ipso manente in impassibilitate; mors ei reputata est, eo manente in immortalitate. Ipse enim dixit: "Ego sum uita"; uita autem nunquam moritur, sed uenit uiuificare pro nobis mortem accipiens. Non enim per hominem erat nobis uita, neque per carnem nobis spes: "Maledictus enim", inquit, "sperans in hominem", et "Qui habet spem in homine erit sicut agrestis murica". Quid ergo dicemus? Non homo Christus? Ex his quae praedicta sunt unicuique clarum est quia absque ulla ambiguitate confitemur dominum deum uerbum hominem factum, non opinione sed ueritate. Sed non homo uenit in profectum deitatis; non enim in homine erat nobis spes salutis; nemo enim omnium hominum in Adam potuit operari salutem, sed deus uerbum homo factus, ne spes nostra in hominem sed in deum uiuentem et uerum factum hominem fieret. "Omnis enim sacerdos ex hominibus acceptus, pro*

1-2 Gen. 46, 27 (iuxta LXX). 2-3 Ioh. 1, 14. 4-5 Matth. 26, 41; Marc. 14, 38. 8-9 Luc. 23, 46. 19 Rom. 6, 10. 20-21 Phil. 2, 8. 25 Ioh. 11, 25; 14, 6. 27-28 Ier. 17, 5. 28 Ier. 17, 6. 8.35-10.1 Hebr. 5, 1.

3-4 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, iv, 46-56 (CCSL 48, p. 419; PL 41, 408). 8.19-10.23 EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 92-94 (GCS 25, pp. 113, 17 - 115, 11; PG 43, 185B-188C).

2 **quinque**] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰, quibus H, quique M 6 **spiritu**] R¹, spiritum R⁰
6 **quidem**] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 28 **hominem**] hominem HM 28 **murica**] miricae F (corr. ex murica), mirice HM 32 **erat**] in add. R 35 **fieret**] om. HMR

bodies. And in Genesis: 'All the souls of the House of Jacob which entered into Egypt were seventy-five' (14). In the Gospel the word flesh signifies the whole man: 'And the Word was made flesh' means that the Word was made a complete man, consisting of flesh, soul and mind. And where it is said in another place: 'The spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak', by the flesh is meant the whole of His humanity, and by the spirit the Holy Spirit which was indeed a ready helper for Him in the stress of His Passion in His task of redeeming the human race. It is that Spirit which when He was nailed to the cross He commended to His Father, saying, 'Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit': which is as much as to say: Into Thy hands I commend the Spirit Which proceeds from Thee and from Me, for He is incapable of suffering: I alone shall suffer in the flesh, for I alone put on flesh, and was made flesh. I do not mean that even He, in His Godhead, is capable of suffering, but that with the humanity which He alone put on He was subjected to the capacity for suffering, actual passion and death: these things He suffered together with the manhood which He had taken into the unity of His Substance (15). Since then it is rightly said that He partook of the suffering of His manhood, it is equally true to say that He suffered. For the Substance of the Word and of the man is one, and is not divided in the Passion.

And if you require a more certain support from authority, hear what the same Epiphanius says in his Discourse on Faith: 'He died for us once, consenting to bear suffering for our sufferings: He once tasted death, even the death of the Cross: willingly for us the Word encountered death, that it might destroy death: the Word was made flesh, and while It did not suffer in Its Godhead, yet in Its incapacity for suffering It partook of the suffering of Its manhood. It remains incapable of passion, and yet the Passion is attributed to It: death is attributed to It, and yet It remains in immortality: for He himself has said: "I am the Life": and Life never dies, but accepting death on our behalf, He came to bring us life. For life came to us not through man, nor hope through the flesh. For, "Cursed be he", He says, "who places his hope in man", and, "He who puts his trust in man will be like the tamarisk of the field". What conclusion, then, shall we draw from this? Does it not appear from what we have said that Christ is man? That it must be clear to everyone that we unreservedly confess that the Word Our Lord was made man: this is not a matter of opinion but of truth. But the man was not one who had achieved Godhead: for not in man did our hope of salvation lie; not one of all the men since Adam could have achieved it. But God the Word was made man that our hope should not depend upon man but upon the true and living God made man. For it is written that "every high priest chosen from amongst men is constituted for

hominibus constituitur”, iuxta quod scriptum est. Vnde ex nostra humanitate accepit dominus ueniens carnem, et homo factus est nobis deus uerbum, ut in deitate daretur nobis salus, et in sua humanitate pateretur pro nobis hominibus, passionem per passionem soluens, et mortem per suam mortem mortificans. Deputata est autem passio in deitatem, et quidem deitate non 5
 patiente, reputata autem passione deitati, quia sic bene placuit uenienti sancto et impassibili uerbo. Est autem huiusmodi quoddam exemplum: 745D
 uehuti si quis uestimentum indutus, in uestimento autem sanguis sparsus pollueret uestimentum, et sanguis in uestimentum ueniens non tangeret corpus induti, deputeretur autem contagio sanguinis uestimenti in eum 10
 qui uestimentum induitur. Sic in carne passus est Christus, in ipso dico dominico homine, sic in seipsum reformauit ex caelis ueniens ipse sanctus 746A
 deus uerbum, sicut ait beatus Petrus: “Mortificatus carne, uiuificatus autem spiritu”, et iterum: “Christo ergo patiente pro nobis carne, et nos in eandem intelligentiam armari”. Sic, uehuti sanguis in uestimento deputatur ferenti, 15
 deputata est ei passio carnis in deitatem, deitate nil patiente, ut non in hominem haberet mundus spem, sed in dominico homine, deitate recepta, reputaretur in ipsam passio, ut fieret pro mundo ex deitate impassibili salus, ut in carne facta passio, et deitate nihil patiente neque sustinente, in eam fieret deputata passio, impleta scriptura quae dicit: “Si enim cognouissent, 20
 nunquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent”. Crucifixus est ergo, crucifixus est dominus; et adoramus crucifixum, sepultum, et resurgentem tertia die, et in 746B
 caelos ascendentem.

Vt autem cognoscas quod non de alio, uerum de sancto spiritu dictum sit: Pater, in manus tuas commendo spiritum meum, audi 25
 eundem in eodem: Si audieritis, inquit, quia “in dextra dei exaltatus et promissionem spiritus accipiens a patre”, aut “praestolari promissionem patris quam audistis mei”, aut quia “spiritus eum immisit in desertum”, aut (quod ipse dicit) “Nolite cogitare quid dicatis, quia spiritus patris mei qui loquitur in uobis”, aut “Si autem in spiritu dei eicio daemonia”, aut “Qui 30
 autem blasphematur in spiritu sanctum, non dimittet ei” et reliqua, aut “Pater, in manus tui commendo spiritum mei”, aut “Puer autem crescebat et confortabatur ipse spiritu”, aut “Iesus autem plenus spiritu sancto reuersus est 746C
 ab Iordane”, aut “Reuersus est Iesus in uirtute spiritus”, aut “Quod natum est ex spiritu spiritus est”, aut “Et ego rogabo patrem, et alium paraclitum dabit 35

13–14 I Petr. 3, 18. 14–15 I Petr. 4, 1. 20–21 I Cor. 2, 8. 25 Luc. 23, 46. 26–27 Act. 2, 33. 27–28 Act. 1, 4. 28 Marc. 1, 12. 29–30 Matth. 10, 19–20. 30 Luc. 11, 20. 30–31 Marc. 3, 29. 32 Luc. 23, 46. 32–33 Luc. 1, 80. 33–34 Luc. 4, 1. 34 Luc. 4, 14. 34–35 Ioh. 3, 6. 10.35–12.1 Ioh. 14, 16–17.

10.26–12.3 EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 69 (GCS 25, pp. 85, 23 – 86, 13; PG 43, 144C–145A).

6 deitati] deitate HM 15 sic] sicut HMR rectius ut uidetur: καθώς (GCS 25, p. 25, 27)
 21 crucifixissent] F (p. corr.), HMP; R¹ (ut uidetur), crucifixerunt F (a. corr.), JR⁰ 21 est²] om. HMR 25 sit] est HMR, om. FP 34 in uirtute spiritus] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 35 spiritu] p. ras. R¹

the service of men”. Therefore the Lord when He came took flesh of our humanity, and God the Word was made man for us, so that in His Godhead we might obtain salvation, while in His manhood He might bear sufferings for us men, by His Passion resolving our passion and by His Death slaying death itself. But suffering is attributed to the Deity, and yet the Deity does not suffer: suffering is attributed to the Deity because so the Word, Which is holy and cannot suffer, willed when It came. We may think in this connection of a man who puts on a garment which has been soiled by stains of blood: although the blood is upon the garment it does not touch the body of him who wears it, although it be said of the wearer that he is soiled by the blood. In just such a way Christ is said to have suffered in the flesh, that is to say, in the man whom our Lord became: and such a change the Holy God the Word made in Himself, when He came down from heaven – as the Blessed Peter writes: “Mortified in the flesh, but living in the Spirit”: and again: “Therefore Christ suffering for us in the flesh, we ourselves are fortified by this knowledge”. Thus as the blood upon the garment is attributed to the wearer, so the passion of the flesh is attributed in His case to the Godhead, although the Godhead suffers nothing: so that the world’s hope reposes not in man but in the man whom the Lord became: but when He took upon Himself again His Godhead, the Passion was attributed to it, so that the world might owe its salvation to the impassible Godhead. As the Passion was endured in the flesh, so the attribution of passion was assigned to the Godhead, who neither suffered nor endured, that the Scripture might be fulfilled which says: “If they had known they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory”. So He is crucified, the Lord is crucified: and we adore Him crucified, buried, rising on the third day, and ascending to the heavens’ (16).

But that you may know that it was concerning none other than the Spirit that were spoken the words, ‘Father into Thy hands I commend my Spirit’, refer once again to the same treatise of Epiphanius: ‘When you hear it said that “He ascended to the right hand of the Father and obtained from the Father the promise of the Spirit”, or the words: “To await the promise of the Father which you heard from Me”, or: “The Spirit sent Him into the wilderness”, or the words which He Himself spoke: “Give no thought of what you shall say, for it is the Spirit of My Father Which speaks in you”, or: “But if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils”, or: “But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him”, etc., or: “Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit”, or: “But the Boy grew and was strengthened by the Spirit”, or: “But Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from Jordan”, or: “Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit”, or: “That which is born from the Spirit is spirit”, or: “And I shall ask My Father, and He shall send you

uobis spiritum ueritatis”, aut “Quare impleuit Satanas cor tuum (Ananiae dixit Petrus) mentiri spiritui sancto?”, et posthac, “non hominibus mentitus es, sed deo”, igitur deus ex deo et deus spiritus sanctus est. Hactenus ex Epifanio.

A. Transitus iste, quamuis longius proposito uideatur recessisse, 5
utilis tamen est uolentibus sanctam scripturam intelligere. Suasit
enim deitatem uerbi et impassibilem esse et suae humanitati
compassam. Approbat etiam quod dominus dixit in euangelio –
Spiritus quidem promptus est, caro uero infirma, itidem *Pater, in manus tuas* 746D
commendo spiritum meum – non de alio spiritu dictum, sed de spiritu 10
sancto. Sed ad propositum redire oportet.

N. *Producat terra animam uiuentem*, hoc est: producat terra animal
uiuens. Vide quam pulchre iuxta praedictum tropum et totum a 747A
parte, totum scilicet animal, ex meliore eius medietate, quae est 15
anima, significauit. Et quia minor medietas totius animalis, quae est
corpus, a terra sumitur, eodem tropo totum animal, hoc est corpus et
animam, a terra produci iubetur, dum anima omnino terra non sit,
sicut neque corpus anima. Quoniam uero ipsa corpori adhaeret in
unitate animalitatis, simul de terra fieri scriptura testatur.

Sed si quis altius hunc locum quaesierit, potest alio modo 20
intelligere. Terrae siquidem uocabulo totius naturae substantialis
uisibilium et inuisibilium incommutabilis soliditas solet insinuari,
quod etiam tertiae lucis operationem speculantes exposuimus. Hinc
est quod ait Apostolus: *Mortificate membra uestra quae sunt super terram*.
Ac si aperte diceret: *Membra malitiae* (quae uestra sunt, quoniam ex 747B
uestra inoboedientia, et non ex deo facta), ex quibus ueluti quoddam 26
corpus uniuersalis nequitiae aedificatis supra terram (hoc est super
soliditatem naturae a deo conditae), ne ab eis diutius polluat,ur,
mortificate; et pro membris malitiae interemptis membra iustitiae
(quae sunt uirtutes) constituite, ut quemadmodum, super naturam ex 30
de conditam, uestris diuersis criminibus ueluti templum quoddam
abhominabile diabolicaque habitatione condignum construxistis, ita
etiam ex lapidibus uirtutum, diuina gratia dolatis, domum pretiosam
conditori ipsius terrae (hoc est ipsius naturae), omni sorde expulsa 35
penitusque interempta, reaedificetis. Cui sensui Psalmista consentit 747C
dicens: *Deficient peccatores a terra et iniqui, ita ut non sint*, ubi tropice

1–2 Act. 5, 3. 2–3 Act. 5, 4. 9 Marc. 14, 38. 9–10 Luc. 23, 46. 12 Gen. 1, 24.
24 Col. 3, 5. 36 Ps. 103, 35.

23 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 702B–D.

2 posthac] post haec HM 5 longius proposito] longius proposito M (a. corr.), longius a
proposito H, M (p. corr.) 11 sed] p. ras. R¹ 14 totum scilicet] partim p. ras. partim sup.
l. R¹ 17 animam] anima HM 27 supra] super HM 31 deo conditam uestris] sup. l.
R¹, om. R⁰ 33 etiam] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 34 terrae] om. FJP 35 reaedificetis] corr. R¹

another Comforter, the Spirit of Truth” or: “Why has Satan filled your heart”, said Peter to Ananias, “that you lie to the Holy Spirit”, and later on: “You did not lie to men, but to God”, – from all these it follows that from God proceeds God, and the Holy Spirit is God’. So much from Epiphanius.

A. Although this digression seems to have taken us some way from our subject, it is valuable for those who wish to understand the Holy Scriptures. For from it we have learnt that the Godhead of the Word is incapable of suffering, and yet shares in the suffering of Its humanity. And this agrees with what our Lord has said in His Gospel: ‘The Spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak’; and again: ‘Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit’ – where He is speaking of no other spirit than the Holy Spirit. But we must return to our subject.

N. ‘Let the earth bring forth the living soul’: that is to say, Let 4
the earth bring forth the living animal. Note the beauty of this figure, mentioned already, of the part for the whole, whereby the whole animal is indicated by its better part, the soul. And since of the whole animal the lower part (17), the body, is derived from the earth, this same phrase is a command to the whole animal, body and soul, to be produced from the earth. For although the soul has nothing earthly about it since it is not a body, yet since it combines with the body to produce the unity of the animal, the Scriptures can say that it too is formed from the earth.

But if an enquiry is desired into the higher meaning of this passage, it can be interpreted in another way: We are wont to use the word ‘earth’ to signify the constant mass of the totality of substantial nature, including both the visibles and the invisibles – everything in fact which we speculated to have come into being on the Third Day. Hence, when the Apostle says: ‘Mortify your members which are above the earth’, he means us to mortify the members of our wickedness which are ours not because God created them, but as a result of our disobedience: so that above the earth, that is, in addition to the mass of nature which was created by God, we have built up, as it were, a body of universal sin: it is this that we must mortify lest we be any longer defiled by it. And in the place of the members of wickedness which we have destroyed, we should establish the members of righteousness, that is to say, the virtues, so that in the same way as we, by our various vices, constructed upon the nature which God had created an abominable temple fit only for the habitation of the devil, so we should now build anew from the stones of our virtues (18), which by the grace of God have been hewed out for us, a house acceptable to the Creator of the earth itself, that is, to the Creator of nature itself, from which all taint of evil should be cleansed and done away. This interpretation accords with the words of the Psalmist: ‘Sinners and evil-doers shall perish from the earth

ex effectibus causam significans, per peccatores et iniquos peccata et iniquitates insinuat, quae ex terra naturae, quando liberabitur ab omni malitia, deficient, ita ut non sint. Peccata enim et iniquitates tamdiu esse uidentur, dum nihil sint, quamdiu subiecta natura contineantur. Ea uero purgata et ad pristinam sinceritatem reducta, 5 quae per se (id est peccata et iniquitates) subsistere nesciunt, ad nihilum penitus redigentur, ita ut non sint.

Idem alibi sub persona uiri iuste uiuentis omnes iustos beatificans, qui erunt *tanquam lignum quod plantatum est secus decursus aquarum*, hoc est, tanquam uerbum quod inhumanatum est in fine omnium 10 saeculorum propter nos, *in quos*, sicut ait Apostolus, *fines saeculorum deuenere*, pluraliter quidem unum omnium finem, Christum uidelicet, nominans: ipse siquidem est fines saeculorum, qui uniuersorum est consummatio. Continuo subiunxit: *Non sic impii, non sic, sed tanquam puluis quem proiicit uentus a facie terrae*, discretionem iusti 15 iudicii uentum uocans, qua ille *cuius uentilabrum in manu sua puluerem totius malitiae ex superficie terrae* (hoc est ex substantiali 748A pulchritudine naturae) proiiciet. De hac terra in alio psalmo idem ait: *Exibit spiritus eius, et reuertetur in terram suam*. Cuius spiritus? Illius uidelicet qui fixus patibulo pro nobis, *inclinato capite, tradidit 20 spiritum*. Quo exhibit? Descendit ad inferna. Ad quid? Reducere inde humanam naturam, quae captiua illic detenta est: *Captiuam enim duxit captiuitatem*. Sed quoniam mors non poterat retinere captiuum, quem non inuenerat criminis, *reuertitur in terram suam*, in naturam suam quam fecit et redemit et accepit, in corpus 25 immortale, in pristinum naturae humanae statum, insuper etiam in gloriam resurrectionis.

Et ut cognoscas eum qui pollicitus est spiritum suum solum exiturum, non solum sed cum tota humana natura reuersurum, 748B audi ipsum dicentem: *Nisi granum frumenti cadens in terram mortuum fuerit, ipsum solum manet; si autem mortuum fuerit, multum fructum fert*. *Emittes, inquit, spiritum tuum, et renouabis faciem terrae*, hoc est, restitues integritatem naturae. Siue de anima Christi spiritum quis

9 Ps. 1, 3. 11-12 I Cor. 10, 11. 14-15 Ps. 1, 4. 16 Matth. 3, 12. 19 Ps. 145, 4. 20-21 Ioh. 19, 30. 22-23 Eph. 4, 8. 24-25 Ps. 145, 4. 30-32 Ioh. 12, 24-25. 32 Ps. 103, 30.

3-5 Cf. *De praedestinatione* X, 89-94. XV, 175-184 (CCCM 50, pp. 65 et 92; PL 122, 395C-396A et 416B-C). 8-11 Cf. *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* I, 550-560 (CCCM 31, p. 16; PL 122, 139C-140A).

I significans] *R*^l, significat *F* (corr. ex significans), *R*^o 2 insinuat] *J* (corr. ex insinuando), insinuando *R*^l (corr. ex insinuans), *FH*, *J* (a. corr.), *M* (corr. ex insinuanda), *P*, uel insinuat quasi alteram lectionem sup. l. add. *M* 5 contineantur] corr. *R*^l 13-14 ipse . . . consummatio] *R*^l, om. *R*^o 17 superficie] corr. *R*^l 20 fixus patibulo] patiens *HMR* 21 descendit] descendit *R* 24 reuertitur] reuertetur *HMR* 28 solum] *R*^l, om. *R*^o 33 spiritum] *R*^l, om. *R*^o

so as not to be'. For here by another figure the effect signifies the cause, and by sinners and evil-doers are meant sins and evils, which shall perish from the earth of nature when it is freed from all evil, so as no longer to exist. For as long as our nature is held subject to sin and evil, so long will they appear to be, although in fact they are not: but when our nature is purged of them and returns to her former purity, all things which have no subsistence of themselves, that is to say, sin and evil, shall revert to utter nothingness, so as no longer to exist.

In another place the Psalmist in the name of a righteous liver bestows his blessing upon all the righteous: 'They shall be like a tree that is planted by the water-side', that is to say, like the Word Which was made flesh for our sakes in the end of all the ages. For the Apostle says that upon us 'the ends of the ages have come down', using the plural for the singular End of all, namely Christ: for He is the ends of the ages because He is the consummation of all things (19). The Psalmist continues: 'Not so shall it be with the wicked, not so: but they shall be as the dust which the wind blows from the face of the earth', calling the dispensation of the righteous judgment a wind because it is by that, 'with a winnowing fan in His hand', that He dispels the dust of all evil from the surface of the earth, that is to say, from the loveliness of the substance of nature. In another psalm the writer says of this earth: 'His Spirit shall go forth and shall return again to his own earth'. Whose Spirit? Surely His Who, when nailed to the cross for us, 'drooped His head and gave up His Spirit'. And where is it to go forth? He descended into hell. For what purpose? To lead out our human nature which had been held in bondage there: for 'He led captivity captive'. But since death was not able to hold captive Him in Whom she found no sin, 'He returns again to His own earth': He reverts to His own nature, the nature which He had created, redeemed, and made His own: he puts on the body of immortality, the first state of man's nature, and in addition the glory of His own Resurrection.

And that you may know that He Who promised that His Spirit should go forth alone, shall Himself return not alone, but bringing the whole of human nature with Him, hear His very words: 'If a grain of wheat falls not into the earth and dies, it remains alone: but if it shall have died it bears much fruit'. 'You shall send forth Your Spirit', He says, 'and shall renew the face of the earth', that is to say, You will restore the integrity of nature: and the Spirit may be taken to refer to the soul of Christ which, 'at the drooping of His head' (signifying

intelligat, quae, *inclinato capite* (compatiente uidelicet eius deitate), pro salute mundi tradita est, et exiuit, et reuersa est in illam naturam, quam legatione sua redemit – emissa quoque est ut restauraret pulchritudinem naturae quae in primo homine deleta est – siue de spiritu sancto (qui est spiritus Christi), qui, humiliato capite 5 (quod est Christus), momentanea carnis morte traditus est uniuersae creaturae, cuius primogenitus est, ipse cuius spiritus est exhibit, et *reuertetur in terram suam*, hoc est in illam naturam quam propter 748C peccatum primi hominis deseruerat. Sua erat, priusquam peccantem relinqueret, sed propter eum, cuius spiritus est, et qui pro ea passus 10 est, in eam reuertitur, et amplius resurrectionis tempore reuertetur; et mittitur, ut uirtute ipsius uniuersae naturae facies in pristinum decorem restituatur.

Quoniam itaque in hac omnium communi terra omnia animalia secundum corpus et animam causaliter et primordialiter creata sunt 15 (nam in homine omnia facta sunt), quid mirum si diuino praecepto iubeatur animam uiuentem (hoc est animal uiuens) producere, ut quod causaliter occulte in causis et rationibus habebat, hoc in genera et species aperte produceret? Et uide quomodo naturalem rerum 748D consequentiam diuinum nobis manifestat eloquium: *Producat*, inquit, 20 *terra animam uiuentem in genere suo*. Primo genus posuit, quoniam in ipso omnes species et continentur et unum sunt, et in eas diuiditur, et multiplicatur per generales formas specialissimasque species. Quod etiam ostendit dicens: *iuuenta et reptilia et bestias terrae secundum 749A species suas*. Ac per hoc intelligitur quod ars illa, quae diuidit genera 26 in species, et species in genera resoluit, quaeque ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ dicitur, non ab humanis machinationibus sit facta, sed in natura rerum ab auctore omnium artium, quae uere artes sunt, condita, et a sapientibus inuenta, et ad utilitatem sollerti rerum indagine usitata.

Qualis discretio inter ea quae de aqua et de terra producta sunt inuenitur

A. Ex his quae, ni fallor, rationabiliter a te dicta sunt, si quis 30 uoluerit, potest etiam alio modo intelligere quod scriptum est: *Producant aquae reptile animae uiuentis et uolatile super terram*, ut non solum simpliciter, quemadmodum superius tractatum est, intelligat pisces et uolatilia de hoc uisibili atque tractabili humidoque ac frigido 35 aquarum elemento creata esse, uerum etiam, altiori sensu, ex abditis profundisque naturae sinibus, in quibus causaliter et primordialiter 749B

1 Ioh. 19, 30. 8 Ps. 145, 4. 20–21 Gen. 1, 24. 24–25 Gen. 1, 24. 32 Gen. 1, 20.

27–29 AVGVSTINVS, *De doctrina christiana* II, xxxii, 50, 1–4 (CCSL 32, p. 67; PL 34, 58).

2 naturam] patriam HM 4 in primo homine] om. MR 16 nam . . . sunt] om. R^o, quoniam in homine (honore HM) omnia facta sunt HMR^l 26 resoluit quaeque] resoluitque quae HM 29 sollerti . . . indagine] sollertis rerum indagis (-ginis H) HMR

the condescension of the Deity to participation in the Passion), was given over for the world's salvation, and it went out and returned to that nature which it had redeemed by its mission, and it was sent forth to restore the beauty of the nature which was destroyed in the First Man; or the Spirit may be taken to refer to the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ, Who bowing His head, which is Christ, was given over in the passing death of the flesh for the universal creature, of which He is the Firstborn whose Spirit He is. He shall go forth 'and return again to His own earth', that is to say, into that nature which He had abandoned because of the sin of the First Man; for that was His own until it transgressed and was abandoned by Him; but He returns to it again for the sake of Him Whose Spirit He is and who endured the Passion on its behalf: and at the time of the Resurrection He shall return again in yet fuller measure, and He shall be sent to restore by His power the countenance of the universal nature to its former glory.

Therefore, seeing that on this earth that is common to us all every animal was causally and primordially created as soul and body (for all things were created in man) (20), why should we be surprised that the Divine Precept ordained that there should be brought forth the living soul, that is, the living animal, which is simply the evolution into the tangible state of genus and species of those things which were already contained latently in their reasons and causes? And see how the Sacred Text declares to us the natural sequence of events: 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul in its genus'. Genus is mentioned first because all species are contained in it and achieve their unity in it, and it is divided into them, and achieves its multiplicity by division into the general forms and differentiated species, a process which is also revealed in the words: 'Cattle and reptiles and beasts of the field after their species' (21). From this we may see that that art which concerns itself with the division of genera into species and the resolution of species into genera (22), which is called *dialectic* did not arise from human contrivances, but was first implanted in nature by the originator of all the arts that are properly so called, and was later discovered there by the sages who make use of it in their subtle investigation of reality (23).

A. From what you have, unless I am mistaken, outlined so reasonably, one could if one wished interpret in another way the text, 'Let the waters bring forth living souls both creeping things and things that fly above the earth'. For not only can this mean simply, as said above, that fishes and birds were created from the moist and cold element of water which we can touch and see, but it is also capable of a higher significance relating to the deeply hidden recesses of nature in which these were created in their primordial causes before they

5
The
difference
between what
is produced
from water
and what
from earth

facta sunt, in genera et species deducta. Quid enim obstat ne, sicut terrae uocabulo naturae significatur soliditas et fertilitas, ita etiam aquarum significatione eiusdem naturae abdita intelligatur profunditas, ut omnium animalium quae, siue ex terra siue ex aquis leguntur creari, una eademque cognoscatur origo, quamuis diuidatur 5 eorum speculatio: alia siquidem in quinta prophetica theoria, alia in sexta condita esse memorantur. Nec hoc sine ratione factum crediderim. Veri enim simile uidetur quod ideo terrena animalia sexta die, in qua etiam homo factus est, de terra produci iubentur, quoniam maiorem similitudinem hominis in natura sua uidentur 10 habere: omne siquidem quod in natura animalis hominis praeter intellectum et rationem cognoscitur, naturaliter eis inesse physica 749C speculatione inuenitur.

De eo quod
terra uisibilis
et aqua
nil per se
gignunt

N. Non solum, ut opinor, nil obstat, uerum etiam ut ita intelligamus ea quae scripta sunt secundum ueritatem rerum 15 factarum, ratio ipsa intentius considerata nos aduocat. Est enim multiplex et infinitus diuinorum eloquiorum intellectus: siquidem in penna pauonis una eademque mirabilis ac pulchra innumerabilium colorum uarietas conspicitur in uno eodemque loco eiusdem pennae portiunculae. Et quidem natura ipsa rerum ad hunc 20 attrahit intellectum. Terra nanque ista sensibilis et aqua corpora composita sunt ex qualitatibus quattuor elementorum; et nihil de se gignunt, nullaue species naturae ex eis nascitur, quamuis ex eis nasci uideatur. Vis autem seminum, quae in eis sunt, operante 749D illa uita, quae nutritiua dicitur, secundum leges et rationes insitas, 25 quantum sinit diuina prouidentia, in diuersas species herbarum, surculorum, animalium per genera et formas ex secretis creaturae sinibus erumpit. Ac per hoc, unde terra et aqua uisibilis et tractabilis in suas naturales species et qualitates et quantitates processere, inde omnia quae ex eis nasci uidentur generationis suae originem sumunt. 30 Est enim generalissima quaedam atque communis omnium natura, 750A ab uno omnium principio creata, ex qua ueluti amplissimo fonte, per poros occultos corporalis creaturae, ueluti quidam riuli deriuantur, et in diuersas formas singularum rerum eructant. Praedicta siquidem uis per diuersa semina ex archanis naturae proueniens, primumque 35 in ipsis seminibus erumpens, deinde diuersis humoribus admixta, in species singulas sensibiles ebullit.

11 animalis] *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 11 praeter] *corr.* *R*¹ 12 physica] *scripsi*, *physica codd.*
18 mirabilis] *partim p. ras. partim sup. l.* *R*¹ 19 uno . . . loco] una eademque *M*, una eademque mirabilis ac pulchra *H* 19-20 eiusdem pennae portiunculae] *sup. l.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰, eiusdem pennae portiuncula *HM* 33 corporalis] *codd.*, corporales *Gale* (164.22) et *Floss* (750A4)

evolved into their genera and species (24). For if we can take earth to mean the mass and fertility of nature, what is to prevent us from taking water to mean her concealed depths? In which case, for all animals, whether we are taught that they come from land or sea, we should recognise one and the same ultimate source, in spite of the fact that we speculate on them separately: for some were said to be created on the Fifth Prophetic Day, and others on the Sixth. And I believe there is a reason for this: for it seems likely that the earth was commanded to bring forth the land animals on the Sixth Day, the day of the creation of man also, because their nature appears to exhibit a closer resemblance to that of man. For excepting reason and intellect there is nothing in the nature of man as animal (25) that may not be observed in Physics as natural in the others.

N. Far from anything preventing us, reason herself, in my opinion, if we could but listen to her more carefully, insists that we should understand the relation which exists between the Sacred Texts and reality. For there are many ways, indeed an infinite number, of interpreting the Scriptures (26), just as in one and the same feather of a peacock and even in one and the same point of a tiny portion of the same feather, we see a marvellously beautiful variety of innumerable colours (27). And this variety of interpretation is not contrary to nature, for this tangible earth and water are bodies composed of the qualities of the four elements: and they bring forth nothing of themselves and in spite of all appearance no natural species is born of them. No: it is by the operation of that life force which is called the nutritive, in accordance with the laws and principles which were implanted in them, that the potency of the seeds which they contain bursts forth from the secret recesses of creation (28), as far as it is permitted by the Divine providence, through the genera and the forms into the different species of grasses, twigs, and animals: so that the coming into being of all things which appear to be born of visible and tractable earth and water originates from the same source whence they themselves have issued forth into their natural species and qualities and quantities. For there is a most general nature in which all things participate, which is created by the One Universal Principle. And from this nature as from an ample spring certain streams, so to speak, issue through the hidden pores of the corporeal creature (29), and pursue their different courses through subterranean channels until they break out above ground in the different forms of the individual objects of nature. For the potency which I have mentioned, coming forth from the hidden places of nature through the various seeds, first declares itself in those seeds, and then mixed with various fluids pullulates into the distinct species of the sensibles.

The visible
earth and
water gener-
ate nothing
of themselves

Qualis inter
conditionem
hominis et
animalium
distantia

A. Rata haec uerique similia physiologiaeque speculationibus conueniunt. Quoniam uero homo, qui sexta die conditus est, in numero animalium constituitur, quae sub uno genere comprehenduntur, num in hoc praecepto diuino, quo iubetur terra animam uiuam producere, intelligendus sit necne, uelim a te audire. 750B

N. Hanc inquisitionem non facile soluerim, si solummodo diuina scriptura pronuntiaret: *Producat terra animam uiuentem*. Verum quia addidit *in genere suo*, planissime patefecit omnia animalia in hoc praecepto contineri. Nulla enim species est quae in genere suo omnino non collocatur. Sed quia haec forma animalis, quae in homine constituta est, caeterorum animalium naturam, quae sub eodem genere sunt, dignitate rationis et intelligentiae superat, prouide prophetica contemplatio eam caeteris animalibus adiungere uoluit, ut conditionem ipsius iuxta suae naturae excellentiam latius et copiosius in fine omnium quae a deo facta sunt narraret. Species igitur animalis maxima et pretiosissima bis in operibus sextae speculationis commemoratur: primum quidem in genere suo, quod est animal, iubetur a terra produci, deinde paulo post, caeterorum animalium breuissima diuisione facta, conditio eius ad imaginem et similitudinem dei introducitur. 750C

A. Vna itaque forma et inter caetera animalia de terra producitur, ac mox ad imaginem dei fieri perhibetur. Quod merito me mouet. Si enim omne illud genus, quod dicitur animal, cum omnibus suis formis ad imaginem et similitudinem dei fieret, non perturbaret me fortassis quod doces, hominem quidem et de terra inter caetera animalia produci, et postmodum ad imaginem et similitudinem dei fabricari. Iam uero quoniam solum hominem, et nullum aliud animal praeter hominem, ad imaginem dei creari diuina perhibet historia, ualde miror quomodo inter iumenta et reptilia et bestias terrae homo a terra producitur, et ad imaginem dei longe et incomparabiliter ultra caetera uniuersa animalia solus formatur, dicente scriptura: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*. Et, quod est mirabilius, quomodo a terra producitur inter ea quibus praefertur et dominari iubetur? Subiunxit enim scriptura: *Et praesit piscibus maris et uolatilibus caeli et bestiis, uniuersaeque creaturae, omnique reptili quod mouetur in terra*. 750D

7-8 Gen. 1, 24. 32 Gen. 1, 26. 34-36 Gen 1, 26.

1 physiologiaeque] scripsi cum M (p. corr.), physeologiaeque M (a. corr.), phiseologiaeque F (a. corr.), JPR, physiologiaeque F (p. corr.), H 6 non] tam add. HMR 6 soluerim] soluerem FJ (corr. ex soluerim), absoluerim HMR 13 adiungere] abiungere HMR 21 itaque] igitur HMR 24 dei fieret] p. ras. R^l 24 fieret] creari add. R^o (postea erasum)

A. Your account is logical and likely, for it accords with the observations of the naturalists. But since man, who was created on the Sixth Day, is thus set among the number of the animals, and comprehended under one genus with them, I should like to hear from you whether or not his creation is also included within the Divine Precept which commanded the earth 'to bring forth the living soul'.

The
difference
between the
creation of
man and of
animals

N. This would be a hard question to answer if the Scriptures merely said 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul'. But the addition of the words, 'in its genus', makes it quite clear that this precept applies to all the animals. For there is no species which is not wholly included in its genus. It is true that the species of animal which is established in man is superior by virtue of reason and intelligence to the nature of the animals which are in the same genus, and is only placed with the other animals (30) by the foresight of the Prophet's Contemplation in order that he might describe his creation more spaciouly and in greater detail – as the excellence of his nature required – at the conclusion of all the things which God created. Thus he records this greatest and most precious species of animal twice in his account of the events of the Sixth Day: first, under his genus, which is animal, he is commanded to be brought forth from the earth; and then somewhat later, when a brief classification of the animals has been given, mention is made of his creation as image and likeness of God.

A. A single form, then, is first brought forth out of the earth together with the other animals: and a little later is said to be made in the image of God. Not unreasonably, I am troubled about this. For if the whole of that genus which is called animal with all its species was made in the image and likeness of God I should perhaps find nothing surprising in your doctrine that man was first brought forth from the earth with the rest of the animals and then a little later was made in the image and likeness of God: but since in fact the Sacred Narrative relates that only man, and no other animal but man, was created in the image of God, I find it somewhat strange that man was brought forth from the earth with cattle, reptiles and beasts of the field; and yet he alone is formed in the image of God, and so removed far beyond all comparison with the rest of the animal kingdom: for it is written: 'Let Us make man in Our image and likeness'. And I find it stranger still that he was brought forth together with those over whom he is preferred and ordained to be master. For the Scriptures go on to say: 'And let him have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over the cattle and over the universal creature and over every creeping thing that moves upon the earth'.

N. Nec immerito nec irrationabiliter moueris. Haec enim
cautissima et sollertissima inquisitione digna sunt. Et primum
quidem, ut intelligas, remota totius ambiguitatis caligine, quod in
uniuersali animalium genere homo conditus sit, hoc maximum
suscipe argumentum, tripertitam uidelicet huius generis diuisionem 5
in iumenta et reptilia bestiasque. Quae diuisio non sine causa facta
est, ut existimo. Nam in aliis diebus, id est in tertia et quinta, in
quibus genera et species commemorantur, nulla diuisio generis in
species introducitur, sed simpliciter aut solum genus et indiscrete
species, ut in tertia (qua herbarum surculorumque genera speciesque 751B
de terra oriri iubentur), aut solum genus et una species ipsius, ut 11
in quinta, piscium quidem genus reptile, auium uero uolabile
uocans, neque hoc neque illud in species diuidens. Nam in eo
quod dixit *creauitque deus KETH grandia*, magis speciem pro genere
intelligendum posuisse, quam genus in species diuisisse. Quomodo 15
enim diuisio generis in unam speciem posset fieri, dum omnis
diuisio non minus quam in duobus inuenitur? Sexta autem die,
non solum generis conditio, uerum etiam trina diuisio ipsius in
species narratur: *Dixit, inquit, deus: Producat terra animam uiuentem
in genere suo, iumenta, et reptilia, et bestias terrae, secundum species suas.* 20
Vel secundum septuaginta interpretes: Dixit deus: Educat terra animam 751C
*uiuam secundum genus, quadrupedia, et reptilia, et bestias secundum genus,
et factum est sic.* Haec itaque, ut arbitror, tripertito totius uitae terreno
corpori adhaerentis animalque per copulam ad corpus efficientis –
est enim animal corporis et animae cum sensu connexio – triplicem 25
motum insinuat.

Et quidem ternarius ille motus in homine solo, qui solus est
I rationabile animal, intelligitur, quosdam quidem motus suos rationi
subditos habens, qui iumentorum seu quadrupedum uocabulo
significari uidentur (Verbi gratia, mouet quinquepertitum corporis 30
sensum disciplinaliter in cognitionem sensibilibum rerum sollerti
earum intelligentiae studio. Qui motus non irrationabiliter
iumentum dicitur: non enim paruam adiutorium rationabili 751D
animae praestat ad contemplationem ueritatis sensibilibum omnium,

14 Gen. 1, 21. 19–23 Gen. 1, 24.

32–33 ISIDORVS, *Etymologiae* XII, i, 7.

1 irrationabiliter] *corr. R¹* 2 sunt] *R¹, om. R⁰* 5 huius] *p. ras. R¹, eius R⁰*
7 ut existimo] *p. ras. R¹* 10–11 qua herbarum . . . iubentur] *partim p. ras. partim
sup. l. partim mg. R¹* 15 intelligendum] *est add. HMR* 15 species] *speciem
HM* 18 conditio] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 19 species] *conditionis add. R⁰ (postea
erasum)* 23 terreno] *om. HMR* 24 animalque] *R¹, diffinitionemque animalis R⁰*
24 copulam] *corr. R¹* 25 cum sensu] *om. MR* 22.30–24.12 uerbi gratia . . . originem
ducit] *Locus iste, quem uncis inclusimus, uidetur fuisse prius, glossae instar, in margine positus.
Qui, postquam in textum irrepsit, stylum eius obscurauit.*

N. Yes, you have good and reasonable cause for finding this
strange: for these matters demand a most cautious and searching
investigation. First let us prove for you beyond the shadow of any
doubt that man was in fact established within the universal genus of
the animals. The best proof of it is that this genus falls into three
groups: cattle, reptiles, and beasts of the field. There is, I think, a
reason for this division. On the other Days, the Third for instance
and the Fifth, in which mention is made of genera and species, there
is no analysis of the genus into its species: either simply the genus
alone with its species undiscriminated is given, as on the Third Day,
on which the earth was commanded to put forth the genera and
species of grass and twigs; or only the genus and one of its species, as
on the Fifth, when the genus of fish is called reptile, and the genus
of birds volatile, without in either case discrimination into species.
For where it is said: And God created the 'great sea monsters' it is
rather a question of substituting species for genus than of analysing
the genus into its species. For how could a genus be divided into one
species, seeing that no analysis discovers less than two components?
But on the Sixth Day not only do we have a description of the
creation of a genus but also of its division into three species. For it
is written: 'God said, Let the earth bring forth the living soul in its
genus, cattle and creeping things and the beasts of the earth after
their species': or as the Septuagint has it: 'God said: let the earth
bring forth the living soul according to its genus, four-footed things,
reptiles and beasts according to their genus; and so it was done' (31).
I believe, therefore, that this threefold division of all life that is joined
to an earthly body and constituting the animal through connection
with the body – for the animal is the juncture of soul and body in
sensation – implies a triple motion (32).

But this threefold motion becomes intelligible in man only, the
only rational animal. (i) For he has in subjection to his reason
certain motions which may be symbolised by the word 'cattle'
or 'four-footed things' (33). (For instance, by his skilled zeal to
understand the sensibles he moves his five-fold sense in disciplined
order towards cognition of them, and to this motion it is reasonable
to give the name of 'cattle', for it is of no small assistance (34) to
the rational soul in acquiring true and accurate knowledge of all the

'Cattle'
signify the
rational
motions of
the soul

De quadru- cuncta falsitate remota, uera sinceraque notitia. Est etiam quasi
pedibus quidam quadrupes motus sensuum, subditus rationi: siquidem
allegoricis omne quod per sensum cognoscimus in natura sensibilium rerum,
hoc ex quattuor elimentis est compositum, aut in ipso composito
5
species in aliqua materia ex qualitatibus quattuor elimentorum
752A
facta constituta est; si sonum seu odorem senseris, ex aere
quattuor elimentis composito; similiter si gustum seu tactum, ex
compactionibus aquae terraeque accidere non dubitabis. Non
immerito igitur corporeus sensus quadrupedis uocabulum accepit,
10
quoniam omne quod sentit non aliunde nisi ex quattuor elimentis
II originem ducit); quosdam uero ex inferiori natura sumptos,
irrationabiles, hoc est rationi resistentes, ut est furor et cupiditas
inordinatque corporalium sensuum appetitus in abusionem
15
sensibilibus creaturis. Et quoniam hi motus ex irrationabilibus
De bestiis animalibus humanae naturae inserti sunt, non incongrue bestiarum
rationi appellacione significantur, praesertim cum semper rationabilibus
reluctantibus disciplinis reluctari non desinant, et aut uix aut nunquam domari
ab eis possint, motusque rationabiles feroci impetu dilaniare semper
20
appetant. Sunt praeterea in animali rationabili occulti quidam
III motus, quibus maxime corpus sibi coniunctum administrat, et
sunt in auctiua et nutritiua parte animae constituti. Qui, quoniam
De reptilibus naturali facilitate sua peragunt officia, et quasi latenter, quia
humanis animae intentionem nullo modo sollicitant atque perturbant, si
tamen integritas naturae incolomis exstiterit, silenti quodam meatu
25
corporalem armoniam penetrantes, reptilium appellacionem non
irrationabiliter meruerunt. Caeteris uero animalibus, praeter solum
hominem, ex tribus praedictis motibus duo tantummodo insunt:
752C
unus quidem qui in sensibus est propriae rationis regimine carens, ac
per hoc bestialis, alter qui nutritiuae uitae deputatur, reptili similis. 30
Quos homo cum caeteris animalibus participat, et reciproce caetera
animalia cum ipso participant. Videsne igitur hominem in omnibus
animalibus, et omnia in homine, et super omnia hominem?
Et si quis intentius naturae ipsius mirabilem ac penitus ineffabilem
conditionem inspexerit, clare inueniet eundem hominem et formam 35

2 quidam] quoddam HMR 2 subditus rationi] sub dictione rationis HMR 3 omne
quod] corr. R^l 7 facta] om. HMR 12 sumptos] recte dixeris add. Gale (165.29) et
Floss (752A9), at immerito, ut patet ex nota superius (22.30-24.12) posita 14 abusionem]
attributos add. Gale (165.31) et Floss (752 A12), at immerito. Eriugena enim construxit
substantiuum nomen 'abusio' cum ablatiuo. Vnde uerba illa (in abusionem sensibilibus
creaturis) pro istis posuit: ad abutendum sensibilibus creaturis. Cf. Periphyseon V, 974A
18 aut²] corr. J, M, ut F, J (a. corr.), PR 19 dilaniare] corr. J, HM, delaniare F (a. corr.),
PR 20 quidam] R^l, quidem R⁰ 22 auctiua] actiua R⁸ (corr. ex auctiua), F (a. corr.),
HM 25 incolomis] incolomis HM 25 exstiterit] corr. R^l 27 praeter] corr. R^l
29 sensibus] sensibilibus HM 29 propriae] FMR^l, proprie HJR⁰P 34 et] om. JP
34 penitus] R^l, pene R⁰

sensibles, dispelling all falsehood. For there is, as it were, a kind of
four-footed motion of the senses subject to reason. For everything
Allegorical quadrupeds
in sensible nature of which we obtain knowledge through the sense
is composed of four elements, or rather is constituted out of such a
composition. For consider the corporeal species and you will see that
it is composed of some matter made from the qualities of the four ele-
ments. Whatever you hear or smell you may be sure is a product of
the air from among the four elements, and in like manner whatever
you taste or touch arises from the combination of earth and water. So
the term "quadruped" is not inappropriate to the bodily sense, seeing
that every sensible has its origin in the four elements and nowhere
else) (35). (ii) But there are certain irrational motions arising from
the lower nature, which are resistant to reason – such as rage and
covetousness and all the inordinate appetites of the corporeal senses,
that make wrong use of sensible creatures. And since these motions
which infect human nature belong properly to the brute creation,
Beasts that resist reason
they are not improperly called beasts, especially as they are in con-
tinual revolt against the discipline of reason, and can rarely, if ever,
be tamed thereby, but are ever seeking to attack savagely and devour
the rational motions. (iii) Moreover in the rational animal there are
certain other motions, though not manifesting themselves, by which
the body joined to it is administered. These motions are situated in
the auctive and nutritive part of the soul (36). And since they per-
form their functions by their natural facility and as it were hiddenly –
Human reptiles
for they in no way agitate or disturb the disposition of the soul but,
provided that the integrity of nature is preserved intact, penetrate by
a silent progress the harmony of the body – they are therefore not
improperly given the name of reptiles. Now in all animals except man
two only of these aforesaid three types of motion are found: that which
resides in the sense and lacks the control of its own reasoning, and is
therefore called bestial; and that which is attributed to the nutritive life
force, and resembles the reptile. Man participates in these together
with all other animals, and conversely all the other animals participate
in them in common with him. Do you now see how it is that man is in
all animals and all animals in him, and that yet he transcends them all?

And if anyone look more closely into the admirable and absolutely
ineffable constitution of his nature, he will clearly see that the same

De eo quod
homo animal
est et animal
non est

quandam in genere animalium esse, et super omnem formam
animalem subsistere, ac per hoc et affirmationem et negationem
recipere, et de eo praedicari recte posse: 'Homo animal est', 'Homo
animal non est'. Dum enim in ipso corpus et uita nutritiua et sensus
et memoria sensibilibus omnique irrationabilis appetitus (ut est
furor et cupiditas) considerantur, omnino animal est: haec enim
omnia communia sunt illi cum caeteris animalibus. Altiori uero
sui parte (qua ratione consistit, et intellectu, et interiori sensu),
cum omnibus suis rationabilibus motibus, quos uirtutes appellant,
cumque aeternarum diuinarumque rerum memoria, omnino animal
non est: siquidem cuncta haec eadem sunt homini cum caelestibus
essentiis, quae omne quod in animalium natura comprehenditur
excellencia suae substantiae incomprehensibiliter superant. Recte
igitur, ut diximus, de homine dicitur: 'Animal est', 'Animal non est'.

Quod etiam ex auctoritate diuinae scripturae possumus
corroborare. Apostolus ait: *Animalis homo non percipit quae sunt
dei*, et iterum: *Spiritualis homo iudicat omnia, ipse uero a nemine
diuidicatur*. Intuere quam clare, quam aperte hominem uelut in
duos homines diuidit, quorum unus quidem animalis est, quoniam
naturae animalium similis consistit (quae nihil spiritualium in se
recipit), alter uero spiritualis, quoniam aeternis et spiritualibus
diuinisque communicat subsistentiis, totiusque animalitatis expers
est. Et ea quidem pars, qua animal est, exterioris hominis, ea uero,
qua superat caetera animalia et seipsum in quantum animal est,
interioris congrue appellationem recipit. In his enim qui spiritualiter
uiuunt, ut idem ait Apostolus, *exterior homo corrumpitur, interior uero
de die in diem renouatur*. Nam qui perfecte uiuit, omnino corpus
suum, et uitam qua illud administratur, omnesque corporeos sensus
cum his quae per eos percipit, omnesque irrationabiles motus quos
in se sentit cum omnium rerum mutabilium memoria, non solum
spernit, uerum etiam, quantum potest, et corrumpit et destruit,
ne ullo modo in eo praeualeant, et omnino perire eis et ea sibi
appetit; seipsum uero, in quantum caelestis essentiae particeps est,
de die in diem, hoc est de uirtute in uirtutem ascendens, diuina
gratia mouente, cooperante, ducente, perficiente, renouat. Et ea
quidem natura, qua animalibus homo communicat, caro dicitur;
ea uero, qua caelestis essentiae particeps est, mens, uel animus,

16-17 I Cor. 2, 14. 17-18 I Cor. 2, 15. 26-27 II Cor. 4, 16.

23-25 AVGVSTINVS, *De Trinitate* XII, i, 1 (CCSL 50, p. 356; PL 42, 997-998).9 quos] quas HM 13 incomprehensibiliter] incomparabiliter HMR 17 dei]
spiritus HMR 20 naturae animalium similis consistit] R^l, natura animalium consistit
R^o 27 nam qui] qui enim HMR

man is a species of the genus animal and also transcends every animal
species, and thus admits of an affirmation and a negation: for it may
rightly be predicated of him: 'Man is an animal'; and: 'Man is not an
animal'. For when consideration is given to his body and his nutritive
life force, to his senses and to his memory of sensibles, and to all his
irrational appetites, such as rage and covetousness, he is altogether an
animal; for all these he shares in common with all the other animals.
But in his higher nature, which consists in reason and mind and the
interior sense, with all its rational motions, which are called virtues,
and with the memory of the eternal and divine things, he is altogether
other than animal. For all these attributes he shares with the celestial
essences, which by the excellence of their substance transcend in a
manner beyond our comprehension everything which is understood
in the animal nature. Therefore, as we have said, it may be claimed
with equal justification of man that he is, and is not, an animal (37).

And we may obtain corroboration of this from Holy Scripture (38).
'Man in his animal nature', says the Apostle, 'does not perceive
the things of God'. And again: 'Man in his spiritual nature judges
all things, but is himself judged by none'. See how clearly, how
unambiguously, he divides man into, as it were, two men: of whom
one is animal, since his nature resembles that of the animals, which
admits nothing spiritual within itself; and the other spiritual, since
it has communion with the eternal, spiritual, and divine substances,
and is free of all animality. And that part of him by which he is
animal is appropriately termed the outer man, while that by which
he transcends all other animals as well as the animal part of himself
may be called the inner man. For in those who live according to
the Spirit, in the words of the same Apostle, 'the outer man wastes,
but the inner man is renewed from day to day'. For he who lives
perfectly not only altogether despises his body and the life force
which administers it and all the corporeal senses together with the
objects which they perceive, and all the irrational motions which he
perceives in himself, together with the memory of all transient things,
but also, in so far as he is able, does away with them and destroys
them, lest they should in any way prevail within him, and strives that
he may become dead to them and they to him. But that part of him
by which he partakes of the celestial essence he renews 'from day to
day', that is, he ascends from virtue to virtue by the movement and
co-operation and leadership and perfecting power of the grace of
God (39). And that nature through which man is in communion
with the animals is called the flesh: and that by which he participates
in the celestial essence is called mind or spirit or intellect. Hear what

Man is
animal and is
not animal

uel intellectus. Audi Apostolum: *Mente*, inquit, *seruio legi dei*, *carne autem legi peccati*. Et innumerabiles diuinae scripturae sententiae hoc ipsum approbant. Quid ergo mirum, si duplex hominis conditio intelligatur, cum ipse quodammodo duplex sit; et quod animalibus simile est, cum animalibus, quod autem spiritualibus per se et absolute, cum spiritualibus creari? Ac per hoc non te turbet quod dixi hominem cum caeteris animalibus in uno eodemque genere de terra productum et, ultra omnium animalium naturam, ad imaginem et similitudinem dei factum.

A. Non me fortassis moueret, si possem ad purum dinoscere quomodo sub uno eodemque genere cunctorum animalium ita homo conditus sit, ut meliori sua parte super omnem naturam animalium subsistat.

N. Miror cur eadem repetis. Diximus enim hominem, in quantum animal est, inter animalia sub uno genere, in quantum animal non est, extra omne genus omnium animalium factum fuisse.

A. Eheu! Iam maior longeque difficilior quaestio, quantum mihi uidetur, orta est.

N. Quae sit illa, dic, quaeso.

A. Videris, ut opinor, duas animas in uno homine subsistere arbitrari: unam quidem quae corpus administrat et uiuificat et nutrit et auget, et per corporeos sensus sensibilia sentit eorumque phantasias in memoria sua recondit, et caetera quae animas animalium caeterorum in corporibus suis peragere notissimum est, alteram uero in ratione et intellectu subsistentem, ad imaginem dei et similitudinem factam, quod ualde absurdum uidetur.

N. Duas animas in uno homine nec ratio nec diuina auctoritas sinit me arbitrari, immo etiam prohibet, nec ulli recte philosophantium fas est aestimare. Vnam uero eandemque rationabilem animam humano corpori ineffabili modo adiunctam hominem esse assero; ipsumque hominem mirabili quadam et intelligibili diuisione, ea parte qua ad imaginem et similitudinem creatoris factus est, nullius animalitatis participem esse et ab ea omnino absolutum, ea uero qua animalitati communicat, in uniuersali animalium genere de terra (hoc est de communi omnium natura) productum.

1-2 Rom. 7, 25.

3 mirum] duplex conditio hominum *titulum mg. add. J* 15 animal est . . . non est] *p. ras. R¹* 17 mihi] *om. HM* 25 subsistentem] *H, J (p. corr.), M, subsistens F, J (a. corr.), PR*

the Apostle says: 'By my mind I serve the Law of God, but by flesh the law of sin'. And this has the support of innumerable other texts of Holy Scripture. So what is there so remarkable in the fact that man is understood to have a two-fold creation, seeing that he himself is in a manner of speaking a two-fold creature? That in him which resembles the animals was created with the animals, and that which resembles the spiritual creatures was created in itself and absolutely with the spiritual creatures. Let not your mind therefore be troubled that I said that man was produced out of the earth in one and the same genus as the rest of the animals, and yet is made 'in the image and likeness of God' beyond all animal nature.

A. My mind would not perhaps be so troubled if it could realize more clearly how the creation of man can be such that he is of one and the same genus as the rest of the animals, and yet in his better part transcends all animal nature.

N. I cannot understand why you wish me to repeat myself. For we have said already that man, in so far as he is an animal, is found among the animals in one genus but that in so far as he is not an animal, he was created outside every genus of all the animals.

A. Alas, a still greater and far harder problem, I think, arises.

N. Be good enough to tell me what it is.

A. Your opinion, I think, is that two souls co-exist in the same man, of which one administers the body, giving it life and nourishment and increase, and perceives the sensibles by means of the corporeal senses and stores the phantasies of them in its memory, and performs all the other functions which it is well known are performed by the souls of the other animals; while the other, which subsists in the reason and the mind, 'is made in the image and likeness of God'. But this seems altogether absurd.

N. Neither reason nor divine authority would permit me to hold that in the one man there are two souls (40). Indeed, they would forbid it, and it is not right that any true philosopher should maintain such an opinion. Rather I declare that man consists of one and the same rational soul conjoined to the body in a mysterious manner, and that it is by a certain wonderful and intelligible diuision that man himself is divided into two parts, in one of which he is created in the image and the likeness of the Creator, and participates in no animality but is utterly removed therefrom; while in the other he communicates with the animal nature and was produced out of the earth, that is to say, out of the common nature of all things, and is included in the universal genus of the animals.

De humana
anima

A. Quid ergo dicemus? Num humana anima simplex quaedam natura omnique compositione absoluta, an quibusdam partibus in unitatem quandam copulata credenda est?

N. Vnum firmissime teneo, simplicem uidelicet omnique copula partium carentem esse; alterum uero omnino abnuo, hoc est 5
ullam compositionem differentium a se inuicem partium recipere. Tota enim in seipsa ubique est per totum. Tota siquidem uita est, 754C
tota intellectus, tota ratio, tota sensus, tota memoria: tota corpus uiuificat, nutrit, continet, auget; tota in totis sensibus species rerum sensibilibus sentit; tota ipsarum rerum, ultra omnem corporeum 10
sensem, naturam et rationem tractat, discernit, coniungit, diiudicat; tota extra, et supra omnem creaturam et seipsam (quia in numero creaturarum comprehenditur) circa suum creatorem intelligibili motu atque aeterno, dum omnibus uitis phantasiisque purgatur, circumuoluitur. 15

Et cum ita simplex naturaliter subsistat, suarum intelligibilium et substantialium differentiarum (ueluti totius in partes) diuisiones recipit, secundum motuum suorum numerositatem. Ac per hoc 754D
multis nominibus denominatur. Siquidem dum circa diuinam essentiam uehitur, et mens et animus et intellectus; dum rerum 20
creatarum naturas causasque considerat, ratio; dum per sensus corporeos species sensibilibus recipit, sensus; dum in corpore occultos suos motus iuxta similitudinem irrationabilium animarum peragit, nutriendo illud et augendo, uitalis proprie motus solet appellari. In his autem omnibus tota ubique est. 25

A. Tota igitur et in genere animalium de terra producta est, et tota ad imaginem dei facta. Praedictis enim rationibus concluditur ita et non aliter esse. 755A

N. Etiam. Et nec ulli recte ac pie philosophantium de hoc dubitare licet, ne simplicissimam et indiuiduam naturam scindere uideatur, 30
quod ualde impium est.

A. Quomodo ergo unus atque idem homo, secundum praedictam controuersiam, et animal est et non est animal, uel quomodo et animalis est et animalis non est, et caro est et caro non est, et spiritualis est et spiritualis non est, et quomodo haec sibi inuicem 35
opposita et contradicentia in una simplicissima natura possunt intelligi, non satis uideo.

4 firmissime] corr. R¹ 14 phantasiisque] sup. l. J, om. HMR 19 denominatur] de anima titulum mg. add. R² 24 uitalis . . . motus] uita proprie HMR 27-28 et non] p. ras. R¹ 29 et nec ulli] nec ulli R⁰, et nec ulli R¹ (forsan ex imperfecta correctione pro: et nulli)

The human
soul

A. What, then, shall we say? Can the human soul be described as a certain single nature free from all composition or are we asked to believe that its unity is composed of a number of parts?

N. To one thing I hold most firmly, that the soul is simple and lacks all composition of parts: and one thing I utterly reject, that it receives into its nature any kind of composition whatsoever of parts which differ from one another. For it is whole in itself and its wholeness pervades the whole of its nature (41). For it is wholly life, wholly mind, wholly reason, wholly sense, wholly memory, and it is as a whole that it gives life, nourishment, consistency and increase to the body. As a whole it perceives the sensible species through the whole of its senses; as a whole it operates beyond the bounds of the bodily senses and treats, separates, combines and forms judgments upon the nature and reason of the sensibles; as a whole it extends beyond and above every creature, including even itself in so far as it is itself reckoned among the numbers of the creatures, and, purged from all vices and all phantasies, revolves about its Creator in an eternal and intelligible motion.

And while it is thus by nature simple, its division into the intelligible and substantial differentiations as it were of a whole into its parts is in accord with the plurality of its motions. This is the reason for the many names under which it goes. For when it is occupied with the Divine essence it is called mind and spirit and intellect (42); when it is occupied with the natures and causes of creation it is called discursive reason; when it receives the species of the sensibles through the corporeal senses, it is called sense; when after the manner of the irrational animals it performs those hidden operations within the body which give it nourishment and increase, its proper name is vital motion (43). But in all these cases it is everywhere whole.

A. Therefore the whole soul is on the one hand produced from the earth in the genus of the animals, and on the other hand is made in the image of God. For this and nothing else is what must follow from the foregoing arguments.

N. Just so. And no true and orthodox philosopher should doubt it, lest he appear impiously to tear in two this most simple and indivisible nature.

A. I still do not see how one and the same man can, as this discussion seeks to demonstrate, be, and yet not be, an animal; possess, and yet not possess, animality; be, and yet not be, flesh; be, and yet not be, spirit. How can such contradictory and mutually opposed predicates be understood of one absolutely simple nature?

N. Ex his quae praedicta sunt, omne quod tibi uidetur in simplicitate humanae naturae contrarium, si quis intentius perspexerit, luce clarius inueniet, non solum non esse contrarium, uerum etiam omnino conueniens. Constat enim inter sapientes, in homine uniuersam creaturam contineri – intelligit enim et ratiocinatur ut angelus, sentit et corpus administrat ut animal – ac per hoc omnis creatura in eo intelligitur. Totius siquidem creaturae quinquepartita diuisio est: aut enim corporea est, aut uitalis, aut sensiuua, aut rationalis, aut intellectualis. Et haec omnia omni modo in homine continentur: extremum quidem subsistentiae ipsius corpus est, deinde seminalis uita corporis administratiua, cui praeest sensus, deinde ratio quae inferioribus se naturae partibus dominatur, supremum in his omnibus animus obtinet locum. Ac per hoc tota humana natura, in quantum communicat animalibus, merito animal est (communicat autem eis in quantum corpus est, et uita corpus regitans, et sensus et memoria rerum sensibilibus phantasias tractans); in quantum uero diuinae caelestisque essentiae particeps est, non est animal, ratione autem et intellectu aeternorumque memoria caelestem participat essentiam. Ibi igitur omnino animalitatis expertus est. In illa siquidem parte sui ad imaginem dei facta est, ad quam solam in idoneis hominibus loquitur deus. *Ad illud enim hominis, ut ait Augustinus in XI de ciuitate dei, loquitur, quod in homine caeteris quibus homo constat est melius, et quo ipse deus solus est melior. Cum enim homo ad imaginem dei factus sit, profecto ea sui parte est propinquior superiori se deo qua superat inferiores suas, quas etiam cum pecoribus communes habet.* Et notandum quod etiam in hac uita, priusquam totum quod in homine animale est uertatur in spirituale, et omne quod in eo compositum est in ineffabilem adunetur simplicitatem, potest totus homo et animalis fieri et spiritualis, sed animalis sola libertate arbitrii, spiritualis uero et libero arbitrio simul et gratia, sine qua naturalis potentia uoluntatis mouere hominem in spiritum nullo modo sufficit. Animalis igitur homo et fit et dicitur quando, relictis motibus qui secundum rationem et intellectum sunt circa cognitionem creatoris et creaturae, in motus irrationabiles quibus animalia bruta circa corporis desideria mouentur spontaneo appetitu decidunt, ita ut totam suam intentionem temporalium fragiliumque rerum

21–25 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XI, ii, 14–20 (CCSL 48, p. 322; PL 41, 318).

2 intentius] intentus HMR 4 inter sapientes] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 10 subsistentiae] naturae HMR 11 seminalis] p. ras. R¹ 11 cui praeest] p. ras. R¹ 17 est] om. HMR 20–25 In illa . . . communes habet] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 20 facta] factus MR¹ 24 dei] om. FR 28 in] sup. l. HM, om. R 31 mouere] R¹, moueri R⁰ 33 qui] scripsi, quae codd. 33 cognitionem] cognationem J (a. corr.), cogitationem FP 35 decidunt] R¹, descendit R⁰

N. From what has already been said it should be as clear as day to anyone who looks into the matter more carefully that everything which seems to you to be contrary to the simplicity of human nature is in fact not only not contrary to but is entirely suitable. For among the wise it is maintained that in man is contained the universal creature (44). For, like the angel, he enjoys the use of mind and discursive reason; and like the animal, the use of physical sense and the capacity to administer his body: and therefore his nature is understood to include that of every creature. For the whole of creation is divided into five parts: the creature may be either a body; or a living being; or a sensible being; or a rational being; or an intellectual being (45). And all these five parts are in every way found in man. For he possesses in his body the basis of his subsistence; then a seminal life to administer that body; sense to preside over that life; then reason to govern the natural parts that are inferior to itself; and finally spirit, which holds the highest place of all. And so all human nature, in what it shares with the other animals, is truly animal nature. What it shares with them is body; the life which controls the body; and the sense together with the memory which draws from it the phantasies of sensible objects. But insofar as it participates in the divine and celestial essence, human nature is not animal nature; for it participates in the celestial essence by reason and intellect and memory of eternal things (46). Here it is entirely free from all taint of animality. For in this part of itself it is made in the image of God: and it is with this part only, in men who are apt for it, that God holds converse. 'For it is to that part of man that He speaks', writes St. Augustine in the Eleventh Book of the *City of God*, 'that is better than the other parts of which man is composed, and God Himself alone is better than that part. For since man is made in the image of God, he straightway is nearer to God (who is superior to him) in that part of himself by which he transcends the natures which are lower in him, those natures which he shares in common with the beasts'.

And be it noted that even in this life, even before the time when all that is animal in man becomes spiritual and all that is composite is made one in an ineffable simplicity, the whole man can be both an animal and a spiritual creature; but while it is by the freedom of his will only that he is animal, he is spiritual by the combined operation of free will and of grace, for without the latter the innate power of the will is quite insufficient to convert man into spirit (47). Therefore man becomes animal, and is so described, when he abandons those operations, which accord with reason and intellect and are concerned with the knowledge of the Creator and of creation, for those irrational activities which among the brute beasts are concerned with the appetites of the body – and falls through his wilful appetite, so as to

et ad non esse tendentium loetiferis delectationibus ingurgitet; spiritualis uero dum, mutata omni conuersatione in melius, diuini amoris incendio inflammatus, mundo et carne omni modo spretis, omnibusque animalium motibus relictis, ad caelestium essentiarum similitudinem totus transformatur, ut quod ei futurum est secundum 5 inconuersibilem substantiam, hoc in eo praecedat secundum uitae uirtutibus ornatae qualitatem. Ac per hoc duobus modis 756B animalis homo cognoscitur: uno quidem quo secundum naturam subsistit, altero qui ei ex irrationabili motu liberae uoluntatis procliuaeque ad malitiam accidit. Similiter spiritualis, et secundum 10 naturam subsistens, et secundum bonam uoluntatem diuina gratia praeuentam, actu et scientia purgatam, uirtutum ornamentis redimitam, ad pristinam diuinae imaginis dignitatem reuocatus.

A. Haec libenter accipio, sed non perpure conspicio quomodo, cum omnes species in genere unum sint, contradicentes inter 15 se inuicem in illo unum subsistunt. Diffinitio siquidem hominis caeterorum animalium diffinitionibus contradicere uidetur: est enim homo animal rationale, caetera uero animalia irrationabilia. Videsne 756C quomodo aduersantur sibimet rationale et irrationale?

N. Paululum acutius naturam rerum inspicere, et inuenies hanc 20 praepositionem, quae est 'in', differentiae uirtutem non autem controuersiae in multis. Verbi gratia: 'Omnis creatura aut uisibilis est aut inuisibilis'. Hic differentiam facit, non controuersiam; uisibilitas enim et inuisibilitas duo quaedam sunt a se discreta, non sibi repugnantia. Similiter: 'Aut corporalis aut incorporealis est omnis 25 creatura'. Diuinarum quoque personarum habitudines discernit: pater siquidem ingenitus est, filius uero genitus, spiritus neque ingenitus neque genitus. Et innumerabilia exempla huiusmodi sunt. Et ut clarius cognoscas, uide quod omnis controuersia in una eademque specie seu parte intelligitur, differentia uero in 756D diuersis. Veluti si quis de homine dixerit: 'Homo est animal rationale', 'Homo est animal irrationale', de illa specie naturae quae substantialiter homo dicitur pronuntians, contradictoria proloquia fient, et necessario unum erit uerum, alterum falsum. Non enim 31

1 loetiferis delectationibus] *partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹*, amoribus *R⁰* 1 ingurgitet] *p. ras. R¹* 2 conuersatione] *R¹*, conuersione *R⁰* 3 incendio] *p. ras. R¹* 5-7 ut quod . . . qualitatem] *mg. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 10 procliuaeque] *R¹*, proclueque *R⁰* 12 actu et scientia] *actam uitiis R (intellige: praeuentam, actam, uitiis purgatam)* 12 purgatam] *quam add. H, M(m. rec. suppl. sup. l., ut sit sensus: praeuentam, ac tam uitiis purgatam quam uirtutum ornamentis redimitam)* 15 omnes] *omnis FJR* 15-16 inter se inuicem] *inuicem species HMR* 21-22 praepositionem . . . controuersiae (-ae *R¹*) in multis] *HMR*, propositionem quae est in differentia sub uno genere differentias esse, non controuersias *FJP* 22 uerbi gratia] *sup. l. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 27-28 spiritus . . . neque genitus] *om. HMR* 30 una eademque] *uno eodemque R, ut sit sensus: in uno eodemque (specie seu parte)* 31 ueluti] *R¹*, uerbi gratia *R⁰* 34 fient] *R¹*, erunt *R⁰*

gorge his interest with the deadly allure of the temporal and corruptible things which tend towards non-being. But he becomes spiritual when, turning his life wholly towards the better and kindled by the fire of Divine love, he despises the world and the flesh in all their forms and, abandoning all the activities of animal nature, is wholly transformed into the likeness of the celestial essences, so that in the quality of a life adorned with all the virtues there is anticipated in him the state to which he is destined by his immutable substance (48). Thus there are two ways of recognising the animal man: by one, he lives entirely according to nature; the other happens to him through the irrational motion of his free will tending to evil. The spiritual man also lives according to nature; but also, in accordance with good will helped by divine grace, purified from vice by act and knowledge and decked with the adornments of the virtues, he is recalled to the former dignity of the Divine image (49).

A. This I freely accept. But there is still something I am not quite clear about. In the genus all species are one. But how can mutually contradictory species be one in their genus? For the definition of man seems to be in contradiction to those of the other animals. For man is a rational animal; the others are irrational animals. Do you not see how completely opposed to one another are the terms rational and irrational?

N. If you consider the nature of things more carefully you will find that the prefix 'in' refers in many cases to a difference, not a contradiction (50). Let us take an example: 'Every creature is either visible or invisible'. This distinction is one of difference, not of contradiction. For visibility and invisibility are two properties which are separate from one another but not mutually repugnant. Likewise 'every creature is either corporeal or incorporeal'. Again, in the Divine Nature there are distinguished the different states of the Divine Persons. For whereas the Father is unbegotten, the Son is begotten and the Spirit is neither begotten nor unbegotten; and there are innumerable examples of the same kind. But to give you a clearer understanding I would ask you to observe that contradiction is always held to be within one and the same species or part, whereas difference distinguishes one species from another: thus, if speaking of man one were to say of that species of nature which according to its substance is called man, 'man is a rational animal' and 'man is an irrational animal', this would be the statement of a pair of contradictories, of which one will be true and the other false. For

aut simul uera possunt esse aut simul falsa contradictoria proloquia
de subiecto eodem, siue uniuersaliter sint, siue particulariter. Dum 757A
igitur dicis 'Homo est animal rationale, equus est irrationale animal',
nulla intelligitur contradictio, quoniam rationabilis et irrationabilis
animalis substantialem differentiam patefacis. Dum rationem homini 5
das, et ab equo aufers, differentiam hominis et equi significas. Et sit
differentia hominis a caeteris animantibus habere rationem, sicut
caeterorum animantium ab homine differentia rationem non habere,
dum neque in hoc habitus et priuatio dinoscitur. Habitus enim
hominis est habere rationem, habitus autem equi rationis absentia. 10
Siquidem equus non priuatur eo habitu, quem nunquam potuit
habere. Vbi autem habitus non praecedit, ibi priuatio consequens
non erit. Animalis seu cuiusque uitam participantis mors non 757B
accideret, si prius ei habitus uitae non inesset. Ideoque nullum
animal proprie dicimus stultum, praeter illud in quo uidemus posse
fieri rationis habitum; neque stolidum, nisi cui naturaliter inesse
potest sentiendi habitudo. 15

A. Quare ergo dixisti in uno eodemque subiecto duo proloquia
sibimet aduersantia falsa simul aut uera simul esse non posse, sed
si unum sit uerum, necessario alterum erit falsum (uerbi gratia, si 20
quis dixerit de uno eodemque: 'Hoc animal equus est, equus non
est'), cum uidearis asserere contradictoria proloquia uera simul
posse esse in homine ('Homo animal est', 'Non est animal homo'),
et hoc naturaliter inesse ei doces, donec totus moueatur animalis in
spiritualem? Et cur hoc in homine solo, in caeteris uero animalibus 757C
nullo modo, in quibus omnino uerum est animal esse, animal autem
non esse omnino falsum? 26

N. Putasne aliud animal praeter hominem ad imaginem dei
factum? 30

A. Nequaquam.

N. Negabis duo proloquia sibimet colluctantia, dum de deo
praedicantur, uera simul esse, et nullo modo falsa, quanquam ambo
eiusdem uirtutis non sint, ut puta: 'Deus ueritas est', 'Deus ueritas
non est'?

A. Negare non ausim, dum ipse de seipso dicit: *Ego sum uia, et* 35
ueritas, et uita. Sanctus autem Ariopagita Dionysius in symbolica

35-36 Ioh. 11, 25; 14, 6.

2 de subiecto eodem] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 5 animalis] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 5 dum] enim
add. HMR 6 et sit] est sic p. ras. R¹, est enim (enim sup. l. M) sic HM 7 sicut] et
add. HMR 9 dum] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 13 seu . . . participantis] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰
17 sentiendi habitudo] p. ras. R¹ 20-22 uerbi gratia . . . non est] mg. R¹, om. R⁰
36.36-38.1 in symbolica . . . quia deus] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹

contradictory statements of one and the same subject cannot both at
the same time be true or both at the same time be false, whether they
be of a universal or of a particular application (51). So when you say:
'Man is a rational animal, horse is an irrational animal', no contra-
diction arises since the difference of substance between the rational
and the irrational animal is made clear. For in allowing reason to man
and denying it to horse you indicate the difference between man and
horse. Let it be this that is man's difference from the other anim-
als, that he possesses reason, just as it is their difference from him
that they do not. But no distinction must be made herein between
the possession and the lack; for the possession in man's case is the
presence of reason, while in the case of the horse the possession is
the absence of reason. For the horse is not deprived of that which
it never could have possessed. Where there was no antecedent pos-
session there will be no consequent deprivation. Death could never
occur to any animal or to any being which participates in life if there
had not been an antecedent possession of life. And in like manner
it would be wrong to call any animal stupid save that in which we see
that the possession of reason was a possibility; nor insensitive save that
in which the possession of sense could naturally inhere.

A. Why, then, did you say that in one and the same subject two
mutually contradictory predicates could not be both at the same time
false or true, but that if the one were true the other must be false, (for
example if one said of one same thing: 'This animal is a horse, is not
a horse')? Now you appear to assert the simultaneous truth of contra-
dictory predicates in man: that 'man is an animal', and that 'man is
not an animal', and you declare that he possesses this character natur-
ally until his whole animal nature becomes spiritual. And why is this
so in the case of man only and not in that of the other animals, in
whom it is absolutely true that they are animal and absolutely untrue
that they are not animal?

N. Do you believe that any other animal than man was made in the
image of God? (52)

A. Certainly not.

N. Do you deny that two mutually adverse predicates can be made
of God, and can be true and in no way false, although they are not of
the same power, as for instance when it is said that 'God is truth' and
that 'God is not truth'?

A. I would not dare to do so, seeing that He Himself has said of
Himself 'I am the Way and the Truth and the Life,' while St. Dionysius
the Areopagite says in the *Symbolic Theology* that God is neither the

theologia dicit quia deus neque ueritas est, neque uita. Ait enim: *Neque uirtus est, neque lux, neque uita*, et paulo post: *neque scientia est, neque ueritas*.

N. Fortassis Dionysius contradicit Christo, qui de seipso praedicat seipsum ueritatem esse? 757D
5

A. Absit.

N. Vtrumque igitur uerum est 'Deus ueritas est', 'Deus ueritas non est'.

A. Non solum uerum, sed etiam uerissimum. Vnum quidem dictum est secundum affirmationem per metaforam, quoniam ipse conditor est et causa primordialis ueritatis, cuius participatione uera sunt quaecunque uera sunt omnia; alterum autem per negationem, quae est secundum excellentiam, quia plus est quam ueritas. Ac per hoc et uerum est 'Deus ueritas est', dum sit uerorum omnium causa, et uerum est 'Deus ueritas non est', quia superat omne quod dicitur et intelligitur et est. Nec me latet quod addidisti 'quanquam ambo non eiusdem uirtutis sint'. Minus enim ualet ad ineffabilis diuinae essentiae significationem affirmatio quam negatio, quoniam una ex creaturis ad creatorem transfertur, altera ultra omnem creaturam de creatore per seipsum praedicatur. 10
758A
15
20

N. Bene uides quod addidi. Quid igitur mirum si de homine, qui solus inter caetera animalia ad imaginem dei factus est, uere simul possit praedicari 'Homo animal est', 'Non est animal homo', ut per hoc saltem intelligamus ad imaginem dei illud animal specialiter esse conditum, de quo pugnantia sibimet in aliis animantibus proloquia uere simul praedicantur? Porro si propterea diuinae essentiae affirmationes et negationes conueniunt quoniam superat omnia quae ab ea facta sunt et quorum causa est, cui non liceat perspicere negationes et affirmationes imagini et similitudini eius, quae in homine est, unanimiter conuenire, quandoquidem superat caetera animalia, inter quae sub uno genere conditus est, et cuius causa condita sunt? Quis enim recte sapientum ignorarit hunc mundum uisibilem, cum omnibus suis partibus, a summo usque deorsum, propter hominem esse factum, ut ei praeesset, et dominaretur omnium rerum uisibilium? 758B
25
30
35

4-5 Ioh. 14, 6.

2-3 DIONYSIUS ARIOPAGITA, *De mystica theologia* V (PL 122, 1176B4-7; PG 3, 1048A3-6).

1 *neque ueritas est*] *corr. R¹* 2-3 *ait... neque ueritas*] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰* 25 *animantibus*] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 30 *homine est*] *corr. R¹* 32 *sapientum*] *codd., sapientium Gale et Floss*

truth nor the life: for he writes that 'He is neither power nor light nor life', and a little later 'neither is He knowledge or truth'.

N. Perhaps Dionysius is contradicting Christ Who predicated of Himself that He was Himself the Truth?

A. Impossible.

N. Either statement is true, then: 'God is truth' and 'God is not truth'?

A. Not only true, but the profoundest truth. The one statement is made by affirmation and by metaphor from the fact that He is the Creator and primordial Cause of truth, and because it is by participation in Him that whatsoever things are true are all true; while the other is made by negation, and relates to that transcendence which is More-than-truth. And so it is true that 'God is truth', since He is the cause of all truths, and it is also true that 'God is not truth', transcending as He does everything which can be spoken or can be thought or can exist. Nor have I forgotten that you added the words, 'although both statements are not of the same power'; for affirmation is less capable than negation of signifying the ineffable essence of God, seeing that by the former one among the created attributes is transferred to the Creator, whereas by the latter the Creator is conceived in Himself beyond every creature.

N. You did well to recall this comment which I added. Why should we then be surprised if man, who alone among the animals is made in the image of God, can truly and simultaneously have it said of him that 'man is an animal', and that 'man is not an animal'? For by this we at once understand that he belongs to the species of animal specially fashioned after the image of God, concerning whom predicates may be truly and simultaneously made which in the case of other animate creatures are mutually exclusive. And if affirmations and negations concerning the Divine essence coincide for the reason that It transcends all things that were created by It and of which It is the Cause, who would not infer that affirmations and negations harmoniously coincide also in the image and likeness of It which is man, seeing that this animal transcends the others among which it is fashioned in the same genus, and is the cause for which they were fashioned? For what true philosopher is unaware that this visible world with all its parts, from the highest to the lowest, was created for the sake of man in order that he might preside over it and be the lord of all visible nature?

Quod Sanctus Gregorius in sermone de imagine his uerbis edocet: 758C
*Quomodo, inquit, tota creatura praeter hominem diuina uirtute simul
 cum praecepto constituta sit, hominis uero constitutionem consilium praecedat,
 et praeformatur ab artifice per uerbum scripturae quid futurum esset, et quale
 esse conueniret, et ad quale principale exemplar similitudinem ferret, et in* 5
*quo fieret, et quid operaretur factum, et quibus dominaretur, omnia prius
 sermo circumspicit, ut uenerabiliorem generationis dignitatem, priusquam
 in essentiam ueniret, ipse sortiretur qui principatum eorum quae sunt
 possessurus foret. "Dixit enim", inquit, "deus: Faciamus hominem ad
 imaginem nostram et similitudinem, et dominetur piscium maris et bestiarum* 10
*terrae et uolatilium caeli et pecorum et omnis terrae". Et hoc ei datum
 est, siue peccaret siue non peccaret, quamuis non eodem modo* 758D
*regeret si non peccaret, quo regit postquam peccauit. Et ut hoc
 certius cognoscas, num existimas hominem ea parte sui, qua ad
 imaginem dei factus est, animal esse, aut ea, qua inter animalia de* 15
*terra productus est, imaginem dei subsistere, aut utrumque, hoc est
 et imaginem et animal ueraciter in eo non esse?* 759A

De eo quod
humana
natura imago
in animali
et animal in
imagine sit

A. Hoc ultimum nullo modo aestimarim (haec enim simul esse
 in homine uera ratio comprobatur), illud uero (hoc est imaginem in
 animali et animal in imagine) omnino negarim, si me non moueret 20
 quod in superioribus a te diffinitum est, hominem uidelicet in
 seipso ubique totum esse; ex quo datur intelligi, ut opinor, et totam
 imaginem in toto animali, et totum animal in tota imagine per totum
 hominem subsistere.

N. Miror cur te talia mouerent, cum uideas in hoc maxime 25
 imaginem et similitudinem dei in humana natura posse cognosci.
 Vt enim deus et super omnia et in omnibus est (ipse siquidem
 essentia omnium est, qui uere solus est; et cum in omnibus totus
 sit, extra omnia totus esse non desinit, totus in mundo, totus circa
 mundum, totus in creatura sensibili, in intelligibili totus, totus 759B
 uniuersitatem facit, in uniuersitate totus fit, in toto uniuersitatis
 totus, in partibus eius totus, quia ipse est et totum et pars et neque
 totum neque pars), ita humana natura in mundo suo (in subsistentia
 31

9-11 Gen. 1, 26.

2-11 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 3 (Capp, pp. 212, 39-213, 8;
 PG 44, 133C-D). 21-22 Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 754B-C. 40.27-42.3 CLAUDIANVS
 MAMERTVS, *De statu animae* III, 2 (CSEL 11, p. 155, 8-13; PL 53, 761B).

1-12 Quod sanctus Gregorius . . . datum est] *mg. R^v, om. R^o* 2-3 quomodo . . . uero]
 Hoc quoque indignum est inconsideratum despiciere quia tanto mundo partibusque
 eius ordinate ad uniuersitatis *CCapp (212, 40-41)* 2 tota] *om. HMR* 2 praeter
 hominem] *om. HMR* 13 peccauit] *corr. R^l* 14 num] *p. ras. sup. l. R^l* 18 hoc
 ultimum] *sup. l. R^l, om. R^o* 18 aestimarim] *FR^l, estimarim HJMPP^o* 19-20 illud
 uero . . . negarim] *sup. l. R^l, om. R^o* 27 super] supra *HM* 40.33-42.1 in subsistentia
 sua] *om. HMR*

This is the teaching of St. Gregory, who in his *Treatise on the Image*
 describes as follows how the whole 'creation' except man 'was estab-
 lished by the Divine power at the same time as the Mandate was given.
 But before the establishment of man there was a plan (53), and he was
 prefigured by the Creator through the word of Scripture as to what he
 should be, and with what quality it were fit to endow him, and after
 what Primal Exemplar he should be modelled and of what material
 he should be made, and what function he should perform, and over
 what he should be lord. All these things were first considered by the
 Word so that, before he came forth into being, a more venerable rank
 in the world of becoming was allowed him as one destined to hold sway
 over all the things that are. For, to quote the Holy Word, "God said:
 Let us make man in our image and likeness, and let him have domin-
 ion over the fishes of the sea and over the beasts of the earth and over
 the birds of the air, and over cattle and over the whole earth". And
 this was given him whether he sinned or not, although he would not
 have ruled in the same way if he had not sinned as he rules now that
 he has sinned. And to make matters clearer: do you suppose that man
 is an animal in that part which is made in the image of God? Or that
 the image of God subsists in that part in which he was brought forth
 among the beasts of the field? Or that both, that is both image and
 animal, are not truly to be found in man?

A. To the last question I would say at once that I make no such
 supposition; for that reasoning is sound which discovers both these
 aspects in man. But to the former questions, that is, as to whether the
 image is in the animal or the animal in the image, I should reply with
 an unqualified negative were I not perplexed by something which you
 said before as to man being everywhere a whole in himself. For from
 this it appears to me to follow that the whole image must subsist in the
 whole animal and the whole animal in the whole image throughout
 the whole man.

N. I am surprised that this should trouble you, seeing that it is pre-
 cisely herein that the image and likeness of God in human nature can
 be recognised. For just as God is both beyond all things and in all
 things - for He Who only truly is, is the essence of all things, and
 while He is whole in all things He does not cease to be whole bey-
 ond all things, whole in the world, whole around the world, whole in
 the sensible creature, whole in the intelligible creature, whole creat-
 ing the universe, whole created in the universe, whole in the whole
 of the universe and whole in its parts, since He is both the whole and
 the part, just as He is neither the whole nor the part - in the same
 way human nature in its own world (in its own subsistence) (54) in

Human
nature is the
image in the
animal and
the animal in
the image

sua), in uniuersitate sua, in partibus suis uisibilibus et inuisibilibus, tota in seipsa est, et in toto suo tota est, et in partibus suis tota, partesque eius in seipsis totae, et in toto totae. Nam et extrema pars eius et uilissima, corpus dico, secundum rationes suas tota est in toto homine, quoniam corpus, in quantum uere corpus est, in 5 rationibus suis subsistit, quae in prima conditione factae sunt. Et cum in seipsa ita sit, humana uidelicet natura, totum suum excedit. Non enim aliter conditori suo adhaerere posset, si omnia quae sub 759C ipsa sunt et seipsam non excederet, quoniam *inter mentem nostram, ut ait Augustinus, qua patrem intelligimus, et ueritatem per quam ipsum intelligimus nulla interposita creatura est.* Quod etiam ipse Ariopagita (Dionysium dico) in symbolica theologia pulchre docet dicens: *O amice Timothee, circa mysticas speculationes corroborato itinere et sensus desere et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et inuisibilia et omne non ens et ens, et ad unitatem, ut possibile, inscius restituere ipsius qui est super omnem 15 essentiam et scientiam: ea enim teipso et omnibus immensurabili et absoluto mentis excessu ad superessentialem diuinarum tenebrarum radium, omnia deserens et ab omnibus absolutus, ascendes.* Et in euangelio dominus ait: *Vbi ego sum, illic et minister meus.* Est autem ille super omnia. Est 759D igitur illi adhaerens homo super omnia et super seipsum, quantum in omnibus est. Et quamuis humana natura, dum in hac uita mortali uersatur, adhaerere deo re ipsa non possit, uerumtamen, quoniam possibile est ei et naturale creatori suo adhaerere eius gratia cui adhaeret, adhaerere non incongrue dicitur. Saepe enim possibilitas 760A pro experimento solet accipi, et quod certum est quandoque fore, 25 pro praesenti computari et iam peracto.

Et quid dixi 'in mundo suo, in uniuersitate sua', cum apertius pronuntiarim in uniuerso mundo uisibili et inuisibili? Humana siquidem natura in uniuersitate totius conditae naturae tota est, quoniam in ipsa omnis creatura constituta est, et in ipsa copulata, 30 et in ipsam reuersura, et per ipsam saluanda. Audi creatorem ipsius dicentem: *Praedicate euangelium omni creaturae, homini profecto.* Ibi intellectus, ibi ratio, ibi sensus, ibi seminalis uita, ibi corpus, non

19 Ioh. 12, 26. 32 Marc. 16, 15.

9-11 AVGVSTINVS, *De uera religione* LV, 113 (CCSL 32, p. 259; PL 34, 172). Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 531B; *Expositiones in Hier. cael.* IV, 406-408 (CCCM 31, p. 75); *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* IV, v, 29-30 (SC 180, p. 306; PL 122, 336B). 12-18 DIONYSIVS ARIOPAGITA, *De mystica theologia* I (PL 122, 1173A; PG 3, 997B). Cf. *Periphyseon* I, 510C. 18-19 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 576B-C; V, 905B. 31-32 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 536B; IV, 774B; V, 912A. *Vox spiritualis* XIX, 21-24 (SC 151, p. 296; PL 122, 294B).

I sua²] sup. l. R^s, om. R^o 5-6 quoniam corpus . . . factae sunt] om. HMR 7 humana uidelicet natura] om. HMR 9 ipsa] ipso HMR 11-18 quod etiam . . . ascendes] mg. R^s, om. R^o 12 dionysium dico] om. HMR 25 pro] R^l, per R^o 26 computari] corr. R^l 32 profecto] R^l, profecto R^o

its own universe and in its visible and invisible parts is whole in itself, and whole in its whole, and whole in its parts, and its parts are whole in themselves and whole in the whole. For even the lowest and least valuable part, the body, is according to its own principles whole in the whole man, for the body, in so far as it is truly body, subsists in its own reasons which were made at the beginning of creation; and since human nature is so in itself, it goes beyond its whole. For it could not otherwise cleave to its Creator if it did not go beyond all the things that are beneath it and beyond itself. For, says Augustine, 'between our mind by which we know the Father and the Truth through which we know Him, no creature is interposed'. And in a fine passage of the *Symbolic Theology* the Areopagite, Dionysius, I mean, teaches the same thing: 'O friend Timothy, do you, strengthened by your sojourn among the mystical speculations, abandon not only the senses but also intellectual activities, abandon the sensibles and the invisibles, all non-being and all being, and emptying yourself of all knowledge restore yourself as far as possible to the Unity of Him who is beyond all essence and all knowledge; for there by the immeasurable and absolute ecstasy of the mind you will ascend from yourself and all things, abandoning all things and liberated from all things, to the Superessential ray of the Divine darkness' (55). And in the Gospel Our Lord says: 'Where I am there is My servant also'. But He is above all things: above all things therefore is the man who cleaves to Him, and above himself in so far as he is in all things. And although human nature while sojourning in this mortal life cannot by itself truly cleave to God, yet by the grace of Him to Whom it cleaves it is both possible and in accordance with its nature to do so; therefore we not improperly say that human nature cleaves to its Creator. For possibility is often taken for realization, and that which is bound to happen some day is regarded as happening now and already achieved.

But why did I say 'in its own world, in its own universe,' when I could more plainly have said 'in the whole world, both visible and invisible'? For humanity is wholly in the wholeness of the whole created nature, seeing that in it every creature is fashioned, and in it all are linked together, and into it shall all return, and through it must all be saved. Hear what its Creator says: 'Preach the gospel to every creature'; that is, actually, to man (56). There mind is to be found, there reason, there sense, there the seminal life, there the body (57) -

hoc corruptibile post peccatum, sed illud ante delictum, non hoc
compositum atque solubile, sed illud simplex et indiuiduum, non
hoc animale et terrenum, sed illud spirituale et caeleste, non hoc 760B
ex duplici sexu per carnales connexus seminibus genitum, sed illud
ex simplicitate naturae ante praeuaricationem productum et in 5
resurrectione futurum, non hoc corporeo sensui cognitum, sed illud
in secreto naturae adhuc occultum, non hoc quod merito peccati
superadditum, sed illud quod incorruptae adhuc naturae erat insitum
et in quod hoc corruptibile et mortale reuersurum. *Seminatur*, inquit
Apostolus, (hoc est de semine nascitur) *in corruptione, surget in uirtute.* 10
In quali uirtute? Ipsius uidelicet corporis, quod prius naturaliter est
conditum: *Seminatur in contumelia, surget in gloria; seminatur corpus
animale, surget corpus spirituale.* Omne siquidem quod naturaliter in
homine est creatum, necessario aeternaliter manet integrum, atque 760C
incorruptum; non enim diuinae iustitiae est uisum ex eo quod fecit
quicquam perire, praesertim cum non ipsa natura peccauerit, sed
peruersa uoluntas, quae contra naturam rationabilem irrationabiliter
mouetur.

Cuius rei maximum est argumentum: si naturaliter inest homini
mortis odium, quomodo in odio non haberet naturaliter mortis 20
causam, peccatum dico? Et hoc commune omnibus animalibus
est mortem mortisque causas deuitare et timere. Vt ergo nullus
sapiens uult errorem incurrere, ita humana natura noluit peccare.
Ac per hoc conditor ipsius, dum sit iustus, noluit eam punire, uoluit
autem ei superaddere in quo posset delictum, quod ex peruersa 25
uoluntate et suadente serpente acciderat, ne semper ei adhaereret,
purgari. Natura siquidem rationalis et intellectualis, quamuis noluit
falli, potuit tamen decipi, praesertim cum nondum formationis suae
perfectionem acceperit, quam merito oboedientiae esset acceptura, in
ΘΕΩCIN (deificationem dico) transformanda. Non ergo debemus 30
de humana natura iudicare secundum quod corporeis sensibus
apparet, et merito praeuaricationis poenaliter ad similitudinem
irrationabilium animalium per copulam sexuum in hoc mundo 761A
nascitur temporaliter corruptibiliter (cuius finis mors est), uerum
secundum quod ad imaginem dei, priusquam peccaret, condita 35
est, quod etiam omnem sensum corporeum omnemque mortalem

9-10 I Cor. 15, 42-43. 12-13 I Cor. 15, 43-44.

15-18 Cf. *De praedestinatione* VIII, 79 et XVIII, 230-232 (CCCM 50, pp. 51 et 117-118; PL 122, 386C et 436A).

3 sed] corr. R¹ 19 inest] R^x, mouetur non est R^o (postea cancellatum) 21 dico] sup. l. R¹, om. R^o 22 et timere] sup. l. R¹, om. R^o 30 ΘΕΩCIN] sup. l. J (p. corr.), ΘΕOCIN F, J (a. corr.), PR, theosin HM 30 deificationem dico] sup. l. R¹, om. R^o 32 poenaliter] p. ras. R¹ 34 corruptibiliter] corruptibiliterque HMR¹

not this corruptible body which is the result of sin, but that which man
had before the Fall: not this composite and dissoluble body, but that
simple and indivisible body; not this animal and earthly body, but that
which is spiritual and heavenly; not this body begotten by both sexes
from seeds through carnal intercourse, but that which was brought
forth before the Fall out of the simplicity of nature and which is to
be in the Resurrection; not this body which is known to the corporeal
senses, but that which is still hidden in the secret place of nature; not
this which was laid upon us in recompense for sin, but that which was
already inherent in us in our uncorrupted nature and to which this
corruptible and mortal body will be restored (58). 'It is sown', says the
Apostle, meaning that it is born from the seed, 'in corruption, it will
rise in virtue'. In what sort of virtue? Surely, in the virtue of that very
body which was established according to nature in the beginning. 'It
is sown in derision, it will rise in glory; it is sown an animal body, it will
rise a spiritual body'. For everything that is created in man according
to nature must of necessity remain eternally intact and uncorrupted.
For it is not in accordance with the Divine justice that anything should
perish of that which He has made, especially as it is not nature herself
who has sinned, but the perverse will which moves irrationally against
rational nature.

Now of this there is an excellent proof: if the hatred of death is
an innate quality in man, must he not also hold naturally in abhor-
rence the cause of death, which is sin? (59) And this is something
common to all animals, to avoid and fear death and the causes of
death. Therefore just as no philosopher wishes to enter into error,
so human nature did not wish to sin, and therefore her Creator, being
just, did not wish to punish her, but rather it was His will to add to
her something in which might be purged that fault, caused by the
perversity of the will and the persuasiveness of the serpent, that it
might not cleave to her forever. For the reasonable and intellectual
nature, although not wishing to be deceived, was not incapable of suf-
fering deceit, especially as she had not yet attained the perfection of
her form which she was to receive as the reward of her obedience
and by which she was to be transformed in θεωσις or deification. We
ought not therefore to judge human nature as she is manifested to
the bodily senses and as in punishment for her Fall - she undergoes
the penalty of being born a temporal and corruptible object into this
world by sexual intercourse after the likeness of the irrational animals
whose end is death - but as she was established before the Fall in the
image of God, a condition in which she eludes in a mysterious way,

cogitationem pro ineffabili naturae dignitate incomprehensibiliter fugit. Sed decepta et lapsa, prauae suae uoluntatis tenebris obcaecata, et seipsam et creatorem sui obliuioni tradidit. Et haec est miserrima mors ipsius, profundissimaque in caligines ignorantiae submersio, et a seipsa et a creatore suo longissima distantia, irrationabilibus uero mortalibusque animantibus proxima turpissimaque similitudo, ex qua iterum nemo eam potuit redimere, reuocare, reducere, et ad statum pristinum, de quo ceciderat, restaurare. Sed dei sapientia, quae eam creauit, eamque in unitatem sibi substantiae accepit ut sic eam saluaret, cuncta liberauit miseria. Non te igitur moueat quod de humana natura dictum est totam in seipsa ubique esse, et imaginem in animali totam, et animal in imagine totum. Omne siquidem quod in ea conditor suus primordialiter creauit, totum integrumque manet, adhuc tamen latet, *reuelationem filiorum dei expectans*.

A. Non me fortassis moueret, si mihi clare suaderes quod per meipsum perspicere non ualeo. Delibero nanque utrum homo, si non peccaret, animal esset. Quod etiam alio modo possum dicere: num homo ante peccatum animal erat? Si non erat, cur tantum laborauimus quaerentes – et, ut est uisum, inuenientes – in uniuersali genere animalium hominem conditum esse? Si enim in eo genere non est creatus, aut omnino ante peccatum animal non erat, aut, si erat, in alio genere animalium conditus erat, quod nec diuina scriptura introducit, nec diligens rationis inquisitio in natura rerum reperit. Omnia enim animalia in uno genere subsistunt, a quo per diuisiones procedunt. At si, in eo quod scriptum est *Producat terra animam uiuam*, inter animalia caetera conditio hominis introducta est ante peccatum, quomodo Psalmista ueluti magnum opprobrium humanae naturae post lapsum ingerit dicens: *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis?* Vbi Propheta aperte uidetur pronuntiare hominem ante lapsum in honore spiritualis substantiae, ultra omnium animalium naturam, substitisse; eo uero labente dignitatemque suae naturae non intelligente, in contumeliam iumentorum similitudinis cecidisse. Si autem ante lapsum animal erat, cur post lapsum in eo iuste reprehenditur animalium similitudinem incurrisse, quibus naturaliter sub uno genere concretus est?

N. Merito deliberares, si Propheta simpliciter dixisset: comparatus est iumentis, et similis factus est illis. Addens uero iumentis *insipientibus*, satis patefecit quod in hoc homo maxime reprehenditur,

14 Rom. 8, 19. 25–26 Gen. 1, 24. 28–30 Ps. 48, 13.21.

18 num] nam FP 24–25 omnia . . . procedunt] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 32 substitisse] H, J (p. corr.), MP, substetisse F, J (a. corr.), substituisse R

through the ineffable dignity of her nature, every bodily sense and all mortal thought. Deceived and fallen, blinded by the murkiness of her depraved will, she has forgotten herself and her Creator. And this is the most wretched feature of her death, and the deepest profundity of her submersion in the fog of ignorance, that she has drifted so far from herself and her Creator and approached in likeness so near and so shamefully the irrational and mortal animals. And from this state none could again redeem her or call her or bring her back or restore her to the former condition from which she fell save the Wisdom of God Which created her and received her into the unity of substance with Him (60), that thus he might save her and free her from all her woe. Let it then not trouble you that it is said of human nature that it is everywhere a whole in itself, that the image is whole in the animal, and that the animal is whole in the image. For everything which her Creator primordialy created in her remains whole and intact, though remaining hidden until now, 'awaiting the revelation of the sons of God'.

A. Perhaps I should not be in difficulty if you could clearly convince me of something which I cannot see for myself; for I wonder whether man would have been an animal if he had not sinned – or, to put the question in another way, was man an animal before he sinned? If he was not, why have we toiled so long to seek, and, I think, to find that man was created in the universal genus of the animals? For if he was not created in that genus, either before the Fall he was not an animal at all, or, if he was, he was fashioned in a different genus of animals. But neither does Holy Scripture make mention of such a thing nor does the most careful enquiry into nature reveal any trace of it. For all animals subsist in a single genus, from which they proceed by divisions. On the other hand, if from the text, 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul', we are to assume that man's creation before the Fall was among the other animals, why does the Psalmist bring it against man after the Fall as a great disgrace: 'Man when he was held in honour, fell short of intelligence, and became comparable to the irrational cattle, and was made like them'? Here the Prophet seems to make it quite plain that before the Fall man held the honour of a spiritual substance transcending the nature of all animals: but that slipping back therefrom and failing to realize the dignity of his nature he fell into the disgrace of a likeness to the beasts of the field. But if he was an animal before the Fall, why after the Fall can it be justly held against him that he has acquired the likeness of the animals with whom he was in his nature created together in a single genus?

N. You would have reason to raise this question if the Prophet had simply said 'He became comparable to the cattle, and was made like them'; but he adds 'irrational' cattle and thereby makes it sufficiently clear that this is the chief charge against man, that while he was a

quia, dum esset spirituale animal et sapiens in prima sui conditione ad imaginem dei et similitudinem, ipse insipienter et irrationabiliter se mouens contra sui creatoris mandatum, insipientium animalium (hoc est brutorum) similitudinem attraxit, eorumque inconuenientibus sibi motibus naturalem naturae suae honestatem dehonestauit. Non enim in eo laudatur quod animal est, sed quod imago dei, sicut in eo non uituperatur quod animal, sed quod imaginem deformare uoluit, quam perdere non potuit. Nam in caeteris animalibus irrationabiles motus turpes non sunt, dum naturaliter eis insunt, et sine quibus animalia esse non possunt. Reprehensibile est autem atque deforme in animali rationabili in motus irrationabilium, quamuis naturales illis sint, illicito peruersae uoluntatis appetitu cadere, in eisque uelle manere, relicta superiori pulchritudine diuinae imaginis.

A. Iure quidem culpatur rationabilis animalis irrationabilis motus. Nam si aliquis homo honestae formae bestialem effigiem sponte sua se indueret, non immerito reprehenderetur, ab eo quod melius est in id quod multo deterius seipsum praecipitans. Sed adhuc quaero: cur deus hominem in genere animalium creauit, quem ad imaginem suam et similitudinem facere uoluit? Gloriosius quippe uideretur omni animalitate fieri absolutum, quod superni characteris particeps esse ultra omnia animalia fuerat electum, caelestiumque essentiarum consors, quibus terrenorum animalium nulla consubstantialitas sinitur inesse. Non enim terrenis corporibus grauantur, nec corporeis sensibus utuntur ad rerum sensibilibus notitiam; non extrinsecus phantasias accipiunt, sed intrinsecus in seipsis rationes eorum quae uident cognoscunt. Nam et anima non extra se uidet quae sentit, sed per phantasias in seipsa. Quod angeli non patiuntur, quamuis Plato angelum diffiniat animal rationale et immortale. Sed quod auctoritate sanctae scripturae sanctorumque patrum probare non possumus, inter certas naturarum speculationes (quoniam temerarium est) recipere non debemus. Quod autem sanctus Augustinus summos angelos spiritualia sua corpora, in quibus

te eo quod
angelus
animal
non est

28-29 CALCIDIVS, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentarius* 135; ed. I. W. Waszink², Londini et Leidae 1975, p. 175, 16-18. 48.31-50.2 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XV, xxiii, 1 (CCSL 48, pp. 488-489; PL 41, 468); *Enarr. in psalmos* Ps. 85, 17 (CCSL 39, p. 1190; PL 37, 1094); *Enchiridion* XV, 59 (CCSL 46, p. 81; PL 40, 260); *Epistula* 95 8 (PL 33, 355); *Sermo* 277 9, 9 (PL 38, 1262); *De Trinitate* III, i, 4-5 (CCSL 50, pp. 130-131; PL 42, 870-871).

2 dei] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 2 ipse] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 3 creatoris] conditoris
HM 3-4 hoc est brutorum] *sup. l. J, om. HMR. Haec glossa inepte interposita est inter insipientium et animalium in codicibus FP* 5-8 Non enim . . . potuit] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰*
8 nam] *p. ras. R¹, siquidem R⁰* 9 non sunt] *p. ras. R¹* 10 possunt] *sed quod add. R⁰ (postea erasum)* 10 autem] *p. ras. R¹, om. R⁰* 20 omni animalitate] *corr. R¹*
20 absolutum] *corr. R¹* 23 consubstantialitas sinitur] *p. ras. R¹* 23-28 non enim terrenis . . . patiuntur] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰* 25 non] *enim add. HMR¹* 28 rationale] *p. ras. sup. l. R¹*

spiritual and rational animal in his original creation in the image and likeness of God, he himself foolishly and irrationally acted against the command of his Creator and brought upon himself the likeness of irrational animals (that is beasts), dishonouring the natural dignity of his nature by an activity of theirs improper to himself. It is not for being an animal that he is praised, but for being the image of God. Likewise it is not for being an animal that he is blamed, but that he willed to distort the image which he could not destroy. For in the other animals irrational action is not shameful, for it is according to their nature, and they could not be animals without it. But in the rational animal it is a reprehensible distortion of nature to fall by the forbidden concupiscence of a perverse will into the activity of irrational animals, although to them it is natural, and to desire to remain therein, abandoning the more exalted beauty of the Divine image.

A. Rightly indeed is the rational animal blamed for acting in the way of the irrational animals; and rightly to be reprehended is the man of honourable form who of his own free will clothes himself in the form of a beast and hurls himself from that which is the better down to that which is much inferior. But there still remains the question why God created man, whom He wished to make in His image and likeness, in the genus of the animals. For since man had been chosen to be the principal participant in the Supernal Figure and to be the peer of the celestial essences in whom there is permitted to be no consubstantiality with the terrestrial animals, it would seem a greater honour for him to be constituted free from all animality. For the celestial essences are not weighed down by earthly bodies, nor do they use corporeal senses for knowledge of sensible things. For they do not receive phantasies from without, but know inwardly within themselves the reasons of the things which they perceive. For that matter neither does the soul see outside itself the things which it perceives, but it does have to rely upon inward phantasies of them, which the angels do not experience. I grant you that Plato defines the angel as a rational and immortal animal (61): but if our speculations about the nature of things are to be firmly grounded we ought not rashly to include among them anything which cannot be supported by the authority of Holy Scripture and the holy Fathers (62). Again, Saint Augustine not only does not deny the possibility that the highest angels have spiritual bodies in

The angel is
not animal

saepe apparent, non solum habere non denegat, uerum etiam 762D
 confirmat, nullo modo compellit nos caelestes substantias animalia
 esse credere, praesertim cum non caelestium et incorruptibilium
 corporum cum angelicis spiritibus armonia inseparabilisque iunctura
 sed terrestrium et corruptibilium cum animabus, siue rationabilibus 5
 siue irrationabilibus, sensu mediante, connexio animal efficiat. Nam
 si sensus exterior angelicis corporibus atque intellectibus inest, quid
 prohibet ne illos animalia, corpore et anima sensu mediante et 763A
 intellectu uiuificante composita, sicut Platoni placet, dicamus? Et
 si sic, quare in genere animalium non computantur? Siquidem et 10
 homo si non peccaret, animal esset. Non enim peccatum de homine
 fecit animal, sed natura. Nam et angelos praeuaricatores animalia
 esse nulla tradit auctoritas. Quod maxime tali docetur argumento.
 Siquidem illa futura felicitas, quae sanctis hominibus promittitur,
 non alia esse praedicatur quam angelicae naturae perfecta et in 15
 nullo deficiens aequalitas. Quis autem sanum sapiens futuram
 hominis transmutationem crediderit ueluti ex animali inferiori in
 animal superius, ex terreno in caeleste, ex temporali in aeternum,
 ex mortali in immortale, ex misero in beatum, sed potius omnia 763B
 quae in hac uita in hominibus sanctis caeteris communia animalibus
 seu intelliguntur seu sentiuntur, in illam essentiam caelestem et
 incommutabilem omnique animalitate carentem ineffabili quadam
 mutatione transferri? Quod etiam homini, si non peccaret, futurum
 erat. Quare igitur homo in genere animalium quae de terra producta 20
 sunt creatus sit, in quo semper non manebit? Siquidem cum mundus
 iste, cuius pars animalis homo est, interierit, omne quod in homine
 animale est cum ipso et in ipso peribit; non enim sinit uera ratio
 totum pati interitum, partes uero illius ab interitu saluari. Porro si
 totus mundus cum omnibus suis partibus interiturus erit, quomodo
 homo, in quantum pars mundi est, post mundum manebit, aut ubi, 763C
 aut quomodo, non satis uideo. Ac per hoc huius quaestionis nodulos 31
 soluas, obnixè flagito.

N. Altam ualde humanae conditionis physicam theoriam postulas,
 nostramque disputationem longius progredi compellis. Et mihi
 sufficeret interroganti tibi quare deus hominem in genere animalium 35
 creauerit, quem ad suam imaginem facere proposuit, breuiter
 respondere: quia ita uoluit eum condere, ut quoddam animal esset,
 in quo imaginem suam expressam manifestaret. Cur autem ita uoluit

14–16 Matth. 22, 30; Marc. 12, 25; Luc. 20, 36.

4 inseparabilisque iunctura] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 5 animabus] animalibus F (a. corr.), J
 (p. corr. ex animabus) 6–13 nam si sensus . . . auctoritas] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 8 et anima]
 om. HMR 8 sensu] sensuque HMR¹ 11–12 de homine fecit] fecit de homine
 R¹, om. R⁰ 23–24 quod etiam . . . futurum erat] partim sup. l. partim mg. R¹, om. R⁰
 28 interitum] corr. R¹

which they frequently manifest themselves but actually asserts that this
 is so: but we are by no means bound by this to believe that the celestial
 substances are animals, especially as it is not the harmony and insepa-
 rable linking of celestial and incorruptible bodies with angelic spirits
 which produce an animal but the joining of earthly and corruptible
 bodies to rational or irrational souls through the medium of sense.
 Of course, if the exterior sense were present to the body and the intel-
 lect of the angel, nothing would prevent us from saying, as Plato was
 pleased to do, that the angel, being in that case a composite of body
 and soul with sense mediating between the two and intellect bringing
 life to the whole, was an animal: but in that case, why are angels not
 counted in the genus of the animals? For as to man, he would have
 been an animal even if he had not sinned: for it was not sin but nature
 which made an animal of him. Moreover there is no tradition which
 gives us the authority to say that the angels who sinned were animals,
 which would logically follow from such an argument. For that future
 bliss which is promised to the saints is taught to be nothing else but
 equality with the angelic nature, perfect and lacking in nothing (63).
 But what man that was truly wise would believe that man's destined
 transformation was as it were from an inferior to a superior animal,
 from an earthly to a heavenly animal, from a temporal to an eternal
 animal, from a mortal to an immortal animal, from an unhappy to a
 blessed animal? Would he not rather believe that all the things which
 in this life are understood or perceived to be attributes common to
 devout men and to the other animals are by a certain ineffable muta-
 tion changed into that celestial and incommunicable essence which
 has nothing of animality about it; and that this too would have been
 the condition of man, had he not sinned? Why then is man created in
 the genus of the animals which are produced out of the earth, a genus
 in which he is not destined always to remain? For when this world, of
 which man is an animal part, shall have perished, all that is animal in
 man shall perish with it and in it. For it is not reasonable that when
 the whole shall perish the parts shall escape destruction. Moreover,
 if the whole world with all its parts is to be destroyed I fail to see how
 man, in so far as he is a part of the world, could survive the world, –
 or in what place or in what way. Hence my insistence in begging you
 to resolve this knotty problem.

N. What you demand is a very advanced physical explanation of
 man's creation, which will require us to prolong our discussion con-
 siderably. When you ask why God should have created man, whom
 He proposed to make in His own image, in the genus of animals, it
 should be enough for me to reply briefly that He wished so to fashion
 him that there might be one among the animals in which His image
 was expressly manifested. But if one goes on to ask why He wished to

quisquis quaerit, diuinae uoluntatis causas quaerit, quas quaerere nimis praesumptiuum est atque superbum: *Quis enim cognouit sensum domini?* Sed si hoc dixero, ingratus fortassis silebis, et nos aestimabis nil ad purum perfectumue ducere posse. Non dicam igitur cur uoluit, quia omnem intellectum superat, sed dicam, prout ipse dederit, quid facere uoluit. Omnem quidem creaturam uisibilem et inuisibilem in homine fecit, quoniam ipsi uniuersitas conditae naturae inesse intelligitur. Quamuis enim adhuc lateat quanta sit prima hominis conditio post praeuaricationem, superni luminis defectu, nihil tamen in caelestibus essentiis naturaliter inest, quod non in homine essentialiter non subsistat. Est enim intellectus et ratio, est caelestis angelicque corporis habendi naturaliter insita ratio, quae post resurrectionem luce clarius et in bonis apparebit, et in malis: hoc nanque commune erit uniuersae humanae naturae, in aeternis incorruptibilibusque ac spiritualibus corporibus resurgere. *Seminatur*, inquit, *animale, surget corpus spirituale*. Totus iste mundus sensibilis in ipso conditus est. Nulla enim pars eius inuenitur, siue corporea, siue incorporea, quae non in homine creata subsistat: sentit, uiuit, incorporatur. Noli moles corporeas in homine pensare, uirtutem magis considera naturalem, praesertim cum uideas in ipso humano corpore pupillam oculi, quae cum sit minima omnium membrorum quantitate, maxima subsistit potentia. Si ergo deus hominem in genere animalium non crearet, uel certe si omnium animalium totam naturam in homine non substitueret, quomodo uniuersa creatura uisibilis et inuisibilis in eo comprehenderetur? Ac per hoc rationabiliter possumus dicere: propterea deus hominem in genere animalium uoluit substituere, quoniam in ipso omnem creaturam uoluit creare. Cur autem in ipso omnem creaturam uoluit creare, si a me quaeris, respondeo: quia ad imaginem et similitudinem suam uoluit eum facere, ut quemadmodum principale exemplum superat omnia essentiae excellentia, ita imago eius superaret omnia creationis dignitate et gratia. Cur autem specialiter prae caeteris uisibilibus et inuisibilibus creaturis ad imaginem suam hominem uoluit facere, fateor me omnino ignorare.

A. Mihi interroganti cur deus in genere animalium hominem uoluit facere, satis, ut aestimo, et rationabiliter responsum.

2-3 Rom. 11, 34. 16 I Cor. 15, 44.

19-22 AVGVSTINVS, *De quantitate animae* XIV, 24 (PL 32, 1048).

7 uniuersitas] *R¹*, uniuersitatis *R⁰* 14 nanque] enim *HMR* 16 *seminatur . . . spirituale*] *mg. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 17 *inuenitur*] *sup. l. R¹*, est *R⁰* (*a. ras.*) 18 *quae non*] *R¹*, quoniam *R⁰* 19-22 *noli moles . . . potentia*] *mg. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 28 creaturam] naturam *HMR* 28-29 cur autem . . . creare] *om. HM* 28 creaturam] naturam *R*, *om. HM* 36 responsum] est *add. R⁰* (*postea erasum*)

do so, he is enquiring into the causes of the Divine will, an enquiry which is over-presumptuous and arrogant. 'For who has known the sense of the Lord'? But if I should say that, you would relapse into an ungrateful silence and consider me incapable of producing a clear and full exposition. While, therefore, I will not tell you why He willed, for that is beyond all understanding, I shall relate, to the extent that He Himself has told us, what He willed to do. He has created in man all creatures visible and invisible, for the whole spread of creation is understood to inhere in man. For although after his transgression and the failure of supernal light it is not clear yet how great was the first creation of man, nevertheless there is nothing naturally present in the celestial essences which does not subsist essentially in man. For there is innate in him intellect and reason, as well as the innate principle of possession of the celestial and angelic body, which after the Resurrection shall appear more clearly than light both in the just and the unjust: for it will be common to all human nature to rise again in eternal and incorruptible spiritual bodies. 'It is sown', he says, 'an animal body; it will rise a spiritual body'. All this sensible world is fashioned in man. No part of it is found, either corporeal or incorporeal, which does not subsist created in man, which does not perceive through him, which does not live through him, which is not incorporated in him. Do not think here of man's physical stature, but rather of his natural potency, particularly bearing in mind that in the human body itself the pupil of the eye, although the least of all the members in physical size, yet exerts the greatest power (64). If then God did not create man in the genus of the animals, or at any rate, if He did not place the whole nature of all animals in man, how would the whole of creation, both visible and invisible, subsist in him? Reason, then, permits us to say that God willed to place man in the genus of the animals for this purpose: that He wished to create every creature in him. And if you ask me why He wished to create every creature in him, I reply: because He wished to make him in His image and likeness, so that, just as the Primal Archetype transcends all by the excellence of His essence, so His image should transcend all created things in dignity and grace. But as to why it should be man whom He wished to create in His image before all creatures visible and invisible, I confess that I am entirely ignorant.

A. I consider that you have given a sufficient and reasonable reply (65) to my question why God wished to create man in the genus

In man every creature was created

Why God willed to create every creature in man

Quomodo
omnia creata
sunt in
homine

Verumtamen adhuc quaero: quomodo in homine omnia creata sunt et in ipso subsistunt? Num secundum solam essentiam, an secundum sola accidentia, an cuncta quae considerantur in uniuersa creatura, hoc est, secundum essentiam, speciem, differentiam, et proprietatem, et omnia quae circa ea intelliguntur?

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N. Hanc quaestionem non mihi facile occurrit quomodo rationabiliter absoluam. Nam si dixero secundum solam essentiam, merito respondebis: omnia igitur in tantum solummodo sunt, in quantum essentialiter subsistunt, caetera uero quae circa essentiam uel substantiam intelliguntur in numero uniuersitatis rerum nec computanda nec penitus sunt. Et si ita est, quaeres a me: unde ergo sunt quae circa essentiam rerum intelliguntur? Si dixero: ex deo facta sunt, dicturus eris: quare ergo in numero uniuersitatis, quae in homine facta est, non includuntur? Si dixero: a deo facta non sunt, respondebis: non sunt igitur, nam si essent, non aliunde nisi ex causa omnium, quae deus est. Et si consensero ea quae circa essentias intelliguntur in numero rerum non esse, quia a deo non sunt, continuo dices: quomodo ergo intelliguntur? Omne enim quod ex deo non est nullo modo intelligi potest, quia ullo modo non est. Si dixero: non solum essentias, uerum etiam omnia quae naturaliter circa eas intelliguntur et ex deo esse et in partibus uniuersitatis computari non est dubium, cogar unum e duobus eligere: aut non totam uniuersitatem in homine conditam, si solummodo essentiae in ipso factae sunt, aut totam uniuersitatem (hoc est essentias et quaecunque circa eas et in eis perspiciuntur) in homine conditam esse. Et si dixero non partem uniuersitatis (hoc est substantias) sed totum in homine constitutum, grauissima quaestione persequeris dicendo: irrationabilitas ergo in eo facta est, et bestialitas, quadrupedalitas, uolatilitas, omnesque differentiae diuersorum animalium aliarumque rerum, species quoque et proprietates et accidentia, et caetera innumerabilia, quae ab humana natura longe distare uidentur, in tantum ut, si homini inesse constiterit, non esse hominem, sed turpissimum monstrum recte iudicetur.

764D

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A. Difficultatem quaestionis cumulasti, quadamque deliberatione quicquid ab alio opponeretur tibi ipse opposuisti. Ac per hoc aut eam

2 et in ipso subsistunt] *p. ras. R¹ 2 num] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 3 an cuncta] cunctaque HMR 4 essentiam] et add. HMR 4 speciem] et add. HMR 5 quae circa] *p. ras. R¹ 5 ea] om. HMR 5 intelliguntur] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 6 quaestionem] quaestionem R, inquisitionem HM 16 aliunde] essent add. H, M (sup. l.) 18 quomodo] *p. ras. R¹ 22 non est dubium] sup. l. R¹ 22 dubium] quin add. H, M (sup. l.), ut sit sensus: si dixero non solum . . . computari, non est dubium quin cogar . . . 26 perspiciuntur] *p. ras. R¹ 29 facta] corr. R¹ 33 constiterit] partim *p. ras. partim mg. R¹*****

of the animals. But I have a further question to ask: In what way were all things created in man, and how do they subsist in him? Are they in him simply as essence, or simply as accidents, or do they play in him all the roles which we observe in universal creation, that is, essence, species, difference, property (66), and everything which is understood to relate to them?

How all
things were
created in
man

N. I am in some difficulty as to how to give a rational answer to that question. For if I reply, simply as essence, you will rightly object that in that case only those things exist which subsist as essences, and other things which are understood to relate to essence or substance are not to be reckoned in the number of the universe of things – in fact are altogether without being; and if this is so, you will ask me, whence are those things which are understood to relate to the essence of existents? If I say that these things were made by God, you will ask: Why then are they not included in the sum of the things which were created in man? And if I say that they were not made by God, you will reply that in that case they are not; for if they were, they would not be from any other than the Universal Cause which is God. And if I grant that those things which are understood to relate to essences are not among the number of existents because they are not from God, you will at once ask: How then do we have understanding of them? For nothing which is not from God can by any means be understood, because it does not exist in any way. If I say that not only the essences, but all things which are understood naturally to relate to them are undoubtedly from God and to be numbered among the parts of the whole, I shall be compelled to choose one of the two following alternatives: either that the whole universe of things was not created in man in its entirety, since only the essences were made in him: or that the entire universe of things, that is, the essences and everything which is perceived to relate to them and to inhere in them, is established in man; but if I say that it is not a part of the universe of things, that is substances, that is constituted in man, but the whole of it, you will follow with the hardest question of all: Was irrationality then made in him, and bestiality, quadrupedality, volatility and all the differences of the divers animals and of the other things, together with all species and properties and accidents and all the other innumerable attributes which seem to be so far removed from human nature that if they were indeed found in man, he would rightly be considered not a man but the foulest of monsters?

A. You have piled up the difficulty of the question, and deliberately raised up against yourself what would have been raised by another;

reserabis, aut obstrusam praeteries, et ad alia transibis, quod ualde incongruum uidebitur.

N. Conemur itaque illam quodammodo conspiciari, ne omnino intacta interim relinquatur.

765C

A. Mihi aliter satisfacere non ualebis.

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N. Omne quod cognoscitur intellectu et ratione, seu corporeo sensu imaginatur, putasne in ipso qui intelligit et sentit quodammodo posse creari et effici?

A. Videtur mihi posse. Rerum siquidem sensibilibum species et quantitates et qualitates, quas corporeo sensu attingo, quodammodo in me creari puto; earum nanque phantasias, dum memoriae infigo, easque intra me ipsum tracto, diuido, comparo, ac ueluti in unitatem quandam colligo, quandam notitiam rerum quae extra me sunt in me effici perspicio. Similiter etiam interius intelligibilium, quae solo animo contempler (uerbi gratia, liberalium disciplinarum) quasdam notiones, ueluti intelligibiles species, dum studiose eas perquiro, in me nasci et fieri intelligo. Quid autem interest inter notitiam et res ipsas quarum notitia est, plane non uideo.

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765D

N. Quid tibi uidetur? Num unius naturae, an alterius sunt res earumque notitiae quae in anima fiunt?

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A. Alterius. Quomodo enim unius naturae erit species corporea (uerbi gratia cuiusdam animalis, seu herbae, seu arboris) et notitia eius quae in natura incorporea efficitur? Eadem ratione, quomodo cuiuspiam disciplinae intelligibilis species et notitia ipsius unius naturae possunt fieri?

766A

N. Si ergo alterius generis seu naturae, et non eiusdem, dic, quaeso, quid horum praestantius ponendum arbitraris: num excelsioris naturae sunt res propriis notionibus, an ipsae notiones rebus?

26

De eo quod rerum cognitio melior est quam res ipsae

A. Visibiles species melioris esse naturae notionibus earum dixerim, si sanctus Augustinus in nono de trinitate, undecimo

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1 Omnes codices habent *obstrusam*, et non *abstrusam*, ut uolunt Gale (172. 34) et Floss (765B12-13). Sciendum est autem *ob* et *ab* a scriptoribus Hiberniae saepe confundi: B. Löfstedt, *Der hibernolateinische Grammatiker Malsachanus*, Vpsaliae 1955, p. 99, n. 2).

1 praeteries] *codd.*, praeteribis Gale (172.34) et Floss (765B13) 4 interim] *p. ras.* R¹ 13 quandam notitiam] R¹, quaedam notitia R⁰ 14 effici perspicio] R¹, efficitur R⁰ 14 interius] R¹, rerum R⁰ 14 quae] R¹, quas R⁰ 15 quasdam] R¹, quandam R⁰ 16 notiones] R¹, notitiam R⁰, notiones FP 16 intelligibiles species] R¹, intelligibilis speciei R⁰ 28 propriis notionibus] *p. ras.* R¹ 56.31-58.6 si sanctus . . . animus] *mg.* add. R^s, *om.* R⁰

and thus you must either clear it up or pass it over (67) as being too abstruse and go on to other matters; but that will seem a most unsuitable proceeding.

N. Let us then make some attempt to examine it so as not to leave it for the time being wholly untouched.

A. You will not be able to satisfy me otherwise.

N. Is it your opinion that everything which is known by the intellect or the reason or imagined by the sense can somehow be created and produced in the knower and perceiver? (68)

A. It seems to me that it can. For it is indeed my opinion that the species of sensible things and the quantities and qualities which I reach by my corporeal sense are in a certain way created in me; for when I imprint the phantasies of them in my memory, and when I deal with them within myself by division and comparison and, as it were, collect them into a kind of unity, I notice a certain knowledge of the things which are external to me being built up within me; and in the same way when I seek earnestly within me after certain concepts resembling the intelligible species, concepts of intelligibles which I contemplate with the mind alone, as for example the concept of the liberal arts, I feel them born and becoming within me; but the relation between this knowledge and the things themselves which are its object I do not fully grasp.

N. How does it seem to you? Are the concepts of things, made in the soul, of the same nature as the things themselves, or are they something different?

A. They are different. For how will the corporeal species of, for example, a certain animal or grass or tree be of one nature with the knowledge of it which is produced in an incorporeal nature? And in the same way how can the intelligible species of any discipline and the knowledge of it be of the one nature?

N. If then they are of a different genus or nature and not the same, tell me, please, which of the two is the more excellent? Are the things of a more exalted nature than the concepts of them, or are the concepts more exalted than the things?

The know-
ledge of
things is
better than
the things
themselves

A. I should have said that the visible species are of a better nature than the concepts of them, were it not for Saint Augustine who in the Ninth Book, *On the Trinity*, Chapter Eleven, gives the following

capitulo, talem sententiam non pronuntiaret: *Cum per sensum, inquit, corporis discimus corpora, fit aliqua eorum similitudo in animo nostro, quae phantasia in memoria est. Non enim omnino ipsa corpora in animo sunt, cum ea cogitamus, sed eorum similitudines. Melior est tamen imaginatio corporis in animo quam illa species corporis, in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est in substantia uitali, sicuti est animus.* Non autem intelligibiles notione sua, quae est in anima, meliores esse audeo dicere. Quod enim intelligit melius esse quam quod intelligitur, ratio docet. Nam si rerum omnium cognitio in diuina sapientia subsistit, meliorem esse incomparabiliter eam rebus omnibus quarum cognitio est non temere pronuntiarim. Et si ita est, talis ordo, ut reor, ex diuina prouidentia per uniuersam creaturam procedit, ut omnis natura, quae sequentis se notitiam comprehendit, non solum melior et superior sit, uerum etiam et ipsa notitia dignitate naturae, in qua est, praecedit eam longe, cuius notitia est. Ac per hoc facilius dixerim notitiam intelligibilium rerum antiquiorem esse ipsis intelligibilibus rebus.

N. Illud fortassis recte diceret, si praestantius sit quod formatur illo quod format.

A. Quare hoc opponis?

N. Quia notitia artium, quae in anima est, ab ipsis artibus formari uidetur. Sed si certissima ratione suaderet non notitiam ex artibus, uerum artes ex notitia formari, tua forsitan ratiocinatio recte ingrederetur.

A. Nonne inter nos confectum iam omne quod intelligit illo quod intelligitur praestantius esse?

N. Confectum.

A. Dic ergo: utrum peritia mentis intelligit disciplinam, an disciplina peritiam?

N. Mente intelligi disciplinam non dubito. Si uero dixero ex ipsa quoque peritia similiter, sicut et mente cuius peritia est, eandem disciplinam cognosci, uereor ne uidear asserere mentem peritiamque sui duo quaedam esse disciplinae notionibus uigentia, et non unam eandemque essentiam, cui naturaliter inest disciplinae cognitio. Si autem mentem suique peritiam non duo quaedam, sed unum atque idem uera docet ratio, cogor fateri omne quod mente intelligitur peritia quoque sui intelligi; et continuo sequetur mentem et peritiam,

1-6 AVGVSTINVS, *De Trinitate* IX, xi, 16 (CCSL 50, p. 307; PL 42, 969).

3 in memoria] memoriae HMR 5 meliore] R^x (a. corr.), meliori R^x (p. corr.) 10 eam] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 28-29 an disciplina] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 30 ex] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 31 quoque] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 37 quoque] quaeque R

opinion: 'When we learn of bodies through the sense of the body, a certain replica of the bodies is created in our mind: this is a phantasy in our memory. For it is certainly not the bodies themselves that are in our mind when we reflect on them, but replicas of them. Nevertheless the phantasy of a body in the mind is better than the species of that body, inasmuch as it is in a better nature, namely, in a vital substance, for such the mind is'. Furthermore I would not dare to say that even intelligible things are better than the concept of them which is in the soul. For it is a doctrine according to reason that that which understands is better than that which is understood. Thus, if the knowledge of all things subsists in the Divine wisdom, I should not be rash in asserting that this wisdom is incomparably superior to the things of which it is the knowledge. And if so, I believe that the same relationship proceeds from the Divine providence throughout all creation, so that not only every nature which has a concept of that which follows it is better and superior, but also the concept itself, through the dignity of the nature in which it resides, greatly excels the object of which it is the concept. And therefore I should find it rather easy to say that the concept of the intelligibles precedes the intelligibles themselves.

N. You would perhaps be right in saying so if that which is formed is more excellent than that which forms.

A. Why do you make this qualification?

N. Because the concept of the arts which is in the soul seems to be formed by the arts themselves. But if you could establish beyond doubt that the concept was not formed from the arts, but the arts from the concept, your argument would perhaps be running on the right lines.

A. Did we not prove a moment ago that everything which understands is more excellent than that which is understood?

N. We did.

A. Tell me then whether it is the skill of the mind which understands a discipline (69) or a discipline which understands the skill.

N. I have no doubt that the discipline is understood by the mind. But if I were to say that the same discipline was known from the skill itself also in the same manner as it is known by the mind which is endowed with that skill, I should be afraid of seeming to assert that the mind and its skill are two things furnished with the concepts of the discipline, instead of being one and the same essence, in which the knowledge of the discipline is naturally present. If however the mind and its skill are not two different but, as true reason teaches, one and the same, I am compelled to admit that everything which is understood by the mind is also understood by its skill, and it must follow that the mind and its skill, or rather, the skilled mind, is of a

uel certe mentem peritam, praestantioris naturae esse ea disciplina quam intelligit, si antiquiora sunt intellectis intelligentia. Si autem dixero ipsam disciplinam peritae mentis peritam esse, consequens erit aut mentem peritam disciplinamque peritam duo quaedam 767A
esse se inuicem intelligentia et a se inuicem intellecta, ac per hoc 5
aequali dignitate naturae pollentia, aut mentem peritamque sui disciplinamque quam intelligit et a qua intelligitur unius eiusdemque essentiae fateri. Sed quid horum tenendum sit, nondum clare patet.

A. Forsan patebit, dummodo rectam ratiocinandi uiam, deo duce, ingrediamur. 10

N. Quaeramus itaque diligentius. Ac primum dicas uolo mentis naturam, cui inest disciplinae peritia, simplicem esse annon.

A. Simplicem arbitror. Est enim incorporea, intellectualis; ac per hoc omni compositione carere necesse est.

N. Recte arbitraris. Putasne igitur aliquid ei accidere, quod eius 15
essentiae naturaliter non inest?

A. Puto quidem. Multa enim contingere ei uideo. Verbi gratia: 767B
temporaliter mouetur, dum ipsa non sit tempus, peritia disciplinarum
ei accidit, nunc enim perita, nunc imperita, nunc disciplinata, nunc
indisciplinata dinoscitur, nunc sapiens, nunc insipiens, nunc 20
errans (quando irrationabiliter uoluitur), nunc rationis uiam recte
ingreditur, et multa id genus.

De eo quod mens et sui peritia et disciplina eiusdem substantiae sunt
N. Non ergo peritia disciplinae, uel ipsa disciplina naturaliter ei inest, sed ex accidentibus extrinsecus proueniunt.

A. Non ausim hoc dicere. Neque enim uerisimile est deum ad 25
imaginem et similitudinem suam creasse mentem, cui naturaliter
peritia atque disciplina non ingenita sit; alioqui non esset mens, sed
bruta quaedam irrationabilisque uita. Nam non recte quis dixerit, ut
arbitror, hominem ad imaginem dei factum secundum accidens, et 767C
non secundum substantiam, praesertim cum intellectum et rationem 30
substantialiter inesse ei uideamus.

N. Non ergo accidunt ei, sed naturaliter insunt.

17-22 AVGVSTINVS, *In Ioh. eu. tr.* XIX, xi, 15-20. XX, xii, 29-32. XXXIX, viii, 4-9
(CCSL 36, pp. 194, 210, 349; PL 35, 1548-1549, 1563, 1685). 30-31 AVGVSTINVS,
De ciuitate dei XI, ii, 20-21 (CCSL 48, p. 322; PL 41, 318).

3 peritam] peritiam J (corr. ex peritam) 13 simplicem] esse add. HM 19-20 nunc
disciplinata nunc indisciplinata] om. HMR 23 disciplinae] R^l, disciplina R^o
24 accidentibus] ei add. HM 25 neque] non HMR 27 alioqui] codd.,
alioquin Gale et Floss 28-31 nam . . . uideamus] mg. R^l: om. R^o 28 nam non] p. ras.
R^l (corr. ex non), non HM

more excellent nature than the discipline which it understands, if the things which understand are prior to the things which are understood. If, however, I were to say that the discipline itself of the skilled mind was skilled, the consequence would be either that the skilled mind and the skilled discipline were two entities with mutual understanding of each other and mutually understood, and thus enjoying an equal dignity of nature; or else the mind and its skill and the discipline which it understands and by which it is understood, must be considered to be of one and the same essence. But it is not yet clear which of these alternatives should be adopted.

A. Perhaps it will be if, under guidance of God, we enter upon the right path of reasoning.

N. Let us then look into the matter more carefully. But first I should like you to tell me whether the nature of the mind which possesses the skill of the discipline is simple or not.

A. I think that it is simple. For being incorporeal and intellectual it must therefore be without all compositeness.

N. You think rightly. Do you suppose then that something which does not naturally reside in its essence may adhere to it as an accident?

A. I think indeed it may. For I see that many things are contingent to it. For example, it is not time; yet it moves in time. Skill in the disciplines is an accident to it: for at one time it is recognised as skilled, at another as unskilled; at one time disciplined, at another not so; now wise, now foolish; sometimes, indulging in irrational cogitations, it is seen to be in error, while at other times it goes upon the path of right reason; and so on.

N. So skill in the discipline, or the discipline itself, do not naturally reside in it, but come to it from outside as the result of accidents. Mind and its skill and its discipline are of the same substance

A. I should not go so far as to say that; for it is not likely that God should have created in His own image and likeness a mind in which skill and the discipline were not naturally inborn, for this would not be so much mind as a kind of brutish and irrational life. Nor do I think that it would be right to say that man's creation in the image of God was rather by accident than by substance, especially when we see that intelligence and reason are present in the mind substantially.

N. Then skill and the discipline are not accidents to the mind, but are naturally present to it?

A. Non temere dixerim, ut opinor. Quamuis enim imperita et insipiens nasci uideatur (quod ei accidit diuini transgressione mandati, qua et suimet et creatoris sui oblita est), doctrinae tamen regulis reformata, deum suum et seipsam suique peritiam et disciplinam et omnia quae naturaliter in ea subsistunt in seipsa potest 5 reperire, redemptoris sui gratia illuminata.

N. Restat igitur considerare quomodo ei insunt peritia et disciplina: num ueluti naturales qualitates, quas uirtutes appellant, ut sunt species sapientiae et scientiae, quas diuini radii repercussione percipit, an ueluti substantiales suas partes, quibus consistit, ita ut 767D
11 quaedam trinitas sit unius essentiae, mens, peritia, disciplina?

A. Quod postremo posuisti crediderim. Videtur enim mihi substantialis quaedam et connaturalis trinitas.

N. Mens itaque et peritiam et disciplinam suam intelligit, et a sua peritia suaque disciplina intelligitur, non quid, sed quia est; aliter enim 15 coessentialis et coequalis trinitas non erit.

A. Nec hoc negarim, quia ita ratio me fateri exigit.

N. Vide igitur utrum a se inuicem, an ab alia quadam superiori se 768A
natura formantur.

A. Si superiorem naturam, ex qua haec trinitas et substituitur 20 et formatur et intelligitur, fides catholica non suaderet, et non approbaret ueritas, fortassis seipsa formari, uel certe principalem formam esse non incaute responderim. Iam uero, quoniam superior est ipsa, ex qua omnia quae formantur incipiunt formari, et ad quam conuersa formantur quae ad eam conuertuntur aut possunt conuerti, 25 ab eadem etiam mentis trinitatem formari non dubito.

N. Hinc ambigere stultissimum. Sola itaque diuina mens notitiam humanae mentis, peritiae disciplinalisque, a se formatae et ad se, ueram possidet in seipsa.

A. Nil uerius aestimandum. 30

N. Putasne aliud esse humanam mentem et aliud notionem eius in mente formantis et noscentis? 768B

6 Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxx, 36-37 (SC 180, p. 160; PL 122, 308A). 24-25 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, viii, 16 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 43, 16-17; PL 34, 269).

13 quaedam] corr. R¹ 17 ratio me] R^x, ratione R^o 18 an] sup. l. R¹, om. R^o
21 catholica] mg. R¹, om. R^o 22 fortassis] a add. HM 24 incipiunt] corr. R¹
25 formantur] corr. R¹ 28 disciplinalisque] disciplinalis HMR 28 et ad se] om. HMR
29 in seipsa] notionem HMR 32 et noscentis] sup. l. R¹, om. R^o

A. I think it would not be rash to say so. For although through the accident of its transgression of the Divine command whereby it became forgetful both of itself and its Creator the mind is born unskilled and unwise, yet when it is reformed by the rules of doctrine it may discover again in itself its God and itself and its skill and the discipline and all those things which subsist in it according to its nature, if it be irradiated by the grace of its Redeemer.

N. It remains then to consider in what way skill and the discipline reside in the mind, whether as those natural qualities which are known as potencies, like the species of wisdom and knowledge which it perceives in the reflection of the Divine ray (70); or as substantial and constituent parts of itself, so that mind, skill and the discipline would form a kind of trinity in one essence.

A. Your last suggestion is the one which I would accept. For the three seem to me to form a kind of substantial and connatural trinity.

N. Then mind intellectually comprehends both its skill and the discipline, and is intellectually comprehended both by the one and by the other (though not as to what it is, but as to the fact that it is) (71). For otherwise the trinity will not be coessential and coequal.

A. I could not deny this, for reason compels me to admit it.

N. Consider then whether they are formed by one another or by some nature superior to them.

A. If the Catholic Faith did not teach that this trinity is established and formed and intellectually comprehended by a higher Nature, and if truth did not assent to this teaching, I should have some justification for replying that they are perhaps formed of themselves, or at least that they are their own primal form. But under the circumstances, of course, I do not doubt that the trinity of the mind is formed by a superior Nature, seeing that all things that are formed take from It the origin of their forms, and it is by being turned towards It that all things are formed which are turned towards It or can be turned towards It.

N. Any hesitation on this point would be extremely stupid. So only the Mind of God possesses in Itself the true concept of the human mind, of its skill and of the discipline, for by It and for It was this trinity formed.

A. Nothing could be truer than that.

N. Do you think that the human mind is one thing, and the concept of it in the Mind of Him Who forms and knows it another? (72)

A. Absit. Immo uero intelligo non aliam esse substantiam totius hominis, nisi suam notionem in mente artificis, qui omnia, priusquam fierent, in seipso cognouit; ipsamque cognitionem substantiam esse ueram ac solam eorum quae cognita sunt, quoniam in ipsa perfectissime facta et aeternaliter et immutabiliter subsistunt. 5

Diffinitio hominis N. Possumus ergo hominem diffinire sic. Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis, in mente diuina aeternaliter facta.

A. Verissima et probatissima diffinitio hominis est ista, et non solum hominis, uerum etiam omnium quae in diuina sapientia facta sunt. Nec uereor eos qui diffiniunt hominem non secundum quod intelligitur esse, sed ex his quae circa eum intelliguntur, dicentes: *Homo est animal rationale, mortale, sensus et disciplinae capax*, et, quod est mirabilius, hanc diffinitionem oysiadem uocant, dum non sit substantialis, sed circa substantiam, ex his quae per generationem substantiae accidunt extrinsecus assumpta. Notio nanque hominis in mente diuina nihil horum est: ibi siquidem simplex est, nec hoc nec illud dici potest, omnem diffinitionem et collectionem partium superans, dum de ea esse tantum praedicatur, non autem quid sit. Sola etenim ac uera oysiades diffinitio est, quae solummodo affirmat esse, et negat quid esse. 20

N. Num tibi uidetur rerum omnium sensibilibus et intelligibilibus quae potest humana mens intelligere notionem quandam in homine esse?

12 SEXTVS EMPIRICVS, *Hypotyposes* II, 26. 211; *Aduersus dogmaticos* VII, 269. TATIANVS, *Oratio ad Graecos* 15 (ed. M. Whittaker, Oxonii 1982, p. 30, 10-11; PG 6, 837A). NEMESIVS EMESENVS, *De natura hominis* I (ed. M. Morani, Lipsiae 1987, p. 11, 3-4; PG 40, 524B). MELETIVS, *Apographon libri Nemesii* (PG 64, 1084A). PSEVDO-GREGORIVS NAZIANZENVS, *Exc.* 44 (ed. K. H. Utheman, "Die Philosophischen Kapitel des Anastasius I von Antiochien (559-598)", *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 46 (1980), p. 364, 77). TERTVLLIANVS, *Ad Marcionem* II, iv, 5 (CCSL I, p. 479; PL 2, 289A). PSEVDO-AVGUSTINVS, *Categoriae decem* 63 (*Aristoteles Latinus* I, 5, p. 147, 13-16; PL 32, 1426). CASSIODORVS, *Institutiones* II, iii, 14 (ed. R. A. B. Mynors, Oxonii 1937, p. 120, 15-19; PL 70, 1173D). ISIDORVS, *Etymologiae* II, xxix, 2. In glossulis super *Categorias* X, quae in quodam codice saeculi X (olim sangermanensi, nunc petropolitano) seruantur, legitur: "Itaque hominem etiam ita diffinimus: Homo est animal mortale, rationale, disciplinae capax" (Leningrad, Bibl. publ. Cl. Lat. F. v. N7, fol. 4^v). Cf. *De praedestinatione* VIII, 72-74 (CCCM 50, p. 50; PL 122, 386C). 13 CASSIODORVS, *Institutiones* II, iii, 14. ISIDORVS, *Etymologiae* II, xxix, 2.

I uero intelligo] *partim mg. partim p. ras R¹, uero R⁰* 3-4 ipsamque cognitionem substantiam esse ueram ac solam] *R¹*, ipsaque cognitio substantia est uera ac sola *R⁰* 10-20 nec uereor . . . substantiam, ex his . . . horum est: ibi siquidem . . . superans dum . . . quid esse] *mg. R⁸ et R¹, om. R⁰* 13 oysiadem] *usiadem HM, intellige οὐσιώδη* 19 oysiades] *usiades HM, intellige οὐσιώδης* 22 quae] *codd., intellige quas*

A. That cannot be. For I understand the substance of the whole man to be nothing else but the concept of him in the Mind of his Artificer, Who knew all things in Himself before they were made; and that very knowledge is the true and only substance of the things known, since it is in that knowledge that they are most perfectly created and eternally and immutably subsist.

N. We may then define man as follows: Man is a certain intellectual concept formed eternally in the Divine Mind. Definition of man

A. That is an extremely true and very well tested definition of man; and not only of man, but of everything else which is formed in the Divine Wisdom. And I am not afraid of those who define him not as he is intellectually comprehended to be, but according to those things which are seen by the intellect to relate to him, saying that 'man is a rational mortal animal capable of sense and discipline'; and what is more amazing, they call this definition a substantial one, although it is not substantial at all, but describes what relates to the substance from the attributes acquired by the substance from outside itself through generation (73). But the concept of man in the Mind of God is none of these; for there it is simple, and cannot be called by this or that name, for it stands above all definition and all groupings of parts, for it can only be predicated of it that it is, not what it is. For that alone is what a truly substantial definition does: it asserts only that it is, but does not say what it is.

N. Does it seem to you that there is a kind of concept in man of all the sensible and intelligible things the human mind can understand?

A. Videtur plane. Et quidem per hoc maxime intelligitur homo esse, quod cunctorum quae, siue aequaliter sibi creata sunt, siue quibus dominari praecipitur, datum est ei habere notionem. Quomodo enim dominatus eorum homini daretur, quorum notionem non haberet? Siquidem dominatus illius erraret, si ea quae regeret nesciret. Quod apertissime diuina nobis indicat scriptura

768D

5

De eo quod notio uniuscuiusque animalis in homine nomen eius sit substantiale

Formatis igitur dominus deus de humo cunctis animantibus terrae, et uniuersis uolatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad Adam ut uideret quid uocaret ea.

Omne autem quod uocauit Adam animae uiuentis, ipsum est nomen eius. 769A

769A

Vt uideret, inquit, (hoc est ut intelligeret) quid uocaret. Si enim non intelligeret, quomodo recte uocare posset? Omne autem quod uocauit, ipsum est nomen eius, hoc est, ipsa est notio animae uiuentis.

10

N. Quid ergo mirum, si rerum notio, quam mens humana possidet, dum in ea creata est, ipsarum rerum quarum notio est substantia intelligatur, ad similitudinem uidelicet mentis diuinae, in qua notio uniuersitatis conditae ipsius uniuersitatis incommutabilis substantia est? Et quemadmodum notionem omnium, quae in uniuersitate et intelliguntur et corporeo sensu percipiuntur substantiam dicimus eorum quae intellectui uel sensui succumbunt, ita etiam notionem differentiarum ac proprietatum naturaliumque accidentium ipsas differentias et proprietates et accidentia esse dicamus?

15

769B

21

A. Non mirum.

N. Creata est igitur in eo irrationabilitas, et omnes species, omnisque differentia, et proprietas ipsius irrationabilitatis, et omnia quae circa eam naturaliter cognoscuntur, quoniam horum omnium et similibus notitia in ipso condita est. 'Similium' autem dixi, propter illa quae extra animalia natura rerum continet, ut sunt mundi elementa, herbarum quoque lignorumque genera, et species, quantitates et qualitates, caeteraque per innumerabiles differentias multiplicata. Quorum omnium uera cognitio humanae naturae insita est, quamuis adhuc inesse ei lateat seipsam, donec ad pristinam integritatem restituatur, in qua magnitudinem et pulchritudinem imaginis in se conditae purissime intellectura est, et nihil eam latebit ex his quae in se condita sunt, diuino lumine ambita et in deum

25

30

769C

35

In
Arithmetis

conuersa, in quo omnia perspicue contemplabitur. An aliud uoluit magnificus Boetius intelligi, ubi ait: *Sapientia est rerum quae sunt*

7-9 Gen. 2, 19.

66.36-68.9 BOETHIVS, *De institutione arithmetica* I, 1 (ed. G. Friedlein, Lipsiae 1867, p. 7-8; PL 63, 1079D-1081A).

1 et quidem] *R*¹, siquidem *R*⁰ 1-2 intelligitur . . . quod] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰
3 notionem] *p. ras. sup. l. R*² 12 eius] *om. MR* 18-23 substantiam . . . n.] *mg. R*¹,
*om. R*⁰ 31 seipsam] *mg. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 66.35-68.11 an aliud . . . sui sunt] *mg. R*², *om. R*⁰

A. That clearly seems to be true; and indeed the essence of man is understood principally to consist in this: that it has been given him to possess the concept of all things which were either created his equals or which he was instructed to govern. For how could man be given the dominion of things of which he had not the concept? For his dominion over them would go astray if he did not know the things which he was to rule. Holy Scripture gives us a clear indication of this when it says: 'Therefore, having formed out of the earth every beast of the field and every bird of the heavens, the Lord God brought them to Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living soul that is its name'. It says 'to see', that is, to understand 'what he would call them'. For if he did not understand, how would he be able to call them rightly? 'But whatsoever he called anything, that is its name', that is, it is the very concept of the living soul.

Man's
concept
of every
animal is its
substantial
name

N. What is so remarkable then, if the concept of nature, created in the human mind and possessed by it, is understood to be the substance of the very things of which it is the concept, just as in the Divine Mind the concept of the whole created universe is the incommunicable substance of that whole? And just as we may call the concept of all intelligibles and sensibles in the whole of things the substance of those intelligibles and sensibles, so we may also say that the concept of the differences and properties and natural accidents are the differences and the properties and accidents themselves.

The sub-
stance, of
things intel-
ligible and
sensible in
man, made
to the like-
ness of God

A. It is not remarkable.

N. Therefore, not only is irrationality created in man, but so also every species, difference and property of irrationality, and all things which are naturally learnt concerning it, since the knowledge of all these and similar things is established in him. By similar things I mean those which nature contains besides the animals, such as the elements of the world, the genera and species of grasses and trees, quantities and qualities, and all the innumerable multitude of differentiations. True knowledge of all these is implanted in human nature, although it is concealed from her that she has it until she is restored to her pristine and integral condition, in which with all clarity she will understand the magnitude and the beauty of the image that is fashioned within her, and will no longer be in ignorance of anything which is established within; for she will be encompassed by the Divine Light and turned towards God in Whom she will enjoy the perspicuous vision of all things. What else does the great Boethius mean when he says: 'Wisdom is the comprehension of the truth of

In the
Arithmetica

suique immutabilem substantiam sortiuntur comprehensio ueritatis. Esse autem illa dicimus quae nec intentione crescunt, nec retractione minuuntur, nec uariationibus permutantur, sed in propria semper ui suae se naturae subsidiis nixa custodiunt. Haec autem sunt qualitates, quantitates, formae, magnitudines, paruitates, aequalitates, habitudines, actus, dispositiones, loca, tempora, et quicquid adunatum quodammodo corporibus inuenitur. Quae ipsa quidem natura incorporea sunt, et immutabilis substantiae ratione uigentia, participatione uero corporis permutantur, et tactu uariabilis rei in uertibilem inconstantiam transeunt. Et ubi haec subsistere intelligis, nisi in notionibus suis, in anima sapientis? Vbi enim intelliguntur, ibi sunt, immo uero intellectus sui sunt.

A. Praesentis quaestionis reseratio multiplicem exigit expositionem. Et, dum reseratur, innumerabilis diuersarum quaestionum undique circumstantium multitudo, ueluti ex quodam infinito fonte, manare non desinit, ut non immerito assimuletur ei herculeae ydrae figmentum, cuius capita in quantum truncantur in tantum crescunt, ita ut pro uno amputato centum ebulliant: humanam porro insinuans naturam, quae ydra, id est fons quidam multiplex est et infinitae profunditatis, quam praeter solum Herculem (hoc est uirtutem) quis potest perspicere? Nemo enim scit quae sunt in homine nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est. Itaque si notio illa interior, quae menti inest humanae, rerum quarum notio est substantia constituitur, consequens ut et ipsa notio, qua seipsum homo cognoscit, sua substantia credatur.

De eo quod est hominis substantia sui notio in seipso

N. Consequens profecto. Diximus enim mentem humanam suiue notitiam, qua se nouit, et disciplinam, qua seipsam discit ut seipsam cognoscat, unam eandemque essentiam subsistere.

A. Quid ergo dicemus? Nunquid paulo superius ad purum deduximus hominis diffinitionem dicentes: 'Homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente diuina aeternaliter facta'? Et, si ita est, quomodo illa notio, qua homo seipsum cognoscit, substantia sua sit, si praedicta diffinitio non temere statuta est?

20-21 I Cor. 2, 11.

16-17 ISIDORVS, *Etymologiae* XI, iii, 34-35. XII, iv, 23. MYTHOGRAPHI VATICANI, I, 62 et II, 188 (CCSL 91C, p. 28 et pp. 241-242). 19 "Alīi ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς (a uirtute scilicet) hoc nomen deductum crediderunt, cum Hercules fortitudo sit, et prudentia, et ratio quae in nobis est, et constantia . . ." (NATALIS COMES, *Mythologiae* VII, 1; Venetiis 1568, p. 210). CICERO, *De officiis* I, 32, 118; FVLGENTIVS PLANCIADVS, *Mythologiae* I, 22 et II, 2 (ed. J. Helm - J. Préaux, Lipsiae 1970, p. 35, 2-3 et p. 41, 3).

1 comprehensio] comprehensione HMR 11 sui] p. ras. R^l 15 ei herculeae] p. ras. R^l 15 ydrae] p. ras. R^l 16 figmentum] p. ras. R^l 25 ut] et HM 26 cognoscat] cognoscit HM, R (corr. ex cognoscat)

the things which are and have been given an immutable substance of their own. And by the things which are we mean those which are neither enlarged by extension nor diminished by retraction nor changed by any variations, but ever preserve themselves in their proper strength by the exercise of their own resources. Such are qualities, quantities, forms, magnitudes, smallnesses, equalities, conditions, acts, dispositions, places, times, and whatever is found in any manner united to corporeal objects. They themselves are by nature incorporeal and flourish by reason of their immutable substance, but through participation in body their circumstance is altered and through contact with the variable object they pass into changeable inconstancy'; and where else do you suppose these things subsist but in the notions of them contained in the soul of the wise? For where they are comprehended, there they are; and they are nothing other than the understanding of themselves.

A. The solution of this present problem demands a complex exposition, and an unceasing flow, as though from an inexhaustible source, of countless and various cognate problems pours forth from all sides of it in the process, so that it would not be unfairly compared to that fictional Hydra of Hercules whose heads grew again as often as they were cut off, in such proportion that for one that was severed a hundred sprang up. Moreover this figment is a symbol of human nature, for that too is a hydra, that is to say, a kind of multiple source of inexhaustible depth into which none save Hercules, that is, virtue, may penetrate. 'For no one knows what things are in man, save the Spirit of man which is in him'. If then that inner concept which is contained in the human mind constitutes the substance of those things of which it is the concept, it follows that the concept by which man knows himself may be considered his very substance.

The substance of man is the concept of himself in himself

N. It certainly follows. For we have already said that the human mind, and its concept by which it knows itself, and the discipline by which it learns itself so as to know itself, subsist as one and the same essence.

A. What then are we to say about our definition of man? Did we not just now arrive at the clear conclusion that 'man is a certain intellectual concept formed eternally in the Divine Mind'? But if that is so, and if we were not overhasty in arriving at this definition, how can the concept by which he knows himself be his substance?

N. Non temere quidem. Nam et illa diffinitio, quae dicit notionem quandam in mente diuina aeternaliter factam substantiam hominis esse, uerax est; et quod nunc dicimus, notitiam uidelicet, qua se mens humana cognoscit, substantialiter homini inesse, non irrationabiliter docetur. Aliter enim omnis creatura in uerbo dei in quo omnia 5 facta sunt consideratur, aliter in seipsa. Hinc sanctus Augustinus in 770C examero suo: *Aliter*, inquit, *sub ipso sunt ea quae per ipsum facta sunt, aliter in ipso sunt ea quae ipse est*. Siquidem intellectus omnium in diuina sapientia substantia est omnium, immo omnia. Cognitio uero qua seipsam in seipsa intelligit intellectualis et rationalis creatura 10 ueluti secunda quaedam substantia eius est, qua se nouit solummodo se nosse et esse et uelle, non autem quid sit. Et illa quidem substantia in sapientia dei constituta aeterna et incommutabilis est, ista uero temporalis et commutabilis; illa praecedit, ista sequitur; illa 15 primordialis et causalis, ista procedens et causatiua; illa uniuersaliter omnia continet, ista particulariter, quantum a superiori distribuitur, subiecta sibi per notitiam comprehendit; ab illa producta est ista; ista 770D uero reuersura est in illam, et non dico nunc illam superessentialem substantiam, quae per seipsam deus est et unica omnium causa, sed illam quae primordialiter in sapientia dei facta est causaliter, cuius 20 effectus est haec, quam secundo loco statuimus, substantia, immo naturalis ordo rerum constituit.

A. Duas igitur substantias hominis intelligere debemus, unam quidem in primordialibus causis generalem, alteram in earum 771A effectibus specialem. 25

De substantia hominis dupliciter intellecta
N. Duas non dixerim, sed unam dupliciter intellectam. Aliter enim humana substantia per conditionem in intellectualibus perspicitur causis, aliter per generationem in effectibus. Ibi quidem omni mutabilitate libera, hic mutabilitati obnoxia; ibi simplex omnibusque accidentibus absoluta omnem effugit conditum 30

7–8 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, vi, 12 (CSEL 28, I, p. 41, 6–8; PL 34, 268). Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 640C. *De praedestinatione* IX, 134–135 (CCCM 50, p. 60; PL 122, 393A). *Vox spiritualis* IX, 28–30 (SC 151, p. 244; PL 122, 288C). 8–9 AVGVSTINVS, *De ordine* II, ix, 26 (CCSL 29, p. 122; PL 32, 1007). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvii, 76–77 (SC 180, p. 138; PL 122, 304C). *Periphyseon* I, 486A; II, 545A; 559A–B; III, 632D–633A; 659A–B. *De praedestinatione* II, 49–50 (CCCM 50, p. 12; PL 122, 361B). 11–12 AVGVSTINVS, *Confessiones* XIII, xi, 12 (ed. M. Skutella, Lipsiae 1934, p. 336; PL 32, 849). 12 Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvi, 11–13 (SC 180, p. 128; PL 122, 302C).

6 facta sunt] *om. FJP* 6 consideratur] *F, J (a. corr.), MP, R (p. corr.), considerantur J (p. corr.), R (a. corr.)* 12 et uelle . . . quid sit] *om. HMR* 16 omnia] *hominem HMR* 18 est] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 20 est] *et add. HMR* 21–22 haec . . . constituit] *intellige: haec substantia quam secundo loco statuimus, immo (quam) naturalis ordo (secundo loco) constituit* 27 **per conditionem**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 28 **per generationem**] *p. ras. R¹* 30 conditum] *contuitum et H, M (corr. ex conditum)*

N. Surely we were not overhasty. For that definition which declares that a certain concept formed eternally in the Divine Mind is the substance of man is true. But neither is our present teaching unreasonable, namely that the concept by which the human mind knows itself is in man his substance. For every creature is considered under one aspect as it exists in the Word of God in which all things are made, and under another as it exists in itself. This is what St. Augustine means when he says in his *Hexameron*: ‘In one way the things which are made through It are subordinate to It, in another the things which It is are in It’. For the understanding of all things in the Wisdom of God is the substance of all things, nay, it is all things (74). But the knowledge by which the intellectual and rational creature has intelligence of itself as it is in itself stands, as it were, for its second substance, so to speak, by which it has only the knowledge that it knows and is and wills (75), but has no knowledge of what it is. The first substance, constituted in the Wisdom of God, is eternal and immutable, while the second is temporal and variable; the one precedes, the other follows; the first is primordial and causal, the second proceeding and caused (76); the first contains all things as a whole, the second comprehends through knowledge as particulars as many things as are allotted it by its superior, and are subjected to it; the second is produced by the first and will return to it again (77). I am not now referring to that Superessential substance which by being itself is God and the sole Cause of all things, but to that which is created as a primordial cause in the Wisdom of God, and of which the effect is this substance which we have put in the second place – as the natural order of things disposes.

A. We should understand, then, that man has two substances, one that is a genus among the primordial causes, and another which is a species among the effects of those causes.

N. No, I should not say that there were two substances, but one which may be conceived under two aspects. Under one aspect the human substance is perceived as created among the intelligible causes, under the other as generated among their effects (78); under the former free from all mutability, under the latter subject to change; under the former simple, involved in no accidents, it

The substance of man understood in two ways

De eo quod
humana
mens intelligi
non potest

intellectum, hic compositionem quandam ex quantitibus et
qualitatibus caeterisque quae circa eam intelliguntur accipit, per
quam mentis recipit intuitum. Vna itaque eademque ueluti duplex
dicitur propter duplicem sui speculationem, ubique tamen suam
incomprehensibilitatem custodit, in causis dico et in effectibus, hoc
est, siue nuda in sua simplicitate, siue accidentibus induta: in his
enim omnibus nulli intellectui creato, neque sensui succumbit, nec a
seipsa intelligitur quid sit.

A. Quid est ergo, quod iam pridem dixisti, mentem quidem
humanam notionem, qua se cognoscit, et disciplinam, qua seipsam
discit, habere, et nunc iterum neque a seipsa neque ab alia creatura
dinosci posse asseris?

N. Vtrumque uerum esse ratio perdocet. Humana siquidem
mens et seipsam nouit et seipsam non nouit. Nouit quidem quia
est, non autem nouit quid est. Ac per hoc, ut in prioribus libris
docuimus, maxime imago dei esse in homine docetur. Vt enim
deus comprehensibilis est dum ex creatura colligitur quia est, et
incomprehensibilis est quia a nullo intellectu humano uel angelico
comprehendi potest quid sit, nec a seipso, quia non est quid, quippe
superessentialis, ita humanae menti hoc solum datur nosse se esse,
quid autem sit nullo modo ei conceditur.

De eo
quod plus
laudanda est
ignorantia
quam
scientia

Et quod est mirabilius, et considerantibus seipsos et deum suum
pulchrius, plus laudatur mens humana in sua ignorantia, quam in
sua scientia. Laudabilius nanque in ea est se nescire quid sit, quam
scire quia est, sicut plus et conuenientius pertinet ad diuinae naturae
laudem negatio eius quam affirmatio, et sapientius est ignorare
illam quam nosse, cuius ignorantia uera est sapientia, quae melius
nesciendo scitur. Apertissime ergo diuina similitudo in humana mente
dinoscitur, dum solummodo esse scitur, quid autem est nescitur
et, ut ita dicam, negatur in ea quid esse, affirmatur solummodo
esse. Nec hoc ratione uacat. Si enim cognosceretur quiddam esse,
circumscripserat profecto in aliquo esset, ac per hoc imaginem sui
creatoris non omnino in se exprimeret, qui omnino incircumscripserat
est et in nullo intelligitur, quia infinitus est, super omne quod dicitur
et intelligitur superessentialis.

15-16 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 585B-C. 27 DIONYSIUS ARIOPAGITA, *Epistula I* (PL 122, 1177B; PG 3, 1065A). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxv, 98-99 (SC 180, p. 126; PL 122, 302B). *Periphyseon* I, 510B; II, 593C, 594A, 597D. 27-28 AVGVSTINVS, *De ordine* II, xvi, 44 (CCSL 29, p. 131, 15-16; PL 32, 1015). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxv, 98 (SC 180, p. 126; PL 122, 302B). *Periphyseon* I, 510B; II, 597D, 598A; III, 687A.

2-3 intelliguntur . . . quam] intelliguntur *patiens* HMR¹, intelligunt *R*⁰ 8 quid sit] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 14 nouit³] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 19-20 nec a seipso . . . superessentialis] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 25 pertinet] pertineat HMR 26 eius] *om. HMR* 30 affirmatur] *R*¹, *affirmas R*⁰

eludes all created intelligence; under the latter it receives a kind
of composition of quantities and qualities and whatever else can be
understood in relation to it, whereby it becomes apprehensible to the
mind. So it is that what is one and the same thing can be thought of
as twofold because there are two ways of looking at it, yet everywhere
it preserves its incomprehensibility, in the effects as in the causes, and
whether it is endowed with accidents or abides in its naked simplicity:
under neither set of circumstances is it subject to created sense or
intellect nor is it understood by itself as to what it is.

A. How can it be, then, that the human mind, as you have been
asserting now for some time, possesses a concept by which it knows
itself and a discipline by which it learns of itself; and yet, as you now
maintain, is not discernible either to itself or to any other creature?

N. Both assertions have the full support of reason. For the human
mind does know itself, and again does not know itself. For it knows
that it is, but does not know what it is. And as we have taught in the
earlier books, it is this which reveals most clearly the image of God to
be in man. For just as God is comprehensible in the sense that it can be
deduced from His creation that He is, and incomprehensible because
it cannot be comprehended by any intellect whether human or angelic
nor even by Himself what He is, seeing that He is not a thing but is
superessential: so to the human mind it is given to know one thing
only, that it is – but as to what it is no sort of notion is permitted it (79).

And, a fact which is stranger still and, to those who study God and
man, more fair to contemplate, the human mind is more honoured in
its ignorance than in its knowledge; for the ignorance in it of what it is
is more praiseworthy than the knowledge that it is, just as the negation
of God accords better and more suitably with the praise of His Nature
than the affirmation (80), and it shows greater wisdom not to know
than to know that Nature 'of Which ignorance is the true wisdom and
Which is known all the better for not being known' (81). Therefore
the Divine likeness in the human mind is most clearly discerned when
it is only known that it is, and not known what it is; and, if I may so put
it, what it is is denied in it, and only that it is is affirmed. Nor is this
unreasonable. For if it were known to be something, then at once it
would be limited by some definition, and thereby would cease to be a
complete expression of the image of its Creator (82), Who is absolutely
unlimited and contained within no definition, because He is infinite,
superessential beyond all that may be said or comprehended (83).

The human
mind
cannot be
understoodIgnorance is
to be praised
more than
knowledge

A. Quomodo igitur omnis creatura in notitia hominis facta est, quae nec seipsam cognoscit quid sit? Et hoc pro magna laude ipsius accipitur, prae nimia sui excellentia, dum nulla finita substantia circumcluditur. 772A

N. Immo etiam hoc maximo argumento colligitur quod in homine omnis creatura substantialiter creata sit. Omnium siquidem quae sunt substantia nullo modo diffiniri potest quid sit, teste Gregorio theologo, qui de talibus disputat agens aduersum eos qui negant uerbum dei superessentiale esse, contententes illud in aliqua substantia concludere, ac per hoc non super omnia esse, sed in numero omnium contineri, uolentes substantiam filii a substantia patris segregare. Itaque sicut diuina essentia ad cuius imaginem facta est infinita est, ita illa humana substitutio nullo certo fine terminatur, ex his autem quae circa eam intelliguntur (hoc est temporibus, locis, differentiis, proprietatibus, quantitibus, qualitibus, relationibus, 772B
habitudinibus, positionibus, actionibus, passionibus) solummodo 16
intelligitur esse, quid autem sit nequaquam. Atque hinc datur intelligi nullius creaturae aliam subsistentiam esse, praeter illam rationem, secundum quam in primordialibus causis in dei uerbo substituta est, ac per hoc diffiniri non posse quid sit, quia superat omnem 20
substantialem diffinitionem; diffinitur autem per suas circumstantias, quae sibi accidunt, in speciem propriam per generationem seu intelligibilem seu sensibilem proueniens.

A. Humanam angelicamque naturam aut eandem aut simillimas esse, et diuina scriptura et ipsa ratio perhibet. Nam et homo et angelus intellectualis et rationalis creatura dicitur et est. Et si ita sibimet conueniunt, non immerito quaerendum quare omnis creatura in homine creata legitur, non autem in angelo. 772C

N. Non sine causa, ut opinor. Siquidem uidemus in homine non perpauca, quae in angelo subsistere nec auctoritas tradit nec ratio intelligit, ut hoc corpus animale, quod etiam ante peccatum humanae animae adiunctum fuisse diuina scriptura testatur, corporeus quoque quinquepertitus sensus exterior rerumque sensibilibum phantasiae, quae per eum humanae animae ingeruntur, ratiocinationis quoque in inquirendis rerum naturis perplexio morosaque difficultas, in 35

25 Ps. 8, 6; Hebr. 2, 7.

7-12 GREGORIVS NAZIANZENSIS, *Oratio XXIX*, 15-16 (SC 250, pp. 208-212; PG 36, 93B-96B). Hunc locum citat MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem XXI-XXII* (CCSG 18, pp. 151-154; PG 91, 1264C-1268B).

8-12 agens . . . segregare] *mg. R^x, om. R^o* 12-13 itaque . . . ita] sed sicut *HMR*
31 intelligit] *R^l*, facit intelligi *R^o* 32 testatur] *R^l*, uidetur testari *R^o* 33 exterior]
sup. l. R^l, om. R^o 33-34 phantasiae quae] phantasias quae *R^l*, phantasiasque *R^o*
35 perplexio] *p. ras. R^l*

A. How then is every creature made in the concept of man, which does not even know of itself what it is, and this is thought to be its great glory, that because of its superior nature it is circumscribed by no finite substance?

N. I assure you that this is a very strong argument which points to the fact that every creature is created as substance in man. For we are taught by Gregory the Theologian (who touches on this matter in his controversy with those who deny that the Word of God is superessential, and maintain that It is contained within some substance, and therefore does not transcend all things but is to be counted among their number – seeking thereby to show a distinction between the Substance of the Father and the Substance of the Son) that of the Substance of all things we cannot have a definition of what it is. So the human replica of the Divine essence is not bound by any fixed limit any more than the Divine essence in Whose image it is made. And from the things that are understood to accompany it: its time and place; its differences and properties; its quantities and qualities; its relations, conditions, positions; its acts and its passions: it is gathered only that it is, but by no means what it is (84). From this it follows that there is no creature that can be held to possess any other substance than that 'reason' by which it subsists in the primordial causes within the Word of God; and thus there can be no definition of what it is, seeing that it transcends every substantial definition. There can be circumstantial definition only, which relates to its accidents whereby it proceeds through generation into its proper species, either intelligible or sensible.

A. Both Holy Scripture and our own reason declare that the human and the angelic nature are either the same or very similar (85); for both man and angel are held to be, and in fact are, intelligible and rational creatures (86). And if there is this close correspondence between them it is reasonable to enquire why we are taught that every creature is made in man but not in angel. 8

N. There is a good reason for this, I think. For we observe in man not a few things which neither reason understands nor authority transmits to subsist in angel. For instance there is this animal body which, according to Holy Scripture, was attached to the human soul even before the Transgression; there is the fivefold bodily exterior sense; there are the phantasies of sensible objects, which through that sense enter into the soul; there are the perplexity and painful

discernendis item uirtutibus et uitii laboriosa sollertia, plurimaque
id genus. His enim omnibus angelicam essentiam carere perspicuum,
et tamen naturae rerum inesse nemo recte sapientium abnegarit, 772D
quamuis uideatur Augustinus sentire angelos docuisse, in octauo
de ciuitate dei, septimo capitulo, ubi magnorum philosophorum 5
contemplationis uirtutem laudat, qui asserunt, *quoquo modo et
qualiscunque natura est, non esse posse, nisi ab illo qui uere est, quia
incommutabiliter est. Ac per hoc siue uniuersi mundi corpus, figuras,*
qualitates, ordinatumque motum, et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad 773A
terram, et quaecunque corpora in eis sunt, siue omnem uitam, uel quae nutrit
et continet, qualis est in arboribus, uel quae et hoc habet et sentit, qualis est
in pecoribus, uel quae et haec habet et intelligit, qualis est in hominibus, uel
quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget sed tantum continet, sentit, intelligit,
qualis est in angelis, nisi ab illo esse non posse, qui simpliciter est. De sensu
tamen interiori dixisse crediderim. Proinde caelestem essentiam 15
plurimarum naturae partium motionumque, quae naturaliter
humanae insunt naturae, expertem quis ignorat?

De eo quod
non sentiunt
angeli

Eorum etiam notitiam, quae ei (caelesti dico essentiae) aut
secundum substantiam non insunt, aut secundum accidens non 773B
contingunt, non habere uera testatur ratio. Quamuis enim angeli
mundum istum omnemque corpoream creaturam administrare 21
perhibeantur, nullo modo tamen putandi sunt ad hoc peragendum
corporeis sensibus, seu motibus localibus uel temporalibus, aut
uisibilibus apparitionibus indigere: haec autem omnia, quae nobis
accidunt, pro nostrae naturae indigentia, locorum temporumque 25
uarietatibus adhuc subiectae, non illorum potestatis defectu eis
accidere recte iudicantur. Dum enim spiritualia sua corpora et
inuisibilia in formas uisibiles transmutant, ita ut mortalium sensibus
uisibiliter, localiter, temporaliter possint apparere, non hoc eis accidit
propter semetipsos, sed propter homines, quibus praesunt, et diuina 30
mysteria declarant. Nam localiter non uident per sensum, neque
temporaliter eis accidit nosse quid in rerum administratione acturi 773C
sunt, quippe dum sint aeternaliter super omne tempus et locum in
contemplatione ueritatis, in qua uident simul administrationis suae
causas. 35

Et ne me existimes de omnibus caelestibus essentiis talia
pronuntiare, sed de excellentioribus solummodo ordinibus, qui

6-14 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* VIII, vi (CCSL 47, p. 223, 8-18; PL 41, 231).
20-22 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, xxiv, 45 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 263; PL
34, 390).

3 et] *corr.* R^l 4-15 quamuis . . . crediderim] *mg.* R^s, *om.* R^o 11 hoc] haec F (*a. corr.*),
P 18 caelesti . . . essentiae] *om.* HMR 22 putandi sunt] *corr.* R^l 24 autem] *p. ras.*
R^l 24-25 quae . . . accidunt] *om.* HMR 26 illorum] *p. ras.* R^l, autem illorum R^o
27-31 dum enim . . . declarant] *mg.* R^s, *om.* R^o 31 nam localiter non] R^l, non enim
localiter R^o

difficulty of the reason's enquiries into the nature of the universe;
the toilsome industry which it requires to discriminate between vice
and virtue; and very many other things of that sort. That all these
things are lacking to the angelic nature while present in the nature
of things no truly wise man would deny. Nevertheless, Augustine in
the Eighth Book of the *City of God*, Chapter Seven, would appear to
have taught that the angels have sense, for in that chapter he praises
the contemplative power of the great philosophers because they assert
that: 'no matter what kind or of what nature a thing is, it has its origin
from none but Him that truly is because He is unchangeable.
Consequently neither the body of this universe, the figures, qualities,
ordered motion, and elements disposed from heaven down to earth,
and whatever bodies are in them, nor any life – whether that which
nourishes and conserves, as in the case of trees, or that which has this
but also perceives, as in the case of the animals, or that which has all
this but also understands, as in the case of man, or that which has
no need of the support of nourishment, but conserves, perceives and
understands, as in the case of the angels – can have being but from
Him Who simply is'. But I should say that he was here referring to
the interior sense. For who does not know that the celestial being is
untouched by very many of the parts and motions of nature which are
naturally innate in the human being?

And of those things which are not innate in it (I mean the
celestial essence) either as substance or happen to it as accident, it
is reasonable to hold that the celestial substance does not possess
the knowledge. For although the angels are held to administer
this world and every corporeal creature, yet we must by no means
suppose they do so through the instrument of the corporeal senses
or by movements through space or time or by visible manifestations.
Nor would it be right to say that it was through some defect in their
power that they do not have those accidents, which are ours through
the shortcomings of a nature which is still subject to variations of
space and time. For when they transform their spiritual and invisible
bodies into visible apparitions in order to reveal themselves in space
and time to the mortal senses, they have this accident not for their
own sakes, but for the sake of those men of whom they are in charge
and to whom they declare the mysteries of God. For with them vision
is not exercised through sense nor conditioned by space, nor their
knowledge of how they shall act in administering nature conditioned
by time, for they eternally transcend all time, and all space in the
contemplation of Truth, in Which the causes of their administration
are present all at once to their sight.

And do not suppose that I am speaking of all celestial essences – I
speak only of the higher orders who are ever around God (87) and

The angels
do not have
sense

semper circa deum sunt, et quibus nulla ignorantia inest, praeter
illam diuinarum tenebrarum, quae superat omnem intellectum.
Ordo siquidem extremus, qui proprie dicitur angelicus, per quem
superiores ordines administrant quicquid in humanis mentibus per
diuinas reuelationes, uel in caeteris mundi huius partibus diuina
5 prouidentia iubet peragi, nondum omni ignorantia absolutus est.
Ideo ut sanctus Dionysius Ariopagita in libro de caelesti ierarchia
subtilissime pertractat, a superioribus ordinibus docetur et in
773D altiorum se diuinarum mysteriorum notitiam introducit. Proinde
non irrationabiliter iubemur credere et intelligere omnem uisibilem
10 et inuisibilem creaturam in solo homine esse conditam, cum nulla
substantia sit creata, quae in eo non intelligatur esse, nulla species,
seu differentia, seu proprium, seu accidens naturale in natura rerum
reperiatur, quae uel ei naturaliter non insit, uel cuius notitia in eo
esse non possit; ipsaque notitia rerum, quae intra se continentur,
774A in tantum melior est his quorum notitia est, in quantum melior
16 est natura in qua constituta est. Omnis autem rationabilis natura
omni irrationabili et sensibili naturae recta ratione praeponitur,
quoniam deo propinquior est. Quapropter et res, quarum notitiae
humanae naturae insunt, in suis notionibus subsistere non incongrue
20 intelliguntur. Vbi enim melius cognitionem suam patiuntur, ibi
uerius existere iudicandae sunt. Porro si res ipsae in notionibus
suis uerius quam in seipsis subsistunt, notitiae autem earum homini
naturaliter insunt, in homine igitur uniuersaliter creatae sunt. Quod
25 reditus omnium in hominem suo tempore indubitanter probabit.
Qua enim ratione in eum reuersura sunt, si in eo connaturalem
quandam cognationem non possiderent, et ab eo quodammodo non
774B procederent? De quo reditu suo loco dicendum promissimus.

A. Haec, quamuis ualde difficilia uideantur, quoniam simplicis
doctrinae modum excedunt, speculatrice tamen considerata
30 ratione amplitudini humanae conditionis intelligendae admodum
conueniunt, utilissimeque proficiunt, ut non immerito dicamus non
hominem in genere animalium, sed magis omne genus animalium
in homine de terra (hoc est soliditate naturae) productum; et non
solum omne genus animalium, uerum etiam uniuersitatem conditam
35 in homine factam, ita ut ueraciter de homine intelligatur quod

7-9 DIONYSIUS ARIOPAGITA, *Cael. Hier.* IV, 3. X, 2: PL 122, 1047C-1048A.
1058D-1059A; PG 3, 180D-181B. 273A-B (*ad sensum*). Cf. *Expositiones in Hier. cael.*
IV, 500-556. VIII, 538-543 (CCCM 31, pp. 77-79. 133; PL 122, 207C). 78.34-80.1 Cf.
Periphyseon II, 536B; IV, 760A; V, 912A. *Vox spiritualis* XIX, 21-24 (SC 151, p. 296; PL
122, 294B).

7 ideo] ideoque HMR 12 non] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 17 in qua] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰
31 intelligen[n]dae] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹

in whom there is no ignorance save that of the Divine dark which
excels every intellect (88). In fact, the lowest order, the angelic prop-
erly so called (89), through which the higher orders carry out the
mandates of Divine providence either in the human mind by means
of apparitions or in the other parts of this world, is not yet free from
all ignorance, for, as St. Dionysius the Areopagite in his book on the
Celestial Hierarchy most ingeniously shows, it is instructed by the higher
orders and initiated into knowledge of divine mysteries beyond its ken.
And so not unreasonably are we told to believe and understand that
every visible and invisible creature is created in man alone. For no
substance has been created which is not understood to subsist in him,
no species or difference or property or natural accident is found in
nature (90) which either is not naturally in him or of which he cannot
have the concept; and the concept of the things which are contained
within him excels the things of which it is the concept by so much as
the nature in which it is constituted excels. For every rational nature
is rightly preferred to the irrational and sensible nature because it is
closer to God. Therefore it is also rightly understood that the things
of which the concepts are innate in human nature have their sub-
stance in their concepts. For where they have the better knowledge
of themselves, there they must be considered to enjoy the truer exist-
ence. Furthermore, if the things themselves subsist more truly in the
concepts of them than in themselves, and the concepts of them are
naturally present to man, therefore in man they are universally cre-
ated, as will no doubt be proved in due course by the Return of all
things into man. For why should they all return to him if they did not
in some sense have a natural relationship in him, and did not in some
manner proceed from him? But about the Return we have promised
to speak in its proper place.

A. Although these matters seem extremely difficult since they pass
beyond the limit of simple doctrine, yet if we consider them with
the speculative reason, they fit in sufficiently with our capacity to
understand the creation of man, and are most useful in establishing
what now may be properly claimed: that man was not brought forth
in the genus of the animals: rather every genus of animals was
brought forth from the earth, that is to say, from the solid part of
nature, in him – and not only every genus of animals was made in
man, but the whole created universe (91); so that truly of man may

ueritas dixit: *Praedicate euangelium omni creaturae*. Item Apostolus: *Omnis creatura congemiscit et parturit usque adhuc*.

Cui autem haec uel nimium obstrusa uel penitus incredibilia 774C
uidentur, si omnino naturalium disciplinarum quas liberales
appellant imperitus est, aut sileat, aut discat ne incautus repugnet his 5
quae intelligere non ualet. Si doctus, plane uidebit (ut de una earum
exemplum proferamus) figuras geometricas non in seipsis naturaliter
subsistere, sed in rationibus ipsius disciplinae cuius figurae sunt
(trigonus siquidem, qui corporeo sensu in aliqua materia conspicitur,
profecto illius qui animo inest quaedam sensibilis imaginatio est), 10
ipsumque trigonum qui in animo disciplinabili subsistit intelliget,
rectoque iudicio quid praestantius sit ponderabit: num figura
trianguli, an ipse triangulus cuius figura est? Et inueniet, ni fallor,
illam quidem figuram uere figuram esse, sed falsum triangulum, 774D
illum uero triangulum, qui in arte subsistit, illius figurae causam esse 15
uerumque triangulum. Et non dico phantasticum triangulum, qui ex
animo descendit per memoriam in sensus, et per sensus in sensibiles
figuras, neque illum qui iterum ex figura sensibili per corporeum
sensus memoriae infigitur, sed illum ipsum qui in ipsa disciplina
uniformiter permanet, ubi simul est linea et angulus, nec alibi linea, 20
alibi angulus, alibi medium, alibi extremum, alibi signum, alibi spatia
laterum a signo, alibi angulorum, alibi punctum, quo lineae incipiunt
et in quo per iuncturas laterum anguli concluduntur; sed in una
eademque notione geometrici animi praedicta omnia unum sunt, et
totum in singulis, et singula in toto intelliguntur, et in ipso intellectu 25
unita sunt, quia ipse omnium quae intelligit substantialis ratio est, ex
qua geometricorum corporum formulae specificantur.

Et quod de triangulo diximus, de caeteris quoque figuris,
angulosis seu circularibus, siue obliquis, in planis quoque ac solidis
intelligendum: quippe cuncta haec una eademque ratione in 30
mente perita disciplinalique in notionibus suis subsistunt. Si ergo
geometrica corpora, siue in phantasiis memoriae siue in aliqua
materia sensibili formentur, in notionibus suis rationabilibus, omni 775B
phantasia atque materia carentibus, super omne quod sensu corporeo
percipitur uel in memoria figuratur, subsistunt, quid mirum corpora 35
quoque naturalia, ex qualitatibus elementorum mundi composita,

1 Marc. 16, 15. 2 Rom. 8, 22.

2 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 536B.

1-2 item . . . adhuc] *mg. R^c, om. R^o* 3 obstrusa] *codd.*, abstrusa *Gale* (177.29) et *Floss* (774C1). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 765B 4 omnino] omnium *HM* 6 plane] *partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹* 7 exemplum] *corr. R¹* 8 cuius] quarum *HMR* 9-12 similitudo . . . corpora] *titulum om. J* 11 intelliget] *sup. l. R¹, om. R^o* 14 quidem] *siquidem a. corr. R* 14 sed falsum] *R¹, falsum uero R^o, et falsum HM* 22 punctum] *R¹, puntus R^o* 27 formulae] *R¹, formale R^o* 31 disciplinalique] *disciplinabilique HM*

we understand these words of the Truth: 'Preach the Gospel to every creature'. Also the Apostle says: 'The whole creation groans and travails together until now'.

But if there be anyone to whom these things seem too abstruse or altogether incredible, let him, if unversed in all the natural disciplines which are called liberal, either keep silent or learn not to argue rashly about what he cannot understand: or if he is learned he will plainly see that (to offer him an example from one of these disciplines) geometrical figures do not naturally subsist in themselves but in the reasons of the discipline of which they are the figures (92). For the triangle which is seen by the corporeal sense in a material object is a kind of sensible image of something which is present in the mind; and of this triangle whose substance is in the instructed mind he will have understanding, and with sound judgment estimate which is the better, the triangular figure or the triangle of which it is the figure. And if I am not mistaken, he will find that the figure is a true figure, certainly, but a false triangle, whereas the triangle which subsists in the discipline is the cause of the figure and is the true triangle. And I am not speaking of the imaginary triangle which proceeds from the mind through the memory into the sense, and through the sense into sensible figures, nor of that which returns again from the sensible figure through the corporeal sense and is implanted in the memory, but of that very triangle which endures immutably in the discipline itself, where line and angle exist together, and where there is not one place for the line, another for the angle, another for the middle, another for the extremity, another for the centre, another for the distances of the sides from the centre, another for the distances of the angles from the centre, another for the point from which the lines originate and in which the angles are enclosed by the meetings of the lines; but all these things are one in one and the same concept of the geometer's mind (93), and the whole is understood in the particulars and the particulars in the whole, and are unified in the intellect itself; for the intellect is the substantial cause of all things which it understands, and that from which the figures of the geometrical bodies proceed into their species.

And what we have said of the triangle must also be understood of all other figures, whether angular or curved or oblique, and whether plane or solid. For all these subsist in their concepts which are comprehended under one and the same reason in the skilled mind instructed in the discipline. If, then, the geometrical bodies, whether they are formed in the phantasies of the memory or in some sensible matter, subsist in the rational concepts of themselves which lack all phantasy or matter, beyond anything which is perceived by the bodily sense or imagined by the memory, why should it be so strange that the natural bodies also, composed of the qualities of the universal elements (94), have their substance in that nature in

An analogy
from geo-
metrical
to natural
bodies

in ea natura, in qua eorum notitia est, subsistere, praesertim cum omnia quae circa corpora sentiuntur incorporea sint? Nam et species, quibus continentur, incorporales sunt. Quantitates similiter et qualitates intelligibilis naturae esse nulli sapienti dubium uidetur, et ab intellectualibus uitalis substantiae rationibus procedere. 5

N. Quisquis naturas rerum intentus perspexerit haec ita se habere incunxanter inueniet.

Quomodo
omnis
creatura
in homine
condita est,
cum ipse
post omnium
conditionem
factus fuisse
legitur

A. His itaque discussis, non incongrue quaeritur quomodo omnis creatura in homine est condita, cum ipse post creationem omnium factus fuisse perhibeatur. Si ergo ante ipsum uniuersa creatura uisibilis et inuisibilis creata est, ut diuina tradit historia, nulliusque conditio post ipsum legitur, qua ratione possumus perspicere omnem creaturam in homine conditam fuisse? Nam si quis dixerit uniuersam creaturam bis conditam, primo quidem specialiter in seipsa, secundo uero generaliter in homine, non facile crediderim rationi conuenire, quia, si ita est, propriam substantiam homo non habebit, sed erit ueluti quaedam compositio multarum rerum, immo etiam totius creaturae prius factae, et una multiplex diuersis formis exaggeratio. Et quod est grauius, si omnis creatura siue uisibilis siue inuisibilis in seipsa perfectissime facta est (perfectus siquidem conditor dum sit, et plusquam perfectus, nullum imperfectum credibile est condidisse), quomodo ueluti secundam conditionis suae perfectionem in homine acceperit, qui extremus in diuinis operationibus creatur? Et si ita est, non de nihilo fecit deus hominem ad imaginem suam, sed de his quae ante ipsum facta sunt. Quod si quis dixerit humanum corpus non de nihilo, sed de aliquo (terreno uidelicet limo) conditum fuisse, quid dicturus erit de meliori hominis factura, quae sine dubio in anima et corpore spirituali in prima conditione constituta est? Quam (scilicet animam) flatu diuino, immo flatum diuinum, de nihilo conditam, non autem de aliquo credimus. 775C 10 15 20 25 776A 30

N. Hanc quaestionem multa caligine inuolutam sentio, multiplicemque reserationis suae facultatem quaerere. Sed ne penitus intacta transiliatur, ipsam quodammodo, prout interior diuini luminis radius arriserit, contemplari conabimur. Ac primum dicas, quaeso: utrum res intelligibiles seu sensibiles priores sunt animo qui eas intelligit, uel sensu quo sentiuntur? 35

A. Vbi aliud est quod intelligit, aliud quod intelligitur, et melioris naturae est quod intelligit quam quod intelligitur, intelligenti

27 factura] parte HMR 27-28 et corpore . . . conditione] om. HMR 28-29 scilicet animam] om. HMR 82.37-84.2 ubi aliud . . . dixerim] mg. R^s, om. R^o 37 intelligit] et add. HMR 82.38-84.1 intelligenti . . . sentienti] R^l, intelligentem animum seu sensum sentientem R^o

which there is a concept of them, especially as all perceptions of bodies are incorporeal? For the species in which they are contained are incorporeal, nor would any wise man doubt that quantities and qualities are likewise of an intelligible nature (95) and proceed from the intelligible reasons of vital substance.

N. Whoever looks intently into the nature of things will soon find that this is the way in which they are constituted. 9

A. After this discussion it will not be inappropriate to enquire in what way every creature was created in man, seeing that we are taught that man himself was created last of all. For if the whole of created nature, both visible and invisible, was created before him, as is handed down to us by the Divine History, and we read of nothing being created after him, how can it be explained that we can perceive that every creature is created in man? For if anyone should say that created nature was created twice, first after its species in itself and then generally in man, I should find difficulty in bringing such a view into accord with reason, for if that were the case, man would possess no substance of his own, but would be a kind of amalgam of many things, in fact of the whole creation which had already been established before, one manifold conglomeration of divers forms. And worse still, if every creature whether visible or invisible is in itself most perfectly created (and since the Creator is perfect and more-than-perfect, it cannot be believed that He has created anything that is imperfect), how should it receive as it were a second perfection of its creation in man, whose creation was the last of the Divine Operations? And if it did, then it would not be out of nothing that God created man in His own image, but out of those things which were created before him. But if anyone shall say that the human body was not made out of nothing, but out of something, namely earthly slime, what would he say about the better creation of man which undoubtedly was established in soul and spiritual body in his first creation? (96) For this (that is, the soul) was made by the Divine breath, nay rather, it is the Divine breath, formed, as we believe, not out of something, but out of nothing.

How every creature was created in man, although we read that he was made after the creation of all

N. I see that this question is involved in a great deal of obscurity and requires versatile skill for its solution; but rather than burke it altogether we shall make some attempt at examining it insofar as we are inwardly enlightened by the Divine ray (97). But first tell me, please, if the intelligibles or sensibles are prior to the mind which understands them or the sense that perceives them?

A. I think I should be right in saying that where there is one thing that understands and another that is understood, and where that

animo seu sensu sentienti rem intellectam seu sensam praecedi non 776B
incongrue dixerim. Res autem ipsas quae se intelligunt, in quantum
se intelligere possunt, non dixerim esse semet priores. Nam ubi res
ipsa et sui cognitio unum est, qualis praecessio fieri potest non uideo.
Scio enim me esse, nec tamen me praecedit scientia mei, quia non 5
aliud sum et aliud scientia qua me scio; et si nescirem me esse, non
nescirem ignorare me esse. Ac per hoc, siue sciuero, siue nesciuero
me esse, scientia non carebo: mihi enim remanebit scire ignorantiam
meam. Et si omne quod potest nescire seipsum, non potest ignorare
seipsum esse (nam si penitus non esset, non sciret seipsum nescire), 10
conficitur omnino esse omne quod scit se esse, uel scit se nescire se
esse. Si quis autem tanta ignorantia obrutus est, ut nec seipsum esse 776C
sciat, nec nescire seipsum esse sentiat, aut penitus talem non esse
hominem, aut omnino extinctum dixerim. In supradictis quoque
rationibus satis inter nos statutum haec duo humanae animae simul 15
et inseparabiliter ac semper inesse, scire et nescire: scit enim se esse
rationabilem et intellectualem naturam, nescit autem quid sit ipse
intellectus et ipsa ratio.

N. Non eras ergo, priusquam scires uel nescires te esse?

A. Non. Simul enim accepi esse et cognoscere me esse, et 20
intelligere me ignorare quid sum.

N. Dic mihi: quando notitiam sui accipit homo? Vtrum in
illa conditione, in qua omnes homines uniuersaliter facti sunt in
primordialibus causis ante tempora saecularia, an in ipsa generatione,
qua in ordine temporum deo soli cognito et praediffinito in hanc 776D
uitam procedit? 26

A. In utrisque, ut arbitror: in una quidem generaliter in causis
latenter, in altera uero specialiter in effectibus manifeste. Nam
in illa primordiali et generali totius humanae naturae conditione
nemo seipsum specialiter cognoscit, neque propriam notitiam sui 30
habere incipit: una enim et generalis cognitio omnium est ibi,
solique deo cognita. Illic nanque omnes homines unus sunt, ille
profecto ad imaginem dei factus, in quo omnes creati sunt. Vt enim 777A
omnes formae uel species, quae in uno genere continentur, adhuc

5-7 Cf. *Periphyseon* I, 490B.

3-4 **nam . . . ipsa**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 4 **non uideo**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 5 **tamen me
praecedit scientia**] *R¹, ego praecedo scientiam R⁰* 9 **nescire**] *codd., scire con. Floss
(776B11)* 9-10 non potest **ignorare seipsum esse**] *nescire non potest ignorare seipsum
esse partim p. ras. partim sup. l. corr. R¹ (imperfecte tamen; postquam enim uerbum ignorare
in uicem uerbi nescire posuit, hoc ultimum uerbum cancellare neglexit), FHJMP, nescire non
potest se esse R⁰ (ut uidetur)* 12-14 **si quis . . . dixerim**] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰* 13 **nescire**] *scire HM* 24 **in**] *sup. l. R¹* 32 **illic**] *p. ras. R¹* 32 **unus sunt**] *corr. R¹* 33 **profecto**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 84.34-86.1 **adhuc per**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰*

which understands is of a better nature than that which is understood,
the understanding mind or the perceiving sense is prior to the thing
which is understood or perceived. But where the things themselves
understand themselves, as far as that may be, I should not say that
they are prior to themselves, for where the thing itself and its know-
ledge of itself are one, I do not see what kind of precedence there can
be. Although I know that I am, my knowledge of myself is not prior to
myself (98), because I and the knowledge by which I know myself are
not two different things: if I did not know that I was, I would not be
ignorant that I did not know that I was: therefore whether I know or
do not know that I am I shall not be without knowledge: for there will
remain the knowledge of my ignorance. And if everything that can be
ignorant of what it is, cannot be ignorant of the fact that it is (99) (for
if it did not have any existence at all it would not know that it did not
know) it follows that absolutely everything has existence which knows
that it is or knows that it does not know that it is. But if anyone is so
far sunk in ignorance that he neither knows that he is nor perceives
that he does not know that he is, I should say that either such a one
is not a man at all, or that he is altogether dead (100). In the fore-
going arguments we have sufficiently established the fact that these
two things inhere at once and inseparably and eternally in the human
soul: knowledge and ignorance. For it possesses the knowledge that
it is a rational and intelligible creature; and the ignorance of what
intelligence and reason are.

N. Then you did not exist before you knew or did not know that
you existed?

A. No. For at one and the same time I received my being, and
the knowledge that I was, and the understanding that I did not know
what I was.

N. Tell me, when does man receive the knowledge of himself: in
that creation in which all men generally were made in their primordial
causes before the beginning of time; or in that generative process by
which in the course of time known only to God and predetermined by
Him man issued forth into this life?

A. In both, I think. In the one he receives the knowledge in a gen-
eral manner and secretly in the causes, in the other he receives it in a
special manner and openly in the effects. For in that primordial and
general creation of all human nature no one knows himself as a spec-
ies nor begins to have a particular knowledge of himself, for there
there is one general and common knowledge possessed by all, known
only to God. There all men are one, and that one is made in the image
of God, in Whom all are created. For as all the forms or species which
are contained in the one genus do not as yet become subject through

per differentias et proprietates intellectui uel sensui cognitae non succumbunt, sed ueluti quaedam unitas nondum diuisa subsistit, donec unaquaeque suam proprietatem et differentiam in specie indiuidua intelligibiliter uel sensibiliter accipiat, ita unusquisque in comunione humanae naturae nec seipsum nec consubstantiales 5 suos propria cognitione discernit, priusquam in hunc mundum suis temporibus, iuxta quod in aeternis rationibus constitutum est, processerit.

N. Quare ergo unusquisque, mox ut per generationem in hunc mundum prouenerit, non seipsum cognoscit? 10

A. Poenam praeuaricationis naturae in hoc manifestari non temere dixerim. Nam si homo non peccaret, in tam profundam 777B sui ignorantiam profecto non caderet, sicut neque ignominiosam generationem ex duplici sexu ad similitudinem irrationabilium animalium non pateretur, ut graecorum sapientissimi certissimis 15 rationibus affirmant. Ipse siquidem qui solus absque peccato natus est in mundo, redemptor uidelicet mundi, nusquam nunquam talem ignorantiam perpessus est, sed confestim ut conceptus et natus est, et seipsum et omnia intellexit, ac loqui et docere potuit, non solum quia sapientia patris erat, quam nil latet, uerum etiam 20 quia incontaminatam humanitatem acceperat, ut contaminatam purgaret, non quia aliam acceperit praeter eam quam restituit, sed quia ipse solus incontaminatus in ea remansit, et ad medicamentum 777C uulneris uitatae naturae in secretissimis ipsius rationibus reseruatus. Tota quippe in totis perit, praeter illum in quo solo incorruptibilis 25 permansit. Et quidem maximum exemplum gratiae ipse est, non quia quid ex reatu humanae naturae indulsum ei sit, sed quia solus omnium, nullis praecedentibus meritis, in unitatem substantiae uerbo dei coniunctus est, in quo omnes electi de plenitudine gratiae eius accipientes, filii dei et participes diuinae substantiae fiunt. 30

N. Inerat ergo humanae naturae potentia perfectissimam sui cognitionem habendi si non peccaret.

29-30 Ioh. 1, 16.

15-16 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 16(15)-18(17) (Capp, pp. 230-237; PG 44, 176C-192A). MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XXXVII, 97-105 (CCSG 18, p. 183; PG 91, 1309A). *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* I, 5-17 (CCSG 7, p. 47; PG 90, 269A-B). 26-29 AVGVSTINVS, *Enarrationes in psalmos* Ps. 108, 23. 34-37 (CCSL 40, p. 1598; PL 37, 1442). Cf. *Vox spiritualis* XXIII, 9-12 (SC 151, p. 310; PL 122, 296A-B).

1 cognitae] *p. ras. R^l* 15-16 ut graecorum . . . affirmant] *mg. R^l, om. R^o* 19 et docere] *mg. R^l, om. R^o* 25 perit] *perit HM* 27 indulsum] *indultum J (corr. ex indulsum), M*

differences or properties to the intellect or the sense, but subsist as a kind of unity which is still undivided until each shall receive in its individual species its property and difference in an intelligible and sensible form: so in the case of the individual in the common unity of human nature, he does not behold with his own proper knowledge either himself or others of like substance with himself until he has proceeded into this world in the time appointed in accordance with the reasons which are eternally established.

N. Why then does not everyone know himself as soon as he has arrived through generation into this world?

A. I could safely say that here we have an indication of the penalty which our nature must pay for its transgression. For if man had not sinned he certainly would not have fallen into such a depth of ignorance of himself, any more than he would have suffered the shame of sharing with the irrational animals the propagation of his species by means of the two-fold sex, as the wisest of the Greeks maintain with the most convincing arguments (101). For He Who alone was born without sin into the world, to wit, the Redeemer of the world, never anywhere suffered from such ignorance, but as soon as he was conceived and born had understanding of Himself and all things, and could speak and teach. This was so not only because He was the Wisdom of the Father from Whom nothing is hidden, but because in order that He might purify the corruption of humanity He put on a humanity which was incorrupt – not that the humanity which He put on is other than the humanity which He restored, but He alone remained incorrupt in it, as a means of healing the wound of our perverted nature, hidden in its inmost reasons. For human nature perished in its wholeness in all men except in Him in Whom alone it remained incorruptible. And indeed He Himself is the greatest example of grace, not because He was freed of any part of the guilt of human nature, but because He alone of all men through no previous merit was joined by unity of substance with the Word of God, in Whom all the elect receiving the fulness of His grace become the sons of God and participants in the Divine substance.

N. There was then in human nature the potency of possessing the fullest knowledge of itself had it not sinned.

A. Nil uerisimilius. Casus quippe illius maximus et miserrimus erat scientiam et sapientiam sibi insitam deserere, et in profundam ignorantiam suimet et creatoris sui labi, quamuis appetitus beatitudinis, quam perdidit, etiam post casum in ea remansisse intelligatur, qui in ea nullo modo remaneret, si seipsam et deum suum omnino ignoraret. 777D

N. Perfectissima igitur cognitio et sui et creatoris ei ante peccatum naturaliter insita est, quantum cognitio creaturae et seipsam et causam suam potest comprehendere. 778A

A. Non aliter existimo. Nam quomodo imago esset, si in aliquo ab eo cuius imago est distaret, excepta subiecti ratione? De qua in superioribus libris diximus, dum de prototypo (hoc est de principali exemplo) eiusque imagine disputabamus, dicentes ipsum deum principale exemplum esse per seipsum, a seipso, in seipso, et a nullo creatum uel formatum uel conuersum subsistens, imaginem uero eius (quae est homo, ab ipso creata) nec per seipsam esse, nec a seipsa nec in seipsa subsistere, sed ab eo cuius imago est accepit esse secundum naturam, et deus esse secundum gratiam; caetera quoque omnia quae de deo praedicantur, de imagine eius praedicari posse, sed de deo essentialitate, de imagine uero participatione. 778B 20

Nam et bonitas est et bona imago participatione summi boni summaeque bonitatis cuius imago est; aeterna quoque et aeternitas participatione illius aeterni et aeternitatis a qua formata est; omnipotentia item participatione illius omnipotentiae a qua condita et ad quam conuersa specificata est. Nam si humana natura non peccaret, eique qui eam condiderat incommutabiliter adhaereret, profecto omnipotens esset. Quicquid enim in natura rerum fieri uellet, necessario fieret, quippe dum nil aliud fieri uellet, praeter quod creatorem sui fieri uelle intelligeret; creatoris autem sui uoluntatem omnipotentem incommutabilem omnino intelligeret, si ei omnino adhaereret eumque non desereret ne sibi dissimilis esset. Et caetera quae recta ratione de deo eiusque imagine intelligi uel cogitari uel praedicari possunt. 778C 25 30

N. Si ergo humanae naturae ante peccatum inerat et suimet perfecta cognitio et creatoris sui, quid mirum si rationabiliter de ea intelligatur plenissimam scientiam similitum sui naturarum (ut sunt caelestes essentiae) et inferiorum se (ut est mundus iste cum

3-5 Cf. *De praedestinatione* IV, 180-182 (CCCM 50, p. 32; PL 122, 373C). 11-20 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 585A-D.

1 **quippe**] *partim* mg., *partim p. ras.* R¹ 2 **sibi insitam**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 5 **remaneret**] *corr. R¹ 20 sed de deo . . . participatione*] *mg. R^x, om. R⁰* 22 **est**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 28 **dum**] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 31 **ne sibi . . . esset**] *mg. R^x, om. R⁰* 88.34-90.4 **si ergo humanae . . . n.]** *mg. R^x, om. R⁰*

A. Nothing is more likely. For most mighty and most wretched was that Fall in which our nature lost the knowledge and the wisdom which had been planted in her, and lapsed into a profound ignorance of herself and her Creator – even though we understand that the desire for the bliss which she had lost remained with her even after the Fall (102), which would certainly not have been the case if she had lost all knowledge of herself and her God.

N. So the fullest knowledge both of herself and her Creator was implanted in her as part of her nature before the Fall, in so far as the knowledge of a creature can comprehend itself and its Cause?

A. Such is my opinion. For how would she be an image if in some respect she differed from that of which she is the image? – except of course in being subject (103) – about which we spoke in the earlier books when we were discussing the prototype or principal Exemplar and its image. We said there that God Himself was the Principal Exemplar, subsisting through, by and in Himself, neither created nor formed nor changed by any thing; whereas His image, which is man, created by Him, does not subsist through, by or in itself; but, at the hands of Him Whose image it is, it has received being in accordance with its nature, and being God in accordance with His grace. But all other things which are predicated of God may be predicated of His image also: but of God essentially, of the image by participation (104).

For it is by participation in the Supreme Good and the Supreme Goodness whose image it is, that the image is both goodness and good; by participation in that Eternal and Eternity by which it is formed, that it is both eternal and eternity; by participation again in that Omnipotence by which it is created and turning to which it is specified, that it is itself an omnipotence. For if human nature had not sinned but had adhered unchangeably to Him Who had created her, she would certainly have been omnipotent. For whatever in nature she wished to happen would necessarily happen, since she would wish for nothing else to happen save that which she understood that her Creator wished to happen; moreover, if she had fully adhered to her Creator and not abandoned Him so as not to lose her likeness to Him, she would fully comprehend His omnipotent and unchanging will and all the other things which may reasonably be predicated or contemplated or understood of God and His image.

N. If then the perfect knowledge both of herself and her Creator was present in human nature before the Fall, it would not be remarkable if in reason we found that she then possessed the fullest knowledge of natures similar to her own, like the celestial essences, and those inferior to herself such as this world with its reasons, which

rationibus suis intellectui succumbentibus) habuisse, et adhuc sola possibilitate – et re ipsa in summis hominibus – habere?

A. Clare intelligentibus non erit mirum, sed uerum et uerisimile.

N. Magna laus est ac uera humanae naturae, immo etiam illius qui sic eam creare uoluit. Quapropter de intellectu illius et cognitione 5
similiter hoc quoque accipiendum. Vt sapientia creatrix (quod 778D
est uerbum dei) omnia quae in ea facta sunt, priusquam fierent,
uidit, ipsaque uisio eorum quae priusquam fierent uisa sunt uera et
incommutabilis aeternaque essentia est, ita creata sapientia (quae 779A
est humana natura) omnia quae in se facta sunt, priusquam fierent, 10
cognouit, ipsaque cognitio eorum quae priusquam fierent cognita
sunt uera essentia et inconcussa est. Proinde ipsa notitia sapientiae
creatricis prima causalisque totius creaturae essentia recte intelligitur
esse, cognitio uero creatae sapientiae secunda essentia et superioris
notitiae effectus subsistit. Et quod diximus de prima et causali essentia 15
in creatricis sapientiae notione constituta, deque secunda et effectiua,
quae in anima humana subsistere non incongrue asseritur, de
omnibus similiter quae circa essentiam totius creaturae dinoscuntur
incunctanter intelligendum. Omne siquidem, quodcunque in
humana intelligentia circa substantias rerum constituitur, ex ipsa 20
notitia creatricis sapientiae per creatam sapientiam procedere
recta naturae consideratio declarat. Constituuntur autem circa
essentias quidem species sensibiles, quantitates, qualitates, loca,
tempora, et similia, sine quibus essentia intelligi esse non potest.
Quamobrem totum quod uolumus suadere, breuiter sic possumus 25
concludere. Quemadmodum intellectus omnium, quae pater fecit
in suo uerbo unigenito, essentia eorum est, et cunctorum quae
circa eam naturaliter intelliguntur substitutio, ita cognitio omnium,
quae patris uerbum in humana anima creauit, essentia est eorum,
omniumque quae circa eam naturaliter dinoscuntur subiectum. Et 30
quemadmodum diuinus intellectus praecedit omnia et omnia est,
ita cognitio intellectualis animae praecedit omnia quae cognoscit, 779C
et omnia quae praecognoscit est, ut in diuino intellectu omnia
causaliter, in humana uero cognitione effectualiter subsistant. Non
quod alia sit omnium essentia (ut saepe diximus) in uerbo, alia 35
in homine, sed quod unam eandemque, aliter in causis aeternis

30–31 AVGVSTINVS, *De ordine* II, ix, 26. 17–18 (CCSL 29, p. 122; PL 32, 1007).
35 Vide supra 770C.

2 habere] *om. HMR* 5 intellectus] quoque *add. HMR* 6 hoc quoque] *om. HMR*
6 ut] enim *add. HMR* 19 intelligendum] est *add. HMR* 22–24 *constituuntur*
... potest] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰* 25 breuiter] ac *add. HMR* 28 substitutio] *om. HMR*
30 *dinoscuntur]* *p. ras. R¹* 30 subiectum] *om. HMR* 35 omnium] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰*
35 saepe] *R¹, sepe R⁰* 36 unam eandemque] *R¹, una eademque R⁰*

are subject to the intellect – and that this science still abides in her, generally in potency only, but in the highest men in act.

A. To those who understand these matters clearly there would be nothing remarkable in that; it would be true and probable.

N. And it is to the great and true glory of the human race that it is so, and especially of Him Who willed to make it so. Wherefore in like manner we should accept the following account of its intellect and knowledge. Just as the Creative Wisdom, which is the Word of God, beholds all things which are made in It before they are made, and that very beholding of all things which are beheld before they are made is their true and eternal and immutable essence, so the created wisdom, which is human nature, knows all things which are made in it before they are made, and that very knowledge of the things which are known before they are made is their true and indestructible essence (105). Accordingly, the knowledge in the Creative Wisdom is itself rightly held to be the primary and causal essence of the whole of creation, while the knowledge in the created nature is the secondary essence and subsists as the effect of the higher knowledge. And what we have said about the primary and causal essence which is constituted in the knowledge of the Creative Wisdom and about the secondary which is its effect and which is reasonably stated to subsist in the human soul, may without hesitation be applied to all the attributes which are observed to be attached to the essence of all creation. For the accurate examination of nature shows us that whatever circumstance attaches to the substances in the human intelligence proceeds through the created wisdom from the knowledge of the Creative Wisdom. Now, attached to the essences there are the sensible species, quantities, qualities, places, times and like attributes without which the essence cannot be understood to be. We can then sum up everything that we have been trying to teach briefly as follows: Just as the understanding of all things which the Father made in His only begotten Word is their essence and is the substance of all those attributes which are understood to be attached by nature to that essence; so the knowledge of all things which the Word of the Father has created in the human soul is their essence and the substance of all those attributes which are discerned to be attached by nature to that essence: and just as the Divine intellect is prior to all things and is all things (106); so the intellectual knowledge of the soul is prior to all the things which she knows and is all the things which she fore-knows. All things subsist as causes in the Divine understanding, but as effects in human knowledge. As we have often said before, this does not mean that the essence of all things in the Word is something other than the essence of all things in man, but one and the same essence is contemplated

The
difference
between
Divine and
human
knowledge

subsistentem, aliter in effectibus intellectam mens speculatur. Illic enim superat omnem intellectum, hic autem ex his quae eam considerantur esse solummodo intelligitur, in utrisque uero quid sit nulli creato intellectui nosse licet. Nam si nosci posset, non omni modo creatoris sui imaginem in se exprimeret, qui ex his quorum principium et causa et conditor est cognoscitur tantum esse, quid autem sit omnem sensum et intellectum effugit.

5

779D

De eo quod nullius creaturae conditio antecessit hominem, hominis uero conditio dignitate et cognitione praecessit
A. Nulla igitur creatura uel uisibilis uel inuisibilis conditionem hominis praecedit, non loco, non tempore, non dignitate, non origine, non aeternitate, et simpliciter nullo praecessionis modo. Ipsa uero cognitione et dignitate, non autem loco uel tempore, praecedit ea quae cum ea, et in ea, et infra eam creata sunt; his uero quibus condignitate naturae aequalis est (caelestibus uidelicet essentiis) concreata est. Nam et ipsa caelestis essentiae et intellectualis particeps. De angelica quippe humanaque essentia scriptum est: *Qui fecit caelos in intellectu*. Ac si aperte diceretur: *Qui fecit intellectuales caelos*. Quapropter non facile occurrit ad intelligendum, si homo angelicis essentiis substantialiter concreatus sit, quomodo omnia uisibilia et inuisibilia in ipso condita sunt. Non enim rationi conuenire uidetur ut et cum caelestibus uirtutibus suae simul principium conditionis habeat, et eae in ipso creatae sint.

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780A

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N. Si intentus intellectualium et rationabilium naturarum reciprocam copulationem et unitatem inspexeris, inuenies profecto et angelicam essentiam in humana, et humanam in angelica constitutam. In omni siquidem quodcunque purus intellectus perfectissime cognoscit, fit, eique unum efficitur. Tanta quippe humanae naturae et angelicae societas fuerat – et fieret, si primus homo non peccaret – ut utraque unum efficeretur. Quod etiam in summis hominibus, quorum primitiae in caelestibus sunt, fieri incipit. Et angelus quidem in homine fit per intellectum angeli qui in homine est, et homo in angelo per intellectum hominis in angelo constitutum. Qui enim, ut dixi, pure intelligit, in eo quod intelligit, fit. Natura itaque intellectualis et rationalis angelica in natura intellectuali et rationali humana facta est, quemadmodum et

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780B

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16 Ps. 135, 5.

4–7 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 585B–C; IV, 771B–C. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvi, 11–13 (SC 180, p. 128; PL 122, 302C). 25–26 Cf. *Periphyseon* I, 449D–450A.

I subsistentem] *R*¹, subst. *R*⁰ I intellectam mens] *mg.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 12 cum ea et in ea et] *p. ras.* *R*¹ 15 intellectualis] *est add.* *HMR* 15 essentia] *natura add.* *HM* 20 et] *sup.* *l.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 20 suae] *sup.* *l.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 26 quippe] *p. ras.* *sup.* *l.* *R*¹ 27 fuerat et] *mg.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 28–30 quod etiam . . . incipit] *mg.* *R*¹, *om.* *R*⁰ 30 quidem] *p. ras.* *sup.* *l.* *R*¹, *nanque* *R*⁰ 31 homine] *p. ras.* *sup.* *l.* *R*¹, *co* *R*⁰ 32 angelo] *p. ras.* *sup.* *l.* *R*¹, *co* *R*⁰

by the mind under two different aspects, as subsisting in the eternal Causes, and as understood in its effects (107): for There it surpasses all understanding, while here it is understood only through the consideration of the attributes which are attached to it: in neither case, however, is it permitted to the created intellect to know what it is. For if it could know, it would not entirely reproduce the image of its Creator in itself, for from those things of which He is the Principle, the Cause and the Maker it can only be known that He is, but what He is escapes all sense and all intellect.

A. There was, then, no creature, either visible or invisible before the creation of man – neither in place nor in time nor in rank nor in birth nor in eternity nor, in a word, in any order of precedence. For in knowledge and rank, though not in place or time, man's creation is prior to those things which were created with it or in it or below it, but simultaneous with the creation of those who are his equals in the hierarchy of nature, that is to say, the celestial essences. For human nature also participates in the celestial and intelligible essence, and it is to human as well as angelic essence and nature that the Scriptural text refers: 'Who created the heavens in His intellect', which may be interpreted: Who created the intelligible heavens. For this reason it is not easy to understand how all things visible and invisible are established in man if man was created as substance together with the angelic essences. For it does not seem in accordance with reason that on the one hand the beginning of his creation should be simultaneous with that of the celestial powers and on the other that they should be created in him.

The creation of no creature preceded man; but his creation preceded in dignity and knowledge

The creation of angel and man was simultaneous

N. If you look more closely into the mutual relation and unity which exist between intelligible and rational natures, you will at once find that not only is the angelic nature established in the human but also the human is established in the angelic. For it is created in everything of which the pure intellect has the most perfect knowledge and becomes one with it. So closely indeed were the human and angelic natures associated, and so it would be now if the First Man had not sinned, that the two were one. Even as it is, this is beginning to happen in the case of the greatest men, whose first-fruits are among the celestial natures (108). Moreover the angel is made in man, through the understanding of angel which is in man, and man is in the angel through the understanding of man which is established in the angel. For, as I have said (109), he who has a pure understanding is created in that which he understands. So the intelligible and rational nature of the angel is created in the intelligible and rational nature of man just as the nature of man is created in the nature of

humana in angelica, per reciprocam cognitionem, qua et angelus
hominem intelligit, et homo angelum. Nec mirum. Nam et nos, dum
disputamus, in nobismet inuicem efficitur. Siquidem dum intelligo 780C
quid intelligis, intellectus tuus efficitur, et ineffabili quodam modo
in te factus sum. Similiter quando pure intelligis quod ego plane 5
intelligo, intellectus meus efficitur, ac de duobus intellectibus fit
unus, ab eo quod ambo sincere et incunctanter intelligimus formatus.
Verbi gratia (ut ex numeris exemplum introducamus) senarium
numerum suis partibus esse aequalem intelligis, et ego similiter
intelligo, et intelligere te intelligo, sicut et me intelligis intelligere. 10
Vterque noster intellectus unus fit senario numero formatus, ac per
hoc et ego in te creor, et tu in me crearis. Non enim aliud sumus,
aliud noster intellectus. Vera siquidem ac summa nostra essentia
est intellectus, contemplatione ueritatis specificatus. Quod autem
intellectus non solum coessentialibus sibi naturis, uerum etiam 780D
inferioribus conformari possit, dum eas amando intelligit, seu sentit, 16
sermo docet apostolicus, intellectuale nostrum diligere uisibiles
formas prohibens, dicendo: *Nolite conformari huic saeculo.*

Hac itaque ratione reciprocae intelligentiae et angelus in homine,
et homo in angelo non ab re creari dicitur. Et neque angelum 20
praecedere hominem ulla conditionis lege, ullo praecessione modo,
recte creditur et intelligitur, quamuis naturae angelicae creationem
prophetica narratio prius pronuntiet, ut multi uolunt, humanae uero 781A
posterius. Non enim, ut ait Augustinus in undecimo de ciuitate dei,
credibile est diuinam scripturam in operibus sex primordialium et 25
intelligibilium dierum conditionem caelestium uirtutum omnino
siluisse, sed, uel in prima fronte Geneseos ubi scriptum est: *In
principio fecit deus caelum et terram*, caeli nomine earum facturam
protulisse, aut paulo post ubi ait: *Et dixit deus: Fiat lux, et facta est lux.*
In alterutro nanque loco praedictus pater angelicam conditionem 30
insinuatam fuisse affirmat, et maxime in secundo. In primo quippe,
sub caeli appellatione, totius inuisibilis creaturae conditionem plus
asserit significatam in informi materia, quam angelicae naturae 781B
specialiter formationem; in eo uero quod scriptum est: *Fiat lux,
et facta est lux*, caelestium essentiarum formationem descriptam 35

18 Rom. 12, 2. 27-28 Gen. 1, 1. 29 Gen. 1, 3.

8-9 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 655C-D. 13-14 AMBROSIVS, *De Noe* 4, 10 (CSEL 32, 1,
p. 420, 4). J. PÉPIN, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu*, Parisii 1971, pp. 167-203.
30-31 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XI, ix (CCSL 48, pp. 328-330; PL 41, 323-325).
94.34-96.3 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, viii, 16 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 43-44; PL
34, 269). *De ciuitate dei* XI, xxxiii, 1-43 (CCSL 48, pp. 352-353; PL 41, 346-347).

4 quid] *FJPR*, quod *HM* 21 *ulla*] *sup. l. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 22 *recte . . . intelligitur*] *sup. l.*
R¹, *om. R⁰* 23 *ut . . . uolunt*] *sup. l. R¹*, *om. R⁰* 24 *ait*] *sanctus add. HMR*

angel, through the mutual knowledge by which angel understands
man and man angel. There is nothing strange in this. For when we
enter upon a discussion together the same thing happens: each of
us is created in the other: for when I understand what you under-
stand (110) I am made your understanding, and in a certain way that
cannot be described I am created in you. In the same way when you
clearly understand what I clearly understand you are made my under-
standing, and of two understandings is made one, formed from that
which we both clearly and without doubt understand. For example, to
take an illustration from numerology, you understand that the num-
ber six is equal to its parts (111): and I understand the same thing,
and understand that you understand it, just as you understand that
I understand. Our two intellects, formed by the number six, have
become one, and thus I am created in you and you are created in
me. For we ourselves are not other than our intellects; for our true
and ultimate essence is intellect specified by the contemplation of
truth (112). Moreover we are taught by the Apostle (when he forbids
our intellect to cherish visible forms, saying, 'Be not fashioned after
this world') that the intellect can conform not only to natures which
are co-essential with itself, but also to natures which are inferior to it
when it understands and senses them in love.

Consequently, by reason of this mutual understanding, it is not
untrue to say that the angel is created in man and man in the
angel, and by no law of creation or method of precedence can it
be rightly believed or understood that the angel is prior to man,
although, according to many, the Prophetic Narrative speaks first of
the creation of the angelic nature and subsequently of the human.
For, as St. Augustine points out in the Eleventh Book of the *City of
God*, it is not to be believed that Divine Scripture, in the relation
of the operations of the Six Primordial and Intelligible Days, was
entirely silent about the creation of the celestial powers, but either
on the very first page of Genesis, where it is written 'In the beginning
God made heaven and earth', he indicated their creation by the
name heaven, or a little later, where it is said 'And God said, Let there
be light, and there was light'. The aforesaid Father asserts that the
creation of the angelic nature is implied in one and the other text,
but especially in the second. For in the former text the name heaven
refers more to the establishment of the whole invisible creation
in unformed matter than to the specific formation of the angelic
nature. But the words 'Let there be light, and there was light' he has
no hesitation in ascribing to the formation of the celestial essences -

incunctanter asserit, quanquam aliorum sensum introduxerit, qui in hoc diuino praecepto cuiusdam primitiuae lucis sensibilis localisque in superioribus mundi partibus opinantur constitutionem. Cui tamen sensui in examero suo acutissime repugnat. Quod autem dictum est: *Et diuisit deus lucem a tenebris, et uocauit deus lucem diem, tenebras uero noctem*, dupliciter uult intelligi. Aut enim lucis uocabulo formatio creaturae angelicae in specie propria, tenebrarum uero ipsius praecedens (origine, non tempore) informitas adhuc imperfectae; aut diuisione lucis a tenebris segregatio atque differentia illius partis angelicae quae conditori suo incommutabiliter adhaeserat, meritoque suae oboedientiae beatitudinis praescia, ab ea parte quae *in ueritate non stetit*, sed suae superbiae poena in tenebras ignorantiae sui lapsus futuri atque aeternae miseriae cecidit, significata est. Quisquis autem plenius hunc duplicem intellectum diuinissimi magistri nosse uelit, ipsius uerba in examero suo et in praefato de ciuitate dei uolumine studiosus legat. Quae quoniam prolixa et omnibus in propatulo sunt, huic nostrae disputatiunculae superfluum mihi uisum est inserere.

A. Prouide. Non enim sanctorum patrum sententiae, praesertim si plurimis notae sint, introducendae sunt, nisi ubi summa necessitas roborandae ratiocinationis exegerit, propter eos qui, cum sint ratiocinationis inscii, plus auctoritati quam rationi succumbunt. Sed uelim per te nosse quamobrem angelica constitutio ueluti in prima intellectuali die (hoc est in prima propheticae contemplationis ordinatione) narratur, postmodum uero, interposita quaternaria sensibilis mundi theoria, humana sexta contemplatione introducitur formatio. Vel ut apertius dicam, quare non in primo introitu totius creaturae contemplationis homo introducitur, sed, eadem contemplatione sexies repetita, in fine omnium introductus est? Videtur enim non solum angelica essentia, uerum etiam sensibilibus rerum quadam dignitate, ut non dicam temporalitate, humanam praecedere substitutionem.

N. Quinimmo in hoc maxime humanae essentiae super omnia quae sunt manifestissime dignitas aperitur. Siquidem luce clarius

5-6 Gen. 1, 4-5. 12 Ioh. 8, 44.

3-4 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, xi-xii, 23-25 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 16-18; PL 34, 254-255). 15-16 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, i, 3; iv, 9; xi, 23; II, viii, 16 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 4-5; 7-8; 16-17; 43-44; PL 34, 247; 249; 254-255; 269). *De ciuitate dei* XI, ix (CCSL 48, pp. 328-330; PL 41, 323-325).

1 asserit] corr. R¹ 1 sensum] R¹, sensuum R⁰ 3 tamen] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰
8 praecedens . . . tempore] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹ 8 imperfectae] imperfecte
HM 24 contemplationis] partim p. ras., partim sup. l. R¹ 27 apertius] R¹, certius R⁰

although he mentions the interpretation of others who refer this Divine precept to the creation in the upper parts of the world of a primal light subject to the sense and occupying space. However this interpretation he refutes by very acute arguments in his *Hexameron*. The words 'And God divided the light from the darkness, and God called the light day, and the darkness He called night' he interprets in a double sense: either light means the formation in its proper species of the angelic creature, and darkness the formlessness of that creature while yet imperfect, a formlessness which is prior to the form in origin though not in time; or the division of the light from the darkness signifies the segregation and differentiation of that part of the angelic nature which had immutably adhered to its Creator, deserving through its obedience the foretaste of bliss, from that part which 'did not abide in truth' but in punishment for its pride fell into the darkness of ignorance of its future fall and lasting misery. But whoever wishes to learn more of this twofold interpretation of the most holy master, let him zealously read his own words in the *Hexameron* and in the aforesaid volume of the *City of God*, which I think it would be redundant to quote in this little discussion of ours, as it is lengthy and available to all.

A. Right. For there is no cause to introduce the opinions of the holy Fathers, especially those that are widely known, except where the gravest necessity requires that reason be supported for the sake of those who, being untrained in it, are more amenable to authority than reason. But I should like to learn from you why the establishment of the angelic nature is related on what is called the First Intelligible Day, that is in the First Movement of the Prophetic Meditation, and then a description of the four days of the sensible universe is interposed before the formation of man is introduced in the Sixth Movement of the Meditation; or, to put it more clearly, why is man not introduced at the very beginning of the Contemplative Act of the whole creation, instead of at the conclusion of all, when that operation has already been six times repeated? For not only the angelic essence, but also the essence of sensible things, seem to precede in a certain dignity, not to say time, the creation of man.

N. It is in this very fact that the exaltation of human nature over all existent things is most clearly shown: for by this it is made abundantly

datur intelligi, in omnibus quae ante constitutionem hominis
narrantur ipsum fuisse creatum, immo omnia in ipso constituta.
Non enim alia ratione, altiori fortassis, in lucis uocabulo angelorum
constitutio aperte non describitur (quippe non est dictum: 'Fiat
angelus' uel 'Faciamus angelum', quemadmodum expresse est
5 scriptum: *Faciamus hominem*), nisi ut intelligatur in conditione lucis
782B non minus hominis quam angeli creatam substantiam significatam
fuisse. Porro si caelestis essentiae conditionis, lucis uocabulo
significatae, homo particeps est, quis rerum naturas recte intuentium
non consequenter inspiciat omnia quae post lucis constitutionem
10 narrantur in homine creata esse, non solum secundum eorum
cognitionem, uerum etiam secundum res ipsas, praesertim dum
incunctanter uideat hunc mundum sensibilem propter hominem
factum fuisse, ut ei praesentet ut rex regno et dominus domui, utque
eo ad laudem creatoris uteretur, nullis eius partibus subditus, sed
15 supra eum, in nullo eius indigens, solo regimine superuectus. Non
782C enim homo, si non peccaret, inter partes mundi administraretur, sed
eius uniuersitatem omnino sibi subditam administraret; nec corporeis
his sensibus mortalis corporis ad illum regendum uteretur, uerum
20 sine ullo sensibili motu, uel locali uel temporali, solo rationabili
contuitu naturalium et interiorum eius causarum, facillimo rectae
uoluntatis usu, secundum leges diuinas aeternaliter ac sine errore
gubernaret, siue in administratione partium, siue in administratione
uniuersitatis. Si uero creatorem deserendo ex dignitate suae naturae
25 in eum caderet, inter partes eius ignobiliter deputatus, diuina iustitia
correctus, suae praeuaricationis poenas lueret.

Proinde post mundi uisibilis ornatus narrationem introducitur
homo, ueluti omnium conclusio, ut intelligeretur quod omnia
782D quae ante ipsum condita narrantur, in ipso uniuersaliter
comprehenduntur. Omnis enim numerus maior minorem
30 intra se numerum concludit. Nam si hominis conditio primitus
in narratione conditarum rerum, siue uisibilium siue inuisibilium,
aperte indicaretur, caetera omnia, quorum conditio narrationis
ordine creationem ipsius sequeretur, extra naturam eius subsistere
non immerito uiderentur. Iam uero, quoniam in fine omnium
35 diuinorum operum introducitur, omnia diuina opera in ipso
783A subsistere et comprehendi manifestantur. Et quidem caelestes

6 Gen. 1, 26.

12-14 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 2 (Capp, p. 212, 7-38; PG 44, 132C-133B).
Cf. *Carmina* II, iii, 21-22 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 532).

3 altiori fortassis] *om. HMR* 7 substantiam significatam] *significationem HMR* 14 ei]
p. ras. R¹ 37 de eo . . . creata sunt] *titulum om. HMR^o, ANAKΕΦΑΛΕΩCIC* sex
dierum operationis in homine *titulum mg. add. R² 37 et²] sup. l. R¹*

clear that in all those events which are related before the creation of
man, he himself was already created, in fact that all things were created
in him. For the chief and perhaps profound reason why the creation
of the angels is not more explicitly stated than by the word 'light', (why
it is not said: 'Let there be angel', or: 'Let Us make angel' in the same
way as it is written, 'Let Us make man') is that we may understand that
the creation of the substance of man, no less than that of angel, is
to be inferred in the creation of light. But if man participates in the
creation of the celestial essence which is signified by the creation of
light, what true natural philosopher would not conclude that all things
that are related after the creation of light are created in man, not only
in his knowledge of them but in their very being – especially when he
is in no doubt whatever that this sensible world was created for the
sake of man, that he might rule it as a king rules his kingdom and as
a husband his household, and that he might use it to the glory of his
Creator, subordinated to no part of it, in no way dependent on it, but
raised above it ruling it alone? For if man had not sinned he would not
be ruled among the parts of the universe, but would himself rule the
whole of it as his subject: and he would not employ for that purpose
these corporeal senses of the mortal body, but would govern eternally
and faultlessly the whole and the parts of it in accordance with the
laws of God, without any physical act in space or time, but solely by
the rational apprehension of its natural and innate causes and by the
easy use of right will. But if he were to abandon his Creator and fall
down into the world from the lofty station of his nature, he would then
lose his rank and be ignobly counted among its parts, and be himself
corrected by the Divine justice and pay the penalty for his sin.

So the reason why man is introduced as the conclusion of the
narrative of the equipping of this visible world is that we might
understand that all the things of which the creation is narrated before
that of man are universally comprehended within him. For every
greater number includes within itself the lesser. For if the creation
of man was clearly stated at the beginning of the narration of the
creation of the visible and invisible universe, all the rest of nature, of
which the creation would be narrated in order subsequently, would
reasonably appear as subsisting outside his nature. But as it is, since
the creation of man is introduced at the conclusion of all the divine
operations, it is shown that the divine creations all subsist and are
comprehended in him. And indeed, in the case of the celestial

The creation
of light in
man

All things
that are
described in
the works of
the First Six
Days were
created in
man

De
conditione
lucis in
homine

De eo quod
omnia quae
in operibus
sex primor-
dialium
dierum
narrantur
in homine
creata sunt

essentias (hoc est angelicas) in ipso esse duobus modis diximus: uno quidem quo coessentialis (hoc est cointellectualis et corrationalis) ei est, praeter quod terrena haec habitatio mortalis corporis post peccatum impedit, altero uero quo per mutuam cognitionem sibi inuicem inseruntur, ita ut et angelus in homine ueluti homo, 5 et homo in angelo ueluti angelus, reciproco intellectu adunati simpliciue ueritatis contemplatione formati, procreatur. Quid de operibus secundae propheticae contemplationis dicam? Nonne

De
 conditione
 firmamenti
 in homine

firmamentum (hoc est simplicium elementorum soliditas, quae inter aquas primordialium causarum superiores et mutabilitates corporeae corruptibilisque naturae inferiores, temporibus et locis per generationem et solutionem fluctuantes, facta est) in humana essentia substitutum cognoscimus? Quis enim humanam naturam perspicue considerans, non catholica mundi elementa in ea reperiat? 783B

De
 conditione
 terrae et
 aquae,
 herbarum
 et fruticum
 in homine

Quid de operibus tertiae lucis aestimandum? Nunquid stabilitas substantiae, aridae uocabulo significata, et mutabilium accidentium instabilitas, aquarum inundationibus intellecta, et haec a se inuicem naturali differentia discreta in homine intelliguntur? Insuper etiam uita illa, quae herbarum surculorumque diuersas species et nutrit et auget et uiuificat, intra partes humanae naturae connumeratur. Et quoniam prima die, in conditione lucis, principalis pars hominis ac sublimissima lux (intellectus uidelicet et ratio) in consortio angelicae naturae constituta est, secundae lucis illius (hoc est exterioris sensus, ad uisibilia rerum recipiendas formas et species et qualitates et quantitates facti) quarta die propheticae theoriae ordo rationabiliter conditionem introduxit. Exterior nanque sensus, exteriorum rerum internuntius, quamuis proprie et naturaliter ad animam pertineat, corpori tamen deputatur, quoniam per corporis instrumenta uim suam exercet. Pulchre itaque illius sensus, qui corpori ex quattuor mundi elementis composito attribuitur, conditionem quarto loco conditionis rerum prophetica theoria constituit. 783C

De triplici
 sentiendi
 modo

Quoniam uero ipsius sensus triplex modus est – quorum primus, qui sine ulla erroris occasione species rerum sensibilibus animo internuntiat tam praeclare, ut facillime ac sine ullo labore ipsas species iudex animus planissime omni caligine remota discernat, ac per hoc non immerito luminare maius appellatur (ipse siquidem 783D

De
 conditione
 solis in
 homine

animus non fallit, ac ueluti clarissimus sol omnes sensibiles species 35

8-13 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 696B-C. 13-14 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 647D. 664A. 15-18 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 701C-702B.

3 ei] eis *H, M (a. corr.), R* 8 in homine] in titulo om. *FP* 12 et] sup. l. *R¹, om. R⁰*
 13 substitutum] substituta *H*, substitutam *M (a. corr.), R* 32 de triplici . . . modo] titulum om. *HMR⁰*, de sensus triplici modo *mg. R²* 35-36 ac . . . immerito] qui modus uisionis *HMR* 100.37-102.1 ac ueluti . . . patefacit] *mg. R¹, om. R⁰*

essences, that is, the angels, we said that they subsisted in him in two ways. In one way because, were he not hindered by the earthly habitation of this mortal body which is the result of sin, he would be co-essential with the the angel, that is to say, co-intellectual and corational: in another because they are so intertwined with one another through their mutual knowledge that, united by reciprocal intellection and formed by the simple contemplation of truth, the angel is born in man as man, and man is born in the angel as angel. What shall I say of the operations of the Second Prophetic Meditation? Do we not recognise that that firmament, which is the solidity of the simple elements set between the upper waters of the primordial causes and the lower waters of the unstable motions of corporeal and corruptible nature, which flow in space and time through the processes of birth and decay, – do we not recognise that it is established in the essence of man? For what shrewd student of human nature does not observe therein the universal elements of the world? What should be said of the operations of the Third Day? Do we not recognise in man the stability of substance which is signified by the phrase 'dry land', and the instability of the transient accidents which is signified by the inundations of the 'waters', and the distinction of the one from the other by their natural differences? And do we not reckon among the parts of human nature that vital principle which gives nourishment and increase and life to the grasses and twigs? And as on the First Day the principal part of man, that most sublime light, that is to say, intellect and reason, was established together with the angelic nature in the creation of light, so on the Fourth Day of the Prophetic Meditation, there was introduced according to a rational order the creation of that secondary light which is called exterior sense, created for the apprehension of the shapes and species and qualities and quantities of visible things. For although the exterior sense, which is the intermediary with exterior objects, belongs properly and naturally to the soul, yet it is reckoned with the body because it exerts its power through bodily instruments. So the Prophetic Meditation did well to establish, in the fourth place of creation of things, the creation of that sense which is attached to a body formed out of the four elements of the world.

Now the modes of this sense are three, of which the first announces to the mind without danger of error the species of the sensibles: and this it does so admirably that with the greatest ease and without labour the mind is able to form unclouded judgments upon these species in all clarity. This mode is therefore not improperly called the larger luminary for it does not deceive the mind, but with all the brightness of the sun uncovers every sensible species and lays them

The creation
 of the firma-
 ment in man

The creation
 of earth and
 water, grasses
 and shrubs
 in man

The triple
 mode of
 sensing

The creation
 of the sun in
 man

detegit rationique patefacit); secundus uero, qui ueluti luminare minus dicitur, ille per quem saepissime animus fallitur, ueluti in quibusdam nocturnis lucubrationibus ambiguus atque errabundus, ut non facile de his quae per sensum recipit rectum iudicium proferre possit (huiusmodi exempla sunt remus in aqua quasi fractus, auersa facies in specilla, motus nauigantibus turrium, imago uocum quae a graecis ΗΧΩ uocatur, et mille huiuscemodi species falsitatum omnibus corporeis sensibus naturaliter adhaerentium, quas discernere ex uera specie rationabilis animae iudicium laboriosissime et sollertissime sudat: haec enim non in rerum natura, sed in sensibus formantur, ac saepe animum fallunt et in errorem mittunt, falsa uera esse approbantem); tertius modus, qui multipliciter et cumulativim sensibilium formarum numeros animo infundit, dum ueluti innumerabilium stellarum (ex sphaera sensibilis naturae innumerabilium specierum uariis ordinibus caelata) choros accipit, in tantum mixtarum phantasiarum diffusionibus perturbatus, ut aut uix aut nunquam de eis sine errore ualeat iudicare, sed quibusdam argumentationibus utens ueri quodammodo similia, ac ueluti de incertis certa proferre conatur probamina, et nec semper eodem modo de minutissimis uisibilium rerum rationibus disputat, aliquando quippe clarius ueritatisque propinquius (ut splendidae stellae), aliquando obscurius et a ueritate longius (ut obscurae), aliquando obscurissime et ab ipsis rebus longissime (ut uix apparentes) opiniones quasdam depromit, ideoque sensuum tertia uis diuersis stellarum praefusionibus significatur – triplex sentiendi modus in triplici caelestium luminarium ordine constituitur. Quod enim sol est in mundo, hoc est clarissimus et non fallens sensus in homine; quod luna, hoc est ambigua phantasia ac ueluti dubia lux animi sentientis; quod stellae, hoc sunt incomprehensibiles et minutissimi phantasiarum numeri, ex innumerabilibus et incomprehensibilibus corporalium rerum speciebus procreati.

6–7 MARIUS VICTORINUS, *Aduersus Arium* I, 55 6–7 (CSEL 83, pp. 153–154). ISIDORUS, *Etymologiae* XVI, iii, 4.

1 uero] modus est (est om. H), add. HMR 1 ueluti] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 2 in] sup. l. R¹ om. R⁰ 3 atque errabundus] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 6 specilla] uel (spec)ulo quasi alteram lectionem sup. l. add. M, specillulo H 6 nauigantibus] om. HMR 7 huiuscemodi] om. HMR 10–12 haec enim . . . approbantem] haec enim . . . approbans sup. l. R¹, HM, om. R⁰ 12 modus] est add. HMR 13 cumulativim] p. ras. R¹ 14 dum] ac HMR 16 mixtarum] multiplicium HMR 17 sine] ullo add. HM, R (corr. ex ulla) 17 ualeat iudicare] p. ras. et sup. l. R¹, iudicare possit R⁰ 18 utens] om. HMR 19 probamina] om. HMR 19 et] sup. l. R¹ (et nec forsan ex imperfecta correctione pro et non), om. R⁰ 20 de minutissimis] R¹, diminutissimis R⁰ 21–22 ut . . . stellae] om. HMR 22–23 ut obscurae] om. HMR 23–24 ut uix apparentes] om. HMR 24–25 sensuum tertia uis] tertius sentiendi modus HMR 25 triplex] itaque add. HMR 27 fallens] p. ras. R¹ 28 quod] et quod HMR 28 phantasia] ΦANTACIA p. ras. J 28–29 ac . . . sentientis] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 29 quod] et quod HMR 29 sunt] J (corr. ex est), est FHMPR

bare before the reason. The second mode, which is likened to the lesser luminary, is one through which the mind is often deceived, as though wandering uncertainly through some nocturnal task: consequently it cannot easily form true judgments upon objects which it receives through sense. Examples of what I mean are the oar which appears to be broken when it is dipped in water (113), the reversed face in the mirror (114), towers which appear to those sailing to move, the counterfeit of voices which the Greeks call 'echo' (115), and a thousand other illusions of this sort, which are found naturally in all the senses of the body (116). And the rational soul, when forming its judgments, must employ the greatest skill and utmost industry to distinguish these from true appearances. For these have no existence in nature, but are formed in the senses and frequently deceive the mind and put it into the error of taking false things for true. The third mode is that which pours into the mind, in multiplicity and accumulation, numbers of sensible forms. It receives from the sphere of sensible nature, decorated with the various orders of innumerable species, choirs, as it were, of countless stars, and is so bewildered by the confusions of so many mingled phantasies that scarcely if ever can it form a judgment about them which will be free from error; but it attempts by means of certain logical processes to make statements which will to some extent resemble the truth, and to be certain about things which are themselves uncertain. And it disputes about the minutest reasons of visible nature in various ways: sometimes offering opinions which, like bright stars, show a degree of clarity and proximity to the truth; sometimes opinions that are more obscure and further from the truth, like dimmer stars; sometimes opinions very obscure and very far from the truth, like those stars which are scarcely to be seen. Therefore the third power of the senses is described under the metaphor of the stars of different brilliancies. The three modes of sensation are established in the three orders of celestial luminaries (117). For as is the sun in the world, so is the most sure and infallible mode of sense in man: as is the moon, so is the ambiguous phantasia which is, as it were, a doubtful light to the sentient mind: as are the stars, so are the minute and imperceptible numbers of the phantasies which are produced by the innumerable and imperceptible species of bodily objects.

The creation of the moon in man

The creation of the stars in man

Et ne mireris quae in humana natura ueluti minora uidentur, sensus dico corporeos, per maiora mundi (hoc est per caelestia corpora) significari. Verissima quippe ratio incunctanter nos docet unum hominem, et singulariter unum, maiorem esse uniuerso mundo uisibili, non mole partium, sed armoniae rationabilis naturae dignitate. Nam si melior est anima uermiculi, ut sanctus pater Augustinus edocet, quam corpus solare totum mundum illustrans (uita siquidem extrema, qualiscunque sit, primo corpori pretiosissimoque dignitate essentiae praeponitur), quid mirum si omnia totius mundi corpora humano sensui postponantur? Primum quidem ratione illa, qua praeponitur causa naturalis his quae propter eam naturaliter fiunt. Et quidem sensibilia propter sensum facta, non autem sensus propter sensibilia nemo sapientum dubitat. Deinde quod uera ratione praeponitur dignitate naturae quod iudicat ei quod iudicatur. Sensus autem de sensibilibus, non uero sensibilia de sensibus iudicare, nulli naturas rerum pure speculanti est ambiguum. Huc accedit quod sensus non nisi in substantia uitali, in qua manifestissimus motus uitae est, constituitur, sensibilia uero, in quantum corpora sunt, quoniam extremum in creaturis obtinent locum, nec semper motum uitae aperte demonstrant: sensibilibus quippe quaedam sunt, in quibus aut uix uitalis motus apparet, aut nunquam. Postremo nullum sensibile uita est, quamuis uita moueri uideatur; sensum uero non solum uiuere, uerum etiam substantiali inesse uitae, ipsa docet natura. Et si quantitas et magnitudo corporeae molis in rebus sensibilibus laudatur, laudabilior est ipsa quantitas et magnitudo uirtutis, quae in sensibus substituta est. Vide quanta uis est in sensu oculorum ad lustranda in infinitum lucida spatia, ad formandas in se diuersas et innumerabiles species corporum, colorum, figurarum, caeterorumque quorum phantasiae per hunc sensum memoriam ingrediuntur. Quid de uirtute audiendi dices? Tantas quippe uoces simul sonantes, et inter se discrepantes, simul potest auditus in seipsum haurire atque discernere! In hunc modum quisquis reliquos sensus inspexerit, mirabiles ineffabilesque eorum uirtutes contemplantur. Hinc datur intelligi: quemadmodum uniuersitatis conditae intelligibiles rationes, in quantum intelligi possunt, in hominis intellectu creatae sunt, ita eiusdem uniuersitatis

6-8 AVGVSTINVS, *De duabus animabus* IV, 4 (PL 42, 96 *ad sensum*). G. MADEC, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs*, Parisiis 1988, p. 117. 27-30 AVGVSTINVS, *De quantitate animae* XIV, 24 (PL 32, 1048).

1-2 quae in humana . . . corporeos] ueluti minora, hoc est quae considerantur in humana natura HMR 2 mundi] om. HMR 5 armoniae] om. HMR 13 nemo sapientum dubitat] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 13 sapientum] sapientium HJM 20 nec] non H, uel non quasi alteram lectionem sup. nec add. M 24 substantiali . . . uitae] substantialiter esse uitam HMR 31 quippe] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 32 auditus] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 34 eorum] horum a. corr. R

And do not let it surprise you that such minor things in human nature – I refer to the bodily senses – are signified by the greater things of the world, namely the celestial bodies: for the soundest reason teaches us in no uncertain way that one man, alone, is greater than the whole visible world, not by the bulk of his parts but by the dignity of the harmony of his rational nature (118). For as the holy Father Augustine teaches us that ‘the soul of a worm is better than the body of the sun that illuminates the whole world’ (119) – for the lowest form of life, however humble, is to be preferred by reason of the dignity of its essence to the first and most valuable of bodies – what then is surprising in the fact that all the bodies of the whole world are of lower degree than the sensation of man? First because the natural cause is of a higher order than those things which are made in nature on its account – and indeed no wise man doubts that the sensibles were created for the sense, and not the sense for the sensibles. Next, because it is reasonable that the nature which makes a judgment is of a higher order than that upon which the judgment is made – and it is perfectly plain to every careful observer of nature that the senses form judgment upon the sensibles and not the sensibles upon the senses. A further consideration is, that sense is found only in living substance, in which the vital activity is most manifest, while the sensibles, in so far as they are bodies, do not always manifest the vital activity, for they exist in the lowest place of creation. For there are some sensibles in which the vital activity scarcely ever or never appears. Finally no sensible is a vital principle even though it may appear to be moved by a vital principle; whereas sense, as nature herself teaches us, is not only alive but is in substantial life. And if the quantity and magnitude of the bodily mass of the sensibles is a matter for praise, still more so is that quantity and magnitude of power which subsists in the senses. See what power there is in the sense of the eyes which can gaze into light-filled spaces to infinity and can mould within itself the divers and innumerable species of bodies, colours, shapes, and all other things of which the phantasies enter the memory by means of this sense (120). And what will you say of the power of hearing, which can absorb and discriminate between so many voices which are heard at the same time and conflict with one another? And anyone who in this way considers the other senses will contemplate for himself their marvellous and indescribable virtues. From the foregoing we may see how the intelligible principles of created nature, in so far as our mind can grasp them, are created in the human intellect; and that similarly the sensible species of the

sensibiles species, et quantitates, et qualitates, in quantum sentiri possunt, in humano sensu conditionis suae causas constituunt atque subsistunt.

Alia tripertitio sensus, quae similiter in homine facta est

Sed quoniam ipse sensus non homini tantum, sed et caeteris animalibus naturaliter inest, propterea et aliam patitur distributionem. 5 Tribuitur enim et reptilibus maris et uolatilibus caeli quinta prophetica contemplatione; nec immerito, cum et ipse sensus, qui quinto die naturae rerum inseritur, quinquepertitus sit. Terrenis quoque animalibus sexta die copulatur, ea intentione, ut opinor, quoniam ipsa maiorem cognationem cum homine, qui sexta die 10 factus est, uidentur habere, quam quae de aquarum natura producta sunt. Ipse itaque homo, cuius conditio in praedictis diuinae operationis contemplationibus per singula latenter insinuat, quoniam in ipso et cum ipso praedicta omnia condita sunt, non 15 per moras temporum, sed ordinatione causarum in effectus suos manantium, in fine totius uniuersitatis manifeste formatur, senaria repetitione propheticae theoriae peracta, ut eo numero non solum perfectio humanae naturae, uerum etiam omnium, quae ante ipsam explicata sunt, in ea conditio significaretur, scriptura dicente: *Et dixit 786A deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et praesit 20 piscibus maris, et uolatilibus caeli, et bestiis uniuersaeque terrae, omnique reptili quod mouetur in terra. Et creauit deus hominem ad imaginem suam; ad imaginem dei creauit illum.*

Vbi primo notandum quod in conditione omnium, quae ab initio creaturae in praedictis quinque intellectualibus diebus narrantur, 25 diuinae naturae superessentialis unitas et ineffabilis trinitas (uel, ut ait sanctus Dionysius Ariopagita, summae bonitatis foecunditas) aperte non est expressa, quamuis in eo quod scriptum est *In principio fecit deus caelum et terram*, patris et filii personas significari non incongrue intelligitur, dei quidem uocabulo pater, principii uero 30 uerbum. Et paulo post, spiritus sanctus introducit, ubi dictum est: *Et spiritus dei fouebat aquas*. Ac sic in conditione primordialium causarum sanctae trinitatis suadetur proprietates. In processionibus etiam ipsarum causarum in formas et species suas eandem trinitatem 35 scriptura commemorare inspicitur. Verbi gratia: *Dixit deus: Fiat lux*, dei nomine patrem; uerbo autem sensibili quod est 'dixit'

19-23 Gen. 1, 26-27. 28-29 Gen. 1, 1. 32 Gen. 1, 2. 35-36 Gen. 1, 3.

12-19 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ii, 2-6. vii, 13-14 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 94-98. 102-103; PL 34, 296-299. 301). *De ciuitate dei* XI, xxx (CCSL 48, p. 350; PL 41, 343-344). 24-32 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 554B-C. 555B-C. 563C-D. 27 DIONYSIVS ARIOPAGITA, *Diu. Nom.* I, iv (PG 3, 592A1-5 *ad sensum*).

2 humano] eiusdem HMR 6 caeli] in *add.* HMR 13 per singula] ueluti HMR 26 trinitas] pluralitas HMR 33 proprietates] *sup.* l. R¹, *om.* R⁰ 36 sensibili] *sup.* l. R¹, *om.* R⁰

same universe, with the quantities and the qualities, in so far as our sense may apprehend them, find the causes of their creation in the human sense, and therein subsist.

But since sensation is not confined to man, but is present by nature in the other animals, it allows a further distribution. In the Fifth Prophetic Meditation it is attributed to the creeping things of the sea and the birds of the air. Rightly so, since the sense which was conferred upon nature on the Fifth Day is itself fivefold. And on the Sixth Day it is applied to the land animals. The reason for this is, I think, that they seem to have a closer kinship with man, who was created on the Sixth Day, than the animals which were produced from the nature of the waters. Thus man himself, whose creation is detail by detail mystically foreshadowed in the Contemplations of the Divine Act referred to before, seeing that all the foregoing were created in him and with him, not in chronological order but the order in which causes flow forth into their effects, is at last manifestly formed as the climax of the whole universe, by the Sixth repetition of the Prophetic Meditation, so that in that number not only the perfection of human nature but the creation in it of all which was revealed prior to it might be symbolised (121). For the Scripture says: 'And God said, Let Us make man in Our image and likeness, and let him rule over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the air and the beasts of the whole earth, and over every creeping thing which moves on the earth. And God created man in His image, in the image of God created He him'.

Here it should first be noted that in the creation of all things which from the beginning of creation are described in the foregoing Five Intellectual Days, the Unity and ineffable Trinity of the Divine Superessential Nature, or, as St. Dionysius the Areopagite calls it, the 'Fecundity of the Highest Good' (122), is not openly expressed - although in the text 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth' it is not unreasonable to see a reference to the Persons of the Father and the Son: the Father in the word 'God', the Word in the word 'beginning'. And a little later the Holy Spirit is introduced in the text 'And the Spirit of God brooded over the waters'. So in the creation of the primordial causes the Holy Trinity is given Its proper role. Moreover, in the procession of the causes into their forms and species Holy Scripture is found to make a similar reference to the Trinity; for instance: 'God said, Let there be light'. By the name of God is intended the Father, and by the sensible word implied by the phrase

Another triple division of the senses which likewise was made in man

unigenitum et superintelligibile eius uerbum, in quo et per quod fecit quae sunt omnia; ubi uero dicit: *Et uidit deus lucem quia bona est*, spiritum sanctum insinuat. Idipsum in caeteris quoque diebus facit ubicunque addit: *Et uidit deus quod esset bonum*. Sexta uero die, dum homo formatur, et unitas diuinae naturae et trinitas apertissime praedicatur: unitas quidem dicendo *Et ait*, ut subaudiatur deus (uel, sicut aperte septuaginta interpretati sunt: *Et dixit deus*); plurali autem uerbo quod est *faciamus*, tres substantiae unius essentiae (uel, ut usitatius latini uolunt, tres personae unius substantiae) exprimuntur. Nec immerito. Vbi enim imago conditur, ibi principale exemplum cuius imago est apertissime aperitur. Sed quoniam homo, dum sit unus, ueluti ex multis partibus compositus est – constat enim ex corpore (hoc est ex formata materia sensibili) et anima (hoc est sensu, et ratione, et intellectu, et uitali motu) – quaeritur utrum per omnes suas partes ad imaginem dei factus est, an secundum eas solummodo, quae in eo excelsioris uel excellentissimae naturae sunt. Et quid tibi uidetur de tali negotio, si libet, edissere.

A. De hac quaestione omnes fere sanctae scripturae expositores non tacent. Et primum quidem unanimiter perhibent hominem, in quantum corpus est, ad imaginem dei non esse factum: deus quippe incorporeus est, nihilque corporalitatis ei inest uel accidit. Vtrum uero secundum animam (hoc est secundum omnes partes quae intelliguntur in anima) ad imaginem dei conditus est, an secundum praecellentes solummodo, studiosissime a spiritualibus uiris quaesitum, et ad hoc peruentum, non alibi nisi secundum excellentissimam sui partem (intelligibilem uidelicet) diuinam imaginem exprimi. Quae pars ueluti triformis intelligitur, in intellectu plane, et ratione, et sensu interiori, de quibus in superioribus libris multa inter nos alternata sunt. Illa siquidem uita, qua corpus administratur et qua anima humana nutritiuae et auctiuae uitae, quae herbis et arboribus specialiter attributa est, communicare uidetur, sensus quoque exterior et quinquepertitus, quo irrationabilibus animalibus homo communicat, quamuis ad partes animae pertinere intelligantur, eis tamen inesse imaginem dei

2–3 Gen. 1, 4. 4 Gen. 1, 10.12.18.21.25. 7 Gen. 1, 26 (Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός).

4–6 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, xix, 29 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 84–86; PL 34, 291–292). 8–9 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 567B–C. 613A–C. 18–19 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, xx, 30 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 86; PL 34, 292). 28–29 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 569B–570C. 572C–579A.

1 et superintelligibile] sup. l. R^l, om. R^o 2 quae sunt] p. ras. R^l 5 trinitas] pluralitas HMR 6 praedicatur] praedicatur R 16 excellentissimae] perexcellētissimae a. corr. R 17 si libet] mg. R^l, om. R^o 25 non alibi nisi] sup. l. R^l, ut R^o 26 intelligibilem uidelicet] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. partim mg. R^l 27 exprimi] exprimere HMR^l, exprimat (?) R^o 28 plane] corr. R^l

'He said' His only begotten and super-intelligible Word, in Which and through Which He made all things that are. But in the text 'God saw the light that it was good' the Holy Spirit is intended, as also on the other days wherever it is added 'And God saw that it was good' (123). But on the Sixth Day, when man is created, both the Unity and the Trinity of the Divine Nature may be stated most explicitly: the Unity in the words 'And He said', where 'God' is understood or, as in the Septuagint, openly expressed, 'And God said' (124); while in the plural verb 'Let Us make' are expressed the Three Substances of the One Essence, or as the Latins more usually have it, the Three Persons of the One Substance (125). Rightly so: for where the image is created, there the Primal Exemplar of which it is the image is most explicitly revealed. Now although man is a unity, he is in a manner of speaking composed out of a number of parts, for it is agreed that he is made up of body, that is, sensible matter invested with a form, and soul, which in turn is composed of sense, reason, intellect, and vital motion (126). It may therefore be asked whether it is throughout all his parts that man is created in the image of God, or only in respect of those which occupy the loftier or most lofty place in his nature. And I shall be grateful to hear what your opinion is in this matter.

A. This is a question on which almost all the scriptural commentators have something to say. And in the first place they unanimously allow that it is not in respect of his body that man is created in the image of God (127): for God is incorporeal; there is no corporality in His substance nor does it befall Him as an accident. But as to whether it is in the soul as a whole, that is, throughout all the parts which are discerned in it, or only in the higher parts that man is created in the image of God, has been a matter of most diligent debate among spiritual authors, and the conclusion has been reached that nowhere but in the most exalted part, that is to say, the intelligible, is the Divine image expressed (128). For this part is seen to be threefold, consisting clearly of intellect, reason and the interior sense, which have been the subject of many exchanges between us in the earlier books (129). For many philosophers deny that the image of God is to be found in that vital principle by which the body is administered and by which the human soul seems to have something in common with the nutritive and auctive life-principle which is the special attribute of grasses and trees; or in that five-fold and exterior sense in which man has something in common with the irrational animals – although these are regarded as parts of the soul. But a

multi sapientes abnegant. Sed dum ipsa ratio humanam animam diligentius conspicatur, simplicissimae naturae eam reperit, totamque per totum in seipsa, et nullo modo in aliqua sui parte dissimilem sui, uel inferiorem uel superiorem seipsa, in ullo eorum quae ipsa essentialiter esse intelliguntur. Tota quippe, ut praedictum est, corpus suum administrat, nutrit, auget, tota sentit in sensibus, tota rerum sensibilibum phantasias recipit, tota in occursoribus numeris (qui primi phantasias sensibilibum suscipiunt), tota in progressoribus (qui eas introducunt), tota in recordabilibus (qui easdem memoriae commendant), tota in tota memoria, tota super totam memoriam siue rerum sensibilibum siue rerum intelligibilium. Ac per hoc non illius partium diuersitas (si tamen partes in ea esse dicendum), sed administrationum ac motuum uarietas dinoscitur. Motus quippe eius partes eius sunt, qui diuersas intelligentias in anima faciunt. Ipsa siquidem in seipsa tota ubique est et indiuidua; motus tamen ipsius, quos etiam numeros animales uocant, quia in anima sunt, diuersis appellationibus significantur. Dum enim circa creatorem suum, super seipsam et super totius creaturae intelligentiam contemplatio motu uersatur, intellectus, seu mens, seu animus; dum rationes rerum ueluti secundo motu naturali inuestigat, ratio; dum inuenit eas et discernit atque diffinit, sensus interior; dum rerum sensibilibum phantasias per organa corporalium sensuum recipit, sensus exterior, non quod sit ipse substantialiter sensus exterior anima, sed quod per ipsum rerum sensibilibum formas et species sentit. Magna enim differentia est inter naturam simplicis animi et corporalium instrumentorum multiplicem uarietatem. Dum corpus administrat, nutriendo illud et augendo, uitalis motus meruit appellari, dum sit ipsa simplicissimae et indiuiduae et impartibilis essentiae, et nec minor in minoribus suis officiis, nec maior in maioribus, nec maxima in maximis, sed in omnibus sibimet aequalis est, ut magnus ille Gregorius Nyseus asserit in sermone de imagine.

Hinc datur intelligi totam animam humanam ad imaginem dei factam, quia tota intellectus est intelligens, tota ratio disputans, tota sensus (in interiori sensu) et sentiens, tota uita et uiuificans.

5-6 AVGVSTINVS, *De immortalitate animae* 16, 25 (PL 32, 1034). 6-7 AVGVSTINVS, *De musica* VI, vi, 16 (PL 32, 1172). Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 731C-732A. 26-30 AVGVSTINVS, *De origine animae hominis* (= *Epistula* 166), 4 (PL 33, 722). Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 729B-C. 30-31 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 15[14] et 16[15] (Capp. p. 230, 3-7 et 231, 26-28; PG 44, 173D et 177B). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 792A et 792D.

4 ullo] *R*¹, aliquo *R*⁰ 5 ut praedictum est] *om. HMR* 8 qui primi . . . suscipiunt] *mg. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 9 qui eas introducunt] *qui introducunt sup. l. R*¹, *HM, om. R*⁰ 9-10 qui easdem . . . commendant] *qui memoriae commendant sup. l. R*¹, *HM, om. R*⁰ 12 dicendum] *est add. HMR* 13 dinoscitur] *om. HMR* 14 qui] *om. HMR* 16 quos etiam . . . anima sunt] *mg. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 22 recipit] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 23 ipse] *corr. R*¹ 23 anima] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 34 in . . . sensu] *om. HMR*

more careful examination of the human soul reveals that its nature is of the simplest, and that it is wholly a whole in itself and by no means is it unlike itself in any part, or inferior or superior to itself in any of those qualities which are found in its essence. For, as has already been said (130), it is as a whole that it administers the body and gives it nourishment and increase; as a whole that it perceives through the senses; as a whole that it receives the phantasies of the sensibles; as a whole it is in the numbers that 'go to meet', which first pick up the phantasies of the sensibles; as a whole in the 'forwarders' which conduct them into the mind; as a whole in the 'recorders' which entrust them to the memory; as a whole in the whole memory; and as a whole above the whole memory, whether of the sensibles or the intelligibles (131). It is not therefore a diversity of parts – if we have to assert that it has parts – which is distinguished in the soul, but a variety of functions and movements. For its movements are its parts, which produce divers cognitive faculties in the soul. For she herself is everywhere in herself whole and individual: but her movements, which are also called soul-numbers, because they are found in the soul, are designated by different names. For when she is occupied in a contemplative activity about her Creator, transcending herself and transcending the understanding of all creation, she is called intellect or mind or spirit: when by what may be called the secondary activity of her nature she investigates the causes of nature, she is called reason: when having found them she distinguishes them and defines them, she is called interior sense: when she receives through the organs of her bodily senses the phantasies of the sensibles, she is called exterior sense (not because the exterior sense is itself the essence of soul, but because it is through it that she perceives the forms and species of the sensibles; for there is a vast difference between the nature of the simple mind and the multitudinous variety of the bodily instruments): when she administers the body by giving it nourishment and increase, she gets the name of vital motion (132): and yet she is of the most simple, the most indivisible and the most impartible essence and is not lesser in her minor offices nor magnified in her greater offices nor is she greatest in her greatest offices, but in all she is the equal of herself, as the great Gregory of Nyssa affirms in his *Treatise On the Image*.

From this we may understand that the whole human soul is made in the image of God, since it is wholly an intellect which intellects, wholly a reason which reasons, wholly a sense in the interior sense

A repetition of the motions of the soul so that they may be seen more clearly

Duobus autem modis maxime humanam animam ad imaginem dei factam cognoscimus. Primo quidem quod, sicut deus per omnia quae sunt diffunditur, et a nullo eorum potest comprehendi, ita anima totum sui corporis organum penetrat, ab eo tamen concludi non ualet; secundo uero quod, quemadmodum de deo praedicatur 5 solummodo esse, nullo modo autem diffinitur quid sit, ita humana anima tantummodo intelligitur esse, quid autem sit, nec illa ipsa nec alia creatura intelligit, sicut praefatus Gregorius in undecimo 788B capitulo praedicti sermonis de imagine, corporeos sensus ab animi natura discernens explanat, ipsum animum incomprehensibilem affirmans: *Quid igitur est, inquit, animus, secundum sui naturam, qui sensuum uirtutibus seipsum impertitur et per singulas conuenienter eorum quae sunt scientiam recipit? Nam quia aliud quid praeter sensus est, non arbitror quempiam sapientum dubitare. Si enim idipsum esset sensui, ad unum omnino haberet secundum sensum operum societatem, eo quod simplex 15 quidem ipse est, nil autem uarium in simplo consideratur. Nunc uero omnibus comparatis, aliud quidem tactum esse, aliud olfactum, aliis similiter absque communi ad se inuicem dispositis, quoniam aequaliter unicuique et conuenienter adest, alterum quid oportet omnino ipsum animum praeter 788C sensum substituere per naturam, ne quis uaria intellectuali simplicitati commisceat. "Quis cognouit animum domini?" ait Apostolus. Ego autem praeter hoc dico: Quis suum animum intellexit? Dicant qui dei naturam inter ea quae in eorum comprehensione sunt faciunt, si seipsum intellexerunt, sui animi naturam cognouere. Multum fortassis partibilis quidam est, multumque compositus? Et quomodo intellectuale in compositione est? Aut 25 quis modus est diuersorum generum concretionis? Sed simplex et incompositus: quomodo in multipliciter partitam sensualitatem diuiditur? Quomodo in singularitate uarium? Quomodo in uarietate unum? Sed cognoscens eorum de quibus dubitatur solutionem, in ipsam dei uocem recurro: "Faciamus", enim inquit, "hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem". Imago, donec in 788D nullo eorum quae in principali intelliguntur exemplo deficiat, proprie est imago. Si uero in aliquo ex similitudine principalis exempli excesserit, in*

21 Rom. 11, 34; I Cor. 2, 16. 29-30 Gen. 1, 26.

2-5 CLAVDIANVS MAMERTVS, *De statu animae* III, 2 (CSEL 11, p. 155, 8-13; PL 53, 761B). ALCVINVS, *Dicta Albini de imagine dei* (ed. J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre*, Cantabrigiae 1981, p. 159, 4-11). 112.11-114.9 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 11 (Capp, p. 220, 46-221, 30; PG 44, 153C-156B).

2 factam cognoscimus] *R*¹, facta est *R*⁰ 5 quod] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 9 de imagine] *om. HMR* 10-11 ipsum . . . affirmans] *partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R*¹ 11 inquit] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 12 impertitur] *R*¹, impartitur *CR*⁰ Capp (221, 1) 14 sapientum] sapientium *HM* 15 secundum] *om. FJP* 16 nil] nihil *C Capp* (221, 5) 20 per] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. CR*⁰ Capp (221, 9) 20 simplicitati] *om. CHMR Capp* (221, 9) 24 fortassis] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. CR*⁰ Capp (221, 13) 26 simplex] *corr. R*¹ 30 imaginem] nostram *add. C* 30 similitudinem] nostram *add. HM Capp* (221, 19) 30 imago] enim *add. C, R*⁰ (*a. corr.*), Capp (221, 19)

and sensing, wholly life and life-giving. Now there are two principal aspects under which we recognise the creation of the human soul in the image of God: first, in that, as God is present throughout all the things that are and can be comprehended by none of them, so the soul penetrates the whole frame of her body but cannot be bounded by it (133). Secondly, in that as of God only being can be predicated, but in no way can it be said of Him what He is, so the human soul is only understood to be, but what she is neither herself nor any other creature understands (134). Thus the aforesaid Gregory in the Eleventh Chapter of the above-mentioned *Treatise on the Image*, drawing a distinction between the bodily senses and the nature of the mind, in treating of the mind says that it is incomprehensible: 'What then in its very nature is the mind', he asks, 'which divides itself up with the powers of the senses, and through each of them receives befittingly the knowledge of the things that are? For no wise man, I fancy, doubts but that it is something other than sense. For if it were itself what sense is, it would certainly have an affinity in operation with sense: for it is simple, and no variety may be admitted into the simple. But now if the senses are compared with one another, it is seen that touch is one thing and smell another and that the others are similarly related to one another without mingling, but the soul is equally and suitably present to each of them. The mind itself, then, must be something of a nature altogether different from sense, if we are to keep its intelligible simplicity free from all variety (135). "Who", asks the Apostle, "has known the mind of God"? But I would go further and say: Who has understood his own mind? Would those who place the nature of God among the things which they hold within their comprehension say if they understood themselves, if they knew the nature of their own mind? Is it perhaps a thoroughly partible nature, and thoroughly composite? How should an intelligible be in composition? Or what would be the mode of putting together the different kinds of things? But if it is simple and incomposite, how is it divided into the manifold divisions of sense? How is variety found in the simple, or unity in variety? But to know the solution of these things of which there is question I have recourse to the very words of God Himself. For He says: "Let Us make man in Our image and likeness". So long as the image does not lack any of those things which are discerned in the Primal Exemplar, it is a proper image: but if in anything it departs from conformity to the Primal Exemplar,

illa parte imago non est. Non ergo, quoniam in his quae circa diuinam
considerantur naturam incomprehensibilitas essentiae est, necessarium erit
eum qui sortitur imaginem omnem ad principale exemplum imitationem
habere? Si enim imaginis natura principale exemplum comprehenderit, super
comprehensionem erit; si contrarietas eorum quae considerantur inuenitur
quod oportet, peccatum imaginis reprehenditur. Quoniam uero scientiam
fugit ipsa nostri animi natura, quae est secundum imaginem conditoris,
diligentem ad id quod ei superponitur habet similitudinem, eo quod secundum
seipsum est incognitus incomprehensibilem naturam characterizans.

Idem in tertio decimo capitulo: Quoniam pulcherrimum omnium et
excellentissimum bonum ipse deus est, ad quem omnia respiciunt quaecunque
boni habent desiderium, propterea dicimus etiam animum sic ad imaginem
formosissimi factum, quatenus ad principale exemplum similitudinem
participarit, quantum quidem ipsum in bono licet permanere. Si uero
quodammodo extra hoc fuerit, pulchritudine illius in quo erat denudatur.
Siquidem dicimus similitudine principalis exempli pulchritudinis animum
ornari, ueluti quoddam speculum caractere apparentis in eo formatum: iuxta
eandem analogiam administratam a se naturam habere animum arbitramur;
pulchritudineque quae ab illo est ipsam ornari, ueluti quoddam speculi
speculum factam, tenerique ab ipso et comprehendi materiale substantiale,
hoc est materialem substantiam, circa quam consideratur natura. (Hoc
autem propterea dicit, quod circa materiam proprie inspicitur
natura, quia natat, donec formam qua stabilitetur materia inueniat).
Si ergo habetur, inquit, ab altero alterum, per omnia corrationabiliter ipsa
ueri boni societas deducta, per id quod superponitur id quod consequens
formificat (hoc est per animum materiam format). Cum uero efficitur
huius optimae connaturalitatis dispersio, et ad contrarium quod superius est

10-21 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 13[12] (Capp, p. 224, 11-22;
PG 44, 161C3-D3). 114.24-116.22 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 13[12]
(Capp, p. 224, 23-225, 17; PG 44, 161D3-164B11).

2 erit] corr. R¹, est CR⁰ Capp (221, 23) 4 comprehenderit] comprehenderet C, R (a.
corr.), Capp (221, 25) 5 erit] p. ras. R¹, esset CR⁰, est Capp (221, 26) 5 inuenitur] sup.
l. R¹, om. CR⁰ Capp (221, 26) 10 quoniam] enim add. C Capp (224, 12) 16 siquidem]
sic quidem M 17 in eo] om. CHMR Capp (224, 19) 18 analogiam] etiam add. CHMR
Capp (224, 19) 20 ipso] ipsa CHMR Capp (224, 21) 20 substantiale] substantiae
CHJMR¹ Capp (224, 22) rectius ut uidetur 21 hoc . . . substantiam] sup. l. R¹, om.
R⁰ 21-23 hoc autem . . . inueniat] partim mg., partim sup. l. R¹, om. CR⁰ Capp (224, 22)
22 inspicitur] dicitur HMR¹ 23 qua] quam HM 23 stabilitetur materia] stabilitet
materiam R¹, stabilitet materia HM 24 inquit] om. HMR 25 deducta] deducendo
CHMR Capp (224, 24) 25 superponitur] supponitur HM 26 hoc est . . . format] hoc
est per animum naturam, per naturam materiam HM, sup. l. R¹, om. CR⁰ Capp (224, 25)
27 contrarium] p. ras. R¹ 114.27-116.1 quod superius est inferius fiat] consequens
fuerit transgredienti (supereminenti C Capp) supereminens CHMR Capp (224, 26). Ad
uocabulum supereminens uidentur referri quinque aut sex uerba, probabilius ab R¹ in margine
codicis R scripta, ita tamen erasa ut uix legi possint: ut uidelicet . . . praeposit(?)

it is no longer an image there. Will it not therefore be necessary, because incomprehensibility of essence is among the things which are predicated of the Divine nature, that he to whom the image has been apportioned shall imitate wholly the Primal Exemplar? For if the nature of the image conforms to the Primal Exemplar, it will be beyond understanding. If discrepancy must be 'found' between the things that are being considered, the fault is attributed to the image (136). But since the very nature of our mind, which is made in the image of its Creator, escapes knowledge, it possesses a scrupulous likeness to that which is placed above it by the fact that in itself it is unknowable, showing the characteristic of an incomprehensible nature'.

Again, in the Thirteenth Chapter he writes: 'Since God is Himself the most beautiful and best of all things, that towards which all things which have a desire towards the Good aspire, we therefore say that the mind also is so created in the image of the Fairest – in so far as it participates in the likeness of the Primal Exemplar – as much as it is permitted to reside in the Good. But if in some manner it transgresses beyond this limit, it is denuded of the beauty of that in which it had been residing. Indeed we say that the mind is adorned with the likeness of the beauty of the Primal Exemplar in the same way as a mirror is adorned by the reflection of that which appears in it. By the same analogy we hold that the mind possesses a nature administered by itself, and that this is adorned by a beauty which is derived from it, as it were a reflection of a reflection, and that the substantial material', that is the material substance 'associated with this nature, is held and embraced by it'. (Now the reason why he says this is that nature is properly observed in association with matter, because matter floats about until it discovers the form by which it is established) (137). 'Therefore', he continues 'if one thing is held by another, the presence of the True Good is brought down through all things co-rationally and forms, by means of that which is placed over, that which is consequent': that is, it forms matter by means of mind (138). 'But when the dispersion of this most excellent connaturality is brought about, and, in a contrary manner, that which is above

The
formation
of matter
through
mind

inferius fiat, tunc ipsius materiae, desolatae ex natura (hoc est naturali ordine), redarguitur deformitas. Deformis enim res quaedam est per seipsam materia ordine naturae mutato, et ipsius deformitati concorruptitur pulchritudo naturae, in qua per animum formatur. Ac sic in ipsum animum turpitudinis materiae per naturam distributio efficitur; ut non iam dei 5 imaginem in caractere figmenti consideres. Nam ueluti quoddam speculum retro bonorum formam se animus faciens, proicit quidem fulgoris summi boni 789D notitias, materiae uero deformitatem in seipsum absorbet. Et hoc modo fit mali generatio mali De generatione mali
generatio, per priuationem boni subtexta. Bonum uero est omne quodcumque consequitur quod primum bonum proprie habet. Quodcumque uero extra illam 790A copulam et similitudinem, quae ad illud est, efficitur, expers boni omnino 11 est. Si ergo unum quidem iuxta consideratam rationem bonum est quod uere est, animus autem, ad imaginem boni factus, etiam ipse habet bonus esse. Natura uero (corporis) quae ab animo continetur, ueluti quaedam imago 15 imaginis est. Ex his ostenditur quia materiale nostrum constituitur quidem et comprehenditur cum ex natura (animi) administratur, soluitur uero iterum et decidit cum a continente (animi) et comprehendente separatur, et ab ipsa ad bonum connaturalitate dispergitur. Hoc autem non aliter efficitur, quam cum naturae ad contrarium fit conuersio, dum desiderium non ad bonum, sed ad id quod formantis indiget intuetur. Necessesse est enim omnem materiam 20 per egestatem propriae formae ad aliquod inhonestum ac deforme simulandum conformari. Et paulo post: Ac per hoc consequens contemplatio rationi 790B occurrit, per quam discimus in humana concreione a deo quidem animum administrari, ab illo autem materialem nostram uitam, dum in natura (hoc est in imagine animi) manet; si autem auersa fuerit a natura, etiam ab 25 ipsa quae est per animum operatione alienari.

Proinde si quis praedicti theologi uerba intentius perspexerit, per totum sermonis de imagine textum inueniet constitutionem totius hominis in tribus quibusdam (quibus naturalis ordo contextitur) ueluti compositis concretam: in animo uidelicet, et uitali motu (quem 30

22-26 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 13[12] (Capp, p. 225, 26-30; PG 44, 164C8-14).

1 materiae . . . ex] materiae cum desolata fuerit ex p. ras. R¹, CHM Capp (224, 27) 1-2 hoc est naturali ordine] om. CHMR Capp (224, 27) 2 redarguitur deformitas] corr. R¹ 2 deformis] informis CHMR Capp (224, 28) 3 ordine . . . mutato] et imperfecta CHMR Capp (224, 28) 3 deformitati] infortitati CR⁰ Capp (224, 29), infortitate HMR¹, deformati FP 7 se animus faciens] animus factus CHMR Capp (225, 3) 7 summi] om. CHMR Capp (225, 3) 8 deformitatem] infortitatem CHMR Capp (225, 3) 12 est] om. CHMR Capp (225, 8) 13 factus] efficiendo CHMR Capp (225, 9) 14 corporis] om. CHMR Capp (225, 9) 15 his] autem add. R¹ (sup. l.), HM 16 animi] om. CHMR Capp (225, 12) 21 aliquod] aliquid HM 22 hoc consequens] haec ex consequentia ipsa C Capp (225, 26-27) 22 contemplatio] quae adiecta est add. C Capp (225, 27) 23 concreione] concreione a. corr. FJ 24 dum] R¹, cum CR⁰ Capp (225, 29) 24-25 hoc est in imagine animi] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹, om. C Capp (225, 29) 26 per] sup. l. R¹ 27 intentius] intentus HMR 28 inueniet] R¹, inueniat R⁰ 29 quibus . . . contextitur] om. HMR 30 compositis concretam] corr. R¹

becomes that which is below, then we see (139) the deformation of matter which has been abandoned by nature', that is, by the natural order. 'For matter by itself is a deformed thing, when the order of nature has been changed (140), and the beauty of nature is corrupted with its deformity – that beauty in which it is formed through the mind. And so the distribution of the baseness of matter is extended through nature into the mind, so that you will see no more the image of God in the character of what has been formed. For the mind, placing the form of good things, like a mirror, behind itself, throws away the manifestations of the brightness of the greatest Good, and at the same time absorbs into itself the deformity of matter, and in this way 789D evil is generated, produced by the privation of good. For every consequent thing is good which properly possesses the First Good: but every thing which is extraneous to relation and likeness to the First Good is altogether lacking in good. If therefore in accordance with the reasoning given the One which truly is is reasonably held to be good, the mind for its part is created in the image of the Good, and is the possessor of well-being. But the nature' of the body, 'which is contained in the mind, is as it were the image of an image – from this it is demonstrated that our material principle is constituted indeed and stabilized when it is administered by the nature' of the mind; 'but it is dissolved again and decays when it is separated from the mind which constitutes and contains it, and is banished from connaturality with the Good. And this occurs through no other means than the conversion of its nature to its opposite, when desire is felt, not for the Good but for that which has need of a forming principle. For it is necessary that all matter be conformed, if it lacks its proper form, to something like the dishonourable and the deformed'. A little later St. Gregory writes: 'And from this the conclusion is drawn that in the composite man the mind is indeed administered by God, but our material life is administered by mind, provided that it remains in its own nature', that is to say, in the image of Mind: 'but if it abandons its nature, it is also alienated from that operation which occurs through the mind'.

Now anyone who follows more closely the words of this theologian will find references everywhere in the text of the *Treatise on the Image* to a threefold division in the constitution of man, out of which the order of his nature is woven, as though it were produced by the composition of the three: that is, the mind; the vital motion,

The generation of evil

The three things of which the whole man is constituted

ipse aliquando fluxilem, aliquando materialem uitam appellat), et ex materia formata, ita ut totus homo animo et materiali uita et ipsa materia constare intelligatur. Et animus quidem, in quo tota animae uirtus constat, ad imaginem dei factus, et summi boni speculum, quoniam in eo diuinae essentiae incomprehensibilis forma ineffabili et incomprehensibili modo resultat. Materialis autem uita, quae specialiter circa materiem uersatur, et propterea materialis dicitur quia mutabilitati materiae (id est corporis) adhaeret, imago quaedam animi est et, ut ipse dicit, speculum speculi, ita ut animus diuinae naturae forma sit, uitalis autem motus (qui etiam materialis uita uocatur) cum ipsa materia forma sit animi, ac ueluti secunda imago, per quam animus etiam materiae speciem praestat. Ac per hoc quadam ratione per humanae naturae consequentiam totus homo ad imaginem dei factus non incongrue dicitur, quamuis proprie et principaliter in solo animo imago subsistere intelligatur, eo ordine ut animus quidem a deo, nulla alia creatura interposita, uitalis autem motus ab animo, postremo per uitalem motum ab animo materia formationis suae causam accipiat, ita ut materia uitalem motum sequatur, uitalis motus animum, animus ipsum deum, ad quem conuersus naturae suae integritatem et pulchritudinem custodit, auersus uero ab eo, et seipsum et quae sibi subiecta sunt (materialem uitam, dico, ipsamque materiam) dissipat atque deformat.

De uitali motu
Sed ipse uitalis motus non paruam quaestionem gignit: quaeritur enim utrum ad substantiam hominis pertineat necne. Et si non pertinet, cur imago imaginis dicitur, hoc est imago animi? Et qua ratione per ipsum materiae animus praestat formam? Si autem substantialiter talis uita inest homini, quare homo ex anima solummodo et corpore constare perhibetur? Et quare, soluta materia, illa uita in nullo intelligitur? Non enim in materia manet, quae iam omni motu uitali deseritur, dum praesentia substantialis uitae (quae anima est) priuatur. Nec in anima subsistere dinoscitur, quae post regimen corporis nullum ad materiam motum patitur. Quapropter non incongrue, ut opinor, uitalis motus talis ratio reddenda est, ut nihil aliud sit ipse, praeter quandam copulam et iuncturam corporis et animae, qua sibi inuicem adhaerent, et per quam corpus ab anima formatur, uegetatur et administratur, siue uigilando, siue dormiendo, siue anima intendat quid in corpore peragat, siue a sensibus recedat et in seipsa quiescat ac, ueluti oblita corporis sui, illud tamen ineffabili quodam silentio administrare non desinit, alimenta quibus corpus nutritur et custoditur singulis quibusque

2 ex] in HM 2 formata] om. HMR 2 ipsa] sup. l. R^l, om. R^o 11 cum ipsa materia] om. HMR 17 per uitalem motum] ex uitali motu (motu om. R^o) HMR^l 17 ab animo] om. HMR 18 suae] om. HMR 33 ut opinor] sup. l. R^l, om. R^o 33 motus] corr. R^l 34 ipse] corr. R^l, ipsa R^o 36 formatur] om. HMR 37 intendat] R^l, intendit R^o

which he sometimes calls the fluid, and sometimes the material life principle; and the informed matter. So that the whole man is said to consist of mind, the material life principle, and matter itself. And indeed the mind, in which all the virtue of the soul subsists, is made in the image of God, and is the mirror of the Supreme Good, since in it the incomprehensible form of the Divine essence is present in an ineffable and incomprehensible way. But the material life principle, whose specific activity centres about matter, and which for that reason is called material, seeing that it is involved in the mutable matter of the body, is a kind of image of the mind, and, as St. Gregory says, a reflection of a reflection: so that the mind is a form of the Divine Nature, but the vital motion, which along with matter is also called the material life principle, is the form of mind, as it were a second image, through which the mind produces a form even of matter. And thus in a way, through the linking of human nature, the whole man can be suitably described as fashioned after the image of God, although really and primarily it is only in the mind that the image can be seen to subsist. It is like this: the mind receives the cause of its formation, without any intervening creature, from God (141), while the vital motion receives it from the mind, and finally matter receives the cause of its formation from the mind through the vital motion. Thus matter follows vital motion, and vital motion follows mind, and finally mind follows God: when therefore it turns towards Him it preserves the beauty and integrity of its nature: but when it turns away from Him it wastes and disfigures not only itself but also that which is subject to it, that is, the material life principle and matter itself as well (142).

But in connection with this vital motion, a question of some importance arises. For it is necessary to enquire whether or not it pertains to the substance of man. If it does not, why is it called the image of an image, that is, the image of the mind? And how could mind through it produce a form for matter? But if such a vital principle is entirely part of the substance of man, how can we say that man is a product of soul and body only, and how is it that the vital principle is found in nothing wherein the matter has been dissolved? For it does not have its home in matter, which has already been abandoned by all vital motion when it is deprived of the presence of substantial life which is the soul. Nor is it seen to subsist in the soul which is unaffected by matter after it has ceased to control the body. For this reason I think that no better explanation can be given of the vital motion than that it is a kind of link or junction between body and soul, through which they are attached to one another, and by means of which the body is formed by the soul and is given life by it and is administered by it in waking and sleeping, that is, whether the soul gives attention to the activities of the body, or withdraws from the senses, and rests within itself as though forgetful of its body. But even then it does not cease in a secret and ineffable silence to administer the body, bestowing upon all its parts food for its nourishment

partibus distribuens. Separatis autem utrisque, corpore uidelicet et anima, uitalis ille motus omnino interit: non enim uiuit, nisi habeat quod moueat, hoc est, nisi habeatur quod per eum moueatur, quia nihil aliud subsistit, nisi motus animi corpus regentis. Dum autem mouens desinit mouere uel moueri, motus omnino in eo perit. 5 Totius enim motus terminus est quies moti uel mouentis. Quiescente igitur anima corpus suum mouere, totus uitalis motus (hoc est tota materialis uita) esse desinit. Hinc idem beatus Gregorius in quarto decimo capitulo: *Materialis, inquit, et fluxilis haec corporum uita, semper motu proueniens, in hoc habet essendi uirtutem in non stante unquam motu.* 10 *Vt enim quidam fluuius, iuxta suum ruens impetum, implere quidem uellem ostenditur, per quamcunque consequitur ferri, non tamen in eadem aqua circa eundem semper locum cernitur, sed illa quidem subter lapsa cucurrit, illa uero desuper fluxit, sic et materiale huius uitae per quendam motum fluxumque uicissitudinum successionis continuitate permutatur, ut nunquam post mutabilitatem stare possit, sed impotentia quiescendi incessabilem habet alternum per similia motum. Si autem aliquando motus cessauerit, omnino etiam essendi quietem habebit, hoc est omnino esse cessabit.* 16

At si uis cognoscere quod animus in nulla parte corporis concludatur, dum totum corpus praesentia sui administrat, et ubique 20 in omnibus quas administrat totus est, audi eundem in eodem sermone, XV capitulo: *Nobis, inquit, sermo erat propositus ostendere non in parte corporis animum detineri, sed totum aequaliter attingere, consequenter naturae subiectae partis motum operans. Est autem ubi etiam naturales affectus animus subsequitur, uelut minister factus. Nam saepe praecipit ipsi 25 corporis natura et contristati sensum et laetantis concupiscentiam animo imponit, ita ut ipsa siquidem prima praestet principia, uel ciborum appetitum, uel cuiusdam omnino eorum quae secundum delectationem sunt desiderium iggerens, animus uero tales impetus accipiens, suis cogitationibus occasiones ad id quod desideratur cum corpore exquirat. Hoc autem non in omnibus 30 est, sed solummodo in his qui plus captiui disponuntur, qui rationem seruire facientes desideriis naturae (corporeae) per auxilium mentis libidini, quae per sensus est, seruiliter blandiuntur. In perfectioribus uero non sic*

8–18 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 14[13] (Capp, p. 226, 3–12; PG 44, 165A2–15). 120.22–122.15 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 15[14] (Capp, p. 230, 3–29; PG 44, 173D3–176B13).

1 et] *R*¹, uel *R*⁰ 5 mouens] *morienis ueluti alteram lectionem sup. l. add. M* 8 beatus] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰* 8 in] *p. ras. R¹* 9 inquit] *sup. l. R¹ om. R⁰* 10 motu¹] *per motum C Capp (226, 3)* 10 stante] *stanti C Capp (226, 4)* 16 post mutabilitatem] *mutabilitate C Capp (226, 10)* 18 omnino] *etiam add. CR Capp (226, 12)* 19 at] *et R* 25 uelut] *ueluti CHMR Capp (230, 6)* 25 ipsi] *om. CHMR Capp (230, 7)* 26 natura] *naturae HM, R¹ (corr. ex natura). Graece φύσις: PG 44, 173D* 27 siquidem] *quidem CHMR Capp (230, 8)* 29 iggerens] *ingerens H, J (corr. ex iggerens), M Capp (230, 10). Videtur Eriugena graecatim iggerens pro ingerens posuisse, sicut alibi euaggelistes pro euangelista posuit* 32 corporeae] *om. CHMR Capp (230, 13)*

and preservation. But when body and soul are separated from one another, there is an end of that vital motion. For it cannot live when it has nothing to move, that is to say, unless that is preserved which is moved through it, since it is nothing else than the movement of mind governing body. But when, as to movement, it ceases to move or be moved, movement perishes entirely in it. For the coming to rest of the moved or the mover is the end of all movement (143). Therefore when the soul rests from moving her body, all vital motion, that is, the whole material life principle, ceases to be. Therefore the same Blessed Gregory writes in his Fourteenth Chapter: ‘This material and fluid life of bodies, which goes forward by a continuous motion, possesses the virtue of being in this: that its motion has no rest. For just as a river is seen to fill any valley through which it flows by the impetus of its flood, without registering the same water being conveyed continuously over the same place, but some flows downstream and some flows from above – so what is material in this life is changed in a certain motion by a continual succession of flux and alteration so that it can never cease to move; and so its inability to stop results in unceasing motion, which is changing but involves similar appearances. But if ever the motion shall cease, it will procure an absolute cessation of being’, that is to say, it will utterly cease to be.

But if you wish to see how the mind is enclosed in no part of the body while by its presence it administers the whole body, and is everywhere a whole throughout all the parts it administers, hear what St. Gregory has to say in the Fifteenth Chapter of the same treatise: ‘It was the purpose of our treatise to show that the mind is not retained in any given part of the body, but that it is in contact with all parts equally, and consequently operates the motion in accordance with the part of the nature which is subject to it. But there are times when the mind follows the inclinations of nature, as if it were the servant. For often the bodily nature commands it, and imposes upon the mind the emotion of one who grieves and the desire of one who rejoices, for it takes the initiative, exciting in the mind the hunger for food or the desire for some delightful thing. And the mind receiving these stimulants enters into a conference with the body for the purpose of gaining opportunities of satisfying them. This, however, is not the case with all, but only with those who find themselves more in the condition of captives, who force the reason to serve the desires of the’ bodily ‘nature, and employ the mind servilely to flatter the lust which operates through the bodily senses. But in the more perfect it is not so.

The natural order disturbed

efficitur: imperat enim animus rationi et non patitur, quod utile est eligens; natura autem e uestigio sequitur praecipientem (animum). Quoniam uero tres secundum uitalem uirtutem differentias ratio inuenit, primam quidem nutritiuam sine sensu, secundam uero nutritiuam quidem et sensiuam, expertem uero rationabilis operationis, item tertiam rationabilem et perfectam, perque omnem uirtutem penetrans, ut et in illis sit, etsi in intellectuali plus possideat. Nemo ex his opinetur tres animas commixtas esse in humana concretionem, in propriis circumscriptionibus consideratas, ita ut conformatione multarum animarum humanam esse arbitretur. Sed uera quidem perfecta quae anima una in natura est, intellectualis et immaterialis, quae per sensus materiali copulatur naturae. Materiale autem omne in conuersione et mutabilitate positum est: si quidem animantem uirtutem participauerit, iuxta incrementum mouebitur, si uero uitali operatione deciderit, motum in corruptionem resoluet. Neque igitur sensus absque materiali essentia, neque intellectualis uirtutis sine sensu fit operatio.

In sexto decimo quoque capitulo eundem sensum repetit dicens: In parte quadam eorum quae in nobis sunt animus non comprehenditur, sed aequaliter in omnibus et per omnia est, neque extrinsecus comprehendens, neque intrinsecus comprehensus. Haec enim in cadis, seu aliis quibusdam corporibus sibi inuicem impositis proprie dicuntur. Ipsa autem intellectualis ad corporale societas ineffabilem et inintelligibilem habet contactum, neque intus existens (non enim in corpore incorporale tenetur), neque extra comprehensum (non enim circumprehenditur incorporale); sed secundum quendam modum superrationabilem et inintelligibilem appropinquat animus naturae, et coaptatus, in ipsa et circa ipsam consideratur, neque intus positus, neque circumplexus. Sed quomodo, non est dicendum neque intelligendum, praeter hoc quod iuxta proprium ordinem ipsius permeabilis naturae etiam animus efficax fit. Si autem aliquod delictum circa ipsam contigerit, secundum illud motus intelligentiae titubat. Ac si aperte diceret: si organum corporis in aliquo deliquerit (hoc est in aliquo defecerit), et integritatem suae naturalis constitutionis aliqua occasione corruptam habuerit, motus intelligentiae (id est motus animi) in ea parte, quae in organo corrumpitur, titubat (hoc est administrationis suae uirtutem manifestare non potest), non quod ille animus deficiat, sed quod illa pars corrupta animi uirtutem recipere non ualeat.

2-6 Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 736A-B. 17-29 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 16[15] (Capp. p. 231, 26-38; PG 44, 177B4-C6).

2 [animum] om. CHMR Capp (230, 17) 3 [quidem] corr. R¹ 6 [perque] per quae FHJP 6 [penetrans] penetrantem HM 6 [in²] sup. l. R¹, om. CFHMPR⁰ Capp (230, 17) 8 [conformatione] codd., συγχρότῳμά τι (PG 44, 176B3), quod Eriugena συγχρότῳμάτι intellexit 19 [in] in ras. J, uasis in add. FP 19 [cadis] uasis sup. l. quasi glossam add. J 23 [comprehensum] comprehensus HM, p. ras. R¹, comprehendens CR⁰ Capp (231, 32) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco περιέχουσα: PG 44, 177B12-13) 24 [quendam modum] quemadmodum C 24 [inintelligibilem] R¹, intelligibilem CH, J (a. corr.), MR⁰ Capp (231, 33) 28 [fit] sit HMR

For the mind rules the reason, and is not passive, but chooses that which is useful': the mind 'marches before and nature follows after. Now reason discovers three varieties in the vital force: the first is that which gives nourishment without sense; the second is that which gives nourishment and sense, but is without the operation of reason; and the third is perfect and reasonable, which penetrates every power so that it may take up its abode in them, although it has more sway over the intellectual. But let no one suppose from this that there are three souls mixed together in a corporate man, or that each of these can be marked off from the others by its proper limits, so that we come to believe that the human soul is an amalgamation of many souls (144). The true and perfect soul is by nature a unity, intellectual and immaterial, and is bound to the material nature through the senses. Now all matter is in a state of flux and mutability. If then it partake of the life-giving power, it is moved positively: but if it fall away from the life-giving act, its motion will be towards corruption and it will perish. Therefore neither can there be operation of the sense without the material essence, nor of the intellect without the sense'.

And in the Sixteenth Chapter he speaks again in the same sense: 'The mind is not contained in any particular part of the things that are in us, but is extended equally in and through all parts. It contains nothing from outside, and is not contained by anything from inside. Such contacts can be spoken of in connection with jars (145) or other such objects where one is placed within the other. But the mind's intellectual association with the corporeal involves a contact which is ineffable and unintelligible: a contact where the intellectual is not existing within (for the incorporeal is not contained in body), nor containing from without (for that which is incorporeal has nothing to do with containment) (146). But mind draws near to nature after a super-rational and unintelligible mode, and, fitted to it, is thought about as in it and around it, although neither placed within it nor enfolding it: but how this can be is not to be explained or comprehended save that it is through the proper disposition of permeable nature itself that the mind also becomes effective. But if that nature suffers some flaw, the movement of the intelligence correspondingly falters'. By this he means to say: If the instrument of the body is damaged or is in any way deficient, and the integrity of its natural constitution is by some accident been spoilt, 'the movement of the intelligence', that is, the movement of the mind, 'falters' in that part where the damage has occurred to the instrument, that is to say, where it is unable to actualise its administrative potency - not because the mind is at fault, but because that part, being damaged, cannot receive the power of the mind.

The soul is not contained within the body nor without

Quoniam uero necessarium est humanam naturam diligenter
considerare, indubitanterque discernere quid in ea ad imaginem
dei et similitudinem (hoc est ad imaginem similem) creatum sit,
et quid similitudine diuinae imaginis longe in ea distat, eiusdem
sanctissimi et sapientissimi magistri, Gregorii uidelicet, uerba 5
inserere placuit. Ait ergo in XVII capitulo sermonis de imagine: 793C
*Recipiamus iterum diuinam uocem: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem
et similitudinem nostram". Quomodo parua, et indigna magnanimitate
hominis, ex his quae extra sunt quidam imaginauerunt, comparatione ad
hunc mundum, quasi in ipso existeret, hominem magnificantes! Dicunt 10
enim hominem MIKPOKOCMON (id est paruus mundum) esse,
ex eisdem quibus uniuersus elementis consistit. Nam qui ornamento
nominis talem laudem humanae donant naturae, obliui sunt semetipsos,
in proprietatibus, quae circa culicem et murem sunt, uenerabilem hominem
facientes. Etenim et in illis ex his quattuor concretio est, eo quod omnino 15
in unoquoque existentium (corporum), aut ex pluribus aut minoribus,
quaedam portio circa animal consideratur eorum sine quibus consistendi 793D
aliquid ex his quae sensum participant naturam non habet. Quid igitur
post mundi charactera et similitudinem arbitrandum est esse hominem,
caelo praetereunte, terra mutata, omnibusque quae in his comprehenduntur 20
cum transitu comprehendentis (mundi) praetereuntibus? Sed in quo iuxta 794A
ecclesiasticam rationem humana magnitudo est? Non in ipsa ad creatum
mundum similitudine, sed in ipso quod secundum imaginem naturae creatoris
factus est. Quae igitur est imaginis ratio, merito dices. Quomodo assimilatur
incorporeo corporale? Quomodo sempiterno temporale? Immutabili quod 25
per conuersionem mutabile est? Impassibili et incorruptibili passibile et
corruptibile? Puro ab omni malitia quod semper ei cohabitat et ad eam
conuertitur? Multa enim medieta est illius animi (diuini scilicet) qui est
principale exemplum, et illius qui secundum imaginem factus est. Imago
siquidem, si habuerit ad principale exemplar similitudinem, proprie illud 30
etiam nominatur. Si uero imitatio ab eo quod praepositur distauerit, aliud
aliquid, et non imago illius illud est. Quomodo ergo homo, mortale hoc et 794B*

7-8 Gen. 1, 26.

124.7-132.28 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 17[16] (Capp, p. 232, 5-236, 9; PG 44, 177D-185D).

6 placuit] primum in textu positum, postea erasum, denique in margine scripsit R¹ 6 ait] ut
(ex ait) corr. MR^s 6 capitulo] kap. mg. R², om. R⁰ 8 magnanimitate] magnanimitati
F, J (p. corr.), P, magnanimitatis J (a. corr.) 11 MIKPOKOCMON id est] om. CHMR
Capp (232, 9) 12 uniuersus] uniuersum CHMR Capp (232, 9) 12 consistit]
consistens CHMR Capp (232, 10), uel consistentem sup. l. ueluti alteram lectionem add. M
16 corporum] om. CHMR Capp (232, 13) 17 animal] animatum HMR Capp (232, 14)
19 est] om. Capp (232, 16) 21 mundi] om. CHMR Capp (232, 18) 22 est] mg. R¹, om.
R⁰ 23 similitudine . . . secundum] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 24 assimilatur] assimilatur corr.
M 28 diuini scilicet] om. CHMR Capp (232, 25)

But since it is necessary to make a diligent examination of human 1
nature, and to distinguish beyond question what in it is created in the
image and likeness, that is, in the like image of God, and what in it is far
removed from the likeness of the Divine image, I thought fit to bring in
the words of the same most holy and most wise master Gregory. In the
Seventeenth Chapter of his *Treatise on the Image*, then, he writes: 'Let us
consider again the word of God: "Let us make man in Our image and
likeness". What poor notions, unworthy of man's excellence, derived
from external things (147), have been conceived by those who seek to
magnify man by comparing him with this world, as if it existed in him.
For they call him a microcosm', that is, 'a little world, consisting of the
same elements as those from which the universe is created. But those
who praise man with this title have forgotten themselves, for the prop-
erties for which they honour him are common to the mouse and the
flea. For in these too, the composition is of the same four elements. In
all existing' bodies 'there is a portion, pertaining to the animal part,
of these elements - whether many on the one hand or small on the
other, without which nothing of those things that have sense can have
the nature of being at all. What should we think of man, if he were
made after the stamp and likeness of the world, when the heaven has
passed away and the earth has been changed and all things contained
in it have passed away with the disappearance of' the world 'which
contained them? But according to the Church's reasoning, the great-
ness of man lies not in his likeness to the created world but in the fact
that he is created according to the image of the Creator of nature.
What kind then, you will rightly ask, is this image? How can the cor-
poreal be assimilated to the incorporeal? How the temporal to the
eternal, that which is changing and mutable to the immutable, that
which is passive and corruptible to the impassive and incorruptible,
that which dwells with evil and ever turns towards it (148) to that which
is pure from all evil? For between that Mind, (the Divine), Which
is the Primal Exemplar, and that which is created after Its image, a
vast space intervenes. For if the image possessed a likeness to the
Primal Exemplar then it could rightly be given the same name: but
if the imitation is far removed from the archetype it is no longer an
image but something different. So how can man, this mortal and

passibile citoque deficiens, immortalis ac purae semperque existentis naturae est imago?

Sed ueram de hoc rationem sola nouerit aperte quae uere est ueritas. Nos uero, quantum capimus, speculationibus quibusdam et opinionibus quod uerum est inuestigantes, haec de quaestionibus susceptis dicimus: neque 5 diuinus mentitur sermo, secundum imaginem dei fieri hominem dicens, neque miseria humanae naturae (usque ad infelicitatem) beatitudini impassibilis uitae assimilatur. Necessae enim est e duobus alterum fateri, si quis comparat deo quod nostrum est: aut passibile est diuinum, aut impassibile humanum, ut ex aequalibus similitudinis ratio in utrisque comprehendatur. Si autem 10 neque diuinum passibile, neque nostrum extra est passionem, igitur quae 794C alia relinquatur ratio, per quam ueridicam dicimus diuinam uocem, quae ad imaginem dei factum fuisse hominem dicit? Non ergo ipsa recipienda nobis est sancta scriptura? Fiat itaque quaedam, ex his quae scripta sunt ad id quod quaeritur, a nobis manuductio. Postquam dixit: "Faciemus hominem", et in 15 talibus faciamus, infert hunc sermonem quia "fecit deus hominem; secundum imaginem dei fecit eum; masculum et feminam fecit eos". Dictum est igitur iam, et in his quae coram sunt, quia ad solutionem hereticae impietatis talis sermo praenuntiatus est, ut discentes quia fecit hominem unigenitus deus secundum imaginem dei, nulla ratione diuinitatem filii et patris segregemus, 20 794D fideli diuina scriptura deum utrumque nominante, eum uidelicet qui fecit hominem, et eum ad cuius imaginem factus est. Sed de hoc quidem sermo demittatur. Ad uero propositum conuertenda est quaestio. Quomodo diuino et beato illi miserum hoc simile a sancta scriptura nominatur? Nonne itaque 25 diligenter ordinanda sunt uerba? Inuenimus enim quia alterum quid, 795A quod secundum imaginem factum est, alterum quod nunc in infelicitate ostenditur. "Fecit deus", inquit, "hominem; ad imaginem dei fecit eum": finem habet ipsa ad imaginem facti creatio. Deinde ΕΠΑΝΑΛΗΜΨΙΝ (id est repetitionem) facit, secundum constitutionem sermonis, et ait: 30 "Masculum et feminam fecit eos". Omnibus enim arbitror notum esse quia hoc extra principale exemplum intelligitur: "In Christo" enim "Iesu", sicut ait Apostolus, "neque masculus neque femina est". Sed in haec hominem diuini sermo dicit. Nonne itaque duplex quaedam est nostrae naturae constitutio, una ad deum assimilata, altera ad talem differentiam diuisa? Tale enim 35 aliquid ex constructione eorum quae scripta sunt ratio insinuat, primum

16-17 Gen. 1, 27. 31-32 Gal. 3, 28.

1 purae] CR Capp (232, 30) iuxta graecum καθαρός (PG 44, 180B 13), pure FHJMP 8 assimilatur] assimilatur HM 9 est²] esse CHMR Capp (233, 2) 10 aequalibus] aequalitatibus Capp (233, 3) 12-13 ad imaginem] in imagine CHMR Capp (233, 6) 14 itaque] p. ras. R¹, igitur C Capp (233, 7) 21 fideli] codd., ἐπίσης (PG 44, 180D12), quod Eriugena πιστῆς intellexit 23 demittatur] dimittatur HM 23-24 diuino . . . simile] diuinum et beatum et miserum et simile illi hoc CHMR Capp (233, 17) 24 nonne] R¹, non CR⁰ Capp (233, 18) 29 repetitionem] adiectionem CHMR Capp (233, 22) 33 dicit] docet a. corr. R 34 assimilata] assimilata HM

passive and quickly withering object, be the image of the Nature which is immortal, pure, and ever-existent?

'Only that Truth Which truly is fully knows the true nature of this image; but after a search for the truth of this by speculations and opinions (149), in so far as it can be grasped, we say in reply to these questions the following: Neither does the Word of God lie when it says that man is made after the image of God: nor is the misery even to unhappiness of human nature assimilated to the bliss of the Life that knows no passion. For we must choose between two alternatives: if someone compares to God that which is ours, either the Divine can suffer or the human is free of suffering, if the principle of likeness is to be equal in each. But if the Divine cannot suffer, nor our own nature be free from suffering, then what other principle remains on which we may affirm the truth of the Word of God which declares that man was made in the image of God? Must we reject the Holy Scripture? Let us then open up a way which shall give a lead and bring us from what is written to what we wish to solve (150). After He said "Let Us make man and let Us make him after this sort", the text goes on to say that "God made man, after the image of God made he him, male and female made He them". This has already been stated and now these words are uttered in the text before us (151) – for the refutation of heretical impiety – so that by learning that the only-begotten God created man in His own image, we may not separate the divinity of the Father from that of the Son, seeing that the Holy Scripture also (152) calls both God – Him Who created man and Him in Whose image he was created (153). But we must not go on about this. Now we must turn to the question how an unhappy thing can be called by Holy Scripture a similitude of what is divine and blessed. For this purpose (154) the text must be examined carefully. For we find that that which was made in the image of God is one thing and that which is shown to be now in unhappiness another. "God made man", it is written, "in the image of God made He him". The creation of that which was made in the image is completed, and then follows according to the structure of the text an epanalepsis (or repetition), "Male and female created He them". For I think that all will agree that this is something outside the principal image. For, according to the Apostle, "in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female". And yet the text says that man is divided into these two categories. Does it not then appear that there is a two-fold fashioning of our nature, one by which we are assimilated to God, the other by which we are divided by this differentiation? For something of this sort is implied in the construction of the words;

quidem dicens quia "fecit deus hominem; secundum imaginem dei fecit eum", 795B
iterum uero his quae dicta sunt addens quia "masculum et feminam fecit eos",
quod alienum est ab his quae de deo intelliguntur.

Ego quidem arbitror magnam quandam excelsamque doctrinam ex
his quae dicta sunt a sancta scriptura tradi. Talis autem doctrina est. 5
Duorum quorundam per extremitatem a se inuicem distantium medium
est humanitas, diuinae uidelicet incorporalisque naturae, et irrationalis
pecudalisque uitae. Licet enim utrumque praedictorum in humana
comparatione considerari: portionem quidem dei quod rationale est atque 10
intellectuale, quod iuxta masculum et feminam differentiam non admittit,
irrationabilis uero corporalem constitutionem et duplicationem in masculum
et feminam partitam. Vtrumque horum est omnino in omnibus humanam 795C
uitam participantibus. Sed prius esse intellectuale ab eo qui humanam
generationem in ordine percurrit didicimus, supergenitiuam uero esse homini
ad irrationabile societatem et cognationem. Primum nanque ait quia "fecit 15
deus ad imaginem dei hominem", ostendens ex his quae dicta sunt, sicut ait
Apostolus, quia in eo qui talis est masculus et femina non est. Deinde infert
materiales humanae naturae proprietates quia "masculum et feminam fecit
eos". Quid ergo ex hoc discemus?

Et mihi nemo imputet longius sermonem producenti proposito intellectu. 20
Deus, in sua natura, omne quodcunque per notitiam accipiendum est bonum,
illud est. Magis autem, omnis boni intellecti et comprehensi summitas
existens, non ob aliud aliquid humanam uitam creat, quam quod bene 795D
esse talem oportet. Ac per hoc ad conditionem nostrae naturae motus,
non nisi imperfectam bonitatis ostenderet uirtutem, aliquid quidem dans ex
his quae sibi insunt, in aliquo autem inuidens suae participationi. Ast 25
perfecta bonitatis species in hoc est: et adducere hominem ex non existente
in generationem, et non indigentem bonorum perficere. Quoniam uero 796A
multus singulorum bonorum catalogus est, neque facile est eum numero
perficere, propterea comprehensiua quadam uoce omnia comprehendens, 30
sermo significauit dicendo ad imaginem dei hominem factum fuisse. Tale
enim est hoc, ac si diceret quia omnis boni humanam naturam participem
fecit. Si enim plenitudo bonorum deus, illius autem hoc (id est homo)
imago, igitur in eo quod sit plenitudo omnis boni, ad principale exemplum
imago habet similitudinem. Non ergo est in nobis omnis boni forma, omnis 35
uirtus et sapientia, et omne quodcunque est in melius intelligendum? In

16-17 Gal. 3, 28.

24-26 PLATO, *Timaeus* 29E.

4 quidem] enim *CHMR Capp* (233, 32) 7 irrationalis] irrationabilis *CHMR Capp*
(234, 1) 18 materiales] om. *CHMR Capp* (234, 12) 21 per . . . est] est per notitiam
accipiendum *CHMR Capp* (234, 14-15) 26 suae] sup. l. *R^l*, om. *CR^o Capp* (234, 19)
27 ex . . . existente] et non existente *Capp* (234, 21), et non existe *C* 29 eum] *CH, J* (p.
corr.), *MR Capp* (234, 23), cum *F, J* (a. *corr.*), *P* 30 perficere] percipere *C Capp* (234, 23)
35 non ergo est] *corr. R^l*, non igitur est *CR^o*, non est igitur *Capp* (234, 28)

for first it is said that "God created man, in the image of God created
He him": and then are added the words, "Male and female created
He them" – something which is alien from the properties of God.

Now it is my opinion that a right and excellent doctrine may be
drawn from this Scriptural text. This doctrine is as follows: Human-
ity is the middle term between two extremes widely separated from
each other, namely, the incorporeal nature of God, and the irrational
nature of the beasts. Let us consider each of these extremes in relation
to man: the divine portion, which is a rational and intelligible nature,
and which does not admit the distinction between male and female;
and the corporeal constitution of the irrational nature and its falling
by division into two kinds, the male and the female. Each of these is
wholly present in all who participate in human life. But from the order
in which the generation of man is related we learn that the intelligible
nature comes first, and that the association and kinship with the irra-
tional nature is something which was superadded to man. For it is first
written that "God made man in the image of God", showing by these
words that, as the Apostle says, in one who is so created there is neither
male nor female. Then the material properties of human nature are
added: "Male and female created He them". What are we to learn
from this?

And let no man accuse me of adducing an argument from afar
in relation to the present subject (155). Everything that is known
and accepted as good is God in His Nature. But the highest existing
intelligible and comprehensible Good creates human life for no other
reason than that well-being should be its property. And therefore,
moved to create our nature, He would only be employing an imperfect
power of goodness if while granting some of what He contains to man
he withheld his full participation through envy. But the perfection
of His goodness is apparent in this, that not only does He bring man
from non-existence into generation, but ordains that he shall not lack
goods (156). But seeing that the catalogue of individual goods is long,
and not easy to enumerate, Scripture indicates them all comprehens-
ively by saying that man was made in the image of God. For by this is
meant that He made human nature a participant in every good. For if
God is the plenitude of good things, and (man) is an image of God, the
image must resemble the Primal Exemplar in this respect also, that it
is the plenitude of all good (157). Is there then not in us every form of
good, every virtue, every wisdom and every thing whatever that is best?

The order of
the words:
everything
that is
known and
accepted as
good – that
is God in His
Nature

eo item quod sit omnium necessitate liberum, nullique naturali (hoc est 796B
materiali) potentiae subiugatur, sed per se potentem ad id quod desiderat
habet uoluntatem. Res enim est dominatu carens ac uoluntaria, uirtus.
Quod autem cogitur uolentiamque patitur, uirtus esse non potest. Itaque in
omnibus imagine principalis exempla charactera pulchritudinis gestante (si 5
quidem in aliquo differentiam habuerit, non iam erit omnino similitudo, sed
hoc in illo per omnia ostendetur, quod in uniuerso non distat), igitur qualem
ipsius dei et deo similis differentiam contemplabimur? In hoc: illud quidem
non creatum, hoc autem per creationem subsistit. Talis autem proprietatis
differentia aliarum iterum proprietatum consequentiam fecit. Conceditur 10
enim omnino increatam naturam inconuersibilem esse semperque similiter
habere, creaturam uero non sine mutabilitate consistere. Nam ipse ex non
existente in esse transitus motus quidam est et mutatio non existentis in esse 796C
secundum diuinam uoluntatem transmutati.

Ac sicut in aere charactera Caesaris imaginem euangelium dicit, per quod 15
discimus iuxta quidem figuram similitudinem esse formati ad Caesarem, in
subiecto uero differentiam habere, sic etiam secundum praesentem rationem
imaginationum quae considerantur in diuina natura in humana etiam
cogitantes, in his in quibus similitudo est, in subiecto differentiam inuenimus,
quae in non creato et creato consideratur. Quoniam igitur illud quidem 20
semper similiter habet, hoc autem per creationem factum ex mutabilitate esse
inchoauit, et cognatim ad talem (mutabilitatem) habet conuersionem,
propterea qui nouit omnia ante generationem eorum, sicut ait Prophetia,
consecutus, magis autem praeintelligens prognostica uirtute ad quid destillaret 796D
per suam uirtutem suamque potentiam humanae uoluntatis motus, quoniam 25
quod futurum est uidit, supermachinatus est imagini secundum masculinum
et feminam differentiam, quae non iam ad diuinum principale exemplum
aspicit, sed, sicut dictum est, in mutabili possidet natura. Causam uero 797A
talis supermachinationis soli quidem nouerint qui ueritatem per se uident,
et ministri sunt uerbi. Nos autem, quantum possibile est, ex quibusdam
coniecturis atque consequentiis ueritatem silentes, quod in animum uenit 30

15 Math. 22, 19–21. 23 Dan. 13, 42 (iuxta Vulgatam); Sus. 35a (iuxta LXX).

3 PLATO, *Resp.* X, 617E.

9 hoc autem] *om.* HM, illud uero *suppl.* Gale (189.12), hoc uero Floss (796B 11)
15 charactera] caractere C Capp (235, 4) 22 cognatim] cognatam Capp (235, 11)
23 prophetia] propheta HM 24 ad quid] aliquid C Capp (235, 14) 26 est¹]
erat C Capp (235, 15) 28 in mutabili] immutabili CHM Capp (235, 17) et Floss
(797A 1) 31 consequentiis] *codd.*, εὐλόγων (PG 44, 185A12), quod Eriugena ἐπομένων
forsan intellexit 31 silentes] CFH, J (*a. corr.*), MPR Capp (235, 20), speculantes *super*
silentes *cancelatum add.* J, opinantes *coni.* Gale (189.32). Melius tamen Gale ipse coniecerat:
φαντασθέντες, simulantes (M, 156a, mg.)

In this respect also it is the image, in that it is free from all necessity,
and is subjected to no natural or (material) authority but possesses in
itself a will which is capable of obtaining its desires. For virtue is a vol-
untary thing, free from all domination. For that which is constrained
under duress cannot be a virtue (158). Therefore if in all things the
image exhibits the stamp of the beauty of the Primal Exemplar – for if
there is a difference in a particular, it will not yet be an entire likeness,
although in all parts it shows that it is not far removed from being
so – what kind of difference do we see between God and the man who
is like God? This, that the one Nature is Uncreated, while the other
obtains its being through creation; and this difference of character
leads to others that follow as a result. For it is agreed that a nature
which is uncreated cannot undergo change, but always remains the
same, while the creature does not subsist without change (159). For
the very transition from not-being into being is a kind of motion, the
God-willed transmutation into existence of that which does not exist.

‘And just as the Gospel calls the impression on the coin the image of
Caesar, from which we learn that the shape of that which is moulded
is in the likeness of Caesar, but the thing itself is something different
from Caesar – so also in the present instance of the imagings (160)
which are taken from the Divine nature. Considering their existence
in human nature in those in whom there is a likeness to God, we
discern a difference in the subject between that which is observed in
the uncreated and that which is observed in the created nature (161).
Seeing therefore that the one remains ever the same while the other,
being a created product, takes its origin from a mutation, and itself
naturally possesses’ a changeableness ‘akin to that mutation, for this
reason He Who in the words of the Prophet knows all things before
their generation, following or rather foreknowing by his prognostic
power, into what the motion of the human will would by its own virtue
and power fall (162) (for He saw that which was to be), built upon
the image the superstructure of the distinction between male and
female (163). This distinction no longer looks to the Divine Principal
Exemplar; it abides rather in a mutable nature (164). But the reason
for this superstructure will only be known to those who regard the
truth in its purity and are ministers of the Word. But we, hazarding
the truth, in giving our opinion in so far as we are able, from certain
conjectures and indications (165), shall not dogmatically set forth

non pronuntiativè exponemus, sed ueluti in gymnasia, si oportet, fidelibus audienda proponemus.

Quid ergo est quod de his cogitamus? Sermo qui dicit "fecit deus hominem", infinita significatione omnem humanitatem ostendit. Non enim nunc connumeratur creaturae Adam, sicut in sequentibus historia dicit, sed nomen 5 creato homini non aliud quoddam uniuersaliter est. Non igitur uniuersali naturae uocatione tale aliquid suspicari introducimus, quia in diuina praescientia et uirtute omnis humanitas in prima constitutione comprehensa 797B est? Oportet enim nil deo infinitum in his quae ab eo facta sunt aestimare, sed uniuscuiusque eorum quae sunt finis et mensura circumponderans 10 factoris sapientia est. Quomodo igitur aliquis homo corporis quantitate coartatur, et mensura sibi substantiae magnitudo est, quae in superficie corporis perficitur, sic arbitror ueluti in uno corpore totam humanitatis plenitudinem prognostica uirtute a deo omnium comprehensam fuisse. Et hoc docet sermo qui dicit quia "fecit deus hominem; secundum imaginem 15 dei fecit eum". Non enim in parte naturae imago, neque in quodam eorum quae secundum ipsam considerantur gratia est, sed in totum genus aequaliter talis peruenit uirtus. Signum uero est: omnibus similiter animus collocatur, dum omnes intelligendi et consiliandi uirtutem habeant, et alia omnia, ex 797C quibus diuina natura in eo quod secundum ipsam factum est imaginatur. 20 Similiter habent et ipse in prima mundi constitutione ostensus homo, et post uniuersitatis consummationem futurus: aequaliter in seipsis diuinam ferunt imaginem. Propterea unus homo nominatum est omne, quia in uirtute dei nihil praeterit, nil instat, sed et quod spectatur aequaliter praesenti comprehensiuè uniuersitatis operatione continetur. Omnis itaque natura 25 humana, quae a primis usque nouissima peruenit, una quaedam uere existentis imago est; ipsa uero in masculum et feminam generis differentia nouissime constitutioni formationis adiecta est.

Et ne mireris easdem eiusdem sententias saepe nos repetere, non enim amplificandi sermonis sed declarandae quaestionis hoc 797D

3 Gen. 1, 27. 5 Gen. 2, 19-20. 15-16 Gen. 1, 27.

I Dubitare licet utrum Iohannes Scottus discernere potuerit inter γυμνάσιον (gymnasium) et γυμνασία (exercitatio) annon. Vox γυμνασία reperitur in glossis super Priscianum a Martino Laudunensi collectis: *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale*, 29, 2, Parisiis 1880, p. 135. Caeteroquin Iohannes ipse fatetur se rudem tironem esse *Elladicarum gymnasiarum* (MGH, *Epistolae Karolini Aevi VI*, p. 159, 3-4). Vnde reicienda est emendatio (gymnasio) a Gale (189.33) et Floss (797A7) proposita.

I si oportet] *codd.*, εἴδει (PG 44, 185A 14, quod Eriugena legit εἰ δεῖ) 5 connumeratur] cognominatur Gale et Floss 6 aliud] *codd.*, ἀλλ' ὁ (PG 44, 185B 6), quod Eriugena ἄλλο intellexit 8 praescientia] H, J (p. corr.), MR rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco προγνώσει: PG 44, 185B), praesentia F, J (a. corr.), P 10 circumponderans] *corr.* R¹ 21 habent] habet C Capp (236, 1) 26 humana] *om.* CHMR Capp (236, 6) 28 nouissime] CHMR Capp (236, 8), nouissimae FJP 28 adiecta est] p. ras. R^x, adiecta est sup. l. R¹ (postea erasum) 132.29-134.1 et ne mireris . . . gratia] *om.* HMR

what comes into our mind, but propose certain theories which may be suitable to the ears of the faithful, as might be required in a disputation (166).

'What, then, is our opinion in this matter? The text "God created man" is not limited to a number of individuals but applies to all humanity. For the name of Adam is not here given to one creature as later on in the story, but the name given to the man who was created is rather of universal application (167). Are we not to gather from the universal application of the term nature that in God's prescience and power the whole of humanity was understood to be in question in that first creation? For we should regard none of the creatures made by God as infinite with Him, but the wisdom of the Creator is the defining limit and measure of each one of them (168). Therefore as an individual man is limited by a certain quantity of body, and his substance is measured by the extent of the surface of his body, so, I think, the whole plenitude of humanity was included by the God of all men through His prognostic virtue, as it were in a single body: and this is the teaching of that text which says that "God created man, in the image of God created He him". For the image is not in a part of man's nature, nor grace in any one of the things considered in relation to grace, but such power attaches to the whole genus equally. It is an indication of this that mind is allotted to all men alike, so that all possess the power of understanding and counselling: and it is the same with regard to all the other things by which is revealed the Divine nature in that which is created after It. And the man who was revealed in the first constitution of the world, and the man who is to come after the consummation of all things (169), both equally bear within them the Divine image. And the reason why the totality is described as one man is that in the power of God there is no past and no present, but what He beholds is contained in the ever-present comprehensive operation of the universe. Therefore all human nature, which endures from the beginning until the end, is an image of Him Who truly exists (170): but that differentiation of the genus into male and female was a later addition to the constitution of the human form'.

And let it not surprise you that we so often have recourse to the opinions of the same author; our purpose is not to expand our treatise

agimus gratia. In octavo decimo item eiusdem sermonis capitulo: *Resurrectionis, inquit, gloria nil aliud nobis promittit, quam in antiquitatem cadentium restitutionem. Est enim reditus quidam in primam uitam cuius spectanda gratia, expulsum paradiso iterum in ipsum reducens. Ipsa igitur* 798A
restitutorum uita ad eam quae proprie angelorum habetur: profecto ante 5
ruinam angelus quidam erat. Propterea ipse ad antiquitatem uitae nostrae
reditus angelis assimilatur. Attamen, sicut dictum est, nuptiis apud eos
non existentibus, in myriadibus infinitis militiae angelorum sunt: sic enim
in uisionibus Daniel narrauit. Non igitur per eundem hominem, si nulla
conuersio et recessus ab angelica societate ex peccato nobis fieret, fortassis 10
nos nuptiis ad multiplicationem alligaremur. Alius quidam est in natura
angelorum multiplicationis modus, ineffabilis quidem et inintelligibilis
humanis argumentationibus, uerumtamen quia omnino est, ipse etiam
in his qui paulo minus ab angelis minorati sunt operaretur, in ipsam
diffinitam factoris consilio mensuram humanitatem augens. Si uero coartat 798B
quis generationis animarum modum inquirens, nisi alligaretur nuptiarum 16
cooperationi homo, respondebimus et nos angelicae substantiae modum,
quomodo in infinitis myriadibus illi et una essentia existunt, et in multis
numerantur. Hoc enim apte respondemus proponenti quomodo esset sine
nuptiis homo, dicentes: sicut sunt angeli sine nuptiis. Hominem enim 20
similiter illis fuisse ante praeuaricationem, ostendit ipsa in illum iterum
restitutio.

His iterum a nobis sic iam bene discretis, in priorem rationem redeundum
est. Quomodo, post constitutionem imaginis, ipsam secundum masculum et
feminam differentiam supermachinatus est deus formationi? Ad hoc enim dico 25
utilem esse prius perfectam a nobis theoriam. Qui enim omnia adduxit in esse,
totumque in sua uoluntate hominem ad diuinam imaginem formauit, non 798C
paulatim adiectionibus futurorum moras fecit, sciendo in suam plenitudinem
animarum numerum perficiendum, sed cumulatim in ipsa plenitudine
omnem humanam naturam per prognosticam operationem intellexit, et in 30
excelsitudine et in coequali angelis quiete honorificauit. Quoniam uero
praeuidit contemplatoria uirtute non recte euntem ad bonum uoluntatem,
atque ideo ex angelica uita recedentem, ne animarum humanarum multitudo
minueretur, cadens ex illo modo per quem angeli ad multitudinem aucti sunt,

8–9 Dan. 7, 10. 14 Ps. 8, 6; Hebr. 2, 7. 19–22 Luc. 20, 34–36.

134.2–136.8 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 18[17] (Capp, pp. 236, 35 – 237, 38; PG 44, 188C–192A).

2 resurrectionis] autem add. C Capp (236, 35) C 2 gloria] gratia CHMR Capp (236, 35)
 rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco χάρις: PG 44, 188C11) 3 cuius] ipsa CHMR Capp (237, 1),
 rectius ut uidetur 6 angelus quidam erat] codd., ὁ . . . βίος ἀγγελικός τις ἦν (PG 44,
 188D 2–3) 6 propterea] etiam add. C Capp (237, 3) 8 enim] om. C Capp
 (237, 5) 9 eundem hominem] codd., τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (PG 44, 189A3), quod Eriugena
 τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον intellexit 19 respondemus] respondebimus HM 21 iterum] om.
 C 23 iterum] igitur C Capp (237, 18) 32 bonum] bonam C, FJ (corr. ex bonum), HMP

but to clarify our problem. In the Eighteenth Chapter of the same discourse he writes: ‘The glory (171) of the Resurrection promises us precisely this: the restitution of the fallen to their pristine state. For the grace to which we are to look forward is a Return to our first way of life, leading back to Paradise once again him who was expelled from it. Therefore the life of those who are restored is compared to that which is properly the life of the angels; man before the Fall was a certain kind of angel (172). And so the return of our life to its ancient state is likened to the angels. But just as it is written that there is no giving in marriage among them and yet that their armies consist of infinite myriads – for so Daniel has related it in his visions – perhaps if no perversion and falling away from the angelic nature had been wrought in us by sin, we should not now be compelled through the same man (173) to multiply ourselves by matrimony. For in the angelic nature there is a different mode of propagation, and one which cannot be described or understood by human reason: but yet it is so, and the same mode would operate in those who were created a little lower than the angels, to give increase to man according to the measure appointed by the plan of the Creator. But should someone insist (174) and make enquiry into the mode of propagation of souls if man did not enter into the intercourse of marriage, we shall indicate the mode of the angelic substance which in that one essence exists in infinite myriads and are numbered as many. For to one enquiring how man could survive without matrimony, we will suitably reply: in the same way as the angels manage without matrimony: for that man was like them before the Fall is shown by his Return once more to that nature.

‘Well then, now that these questions have been well decided by us, a return must be made to our former question, namely how, after the establishment of the image itself, God imposed upon its formation the superstructure of the differentiation into male and female? I offer as useful in this connection a theory which I put forward previously (175). For He Who brought all things into being and formed man entirely in His will after the Divine image, did not establish intervals in which future things would gradually be added, through his knowledge of the number of souls which was required to bring humanity to its fulness, but intellected through His prognostic act the whole of human nature at once in its fulness, and gave it a place of high honour and a tranquility co-equal with that of the angels. But since He foresaw by His contemplative power that man’s will would not go straight for the good (176) and would therefore fall away from the angelic way of life, He formed in our nature a

There would be no marriages if man had not sinned, nor multiplication of (human) nature through male and female, for there would be neither male nor female

propterea conuenientem in peccatum anullatis incrementi excogitationem in natura conformauit, pro angelica magnificentia pecudalem et irrationalem ex se inuicem successionis modum humanitati inserens. Hinc mihi uidetur etiam 798D
magnus Dauid, dolens hominis miseriam, talibus uerbis planxisse naturam 5
quia "homo in honore dum esset, non intellexit" (honorem dicens aequalem angelis reuerentiam), propterea "comparatus est iumentis insipientibus". Vere enim pecorinus factus est, qui animalem hanc generationem accepit propter 799A
ad materiale inclinationem.

De eo quod
post resur-
rectionem
neque
masculus
neque
femina erit

N. Praefati itaque magni theologi uerba, quae a te introducta sunt, 10
nil aliud uidentur suadere quam ut hominem intelligamus solo animo
et uirtutibus ei naturaliter insitis ad imaginem dei factum (insunt
autem ei sapientia, scientia, ratiocinandi uirtus, caeteraeque uirtutes,
quibus ornatur anima, similitudinem in se creatoris sui exprimens),
et quod omnes homines semel et simul facti sunt in illo uno homine,
de quo scriptum est: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem* 15
nostram, et: In quo omnes peccauerunt. Adhuc enim ille unus omnes
fuit, et in quo omnes beatitudine paradisi expulsi sunt. Et si homo
non peccaret, in geminum sexum simplicitatis suae diuisionem
non pateretur. Quae diuisio omnino diuinae naturae imaginis et 799B
similitudinis expers est; et nullo modo esset, si homo non peccaret, 20
sicut nullo modo erit post restaurationem naturae in pristinum
statum, qui post catholicam resurrectionem cunctorum hominum
manifestabitur. Quapropter si homo non peccaret, nullus utriusque
sexus copula, nec ullo semine nasceretur sed, quemadmodum
angelica essentia, dum sit una, in infinitas myriades nullis temporum 25
morulis interiectis simul et semel multiplicata est, ita humana
natura, si mandatum uellet seruare et seruaret, in praecognitum
soli conditori numerum simul et semel erumperet. Quoniam uero
praeuidit deus, qui nec fallit nec fallitur, hominem conditionis suae
ordinem et dignitatem deserturum, supermachinatus est alterum 799C
multiplicationis humanae naturae modum, quo mundus iste locorum 31
et temporum interuallis perageretur, ut homines generalis delicti
generalem luerent poenam, ex corruptibili semine sicut et caetera
animalia nascentes.

Sed dum haec multaque similia ex praedicti magistri testimoniis 35
colliguntur, multae quaestiones undique prosiliunt. Quarum prima

6 Ps. 48, 13.21. 15-16 Gen. 1, 26. 16 Rom. 5, 12.

16-17 AVGVSTINVS, *De peccatorum meritis* III, vii, 14 (CSEL 60, p. 141, 16; PL 44, 194).
Cf. *De praedestinatione* XVI, 3 (CCCM 50, p. 96, 70; PL 122, 419B). *Comment. in eu. Ioh.*
I, xxxi, 32-56 (SC 180, pp. 170-174; PL 122, 310B-D). 23-28 Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.*
I, xxxi, 32-56 (SC 180, pp. 170-174; PL 122, 310B-D).

I anullatis] annulatis J, adnullatis HM

plan of propagation suitable to those who have been snared into sin (177), so that the number of human souls should not be diminished when human nature had fallen from the power of propagating itself in the angelic mode; and implanted in man the irrational method of propagation from one another of the beasts of the field in place of the glorious fecundity of the angels. Moreover, the great David, bewailing the misery of man, seems to me to lament human nature in these words, "Man when he was held in honour did not understand his honour", referring to his equality of status with the angels. "And so", he said "he was now compared with the beasts of the field" who are without reason. For in very truth man has become like cattle, now that on account of his inclination towards the material nature he has accepted the animal mode of generation' (178).

N. The whole drift of the words which you have taken from this great theologian is towards an understanding that man is created in the image of God in his mind only and in its innate powers – now the innate powers of the mind are wisdom, knowledge, the faculty of reason, and those others which by adorning the mind show it to be in the likeness of the Creator – and that all men were at once and together created in that one man about whom it is written, 'Let us make man in Our image and likeness', and 'in whom all men sinned'. For at the time he was all of mankind that existed, and in him all men were driven forth from the bliss of Paradise. And if man had not sinned, he would not be suffering the division of his simplicity into the sexes. And this distinction has absolutely no connection with the Divine image and likeness, and would never have existed had man not sinned, nor will it exist after the restoration of our nature to its pristine condition, which will be manifested after the general resurrection of all men. If then man had not sinned, no one would be born through the intercourse of the sexes nor from seed, but just as the angelic essence while remaining one is at once and together without temporal interval multiplied into infinite myriads, so too human nature, had it been willing to obey the Mandate, and had it obeyed it, would have at once and together broken forth into the number foreknown to its Creator alone. But God, Who neither deceives nor is deceived, foresaw that man would abandon the rank and dignity of his creation, and therefore superimposed upon human nature an alternative mode of propagation, by which this world might be extended in space and time to allow for man to pay for his general offence a general penalty, by being born like the rest of the animals from a corruptible seed.

But while we are collecting these and many similar passages from the teachings of this master, many questions emerge on all sides (179),

After the
Resurrection
there will be
neither male
nor female

ac maxima impetum ualidissimum facit. Si enim omnes homines, non solum qui fuerunt et qui sunt, uerum et qui futuri sunt, simul et semel creati in illa diuina uoce quae dicit *Faciamus hominem*; et si ista corpora corruptibilia et mortalia, ex corruptibili et mortali et materiali semine nascentia, extrinsecus humanae naturae ad imaginem dei factae praeuaricationis merito supermachinata sunt, ac per hoc nullo modo essent si homo diuinae imaginis in qua conditus est pulchritudinem non dehonorearet, non superuacuo quaeritur quomodo prima conditio ad imaginem facta est, siquidem secunda, non ad imaginem, sed propter praefatam causam superaddita. Num in sola anima erat, sine ullo corpore? An in anima simul et corpore? Et si in sola anima, quomodo homo appellatus est, cum constet hominem esse ex duabus naturis compositum, ex inuisibili quidem secundum animam, et uisibili secundum corpus? Et nec partem quidem hominis tunc creatam fuisse crediderim, ut CΥΝΕΚΔΟΧΙΚΩC intelligamus quod dictum est *Faciamus hominem*, praesertim cum naturarum omnium plenissima et perfectissima conditio his propheticis uerbis narretur. Si autem prima conditio in anima et corpore (hoc est in toto et integro homine) recte intelligitur, quaerendum profecto quale corpus illud erat in prima conditione hominis. Et quidem uera ratio clamat hoc corpus, merito peccati supermachinatum, non fuisse illud in prima ac naturali conformatione hominis conditum.

A. Non ex superfluo haec quaestio interposita est, et non infructuose quaerenda atque soluenda. Et quia tu proposuisti, soluendae illius debitor factus es. Non enim, ut arbitror, proponeres quod omnino soluere non procurasses.

N. Illud corpus, quod in constitutione hominis primitus est factum, spirituale et immortale crediderim esse, ac tale aut ipsum, quale post resurrectionem habituri sumus. Non enim facile concesserim corruptibile corpus fuisse et materiale, priusquam causa corruptionis et materialitatis (hoc est peccatum) fieret, et maxime cum manifesta ratio perdoceat, si id ipsum corpus, quod in prima conditione hominis factum est ante delictum, mox conuersum est et factum corruptibile post delictum, non erat illud supermachinatum, sed de spirituali et incorruptibili in terrenum et corruptibile transmutatum. Ac per hoc praedicti magistri, Gregorii uidelicet Theologi, auctoritas uacillare uidebitur. Quod absit. Ipse siquidem incunctanter asserit totum, quod in prima conditione hominis ad imaginem dei factum

3 Gen. 1, 26. 16 Gen. 1, 26.

9 imaginem] dei add. HM 27 procurasses] procurares HM 29 esse] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 29 aut ipsum] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 34 mox] p. ras. R¹, id ipsum R⁰ 34 et factum] mg. R¹, om. R⁰

of which the first and most important strikes one most forcibly (180): if all men, not only those who have been and those who are but also those who shall be, were at once and together created in that Divine word which says, 'Let Us make man'; and if those corruptible and mortal bodies which are born from a corruptible and mortal and material seed are external to the human nature which is made in the image of God, and are superimposed upon it because of our sin and would therefore have no existence if man had not dishonoured the beauty of the Divine image in which he is created – it is not irrelevant to enquire how the first creation of man is in the image of God, for the second is not in the image but is something superimposed upon that image for the reason already stated. Did the first creation take place only in the soul apart from the body, or in soul and body together? If in the soul alone, how can it be called man, seeing that it is agreed that man is composed of two natures, the invisible nature in the soul and the visible nature in the body? I should not think that it was only a part of man that was then created, or that we should synecdochically understand the words, 'Let us make man', chiefly because the Prophetic Books give us the fullest and most perfect account of the creation of all natures. If on the other hand the first creation is rightly referred to soul and body, that is, to the whole integral man, then it must at once be asked what kind of body that was which man possessed at his first creation. For true reason cannot accept that this body, superimposed upon us because of sin, was the one established in the first natural formation of man.

A. This question is not a superfluous one, and the posing of it and its solution will not be without value. As you are the poser, you have made yourself responsible for the answer. For I do not think you would have asked it unless you had some answer in readiness.

N. That body which was created at the establishment of man in the beginning I should say was spiritual and immortal, and either like or identical with that which we shall possess after the Resurrection. For I would not easily admit that it could have been a corruptible and material body at a time when the cause of corruption and materiality, that is, sin, had not yet appeared. And a still greater objection is that it is quite apparent to the reason that if that same body which was made at the first creation of man before the Fall is after the Fall itself changed and made corruptible, then that corruptible body would not be a superstructure but is simply the spiritual and incorruptible body transformed into an earthly and corruptible body: and therefore the authority of the great master, Gregory the Theologian, would seem to waver, a thing not to be believed. For he unhesitatingly asserts that the whole which in the first creation of man is created in the image

Enquiry into
the body
made in the
first creation

est, secundum rationem corporis et animae semper incorruptibiliter manere. Vt enim nunc omittamus perspicuas illius argumentationes, quibus indubitanter affirmat nec animas ante corpora fuisse creatas, nec corpora ante animas, sed simul et semel totum factum in diuino consilio, quo dictum est: *Faciamus hominem*, ac simul in hunc mundum secunda quadam generatione, quae superaddita est, in ordine temporum nasci, quomodo etiam nunc, post peccatum peruersae uoluntatis humanae naturae et corporis illud spirituale et naturale animo semper adhaerens ac sibi concretum discernitur ab eo quod merito transgressionis adiectum est, in XXVII capitulo saepe dicti sermonis luculentissime explanat. *Non enim, inquit, per omnia quod nostrum est in fluxu et transmutatione est. Si enim esset, reprehensibile uniuersaliter quod nullum statum habet ex natura. Sed iuxta subtiliorem rationem, eorum quae in nobis sunt quoddam quidem stat, quoddam uero ex mutabilitate accidit. Mutatur enim per aucionem et diminutionem corpus, ueluti uestimenta quaedam, consequentes aetates indutum. Stat uero per omnem conuersionem intransmutabilis in seipsa forma, insitis sibi semel ex natura signis non desistens, sed in omnibus secundum corpus transmutationibus cum suis notionibus apparet; subtrahitur autem per uerbum (deum uidelicet) ipsa quae ex passione est mutatio, quae formae superaccidit. Nam, ueluti facies quaedam aliena, ipsa per infortitatem deformitas formam deprehendit. Qua (infortitate) per uerbum circumablata, sicut Neeman Syrus, seu decem qui in euangelio narrantur, iterum obscurata sub passione facies per sanitatem in suis notionibus reluet. Igitur in deiformitate animae non fluxile (corpus) per mutabilitatem et transmutabile est, sed quod permanet similiterque in nostra concretionem habetur, hoc animae inseritur. Et quoniam ipsas per speciem differentias ipsae mutabiles concretionis qualitates superformant,*

5 Gen. 1, 26. 23 IV Reg. 5, 10–14. 23–24 Luc. 17, 11–19.

2–7 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 28–29 (Capp. pp. 252–256; PG 44, 229B–240B). MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* 38, 154–538 (CCSG 18, pp. 192–205). 140.11–142.7 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 27 (Capp. pp. 251, 3–252, 3; PG 44, 225D–228B). Cf. *Periphyseon* V, 872B–D.

4 *totum factum*] *partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹* 8 *corporis*] *corpus HMR (rectius ut uidetur)* 15 *accidit*] *prouenit Capp (251, 6)* 19 *subtrahitur*] *subtrahetur FP, subtrahatur Capp (251, 11)* 20 *deum uidelicet*] *sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ Capp (251, 11)* 20 *deum*] *domini HM* 22 *infortitatem*] *codd., infirmitatem Capp (251, 13) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco νόσος: PG 44, 225D 14)* 23 *uerbum*] *p. ras. R¹ 23 syrus] syro Capp (251, 14), om. HM 23 decem] in his HMR Capp (251, 14)* 24 *obscurata*] *p. ras. et sup. l. R¹, occultata Capp (251, 15). Graece κεκρυμμένον: PG 44, 228A 3* 24 *facies*] *species Capp (251, 15). Graece εἶδος: PG 44, 228A 3* 25 *deiformitate*] *FHJPR (θεοειδεῖ: PG 44, 228A 11), deformitate M (corr. ex deiformitate) Capp (251, 16)* 25 *corpus*] *om. H, J (a. corr.), MR Capp (251, 16)* 27 *habetur*] *habet HMR Capp (251, 18), rectius ut uidetur 27 hoc] codd. Forsan huic (τούτω: PG 44, 228A 13) intelligendum 27 animae] mg. J, om. HMR Capp (251, 18)* 28 *superformant*] *performant HMR Capp (251, 19)*

of God remains in its body–soul structure eternally incorruptible. Passing over the lucid arguments by which he affirms beyond doubt that neither were souls created before bodies nor bodies before souls, but that the whole man was made at once and together in the Divine counsel in which it is said, ‘Let Us make man’, and that at the same time by a kind of second begetting imposed upon the first, he is born into this world in due time – we see that he explains brilliantly for us, in the Twenty-Seventh Chapter of the Treatise to which we have already had recourse so often, how even now, after the sin of the perverse will of human nature and the body, the spiritual and the natural (body), clinging always to the soul, and consolidated in itself, is seen as distinct from that (corporeal body) which was added to it on account of the transgression. ‘For’, he says, ‘the fluidity and mutability of our nature is not all-pervasive. If it were so it would be altogether condemned for we should have by nature no stability: but a more careful analysis shows that there is something of us which endures, while another part arises from change. For the body undergoes change by increase and diminution, put on like garments, according to the passing years. But throughout all these changes the form abides and is itself unchangeable, never giving up those impressions which are inscribed at one time on it from its very nature: and this form with its marks is present in all bodily changes. Change, which results from disease and which is an accident superimposed upon the form, is removed through the Word (of God) (181). That deformity that arises from disease, like some different face (182), obtrudes upon the form. But when that (formlessness) is removed by the Word (183) – as in the case of Naaman the Syrian and the ten lepers as told in the Gospel – the face obscured (184) by the disease shines forth in health again along with its marks. Therefore in the likeness of the soul to God, it is not that body which displays the flux of mutability and the capacity for changing which is involved, but that which is permanent, and likewise unchanging in our composition (185) – this is what is present. And since it is the changeable qualities of our composition that shape the differences themselves throughout

You will find this view given again in the Fifth Book

concretio uero non alia quaedam est praeter elementorum mixturam (elementa autem dicimus uniuersitatis corporeae constitutioni subiecta, ex quibus etiam humanum corpus constat), necessario specie ueluti descripti signaculi (formae) in anima permanente, neque reformanda in signaculo ad formam ab ea (uidelicet anima) ignorantur. Sed in tempore reformationis illa iterum ad seipsam recipiet quaecunque formae characteri coaptabit. Coaptabit autem omnino illa his quae ab initio in forma characterizata sunt.

Videsne igitur quam subtiliter primae conditionis proprietatem ab his quae superaddita sunt discernit? Quodcunque enim in humanis corporibus immutabile intelligitur, primae conditionis proprium est. Quicquid uero in eis mutabile ac uarium percipitur, illud est superadiectum, extraque naturam substitutum. Vniuersaliter autem in omnibus corporibus humanis una eademque forma communis omnium intelligitur, et semper in omnibus incommutabiliter stat. Nam innumerabiles differentiae, quae eidem formae accidunt, non ex ratione primae conditionis, sed ex qualitatibus corruptibilium seminum contingunt. Ipsa igitur forma spiritualis spirituale corpus est, in prima conditione hominis factum. Quod autem ex materia (hoc est ex qualitatibus et quantitibus quattuor elementorum mundi sensibilis) cum ipsa forma qualitatiua, de qua in prioribus libris disputauimus, quoniam et augeri et minui patiuntur, ad compositionem superadiecti ac ueluti superflui corporis pertinere non dubium est.

Quod corpus materiale et exterius, ueluti quoddam uestimentum, signaculum interioris et naturalis non incongrue intelligitur. Mouetur enim per tempora et aetates, augmentum et detrimentum sui patiendo, illo semper interiori in suo statu incommutabiliter manente. Sed quoniam et illud exterius a deo est factum et superadditum, diuinae bonitatis magnitudo et infinita erga omnia quae sunt prouidentia noluit penitus perire et ad nihilum redigi, quia ab ipsa est, et extremum in creaturis obtinet ordinem. Porro quia omne quod in hunc mundum per generationem localiter et temporaliter nascitur non potest fine carere, siue minimis (ut dies, horae, momenta), siue maximis (ut saecula), siue mediis (ut aetates, anni) temporum interuallis inter principium natiuitatis in hanc uitam eiusdemque uitae finem interpositis, naturali creaturarum

20-21 Cf. *Periphyseon* I, 495B-496B, 513D; III, 701C-702B.

2 corporeae] J, corpore FP, om. HMR Capp (251, 21), rectius ut uidetur 4 formae] om. HMR Capp (251, 22) 4 reformanda] corr. R¹ 4 in signaculo ad formam] p. ras. R¹ 7 his] om. HMR Capp (252, 2), rectius ut uidetur: PG 44, 228B11 9-11 quodcunque . . . proprium est] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 11 mutabile] commutabile HMR 25 signaculum] om. HMR 30 noluit] illud add. R (postea erasum) 31 porro] p. ras. R¹, et R⁰ 33-34 ut dies . . . momenta] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 34 ut saecula] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 34-35 ut aetates anni] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 36 interpositis] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰

the species, but the composition itself is nothing but a mixture of the elements (and the elements underlie the constitution of the universe, including the human body), the things in the seal (the corporeal body) that are to be re-formed to the form are recognized by the soul – because the impression as it were of an inscribed seal necessarily remains in her always. So at the time when there is a re-forming of all, the soul will receive again to herself whatever she can fit to the stamp of the form. She will certainly fit in whatever were stamped in the form from the beginning’.

You see how nicely he distinguishes the property of the first creation from those things which were added to it? For whatsoever in human bodies is seen to be immutable is proper to the first creation: but whatever in them is perceived to be mutable and variable, this has been added later, and subsists outside the body’s true nature. Now in all human bodies generally there is one and the same common form for all, and that abides ever unchangeable in all. For the innumerable differences which are accidental to this one form do not arise from the ‘reason’ of the first creation but from the qualities of the corruptible seeds. Therefore the spiritual form is itself the spiritual body which was made in the first creation of man. But that which is derived from matter (that is, from the qualities and quantities of the four elements of the sensible world) (186) together with that qualitative form about which we had something to say in the earlier books (187), since they undergo increase and diminution, undoubtedly pertain to the composition of the superadded and, one might say, superfluous body.

And that material and external body is like a garment and is not improperly regarded as the the seal (188) of the internal and natural body: for it is moved through times and ages, suffering increase and loss of itself, while the interior body remains ever immutably in its proper state. But seeing that the exterior body also is created by God, and is added by Him to the other, the greatness of the Divine goodness, and His infinite providence, towards all things which are, was not willing that it should entirely perish and be reduced to nothing (189), because it comes from that Goodness, holding the lowest rank among creatures. Now everything which is born into this world by generation in space and time must have an end, whether the interval between its birth into this life and the end of the same life be a very short while, a day, an hour or a moment, or a very long period of centuries, or a moderate period of seasons or years, this

ordinatione exigente – omne siquidem quod in mundo, ex mundo
compositum, incipit esse, necesse est resolui, et cum mundo interire
– necessarium erat exterius ac materiale corpus solui in ea elementa,
ex quibus assumptum est; non autem necessarium perire, quoniam
ex deo erat, manente semper interiori illo et incommutabiliter stante
in suis rationibus, secundum quas cum anima et in anima et per
animam et propter animam constitutum est. 5

Quoniam uero illius corporis materialis atque solubilis manet
in anima species, non solum illo uiuente, uerum etiam post eius
solutionem et in elementa mundi reductum – disputatio quippe
diuinitis cum Abraham notionem corporum adhaerere animabus post
mortem indicat – propterea partium illius, ubicunque elementorum
sint, non potest anima obliuisci aut eas nescire. Quamuis enim
propter peccatum superadditae sint humanae naturae, ad eam
tamen non pertinere non possunt, quoniam ab eodem naturae
conditore et additae sunt et factae, ac per hoc in restauratione
hominis in unitatem naturae reuocandae sunt, dum anima totum
sibi subditum resurrectionis tempore recipiet. Et hoc est quod ait
magister: *Necessario specie ueluti descripti signaculi (formae) in anima
permanente, neque reformanda in signaculo ad formam ab ea ignorantur.* Ac
si diceret: dum species (hoc est notio) descripti signaculi (exterioris
uidelicet corporis, quod uocat signaculum interioris) in anima
permanet, etiam post signaculi solutionem, propter illam notionem,
quam semper habet, non ignorat partes signaculi per elementa
sparsas, et resurrectionis die, in signaculo (hoc est in corpore) ad
formam animae (quod est interius corpus) reformandas. Est enim
exterius et materiale corpus signaculum interioris, in quo forma
animae exprimitur, ac per hoc, forma eius rationabiliter appellatur.
Et ne me existimes duo corpora naturalia in uno homine docere.
Vnum enim est corpus quo, connaturaliter et consubstantialiter
animae compacto, homo conficitur. Illud siquidem materiale,
quod est superadditum, rectius uestimentum quoddam mutabile et
corruptibile ueri ac naturalis corporis accipitur, quam uerum corpus.
Non enim uerum est quod semper non manet. Et, ut ait sanctus
Augustinus, quod incipit esse quod non erat, et desinit esse quod 35

10–12 Luc. 16, 19–31.

19–20 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 27 (Capp, p. 251, 22–23; PG 44, 228B).
144.34–146.1 AVGVSTINVS, *De uera religione* 49, 97 (PL 34, 165). G. MADEC, *Jean
Scot et ses auteurs: Annotations érigéniennes*, Parisiis 1988, p. 118.

1–2 omne siquidem . . . interire] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 8 manet] p. ras. R¹ 10–12 disputatio
. . . indicat] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 11 abraham] abraam R¹ 17 sunt] om. HMR 19 formae]
om. HMR Capp (251, 22) 22 interioris] om. HMR 23 permanet] permaneat R (a.
corr.), pertinet P 29 naturalia . . . homine] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰

being demanded by the nature of created things. For everything
which comes into being in the world and is composed of the stuff
of the world must of necessity be dissolved and pass away with the
world. It was then necessary for the exterior and material body to be
resolved into those elements from which it was put together: but it
was not necessary that it should perish, because it came from God.
The interior body, of course, endures forever and abides without
change in those principles according to which it was constituted with
and in and through and for the sake of the soul.

But since the impression of that other body, the material and dissol-
uble, abides in the soul, not only during life but even after dissolution
and return into the elements of the world (for the exchange between
Abraham and the rich man shows that the notion of the body remains
with the soul after death): therefore the soul cannot forget or cease to
know her parts wherever among the elements they may be scattered.
For although they are something which has been added to human
nature as the result of sin, they cannot be devoid of all connection
with it, seeing that they were added and created by the same Creator
as created the nature; and therefore in the restoration of man to the
unity of his nature they are to be recalled, so that at the time of the
Resurrection the soul will receive the whole of that which had been
subject to her. This is the meaning of the master's saying: 'the things
in the seal (the corporeal body) that are to be re-formed to the form
are recognized by the soul – because the impression as it were of an
inscribed seal necessarily remains in her always'. By this he means
that, because the idea (that is, the notion) of the impression of the
seal (that is, the exterior body, which he calls the seal of the interior)
remains always in the soul, even after the dissolution of the seal, the
soul, because of that notion of it, which it always retains, recalls the
parts of the seal, scattered as they may be throughout the elements,
and recalls that, at the day of the Resurrection, they are to be formed
again in the seal (that is, in the body) to the form of the soul (which
is the interior body). For the exterior and material body is the seal
of the interior in which the form of the soul is expressed, and so it is,
reasonably called its form. But do not think that I am teaching that
there are two natural bodies in the one man. For there is only one
body by whose fitting together with the soul so as to form with her one
nature and one substance man is made. For that material body which
is added to it is not so much to be regarded as a true body as a kind of
mutable and corruptible garment of the true and natural body. For
that is not true which does not eternally abide (190) and, in the words
of St. Augustine, that which begins to be what it formerly was not, and

est, iam non est. Inde fit quod semper non simpliciter, sed cum additamento aliquo ponitur corpus hoc mortale, uel corruptibile, uel terrenum, uel animale, ad discretionem ipsius simplicis corporis, quod primitus in homine conditum est, et quod futurum est.

803B

A. Quid ergo respondebimus sanctissimo diuinissimoque theologo, Augustino uidelicet, qui praedictis rationibus refragari uidetur? Nam fere in omnibus suis libris incunctanter asserit corpus primi hominis ante peccatum animale fuisse, terrenum, mortale, quamuis non moreretur, si non peccaret; peccando uero mortuum, sicut ait Apostolus: *Corpus quidem mortuum propter peccatum*. Hinc est quod in primo libro de baptismo paruulorum, conuincens eos qui dicunt Adam sic creatum, ut etiam sine peccati merito moreretur, non poena culpae, sed necessitate naturae. *Quid ergo, inquit, respondebunt, cum legitur hoc deum primo homini, etiam post peccatum, increpando et damnando dixisse: "Terra es, et in terram ibis"? Neque enim secundum animam, sed, quod manifestum est, secundum corpus terra erat, et morte eiusdem corporis erat iturus in terram. Quamuis enim secundum corpus terra esset, et corpus in quo creatus est animale gestaret, tamen, si non peccasset, in corpus foret spirituale mutandus, et in illam incorruptionem, quae fidelibus et sanctis promittitur, sine mortis periculo transiturus. Cuius rei desiderium nos habere non solum ipsi sentimus in nobis, uerum etiam monente Apostolo agnoscimus, ubi ait: "Etenim in hoc ingemiscimus, habitaculum nostrum, quod de caelo est, superindui cupientes, si tamen induti, non nudi inueniamur. Etenim qui sumus in hac habitatione, ingemiscimus grauati, in quo nolumus expoliari, sed superuestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a uita".*

803C

803D

Proinde si non peccasset Adam, non erat expoliandus corpore, sed superuestiendus immortalitate et incorruptione, ut absorberetur mortale a uita, id est ab animali in spirituale transiret. Neque enim metuendum fuit ne forte diutius hic uiueret in corpore animali, et senectute graueretur, et paulatim ueterescendo perueniret ad mortem. Si enim deus Israelitarum uestimentis et calciamentis praestitit quod per tot annos non sunt obtrita, quid mirum si oboedienti homini eiusdem praeceptis potentia praestaretur, ut animale hoc et mortale habens corpus, haberet in eo quendam statum, quo sine defectu esset annosum, tempore quo deus uellet a mortalitate ad immortalitatem sine media morte uenturus? Sicut enim haec ipsa caro, quam nunc habemus, non ideo non est uulnerabilis, quia non est necesse

804A

10 Rom. 8, 10. 15 Gen. 3, 19. 22-25 II Cor. 5, 2-4. 30-31 Deuter. 29, 5.

146.13-148.13 AVGVSTINVS, *De peccatorum meritis et de baptismo paruulorum* I, ii, 2-iii, 3 (CSEL 60, pp. 4, 3-5, 20; PL 44, 109-111).

[inde fit] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹ 8-10 terrenum . . . peccatum] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 18 et] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 27 a] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 29 et¹] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 30 ueterescendo] codd., ueterascendo Gale et Floss 32 praeceptis] om. HMR 33 et] om. HMR

ceases to be what it is, already is not (191). Hence it comes about that this mortal, corruptible, earthly and animal body is never just on its own simple but has a certain accretion added to it, and thereby is distinguished from the simple body itself, which was created in man in the beginning, and which will exist.

A. What then shall we reply to the most holy and godly theologian Augustine, whose teaching seems to go against these arguments? For in almost all his books (192) he shows no hesitation in declaring that the body of the First Man before the Fall was of the animal form, was earthly and was mortal, although it had the possibility of not coming to a mortal end if man had not sinned, for it died through sin as the Apostle says: 'The body indeed is dead through sin'. Thus in the First Book on the *Baptism of Young Children*, when arguing against those who say that Adam was so created that even had he not deserved to die because of his sin, he would nevertheless have died, not as a punishment for a fault but through the necessity of nature, he writes: 'What response have they to the Scriptural Authority that it was in reproach and condemnation and after sinning, that God said to the First Man "Dust you are and to dust shall you return"? For he was not dust in respect of his soul, but, as is clear, in respect of his body, and it was through the death of that same body that he was about to return to dust. For although he was dust in respect of the body, and the body in which he was created was an animal body, yet, if he had not sinned, he would have been changed into a spiritual body and, without danger of death, into that incorruption which is promised to the faithful and to the saints. And the yearning for this within us is not only apparent to ourselves but also is accepted by us from the words of the Apostle when he says: "For in this we complain, desiring to put on our habitation which is from heaven, which if we put on we shall not be naked. For as we are in this habitation we are weighed down and mourn, in which we do not wish to be despoiled, but to be garmented afresh, in order that that mortality may be swallowed up in life".

'If, then, Adam had not sinned, he would not have to be despoiled of his body, but would be clothed anew with immortality and incorruption, in order that his mortality might be swallowed up by life, that is, that he might exchange his animal nature for a spiritual. For there was no fear for him that he should remain too long in his animal body and be burdened with age, and after a period of old age gradually arrive at the point of death. For if God provided the Israelites with garments and sandals, which after so many years were never worn out, what would be strange if His power could grant man obedient to his precepts (193) that possessing this animal and (194) mortal body, he should possess it in such a manner that he might become aged without enfeeblement, and be destined at a time willed by God to pass without the mediation of death from mortality to immortality? For just as in the case of the flesh that we now possess, the fact that it does not have to be wounded does not

ut uulneretur, sic illa non ideo non fuit mortalis, quia non erat necesse ut moreretur. Talem puto habitudinem adhuc in corpore animali atque mortali etiam illis qui sine morte hinc translati sunt fuisse concessam. Neque enim Enoc et Helias per tam longam aetatem senectute marcuerunt. Nec tamen credo eos iam in illam spiritualem qualitatem corporis commutatos, qualis in resurrectione promittitur, quae in domino prima praecessit, nisi quia isti fortasse nec his cibis egent, qui sui consummatione reficiunt. Sed ex quo translati sunt, ita uiuunt, ut similem habeant societatem illis quadraginta diebus quibus Helias ex calice aquae et ex collyride panis sine cibo uixit; aut, si et his sustentaculis opus est, ita in paradiso fortasse pascuntur, sicut Adam, priusquam propter peccatum exinde exire meruisset. Habebat enim, quantum existimo, et de lignorum fructibus refectionem contra defectionem, et de ligno uitae stabilitatem contra uetustatem.

Et quid ad rem tanta tanti et tam magni uiri testimonia exaggerare, cum omnibus libros illius legentibus, et maxime de Genesi ad litteram et de ciuitate dei, manifestissimum sit nil aliud docere de corpore primi hominis ante peccatum, quam animale atque mortale fuisse. Si enim animale non fuisset, quomodo de fructibus paradisi comedere iuberetur ne deficeret, et de ligno uitae ne senesceret? Nam ut ipse saepe asserit, primi homines ante praeuacuationem de fructibus paradisi corporaliter comedisse perhibentur.

N. Quisquis uult et potest, respondeat. Mihi autem et tibi, si placet, sufficiat sententias sanctorum patrum de constitutione hominis ante peccatum legere, et quid unusquisque eorum uoluit cauta ac diligenti inquisitione quaerere. Lites autem inter eos constituere, non est nostrum, aut hunc constituere, hunc autem refellere, scientes post sanctos apostolos nullum apud graecos fuisse in expositionibus diuinae scripturae maioris auctoritatis Gregorio Theologo, nullum apud romanos Aurelio Augustino. Et quid si, in hac ueluti controuersia magnorum uirorum, quendam consensum uelimus machinari, dicentes illud corpus, quod Gregorius dicit diuina praescientia propter futurum peccatum homini supermachinatum exteriusque adiectum, idipsum ab Augustino animale uocatum, duasque hominis constitutiones, unam quidem ad imaginem dei substantialiter factam, alteram uero longe imagine distantem, et in masculum et feminam propter peccatum diuisam, Gregorium non tacuisse; unam uero (illam quidem in masculum et feminam

4 Gen. 5, 23-24; IV Reg. 2, 11; Eccli. 44, 16; Hebr. 11, 5. 9 III Reg. 19, 5-8.

9 quibus] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 14 ad rem] p. ras. R¹ 18 de] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰
18-19 comedere iuberetur] R¹, comederet R⁰ 19 ut] R¹, et R⁰ 20 saepe asserit
primi] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹, gregorius aserens primos R⁰ 21 perhibentur] p.
ras. R¹ 26-27 aut hunc . . . refellere] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 29 augustino] n(ota) quantis
laudibus extollat Aug(ustinum) glossam mg. add. J 37 unam] solam HMR

mean that it is not vulnerable, so in the case of the flesh (of the First Man) the fact that it did not have to die did not mean that it was not mortal. I believe that this grace was conferred upon those who were translated hence without undergoing death, even while they were still in the animal and mortal body. For neither were Enoch nor Elijah for all their years tarnished by old age, and yet, as I think, they were not while upon earth already changed into that spiritual kind of body which is promised in the Resurrection and which was first manifested in Our Lord, save perhaps in not needing that food which refreshes by its own consumption. But from the time when men such as these were translated they so live as to enjoy a life similar to that of those forty days when Elijah lived without food save for a cup of water and a cake of bread. Or if there is a need even of such resources as these, perhaps they feed in Paradise as Adam did before he was compelled to depart thence as a penalty for his sin. For he had, I think, refreshment from hunger from the fruits of trees and a bulwark against old age in the Tree of Life¹.

But what purpose would be served by piling up the mighty proofs of this mighty and admirable man when it is perfectly clear to all who read his books, but especially *Genesis Understood Literally* and the *City of God*, that concerning the body of the First Man before the Fall his teaching is none other than that it was animal and mortal. For if it had not been animal, how would it have been bidden to ward off hunger by eating of the fruits of Paradise, and old age by eating of the Tree of Life? For, as St. Augustine himself often declares, the first human creatures are held to have eaten of the fruits of Paradise before the Fall, and to have done so in a corporeal sense (195).

N. Let him reply who will and can: but for you and me perhaps let it be enough to read the opinions of the holy Fathers concerning the condition of man before the Fall, and to enquire cautiously and diligently into the findings of each one of them. But it is not our business to bring one into conflict with another, or to justify one against another, knowing as we do that after the holy Apostles none of the Greeks has higher authority in expounding the Holy Scripture than Gregory the Theologian (196), and none of the Romans than Aurelius Augustinus. And what if in what appears to be a controversy between great men we wish to find an agreement (197), by saying that that body, which Gregory says was added from outside as a superstructure to human nature by the Divine prescience on account of the future sin, is the same as that which Augustine calls animal; and if Gregory does not refrain from saying that there were two creations of man, the one a substantial creation in the image of God, the other widely different from that image, and divided because of

bipertitam) Augustinum dixisse, alteram uero (quae ad imaginem dei est omnique sexu caret) siluisse? Quid ad rem pertinebit, cum uerisimile non uideatur de Augustino aestimare eam conditionem hominis ad imaginem dei siluisse, eam uero quae secundum Gregorium ad similitudinem iumentorum insipientium merito 5 inoboedientiae facta est explanasse, praesertim cum quisquis libros eius perspexerit, apertissime inueniet in primo homine masculum et feminam ad imaginem dei factos fuisse, ipsaque animalia corpora, quae ante peccatum gestauerant, non ex poena peccati 805B sed ex necessitate naturae processisse ad procreationem uidelicet praedestinati sanctorum hominum numeri, et societati angelicae beatitudinis ex humana natura adunandi, donec caelestis ciuitas sanctis angelis sanctisque hominibus impleretur? 10

Sed mirari non desino cur illud corpus appellat animale, quod magnis laudibus exaltat tanquam spirituale atque beatum? Beatum 15 autem fuisse ante delictum ille ipse in quarto decimo de ciuitate dei testatur, decimo capitulo, dicens: *Sed utrum primus homo, uel primi homines (duorum erat quippe coniugium) habebant istos affectus (concupiscentiam profecto, et laetitiam, timorem et dolorem) in corpore animali ante peccatum, quales in corpore spirituali non habebimus, 20 omni purgato finitoque peccato, non immerito quaeritur. Si enim habebant, quomodo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso? 805C Quis tandem absolute dici beatus potest, qui timore afficitur, uel dolore? Quid autem timere aut dolere poterant illi homines, in tantorum tanta affluentia bonorum, ubi nec mors metuebatur, nec ulla corporis mala ualitudo, nec aberat quicquam quod bona uoluntas non adipisceretur, nec inerat quod carnem 25 animumue hominis feliciter uiuentes offenderet. Amor erat inperturbatus in deum, atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate uiuentium, et ex hoc amore grande gaudium, non desistente quod amabatur ad fruendum. Erat deuitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum omnino alicunde 30 malum quod contristaret intruebat. An forte cupiebant prohibitum lignum ad uescendum contingere? Sed mori metuebant, ac per hoc et cupiditas et metus iam tunc illos homines etiam in illo perturbabat loco? Absit ut hoc existimemus fuisse, ubi nullum erat omnino peccatum. Neque enim nullum 805D peccatum est, ea quae lex dei prohibet concupiscere, ab his abstinere timore poenae, non amore iustitiae. Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum iam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de ligno amitterent quod de muliere dominus*

150.17–152.12 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, x, 1–39 (CCSL 48, pp. 430–431; PL 41, 417–418).

4 siluisse] *R*¹, tacuisse *R*⁰ 5 insipientium] *corr. R*¹ 10 necessitate] *corr. R*¹ 10–13 ad procreationem . . . impleretur] *mg. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 11 societati] *R*¹ (*p. corr.*), ad societatem *R*¹ (*a. corr.*) 15 beatum] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 19 concupiscentiam . . . dolorem] *mg. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 26 non] *sup. l. R*¹, *om. R*⁰ 27 uiuentes] *F H, J* (*a. corr.*), *MPR*, uiuentis *J* (*p. corr. ex uiuentes*) 37 amitterent] *F, J* (*a. corr.*), *PR*, admitterent *H, J* (*p. corr.*), *M*

sin into male and female – and Augustine said that there was one division into male and female and was silent about the other which is in the image of God and lacks all sex? What relevance has this, when we consider that it is not a true estimate of St. Augustine to say that he was silent concerning the creation of man in the image of God, but expounded that which according to Gregory was established on account of disobedience in the image of the irrational beasts of the field – especially as anyone who glances through his books will have no difficulty in discovering that in the First Man male and female were created in the image of God, and the animal bodies themselves with which they were endowed before the Fall were not the result of punishment for sin, but of the necessity of nature: that is to say, for the fulfilment by procreation of the predestined number of holy men, and their being made one, as human nature's contribution with the angelic society of bliss, until the Celestial City might be filled with holy angels and with holy men?

But I do not cease to be amazed why St. Augustine calls that body animal which he exalts with loud praises as spiritual and blessed. For that it was blessed before the Fall he himself testifies in the Tenth Chapter of the Fourteenth Book of the *City of God*: 'But it is a fair question whether the First Man or the first human creatures (for there were two in marriage) had in the animal body before the Fall those emotions from which we in the spiritual body shall be free when our sin is purged and done away with (namely, concupiscence and joy, fear and grief) (198). If they had them, how could they have been blessed in Paradise, that memorable abode of bliss? Who can absolutely be called blessed that either fears or sorrows? But how could those human creatures either fear or grieve in that copious affluence of such great goods, where they did not fear death or had any evil sickness of the body, having all things that a good will desired (199), and lacking all things that might be offensive to the physical or mental contentment of man? Their love for God was immutable, their love of one another was that of spouses living in a trusting and pure association, and from that love they derived great joy, having power to enjoy in full what they loved. They were in a peaceable avoidance of sin, and so long as that continued it kept out all external annoyance which might distress them. Did they desire, do you think, to taste of the Forbidden Tree, and fear to die, and thereby experience distress even then and even in that place through the passions of desire and fear? God forbid we should think this to have been where there was no sin at all, for sin cannot be absent where there is a lust for that which is forbidden by God, and abstinence through fear of the punishment instead of the love of righteousness. God forbid, I say, that before there was any sin they should have suffered a sin in relation to the tree similar to that which

ait: "Si quis uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendam eam, iam moechatus est in corde suo". Quam igitur felices erant primi homines, et nullis agitabantur perturbationibus animorum, nullis corporum laedebantur incommodis, tam felix uniuersa societas esset humana, si nec illi malum quod etiam in posteros traicerent, nec quisquam eorum stirpe iniquitatem committeret quae damnationem reciperet, atque ista permanente felicitate, donec per illam benedictionem qua dictum est "Crescite et multiplicamini", praedestinatorum sanctorum numerus completeretur, aliaque maior daretur, quae beatissimis angelis data est, ubi iam esset certa securitas peccatorum, neminemque moriturum. Et talis esset uita sanctorum, post nullum laboris, doloris, mortis experimentum, qualis erit post haec omnia incorruptione corporum reddita resurrectione mortuorum.

Idem in eodem, XXV capitulo: Viuebat itaque homo in paradiso, sicut uolebat, quamdiu hoc uolebat quod deus iusserat. Viuebat fruens deo, ex quo bono erat bonus. Viuebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper uiuere habens in potestate. Cibus aderat ne esuriret, potus ne sitiret, lignum uitae ne illum senecta dissolueret. Nihil corruptionis in corpore uel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas. Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus aut frigus, ita in eius habitatore nulla ex cupiditate uel timore accedebat bonae uoluntatis offensio. Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. Gaudium uerum perpetuabatur ex deo, in quem flagrabat "caritas de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta". Atque inter se coniugum fida et ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque uigilia, et mandati sine labore custodia. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat inuitum. In tanta facilitate rerum et felicitate hominum, absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo uoluntatis nutu mouerentur membra illa, quo caetera; et sine ardoris illecebrosi stimulo, cum tranquillitate animi et corporis, nulla corruptione integritatis, infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris. Videsne quantum laudat, quantum glorificat felicitatem utriusque sexus in paradiso ante praeuaricationem, quam sanctae incontaminataeque nuptiae fierent, qualis amor inreprehensibilis coniugum et inseparabilis societas, quam pulchra sanctorum hominum procreatio, et in praedestinatum numerum multiplicatio (quam post paradisi felicitatem in angelicam beatitudinem sequeretur translatio), ut non immerito quis miretur

1-2 Matth. 5, 28. 7 Gen. 1, 28. 23 I Tim. 1, 5.

13-30 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, xxvi, 1-22 (CCSL 48, p. 449; PL 41, 434).

1 concupiscendam] concupiscendum HMR 5 quisquam] ex add. H, M (sup. l.)
5 quae] quod HMR 8 aliaque] alia HMR 13 xxv] codd., uicesimo sexto Gale
18 ullis] scripsi, ullus FJMP, R (p. corr. ex ullius) 28 caetera] corr. R¹

the Lord mentioned in relation to a woman: "Whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery in his heart". How happy then were the first human creatures, being troubled with no perturbations of the mind nor hurt by any discomforts of the body! Even so happy should all mankind have been if those had not committed sin which they transferred to their posterity; and if none of their seed had committed an act worthy of condemnation. And this bliss remaining until in accordance with the utterance of the benediction: "Increase and multiply", the number of the predestined saints were fulfilled, then should another and better bliss have been given us, namely, that which has been given to the most blessed angels, wherein there would be sure security from sin (200) and that no one would die; and so should the saints have lived then without tasting of labour, sorrow or death, as they shall do now in the Resurrection of the dead when the bodily incorruption is restored to them, after they have endured them all'.

Again in the Twenty Fifth (*sic*) Chapter of the same book he writes: 'Therefore man lived in Paradise as he desired, so long as he only desired what God commanded. He lived enjoying God, the good Source of his own well-being. He lived without need, and he had life eternal in his power. He had food for hunger, drink for thirst, the Tree of Life to ward off old age. All his senses were free from all bodily corruption and from all discomforts arising from the body. He feared neither disease within nor violence without. The acme of health was in his flesh, and fulness of peace in his mind; and as Paradise was neither fiery nor frosty, so was the good will of its inhabitant offended neither with desire nor fear. There was no sorrow at all, no empty delight. But his joy was perpetuated by God when he loved Him "with a pure heart and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith". Their wedlock was faithful and from honourable love; in harmony they watched over mind and body, and kept the Precept without trouble. They were neither weary of leisure nor unwillingly sleepy. And can we not suppose that in all this material ease and human happiness they might beget their children without the disease of lust, and move their organs by the same agreement of the will as they performed their other functions and without the deceitful goad of passion, the man being released in his wife's lap (201) in peace of mind and body without corruption of integrity? You see how he celebrates and praises the happiness of each sex in Paradise before the Fall; how holy and immaculate was their married state; what a blameless love and inseparable association existed between the pair; how lovely was the way in which those holy beings propagated their kind, and increased them to the number foreordained; finally you see that after the happiness of Paradise all were to be translated to the bliss of the angels. It is not surprising if one should express astonishment

quomodo animalia corpora in tam excelsa beatitudine uixisse credibile sit.

A. Num inter nos, dum de conditione humanae naturae disputabamus, confectum est hominem in genere animalium substitutum fuisse, immo etiam omnia animalia substantialiter in illo creata, non solum quod omnium notitia inerat ei, uerum etiam quia uniuersitas uisibilis et inuisibilis creaturae in eo condita est? 807A 6

N. Confectum plane.

A. Quid ergo mirum, uel cur incredibile sit, si humana corpora, priusquam peccarent, in paradiso animalia fuisse dicantur, quae in genere animalium constituta sunt? E duobus quippe unum eligere cogit nos ratio. Aut enim negabimus omnino in genere animalium conditum hominem, si uolumus negare in eo animale corpus fuisse. Aut, si non possumus contendere et abnegare ipsum quidem quoddam animal in genere animalium factum, quomodo negabimus animale corpus habuisse ante peccatum et, si non peccaret, potuisse fieri beatum? 15

N. Acute quidem philosopharis. Putasne itaque deum simul omnia fecisse? 807B

A. Immo credo et intelligo. Omnia siquidem, quae temporum interuallis in mundo nascuntur, simul et semel et ante mundum et cum mundo facta sunt, quamuis non simul per diuinae prouidentiae administrationem mundum sensibiliter adimpleant, sed ordine temporum, domino dicente: *Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor.* 25

N. Recte intueris. Num tibi uidetur quod propterea deus hominem in genere animalium fecerit, quia illum animaliter uicturum praesciuit, inque irrationabiles motus eorum, relicta diuinae imaginis pulchritudine ac dignitate, casurum?

A. Verisimile uidetur. Fecit enim futura, qui fecit omnia simul. 30

N. Quoniam igitur de sua praescientia, quae falli non potest, certissimus erat etiam priusquam homo peccaret, peccati 807C

24-25 Ioh. 5, 17.

6 non solum quod] p. ras. sup. l. R¹, quoniam R⁰ 6-7 uerum etiam . . . condita est] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 13 hominem] p. ras. R¹ 13 in eo] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 14 ipsum quidem] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹ 18 philosopharis] filosofaris p. ras. R¹ 18 itaque] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 22-23 per diuinae . . . administrationem] R¹, diuina prouidentiae administratione R⁰, diuinae prouidentiae amministratione HM 23-24 sed ordine temporum] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 26 recte intueris] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹ 28 irrationabiles] irrationales HMR 30 A. . . omnia simul] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 31 N.] R¹, nam R⁰ 31 igitur] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 32 etiam] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰

that it can be believed that animal bodies could dwell in such a height of bliss (202).

A. Was it not settled between us when we were discussing the creation of human nature that man had been placed in the genus of the animals, in fact, that all the animals were according to their substance created in him, not only because the knowledge of all things existed in him, but also because the visible and invisible universe was established in him?

N. That was certainly our conclusion.

A. Why then should it be considered strange or incredible if human bodies are said to have been animal bodies, before they sinned, in Paradise seeing that they were established in the genus of animals? For we are compelled by reason to choose between two alternatives: Either, if we wish to say that his body was not animal, we must deny that man was created wholly in the genus of the animals; or, if we cannot dispute or deny the fact that he was indeed a kind of animal created in the genus of the animals, we cannot deny that the body which he had before the Fall and that which would have been in bliss, if it had not sinned, was an animal body.

N. You reason acutely. Now, do you hold that God made all things at once?

A. That is certainly my belief and conviction. For all things whose birth into the world is marked by intervals of time were created at one and the same time both before the world and with the world, although the administration of the Divine providence does not fill the universe with them all at once so that they are perceived, but in temporal succession. For the Lord says: 'My Father works until now, and I work' (203).

N. You understand rightly. Do you think that God made man in the genus of the animals because He foresaw that he would come to live as an animal and that he would fall from the beauty and dignity of the Divine image into a life of irrational animal passion?

A. It seems likely. For He Who made all things at the same time made the future (204).

N. Since then this foreknowledge is most sure and cannot be deceived, at the same time as He created man He created the consequences of his sin even before he had sinned, and we may

The two creations of man were simultaneous

consequentia in homine et cum homine simul concreauit, ut
nec immerito aestimetur eorum quae simul in homine facta sunt
quaedam quidem propter diuinam bonitatem (ut sunt illa in
quibus imago conditoris intelligitur, animus uidelicet, et ratio,
sensusque interior, uel, ut ita dicam, essentia, uirtus et operatio), 5
quaedam uero propter delictum praescitum atque certissime
futurum. Multa enim praescit deus, quorum non est causa ipse,
quia substantialiter non sunt – est autem sapiens factor et ordinator
– ne uniuersitatis pulchritudinem perturbent; et solus potens est
de malo irrationabilis uoluntatis facere bonum. Haec autem sunt 10
consequentia peccati, propter peccatum, priusquam fieret peccatum, 807D
ab eo cuius praescientia non fallitur, in homine et cum homine,
ueluti extra hominem ac superaddita: animale quidem corpus
atque terrenum et corruptibile, sexus uterque ex masculo et femina
bestiarum similitudine procreationis multiplicatio, indigentia cibi 15
et potus indumentique, incrementa et detrimenta corporis, somni
ac uigiliarum alterna ineuitabilisque necessitas, et similia, quibus
omnibus humana natura, si non peccaret, omnino libera maneret, 808A
quemadmodum libera futura est. Hoc autem dico Gregorium Nysium
sequens expositoremque ipsius Maximum, non autem alios sanctos 20
patres spiritualis doctrinae qui aliter uidentur sensisse refellens, haec
omnia ad primam et substantialem hominis creationem pertinere
autumantes.

Et si te mouet quare deus in homine fecerit, priusquam peccaret,
quae propter peccatum facta sunt, animaduerte quod deo nihil est 25
ante, nihil post, cui nihil praeteritum, nihil futurum, nihil medium
inter praeteritum et futurum, quoniam ipsi omnia simul sunt. Cur
ergo non simul faceret, quae facienda simul uidebat et uolebat? Nam
cum dicimus ‘ante’ et ‘post’ peccatum, cogitationum nostrarum
mutabilitatem monstramus, dum adhuc temporibus subdimur. Deo 808B
autem simul erant et peccati praescientia eiusque consequentia. 31
Homini siquidem, non deo, futurum erat peccatum. Et consequentia
peccati praecessit peccatum in homine, quoniam et ipsum peccatum
praecessit seipsum in eodem homine. Mala quippe uoluntas, quod
est peccatum occultum, praecessit uetiti fructus gustum, quod est 35
peccatum apertum. Eadem ratione potest intelligi quod scriptum est:
Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui. Nondum enim utriusque malis uel

37 Rom. 9, 13.

2 simul] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 7 causa ipse] partim p. ras. partim sup. l. R¹ 8 factor et]
mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 16 indumentique] om. HMR 19–21 hoc autem . . . refellens] mg. R^x,
om. R⁰ 19 nysium] nyseum H, J (corr. ex nysium), M (corr. ex niseum) 21 qui aliter]
qualiter HM 21–23 haec omnia . . . autumantes] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 28 simul²] om. HMR
33 praecessit] praecesserunt HMR (rectius ut uidetur) 34 eodem] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰
156.36–158.3 eadem ratione . . . et odium] mg. R¹, om. R⁰

without impropriety judge that of the things which were created
together in man, some, like those in which we see the image of God
that is to say, mind and reason and interior sense, or, in other words,
essence, potency and act (205), were creations of the goodness of
God, others are there on account of the transgression which was
foreknown and was most certain to befall. For there are many things
of which God has foreknowledge but of which He is not the Cause,
because they do not substantially exist – He creates and ordains all
things wisely – lest they might disturb the fairness of the universe, and
He alone has the power to make good out of the evil of the irrational
will. Now all these things, the animal, earthly and corruptible body;
the sex that is divided into male and female; propagation by a mode
similar to that of the beasts; the need of food and drink and clothing;
the increase and decrease of the body; the alternation of sleeping
and waking, and the inevitable necessity of both; and all similar
limitations from which human nature would have been entirely free
if it had not sinned – as it is destined one day to be free again – are
the consequences of sin and were added to man, in man and with
man, as something external to his nature on account of sin before
sin was committed, by Him whose foreknowledge is not deceived.
In saying this I am following Gregory of Nyssa and his commentator
Maximus (206), without contradicting other holy Fathers of spiritual
doctrine who seem to have thought differently, as they are of the
opinion that these things refer to the first and substantial creation
of man.

And if you ask why God should create in man before he sinned the
characteristics which were made because of sin, remember that in God
nothing is before and nothing after, because for him there is nothing
past, nor future, nor between past and future, for to Him all things are
at once present. Why should He not then simultaneously create those
things which He saw were to be created and willed to be created? For
when we say ‘before’ and ‘after’ sin we are demonstrating the mut-
ability of our thought processes which is due to the fact that we are
still subject to temporal conditions: but to God the foreknowledge of
sin and the consequence of sin itself were contemporaneous. For it
was to man, not to God, that the sin was a future event, and that the
consequence (207) of sin anticipated the sin itself in man, seeing that
even the sin itself anticipated itself in the same man. Because the evil
will, which is latent sin, was antecedent to the tasting of the forbidden
fruit, which is open sin. This is relevant to the interpretation of the
text ‘Jacob I loved, but Esau I held in hatred’. For at the time neither

The con-
sequences
of sin

bonis actibus perpetratis in ordine temporum, eorum consequentia facta sunt in eo, in quo uniuersitas simul et unum est. Consequentia autem dico dilectionem et odium.

Hoc etiam ipse magister Augustinus edocet in praefati libri tertio 808C
decimo capitulo, de primis hominibus dicens: *In occulto autem mali* 5
esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboedientiam laberentur. Non enim ad malum
opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uoluntas mala. Porro malae uoluntatis
initium, quid potuit esse nisi superbia? "Initium" enim "omnis peccati
superbia est". Ac per hoc datur intelligi hominem peccato nunquam
caruisse, sicut nunquam intelligitur absque mutabili uoluntate 10
substetisse. Nam et ipsa irrationabilis mutabilitas liberae uoluntatis,
quia causa mali est, nonnullum malum esse necesse est. Causam
siquidem mali malam non esse, quis audeat dicere, quandoquidem
libera uoluntas ad eligendum bonum data seipsam seruilem fecit ad
sequendum malum? Quod etiam Augustinus uidetur insinuasse. Non 15
enim ait: 'Vixit homo in paradiso' (uel 'Vixerat'), 'Vixit fruens deo' 808D
(uel 'Vixerat'), 'Vixit sine ulla egestate' (uel 'Vixerat'). Nam si talibus
uerbis praeteriti uteretur, fortassis non incongrue intelligeretur
docere uoluisse hominem in paradiso perfectam beatitudinem sine
ullo peccato per spatia quaedam temporis habuisse. Sed: *Viuebat,* 20
inquit, homo in paradiso, uiuebat fruens deo, uiuebat sine ulla egestate.
Ac si aperte diceret: inchoabat uiuere homo in paradiso, inchoabat 809A
uiuere fruens deo, inchoabat uiuere sine ulla egestate. Haec enim
species praeteriti temporis ab his qui uerborum significationes
acute perspicunt inchoatiua uocatur: inchoationem quippe et 25
auspiciu cuiuspian rei significat, quae iam ad perfectionem nullo
modo peruenit. Quod etiam (hoc est nullo temporali spatio primos
homines fuisse in paradiso) in nono exameri sui ipse edocet dicens:
Cur non coierunt, nisi cum exissent de paradiso? Cito responderi potest:
quia, mox creata muliere, priusquam coirent, facta est illa transgressio, cuius 30
merito in mortem destinati, etiam de loco illius felicitatis exierunt. Non enim
scriptura tempus expressit quantum interfuerit inter eos factos et ex eis natum 809B
Cain. Fuisse autem Adam temporaliter in paradiso, priusquam de
costa eius mulier fabricaretur, dicat qui potest.

8-9 Eccli. 10, 15.

5-9 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, xiii, 1-5 (CCSL 48, p. 434; PL 41, 420).
20-21 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, xxvi, 1-3 (CCSL 48, p. 449; PL 41, 434).
29-33 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, iv, 8 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 272-273; PL
34, 395-396).

[11 substetisse] substitisse H, J (corr. ex sustetisse), M 11-15 **nam et ipsa . . . sequendum malum**] mg. R¹, om. R⁰ 11 irrationabilis] om. HMR 14 data] om. HMR 16 ait] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 18 praeteriti] om. HMR 23 deo] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 24 temporis] sup. l. R¹ om. R⁰ 26-27 **nullo modo**] p. ras. sup. l. R¹, non R⁰ 27-34 quod etiam . . . qui potest] mg. R⁵, om. R⁰ 32 interfuerit] temporis add. HM sequentes obelum quemdam ab R² in R positum

the good nor the evil deeds of either had been committed in time, but their consequences, that is, the love and the hatred, were already effected in the eyes of Him to Whom the universe is contemporaneous and one.

This also is the teaching of that same master Augustine in the Thirteenth Chapter of the book from which I was quoting before: for concerning the first human beings he says: 'But evil begins within them secretly at first, to draw them into open disobedience afterwards. For there would have been no evil work had there not been an evil will before it, and what could begin this evil will but pride, the "beginning of all evil"?' The meaning of this is that man was never without sin, for he was never without the mutability of the will. For that too, the irrational mutability of the free will, which is the cause of evil, must be accounted a kind of evil: for who would dare to say that the cause of evil is not itself evil, when the free will to which it was given to choose the good made itself the slave and follower of evil? It is this which St. Augustine seems to have wished to imply. For he does not say: 'Man lived in Paradise' (or 'had lived'), 'lived in the enjoyment of God' (or 'had lived'), 'lived without any want' (or 'had lived'). For if he had used these verbs in the preterite, he might well be thought to mean that for a space of time man was in actual possession of perfect and sinless bliss in Paradise. But he says: 'Man began to live in Paradise, began to live in the enjoyment of God, began to live without any want'. This is as if he said that man commenced to live in Paradise, commenced to live in the enjoyment of God, commenced to live without any want. This class of past tense is called by accurate observers of the different significances of the tenses the inceptive (208): because it signifies the inception and beginning of some action which has not by any means reached perfection. Now as to the fact that the first human creatures were in Paradise for no temporal space: Augustine teaches in the Ninth Book of the *Hexaemeron* as follows: 'Why was there no sexual intercourse between them until they had left Paradise? We may reply at once, because as soon as the woman was created, and before they came together, that transgression was committed on account of which they were destined for death and departed from the place of that blessedness. For Scripture makes no mention of a time elapsing (209) between their creation and the birth of Cain'. But that Adam was in Paradise for a period of time before the woman was moulded from his rib let him declare who can. 15

Proinde plus, ut arbitror, laus illa uitae hominis in paradiso referenda est ad futuram ei uitam, si oboediens permaneret, quam ad peractam, quae solummodo inchoauerat, nec unquam steterat. Nam si saltem uel paruo spatio stetisset, necessario ad aliquam perfectionem perueniret. Ac per hoc praefatus magister fortassis 5
non diceret 'uiuerebat', sed 'uixit' uel 'uixerat', quanquam si talibus praeteriti perfecti et plusquam perfecti uerbis uteretur, uel si alias usus est, plus crediderim praeteritum pro futuro posuisse, quam statum hominis temporali spatio in felicitate paradisi ante peccatum docuisse, ea uidelicet ratione, ut praedestinatum praediffinitamque 809C
beatitudinem hominis in paradiso, si non peccaret, quasi iam 11
perfectam innueret, dum adhuc in re ipsa (hoc est in effectibus perfectae praedestinationis) futura et facienda erat. Hoc autem dico, quia saepe ipse de paradiso disputans, praeteriti temporis perfecti et plusquam perfecti uerba posuit, sicut librorum illius studiosus lector 15
reperiet, ut est illud in undecimo exameri libro: "*In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec conuertaris in terram ex qua sumptus es, quia terra es, et in terram ibis*". Hos, inquit, esse in terra labores humani generis quis ignorat? Et quia non essent, si felicitas quae in paradiso fuerat teneretur, non est utique dubitandum. "Fuerat" dixit, non "fiebatur". Nec hoc mirum, 20
cum saepissime diuina auctoritas futura quasi iam peracta pronuntiet. 809D

Quis enim crediderit diabolus in beatitudine paradisi fuisse, qui, mox ut conditus, lapsus est, sicut dominus ait in euangelio: *Ille homicida erat ab initio, et in ueritate non stetit?* Quam dominicam sententiam, in undecimo exameri sui, ipse Augustinus de quo nunc 25
tractamus exponit: *Quod ergo, inquit, putatur nunquam diabolus in ueritate stetisse, nunquam cum angelis beatam duxisse uitam, sed ab ipso suae 810A
conditionis initio cecidisse, non sic accipiendum est ut non propria uoluntate deprauatus, sed malus a bono deo creatus putetur; alioquin non ab initio cecidisse diceretur. Neque enim cecidit, si talis est factus. Sed factus, continuo 30
se a luce ueritatis auertit, superbia tumidus, et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus: unde beatae atque angelicae uitae dulcedinem non gustauit, quam non utique acceptam fastidiuit, sed nolendo accipere deseruit et amisit. Proinde nec sui casus praescius esse potuit, quoniam praescientia pietatis est 35
fructus, ille autem continuo impius, consequenter et mente caecus, non ex eo quod acceperat cecidit, sed ex eo quod acciperet, si subdi deo uoluisset. Quod profecto quia noluit, et ab eo quod accepturus erat cecidit, et potestatem illius 810B*

16-18 Gen. 3, 19. 24 Ioh. 8, 44.

16-20 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, xxxviii, 51 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 373; PL 34, 450). 160.26-162.2 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, xxiii, 30 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 355-356; PL 34, 441).

2 ei] eius HM 4 paruo spatio] p. ras. R¹ 28 non propria] sup. l. R², arbitror R⁰ (ab R² cancellatum) 30 si] sed HM 34 praescientia] sapientia HMR

Therefore that praise of the life of man in Paradise must refer rather to the life that would have been his if he had remained obedient than to its happening which only began and in which he did not continue. For if he had continued in it even for a brief interval he must necessarily have achieved some degree of perfection, and in that case perhaps this master would not have said 'He began to live', but 'He lived' or 'He had lived': although if he had used the preterite and pluperfect in this way, or if he used them elsewhere, I should rather think that he was using the preterite for the future than that he meant that man had continued for a space of time in the blessedness of Paradise before the Fall - for the following reason: that he was expressing the predestined and fore-determined blessedness which was to be man's if he had not sinned, as though it had already occurred, when in fact, that is, in the effects of the completed predestination, it was still among those things which were destined to be created at some future time. Now I say this because often when he is writing about Paradise he has used the preterite and pluperfect, as any careful reader of his books can discover for himself: for instance in the Eleventh Book of the *Hexaemeron*: "In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread until you are changed into the earth from which you were taken: for earth you are and to earth shall you return". 'Who does not know', he asks, 'that these are the labours of the human race on earth? And it is not to be doubted that these labours would not be, if the happiness that had existed in Paradise had been maintained'. 'Had existed', he says, not 'began to exist', nor is this surprising since very often the Divine Authority speaks of the future as though it had already happened.

For who would have expected to find the devil in the bliss of Paradise, who fell as soon as he was created, as the Lord says in the Gospel: 'He was a man-slayer from the beginning, and did not abide in truth'. Augustine, about whom we have just been speaking, has something to say about this sentence of Our Lord also in the Eleventh Book of his *Hexaemeron*: "That the devil is thought never to have been in a state of truth, that he never lived a blessed life with the angels, but that he fell at the very beginning of his creation - this must not be accepted in the sense that he was created an evil creature by the good God, but rather that he was depraved by his own will: for otherwise it would not have been said that he fell in the beginning. For on the supposition mentioned he did not fall if he was so created (210). But from the moment of his creation he turned his face away from the light of truth, being swollen with pride and infatuated with the love of his own power. Therefore he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed and angelic life, not because after trying it he rejected it, but because through his unwillingness to accept it he abandoned and lost it. Therefore he could not have had foreknowledge of his own fall, for foreknowledge (211) is the fruit of piety. But he was straightway impious, and was therefore mentally blind, and he did not fall away from a state which he had actually accepted, but from one which he would have accepted if he had been willing to subordinate himself to God. But since this was precisely what he would not do, he fell from that state which it was intended he should accept, and did not

sub quo esse noluit non euasit, factusque in illo est pondere meritorum, ut nec iustitiae possit lumine delectari, nec ab eius sententia liberari. Attamen in figura principis Tyri per Ezechielem prophetam dicitur ei: *Tu es signaculum similitudinis et corona decoris; in deliciis paradisi dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es, et caetera quae quasi iam facta ante ruinam diaboli dicuntur. Et quidem in diuina dispensatione erant facta, quae in illo, si non rueret, erant facienda.*

De eo Porro si de diabolo mystica mutatione temporum talia pronuntiantur (et nec aliter scriptura recte intelligitur), quid quod sicut nunquam diabolus in deliciis paradisi fuit, ita nunquam homo obstat si eodem modo de homine praedicetur in deliciis paradisi fuisse ante peccatum (quod, si non peccaret, profecto ei fieret), praesertim cum nulla auctoritas uel diuina uel humana tradiderit quantum temporis in paradiso, priusquam peccaret, feliciter uixit? Et quare hoc taceretur, si fuisse intelligeretur? Argumenta autem non desunt quibus approbari potest aut breuissimo aut nullo temporis interuallo ante peccatum uixisse. Ex his enim quae ei iussa sunt ante peccatum nihil legitur egisse, uerbi gratia: *Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete terram, uidelicet paradisi.* Qua ratione non continuo felicem prolem gigneret, si in paradiso quodam temporis spatio ante delictum habitaret? Et si de ligno uitae gustaret, ne quid corruptibile corpus eius pateretur, quare diuini ac spiritualis medicaminis uirtus in corpore eius non praeualuit, ne etiam peccando in corruptionem caderet? Ligni siquidem uitae esca, si corpori ipsius, uno uel duobus uel quotlibet diebus, ad sanitatem et incorruptibilitatem profuit, et non semper, profecto non habebat tantum uirtutis quantum et legitur et creditur habuisse? Aut qua ratione lignum uitae diceretur, quod solummodo corruptionem potuit retardare, non autem potuit a corruptione penitus liberare, diurnamque uitam edentibus praestare? Si enim illius ligni natura omni morbo erat contraria, ut omnibus ea fruuentibus praestaret uitam, cur in gustantibus uel etiam comedentibus non uinceret mortem? Peccatum, dices, uirtutem ipsius uicerat, ne in tantum prodesset. Validius ergo erat peccati malum, quam uitae bonum? Potius itaque uideamus quod dominus ipse ait, uerum uitae lignum: *Ille, inquit, (diabolus profecto) homicida erat ab initio.* Putasne alterum hominem occidisse, praeter illum unum et solum, quem deus ad imaginem suam creauit?

A. Nequaquam.

3-5 Ez. 28, 12-13. 17-18 Gen. 1, 28. 34-35 Ioh. 8, 44.

2-6 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, xxv, 32 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 357, 13-18; PL 34, 442). AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 2, 9 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 269, 10-14; PL 14, 278A).

3 ei] sup. l. R¹, om. R⁰ 23 corpori] corr. JR¹, corpore JR⁰ 25 et non semper profecto] om. HMR 28 (diurnam)que] p. ras. R²

escape from the power of Him under Whom he would not serve, and was so weighed down by the punishment that he could not joy in the light of righteousness, nor escape from his sentence'. Yet he is thus addressed in the character of the Prince of Tyre in the Book of Ezechiel the Prophet: 'You are the seal of similitude and the crown of glory, you were (in) the delights of the Paradise of God, you were adorned with every precious stone', etc., things which so to speak refer to a time prior to the devil's fall. And in fact there had been created by the divine dispensation that which was to have been in the devil had he not fallen (212).

But if when such things are said of the devil the passage of time has a mystical meaning and Scripture is rightly understood only in this way, what is there to prevent us from giving the same interpretation to man's having been in Paradise before the Fall, that is to say, that this would have happened to him if he had not sinned: especially as no authority, divine or human, has recorded how much time he spent in the bliss of Paradise before the Fall? Why should nothing be said of this, if we are to understand that he was there? On the other hand there are not lacking proofs that the time of his existence before the Fall was either very short or none at all. For there is no record of his having carried out before the Fall any of the commands which were given him, for instance, 'Increase and multiply and replenish the earth', that is, Paradise. Would he not have immediately begot a happy progeny if he had dwelt for any length of time in Paradise before his transgression? And if he fed upon the Tree of Life, lest his body should suffer corruption, why did not the virtue of that divine and spiritual medicine prevail in his body to keep him from sinning and falling into corruption? For if the food of the Tree of Life furnished his body with health and incorruptibility for one or two or a number of days, if not indefinitely, then it certainly did not have such virtue as it is recorded and believed to have had. Or why should that be called the Tree of Life which only had the power of reducing the process of corruption, and not of altogether eliminating it and of endowing those who ate of it with the gift of lasting life? For if the nature of that tree was the antidote of every disease, so that it gave life to all those who fed on its fruit, why could it not conquer death in those who taste it, or at least in those who eat of it? Sin, you will say, was too strong for its virtue, rendering it less effective. Then the evil of sin was stronger than the goodness of life? Let us therefore consider what is true about the Tree of Life in the words of Our Lord. Speaking of the devil He says: 'He was a man-slayer from the beginning'. Do you think that the Fall happened to any other man than him alone whom God created in His image?

A. No.

As the devil was never in the delights of Paradise so never was man

N. A quo ergo initio homicida erat diabolus? Num ab initio conditionis suae, an ab initio conditionis hominis, an certe ab initio conditionis utriusque, si simul conditi sunt, et alter alterum in conditione non praecessit? Sed si conditio diaboli conditionem hominis praeoccupavit, quomodo ab initio suo diabolus homicida erat? Si uero hominis conditio conditionem diaboli anteuenit, quomodo diabolus ab initio humanae conditionis homicida dicitur? Si autem relinquatur ut ab initio utriusque simul facti, et homicida erat diabolus, et homo erat occisus, quale spatium datur homini in paradiso uixisse, priusquam a diabolo occideretur? Hoc etiam ex euangelica parabola manifeste probatur: *Homo quidam descendebat ab Hierusalem in Iericho, et incidit in latrones*. Non enim ait: homo quidam erat in Hierusalem, et incidit in latrones. Nam si in Hierusalem (hoc est in paradiso) humana natura permaneret, profecto in latrones (diabolum uidelicet satellitesque eius) non incurreret. Prius ergo descendebat de paradiso, suae uoluntatis irrationabili motu impulsus, et in Iericho praecipitabatur (hoc est in defectum instabilitatemque rerum temporalium), et cadendo uulneratus est, omnibus naturalibus bonis, in quibus conditus erat, abusus. Vbi datur intelligi quod homo prius in seipso lapsus est, quam diabolo temptaretur. Nec hoc solum, uerum etiam quod non in paradiso, sed descendente eo, propriaque uoluntate a paradisi felicitate (quae Hierusalem uocabulo, hoc est uisionis pacis, intelligitur) deserente, et in Iericho (hoc est in hunc mundum) labente, a diabolo sauciatus sit et beatitudine spoliatus. Non enim credibile est eundem hominem et in contemplatione aeternae pacis stetisse, et, suadente femina serpentis ueneno corrupta, corruisse, aut ipsum serpentem (diabolum dico) iam de paradiso (dignitate uidelicet angelicae naturae) lapsum, in homine adhuc non peccante neque celsitudine diuinae imaginis corruente praeualuisse.

Idipsum quoque, hoc est hominem aequalem angelis conditum fuisse, non autem in illa dignitate stetisse, sed mox non recte ad bonum ingredi inchoasse, sanctus Gregorius docere uidetur in octauo decimo capitulo sermonis de imagine, quod etiam superius

11-12 LUC. 10, 30.

8-10 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XI, xiii, 34 - xiv, 8 (CCSL 48, pp. 334-335; PL 41, 329-330).

17-18 Iericho defectum instabilitatemque significare dicitur eo quod hoc hebraicum nomen luna interpretatur: HIERONYMVS, *Liber interpretationis hebraicorum nominum*, Lagarde 62, 9 et 78, 6 (CCSL 72, pp. 137 et 157). 23 HIERONYMVS, *Liber interpretationis hebraicorum nominum*, Lagarde 50, 9-10. 62, 5. 74, 17-18. 75, 23 (CCSL 72, pp. 121. 136. 152. 154).

18 instabilitatemque] in instabilitatemque HMR² 19 omnibus] omnibusque HMR
19 abusus] abusus Ff(a. corr.), spoliatus HMR 27-30 aut ipsum serpentem . . .
praeualuisse] mg. R², om. R⁰

N. From what beginning was the devil a man-slayer? (213) Was it from the beginning of his own creation or from the beginning of the creation of man, or perhaps both, if both were created together and neither had his creation before the other? If the creation of the devil was prior to that of man how was the devil a man-slayer from the beginning? But if the creation of man was prior to that of the devil, how can the devil be called a man-slayer from the beginning of the creation of man? If, to take the remaining possibility, it was from the beginning of the creation of both that the devil was a man-slayer and the man slain, what time is allowed for man's life in Paradise before he was slain by the devil? This argument is clearly supported by the parable in the Gospel: 'A certain man was descending from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves'. For it is not said that a certain man was in Jerusalem and fell among thieves. For if human nature had remained in Jerusalem, that is, Paradise, it certainly would not have met with thieves, that is with the devil and his satellites. Therefore he was already beginning to descend from Paradise under the impulse of his irrational will and was beginning to hasten to Jericho (214), that is, into the weakness and instability of temporal nature, and was already wounded by his Fall, and had abused (215) all those natural goods in which he had been created. From which we are given to understand that man fell himself before he was tempted by the devil - and not only this but also that it was not in Paradise, but in his descent therefrom and in his freely willed abandonment of the joy of Paradise, called here Jerusalem, that is to say, the Vision of Peace; and in his fall into Jericho, that is, the present world, that he was wounded by the devil and despoiled of his bliss. For it is not to be believed that the same man could both have been abiding in the contemplation of eternal peace and also have fallen at the persuasion of a woman corrupted by the poison of a serpent; or that that serpent, I mean the devil, who had already fallen from Paradise, that is, from the dignity of the angelic nature, could have prevailed over a man who was not yet in a state of sin and was not already falling from the sublimity of the Divine image.

And the same doctrine, that man was created equal to the angels but did not abide in that dignity, but soon began to deviate from the path of goodness, seems to be taught in the Eighteenth Chapter of St. Gregory's *Treatise on the Image*, which we have already quoted before,

posuimus, et nunc repetere debemus: *Qui omnia, inquit, adduxit in esse, totumque in sua uoluntate hominem ad diuinam imaginem formauit, non paulatim adiectionibus futurorum moras fecit, sciendo in suam plenitudinem animarum numerum perficiendum, sed cumulatim in ipsa plenitudine omnem humanam naturam prognostica operatione intellexit, et in excelsitudine et in coequali angelis quiete honorificauit.* Hic intellige praedictum magistrum praeterita pro futuris posuisse. Quod enim ait prognostica operatione deum omnem humanam naturam in excelsitudine et in aequali angelis quiete condidisse, quomodo aliter intelligi potest, nisi quia iam homo in causis conditus erat, nondum uero in effectus suae beatitudinis procedebat? Et cur non processerat, reddit causam dicens: *Quoniam uero praeuidit contemplatoria uirtute non recte euntem ad bonum uoluntatem, atque ideo ex angelica uita recedentem, ne animarum humanarum multitudo minueretur, cadens ex illo modo per quem angeli ad multitudinem aucti sunt, propterea conuenientem in peccatum annullatis incrementi excogitationem in natura conformauit, pro angelica magnificentia pecudalem et irrationabilem ex se inuicem successionis modum humanitati inserens.* Si itaque haec uerba sancti theologi ueracia sunt, quod non temere crediderim, quid aliud datur intelligi, quam ut humana natura, nullis temporum morulis, nullis rerum sensibilibus effectibus, in paradiso, in quo naturaliter conditus est, stetisse, sed mox de uia ueritatis deuiasse, et diuisionem naturae in duplicem sexum, per quem iumentorum similitudine multiplicaretur, peruersae uoluntatis motu meruisse? Ac per hoc si in ea beatitudine, in qua creata est, permaneret, utriusque sexus copulae ad multiplicationem suam non indigeret: eo enim modo, quo angeli multiplicati sunt, sine ullo sexu multiplicaretur.

De prima hominis conditione secundum spiritum
Huic sensui uenerabilis magister Maximus, praefati theologi expositor, sermonem eius de baptismo exponens, consentit dicens: *Aiunt qui diuina mystice assequuntur eloquia et altioribus, quantum consequens est, glorificant speculationibus, secundum imaginem dei per principia factum hominem fuisse, omnino nascendo secundum propositum spiritu, et accipiendo secundum similitudinem per obseruantiam diuini*

1-6 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 18[17] (Capp, p. 237, 22-27; PG 44, 189C3-11). 12-18 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 18[17] (Capp, p. 237, 27-33; PG 44, 189C11-D6). 28 Quomodo Eriugena Gregorium Nyssenum cum Gregorio Nazianzeno confudisse potuerit, dicitur infra: *Periphyseon* IV, 860A. 166.30-168.17 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XXXVIII, 622-645 (CCSG 18, pp. 208-209; PG 91, 1345D-1348B).

1 qui] enim *add. C Capp (237, 22)* 5 prognostica operatione] per prognosticam operationem *CHM, R (a. corr.), Capp (237, 26), per prognostica operatione R^e (ex imperfecta correctione)* 8 prognostica operatione] per prognosticam operationem *HM, R (a. corr.), per prognostica operatione R^e (ex imperfecta correctione)* 13 bonum] bonam *C, J (corr. ex bonum), M* 16 annullatis] annullatis *J (p. corr.), R (a. corr.), adnullatis HM* 17 irrationabilem] irrationalem *C Capp (237, 32)* 23 similitudine] similitudinem *R*

and which we must now quote again: 'He Who brought all things into being and formed man entirely in His Will after the Divine image, did not establish intervals in which future things would gradually be added, through his knowledge of the number of souls which was required to bring humanity to its fulness, but intellected through His prognostic Act the whole of human nature at once in its fulness, and gave it a place of high honour and a tranquility co-equal with that of the angels'. Here you are to understand that the said master puts the past for the future tense. For he says that it was by God's prognostic Act that He established human nature in a place of high honour and a tranquility co-equal with that of the angels; and how can that be understood save in the sense that although man had now been established in the causes, he was not yet proceeding into the effects of his blessedness. And St. Gregory gives the reason for his not having proceeded: 'But since He foresaw by His contemplative power that man's will would not go straight for the good (216) and would therefore fall away from the angelic way of life, He formed in our nature a plan of propagation suitable to those who have been snared into sin (217), so that the number of human souls should not be diminished when human nature had fallen from the power of propagating itself in the angelic mode; and implanted in man the irrational method of propagation from one another of the beasts of the field in the place of the glorious fecundity of the angels'. If then these words of the holy theologian are true – and it is safe to assume that they are – we can understand nothing else but that human nature abode in the Paradise, in which it was naturally created, for no temporal interval and without sensible effects, but that it quickly deviated from the way of truth and received as a punishment for the activity of its perverse will the division into the two sexes whereby it might propagate its kind after the manner of the beasts of the field. And therefore if human nature had remained in that blessed state in which it was created it would not have needed sexual intercourse for its propagation, but would have multiplied as the angels multiplied, without the use of sex.

The venerable master Maximus, the commentator of our theologian (218), in his *Sermon on Baptism* agrees with this: 'Those who put a mystical interpretation on Holy Writ and glorify it with more exalted speculations in so far as they can be justified, declare that man was made in the image of God in the principles, being born altogether spirit as planned, and accepting his future through observing the Divine Mandate in accordance with the image, so that the same man

Man's first creation according to spirit

mandati quod sibi futurum erat, ut esset idem homo figmentum quidem 812D
 dei secundum naturam, filius autem dei et deus per spiritum secundum
 gratiam. Non enim possibile erat aliter filium dei ostendi et deum
 secundum deificationem ex gratia factum hominem, nisi prius secundum
 propositum nascentem spiritu per adunatam sibi naturaliter per seipsam 5
 motam et liberam potentiam. Quam deificam diuinamque et immaterialem
 natiuitatem intelligibilium et occultorum dumtaxat bonorum deserens 813A
 primus homo praehonorificando quod secundum sensum delectabile est et
 manifestum, merito ex corporibus inordinatam et materialem et corruptibilem
 habere damnatus est natiuitatem, digne deo iudicante peiora melioribus 10
 uoluntarie praeponebat in passibilem et seruilem et coangustatam
 secundum similitudinem in terra irrationabilium brutorumque iumentorum
 generationem libera et impassibili et spontanea et casta alienari natiuitate,
 et pro ipso cum deo diuino et ineffabili honore, cum insipientibus iumentis
 ignobilem recipere copulationem. Qua hominem liberare et ad diuinam 15
 beatitudinem reducere uolens, naturam hominum creans uerbum homo ex
 hominibus uere fit, et nascitur corporaliter sine peccato per hominem.

Vt autem cognoscas quod non ex nobis ipsis accipientes, uerum 813B
 ex praefati auctoris (Maximi uidelicet) discentes, hominem dicimus
 de ligno uitae non gustasse, sed primum cibum mortiferum de ligno 20
 uetito primitus sumpsisse, et ad diuinum lumen mentis oculum non
 subleuasse, audi ipsum in XXVIII capitulo expositionum uerborum
 Gregorii dicentem: Huic itaque diuino lumini nolens eleuare oculum
 animae primus pater Adam, caeci instar, merito in tenebris ignorantiae
 ambabus manibus materiali immunditiae uoluntarie adhaerens, soli sensui 25
 seipsum totum pronus tradidit, per quem amarissimae bestiae corruptiuum
 uirus accepit. Hoc autem dicit, quoniam corporeum sensum, per
 quem Adam deceptus est, in figura mulieris uult intelligi. Nam apud
 graecos AICΘHCIC (id est sensus) feminini generis est. Amarissimam 813C
 uero bestiam diabolus uocat, qui per sensum corporeum humano
 animo uirus nequitiae suae infudit. Deinde ait paulo post: Et ex uetito 30
 ligno, cui etiam mortem inesse prius didicerat, sensu fructum porrigente,
 cibi primitias faciens, conuenientem fructui uitam mutuauit, mortalem
 uidelicet ac fluxilem per corpus corruptibile. Deinde subiungit: Si
 itaque deo magis quam conseruo (sensui uidelicet) credens, ligno uitae 35

23-27 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem VI*, 979-983 (CCSG 18, p. 77;
 PG 91, 1156C). 31-33 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem VI*, 986-989
 (CCSG 18, p. 77; PG 91, 1156C-D). 168.34-170.8 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua
 ad Iohannem VI*, 993-1003 (CCSG 18, pp. 77-78; PG 91, 1156D-1157A).

9 inordinatam] indispositam *HMR Jeau* (209, 635-636) 11 coangustatam]
 concoangustatam *MR Jeau* (209, 638) 25 materiali] materiae *Jeau* (77, 981)
 25 uoluntariae] uoluntariae *MP, R* (a. corr.) 29 AICΘHCIC] AICΘECIC *FJP*
 31 de(inde)] corr: R² 32 didicerat] dederat a. corr: *R, Jeau* (77, 987) 32 sensu] om.
Jeau (77, 987) 32 porrigente] porrigentem *Jeau* (77, 988) 33 mutuauit] mutauit
H, M (a. corr.), *P*

should be the creation indeed of God in accordance with nature, but
 the son of God, and God, in his spirit by means of grace. For it was
 not otherwise possible for created man to be shown as the son of God
 and God by the deification of grace, unless he had already been born
 spirit as planned, through the self-moved and free power that he nat-
 urally possesses. But the First Man, abandoning this God-making and
 Godly and immaterial birth, and by giving greater glory to that which
 is revealed and is pleasurable to the senses than to intelligible and mys-
 tical goods, was deservedly condemned to the disordered and material
 and corruptible birth of bodies; for God worthily judged that by will-
 ingly preferring the worse things to the better, man exchanged his
 free, passionless, spontaneous and chaste birth for a birth that was
 painful and servile and confined according to the earthly image of
 the irrational brutes and the beasts of the field; and that in exchange
 for the divine and ineffable honour of his association with God, he
 was taking the dishonourable intercourse of the irrational beasts. But
 wishing to liberate man from this condition, and to lead him back to
 his divine blessedness, the Word Who is the Creator of human nature
 truly becomes a man and the issue of men, and is born from man
 according to the body, but without sin'.

But that you may know that it is not an invention of our own but
 something which we have learnt from the aforesaid author Maximus,
 that man did not taste of the Tree of Life, but from the start took
 his first and deadly nourishment from the Forbidden Tree, and did
 not raise the eye of his intelligence to the Divine light, hear what he
 says in the Twenty-Eighth Chapter of his commentary on the words
 of Gregory: 'Not willing to lift the eye of his soul to this Divine light,
 our first father Adam, like a blind man, in the darkness of ignorance
 which was his punishment willingly clutching with both hands at
 his material degradation, prostrated himself entirely to the senses,
 through which he imbibed the corrupt poison of the bitterest of
 beasts'. Now by the corrupt sense by which Adam was deceived he
 means the woman (219): for among the Greeks αἰσθησις, sense, is
 of the feminine gender; and by the bitterest of beasts he means the
 devil, who instilled the poison of his wickedness into the human
 mind through the medium of the corporeal sense. Then he goes
 on to say a little later: 'And when 'sense', although he had learned
 full well that death was in the Forbidden Tree, yet offered him
 the fruit of it, he made it his first repast, and thus accommodated
 his life to its food', rendering it mortal and fluid throughout the
 corruptible body. Then he adds: 'So if he had trusted in God rather
 than in his fellow-slave, 'the sense', and had fed on the Tree of Life,

uesceretur, non fortassis datam deponeret immortalitatem semper conseruatam participatione uitae, quoniam omnis uita ex propria et consequenti consueuit esca conseruari. Esca uero beatae illius uitae est panis qui de caelo descendit et uitam dat mundo, sicut ipsum de seipso in euangeliiis non mendax pronuntiauit uerbum. Quo uesci nolens primus homo merito diuina proiectus est uita, aliam uero ex morte genetrice accepit, per quam irrationabilem sibimet formam imponens, diuinae uero supersplendentem abscondens pulchritudinem, uescendo omnem naturam morti tradidit. Sed quia aduersus eos qui dicunt hominem feliciter in paradiso ante peccatum temporali spatio uixisse, illud autem spatium quantum fuerit affirmare non audent, non est nostri propositi agere, ea siquidem solummodo quae nobis uerisimilia uidentur dicere procurauimus. Aliorum uero sententiam qui aliter sapiunt refellere, seu spernere, seu falsam esse pronuntiare dum ad nos nullo modo pertinet, ad ipsius paradisi considerationem transeundum esse uideo.

Nunc incipit
de paradiso
tractare

A. Transeundum plane. Recte quippe ratiocinandi uia tenenda est, ut neque in dexteram neque in sinistram deuiare uideamur, hoc est, neque his quos summae ac sanctae auctoritatis esse catholica sanxit ecclesia detrahimus, neque eos quos simpliciter intellexisse cognouimus, quoniam intra catholicae fidei sinceritatem continentur, spernamus. Vnusquisque enim, ut ait Apostolus, suo sensu abundet. Nostrum quippe sensum approbare aut eorum quos caeteros praecellere arbitramur, aliorum uero sensum reprobare, aut periculosissimum est, aut superbissimum, aut certe contentiosum. Ingrediamur itaque caute, humiliter, modeste, sanctorum patrum in tali negotio uestigia sequentes.

N. Sanctus Augustinus in octauo exameri sui: *Non ignoro, inquit, de paradiso multos multa dixisse. Tres tamen de hac re quasi generales sunt sententiae: una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter paradysum intelligi uolunt, alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum, tertia eorum qui utroque modo paradysum accipiunt, alias corporaliter, alias autem spiritualiter. Breuiter ergo ut dicam, tertiam mihi fateor placere sententiam. Idem in quarto decimo de ciuitate dei, undecimo capitulo: Viuebat itaque, inquit, homo secundum deum in paradiso, et corporali et spirituali. Neque enim erat paradysus corporalis propter corporis bona, et propter mentis non erat spiritualis; aut uero erat spiritualis, quo per interiores, et non erat corporalis,*

3-5 Ioh. 6, 33. 21-22 Rom. 14, 5.

27-32 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, i, 1 (CSEL 28, I, p. 229; PL 34, 371). 170.33-172.9 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIV, xi, 48-65 (CCSL 48, p. 432; PL 41, 419).

5 proiectus] abiectus *Jean* (78, 1000) 13 qui aliter] qualiter *HM* 14 dum] *om. HMR* 19 eos] *p. ras. R²* 22 (abund) *c(t)] R²*, habundat *R⁰* 23 caeteros] caeteris *H, M* (*corr. ex caeteros*) 26 sequentes] de paradiso titulum *mg. add. R²*

perhaps he would not have laid aside the gift of immortality, which would have been preserved by his participation in life, since all life is preserved by its own appropriate and suitable food. But the food of that blessed life is the bread that came down from heaven, and gives life to the world, as the Word Itself truly says of Itself in the Gospels. But the First Man was unwilling to feed on this fare, and was therefore deservedly rejected from the Divine life, and received from its parent death another life, through which he endows himself with an irrational form and obscures the transcendent beauty of the Divine, and by feeding upon the fruit betrays the whole of nature to death'. But it is not our present purpose to argue against those who, admitting that man lived in bliss for a temporal period before the Fall, yet dare not say how long a period that was: for we have made it our aim to say only those things which seem to us to be probable. To refute the opinion of others who think otherwise, or to treat it with contempt, or to pronounce it false, is none of our business. And now I think we ought to turn to the consideration of Paradise itself.

A. Let us by all means do so. For this is the right method of discourse, not to give the impression of deviating to the right or the left, that is to say, neither to make less of those whom the Catholic Church has pronounced as being of the highest and most holy authority, nor to look down upon those whom we have known to take a simple interpretation of things (for they are encompassed within the wholeness of the Catholic Faith). 'For let each one of us', as the Apostle says, 'be rich in his own perception'. For to approve our own perception or that of those whom we consider to be the best while rejecting the perception of others is either extremely dangerous or most insolent or at least productive of controversy (220). Let us therefore in this business proceed with caution, humility and moderation in the footsteps of the holy Fathers (221).

Now
begins the
discussion of
Paradise

N. St. Augustine writes in the Eighth Book of his *Hexaemeron*: 'I am not unaware that concerning Paradise much has been written by many, but their opinions fall more or less into three categories: of which one is of those who hold that Paradise is only to be understood in a corporeal sense; the second of those who say it is only spiritual; the third of those who believe that it is both, that is to say, both corporeal and spiritual. And to be brief I confess that it is the third opinion that I hold myself'. And in the Eleventh Chapter of the Fourteenth Book of the *City of God* he writes: 'Therefore man lived according to God in a Paradise that was both corporeal and spiritual. For Paradise was not corporeal because of the goods of the body without being spiritual because of those of the mind: nor was it spiritual to be enjoyed by man's inner senses without being corporeal

quo per exteriores sensus homo fruere-
tur. Erat plane utrumque propter
utrumque. Postea uero quam superbus ille angelus, ac per hoc inuidus, per
eandem superbiam a deo ad semetipsum conuersus, de spirituali paradiso
cecidit, malesuada uersutia in hominis sensum serpere affectans, cui utique
stanti, quoniam ipse ceciderat, inuidebat, colubrum in paradiso corporali 5
(ubi cum duobus illis hominibus, masculo et femina, animalia etiam
terrestria caetera subdita et innoxia uersabantur), animal scilicet lubricum,
tortuosis anfractibus mobile, operi suo congruum, per quem loqueretur
elegit. Animaduerte quomodo duos paradisos asserit esse, unum
quidem spiritualem in quo homo secundum animam, alterum uero 814D
corporalem in quo idem homo secundum corpus feliciter uiuebat. 11

In libro autem, quem de uera religione scripsit, unum tantummodo
paradisum, eundemque spiritualem, uidetur asserere. Est autem,
inquit, uitium primum animae rationalis, uoluntas ea faciendi, quae uetat
summa et intima ueritas. Ita homo de paradiso in hoc saeculum expulsus 15
est, id est ab aeternis ad temporalia, a copiosis ad egena, a firmitate ad 815A
infirma: non ergo a bono substantiali ad malum substantiale, quia nulla
substantia malum est, sed a bono aeterno ad bonum temporale, a bono
spirituali ad bonum carnale, a bono intelligibili ad bonum sensibile, a bono
summo ad bonum infimum. Videsne quod ait: a bono intelligibili 20
ad bonum sensibile. Nonne aperte dixit intelligibilem paradisum
esse, non autem sensibilem? Nam si sensibilem esse uellet, dixisset
utique: a bono sensibili (hoc est a paradiso corporali) ad inferius
bonum sensibile. Nisi forte quis dicat de solo spirituali paradiso,
ex quo anima peccatrix expulsa est, hanc sententiam protulisse, 25
de expulsionem uero corporis eius de corporali paradiso in ipsa
sententia siluisse. Non enim ait 'primum hominis' sed 'primum
animae rationalis uitium est'. Totum tamen hominem melioris partis 815B
uocabulo significasse crediderim. Non enim credibile est hominem
ex spirituali paradiso, non autem ex corporali, praeuaricationis 30
merito expulsus fuisse, si duo paradisi uel fuere, uel adhuc sunt.
Nisi forte quis dicat de spirituali paradiso expulsionem hominis
solummodo in hoc loco exposuisse, eiusdem uero ex sensibili lapsum
siluisse.

Sanctus quoque Ambrosius, in primordio libri quem scripsit de 35
paradiso, duos similiter paradisos esse uidetur affirmare, eo loci
maxime ubi ait: *In hoc ergo paradiso hominem deus posuit, quem plasmauit.*
Intellige etiam quia non eum hominem, qui secundum imaginem dei est,

13-20 AVGVSTINVS, *De uera religione* XX, 38 (CCSL 32, p. 210; PL 34, 138).
172.37-174.2 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 1, 5 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 267; PL 14, 276B-C).

2 qu(am)] corr. R², nam R⁰ 5 colubrum] HMR, coluber FJP 17 infirma] infirmum
HM 20 infimum] HMR, infirmum FJP 24-29 nisi forte . . . crediderim] mg. R², om.
R⁰ 32-34 nisi forte . . . lapsum siluisse] mg. R², om. R⁰ 37 (plas)mauit] corr. R²,
formaui HM

to be enjoyed by his outer senses: no, it was both for both. But
after that proud and therefore envious angel fell from the spiritual
Paradise, turning through that pride from God to himself, desiring
to creep into man's sense by his malevolent subtlety because, falling
himself, he envied man's constancy, he chose a serpent (222) in the
corporeal Paradise (one of the terrestrial creatures that also lived
harmlessly and in subjection with these two human beings, the male
and the female), a creature slippery and mobile, wreathed in knots,
well fitted for his work, through whom he would speak'. You see how
he asserts that there were two Paradises, the one spiritual in which
man lived a happy psychic life, the other corporeal in which he lived
a happy corporeal life.

But in the book which he wrote on the *True Religion* he seems to say
that there was only one Paradise, the spiritual: 'This is the first sin of
the rational soul, the desire to do that which the highest and inner-
most Truth forbids. Thus man was driven out of Paradise into this
world, that is, out of eternity into time, out of plenty into want, out
of stability into instability: not however from a substantial good into a
substantial evil, for no substance is an evil, but from an eternal good
into a temporal good, from a spiritual good to a fleshly good, from
an intelligible good to a sensible good, from the highest good to the
lowest good'. Notice the expression, from an intelligible good to a
sensible good. Does this not clearly imply that Paradise is intelligible
and not sensible? For if he had intended to say that it was sensible he
would have said: From a sensible good (namely the corporeal Para-
dise) to an inferior sensible good – unless we are to believe that this
passage refers only to the spiritual Paradise from which the sinning
soul was expelled, and that he has refrained from mentioning the
expulsion of its body from the corporeal Paradise. For he does not
say: 'This is the first sin of man', but 'This is the first sin of the rational
soul'. But I would rather suppose that by the name of the better part
of man he is referring to the whole. For it is not to be believed that
if there ever were, or still are, two Paradises, man would have suffered
for his transgression by being expelled from the spiritual but not from
the corporeal, unless we are to believe that in this place he has only
expounded the expulsion of man from the spiritual Paradise, and that
he has refrained from mentioning his expulsion from the sensible.

St. Ambrose also in the introduction to his book *On Paradise* seems to
postulate in the same way two Paradises, particularly in the following
passage: 'In this Paradise, therefore, God placed the man whom He
created. Moreover, you are to understand that it was not that man

posuit in paradiso, sed eum qui secundum corpus est. Incorporalis enim in loco non est. Sed paulo post, ad explanationem paradisi perueniens, non solum paradisi spiritualiter intelligi, uerum etiam nihil aliud esse paradisi, nisi ipsum hominem, manifestissime astruit, omnino, ut aestimo, Origenem sequens, quamuis eum aperte non nominarit. Ait enim: Ante nos fuit, qui per uoluntatem et sensum praeuauaricationem ab homine memorarit esse commissam, in specie serpentis figuram accipiens delectationis, in figura mulieris sensum, in animi mentisque typo uirum constituens. Quem (sensum uidelicet) AICΘHCIN uocant graeci. Decepto autem sensu praeuauaricationem mentem asseruit, quam graeci NOYN uocant. Recte igitur in graeco NOYC in figura uiri accipitur, AICΘHCIC uero in figura mulieris. Vnde quidam Adam NOYN terrenum interpretati sunt. Et post aliquanta: Est ergo paradisi terra quaedam fertilis (hoc est anima foecunda) in Aeden plantata (hoc est in uoluptate quadam); uel exercitata terra, in qua animae fit delectatio. Est etiam NOYC tanquam Adam, et est AICΘHCIC (id est sensus) tanquam Eua. Ac ne haberes quod ad infirmum retorques naturae, uel ad obnoxiam in tolerandis periculis conditionem, considera quae habet anima ista subsidia. Erat fons, qui irrigarat paradisi. Quis fons? Dominus Iesus Christus, fons uitae aeternae sicut et pater, quia scriptum est: “Quoniam apud te fons uitae”, denique: “Flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae”. Et fons legitur, et fluuius legitur, qui irrigat paradisi lignum fructuosum, quo ferat fructum. Hic ergo fons, sicut legisti, in paradiso est. “Fons enim procedit”, inquit, “ex Aeden”, id est: in anima tua fons est – unde et Salomon ait: “Bibe aquam de tuis uasis et puteorum tuorum fontibus” – qui procedit ex illa exercitata et plena uoluptatis anima. Hic fons, qui irrigat paradisi, uirtus est animae eminentissimo fonte pullulans. “Et diuiditur”, inquit, “hic fons in quattuor initia. Nomen est uni Fison”, et caetera quae praefatus sanctus Ambrosius de quattuor paradisi fluminibus luculentissime disputat, singula flumina singulis animae uirtutibus comparans: Fison quidem, qui secundum graecos Ganges dicitur, prudentiae; Geon autem, qui est Nilus, temperantiae;

20 Ps. 35, 10. 20–21 Ioh. 7, 38. 23 Gen. 2, 6. 24–25 Prou. 5, 15. 27–28 Gen. 2, 10–11.

5 PHILO ALEXANDRINVS, *De opificio mundi* 157–166 (*Philonis Alexandrini opera*, ed. L. Cohn–P. Wendland, I, Berolini 1896, pp. 54–58). ORIGENES, *In Genesim Homiliae* I, 15. IV, 4. *In Exodum Homiliae* II, 1. XIII, 5 (GCS 29, pp. 19. 54. 155. 277). 6–12 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 2, 11 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 271, 8–16; PL 14, 279B). 13–28 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 3, 12–14 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 272, 3–21; PL 14, 279C–280A). 174.30–176.2 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 3, 14–18 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 273, 6–277, 14; PL 14, 280B–282C).

5 ut aestimo] *mg. R², om. R⁰* 5 originem] *MR, originem FHJP* 6 uoluntatem] *codd., uoluptatem Schenkl (271, 9)* 7 memorarit] *memorat corr. M* 8 in²] *om. HMR Schenkl (271, 11)* 8 typo uirum] *om. HMR Schenkl (271, 12)* 18 irrigarat] *FJP, irrigaret HMR, inrigaret Schenkl (272, 9)* 23 in paradiso est] *om. HMR Schenkl (272, 14)* 26 uirtus est] *hoc est uirtus HMR*

who is according to the image of God that He placed in Paradise, but man who is according to the body. For that which is incorporeal cannot be in a place'. But a little later when he comes to give his explanation of Paradise he most clearly shows that not only is Paradise to be understood in a spiritual sense, but that it is nothing else than the man himself. Here I think he is wholly indebted to Origen (223), although he does not specifically refer to him, for he says: 'There was one before our time who has remarked that man's transgression was committed through will (224) and through sense; for he took the form of the serpent to represent pleasure, and the form of the woman to represent sense, and saw a representation of man in the mind and the intellect. Now the Greeks call 'sense' αἰσθησις and the mind, which he asserted to have been brought into transgression by the deception of the sense, they call νοῦς. It is appropriate then that in Greek νοῦς has a masculine form, αἰσθησις a feminine. Hence some call Adam the earthly νοῦς'. And somewhat later he writes: 'Paradise is therefore a fertile ground, that is, a fecund soul, planted in Eden, that is, in pleasure; or it is the ploughed land in which the delight of the mind grows. Moreover Adam is, as it were, νοῦς, and Eve αἰσθησις or sense. And see what supports the soul possesses to use against the weakness of nature or the exposure of creation to dangers. There was a fount to irrigate Paradise. What is this fount? Our Lord Jesus Christ, the fount of eternal life, as is the Father too. For it is written: "Seeing that you have in you the fount of life"; and again, "from her belly shall flow the living waters". It is called the fount, and it is called the river, and it irrigates the fruitful Tree of Paradise that it may bear fruit. This fount, then, as you have read, is in Paradise. For it is written that "the fount proceeds out of Eden". That is to say, the fount is in your soul. Hence Solomon also says: "Drink the water from your vessels and from the founts of your wells". This is the fount which proceeds from that well-tilled and pleasurable soul; and this fount, which irrigates Paradise, is the power of the soul which bursts forth from the highest fount. "And this fount", it is written, "is divided into four springs. The name of one is Phison" – and so on. The same Saint Ambrose goes on to discuss most lucidly the four rivers of Paradise, comparing them severally to the several virtues of the soul: Phison, which the Greeks call Ganges, to Prudence: Geon, which is the Nile, to Temperance; Tigris, which is so

The four
rivers of
Paradise

Tigrin, qui uelocitate sui cursus dicitur, fortitudini; Eufraten uero iustitiae. Videsne quemadmodum spiritualiter intelligit paradysum?

A. Video. Sed – fortassis quis dixerit – magis allegorizare quam paradysum corporalem negare uidetur. Nam si corporalem et localem paradysum non existimaret esse, non fortassis in processu 5 praefati operis, post spiritualis paradysi (qui siue ipsa anima est, siue aliquid spirituale in quo anima constituta est) expositionem, adderet exponens illum locum in quo scriptum est “*Et apprehendit deus hominem quem fecit, et posuit eum in paradiso operari et custodire*”: Vides, 816C inquit, quoniam qui erat apprehenditur. Erat autem in terra plasmationis 10 suae. Apprehendit ergo eum uirtus dei spirans processus et incrementa uirtutis. Denique in paradiso eum collocauit, ut apprehensum quasi a flatu diuinae seruitutis. Quo loci illud aduerte quia extra paradysum uir factus est, mulier intra paradysum, ut aduertat quod non loci, non generis nobilitate, sed uirtute unusquisque gratiam sibi comparat. Denique extra 15 paradysum factus, hoc est in inferiori loco, uir melior inuenitur; et illa quae in meliori loco, hoc est in paradiso, inferior reperitur. Mulier enim prior decepta; et uirum ipsa decepit. Nunquid his uerbis manifeste datur intelligi localem paradysum, ac per hoc corporalem atque sensibilem uoluisse astruere? 20

N. Cum his qui talia uolunt non est nostrum colluctari. Neque 816D enim duos paradysos esse, unum quidem corporalem, alterum uero spiritualem negamus, nec affirmamus. Sanctorum autem patrum solummodo sententias interim inter nos conferimus. Qui autem 25 magis sequendi sunt, non est nostrum iudicare: *Vnusquisque suo sensu abundet*, et quos sequatur eligat, litigationibus relictis. Sed quo sensu summae auctoritatis magister, atque acutissimi subtilissimique ingenii 817A in expositionibus diuinae scripturae talia protulerit, non facile nobis elucet, nisi forte, ut saepissime in ipsius expositionibus inuenimus, summos graecorum theologos secutus sit, et maxime Gregorium, qui 30 duas hominis conditiones esse asserunt: unam quidem ad imaginem dei, in qua nec masculus nec femina intelligitur, sed sola uniuersalis et simplex humanitas, simillimaque angelicae naturae, quam omni sexu omnino carere et auctoritas incunctanter et uera docet ratio, alteram uero atque secundam, propter praescitum rationabilis 35 naturae delictum superadditam, in qua sexus constituitur.

Merito ergo quod propter peccatum adiectum est, extra paradysum ac ueluti in inferiori loco factum fuisse de terra plasmationis narratur. 817B

8–9 Gen. 2, 15. 25–26 Rom. 14, 5.

9–18 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* 4, 24 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 280, 7–19; PL 14, 283D–284A).

12–13 a flatu] afflatu HM

called because of the swiftness of its current, to Fortitude; Euphrates to Justice. See in what a spiritual way he interprets Paradise.

A. Yes, I see it. But perhaps someone might say that he is here rather employing allegory than intending to deny the existence of a material Paradise. For if he did not believe in the existence of a corporeal and local Paradise, he would not perhaps in the course of the above-mentioned work after the exposition of the spiritual Paradise, which is either the soul herself or some spiritual environment of the soul, have gone on to expound the text: ‘And God took the man whom He had made, and placed him in Paradise, to till it and watch over it’. ‘Note’, he says ‘that the man is already existing when he is so taken. For he existed in the land of his creation. Then the power of God took him, breathing into him the processes and increases of virtue. Finally he placed him in Paradise, as though caught up by the breath of the divine service. Notice here that man was created outside Paradise and woman inside Paradise, and from this learn that it is not by the nobility of place or class but by virtue that a man acquires grace for himself. For although man was created outside Paradise, that is, in a lower place, he is found to be the better of the two, while she who was created in a better place, that is, in Paradise is found to be inferior. For the woman was first deceived, and then herself deceived the man’. Is it not clear from these words that he wished to postulate a local Paradise, and therefore a corporeal and sensible one?

N. It is not our intention to dispute with those who hold such opinions. For that there were two Paradises, the one corporeal and the other spiritual, we neither deny or affirm. We are merely comparing the opinions of the holy Fathers: it is not ours to say which should be followed rather than another. ‘Let each abound in his sense’, and let him choose which he will follow, avoiding all controversy. But in what sense the master of highest authority and of the acutest and most exalted genius has put forward these suggestions in his commentaries on Holy Scripture it is not clear to us – unless perhaps, as we have very often found in his expositions, he has followed the Greek theologians, and particularly Gregory. For the Greeks maintain that there are two creations of man, one in the image of God, in which there is neither male nor female but only universal and indivisible humanity most like the angelic nature, of which we are unmistakably taught by authority and right reason that it lacks all sexual distinction; the other and second, which was added as a result of the foreknowledge of the Fall of the rational nature, and in which sex is established.

Rightly then is the second creation described as having occurred outside Paradise, and in a lower place, out of the earth of its

Virilis itaque sexus, naturae ad imaginem dei factae superadditus, infra paradisum factus est. Sed quia et ipse sexus priori naturae (diuinae uidelicet imagini) adiungitur ueluti aliunde apprehensus, in paradiso, cum prima scilicet conditione, constituitur; in quo iterum, ueluti in superiori loco, secundus sexus, uocabulo mulieris 5 appellatus, et ex latere eius attractus, in adiutorium procreandae prolis in contumelia similitudinis insipientium animalium ei adiungitur. Et quia conditio uirilis sexus, quamuis non tempore sed sola dignitate praecedat conditionem feminei – *Mulier enim ex uiro in prima conditione, non autem uir ex muliere factus est* – propterea 10 conditionem uiri dicit extra paradisum, mulieris uero intra, ut per hoc intelligas uirum, etiam extra paradisum (hoc est extra primordialis conditionis dignitatem) conditum, meliorem esse muliere, quae ueluti intra paradisum (hoc est post superadditi sexus simplicitati diuinae imaginis adunationem) condita est. Potest et sic dici. 15 Quoniam in unoquoque homine duo quidam homines intelliguntur, dicente Apostolo exteriorem hominem corrumpi, interiorem uero renouari, merito interior, qui ad imaginem dei factus est, in paradiso formatur, exterior uero et corruptibilis extra et infra paradisum de limo terrae fingitur. Qui etiam apprehensus in paradiso ponitur, quoniam si in ipso salutem suam operaretur diuinumque custodiret praeeptum, poterat etiam ad dignitatem superioris conditionis ad imaginem dei peruenire. Quoniam uero noluit diuino oboedire 20 praeepto, non solum creatorem suum, uerum etiam dignitatem imaginis eius deseruit, ac per hoc in geminum sexum scissus est, in masculinum uidelicet et feminam. Quae discissio non ex natura, sed ex uitio causam accepit. Ideoque, quamuis in paradiso femina de uiro facta est, non erat inde uiro melior, quoniam non ex diuina 25 imagine (quae intra paradisum condita est), sed ex merito futurae suae praeuaricationis facturae suae sumpsit occasionem. Nam et illa in exteriore homine (qui extra paradisum merito peccati de limo terrae conditus est) causaliter creata est, quae postmodum, ordine non tempore, in paradiso de latere uiri assumpta est.

Sed siue hoc, siue aliquod aliud praedictus uoluit magister, non est nobis colluctandum aduersus eos qui duos, ut praediximus, paradisos esse credunt, unum quidem spirituales, alterum uero corporales, propter duplicem hominis naturam, praesertim cum uideamus saepissime in diuinae scripturae narrationibus multa iuxta rerum 35

9–10 I Cor. 11, 8. 17–18 II Cor. 4, 16.

178.37–180.1 Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, vi (SC 180, pp. 356–366; PL 122, 345C–348B).

2 infra] extra HM, R² (corr: ex infra cancellato) 10 non] in secunda sup. l. M 28 uiro²] om. HMR 32 causalit(er)creata es(t)] mg. R²

formation, seeing that it was added on account of sin. Therefore the male sex which was added to the nature created in the image of God was made below Paradise. But because even sex itself is added, as though taken from elsewhere, to a previously existing nature, namely, the divine image, it is established in Paradise with the first creation: where also, as in a higher place, the second sex, called by the name of woman, and drawn from the side of the first, is added to it as an assistant in the procreation of offspring in the shameful manner of the irrational animals. And since the creation of the male sex is prior to that of the female not in terms of time but in terms of honour ('for woman was made from man' in the first creation, 'but not man from woman'), he therefore says that the creation of man was outside Paradise, and that of woman inside, so that you may understand by this that man even as made outside Paradise (that is outside the ranks of the primordial causes) was better than woman, who was created as it were inside Paradise (that is after the union of the added sexuality with the simplicity of the Divine image). Or you may put it this way: since in every man it may be said that there are two men, for the Apostle says that the outer man is corrupted but the inner man is renewed, the inner man is properly formed in Paradise after the image of God, while the outer and corruptible man is formed from the clay of the earth outside and below Paradise: and by the fact that that man is taken and placed within Paradise is meant that if he had worked his salvation there and obeyed the Divine Precept, he also could have attained to the rank of the First Man who was created in the image of God. But since he refused to obey the Divine Precept, he abandoned not only his Creator, but also the dignity of the image. And therefore he was cloven into two sexes, the male and the female, a cleavage which derived its origin not from nature but from sin. And therefore although the woman was made from the man in Paradise, she was not for that reason better than man, for she took the occasion of her creation not from the Divine image which was created within Paradise, but from the penalty of her future transgression. For she also was causally created in the outer man, who deservedly because of his sin was created outside Paradise from the clay of the earth; and she was subsequently in order though not in time taken from the side of man in Paradise.

But whether it was this or something else which our master wished to convey, it is not our intention to quarrel with those who believe that there were two Paradises, as I said before, the one spiritual, the other corporeal, answering to the double nature of man – especially as we find that constantly in the Scriptural accounts many references to the

factarum ueritatem et historialiter facta et spiritualiter intellecta. *Abraham enim duos filios habuit, unum quidem ex ancilla, unum de libera.* Et haec quidem secundum historiam facta sunt, iuxta tamen allegoriam duas leges significant, unam quidem ueteris testamenti, noui uero alteram. Petra, de qua aquae fluxerunt in heremo, 5 populum sequebatur, cum dicat Apostolus: *Petra autem erat Christus.* Et quid dicam de ipsis primis duobus hominibus, masculo uidelicet et femina, in paradiso (de quo sermo est) constitutis? Nonne, ut idem testatur Apostolus, figuram Christi et ecclesiae gestabant? Quid ergo mirum, si corporalis paradisi crearetur, per quem spiritualis 10 paradisi significaretur?

Nouimus autem summum sanctae scripturae expositorem, Origenem dico, edisserere non alibi neque alterum paradisi esse, praeter ipsum qui in tertio caelo, ut ipse uult, constitutus est, 15 et in quem apostolus Paulus raptus est. Et si in tertio caelo est, profecto spiritualis est. Tertium siquidem caelum, in quod raptus est Paulus, spirituale esse summi utriusque linguae auctores non dubitant, sed unanimiter affirmant, illud intellectuale uocantes, quanquam Epifanius Constantiae Cypri episcopus in hoc Origenem reprehendat, et omnino paradisi in terra esse astruat quendam 20 quidem sensibilem locum in orientalibus mundi partibus, cum sensibilibus lignis fluminibusque caeterisque, quae corporaliter ab his qui corporeis sensibus adhaerent simpliciter de paradiso creduntur. Idem nanque Epifanius tunicas pellicias, quas deus primis hominibus post praeuocationem consuerat, historialiter de 25 pellibus ouium, quae, ut ait ille, in paradiso fuerant, factas esse non dubitat; et Origenem reprehendit, qui sub illarum pellium figura mortalia corpora, quae primis hominibus merito peccati superaddita sunt, pulcherrime atque uerissime significata fuisse exponit. Quem 30

2-3 Gal. 4, 22. 3-5 Gal. 4, 24-26. 6 I Cor. 10, 4. 8-9 Ephes. 5, 31-32. 15 II Cor. 12, 2-4.

19-24 EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 54-58 (GCS 25, pp. 63-69; PG 43, 112A-120C). 24-27 EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 62 (GCS 25, pp. 74-75; PG 43, 128B-129A). 27-29 ORIGENES, *In Genesim* (PG 12, 101A-C). THEODORETUS CYRENSIS, *Quaestiones in Genesim* 39 (PG 80, 140C-141B). *Catenae Graecae. Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim* 121 (CCSG 15, pp. 124-125). EPIPHANIVS, *Ancoratus* 62 (GCS 25, pp. 74-75; PG 43, 128B-129A). PHILO ALEXANDRINVS, *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim I et II uersione armeniaca* 53 (ed. C. Mercier, Parisii 1979, pp. 120-122). 180.29-182.2 Aliter sentiebat P. D. HVETIUS, *Origeniana* II, xii, 8 (PG 17, 1057D-1059B).

8 constitutis] constitutus R 19 originem] originem FH, J (a. corr.), P 22 corporaliter] carnaliter HMR 27 originem] originem FH, J (a. corr.), P

truth of nature are to be taken both as historical facts and as spiritual signs. 'For Abraham had two sons, one from his handmaid, and one from the free woman': these were historical events. But they also have the allegorical significance of the Two Laws, that of the Old Testament and that of the New (225). The rock from which the waters flowed in the wilderness followed the Chosen People: but the Apostle says: 'Now the rock was Christ'. And what of the constitution of these two very beings, the male and the female in Paradise, which is under discussion at the moment? Do they not signify, as the Apostle bears witness, Christ and His Church? What then would be so strange in the fact that the corporeal Paradise was created as a symbol of the spiritual?

And we know that Origen, that supreme commentator of Scripture, declares that Paradise is nowhere and nothing else than that which is established, as he says, in the third heaven, into which St. Paul was rapt. But if it is in the third heaven, then it is certainly spiritual. For the spiritual nature of the third heaven into which St. Paul was rapt is not doubted by the best authors in either tongue: for they all agree in calling it intellectual. But Epiphanius the Bishop of Constantia in Cyprus reproves Origen in this, and uncompromisingly maintains that Paradise is on earth: it is a certain sensible place in the eastern parts of the earth with sensible trees and rivers and the other objects, which are believed concerning Paradise in a simple corporeal sense by those who cleave to the corporeal senses. For the same Epiphanius has no doubt that those tunics of skin which God stitched together for man after his transgression were, as an historical fact, made from the fleece of the sheep which, as he says, were in Paradise: and he reproves Origen who by a very fine and truthful allegory interprets those skins as signifying the mortal bodies which were added to the first human beings as a

(Origenem dico) in theoria tonicarum pelliciarum omnes fere auctores graecorum latinorumque sequuntur.

819A

Non ab re etiam, ut opinor, sententiam magni Gregorii NYCEI de esca paradisi et de ligno uitae deque scientiae boni et mali ligno inserere. In uicesimo capitulo sermonis de imagine: *Recte*, inquit, 5 *quisque non in eandem iterum uitae speciem reuersurum esse hominem dicit; et si prius in comedendo nobis species uitae erat, posthac tali administratione liberabimur. Sed ego sanctae auscultans scripturae, non solum corporalem cognosco cibum, neque solam carnis laetitiam, sed etiam alteram quandam escam, analogiam quandam ad corporis elimenta habentem, cuius perfructio in animam solam pertransit. "Comedite ex meis panibus", Sapientia esurientibus iubet. Et eos qui talem cibum esuriunt dominus beatificat: "Beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam", "Et si quis sitit, ueniat ad me et bibat". Magnus item Esaias: "Bibite laetitiam", ualentibus magnificentiam eius laudare praecipit. Est autem quaedam comminatio prophetica aduersos eos qui ultione digni sunt, ueluti fame torquendos. Fames uero non panis est quaedam egestas et aquae, sed uerbi defectus: "Non enim famem panis", inquit, "uel sitim aquae, sed famem audiendi uerbum domini". Nunquid ergo plantationis dei in Edem delicias – nam deliciae Edem interpretatur – lignorum quandam conuenit fructum intelligere, ac per hoc comedisse 20 hominem non dubitare? Annon omnino transitoriam fluxilemque hanc escam in paradisi conuersatione recipere in hoc: "Ab omni ligno quod est in paradiso cibum comedite"? Quis dabit sanando sic esurienti lignum illud quod est 819C in paradiso, quod omne bonum comprehendit, cui nomen est pan (id est omne), cuius participationem homini lex naturae donat? Generali enim 25 et supereminenti ratione omnis bonorum forma apud seipsam connaturaliter habet totum et unum est. Quis me commixto ex utroque ligni gustu segregabit? Omnino enim non est perspicacioribus obscurum quid 'omne' illud, cuius*

10

819B

15

20

819C

25

11 Prou. 9, 5. 13 Matth. 5, 6. 13–14 Ioh. 7, 37. 14 Is. 12, 3; 25, 6 (ad sensum). 17–18 Amos 8, 11. 22–23 Gen. 2, 16.

182.5–184.16 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 20[19] (Capp, pp. 240, 4–241, 8; PG 44, 196C–197B).

[Origenem] oregonem J (p. corr.), originem F, J (a. corr.), P 1 tonicarum] tunicarum HM (De quo consulantur B. Löfstedt, *Der hibernolatinische Grammatiker Malsachanus, Vpsaliae* 1965, pp. 100–102, et L. Bieler, *The Irish Penitentials, Dublini* 1963, pp. 29–30) 5–6 recte . . . quisque] recte quis C Capp (240, 4) 8 sed] et add. C Capp (240, 6) 10 elimenta] alimenta CHMR Capp (240, 8) rectius ut uidetur 13 beati . . . iustitiam] om. CHMR Capp (240, 11) 13 sitit] inquit add. CHMR Capp (240, 11) 14 esaias] isaias J (corr. ex esaias), ysaias HM 15 praecipit] praecipit HM, P (a. corr.), Capp (240, 12) 19 delicias] delicias F (a. corr.), P, om. CHMR Capp (240, 17) 19 nam deliciae] deliciae autem ipsa CHMR Capp (240, 17) 20 lignorum] lignum HMR, dignum C Capp (240, 17) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco ἄξιον: PG 44, 196D8) 21 annon] et non CHMR Capp (240, 18) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco καὶ μή: PG 44, 196D10) 22 recipere in] intelligere CHMR Capp (240, 20) 23 comedite] comedere C Capp (240, 20) 24 pan id est] om. C Capp (240, 22) 25 naturae] om. CHMR Capp (240, 23) 27 ex] et CHMR Capp (240, 25) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco τε καί: PG 44, 197A4) 28 perspicacioribus] perspicacioribus C Capp (240, 25)

punishment for their sin. Almost all authors, Greek and Latin, follow Origen in his theory of the tunics of skin (226).

It would not be irrelevant, I think, to insert here the opinion of the great Gregory of Nyssa concerning the food of Paradise, and the Tree of Life, and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. In the Twentieth Chapter of his *Treatise on the Image* he writes: 'Rightly (227) is it said that man will not return into the same species of life: and if the species of the former life consisted in eating, in the after life we shall be released from this activity. But I, giving ear to Holy Scripture, recognise not only a corporeal food, and not only a fleshly joy, but also another kind of food, which bears a certain analogy to the nourishment of the body, a food of which the goodness is conveyed only into the soul. "Feed of My loaves", says Wisdom to the hungry, and those who hunger and thirst after this food are blessed of the Lord: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after righteousness", and: "If any thirst, let him come to Me and drink". And the great Isaiah says to those who are able to appraise his greatness: "Drink of happiness". And there is also a kind of prophetic threat against those who deserve vengeance, that they shall be tormented with hunger. But this hunger is not a need for food and drink, but a deprivation of the Word. "For it is not", He says, "a hunger for bread or a thirst for water, but a hunger for hearing the Word of the Lord". Is not this delight, then, – for the meaning of Eden is 'delight' – found in the Eden of God's planting to be understood as some worthy fruit of trees and that undoubtedly man was nourished in this way? In the discussion of Paradise we are not to understand from "eat food from the 'All'-tree (228) in Paradise" that this food is at all passing and mutable. Who shall give to him, who hungers healthily for it, the fruit of that Tree which is in Paradise and which comprises every good thing, and whose name is therefore πᾶν, that is 'all' (229), and of which the law of nature (230) makes man a participant? For by a universal and overruling reason every form of the good contains naturally in itself the whole, and is one (231). Who shall keep me away from food mixed from both trees? (232) For to the discerning it is by no means difficult to see what is that 'all', of which the fruit is Life; and what is that

The Tree of Life is Christ, for He is the 'All'-Good

fructus uitae, et iterum quid hoc 'mixtum'. Nam qui ab 'omni' usum
copiose proponit, ratione quadam omnino et providentia promiscuorum
participatione hominem prohibet. Et mihi uidetur magnus David et sapiens
Salomon magister huius legis expositionem suscepisse. Vterque enim concessae
escae unam intelligunt gratiam, ipsum bonum quod uere est, quod etiam omne 5
est bonum, David quidem dicens: "Delectare in domino", Salomon autem 819D
ipsam escam, quae est dominus, lignum uitae nominans. Non ergo idipsum
est lignum uitae et omne lignum, cuius cibum secundum deum formato 820A
lex dat? E contrario autem separatur ab hoc ligno alterum lignum, cuius
cibus boni et mali scientia est, dum non specialiter alterutrum e contrario 10
significatorum in parte fructificet, sed quendam confusum mixtumque
fructum pullulat, contrariis qualitatibus concretum, cuius escam prohibet dux
uitae, consilium uero dat serpens, ut morti praepararet introitum. Et suasor
factus est consilium dans, boni quadam pulchritudine ac delectatione mali
fructum circumcolorans, ut delectabiliter uideretur, ac desiderium ad gustum 15
superponeretur.

Idem in uicesimo primo eiusdem sermonis capitulo: Quid ergo est,
inquit, illud (lignum uidelicet) quod bono ac malo commixtam habet
scientiam, delectationibus quae secundum sensum sunt insitam? Non 820B
longe itaque a ueritate intueor – lignum scientiae boni et mali gnoston 20
graeci uocant, lignum uero uitae ΠΑΝ – ΓΝΟCΤΙ ligni intellectu in
occasionem theoriae utor. Arbitror enim non disciplinam hic a scriptura
intelligi per scientiam, et quandam differentiam ex scripturae consuetudine
inuenio scientiae et diiudicationis (hoc est discretionis). Nam discernere
disciplinaliter bonum ex malo perfectae habitudinis esse Apostolus dicit, 25
et exercitatorum officii sensuum. Propterea etiam praeceptum facit omnia
probandi, et spiritualis hominis diiudicare proprium esse dicit. Scientia uero
non ubique disciplinam et peritiam illius quod significatur indicat, sed ad id

6 Ps. 36, 4. 6–7 Prou. 3, 18. 24–26 Hebr. 5, 14. 26–27 I Thess. 5, 21. 27 I Cor.
2, 15.

184.17–188.22 GREGORIVS NYSSENVVS, *De imagine* 21[20] (Capp. pp. 241, 9–243, 6;
PG 44, 197C–201A).

I mixtum] uerba οὐ πέρας ὁ θάνατος (PG 44, 197A8) desunt in translatione Eriugena
I usum] usu C 3 (participatio)ne] corr. R² 7 ipsam] om. HM 7 escam] sapientiam
CHM Capp (240, 32), om. R. Graece σοφίαν (PG 44, 197B1) 8 lignum uitae] uitae ligno
C Capp (240, 33) 8 lignum] sup. l. R², om. R⁰ 8 et] sub. l. R², om. R⁰ 14 boni] bona
CHMR Capp (241, 6) 14 mali] om. CHMR Capp (241, 7) 18 lignum uidelicet] om. C
Capp (241, 10) 18 ac] et HM 19 insitam] insitum CHM Capp (241, 11) 21 ΓΝΟCΤΙ]
codd., intellige γνωστοῦ 22 utor] utens C Capp (241, 13) 23 per] om. C Capp
(241, 14) 23 et] sed C Capp (241, 14) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco ἀλλά: PG 44, 197C9)
24 diiudicationis] deiudicationis C Capp (241, 16) 24 hoc est discretionis] om. C Capp
(241, 16) 25 disciplinaliter] disciplinabiliter HM 25 perfectae] perfectioris C Capp
(241, 16) 26 officii] officiorum C Capp (241, 17) 26 propterea] propter hoc (hoc
om. HM) CHM Capp (241, 18) 27 hominis] om. C Capp (241, 18) 28 indicat] om. C
Capp (241, 20)

'mixture' of which the end is death? (233) For He Who offers that
enjoyment of that 'all' freely is the same as He Who by His providence
and by a certain principle prohibits man from participation in things
mixed. And I think that this Law (234) is explained by the great David
and the wise master Solomon: for each of them understands that the
permitted food has a single grace, the Good itself, which truly is, and
which is all good. For David says "Rejoice in the Lord", and Solomon
calls Wisdom Itself, which is the Lord, the Tree of Life. Therefore
is not that tree whose food is given by the Law (235) to him who is
formed in the image of God the Tree of Life and 'All'-tree? Separated
from it as a contrary is the other tree, whose fruit is the Knowledge
of Good and Evil: it is not the case that this tree specifically produces
in part each of the contrary things indicated; it produces a confused
and mixed kind of fruit, a composite of contrary qualities. And its
fruit is forbidden by the Lord of Life: but the serpent commends it so
as to prepare an entry for death. He persuades us, giving us counsel,
painting that fruit with the beauty of good and the delight of evil, that
it might seem desirable, and that desire might lead us to tasting.

Again in the Twentieth Chapter of the same treatise he writes: 'Now
what is that' tree 'whose fruit is the mingled knowledge of good and
evil, a knowledge which is impregnated (236) with the delights of the
senses? I think my understanding of the matter is not far from the
truth' – the Greeks call the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil
'gnoston' (237), but the Tree of Life πᾶν – 'I use the understanding
of the γνωστοῦ tree to provide a theory. I think that by knowledge
the Scripture does not mean a discipline, and I find that in the Scrip-
tures a certain distinction is drawn between knowledge and judgment'
or discrimination. 'For as the apostle tells us, skilfully to discriminate
the good from the evil is the mark of a perfect disposition, and the
service of properly trained senses. And therefore he lays it down as a
precept that all things should be judged and that judgment is the prop-
erty of the spiritual man. But knowledge does not everywhere mean a
discipline and skill in that which is signified, but an affection towards

cui gratia donata est affectum: "Cognouit dominus qui sunt eius" (hoc est suam gratiam eis donauit). Et ad Mosen ait quia "cognoscebam te super omnes". His autem qui in malitia redarguuntur dicit qui omnia nouit quia "nunquam cognoscebam uos" (hoc est meam gratiam nunquam uobis largibar). Non ergo lignum, ex quo mixta scientia fructificatur, prohibitum est? Miscetur autem ex contrariis (bono uidelicet et malo) fructus ille qui causidicum (hoc est aduocatum) suum habet serpentem, iuxta hanc forsitan rationem, quia non nudum proponitur (id est ostenditur) malum ipsum in seipso secundum propriam naturam manifestum. Ipsa enim malitia otiosa esset, nullo colorata bono, quo ad concupiscentiam suam seductum (hominem scilicet) attraheret. Nunc autem commixta quodammodo malitia est, in profundo siquidem perniciem ueluti quasdam insidias occultas habens, aperte uero in seductionem quandam boni phantasiam ostendens. Bonum uidetur auaris materiae pulchritudo; sed "radix omnium malorum philargia". Quis forsitan in foetidam paludem intemperantiae perderetur, nisi delectatione bonum atque eximium quodammodo aestimaret eam qui tali illecebra ad passionem attrahitur? Similiter habent et caetera peccata occulta differentiam habentia propriam delectationem: ex quadam seductione eximia uidentur minus considerantibus pro bono sollicitanda. Quoniam igitur multi illud in quo sensus delectantur bonum iudicant, et quia est cognominatio existentis (hoc est ueri) boni et ipsius boni quod uidetur esse (dum non sit bonum), huius rei gratia, ipsa ad malum ueluti ad bonum facta concupiscentia, boni et mali scientia a scriptura nominata est, dum affectionem quandam et concretionem boni et mali interpretatur (hoc est significat) scientia. Neque absolute malum, eo quod ambitur bono, neque pure bonum, eo quod suboccultatur malum, sed commixtum ex utrisque interdicti ligni fructum esse

1 II Tim. 2, 19. 2-3 Ex. 33, 17. 4 Matt. 7, 23. 14 I Tim. 6, 10.

1-5 Eosdem Scripturae locos citat MAXIMVS, *Ambigua ad Iohannem III*, 335-338 (CCSG 18, p. 32; PG 91, 1085B-C).

1 cui] quod C Capp (241, 20) 1 donata] donatum C Capp (241, 20) 1 affectum] ut add. C Capp (241, 21) iuxta Graecum ὡς (PG 44, 197D3) 1-2 hoc . . . donauit] om. C Capp (241, 21) 3 his] de his C Capp (241, 22) 4 cognoscebam] noui Capp (241, 23) 4-5 hoc . . . largibar] om. C Capp (241, 23) 5 largibar] largiebar HM 6 bono . . . malo] om. C Capp (241, 24) 7 hoc . . . aduocatum] om. C Capp (241, 25) 8 id est ostenditur] om. C Capp (241, 26) 10 colorata] H, J (p. corr.), M, colorato F, J (a. corr.), PR, accolorata C Capp (241, 27) 11 hominem scilicet] om. C Capp (241, 28) 11 malitia] mali natura C Capp (242, 1) 13 seductionem] seductione C Capp (242, 2) 14 philargia] philurgia R (a. corr.), philargiria MC Capp (242, 4) 14 philargia] est add. M, fit add. Capp (242, 4) 15 delectatione] delectationem C Capp (242, 5) 16 eam] om. C Capp (242, 6) 17 passionem] passiones C 17 similiter] sic C Capp (242, 7) 17 habent] CHMR Capp (242, 7), habet FJP 17 occulta] occultam CHM Capp (242, 7) 17 differentiam] codd. et Capp (242, 7). Graece: διαφθοράν (PG 44, 200B3) 18 propriam] per primam C Capp (242, 7) 21 hoc est ueri] om. C Capp (242, 10) 21 dum non sit bonum] om. C Capp (242, 11) 23 affectionem] coaffectionem C Capp (242, 12) 24 boni et mali] om. CHMR Capp (242, 13) 24 interpretatur] interpretetur C Capp (242, 13) 24 hoc est significat] om. C Capp (242, 13) 25 absolute] CHMR Capp (242, 13), absolutae FJP

that to which grace is given – as when it is written, "God knows those who are His", that is to say, He gives His grace to them. 'And to Moses He says: "For I knew you above all". But to those whose wickedness is proved He Who knows all things says: "I never knew you", that is to say, I never bestowed My grace upon you. 'Therefore is it not the tree whose fruit is this mixed knowledge that is prohibited? But that fruit which has the serpent for its spokesman', that is, advocate, 'is a mixture of contraries', to wit, of good and of evil. 'And it is perhaps for this reason that pure evil, nakedly manifested by itself and in itself according to its proper nature, is never offered', that is, is never revealed. 'For no evil would be effective which was not coloured with good, by which it may attract him whom it has seduced', that is to say man, 'to lust after it. But now it is somehow mixed with good. It harbours destruction in its depths as a secret ambush, but outwardly displays, for the purpose of seduction, a certain appearance of good. Thus the beauty of material wealth seems to the greedy a good: "but cupidity is the root of all evil". And who would fall into the filthy swamp of intemperance (238) unless he estimated it as good and something excellent in its pleasure, and by this snare is enticed into passion? (239) And it is the same with the other hidden sins, each distinguished by its own particular pleasure. They seem desirable as a good, through this great allurements (240), to those who do not examine the matter carefully. Since then many take for good that in which the senses delight, and since that which seems to be the good', while it is not, 'has the same name as the Good which is'; that is to say, the true Good 'which is Goodness itself: for this reason the concupiscence felt towards evil as though towards the Good is called by Scripture the knowledge of good and of evil, where the term 'knowledge' has the significance of a kind of interaction and concretion of 'good and evil' (241). It is neither absolutely evil, for it is surrounded by good; nor is it purely good, for evil is concealed within it: but Scripture tells us that the fruit of the forbidden tree which, it

inquit scriptura, cuius gustum dixit in mortem tangentes ducere, solummodo non aperte doctrinam clamans quia bonum quod vere est simplum et uniforme natura est, omnique duplicitate et ad contrarium copulatione alienum. Malum uero uarium et configuratum est (alicui bono commixtum) ***

Haec est doctrina ligni gnosti

et alterum per experimentum (non enim ita inuenitur sicut aestimatur esse) assumptio mortis et corruptionis principium causaque efficitur. Propterea serpens praemonstrat malignum peccanti fructum, sic ex propatulo malum non habere naturam ostendens. Non enim forsitan seduceretur homo aperto malo, sed per quandam speciositatem apertum declarauit malum, quandamque delectationem secundum sensum seducens, gustuique suadens, mulieri manifestauit, sicut ait scriptura: "Et uidit femina quia bonum lignum in escam, et quia placabile uidere, et speciosum cognoscere, et accipiens fructum eius comedit". Esca illa mater mortis hominibus facta est. Ipsa igitur mixturae est fructifera, aperte intellectum ratione interpretante, per quem boni et mali cognitio lignum illud nominatum est, quia iuxta mortiferorum malitiam quae in melle fiunt, in quantum quidem dulcorat in sensum, bonum esse uidetur, in quantum uero tangentem corrumpit, omnis mali nouissimum pessimum efficitur. Cum itaque operatum est in hominis uita malum mortiferum, tunc homo, magna res et nomen, diuinae naturae imago, "uanitati", sicut ait Propheta, "assimilatus est". Ergo si quidem imago ad id quod melius in nobis intelligitur sociatur, quaecumque circa hanc uitam tristitia miseraeque sunt, similitudinis quae ad deum est non sunt. Animaduerte qualem paradysum, et qualia ligna, qualesque fructus praefatus astruit theologus.

A. Animaduerto, clareque perspicio spiritualem profecto et inlocalem. Velim tamen aperte ac breuiter ea quae ab ipso obscurius explicata sunt a te aperiri.

N. Quisquis diligenter praefati theologi uerba perspexerit, nil aliud, ut opinor, in eis reperiet suaderi quam humanam naturam ad imaginem dei factam paradysi uocabulo, figuratae locutionis modo, a diuina scriptura significari. Vera enim plantatio dei est natura ipsa, quam ad imaginem et similitudinem suam (hoc est ad imaginem

De eo quod humana natura paradysus intelligitur

11–13 Gen. 3, 6. 20 Ps. 143, 4.

188.32–190.1 Cf. Periphyseon IV, 778A–B.

1 scriptura] om. C Capp (242, 15) 1–2 solummodo non] codd. Graece: μονονουχι (PG 44, 200C1) 3 copulatione] coniugatione C Capp (242, 18) 4 bono] mg. R², om. HMR⁰ 4 ***] ἄλλο τι νομιζόμενον (PG 44, 200C5) deest in translatione Eriugena 5–6 non enim . . . esse] apparens cuius scientia hoc est per experimentum Capp (242, 20), om. C 6 efficitur] fit C Capp (242, 21) 7 peccanti] peccati CHM, P (a. corr.), R Capp (242, 22) rectius ut uidetur (ex graeco της ἀμαρτίας: PG 44, 200C9) 9 malum] om. C Capp (242, 24) 12 placabile] oculis add. C Capp (242, 27) recte ut uidetur 16 sensum] sensu MR Capp (242, 31) 18 pessimum] om. C Capp (243, 1) 20 assimilatus] assimilatus C 20 si quidem] ἢ μὲν (PG 44, 201A3), quod Eriugena εἰ μὲν intellexit

says, brings those who taste of it to death is a mixture of both. It all but proclaims this teaching, that the good, which truly is, is simple and uniform by nature, and is free from all duality and mingling with its opposite. But evil is varied and is so formed as to have' some good mixed with it 'but is found on trial to be different'. For it is not found to be as it is estimated, 'but becomes the source of death and the cause and principle of corruption (242). Therefore the serpent shows the sinner the injurious fruit in such a way as to represent on the face of it that it has no evil. For by an obvious evil man, probably, would not have been seduced, and so he adorned the obvious evil with a specious appearance, and made it enticing by a form which was pleasurable to the sense, and thus revealed it to the woman (243), persuading her to taste it. For the Scripture says: "And the woman saw that the tree was good to eat and that it was fair to look upon, and beautiful to know, and so she accepted the fruit and ate it". And so that food became for man the mother of death. Therefore it is fruitful of mixture, if we rightly interpret the obvious sense in which that tree is named the Knowledge of Good and of Evil (244) – because in the evil of the death-bearing properties which are in its sweetness, in so far as it sweetens the sense, it appears good, but in so far as it corrupts what it touches, it is the worst evil of all (245). Therefore, when it worked in the life of man as a death-bearing evil, at that moment man, so great a thing and so great a name (246), the image of the Divine nature, "is made to resemble vanity", as the Prophet says. The image is associated with what is understood to be our better nature: but the sad and unhappy things which relate to this life do not belong to the likeness of God'. See then of what nature Paradise, its trees, and its fruits were thought to be by this theologian.

The teaching on the tree called gnoston

A. I see very well. They were clearly spiritual and unlocalised. But I should like from you a clear and brief explanation of those things which he expounds rather obscurely.

N. Whoever looks closely into the words of this theologian will find that his teaching is none other than that the word Paradise is a mere figure of speech by which Holy Scripture signifies the human nature that was made in the image of God. For what God in truth planted is that very nature which He created in Eden, that is to say, in the delight of eternal bliss (247) and the happiness of divine similitude, in His

Paradise is human nature

omnino sibi similem, praeter rationem subiecti, ut praedictum est creauit in ΕΔΕΜ (hoc est in deliciis aeternae felicitatis et beatitudine diuinae similitudinis), maior et melior omni sensibili mundo, non mole, sed dignitate naturae. Cuius terra fertilis erat corpus essenziale, immortale per possibilitatem. Naturale quippe corpus mori dicitur, quia superaddito commori uidetur, dum sit semper immortale: in se quippe refertur quod sibi superadiectum patitur, hoc est posse mori, posse non mori. Corpus nanque primi hominis, ut ait Augustinus, potuit non mori, nec moreretur, si ueneno praeuaricationis non corrumperetur, sed floribus spiritualis pulchritudinis uiresceret, neque unquam temporalibus incrementis senesceret. Cuius aqua, formarum capax, sensus incorruptibilis corporis, sensibilibus rerum sine ulla falsitatis deceptione phantasiis formatus. Cuius aer, diuinae sapientiae radiis illuminatus, ratio erat, qua rerum omnium naturas cognosceret. Cuius aether, animus, circa diuinam naturam aeterno et inerrabili motu, immutabili et mutabili statu circumuolueretur, et caetera quae de diuina imagine sunt praedicanda, immo etiam, quoniam intelligi non possunt, silentio sunt honorificanda.

In hoc itaque paradiso fontem uitae manare scriptura testatur, ex quo quattuor uirtutum flumina, in figura quattuor principalium mundi sensibilis fluuiorum diuidi narrantur, prudentiam dico, temperantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam. Quae spiritualia fluentia ex diuina sapientia, quae est totius uitae fons atque uirtutis, erumpentia, irrigant superficiem humanae naturae: prius quidem in secretis humanitatis sinibus, ueluti in occultissimis intelligibilis terrae poris, in inuisibilibus uirtutes surgentia, deinde in apertos bonarum actionum effectus scatentia, innumerabiles species uirtutum et actionum produnt. Ex ipsis enim omnis uirtus et actio progreditur, et in ipsas reuertitur. Ipsae uero ex diuina sapientia egrediuntur, et in eam reuoluuntur.

In eodem paradiso duo ligna esse praefatus theologus, magnus uidelicet Gregorius, exponit, quorum uni, ut ait ipse, nomen est ΠΑΝ (hoc est omne), alteri uero ΓΝΟCTON (quod est scibile). Cuius nominis interpretatio, si ad liquidum proferatur, non satis intellectum ligni exprimit. Propterea, ut facilius intelligatur quid

8-11 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litt.* VI, xxv-xxvi, 36-37 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 197-198; PL 34, 354). Cf. *De praedestinatione* V, 9 (CCCM 50, pp. 40, 196-41, 205; PL 122, 379B-C). 19-22 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIII, xxi, 14-20 (CCSL 48, p. 404; PL 41, 394-395). 29-30 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* III, 14 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 273, 17-274, 2; PL 14, 280C). 31-33 GREGORIVS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 20 [21] (Capp, pp. 241, 9-243, 6; PG 44, 197C-201A).

4 essenziale] *om. HMR* 5-8 naturale quippe . . . non mori] *om. HMR* 8 ut ait augustinus] *om. HMR* 9-10 si ueneno . . . corrumperetur] *partim sup. l. partim mg. R², om. R⁰* 21 sensibilis] *mg. R², om. HMR⁰* 33 ΓΝΟCTON] *codd., intellige γνωστόν* 33 quod est scibile] *om. HMR*

image and likeness, that is, in an image which in every way resembles Himself save only, as I have said before, in his status of subject – a nature which is greater and more excellent than the whole sensible universe, not in respect of size, but in respect of the dignity of its nature. And the fertile earth of this Paradise was the essential body, which possesses a possible immortality. For the natural body is said to die because it appears to share the death of that which is added to it: but in fact it is always immortal in itself. For statements such as 'It has the possibility of dying, and the possibility of not dying' – death being something that affects what is added to it – are (wrongly) taken as referring to it. For the body of the First Man, as St. Augustine says, might not have died, and would not have died if it had not been corrupted by the poison of transgression, but would have blossomed with the flowers of spiritual beauty, and would never have grown old with the accumulation of time. And the water of this Paradise was the sense of the incorruptible body able to receive forms and formed by the phantasies of sensible things without being deceived. And the air of this Paradise, illuminated by the rays of the Divine wisdom, was the reason, by which it might have knowledge of all things. And the ether was the mind which was centred on the Divine nature in an eternal and ineffable motion and a mutable and immutable stability (248). And so for the other things which are to be predicated about the image of the Divine nature, but which, since they cannot be understood, must be honoured in silence.

Therefore Scripture testifies that in this Paradise flows the Fountain of Life, from which we are told, under an allegory of the four principal rivers of the sensible world, that the four streams of the virtues divide, namely, prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice. And these spiritual rivers bursting forth from the Divine wisdom, which is the fount of all life and all virtue, water the surface of human nature: first, arising in the secret recesses of humanity (249), in the most hidden channels, as it were, of the intelligible earth they issue in invisible virtues: then they spread out into the manifest effects of good actions and produce innumerable kinds of virtues and acts. For from them every virtue and every act proceeds and into them returns: but they themselves proceed from the Divine wisdom, and into It return.

In the same Paradise there are two trees, of which, according to the exposition of the great Gregory, the one is called πᾶν, that is, 'all', the other γνωστόν, that is 'knowable': but if we analyse the interpretation of this word, it does not satisfactorily express the meaning of the tree. Therefore, for the sake of a better understanding of what is signified by

eo ligno significatur, placuit nobis ΓΝΟCTON uertere in 'mixtum'. Quid est ergo ΠΑΝ, de cuius fructu iussus est homo cibum sumere? ΠΑΝ profecto est illud lignum, de quo scriptura dicit: *Produxitque dominus deus de humo omne lignum pulchrum uisu et ad uescendum suauae, lignum etiam uitae in medio paradisi.* Animaduerte quomodo unum 5 idipsumque lignum duobus modis prophetica theoria et narrat et nominat. Primum quidem *omne lignum dixit pulchrum uisu et ad uescendum suauae,* et iterum *lignum etiam uitae in medio paradisi,* et paulo post: *Ex omni ligno paradisi comede,* unum lignum 'omne' lignum uocitans. Nemo ergo sequentium praedicti theologi doctrinam 10 existimet in paradiso esse plurima ligna diuersarum formarum, diuersorumque fructuum, ueluti quandam siluam multis arboribus copiosam, sed duo solummodo: unum quidem ΠΑΝ, alterum uero ΓΝΟCTON.

De 'omni' ligno paradisi, quod est Christus 15
Et est ΠΑΝ ΞΙΑON (hoc est 'omne' lignum) paradisi uerbum et sapientia patris, dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui est 'omne' lignum fructiferum, in medio humanae naturae paradisi plantatum, duplici uidelicet modo. Primo quidem secundum suam diuinitatem, qua nostram naturam et creat, et continet, et nutrit, et uiuificat, et 20 illuminat, et deificat, et mouet, et esse facit: *In ipso enim uiuimus, et mouemur, et sumus.* Secundo uero, quo nostram naturam, ut saluaret eam et in statum pristinum reuocaret, in unitatem substantiae sibi adiunxit, ut in duabus naturis subsisteret, diuina uidelicet atque humana. Et hoc est quod scriptura ait: *Produxitque dominus deus de humo,* hoc est ex materiali nostra natura, *omne lignum,* hoc est 25 uerbum incarnatum, in quo et per quod facta sunt omnia, et quod est omnia. Ipsum enim solummodo est substantiale bonum, caetera enim quae dicuntur esse bona, non per se, sed participatione ipsius bona sunt, qui per se uere existens bonum est, et omne bonum, et bonitas, et totius boni et bonitatis fons et origo, causa et principium, 30 finis et perfectio, motus atque quies, medium et extremitas, ambitus et locus. Cuius fructus uita aeterna est. Cuius esus gaudium et laetitia et ineffabiles deliciae. Cuius aspectus pulcher est: ipse siquidem pulchrum, et pulchritudo totius pulchri, et pulchritudinis causa et plenitudo. Cuius gustus et comestio nescit saturitatem: eo 35 siquidem in quantum quis uescitur, in tantum in desiderium uescendi suscitatur. De hoc itaque 'omni' ligno (id est omnium bonorum 824A

3-5 Gen. 2, 9. 9 Gen. 2, 16. 20-21 Act. 17, 28. 24-25 Gen. 2, 9.

15-16 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, v, 9 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 237, 3-4; PL 34, 376).

2 est¹] ergo add. R⁰ (ab R² cancellatum) 2 ergo ΠΑΝ . . . sumere] mg. R², om. R⁰ 14 ΓΝΟCTON] codd., intellige γνωστόν 15 ΞΙΑON] codd., intellige ξύλον 15 paradisi] om. HMR 35 et¹] sup. l. R², om. R⁰ 36 qu(antum qui)s] corr. R², tantum qui R⁰

that tree we have decided to substitute for γνωστόν the term 'mixed' (250). But what is this πᾶν, of whose fruit man was commanded to feed? Πᾶν is that tree of which the Scripture says: 'And the Lord God produced from the earth the 'All'-tree that is fair to look upon and pleasant to taste, the Tree of Life in the midst of Paradise'. Notice how the Prophetic Meditation describes and names one and the same tree in two ways: first as 'the 'All'-tree' that is fair to look upon and pleasant to taste', and then as the 'Tree of Life in the midst of Paradise'. And a little later: 'eat from the 'All'-tree of Paradise', where by the 'All'-tree is meant a single tree. Now, let no follower of our theologian's doctrine imagine that there was in Paradise a large number of trees of different forms and different fruits, as though it were a forest thick with trees: there were but two, the one πᾶν, and the other γνωστόν.

And the πᾶν ξύλον, that is, the 'All'-tree, of Paradise is the Word and Wisdom of the Father, Our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is the fruit-bearing 'All'-tree and is planted in the midst of the Paradise of human nature (251) in two ways: first through His own divinity, by which He creates our nature and contains it and endows it with nourishment and life and light and godhead and movement and being: 'for in Him we live and move and have our being'; and secondly through taking our nature upon Him in the unity of His substance in order that He might save it and recall it to its former state – so that He came to subsist in two natures, a divine and a human. And this is what the Scripture says: 'And the Lord God produced from the earth', that is, from our material nature, 'the 'All'-tree', that is, the Incarnate Word, in Which and through Which all things are made, and Which is all things. For It alone is the substantial Good. The other things which are called good are good not through themselves but through participation in Him Who in Himself truly is the Good Which is, and all good and goodness, and the fount and origin, the cause and principle, the end and perfection, the movement and rest, the middle and the end, the environment and the place, of all good and goodness (252): and His fruit is life eternal, and His food is joy and bliss and ineffable delight, and His countenance is fair to look upon. For He is the Beautiful and the Beauty that lies in all things beautiful, and He is the cause and perfection of Beauty (253), and those who taste and feed on Him know no satiety: for the more they feed on Him the greater grows their desire for that repast. From this 'All'-tree then, that is to say,

The 'All'-tree of Paradise is Christ

plenitudine) primi homines iussi sunt cibum sumere, et adhuc
omni generi humano inde uiuere praecipitur. Quoniam uero primi
parentes cibum inde sumere noluerunt, praeponentes ei prohibiti
ligni mortiferum fructum, non solum illi, uerum etiam totum genus
ab eis propagatum iustissimo diuino iudicio et ex dignitate naturae
expulsi sunt, ac morte damnati. Videsne igitur quid 'omnis' ligni
uocabulo figurate diuinus Propheta, immo sanctus spiritus per
Prophetam significare uoluit?

A. Plane uideo, et nihil aliud, ut arbitror, praeter deum uerbum
hominem factum, omne bonum totius paradisi (hoc est totius nostrae
naturae), et non aliud praeter ipsum, subsistere. De quo comedere
(hoc est pio intellectu eum percipere seu fide credere) uita aeterna
est et incorruptibilis sanitas, ignorare uero uel negare mors aeterna
est et infinita corruptio.

N. Clare perspicis. Restat itaque de ΓΝΟCΤΩ dicere, hoc est de
ligno scientiae boni et mali. Iam diximus ΓΝΟCΤON, non de uerbo
ad uerbum, sed de sensu ad sensum, faciliori intellectu mixtum
interpretari posse. Et est quidem ΓΝΟCΤON, iuxta praefatum
magistrum, cuius sententiam de paradiso et sequimur, et aperiendae
obscuritatis gratia recapitulamus, malitia in phantasia boni colorata,
corporis sensibus insita, priori ligno, quod est ΠΑΝ, omnino
contrarium. Vt enim in illo omne bonum imaginatur et omne
bonum est, ita in isto uniuersitas totius mali. Illud igitur est omne
bonum uere subsistens, hoc autem omne malum per phantasiam
boni omnes malos seducens. Cur autem utrumque lignum, hoc
est 'omne' lignum (quod etiam lignum uitae uocatur) et alterum
lignum 'scientiae boni et mali' in medio paradisi esse narrantur, non
otiosa est quaestio. Quae tamen, ut opinor, tali modo solui potest, si
primum quidem tota humana natura, uisibilis uidelicet et inuisibilis,
exterior et interior, ad imaginem dei facta et propter peccatum
superaddita intimanda fuerit.

Quisquis itaque textum sermonis beati Gregorii de imagine
intentus inspexerit, senariam totius humanae naturae, et generaliter
in omnibus, et specialiter in singulis, partitionem reperiet. Ac
primum in duas ueluti principales partes segregatur; et una quidem
corpori attribuitur, altera uero animae. Et ea quidem quae corpori

11-13 Ioh. 6, 52; 17, 3.

16-17 CICERO, *De optimo genere oratorum* V, 14-15. HORATIUS, *De arte poetica* 133-134.
HIERONYMVS, *Epistula* 57 (CSEL 54, p. 508, 10-13; PL 22, 571). 17-18 Cf. *Periphyseon*
IV, 823A.

7 sanctus spiritus] spiritus sanctus HMR 12 eum] om. HMR 15 ΓΝΟCΤΩ] codd.,
intellige γνωστῶ 16 ΓΝΟCΤON] codd., intellige γνωστὸν 18 ΓΝΟCΤON] codd.,
intellige γνωστὸν 21 corporis] corporeis HM, R² 26 alterum] sup. l. R², om. R⁰

this plentitude of all goods, the first human beings were ordered to
take their food: and the whole human genus until now is bidden to
live by it. But since our first parents refused to take their food there-
from, preferring to it the deadly fruit of the Forbidden Tree, not only
they but the whole genus which sprang from them were by the most
righteous decree of God expelled from the dignity of their nature
and condemned to death. Do you now see what the holy Prophet,
or rather, the Holy Spirit through the Prophet, wished to signify by
the phrase 'All'-tree?

A. I see clearly: nothing else, I think, but God the Word made man
is the 'All'-good of the whole of Paradise, that is to say, of the whole of
our nature, and nothing else subsists than Him to partake of Whom
(that is, to regard Him with a devout mind, or believe in Him faith-
fully) is eternal life and incorruptible health; but not to know Him or
to deny Him is eternal death and infinite corruption.

N. You understand correctly. It now remains to speak of the
γνωστὸν, that is, the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. It
has already been suggested that to make things easier the word
γνωστὸν be translated not literally but in such a way as to give a true
interpretation of its meaning, 'mixed'. And in fact according to the
above mentioned master whose teaching about Paradise we follow
and reproduce in order to dissipate the obscurity of the problem,
the γνωστὸν is that evil disguised under the colour of good which
is instilled into the bodily senses and is the direct opposite of the
former tree, the πᾶν. For just as in that tree all good is reflected and
all good exists, so in this is the totality of all evil. The one, therefore,
is all good which truly subsists, the other every evil which seduces
all evil men by its appearance of good. Now it is not irrelevant to
enquire why the account relates that both trees were in the midst of
Paradise, the 'Tree', which is also called the Tree of Life, and the
other 'Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil'. And the answer,
I think, can be found if it be first supposed that the whole of human
nature was implied, that is to say, the visible and the invisible, the
exterior and the interior, that which was created in the image of God
and that which was added to it on account of sin.

Anyone who has read carefully the text of the blessed Gregory's
Treatise on the Image will find that there is in the whole of human
nature, both generally in all and specifically in individuals, a sixfold
division (254). First there is the division into the two principal parts
of the body and the soul; then body, that is, the exterior man, is

The Tree of
Knowledge
of Good and
Evil which is
called *gnoston*

The six parts
of man

(exteriori uidelicet homini) datur, in tres partes rationabili contuitu
 I separatur. Quarum prima corpus ipsum est, formata materia
 constitutum, de quo solummodo praedicatur esse, quo in humana
 II natura nil inferius intelligitur. Secunda pars est sursum uersus quae
 multis nominibus appellari et solet et potest. Dicitur enim nutritiua et
 5 auctiua, quia nutrit corpus, et auget, et continet in uno, ne defluat et
 soluatur. Vocatur etiam uitalis motus. Nec immerito, quod non solum
 uitam corpori praestat, uerum etiam mouet illud, siue localiter per
 spatia locorum, siue per numeros locorum et temporum: locorum
 nunc dico quibus plenitudo membrorum impletur, temporum uero
 10 quibus incrementa aetatum ad perfectionem ducuntur. Tertia pars
 est quae in quinquepartito corporeo sensu dinoscitur. Quae uidelicet
 pars phantasias omnium rerum sensibilium quae circa hominem
 exteriorem intelliguntur recipit, memoriaeque tradit. In his tribus
 partibus totus exterior homo constituitur. Interior uero homo,
 15 qui in anima sola subsistit, et ad imaginem dei factus est, alteram
 III tripertitam recipit discretionem. Habet enim sensum interiorem,
 per quem anima phantasias sensibilium rerum, quas per corporeum
 20 sensum excipit, discernit atque diiudicat. Deinde rationem possidet,
 per quam omnium rerum, quas uel intelligere uel sentire potest,
 VI rationes inuestigat. Summum hominis est animus, ultra quem in
 humana natura nil superius inuenitur, cuius proprium officium est
 et praedictas partes inferiores se regere, et ea quae supra se sunt
 (deum suum uidelicet, et ea quae in ipso et proxime circa ipsum
 subsistunt), quantum sinitur ascendere, contemplari. Videsne igitur
 25 senariam humanae naturae discretionem? Est enim, et uiuit, et
 sentit per corpus; sentit extra corpus, ratiocinatur, intelligit. Sed
 illa tria, quae in inferiori parte hominis cognoscuntur, corruptibilia
 sunt, solutionique obnoxia; ternarius uero superioris partis, qui
 30 in sola anima omnino absolute constitutus est, incorruptibilis et
 insolubilis et aeternus, merito dum in eo imago diuinae naturae
 expressa est. Ideoque a graecis, ut in prioribus libris docuimus,
 ΟΥΪΙΑ, ΔΥΝΑΜΙC et ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ praefatus ternarius humanae
 animae uocatur, qui teste sancto Dionysio nec solui, nec corrumpi,
 nec ullo modo perire potest. 35

32-34 Cf. *Periphyseon* I, 486B-C. 489C-490B; II, 567A. *Expositiones in Hier. cael.*
 XI, 71-103 (CCCM 31, pp. 159-160; PL 122, 229C-230B). 34-35 DIONYSIUS
 AREOPAGITA, *Cael. Hier.* XI, 2. *Diu. Nom.* IV, 1. 10. 23 (PG 3, 284D-285A.
 693B. 705C. 724C-725A; PL 122, 1059D. 1129A. 1134A. 1142A-B). Vide notulam quam
 Sheldon-Williams suae editioni apposuit: *Periphyseon* I, p. 237, n. 144. Iuxta *Periphyseon*
 I, 490A-B, essentiam incorruptibilem esse Dionysius asserit in *De Diu. Nom.* IV, 23 (PG
 3, 724C-725A; PL 122, 1142A-B).

4 sursum uersus] *mg.* R², *om.* R⁰ 12 dinoscitur] *HMPR*⁰, *denoscitur* *FJPR*²
 14 exteriorem] *mg.* R², *om.* R⁰ 19 deinde] *sup.* l. R², *om.* R⁰ 28 (in)
 in(feriori)] R² 31 et] *sup.* l. R⁸, *om.* R⁰ 33 ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ] *ENAPTIA MR*, *intellige*
 ἐνέργεια

logically divided into three subdivisions, of which the first is the
 body itself constituted out of formed matter, of which only being
 may be predicated, than which the understanding finds nothing
 lower in human nature. The second part, which lies above it, may
 be called, and is customarily called, by many names. Thus it is
 named the nutritive and active part because it provides the body
 with nourishment and causes it to grow and holds it together that it
 may not fall apart and dissolve. It is also called vital motion, a name
 which is appropriate because not only does it give life to the body,
 but also motion, either locally through space or through numbers of
 place and time – by numbers of place I here mean those in which
 the fulness of the body's parts is achieved, and by numbers of time
 those in which increases of ages are brought to perfection. The
 third subdivision, which is manifested in the five-fold bodily sense,
 receives the phantasies of all sensible objects which surround man
 externally and conveys them to the memory. In these three parts the
 whole of the exterior man is constituted. But the inner man, who
 subsists in the soul alone, and is made in the image of God, has also a
 three-fold division. For it possesses the interior sense, through which
 the soul distinguishes and forms judgments upon the phantasies
 of the sensible objects which she receives through the corporeal
 sense. Next she possesses reason, through which she investigates the
 'reasons' of all things which are apprehended by the intelligence
 or the sense. But the highest part of man is the mind, above which
 there is found nothing higher in human nature, and whose proper
 function is the government of the parts which are inferior to it, and
 the contemplation of what lies above it, namely, God, and of what
 lies in Him and subsists about Him, according as it is allowed to
 ascend. Is the sixfold division of human nature clear to you? Human
 nature is, and lives and perceives through the body; it perceives and
 reasons, and intellects outside of the body. But the three properties
 which are discerned in the lower part of man are corruptible and
 susceptible to dissolution, while the triad of the upper part, which is
 wholly and absolutely constituted in the soul alone, is incorruptible
 and indissoluble and eternal, as befits that which has impressed upon
 it the image of the Divine nature. And therefore, as we have shown
 in the previous books, the Greeks give to this triad in human nature,
 which St. Dionysius tells us can neither be dissolved nor corrupted
 nor in any way destroyed, the names οὐσία, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια.

Considera ergo extremitates humanae naturae ueluti cuiuspiam paradisi terminos, sursum uersus atque deorsum, extra quos nulla creata intelligitur natura. Siquidem ultra animum solus deus est, infra materiem (corpus dico solum) nihil est, non illud nihil quod per excellentiam naturae, sed illud quod per priuationem totius naturae 5
et dicitur et cogitatur. Inuenies itaque, ni fallor, animum summum 825D
naturae humanae locum obtinere, corpus uero materiale infimum. Intuere etiam media eiusdem naturae, et inuenies infra animum superius rationem, supra corpus inferius uitalem motum, nutritiuam dico uitam; et iterum in ipsa medietate naturae, ueluti in medio 10
paradisi, duos sensus, exteriorem uidelicet uitali motui corporique adhaerentem, et interiorem rationi animoque inseparabiliter et consubstantialiter coniunctum. In his igitur duobus sensibus, ueluti in quibusdam duobus locis medii humanae naturae paradisi, duo illa intelligibilia ligna, IAN uidelicet et ΓNOCTON, intelliguntur: IAN 826A
quidem in interiori sensu, ΓNOCTON uero in exteriori. 16

De 'omni' ligno et de ligno scientiae boni et mali in humana natura

In interiori enim homine habitat ueritas et omne bonum, quod est uerbum dei, filius dei unigenitus, dominus noster Iesus Christus, extra quem nullum bonum est, quoniam ipse est omne uerum et substantiale bonum et bonitas. Cui e contrario, ex diuersa parte, 20
malum et malitia opponitur. Et quia omne malum nec in natura rerum substantialiter inuenitur, neque ex certa causa et naturali procedit (per se enim consideratum, omnino nihil est, praeter irrationabilem et peruersum imperfectumque rationabilis naturae motum), nullam aliam in uniuersa creatura sedem reperit, nisi 25
ubi falsitas possidet. Propria autem falsitatis possessio est sensus corporeus. Nulla enim alia pars humanae naturae falsitatis errorem recipit, praeter sensum exteriorem: siquidem per ipsum et interior sensus et ratio, ipse etiam intellectus saepissime fallitur. In loco itaque falsitatis et uanarum phantasiarum, hoc est in sensu corporeo 30
(qui a graecis AICΘHCIC uocatur, et sub figura mulieris insinuatur), ΓNOCTON (hoc est lignum scientiae boni et mali) constituitur, malitia uidelicet in phantasia boni colorata, uel malum configuratum bono, uel ut simpliciter dicam, falsum bonum uel malum sub figura boni latens. Cuius fructus mixta scientia est, hoc est confusa: 35
confunditur enim ex malo latente et ex forma boni patefacta, ac per hoc seducit primo sensum, in quo est, ueluti quandam mulierem discernere non ualentem inter malitiam quae latet, et formam boni qua ipsa malitia ambitur. 826C

17 AVGVSTINVS, *De uera religione* XXXIX, 72 (CCSL 32, p. 234, 12-13; PL 34, 154).

9-10 nutritiuam dico uitam] *om. HMR* 15 ΓNOCTON] *codd., intellige*
γνωστόν 16 ΓNOCTON] *codd., intellige γνωστόν* 16 exteriori] *exteriore HMR*
32 ΓNOCTON] *codd., intellige γνωστόν*

Therefore the limits of human nature are to be considered as the upper and the lower boundaries of Paradise, beyond which no created nature may be supposed to exist. For above mind there is only God and below matter, (I mean body only) there is nothing – not that nothing which is called so and thought to be so because of the transcendence of its nature, but that which is conceived and called so because of its lack of all nature. You will also find, if I am not mistaken, that mind holds the highest place in human nature, and the material body the lowest. And if you now turn to the intermediate parts of the same nature you will find below mind, on the upper side, reason, and above body, on the lower side, vital motion, by which I mean the nutritive life principle; and again in the midst of this nature, as in the midst of Paradise, two senses, the exterior which adheres to the vital motion and the body, and the interior sense which is inseparably joined to reason and mind, and is consubstantial with them. Therefore, these two senses, occupying as it were the two middle positions of the Paradise of human nature, represent those two intelligible trees, πᾶν and γνωστόν: the interior πᾶν and the exterior γνωστόν.

For in the interior of man abide truth and every good, which is the Word of God, the only-begotten Son of God, Our Lord Jesus Christ outside of Whom there is no good, since He is all True and substantial Good and Goodness. And to Him is opposed on the other side the evil thing and evil. And since there is no evil which is found to exist substantially in nature, nor proceeds from a fixed and natural cause – for considered in itself it is absolutely nothing (255) but the irrational and perverse and imperfect motion of the rational nature – it can find no other abode in the universal creature save where falsehood resides: and the proper residence of falsehood is in the corporeal sense. For no part of human nature is the recipient of error except the exterior sense, and that is the means through which the interior sense, the reason, and even mind are very often led astray. Therefore it is in this place of falsehood and vain phantasies, namely in the corporeal sense which the Greeks call αἰσθησις and is symbolised by the woman, that γνωστόν, that is, the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil, is established, which is evil painted to resemble good, or evil in the form of good, or, to speak plainly, a false good, or evil hiding under the guise of good, whose fruit is a confused or mixed knowledge. For there is in it a confusion of hidden evil and apparent good which at first, as a woman, seduces the sense, in which it lies, unable to discern the hidden evil and the appearance of good by which it is disguised.

The 'All'-tree and Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in human nature

Malitia siquidem per se deformitas quaedam est et abhominabilis turpitudine. Quam si per seipsam errans sensus cognosceret, non solum non sequeretur neque ea delectaretur, uerum etiam fugeret et abhorreret. Errat autem insipiens sensus, ac per hoc decipitur, credens malum bonum et pulchrum esse et ad usum suaue. Verbi 5
 Quomodo fallitur mulier per lignum scientiae boni et mali gratia, ut aliquo utamur exemplo, phantasia auri uel cuiuspiam sensibilis materiae corporeo sensui imprimitur: ipsa phantasia pulchra atque formosa uidetur, quia de creatura bona extrinsecus assumpta est; sed mulier (hoc est carnalis sensus) decipitur et delectatur, non sentiens latentem sub ipsa falsa et phantastica 10
 pulchritudine malitiam, hoc est philargiam, quae est *radix omnium malorum*. *Qui uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam*, dominus inquit, *iam moechatus est in corde suo*. Ac si aperte diceret: Qui phantasiam de forma feminea suo carnali infigit sensui, iam moechatus est in cogitatione sua, appetens turpitudinem libidinis, quae se latenter 15
 attrahit sub falsa illa muliebris formae imaginatione. Est igitur, ut praediximus, lignum scientiae boni et mali malitia perniciosa mortiferaque in figura boni imaginata; et hoc lignum ueluti intra quandam feminam (in carnali scilicet sensu, quem decipit) constitutum. Cui sensui si animus consenserit, totius naturae 827A
 humanae integritas corrumpitur. Excelsissima nanque naturae 21
 parte praeuaricante, qualis inferior salua remanebit? Cuius ligni fructus scientia est ex bono et malo, hoc est indiscretus mali bono imaginati appetitus, et amor, et concupiscentia, et delectatio. Per 25
 quam, ueluti per quendam colubrum, antiquus hostis humani generis primo praeuaricationem suavitatis, deinde mortem totius naturae adiecit: animae quidem deserentis deum, corporis uero ab anima deserti. Scientia itaque in hoc loco non doctrinam quandam cognitionis et diiudicationis naturarum, sed illicitum motum atque confusum appetitum ad concupiscendum malum, hoc est peccatum 30
 similitudinis boni falsa specie seducendi gratia coloratum significat. Sed fortassis quaerere uis utrum deus tale lignum, cuius fructus mixtus atque confusus appetitus est boni et mali, cuius natura est malum phantasia boni coloratum, cuius esca causa mortis exstitit, in paradiso humanae naturae plantauit. 35

A. Profecto quaero, et nec otiose quaerendum uideo. Si enim deus creauit illud, fortassis aestimabitur conditor mali et causa mortis esse, quod impiissimum est de auctore omnium bonorum dicere, quanto

11-12 1 Tim. 6, 10. 12-13 Matth. 5, 28.

6 exemplo] dum *mg. add. HM* 11 philargiam] philargiriam *HM* 18 hoc] hoc est *HM*, est hoc *R* 23 fructus] mixta *add. HMR* 34 exstitit] extitit *HJM*

For in itself evil is a deformity and an abhorrent ugliness which, if the erring sense beheld undisguised, it would not only refuse to follow or take delight in, but would flee from and abhor (256). But the unwitting sense errs, and in erring is deceived, because it takes the evil for something which is good and fair to look upon and pleasant to taste. To take an example, when the phantasia of gold, for instance, or of any other sensible material, is impressed upon the corporeal sense, the phantasia itself seems fair and lovely, because it is taken from a creature which is outwardly good. But the woman, that is the carnal sense, is deceived and delights in it without perceiving the evil which lies hidden in the false and phantastic beauty, that is to say, cupidity which is the 'root of all evil'. 'Whoever looks on a woman to lust after her', says the Lord, 'has already committed adultery with her in his heart', meaning by that: whoever implants in his carnal desire the phantasia which is taken from the female form has already committed adultery in his thought, for he is seeking the ugliness of lust which is enticing him secretly under that false imagination of the female form.

So then, as we have said above, the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is pernicious and deadly wickedness masquerading under the form of good, and this tree is planted, as it were, in a woman, that is, in the carnal sense, which it deceives. And if the mind consents to the sense, then the integrity of the whole of human nature is destroyed. For if the highest part of that nature transgresses, what lower part will remain unharmed? And the fruit of this tree is the mingled knowledge of good and of evil, that is, the indiscriminating appetite of evil imagined as good, and love and lust and pleasure, through which in the form of a serpent the ancient enemy of the human genus first urged transgression and then brought death upon the whole of nature: upon the soul which abandoned God, and upon the body which was deserted by the soul. Knowledge, therefore, in this place signifies not some science of the recognizing and distinguishing of natures, but an illicit motion and confused hankering after a coveted evil, that is, sin, which for the purpose of deception is disguised in the false appearance of a likeness to the good. But perhaps you wish to enquire whether it was God Who implanted in the Paradise of human nature such a tree, whose fruit is the mixed and confused appetite for good and evil, whose nature is evil disguised under the phantasia of good, whose food was the cause of death?

A. Certainly I wish to ask that, and I think it is proper that I should. For if God did create it, He might well be considered the Creator of evil and the Cause of death – which would be a most impious thing to say of Him Who is the Author of all good things, and all the more

How the woman is deceived through the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil

magis credere uel existimare. Si autem a deo non est plantatum, unde illud naturae humanae est insitum?

N. Primo itaque consulenda est sancta scriptura, quae incunctanter illud lignum, quod est IAN, ad diuinam plantationem pertinere testatur dicens: *Produxitque dominus deus de humo omne lignum pulchrum uisu et ad uescendum suauē*, ac ueluti ipsius ligni, quod est 'omne', 6 qualitatem explanans: *lignum etiam uitae in medio paradisi*. Ac si aperte diceret: illud lignum non solum omne bonum et omne pulchrum et omnis esca suauis ac spiritualis, uerum etiam lignum uitae, quo uiuit paradisi ille (humana uidelicet natura), in cuius medio constitutum 10 est.

Quod autem sequitur – *lignumque scientiae boni et mali* – non satis elucet utrum a superioribus suppletur, ut ita legatur: *Produxitque lignum scientiae boni et mali in medio paradisi*, quemadmodum lignum uitae, an etiam ita introductum est absolute: *Lignumque scientiae boni et mali*, ut non productum a deo intelligamus, sed solummodo superiori ligno contraria qualitate oppositum, ut quemadmodum illud omne bonum et uita causaque uiuentium, ita et illud omne malum et mors causaque morientium. An forte debemus intelligere (quoniam scientiae boni et mali est lignum) in quantum forma boni ambitur ex deo esse, quoniam ipse est totius formae et pulchritudinis causa, siue ipsa forma et pulchritudo in aliqua substantia intelligatur uel sentiatur, siue in phantasiis sensibilis materiae, quarum propria sedes est sensus corporeus, quia per ipsum interiori sensui inferuntur; in quantum uero ipsum malum 828A forma boni ambitum ac per seipsum informe et incognitum malum 26 est, nec a deo esse nec ab aliqua causa certa ac diffinita? Malum siquidem uarium est et incausale, quoniam in rerum natura omnino substantialiter non inuenitur. Illud igitur lignum, in quantum malum 30 est, nulli causae refertur, quoniam omnino nihil est; in quantum uero formatur bono ut incautos decipiat, quoniam materia illa cuius phantasia formatur ex omnium bonorum conditore et facta est et bona est, non omnino malum. Forma itaque, per quam malum seducit eos quos interimit, bona est, quoniam cuiuspiam boni phantasia est; ipsum uero malum omnino malum est, et a nullo bono 35 factum, quoniam omni bono est contrarium. Proinde si naturam 828B phantasiarum, quibus coloratur malum, quod per seipsum apparere non potest, quoniam informe et deforme et turpe est et incausale, quis acute inspexerit, ipsam profecto omnino bonam reperiet.

5-7 Gen. 2, 9. 12 Gen. 2, 9.

8 bonum] est *add. H, M (sup. L)* 22 *et*²] *sup. l. R², om. R⁰* 30 quoniam] quia *HM*

impious to believe or think it. But if it was not planted by God, whence was the seed of it sown in human nature?

N. We must first consult Holy Scripture which unhesitatingly ascribes a divine planting to that tree which is called πᾶν. For it says: 'And the Lord God produced out of the earth the 'All'-tree that is fair to look upon and pleasant to feed upon', and then, as though in explanation of the quality of that tree which is 'All' tree, 'the Tree of Life in the midst of Paradise'. By this is meant that that tree is not only all good and all beautiful and all pleasant and spiritual food, but also the Tree of Life, by which that Paradise, that is, human nature, is alive, for it is planted in the midst of it.

But it is not sufficiently clear whether that which follows, 'and the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil,' is governed by the preceding words, so that we should read 'and He brought forth' the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil 'in the middle of Paradise' as He did the Tree of Life, or whether the phrase is to be taken independently: 'and there was the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil', so that we should not take it to have been brought forth by God, but only opposed by its contrary quality to the first tree, so that as that was all good and life and the cause of life in those who live, so this was all evil and death and the cause of death in those who die. Or perhaps, since it is the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil, we should understand that in respect of its form of good it is from God: for He is the Cause of every form and all beauty, whether that form and that beauty are perceived by the mind or the sense in some substance or whether they lie in the phantasies of sensible matter which are received by the senses and of which the bodily sense is the proper abode – since it is from the bodily sense that they are carried to the interior sense. But in respect of the evil itself which is clothed in the form of the good, but which in itself has no form and is unknown, it is neither from God nor from any sure or definite cause. For evil is inconstant and without cause (257), for as a substance it does not occur anywhere in nature. Therefore that tree in respect of its evil is not to be referred to any cause, because it is entirely devoid of being: but the form of good by which the unwary are deceived, because it is taken from matter (by the phantasy of which it is formed) which is both made and made good by the Creator of all things, consequently can be by no means evil. Therefore the form by which evil seduces those whom it destroys is good, since it is the phantasy of a good: but the evil itself is absolutely evil and is not created by any good, for it is the contrary of every good. And if anyone examines closely the nature of the phantasies by which evil is painted, for in her naked self she cannot appear, being without form and deformed and shameful and without cause, he will see for himself that it is altogether good.

Quod tali argumento manifestissime possumus approbare. Ponamus duos homines, unum quidem sapientem et nullo modo auaritiæ stimulis titillatum seu compunctum, alterum uero aultum, auarum, omnino peruersæ cupiditatis aculeis confixum ac laceratum. His duobus uno loco constitutis afferatur uas aliquod 5 obrizo auro factum, pretiosissimis gemmis decoratum, forma pulcherrima compositum, regali usu dignum. Ambo illud aspiciunt, sapiens uidelicet et auarus, ambo ipsius uasis phantasiam suo corporeo sensu recipiunt, memoriae infigunt, cogitatione tractant. 828C Et sapiens quidem simpliciter ad laudem creatoris naturarum 10 pulchritudinem illius uasis, cuius phantasiam intra semetipsum considerat, omnino refert: nulla ei cupiditatis illecebra surripit, nullum philargiæ uenenum intentionem puræ ipsius mentis inficit, nulla libido contaminat. Auarus uero penitus e contrario. Ille 15 nanque, mox ut phantasiam uasis imbiberit, cupiditatis flamma ardescit, consumitur, contaminatur, moritur, pulchritudinem naturæ ipsiusque phantasiarum non ad laudem ipsius qui dixit: *Meum est aurum, meum est argentum* referens, sed seipsum in foetidissimam cupiditatis paludem immergens et ingurgitans. Videsne unius uasis 20 phantasiam in utroque bonam et pulchram? Sed in sapienti sensu simplex est et naturalis, nullaque ei malitia subest; in auaro autem duplex et mixta ex contrario malo cupiditatis, quæ ei miscetur et ab ea formatur et coloratur, ut uideatur esse bonum, dum sit uenenosissimum malum.

Non ergo in natura humana plantatum est malum, sed in 25 peruerso et irrationabili motu rationabilis liberaeque uoluntatis est constitutum. Qui motus non intra naturam sed extra, et ex bestiali intemperantia sumptus perspicitur; miscetur tamen bono ac tingitur antiqui hostis consilio et astutia, ad decipiendos carnalium 829A sensuum libidinosos affectus, ac per hoc morte perimendos. Neque 30 hoc dicimus sensum illorum refellentes, qui praefatum lignum scientiæ boni et mali omnino naturaliter asserunt esse bonum, et historialiter in paradiso locali factum, cuius fructus scientia, hoc est experimentum boni erat et mali. Nam si tactu et gustu ipsius primi 35 homines se abstinerent, sicut eis praeceptum est, experimentum uitæ aeternæ perpetuaeque beatitudinis nulla interposita morte haberent. Sin uero diabolicis astutiis consentientes, sua miserrima intemperantia de fructu ipsius escam mortiferam illicite sumerent, aeternæ mortis et infelicitatis experimentum subirent. Sed quisquis 829B

17-18 Agg. 2, 9.

14-19 GREGORIUS NYSSENVS, *De imagine* 21[20] (Capp. p. 242, 3-9; PG 44, 200 A-B, *ad sensum*). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 820D-821A.

13 philargiæ] philargiæ *H, J* (*p. corr.*), *M*

And this can be most clearly shown by the following argument: Let us suppose that two men, of whom the one is wise and by no means tickled or stung by the goads of avarice, while the other is foolish and greedy, pierced and torn by the goads of his perverse desire, are brought into one place and a vessel offered them made of pure gold and set with most precious jewels, endowed with the loveliest form, fit for the use of a king. Both, the wise man and the greedy one, see it, both receive through the corporeal sense the phantasy of the vessel itself, both store the phantasy in the memory, both bring thought to bear upon it. But the wise man by a simple mental process entirely refers its beauty, the phantasy of which he ponders within himself, to the glory of the Creator of natures: no enticement of cupidity steals upon him, no poison of greed infects the purpose of his pure mind, no lust contaminates it. With the greedy one on the other hand it is altogether different. Directly he has absorbed the phantasy of the vessel he blazes with the fire of cupidity, he is consumed, he is poisoned, he dies: for instead of referring the beauty of that nature and of its phantasies to the glory of Him Who said 'Gold is mine and silver is mine', he plunges and is swallowed up in the most stinking swamp of cupidity. Notice that for both the phantasy of the same vessel was good and beautiful. But whereas in the sense of the wise man it is simple and natural and free from all evil, in the greedy one it is a double phantasy, compounded with the contrary evil of cupidity, which is mixed with it and given form by it and coloured by it so as to seem good, whereas it is a most poisonous evil (258).

Evil, then, is not implanted in man's nature, but established in the perverse and irrational motion of the free and rational will. And it appears that this motion is not within human nature but from outside, from a bestial intemperance, and by the subtle devising of the ancient enemy it is tinged and mingled with good so as to deceive the lustful affections of the carnal senses, and thus to destroy them by death. Now in saying this I do not wish to refute the interpretation of those who maintain that this Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil is of its nature wholly a good, and that its creation in a local Paradise was an historical event, and that its fruit is the knowledge, that is to say, the experience, of good and evil. For if the first human beings had abstained from touch and taste of it, as they were bid, their experience would have been of the eternal life, of everlasting bliss without the interruption of death (259). But should they consent to the wiles of the devil and illicitly in their most wretched concupiscence partake of the deadly food of its fruit, they would encounter the experience of eternal death and unhappiness. But

haec, quae inter nos tractamus, non dedignatus fuerit legere ac diligenter intueri, eligat ex praedictis sanctorum patrum sententiis quod sibi sequendum uidetur; uideatque ne incaute nos laceret, aestimans ea quae a nobis dicta sunt nullius auctoritatis auxilio esse munita, ac ueluti praesumptiue contra sanctorum patrum traditiones 5 machinata. Habes itaque, ut opinor, breuem apertamque paradisi expositiunculam, quantum uires intentionis nostrae suppetunt.

ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑ-
ΛΙΟCIC

A. Habeo sane. Sed uelim ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΙΟCIN (hoc est recapitulationem) a te fieri, quae ueluti modo quodam conclusionis 10 ea, quae sparsim dicta sunt de paradiso, in unam quandam complexionem colligat atque diffiniat.

N. Plantationem dei (hoc est paradisum) in Edem (in deliciis uidelicet aeternae ac beatae felicitatis) humanam naturam esse 829C diximus ad imaginem dei factam. Cuius fons est Christus, de quo Propheta ad patrem proclamat: *Quoniam apud te est fons uitae*, qui 15 etiam omnes sitientes iustitiam ad se bibendum inuitat dicens: *Si quis sitit, ueniat ad me et bibat*. Cuius flumina, ex sapientiae fonte manantia, quattuor principales animae uirtutes sunt, ex quibus omnis uirtus et bona operatio scaturit. Cuius 'omne' lignum, de quo scriptum est: *Qui uicerit, dabo ei edere de ligno uitae quod est in 20 paradiso, quod plantatum est secus decursus aquarum*, hoc est, circa quod omnia prophetarum oracula, omnia utriusque legis symbola, symbolorumque intelligentiae, omnesque apertae ac simplices doctrinae confluunt, dei uidelicet uerbum humanae naturae insitum, 829D et ex humana natura incarnatum. Cuius paradisi mixtae scientiae 25 est lignum indiscreta uel confusa carnalium sensuum appetitio in diuersas libidines, sub forma boni latentes, et incautas animas decipientes ac perimentes. Cuius uir animus est, uniuersae humanae naturae praesidens. Cuius mulier sensus, cui incaute animus consentiens perditur. Cuius serpens illicita delectatio, qua ea, quae 830A carnalem sensum delectant, illicite ac damnabiliter concupiscuntur. 31

Et ne existimes his quae diximus – hoc est duo solummodo in paradiso ligna esse, ΠΑΝ et ΓΝΟCΤΟΝ – repugnare quod mulier diabolo respondisse narratur: *De fructu lignorum quae sunt in paradiso*

15 Ps. 35, 10. 16–17 Ioh. 7, 37. 20–21 Apoc. 2, 7. 21 Ps. 1, 3. 206.34–208.1 Gen. 3, 2.

21–25 Cf. *Expositiones in Hier. cael.* I, 555–561 (CCCM 31, p. 16; PL 122, 140A). *Periphyseon* IV, 747C–D. *Vox spiritualis* XXIII, 40–45 (SC 151, p. 316; PL 122, 296D).

I tractamus] tractauimus HM 8 ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΙΟCIC] titulum mg. FJP. (AN)ΑΚΕΦΑΛΕΩ(CI)C de paradiso mg. R² (intellige ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) 8 ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑΛΙΟCIN] codd., intellige ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν 12 Edem] hoc est add. HMR 13 uidelicet] om. HMR 14 Christus] mg. J, om. HMR 33 ΓΝΟCΤΟΝ] codd., intellige γνωστόν

whoever has thought it worth while to read with close attention the discussion that we have been conducting is in a position to choose from the above mentioned opinions of the holy Fathers, which we have set on record, the one which it seems best to him to follow, and to see that he cannot bring it against us that what we have said is not corroborated by any authority or is presumptuously invented as a counterblast to the traditions handed down by the holy Fathers. Here you have, then, what I think is as clear and brief a modest explanation of Paradise as my capacity can supply.

A. Yes, but I should like you to make an ἀνακεφαλαίωσις or recapitulation which may embrace in the form of a conclusion and make 17 precise all the scattered remarks which you have made about Paradise. Recapitulation

N. We have said: That the plantation of God, namely, Paradise, in Eden, that is to say, in the joy of the eternal and blessed happiness, is human nature made in the image of God; That the fount that is therein is Christ, concerning Whom the Prophet, addressing the Father, says: 'For in Thee is the fount of Life'; Who also invites all those who thirst after righteousness to drink of Himself, saying: 'If any man thirst let him come to Me and drink'; That its rivers which flow from the fount of Wisdom are the four cardinal virtues of the soul, and that from them every virtue and every good act springs; That its 'All'-tree, of which it is written: 'To him that overcomes I will give to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in Paradise, planted by streams of water', is that about which all the oracles of the prophets, all the symbols of either Law, the interpretations of those symbols, and all the exoteric and simple doctrines flow, namely the Word of God found in human nature and incarnate in human nature; That the tree of mixed knowledge in this Paradise is the indiscriminating or confused hankering of the carnal senses to satisfy the various lusts which are concealed under the appearance of good and which deceive and destroy unwary souls; That the man in this Paradise is mind, which presides over the whole of human nature; That the woman therein is the sense, to which if mind incautiously consent, it is lost; That the serpent therein is the forbidden pleasure by which those things which charm the senses are illicitly and damnably desired.

And do not think that my theory that there were only two trees in Paradise, πᾶν and γνωστόν, is disproved by the reply which the woman is reported to have given to the devil: 'We feed on the fruit of the trees

uescimur. Non enim dixit: De fructu 'omnis' ligni uescimur (hoc est uesci iubemur), sed de fructu lignorum pluraliter, ac si plurima ligna diuersarum formarum essent, quibus uesci est eis concessum. Potest nanque intelligi 'omne' lignum plurima ligna mulierem dixisse. 'Omne' siquidem non de aliquo singulari, sed quodam in seipso multiplici dicitur: omnis enim homo multiplex humanae naturae numerus, et iterum ipse multiplex numerus, quoniam unius naturae particeps est, unus homo solet appellari. Quid ergo mirum si 'omne' lignum plurima ligna dicatur? Dei nanque uerbum, quod est 'omne' lignum (hoc est omne bonum) et unum est, et in seipso multiplex, et ex quo omne bonum (hoc est omnis uirtus et sapientia et essentia) in humana natura fructificat. Omnes igitur rationabiles motus rationalis naturae, quibus homo uti concessus est et iussus, quoniam ex communi omnium bono (diuina uidelicet sapientia) in humana natura (quae est dei plantatio et paradisu) pullulant, ueluti quaedam ligna plurima atque fructifera appellata sunt. Quae uidelicet ligna in ipso, in quo omnia bona unum sunt, subsistunt. Vnum itaque lignum (quod est ΠΑΝ) plurima ligna, quoniam in ipso omnia bona sunt, pulchre a muliere, adhuc non decepta, ac uirtutum sibi insitarum naturaliter conscia, est uocatum.

Hactenus
ΑΝΑΚΕΦΑ-
ΛΕΩΣΙΟ

Sed ne uideamur graecorum auctorum solummodo sententias de paradiso sequi, latinorum uero auctoritatem in talibus aut praetermississe, aut in eis talem sensum de paradiso inuenire non potuisse, ac per hoc temere affirmasse quod in magistris utriusque linguae non ualuumus inuenire, sancti Ambrosii sententias de paradiso huic nostrae disputationi inserere congruum mihi uidetur ac necessarium, si tibi placet.

A. Placet sane. Magni siquidem et sapientissimi uiri sententiis resistere quis, nisi amens, audebit?

In hoc loco
sanctus
Ambrosius
suum sensum
non sibi sed
aliis deputat

N. Ait itaque in libro de paradiso: *Sunt qui putant nequaquam mandatum istud* (de manducando uidelicet de ligno uitae, et non manducando de ligno prohibito) *conuenire caeli et terrae atque omnium creatori, et nequaquam dignum incolis paradisi, et quod illa uita similis angelorum. Et ideo non terrenum et corruptibilem hunc cibum esui fuisse possumus aestimare, quia non bibunt neque manducant, "et erunt sicut angeli dei in caelo". Cum igitur in cibo neque praemium sit, quia "esca nos non commendat deo", neque magnum periculum sit, quia "neque quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem, sed quod exit de ore", uidetur sine dubio*

35-36 Matth. 22, 30. 36-37 I Cor. 8, 8. 37-38 Matth. 15, 11.

208.30-210.11 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* IX, 42 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 298, 23-300, 2; PL 14, 294C-295A).

33 et¹] sup. l. R², om. R⁰ Schenkl (299, 2)

which are in Paradise': for she did not say we feed, that is are bidden to feed, on the fruit of the 'All'-tree, but of trees, in the plural, as though those were many trees of various kinds upon which they were permitted to feed. But it is possible to believe that what the woman called the 'All'-tree was in fact a great number of trees, for the word 'all' is not used in a singular significance but has reference to that which has a plural content. For 'all' man is the manifold number of human nature, and again this manifold number, since it partakes of a single nature, is wont to be described as one man. What would be surprising, then, if the term 'All'-tree meant a large number of trees? For God the Word, Who is 'All'-tree, that is, all good, and is One, is at the same time Many, and is the Source of all good, that is to say, of every virtue and wisdom and essence which bears fruit in human nature. Therefore all the rational motions of rational nature which man is permitted and commanded to perform, since they are the derivatives of the common good of all, that is, the Divine wisdom, in human nature, that is, the plantation and Paradise of God, are described as a great number of fruit-bearing trees: but these trees all subsist, as it were, in that one in which all goods are one. Therefore the woman said well when, not yet deceived and still conscious of the virtues implanted in her nature, she called the single πᾶν tree many trees, for in it are all good things.

Thus far
the recapitulation

I do not wish it to be thought that I am following only the doctrines of the Greek writers about Paradise, and am either ignoring the Latin writers or am incapable of finding among them support for this interpretation: for I should then seem to have spoken rashly, proposing a doctrine that was not supported by the masters of both tongues. Therefore it is necessary as well as relevant to insert into our discussion the opinions of St. Ambrose about Paradise, if you agree.

A. Certainly I agree. For who but a madman would dare to reject the opinions of so great and wise a man?

N. St. Ambrose, then, writes in his book *On Paradise* as follows: 'There are some who think that that Precept', to eat of the Tree of Life and not to eat of the Forbidden Tree, 'is neither appropriate to the Creator of heaven and earth and all things nor suitably addressed to the inhabitants of Paradise, for the life that they led there was similar to that of the angels. Therefore they cannot accept the view that this food was earthly and corruptible to eat, for the inhabitants of Paradise neither eat nor drink but "shall be as the angels of God in heaven". Since, therefore, there is in food neither a great prize, for it is "not by what we eat that we are commended to God", nor a great danger, for "not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man, but that which proceeds forth from the mouth", there seems to be no question but

18
Here St. Ambrose attributes the interpretation he gives not to himself but to others

tanto auctore indignum praeceptum, nisi hunc cibum ad illum perfectum referas, quem pro magno praemio dominus sanctis pollicetur suis: "Ecce qui seruiunt mihi manducabunt, uos autem esurietis". Hic enim cibus, in quo uita diffinitur aeterna, quo quisque fuerit defraudatus, morte morietur, quando panis uiuus atque caelestis ipse dominus est, qui uitam dat huic mundo. Vnde et ipse ait: "Nisi manducaueritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, non habebitis uitam aeternam". Erat ergo panis aliquis, de quo praeceperat deus edendum paradisi incolis. Quis ille? Accipe quem dicat: "Panem", inquit, "angelorum manducauit homo". Est etiam bonus panis, si facias uoluntatem dei. Vis scire quam bonus panis? "Meus cibus est ut faciam uoluntatem patris mei, qui in caelis est". Intende qualem cibum summus magister edocet, quem paradisi incolis edendum dominus praecepit: non corporalem et corruptibilem, sed spiritualem, dei uerbum uidelicet eiusque uoluntatem.

A. Animaduerto. Valdeque admiror quantum intellectui Gregorii Theologi congruit, qui et ipse, ut superius est dictum, cibum, fructumque, potumque spiritualem atque intellectualem paradisi esse incunctanter asserit. Porro si cibus paradisi spiritualis et intelligibilis est, necessario sequitur ut et illud 'omne' lignum, cuius fructus cibus ille est, intellectualem et spirituale intelligatur. Non enim de corporeo sensibilibus ligno incorporeus intelligibilisque fructus nasci credibile est et rationi rerum conueniens. Porro si et fructus et ligna spiritualia sunt, nonne consequens est ut et locus ille, in quo subsistunt, non corporalis, sed profecto spiritualis et credatur et cognoscatur?

N. Consequens quidem, et rationis plenum, et ueritati simillimum. Sed ut hoc praefati patris, Ambrosii dico, inconcusso testimonio roboretur, quid ipse de loco paradisi, deque fere omnibus quae in ipso esse diuina narrat historia, in praefato sui opere scripserit, intentius intueamur. Plerosque, inquit, mouet qui diligentius intuentur, quomodo, si primo magnum munus dei fuit circa homines, ut in paradiso locarentur, uel postea magnorum remunerator esse uideatur meritorum, ut in paradysum iustus unusquisque rapiatur. Dicuntur etiam bestiae et pecora agri et uolatilia caeli in paradiso fuisse. Vnde plerique paradysum animam esse uoluerunt, in qua uirtutum quaedam germina pullulauerunt; hominem autem ad operandum et custodiendum paradysum esse positum, hoc est, mentem hominis, cuius uirtus animam uidetur excolere, non solum excolere,

2-3 Is. 65, 13. 5-6 Ioh. 6, 33. 6-7 Ioh. 6, 54. 9 Ps. 77, 25. 10-11 Ioh. 4, 34.

210.30-212.34 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XI, 51-53 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 307, 25-310, 9; PL 14, 299C-300C).

8 (praec)pe(rat)] corr. R², praescripserat Schenkl (299, 18) 19 et] p. ras. sup. l. R² 27 inconcusso] inconcusso F, J (a. corr.), PR 31 quomodo] uel add. R

that the Precept was unworthy of such an Author unless you identify this nourishment with that perfect food which the Lord promises to His saints as their great reward: "Behold, those who serve me shall feed, but you shall go hungry". For this is the food which contains eternal life, which if any man lose he shall die the death – for the living and heavenly bread is the Lord Himself Who gives life to this world. Therefore He Himself says: "Unless you eat My flesh and drink My blood you shall not have eternal life". There was, then, a certain bread which God commanded the inhabitants of Paradise to eat. What was that bread? Hear what it is: "Man ate the bread of angels". Good bread is also doing the will of God. Do you wish to know how good that bread is? "My food is to do the will of My Father Who is in heaven". Observe what kind of food the great master teaches it was which the Lord commanded the inhabitants of Paradise to eat: not a corporeal or corruptible food, but spiritual, none other than the word of God and His will.

A. I observe, and I greatly marvel how well he agrees with the interpretation of Gregory the Theologian, who also, as was said above, unhesitatingly asserts that the food and fruit and drink of Paradise are spiritual and intelligible (260). Furthermore, if the food of Paradise is spiritual and intelligible, it necessarily follows that that 'All'-tree, whose fruit that food is, must also be regarded as intelligible and spiritual. For it is incredible and is contrary to reason for an incorporeal and intelligible fruit to grow from a corporeal and sensible tree. Again, if both the fruit and the trees are spiritual, does not this compel us to believe and maintain that the place in which they subsist is not corporeal either but spiritual?

N. What you say is to the point, is reasonable, and very probable. But in order that we may have the unshakeable support of this father Ambrose, let us look more closely into what he has written in this book about Paradise and almost everything which the Divine History declares that Paradise contains. 'Many careful students wonder that in the first instance it was a great gift of God to men that they should be placed in Paradise, or afterwards that He should seem a rewarder of great merits in that all just men should be seized up into Paradise. Even animals, both the beasts and the cattle of the field and the birds of the air, are said to have been in Paradise. Hence for the most part they believe that Paradise is the soul of man, in which the seeds of the virtues, as it were, germinated: but that man, that is, the mind of man, was placed there to till and to guard Paradise. For it is by the virtue of the mind that the soul seems to be tended; and not only tended, but

De bestiis et
uolatilibus
paradisi

sed etiam, cum coherit, custodire. Bestiae autem agri et uolatilia caeli, quae ducuntur ad Adam, nostri irrationabiles motus sunt, eo quod bestiae et pecora quaedam diuersae sunt corporeae passionēs, uel turbulentiores, uel etiam languidiores. Volatilia autem caeli quid aliud aestimamus, nisi inanes cogitationes, quae uolatilium more nostram circumuolant animam, et huc atque illuc uario motu saepe transducunt? Propterea nullus inuentus menti nostrae similis adiutor, nisi sensus (hoc est ΑΙCΘΗCΙC) quem similem sibi solum ΝΟΥC noster potuit inuenire. Sed forte redarguas (quia haec quoque deus in tali paradiso locauit, hoc est passionēs corporis, et uanitatē quandam fluctuantium inanium cogitationum) quod ipse noster fuerit auctor erroris. Considera quid dicat: "Habete", inquit, "potestatem piscium maris et uolatilium caeli et omnium reptantium quae repunt super terram". Vides quod ille tibi tribuerit potestatem, ut de omnibus tu iudicare debeas, singulorum genera iudicii tui sobria diffinitione discernere. Vocauit ad te omnia deus, ut supra omnia mentem tuam esse cognosceres. Cur quae tibi dissimilia repperisti asciscere tibi et copulare uoluisti? Dedit tibi certum sensum, quo uniuersa cognosceres, et de cogitationibus iudicares. Meritoque de illo foecundo paradisi agro eiectus es, quia non potuisti seruare mandatum. Sciebat enim deus esse te fragilem, sciebat iudicare non posse. Ideo dixit quasi fragilioribus: "Nolite iudicare, ut non iudicemini". Ergo, quia sciuit infirmum te esse ad iudicandum, uoluit te oboedientem esse mandato. Ideo praeceptum posuit. Quod si illud non praeuaricatus esses, periculum incerti iudicis incidere nequiuisses. Quoniam uero iudicare uoluisti, et ausus es, ideo addidit: "Adam factus est tanquam unus ex nobis, ut sciat bonum et malum". Uoluisti tibi arrogare iudicium; poenam prauis iudicii refutare non debes. Posuit te tamen contra paradysum, ne memoriam eius possis abolere. Denique iusti in paradysum saepe rapiuntur, sicut Paulus raptus est in paradysum et audiuit uerba ineffabilia. Et tu, si a primo caelo ad secundum caelum, et a secundo ad tertium mentis tuae uigore rapiaris (quia primum unusquisque homo est corporalis, secundo animalis, tertio spiritualis), ita rapiaris ad tertium caelum, ut uideas fulgorem gratiae spiritualis (animalis enim homo quae sunt spiritus dei nescit; et ideo tertii caeli ascensio tibi est necessaria ut rapiaris in paradysum), rapiaris iam sine periculo, ut possis diiudicare omnia, quia "spiritualis diiudicat omnia, ipse uero a nemine iudicatur".

Intuere quemadmodum Ambrosius sensum Origenis approbat, Epifanii autem infirmat. Origenis siquidem paradysum in tertio caelo, quod est intellectuale (hoc est in ipso homine quantum

11-12 Gen. 1, 28. 14-15 Gen. 2, 19-20. 20 Matth. 7, 1. 24 Gen. 3, 22. 27-28 II Cor. 12, 2-4. 31-32 I Cor. 2, 14. 34 I Cor. 2, 15.

3 sunt] sint HMR 7 quem] om. HMR Schenkl 8 solum] solam HMR Schenkl 15 dissimilia] similia HMR 23 et ausus es] om. HMR 23 addidit] ecce (esse R) add. HMR 25 prauis] prauis FJP 29 rapiaris] hoc est add. HMR 29 primum] primo a. corr. R 30 spiritualis] si add. HMR 30 rapiaris] rapiaris HMR 32 tertii] H, quasi alteram lectionem sup. l. M, Schenkl (310, 5), tertio FJMPR

The beasts
and birds of
Paradise

thereafter protected. But the beasts of the field and the birds of the air which are brought to Adam are our irrational emotions, because the beasts and cattle are the various passions of the body, either the more violent or the more sluggish ones. And as to the birds of the air, what else should they be but the empty thoughts which hover birdlike about our soul, and often lead it in varied motion to one thing or another? Therefore there was found no other similar helpmeet for our minds but the sense or *αἰσθησις*; only that could our *νοῦς* find like to itself. But perhaps you will argue that since these things also, the passions of the body and the vanity of the empty vacillating thoughts, were placed in this Paradise by God, that therefore He Himself was the author of our transgressions? Consider what He says: "You have power over the fishes of the sea and over the birds of the air and over all creeping things which creep upon the face of the earth". You see that He has given you power to make judgments upon all of them and by the sober definitions of your judgment discern the genus of each. God called all things to you that you might learn that your mind should be supreme over them all. Why have you desired to cleave to those things which are not of your kind, and to join yourself to them? He gave you a sure sense by which you might know all things and judge your thoughts. With justice you were driven forth from that fertile field of Paradise, for you could not keep His commandment. For God knew that you were a fragile thing, He knew you were incapable of judgment; and it was for that that He said to you, as to rather fragile creatures: "Judge not, that you be not judged". Therefore because He knew you to be uncertain in your judgments, He desired that you should be obedient to His Mandate, and so laid a command upon you: and if you had not transgressed it you could not have incurred the dangers of your unsure judgment. But since you willed to judge and so dared, He therefore added: "Behold Adam has become one of us, so as to know good and evil". You willed to arrogate judgment to yourself: you should not then refuse the punishment for perverse judgment. But He has placed you near Paradise so that you may not lose the memory of it. Finally the righteous are often snatched into Paradise as Paul was, and heard there ineffable things spoken. And you, if through the vigour of your mind you be rapt from the first heaven to the second and from the second to the third, seeing that in the first each man is a body, in the second a living body, and in the third a spirit, you will be so rapt to the third heaven that you may see the splendour of the spiritual grace: for the animal man does not know the things of the Spirit of God. And therefore the ascension to the third heaven is necessary for you in order that you may be rapt into Paradise and you may now be taken there to judge all things without peril: "for the spiritual judges all things and is judged by none".

See how Ambrose confirms the interpretation of Origen but weakens that of Epiphanius. For Origen maintains that Paradise is in the third heaven, which is the intellectual heaven, that is, in man

intellectus est) asserit esse. Epifanius uero, ut praediximus, nimium simpliciter sentiens, terrenum quendam locum paradisi aestimat, terrenaque ligna, fontesque sensibiles: quod uera deridet ratio. Non enim credibile est de Apostolo aestimare in alium paradisi raptum fuisse, nisi in ipsum, in quo primus homo ad imaginem factus dei est, et de quo merito inoboedientiae detrusus. Vnum nanque paradisi diuina narrat historia, et unum hominem in ipso creatum, in quo (uidelicet homine) uir et mulier intelligitur esse, si uerba sanctorum patrum sequenda sunt. Naturae siquidem humanae uir est intellectus, qui a Graecis uocatur ΝΟΥΣ, mulier 10 sensus, qui feminino genere ab eis ΑΙΘΗΡΑΙΟΝ exprimitur. Quorum 833B mystico coniugio Christi et ecclesiae futura copula praefigurata est. Cui uiro atque mulieri (intellectui uidelicet sensuique) diuina lex non solum concessit, uerum etiam praecepit de ligno uitae comedere (de sapientia profecto patris et uerbo) quod est dominus 15 Iesus Christus, qui in medio humanae naturae paradisi plantatus est, qui est spiritualis panis, quo angeli perfectique homines, quorum conuersatio in caelis est, uescuntur. Prohibentur autem a non discreto atque commixto boni et mali appetitu, qui ex delectatione materialium rerum pulchritudinis imperfectis animabus infigitur. A 20 quo abstinere meritum uitae aeternae est, eo abuti aeterni interitus occasio.

Caetera uero, quae a sancta scriptura de paradiso traduntur, 833C quamuis per anticipationem dicta sint ac ueluti in paradiso facta, plus tamen et rationabilius (quoniam merito peccati superaddita sunt et 25 ad exteriorem hominem pertinent) extra paradisi post peccatum fuisse intelligenda. Verbi gratia: *Formauit igitur dominus deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum uitae, et factus est homo in animam uiuentem.* Quomodo de limo terrae est formatus, qui ad imaginem et similitudinem dei factus? Aut quomodo de eo 30 diceretur: *Factus homo in animam uiuentem?* Quod de caeteris bestiis de terra prolatis similiter dictum est: *Producat terra animam uiuentem.* Nonne ergo duarum hominis conditionum ratio datur intelligi? 833D Primo quidem scriptum est: *Et creauit deus hominem ad imaginem*

De prima
et secunda
conditione
hominis

4-5 II Cor. 12, 2-4. 11-13 Ephes. 5, 31-32. 17-18 Phil. 3, 20. 27-29 Gen. 2, 7. 32 Gen. 1, 24. 1-2 Gen. 1, 27a.

1-3 Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 818B-D. 15-18 Cf. *Carmina* IX, 54-62 (MGH, PLAC III, pp. 551-552). Vide G. MADEC, "Panis angelorum", *Forma futuri. Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino*, Augustae Taurinorum 1975, pp. 818-829.

4 aestimare] aestimari HMR 11 ab eis] om. HMR 15 sapientia] HM, R (corr. ex sapientiae), sapientiae FJP 21 abuti] p. ras. R² 23 caetera uero] quae de homine ex(terio)ri leguntur facta (in pa)radiso, per anticipa(tio)nem sunt dicta (ac)per hoc extra p(a)radisum intell(e)gantur act(a)titulum mg. add. J 24 sint] mg. R², sunt R⁰ (postea erasum) 26 paradisi] et add. HMR 31 factus] est add. HM 33 nonne] HMR, non FJP

himself as mind. But Epiphanius, as we have shown above, giving an over-simple interpretation, considers Paradise to be some earthly place, and the trees to be earthly and the fountains sensible (261): but this is ridiculed by right reason. For it is not to be believed that the Paradise into which the Apostle was rapt was other than that in which the First Man was made in the image of God and from which he was thrust out in punishment for his sin (262). For the Divine History mentions but one Paradise and but one man created in it – though the one man includes both male and female, if the words of the holy Fathers are to be followed. For the male is the intelligible principle of human nature which the Greeks call νοῦς, the female is sense which they call by a word in the feminine gender, αἰσθησις: by whose mystical marriage the future union of Christ and His Church is prefigured (263). And this man and woman, that is, mind and sense, were not only permitted but enjoined by the Divine Law to eat of the Tree of Life, that is to say, of the Wisdom and Word of God, Which is the Lord Christ. For He is planted in the midst of the paradise of human nature, and is the spiritual bread which is the food of angels and of perfect men whose business is in heaven. They are forbidden, however, to hanker after the indiscriminating and confused appetite for good and evil, which is implanted in imperfect souls by delight in the beauty of material objects. To abstain from this is to merit eternal life, wrongly to use it is to incur eternal death.

But as to the other things which Scripture has to say about Paradise, although they are introduced by anticipation and as having taken place in Paradise, they are better and more reasonably understood to have occurred outside after the Fall (264), seeing that they were added to human nature as a penalty for its transgression, and concern the outward man. For instance: 'Therefore the Lord God formed 19 man of the clay of the earth, and breathed in his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul'. How is that which is created in the image of God formed out of the clay of the earth? And how could it be said of him, 'man became a living soul', as was said of the other beasts, which had been brought forth from the earth: 'Let the earth bring forth the living soul'? Have we not here good reason to believe that there were two creations of man? (265) For first it is written: 'And God created man in His own image, in the image of God

The first and
second cre-
ation of man

suam, ad imaginem dei creauit illum. Ecce prima conditio, in qua nulla terreni limi commemoratio facta est, neque animae uiuentis. Sequitur autem secunda, quae ex diuisione naturae in duplicem sexum, poena praeuaricationis superaddita, exordium sumpsit: 5
Masculum, inquit, et feminam creauit eos. Prius siquidem simplicitatem 834A
 naturae ante delictum singulariter expressit: *ad imaginem dei creauit illum;* diuisionem uero eius propter delictum pluraliter: *masculum et feminam creauit eos.* Quam diuisionem similitudo insipientium animalium secuta est: *Factus, inquit, homo in animam uiuentem.* Non 10
 dixit: in spiritum uiuificantem. *Primus enim homo de terra terrenus,* ait Apostolus, *secundus homo* (in quo tota natura humana restaurata est) *de caelo caelestis.* *Et non prius, inquit, (hoc est in primo homine praeuaricante) quod spirituale, sed quod animale, deinde (hoc est in secundo restaurante) quod spirituale.* 15

Hoc etiam textus diuinae historiae euentissime declarat. Nam postquam secundam conditionem terreni hominis de limo terrae, caeterorum animalium similitudine in animam uiuentem introduxit, 834B
 ne primam conditionem ad imaginem dei introductam aestimares, ipsam primam seorsum addidit dicens: *Plantauerat autem dominus deus paradysum uoluptatis a principio,* hoc est a prima conditione. Ac si diceret: Noli primam conditionem in eo quod scriptum est *et factus est homo in animam uiuentem* intelligere, sed secundam. Primam autem in plantatione paradisi intellige; *plantauit* siquidem *deus paradysum uoluptatis* (hoc est humanam naturam) in *Edem* (in deliciis aeternae felicitatis). Et ubi plantauerat? In *principio,* uerbo uidelicet, in quo fecit deus caelum et terram. Intuere uim uerborum. In secunda conditione uerbo praeteriti perfecti Propheta usus est: *Factus est, inquit, homo in animam uiuentem;* in prima uero uerbo praeteriti plusquam perfecti: *Plantauerat dominus deus paradysum,* ut cognosceres 834C
 primam dignitate et beatitudine, non autem tempore, praecedere secundam. In qua prima tantae spiritualitatis homo fuerat, ut nullis usibus corporalium sensuum indigeret, si solo intelligentiae officio frueretur. Quod etiam sanctus Ambrosius testatur dicens: *"Et aperti sunt oculi eorum, et cognouerunt quod nudi essent". Et ante quidem, inquit, nudi erant, sed non sine uirtutum tegumentis. Nudi erant propter morum simplicitatem, et quod amictum fraudis natura nesciret;* 35

6 Gen. 1, 27b. 10 Gen. 2, 7. 11-13 I Cor. 15, 47. 13-15 I Cor. 15, 46. 18 Gen. 2, 7. 20-21 Gen. 2, 8 (iuxta Vulgatam). 22-23 Gen. 2, 7. 24-25 Gen. 2, 8 (iuxta LXX). 26 Gen. 2, 8 (iuxta Vulgatam). 28-29 Gen. 2, 7. 30 Gen. 2, 8. 35 Gen. 3, 7.

216.35-218.8 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XIII, 63 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 322, 20-323, 9; PL 14, 307B-C).

21 a¹] in HMR 21 hoc est a prima conditione] om. HMR 25 in edem] om. HMR 26 uerbo] om. HMR 33 si] sed HMR rectius ut uidetur

created He him'. This is the first creation, in which there is no mention of the clay of the earth nor of the living soul. But then follows a second creation which began with the division of his nature into two sexes as a punishment for transgression: 'Male and female', he says, 'created He them'. First, by the use of the singular, the simplicity of human nature before the Fall is indicated: 'In the image of God created He him': but then the plural is used with reference to the division of that nature on account of sin: 'Male and female created He them'. From this division followed the assimilation to the irrational animals: 'Man', he says, 'was made a living soul'. He does not say: a life-giving spirit. 'The First Man', says the Apostle, 'is of the earth earthy, the Second Man', in whom the whole of human nature is restored, 'is of heaven heavenly. And first', that is to say, in the First Man, the transgressor, 'there was not that which was spiritual but that which was animal: then', that is, in the Second Man, the restoring, 'that which is spiritual'.

Moreover this is made perfectly plain by the text of the Divine History. For after the second creation of the earthy man from the clay of the earth 'as a living soul' in the likeness of the rest of the animals has been introduced, to avoid confusion with the first creation in the image of God, there is a particular reference to the latter: 'Now the Lord God had planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning', that is, from the first creation. Clearly this means: Do not relate to the first creation the text 'and man was made a living soul', but to the second. Take the first to be the plantation of Paradise: 'for God planted a Paradise of pleasure in Eden', that is to say, God planted human nature in the joy of eternal bliss. And where had He planted it? 'In the Principle', that is to say, in the Word (266), in which God made heaven and earth. Notice the precise meaning of the verbs. In speaking of the second creation the Prophet used the verb in the past tense, 'Man was made a living soul': but in the first the verb is in the pluperfect: 'The Lord God had planted a Paradise', so that you may know that the first is prior to the second, not of course in time, but in dignity and blessedness (267). And in the First Man had been a creature of so spiritual a nature that he did not require the use of any corporeal sense, but could depend wholly on the function of his intelligence. To this too St. Ambrose bears witness: "And their eyes were opened and they knew that they were naked". And before that they were naked', he says, 'but they were not without the covering of the virtues: they were naked because of the simplicity of their habits and because their nature was innocent of the cloak of deceit.

The nakedness of Adam and Eve

nunc autem multis simulationum inuolucris mens humana uelatur. Ergo posteaquam spoliantur illa sinceritate et simplicitate integrae incorruptaeque naturae, quaerere mundana et manufacta coeperunt, quibus nuda suae mentis operirent delectationibus et genitale secretum. Nam quomodo usus corporis habuit Adam, qui omnia animantia uidit, et his nomen imposuit? Quomodo cognouerunt, interiore uidelicet et altiore scientia, non tunicas sibi sed uirtutum deesse uelamina. Eodem igitur modo, quo omnia animalia uidit, suam nuditatem cognouit, solo uidelicet interioris scientiae simpliciue mentis oculo, absque corporalis mortalisque sensus auxilio. Vbi datur intelligi quod omnia animalia et uolatilia, quae de terra et de aquis facta narrantur, sparsim per terrarum spatia locis suis sedibusque naturalibus erant. Quae tamen omnia nec localiter nec sensu corporeo, sed solo mentis contuitu, ultra omnem sensum corruptibilem, ultra omnem locum et omne tempus, in rationibus suis, secundum quas creata sunt, primus homo, priusquam uirtutum tegmine spoliaretur, potuit contemplari.

De ipsa quoque nuditate primi hominis Gregorius Theologus, in sermone de pascha, sic ait: *Nudum simplicitate et uita sine arte et sine omni uelamine et problemate, talem decuit esse eum* (uidelicet hominem) a principio. Cuius uerba Maximus exposuit, XLI capitulo de Ambiguis dicens: *An forte 'nudus', ut ait magister, uaria circa naturam contemplatione scientia, et 'uita sine arte' circa actionem et uirtutem extra multimodam artificiositatem subsistens, secundum habitum habens incontaminatas uirtutum rationes, et 'sine omni uelamine atque problemate' ipsius in sensibus uisibilium notitiae ad intelligentiam diuinorum introductiuae non indigens, in solum simplicem uniformis et continuatiuae eorum quae post deum sunt contuitum uirtutis atque scientiae possidens accessum, solius in operatione motus indigens ad promptam per se pronuntiationem. Itaque quicumque philosophica ratione seipsum erigere primi patris lapsu desiderant, primo perfecta passionum sensualium ablatione incipiant, deinde circa rationes artium naturalium sollicitudinem, ac finis, naturalem superuolantes theoriam, in aeternam immaterialemque aspiciant scientiam, non habentem omnino sensui impressam formam aut intellectum duce ratione collocatum,*

19-21 GREGORIVS NAZIANZENSIS, *Oratio* XLV, 8 (PG 36, 632C6-9). MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* 41, 1-3 (CCSG 18, p. 213; PG 91, 1352B). 218.22-220.2 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* 41, 71-86 (CCSG 18, p. 215; PG 91, 1356A-B).

3 et] ac HM 4 suae] sua JP 5 genitale] genitalis HMR 7 (cognou)erunt] p. ras. R² 7 uidelicet] sup. l. R², om. R⁰ 7 tunicas] tunicam HMR 17 tegmine] tegimine HM 23 scientia] scientiaque HMR *Jeau* (215, 72) 26 introductiuae] praeductiuae HR *Jeau* (215, 76), praeductiuae M 28 possidens] om. HMR *Jeau* (215, 78) 29 indigens] indigentem HMR *Jeau* (215, 78) 31 sensualium] om. HMR *Jeau* (215, 80) 31 deinde] sic add. HMR *Jeau* (215, 81) 32 naturalium] om. HMR *Jeau* (215, 81) 32 sollicitudinem] sollicitudine HMR *Jeau* (215, 81) 32 superuolantes] superuolantes HMR *Jeau* (215, 82)

But now the human mind is veiled in many concealments of pretence. So after integrated and incorrupt natures are robbed of their purity and simplicity, they begin to seek after earthly and artificial things with which delights to cover the nakedness of their minds and conceal their genital privacy. Was it that the use of his body was available to Adam (268), who saw all living things and endowed each with a name? How did they know? By an inner and a higher knowledge they knew that they lacked not tunics but the coverings of the virtues'. So in the same way in which he saw all the animals, he recognised his own nakedness, that is to say, with the sole eye of the interior knowledge and the simple eye of the mind, without the aid of the perishable and corporeal sense. By this we are given to understand that the First Man before he was despoiled of the garment of the virtues was able to contemplate all the animals and birds – which, we are told, were created from earth and water and were distributed about the spaces of the earth in their own places and natural lairs – by contemplation not of a localised kind nor by the corporeal sense, but by the observation of the mind alone (which excels every corruptible sense, and all place and all time) of the principles according to which they were created.

There is also a reference to the First Man's nakedness in Gregory the Theologian's *Sermon on Easter*: 'Such a condition became man in the beginning, to be naked by reason of his simplicity and with a life that was artless and free from every veil and problem'. Maximus explains these words in the Forty-First Chapter of the *Ambigua*: '“Naked” perhaps, as the master says, in regard to the manifold knowledge in the contemplation of natural objects, and “a life that was artless” in regard to act and power, subsisting apart from varied artificiality, having for his raiment the immaculate principles of the virtues. And “free from every veil and problem”, because he is not in need of that knowledge which resides in the sensible perceptions of visible objects to introduce the understanding to divine matters, since he possesses access to the simple vision of the uniform and continuing power and knowledge of the things which are next after God; an operation which requires only to be put into action to manifest itself spontaneously. Therefore they who desire to rise again through philosophical reasoning from the Fall of our first father, let them begin by the total removal of sensual passions; then flying above natural contemplation in their pursuit of the principles and ends of the natural arts, let them look upon the eternal and immaterial knowledge that is absolutely without forms impressed from sense, or intellection deriving from the lead of reason.

sicut ex principio primum hominem fecit deus, nudi erant simplicitate scientiae et incircumscripta uita mortificatione carnis facti.

Similiter de sopore, quem dominus deus immisit in Adam, intellige. Siquidem sopor ille et causa peccati et post peccatum immisus est, ut uerius dicam, permissus uidetur esse. Nam deum facere quod sinit 5
De sopore Adam fieri, modo quodam locutionis scriptura solet dicere. Sopor itaque ille erat animi intentionis, quo semper et inflexibiliter creatorem suum contemplari debuerat, ad delectationes rerum materialium 835D reflexio, et carnis copulae appetitus, ut beatus Ambrosius exponit: *Quis est iste, inquit, sopor, nisi quia paulisper ad coniugium copulandum cum intendimus animum, uelut intentos oculos ad dei regnum inclinare atque inflectere uidemur ad quendam somnum istius mundi, et paulisper obdormire diuinis, dum in saecularibus mundanisque requiescimus?* Quem soporem (hoc est ab aeternis ad temporalia, a deo ad creaturam 836A mentis inclinationem) sequitur dormitus. *Postquam soporem, inquit, immisit deus in Adam, obdormiuit, hoc est, seipsum omnino aeternae ac beatae contemplationis uigore segregauit, et in delectationem sensibilibus omni uirtute euacuatus cecidit, sensibusque spiritualibus penitus recessit.* Vbi notandum quod, postquam obdormiuit Adam, conditionem mulieris introduxit scriptura, ut per hoc insinueret 20 quod, si humana natura simplicem sinceramque integritatem suae constitutionis, qua ad imaginem dei facta est, irrationabili motu liberae uoluntatis non desereret, sed semper in contemplatione ueritatis incommutabiliter permaneret, omnino scissuram suam in duplicem sexum ad similitudinem irrationabilium animalium 25 non pateretur, sed eo modo, quo angelicus numerus sine ullo sexu multiplicatus est, multiplicaretur. Quoniam uero sponte dormiuit (hoc est suae naturae dignitate non inuita lapsa est), sui diuisionem et ad similitudinem pecorum propagationem consecuta.

Cumque obdormisset, inquit, tulit unam de costis eius et repleuit carnem pro ea. Et aedificauit dominus deus costam, quam tulerat de Adam, in mulierem. Vbi, quamuis sub figura unius costae, quam tulit deus de latere Adam, et naturae scissura in duplicem sexum, et uniuersae uirtutis interioris, quae ei inerat priusquam peccaret, custodiae ablatio, per carnem uero, quae in loco costae ablatae collata est, miserrima illa 35 commutatio, qua pro custodia uirtutis et beatitudinis uitiorum atque

15-16 Gen. 2, 21. 30-31 Gen. 2, 21-22.

10-13 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XI, 50 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 307, 10-14; PL 14, 299A-B).

15-16 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XI, 50 (CSEL 32, 1, p. 307, 9-10; PL 14, 299A).

1 erant] *mg.* R², *om.* R^o *Jeau*n (215, 85) 2 incircumscripta] incircumflexa *HMR* *Jeau*n (215, 85) 2 uita] et *add.* *HMR* *Jeau*n (215, 85) 4 immisus] *J* (*p. corr.*), *M*, immisus *F*, *J* (*a. corr.*), *PR* 6 solet dicere] *p. ras. sup. l.* R² 29 consecuta] *est add.* *HMR* 35 collata] collocata *HMP*

Then they will be just as God made the First Man in the beginning, who was naked in the simplicity of knowledge, and in a life free from the death of the law of the flesh'.

And the trance which the Lord God sent upon Adam must be interpreted in the same way. For that trance appears to be both the cause of sin and also sent after or rather, permitted after, sin. For Scripture often employs a figure of speech which describes what God permits to be done as though He Himself does it (269). So that trance was the deflection of the intention of the mind, which ought always and inflexibly to have been fixed upon its Creator, to the delights of material objects, and the lust for carnal copulation, as the blessed Ambrose explains: 'What is that trance', he asks, 'other than the turning of our mind for a while to sexual intercourse when we seem to incline the eyes that were intent on God's Kingdom and bend them to some sleep of this world, and to fall asleep for a while to divine matters, taking our rest in profane and worldly things'? After this trance, that is, this turning away of the mind from eternal to temporal things, from God to the creature, there follows a sleep. 'After God' he says, 'sent the trance upon Adam, Adam slept', that is to say, he separated himself entirely from the vigour of eternal and blessed contemplation and, emptied of every virtue, fell into the delight of sensible things, abandoning completely the spiritual senses. And here it is to be noted that after Adam fell asleep Scripture introduces the creation of woman, by which it is implied that if human nature had not by the irrational motion of the free will deserted the simple and pure integrity of its constitution in which it was made in the image of God, but had always and unchangeably remained in the contemplation of the truth, it would on no account have suffered division into two sexes in which it becomes like the irrational animals, but would propagate in the same way as the number of the angels is multiplied without the aid of sex. But since of his own accord he fell asleep, that is, human nature willingly fell from its dignity, it acquired the division of that nature and a generative process similar to that of the beasts of the field.

'And when he had fallen asleep', he says, 'He took one of his ribs and replaced it with flesh, and the Lord God fashioned the rib which He had taken from Adam into woman'. Now although under the figure of this one rib which God took from Adam seem to be signified both the division of his nature into two sexes, and the taking away from him of the guardianship of the universal inner virtue which was within him before he had sinned; and by the flesh which was put in the place from which the rib was taken seems to be meant that most unhappy alteration whereby the guardianship of virtue and blessedness was exchanged for the deadly folly of vice

20
The trance
of Adam

De primo
et secundo
Adam, sed
e contrario

miseriae mortiferam imbecillitatem mutuauit, significari uideatur, 836C
plus tamen Christi et ecclesiae mysterium propheticæ præfiguratum
intelligendum esse arbitror. Primus siquidem homo Adam, sicut
docet Apostolus, ubique *forma futuri est*, Christi uidelicet, sed e
contrario. In primo siquidem Adam scissa est natura in masculum et 5
feminam, in secundo adunata est: *In Christo enim Iesu non est masculus
neque femina*. In primo uniuersa natura de felicitate paradisi est
expulsa, in secundo in eandem felicitatem est reuocata et restituta.
In primo caro pro costa (hoc est infirmitas pro uirtute) assumpta est,
in secundo infirmitas et mors absorpta, uirtus uero et uita aeterna 10
humanae naturae donata: *Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et
in Christo omnes uiuificantur*. *Dormit* itaque, ut ait sanctus Augustinus, 836D
Adam, et fit Eua; moritur Christus, et fit ecclesia. *Dormienti Adam fit Eua
de latere; mortuo Christo percutitur latus, ut profluant sacramenta quibus
formatur ecclesia*. Sanguis enim est in consecrationem calicis, aqua 15
uero in consecrationem baptismatis. In primo homine humana
natura tunicas induitur pellicias (hoc est mortalia corpora), relicta
naturali nuditate, uidelicet sinceritate et simplicitate. In secundo
eadem tunicas spoliatur pellicias, omni imbecillitate mortalium 837A
corporum perempta, et nuditate (id est simplicitate pristinae
naturae) recepta. 20

Haec igitur, ut praediximus, quae post soporem immissum in Adam
diuina narrat scriptura, quamuis in paradiso ueluti facta legantur,
rationabilius tamen et ueritati congruentius post peccatum (ac per
hoc extra paradysum) humanae naturae merito inoboedientiae 25
superaddita credenda et intelligenda sunt. Si enim plantatio
dei est et paradysus in deliciis humana natura ad imaginem dei
facta, nullaue praeuaricationis contagione deformata, quicquid
extra dignitatem naturae causaque peccati factum intelligitur,
cur non etiam extra paradysum fuisse non intelligeretur ignoro. 30
Non ignoro autem usitatissimum diuinae scripturae tropum, qui 837B
a graecis ΙCΤΕΡΟΙΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ, a latinis uero praeposterum seu

4 Rom. 5, 14. 6-7 Gal. 3, 28. 10 I Cor. 15, 54. 11-12 I Cor. 15, 22.

12-15 AVGVSTINVS, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus IX*, x, 33-36 (CCSL 36, p. 96; PL 35, 1463). 15-16 ANONYMVS, *In Genesim* 115-116 (E. Jeauneau, *Etudes érigéniennes*, Parisiis 1987, p. 574). Cf. *Carmina II*, i, 25-28 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 528). 23 De his quae ueluti facta a sacra scriptura traduntur, consulatur Iohannis Scotti *In Ioh. eu. commentarius VI*, v, 51. 55. 62 (SC 180, p. 354; PL 122, 345A-B). 31-32 DONATVS, *Ars Maior III*, 6 (ed. L. Holtz, p. 670, 8-9). 222.32-224.1 L. Holtz, *Donat et la tradition de l'enseignement grammatical*, Parisiis 1981, pp. 193-194.

10 (absor)p(ta)] R², absorta R⁰ 11 donata] est add. HMR 18 et simplicitate] mg. R², om. R⁰ 32 ΙCΤΕΡΟΙΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ] ΙCΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΙΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ HM, intellige ὑστερον πρότερον

and wretchedness: yet I think we are rather to understand here a prophetic prefiguration of the mystery of Christ and the Church. For as the Apostle teaches, the First Man, Adam, is always 'a figure of the Man to come', Christ: but an inverse figure. For in the First Man nature was split into male and female: in the Second Man it is brought together, for in 'Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female'. In the First Man all nature was expelled from the blessedness of Paradise: in the Second Man it is recalled and re-established into that same blessedness. In the First Man flesh is put in the place of rib, that is to say, weakness in the place of strength: in the Second Man weakness and death are swallowed up while strength and eternal life are bestowed upon human nature (270), for 'as in Adam all men die, so in Christ are all men made alive'. Therefore, as St. Augustine says, 'Adam sleeps and Eve is made: Christ dies and the Church is made. While Adam sleeps Eve is made from his side: when Christ is dead His side is pierced that the sacraments may flow forth upon which the Church is built'. For the blood stands for the consecration of the cup, the water for the consecration of baptism. In the First Man human nature puts on tunics of skin (271), that is to say, mortal bodies, renouncing the nakedness, that is, the purity and simplicity, of its proper nature: in the Second Man she has the tunics of skin taken from her, and all the folly of mortal bodies is removed, and the nakedness, or simplicity, of her former state is resumed.

So, as I have said before, although we read the events, described by Scripture as taking place after the trance had been sent upon Adam, as apparently occurring in Paradise, it is more reasonable and accords better with the truth to believe and understand that they were added to human nature as a punishment for disobedience after the transgression and therefore outside Paradise. For if the Paradise of God which He planted in delight is the human nature which was created in the image of God and was not disfigured by spot of sin, I do not see how we can understand that anything which is held to be outside the dignity of that nature and the cause of its Fall was not also outside Paradise. I am not unaware that Holy Scripture very frequently makes use of that figure of speech which is called by the Greeks ὑστερον πρότερον and by the Latins *praeposterum* or

The First
and (but
in a con-
trary way)
the Second
Adam

anticipatio (quam graeci ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ dicunt) uocatur, quo Matheus euangelistes usus est, passionem et resurrectionem domini narrans. Ea siquidem quae resurrectionis articulo facta sunt, passionis hora euenisse scribit. Ait enim: *Iesus autem iterum clamans uoce magna emisit spiritum. Et ecce uelum templi scissum est in duas partes a summo usque deorsum, et terra mota est, et petrae scissae sunt, et monumenta aperta sunt. Et multa corpora sanctorum qui dormierant surrexerunt. Et exeuntes de monumentis post resurrectionem eius, uenerunt in sanctam ciuitatem, et apparuerunt multis.* Haec omnia iuxta rerum factarum seriem resurrectionem domini secuta sunt, sed praedicto narrationis tropo post passionem fuisse euangelista uoluit narrare. Non enim credendum est aliorum monumenta aperta fuisse, priusquam ipse suum aperiret monumentum, aut uerae resurrectionis testes resurrexissent, priusquam ipse, cuius resurrectionis testes sunt, resurgeret. Sopor itaque Adam, sequensque dormitus, et ablatio costae, et diuisio simplicis naturae in duplicem sexum, et mystica uxoris agnitio, caeteraque quae in figura Christi et ecclesiae praefigurata sunt, cognitio quoque nuditatis, hoc est naturae sinceritatis – atque ideo non de ipsa erubescerant, quoniam uirtutum tegmina induebantur, delectationibus uero irrationabilium motuum omnino absoluta – quam peccando perdidit et perdendo recognouerant, fallax item suasio serpentis et subdola, mulierisque cum serpente disputatio atque seductio, ac de fructu uetiti ligni illicita assumptio loetiferque gustus, uiri quoque consensus et casus, non ignorantis, sed leue peccatum existimantis unice suae uxori consentire – *Adam enim non est seductus, mulier autem seducta est*; non enim inscius peccauit, ideoque durius puniri meruit –, apertio item oculorum qua suam nuditatem cognouerant, perizomatiumque de foliis fici consutio, uocis item deambulantis domini dei in paradiso auditus, amborumque (Adam uidelicet et uxoris eius) a facie domini dei fuga et in medio ligni absconsio, et caetera usque ad expulsionem hominis de paradiso: haec omnia in paradiso per anticipationem praepostere facta esse diuina narrat scriptura, dum sint peccatum consecuta. Si enim paradisi est humana natura ad imaginem dei condita, et in angelicae beatitudinis aequalitate constituta, mox profecto ut creatorem suum deserere uoluit, ex dignitate suae naturae lapsa est. Nam et priusquam uxori suae consentiret, superbire inchoauit. Porro si nullum spatium temporis inter conditionem ipsius et lapsum diuina tradit historia, quid aliud

De his
quae post
peccatum
conuenienter
facta
leguntur

4–9 Matth. 27, 50–53. 26 I Tim. 2, 14.

[I ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΣ] *codd., intellige πρόληψιν.* || Nota proleptin esse uelum templi scissum, terram motam, p[etras]scissas, monument(a)aperta, et caetera resurrectionis artic(ulo)facta *glossam mg. add. J 15 sequensque] eum add. HMR*

anticipation, the equivalent of the Greek πρόληψις (272). Matthew the Evangelist uses it when he describes the Passion and Resurrection of the Lord. For he writes of the events which took place at the moment of the Resurrection as though they occurred at the time of the Passion: 'Now Jesus crying again in a loud voice yielded up His Spirit, and behold the veil of the temple was rent in two parts from the top to the bottom, and the earth was moved, and stones were split, and tombs were opened up, and many bodies of the saints which had been asleep arose and coming forth from their tombs after His Resurrection, came into the holy city and were seen by many'. All these things occurred in a series of events after the Resurrection of the Lord, but the Evangelist wished to adopt this figure of speech and so described them as taking place just after the Passion. For it is not to be believed that the tombs of others were opened before He opened His own tomb, or that witnesses to the truth of the Resurrection were already resurrected before He, of Whose Resurrection they are witnesses, should Himself have arisen. So the trance of Adam, and the sleep that followed it, and the removal of his rib, and the division of the one nature into two sexes, and the mystical recognition of his wife, and all the other events which prefigure Christ and the Church; as well as their recognition of their nakedness, that is, of the purity of their nature (which did not at first cause them to blush because they were clothed in the raiment of the virtues which is unspotted by the delights of the irrational emotions), which in sinning they lost, and in losing became conscious of; the deceptive and crafty persuasion of the serpent, the conversation between the woman and the serpent, her seduction by him, the illicit plucking of the fruit of the Forbidden Tree, and the fatal tasting of it; the willing consent and fall of the man, not because he did not know that it was a sin, but because he thought it but a light one to consent to his only wife ('for it was not Adam but the woman who was seduced' – for he did not sin unwittingly, and therefore was worthy of a severer punishment); the opening of their eyes by which they saw their nakedness, the sewing of girdles from fig-leaves, the hearing of the voice of the Lord walking in Paradise, the flight of both of them, Adam and his wife, from the face of the Lord God, their hiding of themselves in the tree, and all the other events up to the expulsion of man from Paradise: – all these things Holy Scripture records by anticipation and out of their proper sequence as having taken place in Paradise, whereas they are the consequences of sin. For if Paradise is human nature as it is made in the image of God and established on an equality with the blessed state of the angels, then as soon as it willed to turn away from its Creator, in that very moment it fell from the dignity of its nature. For even before Adam consented to his wife he began to wax proud. For if the Divine History records no temporal interval

The
narration
of the
appropriate
con-
sequences of
sin

De eo datur intelligi scripturae silentio, nisi hominem, mox ut conditus est, quod ut superbisce, ac per hoc corruiſſe? Cuius rei maxima argumentatio est homicidium diaboli, *qui homicida erat ab initio, et in ueritate non conditus stetit*. Qui et ipse, nulla mora interſtante, mox ut creatus est, lapsus est corruiſſus 5
superbiendo, conſequenterque homini concreato ſibi inuidendo, eumque aſtutiae ueneno interimendo. De paradiso ſufficienter habes, ut arbitror.

A. Sufficeret forſitan, ſi breuiter de ficu illa, cuius foliis ſuccinctoria conſuta ſunt, deque domini dei deambulatione in paradiso aperires quid ſentias. Nam de pelliciis tunicis praedictum eſt. 10

De ficu N. Ficus illa diuinum legis mandatum primis hominibus in 838C
paradiso traditum non incongrue accipitur. Erat autem illud mandatum: *De omni ligno paradisi comedite, de ligno autem ſcientiae boni et mali comedere nolite*. Et ut cautius mandatum cuſtodirent, praeuaricationis periculum non eſt ab eis occultatum: *In quacunq[ue] enim die, inquit, comederitis ex eo, morte moriemini*. Lex ergo primis 15
hominibus in paradiso data eſt, cuius uerba memoriter tenebant. Quod reſponſo mulieris ſerpenti declaratur. Reſpondit enim: *De fructu lignorum quae ſunt in paradiso ueſcimur, de fructu uero ligni, quod eſt in medio paradisi, praecepit nobis deus ne comederemus, et ne tangeremus illud, ne forte moriamur*. Cuius legis uerba male interpretatus eſt 20
coluber, ut primo mulierem (id eſt ſenſum) ſeduceret, ut per eum ad uirum (ad animum uidelicet) haberet accessum; ueram autem et ſalutiferam diuini mandati diſſimulauit uirtutem. Quam ſi mulier illa cognosceret, diligeret, uereretur, non fortassis a ſerpente 839A
ſeduceretur, nec uirum ſuum attraheret ut perderetur, nec de 26
De ſuc- foliis fici (hoc eſt de uerbis ſolummodo mandati) ſuccinctoria cinctoriis ſibi conſuerent (congruos uidelicet deſideriis carnis mortiferisque turpitudinibus uſus), ſed de fructu illius (hoc eſt de uera uitalique 30
diuinae legis uirtute atque intelligentia) ſumerent, comederent, et in aeterna felicitate uiuerent. Lex itaque diuina peruerſe interpretata, et ſecundum ſolam litteram conſiderata, humaniſque ſeu diabolicis ſuperſtitionibus corrupta, carnalibus concupiſcentiis eſt congrua, et irrationabilibus motibus perizomata, ueluti quibusdam foliis 35
inanibus omnique uirtute ac uero intellectu uacuis praestat conſuta; bene uero et ſpiritualiter intellecta, omnique carnali ſenſu ac 839B
ſuperſtitione purgata, ſalutiferum uitalemque comedentibus (hoc 3-4 Ioh. 8, 44. 13-14 Gen. 2, 16-17. 15-16 Gen. 2, 17. 18-21 Gen. 3, 2-3.

4-6 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XI, xiii, 34-xiv, 8 (CCSL 48, pp. 334-335; PL 41, 329-330). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 811A-B.

5 concreato] cum creato M 7 (habe)s] p. ras. R² 11 n.] mg. R², om. R⁰ 28 congruos uidelicet] hoc eſt congruos HMR 29 turpitudinibus] ſuis add. HM

between his creation and his Fall, how else can this omiſſion in Scripture be interpreted than that ſoon after man was created he waxed proud and was therefore ruined? But the weightieſt proof of this is in the devil's guilt of manſlaughter: 'for he was a man-ſlayer from the beginning, and did not abide in the truth'. He too without any intervening delay fell by pride as ſoon as he was created, by his not ſurpriſing envy of the man who was created together with himſelf and by his deſtruction of him with the poiſon of his guile. But you have heard enough of Paradise, I think.

A. It would perhaps be enough if only you would give your opinion about that fig-tree from the leaves of which they ſewed their girdles, and of the Lord God's walking in Paradise. For the tunics of ſkin have been dealt with already.

N. That fig-tree is not inappropriately regarded as the Divine Precept of the law given to the firſt human beings in Paradise. Now that Precept was as follows: 'Of every tree of Paradise eat, but of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil do not eat'. And that they might keep the Precept the more carefully the peril involved in tranſgreſſion was not hidden from them: 'For on the day on which you eat of it you ſhall die the death'. There was then a law given to the firſt human beings in Paradise, and that they kept the words of it in their memories is clear from the reply which the woman gave to the ſerpent: 'Of the fruit of the trees that are in Paradise we may feed, but of the fruit of the tree which is in the miſt of Paradise God commanded us not to eat nor to touch it, leſt we die'. But the ſerpent put a wrong interpretation on the words of the Law ſo that firſt he might ſeduce the woman, that is, the ſenſe, and then through her gain access to the man, or mind. He belittled the true and ſaving power of the Divine Precept, which if that woman had known and loved and revered, ſhe would not perhaps have been ſeduced by the ſerpent, nor have enticed her husband to his downfall, nor would they have ſewn together for themſelves girdles – that is to ſay, practices according with the deſires of the 21
The fig-tree
The girdles
flesh and its pernicious obſcenities – of figleaves, that is, of the words only of the Precept; but would have taken and eaten of the fruit of the fig-tree, that is of the true and life-giving power and understanding of the Divine Law, and would have lived in bliſs for all eternity. Thus when the Divine Law is peruerſely interpreted and is only obſerved according to the letter and is corrupted by the ſuperſtitions of man or devil, it becomes bent to the luſts of the flesh and affords girdles ſewn together from irrational emotions, as though from empty leaves, being devoid of every virtue and true intelligible principle. But when it is well and ſpiritually underſtood, and is purged of every carnal ſenſe and ſuperſtition, it brings forth ſaving and life-giving food for

De fructu fici

est recte secundum spiritum intelligentibus eam) fructificat esum. De quo primi homines comedere nolentes, plus falsiloqui serpentis interpretationi credentes, non fructum legalis fici in usum spiritus acceperunt, sed folia inania fraudisque plena (sola uidelicet uerba diabolica astutia connexa), quibus suarum libidinum turpitudines 5 cooperire ualerent.

Hoc autem dicimus sanctum Ambrosium sequentes, qui praefatam ficum in libro de paradiso exponit dicens: *Assuerunt, inquit, folia ficus et fecerunt sibi succinctoria. Ficum hoc loco pro qua specie debemus accipere, diuinarum nos docet series lectionum, quandoquidem saluos esse 10 qui sub uite et ficu requiescunt scriptura memorauerit, et Salomon dixerit, et dominus ad ficum uenerit, sed ideo sit offensus quia non inuenerit fructum, 839C sed folia tantum. Docet me ergo Adam quae sint folia, qui, posteaquam peccauit, de foliis fici fecit sibi succinctoria, qui de fructibus eius maius gustare debuerit. Iustus fructum elegit, folia peccator. Quid est fructus? 15 "Fructus", inquit, "spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia, benignitas, modestia, continentia, dilectio". Non habebat fructum, qui gaudium non habebat; non habebat fidem, qui praeuaricaturus erat mandatum dei; non habebat continentiam, qui interdicto sibi gustauerat ligno. Ergo quicumque praeuaricatur mandatum dei, spoliatur atque nudatur, et fit ipse sibi turpis: 20 uult se operire quibusdam foliis ficus, fortasse quibusdam inanibus uel umbratilibus sermonibus, quos compositis mandatis assuens, et uerbum de 839D uerbo struens, ad operiendam conscientiae suae mentis factique turpitudinem uelamen peccator intexit, ut pudenda sua contegat. Ita enim supra se folia consuit, qui culpam uelare desiderat: aut diabolum delicti memorat 25 auctorem, ut carnis praetendat illecebras, aut alium quempiam persuasorem 840A prodit erroris. Et scripturis diuinis frequenter promit exempla, quibus in culpam perhibet incidisse dicens, si forte in stupris quis fuerit deprehensus: Et Abraham cum ancilla procubuit, et David alienam adamauit et sibi asciiuit uxorem. Assuit enim quaedam exempla de prophetarum serie scripturarum, 30 fructum earum non putat requirendum. Nonne tibi uidentur etiam iudaei folia assuere, dum legis spiritualis uerba corporaliter interpretantur? Quorum interpretatio fructum omnem uiriditatis amittit, damnata maledicto ariditatis aeternae. Bona igitur interpretatio, hoc est spiritualis, ficus est fructuosa, sub qua iusti sanctique requiescunt. Quam qui plantauerit in animis singulorum 35*

11 III Reg. 4, 25; IV Reg. 18, 31; Mich. 4, 4; Zach. 3, 10. 11 Prou. 27, 18 (Qui plantat ficum comedet fructus eius *om. codd.*). 11-13 Marc. 11, 12-14. 16-17 Gal. 5, 22. 28-29 Gen. 16, 1-4. 29-30 II Reg. 11, 4. 27.

228.8-230.4 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XIII, 64-67 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 323, 9-325, 5; PL 14, 307C-308B).

14 maius] magis HM Schenkl (323, 19). *Scriptores latinos Hiberniae maius et magis aliquando confudisse testatur Iohannes Chittenden in prooemio suae editionis Donati Ortigraphi: CCGM 40D, p. LI* 19 (quicumque] p. ras. R² 22 mandatis] *codd.*, mendacis Schenkl(324, 6) 27 et] de *add. H, M (sup. l.)*

those who eat of it, that is, who understand it rightly according to the spirit. Of this fruit the first human beings were unwilling to eat, and were therefore all the more ready to believe the interpretation of the false-tongued serpent. They did not accept the fruit of the fig of the Law for the nourishment of their spirit, but only leaves, empty of nourishment and full of deceit, that is to say, they accepted only the verbal sense, words woven together by the subtlety of the devil, by which they could cover up the obscenity of their lusts.

And here we are in agreement with St. Ambrose, who in his book *On Paradise* explains the aforesaid fig-tree as follows: 'They sewed figleaves and made themselves girdles. As to the interpretation of "fig" in this place, we have a whole series of divine texts to instruct us. The Scriptures record that those are secure who shelter beneath the vine and the fig; and Solomon also similarly tells us: and the Lord came to a fig-tree and was offended at it because He found no fruit but leaves only. So I learn from Adam what those leaves are, for after he had sinned, he made himself girdles of the leaves of the fig, who should rather have tasted of its fruit. The righteous man chooses the fruit, the sinner the leaves. What is the fruit? "The fruit of the spirit", says the Apostle, "is charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, modesty, continence, and love". He did not have fruit who did not have joy: he did not have faith who was about to transgress the Precept of God: he did not have continence who tasted of the Tree which was Forbidden him. Therefore whosoever transgresses the Precept of God is despoiled and stripped and naked, and becomes a thing abhorrent to himself, and wishes to cover himself with certain figleaves, perhaps certain empty and obscure treatises, which the sinner stitches together with fabricated pronouncements, taking them literally, to form a veil wherewith to cover up the shamefulness of his consciousness of thought and deed, that his shameful parts may be hidden. Thus he who desires to hide his own guilt, or records the fact that the devil is the author of his sin in setting the traps into which the flesh may fall, or suggests some other agent for his transgression, sews leaves on himself. And he often produces instances from the Scriptures of men falling into sin, quoting instances of their being taken in adultery such as Abraham's sleeping with a handmaid, and David's love for the wife of another, and his taking her as wife. Such leaves he sews to himself, examples from the text of the prophetic Scriptures, but the fruit of them he thinks he can do without. Do you not think that the Jews also sew on leaves when they interpret in a corporeal sense the words of the spiritual Law? Their interpretation loses all the fruit of its verdure and is damned with the curse of eternal sterility. Therefore the good interpretation, namely the spiritual, is the fruitful fig-tree under which the righteous and the saints take their rest, and he who has planted it in the souls of others

The fruit of
the fig-tree

(sicut Paulus ait: "Ego plantaui, Apollo rigauit") manducabit ex ea fructum. 840B
Mala autem interpretatio fructum ferre uiriditatemque seruare non poterit.
Quod igitur grauius est, hac se Adam interpretatione succinxit eo loco, ubi
fructu magis castitatis se succingere debuit.

Audisti Ambrosium de ficu. Audi etiam eundem de domini 5
deī deambulatione in paradiso, humana uidelicet natura, quam
ad imaginem suam condidit, quam nunquam deseruit neque
perire permisit, in qua semper deambulat occulte ac spiritualiter,
scrutans corda singulorum et renes, intelligibilique uoce causas
praeuaricationis interrogans, et plus misericorditer increpans et 10
corrigenens, quam iuste ulciscens. Ait ergo praefatus magister: "Et
audierunt uocem domini deambulantem ad uesperam". Quid est deambulatio 840C
illius qui ubique semper est? Sed puto deambulationem quandam esse dei per
diuinarum seriem scripturarum, in quibus quaedam dei uersatur praesentia,
cum audimus quia ipse aspicit omnia et "Oculi domini super iustos", cum 15
legimus quia "Iesus sciebat cogitationes eorum", cum legimus: "Quid cogitatis
in cordibus uestris?" Ergo, dum haec recensemus, quasi deambulantem
cognoscimus domini uocem. Fugerat peccator, non quo dei posset latere
conspicuum, sed intra conscientiam suam latere cupiebat, opera sua lucere
nolebat. Iusti enim est facie ad faciem uidere. Quamuis timens, non solum 20
deo praesens est, sed etiam cum deo disputat, sicut scriptum est: "Iudicate
pupillo et iustificate uiduam, et uenite, et disputemus, dicit dominus". Ergo 840D
cum legit peccator scripturas diuinas, audit uocem domini quasi ambulantis
ad uesperam. Quid est uespera, nisi quia culpam suam sero cognoscit, et
secundo uenit quaedam erroris praeteriti uerecundia, quae errorem praeuenire 25
debuerat? Nam dum culpa feruet in corpore, et anima exagitur corporis
passionibus, non cogitat deum sensus errantis, hoc est, non audit deum
ambulantem in scripturis diuinis, ambulantem in mentibus singulorum.
Dicit enim deus "quoniam inhabitabo inter illos, et inter eos ambulabo, et 30
ero illorum deus". Ergo cum in animae sensus redierit potestatis formido
diuinae, tunc erubescimus, tunc nos gestimus abscondere, tunc in peccatorum
nostrorum positi cognitionibus, in medio ligni paradisi, ubi peccauimus,
deprehendimur, latere cupientes, et arbitantes quod deus non requireret occulta. 35
In his uerbis praefati magistri intellige illud lignum in medio
paradisi, in quo latere se posse fugientes praeuaricatores putauerant,

1 I Cor. 3, 6. 9 Ps. 7, 10; Ier. 17, 10; Apoc. 2, 23. 11-12 Gen. 3, 8. 15 Ps. 33, 16.
16 Luc. 6, 8. 16-17 Matth. 9, 4. 21-22 Is. 1, 17-18. 29-30 Leu. 26, 11-12.
33 Ps. 9, 34.

10-11 Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 849B. 11-33 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XIV, 68 (CSEL 32, 1,
pp. 325, 16-326, 23; PL 14, 308D-309B).

8 permisit] HJM, permisit FPR 8 deambulat] deambulabat HM 17 haec]
hoc HMR 20 quamuis timens] quamuis iusti mens J [corr. ex quamuis timens], quia
iusti mens Schenkl (326, 6) 20-21 solum deo] solummodo HM 25 secundo]
codd., sero Schenkl (326, 12) 32 cognitionibus] cogitationibus HMR Schenkl (326, 21)
33 requireret] requirit HM

(as Paul says "I planted, Apollo watered") shall eat its fruit. But the evil
interpretation will not be able to bear fruit nor preserve its verdure.
It was all the more serious then that Adam girdled himself with this
interpretation where he should have girdled himself with the fruit of
chastity'.

You have heard Ambrose on the fig-tree. Hear him now on the walk
of the Lord God in Paradise, that is, in human nature as He had cre-
ated it in His own image, which He never abandoned nor gave over to
destruction, in which after a mystic and spiritual manner He is always
walking, examining the hearts and the loins of each, enquiring in an
intelligible voice after the causes of our transgression, and rebuking
and correcting us with a mercy greater than the justice of His ven-
geance. These, then, are the words of the said master: "And they
heard the voice of God as He was walking towards evening". What is
meant by the walking of Him Who is always everywhere? (273) But
I think there is a kind of walking of God through the sequence of
the Holy Scriptures: for they seem to be pervaded by the Divine pres-
ence, as when we hear that He beholds all things, and that "the eyes of
the Lord are upon the righteous", and when we read that "Jesus knew
their thoughts", and when we read: "Why do you think evil in your
hearts"? So when we recall these passages, we recognise the voice of
the Lord as He is walking. So the sinner had run away not in order to
hide from the sight of God, but because he desired to hide his deeds
within his own conscience, not wishing them to be brought into the
open. For to the righteous man it belongs to see God face to face:
although in awe, he is not only present to God, but even reasons with
God (274), as it is written: "Judge for the orphan and justify the widow
and come, let us reason together, says the Lord". Therefore when the
sinner reads the Holy Scriptures, he hears the voice of God as though
walking towards evening. What can the word 'evening' mean but the
lateness of the recognition of his fault and of the shame that he has
of it, now that it has been committed, but which he should have felt
before he committed it? For while sin boils up in the body, and the
soul is agitated by the corporeal passions, the sense of the transgressor
does not think of God, that is to say, he does not hear Him walking
in the Holy Scriptures, he does not hear Him walking in the minds of
men. For God says: "I shall dwell among them, and walk among them,
and I shall be their God". Therefore when the fear of the Divine power
returns into the senses of our soul, then we blush, then we try to hide
ourselves, then we are taken in the consciousness of our sins, in the
midst of the tree of Paradise, where we have committed our offences,
wishing to lie concealed, and thinking that God does not look into the
hidden places'.

From these words of our master you may understand that that tree
in the midst of Paradise in which the fugitive sinners had thought

The Lord's
walking in
Paradise

The evening

The tree
where the
transgressors
wanted
to hide
themselves

non aliud esse nisi humanae cogitationis et conscientiae secretum. Sed scrutator, inquit, animarum et cogitationum usque ad diuisionem animi penetrans dixit ad Adam: "Adam, ubi es?" Quomodo loquitur deus? Nunquid uoce corporea? Non utique, sed uirtute quadam praestantiore quam uox corporis potest et fundit oracula. Hanc uocem eius prophetae audierunt, hanc uocem fideles audiunt, impii non intelligunt. Talium sermonum uirtutem quisquis acute perspexerit, inueniet paradisum non localem terrenumue quendam locum esse nemorosum, sed spiritualem, germinibus uirtutum consitum, et in humana natura plantatum, et, ut apertius dicatur, non aliud praeter ipsam humanam substantiam ad imaginem dei factam, in qua lignum uitae (uerbum uidelicet patris et sapientia) omnem fructificat uitam; in cuius medio fons omnium bonorum (eadem uidelicet diuina sapientia) manat. Ibi ficus illa (diuina profecto lex) radicata est. Cuius uera interpretatio et spiritualis fructus uitae est comedentibus (hoc est intelligentibus eam pie perfecteque); peruersa uero et carnalis secundum litteram inania folia sunt et infructuosa, quibus diuinae legis transgressores culpas suas operire contendunt falsiloqua apologia, et uel in ipsum legis auctorem, uel in diabolum, uel in aliam quempiam personam, uel in similitudinem factorum, quae a sanctis patribus figurate perpetrata sunt, referre non uerentur, facta patrum carnaliter secundum litteram accipientes, spiritualiter autem nullo modo intelligentes, et in occasionem sui erroris talia exempla de diuina scriptura proferentes. De quibus conuenienter Apostolus ait: *Littera occidit, spiritus autem uiuificat.*

In hoc paradiso, intelligibili incessu deus deambulat. Custos quippe est et scrutator plantationis, quam ad imaginem et similitudinem suam plasmauit. Cuius uox inexplanabilis: *Adam, ubi es?* Haec uox est creatoris humanam naturam increpantis. Ac si dixisset: Vbi nunc es post praeuaricationem? Non enim ibi te reperio, ubi te creatum cognosco. Non in ea dignitate, qua ad imaginem et similitudinem meam te feci, inuenio. Sed desertorem beatitudinis, uerique luminis fugitantem, et in latibulis malae conscientiae latitantem increpo, causamque tuae inoboedientiae inquirō. Putasne me ignorare quid fecisti, uel quo fugisti, uel quomodo timens uocem meam te abscondisti, uel quemadmodum nuditatem tuam (sinceritatem uidelicet et simplicitatem naturae), in qua conditus eras, sero recognouisti? Nonne haec omnia perpessus es, quia ex ligno, de quo

2-3 Hebr. 4, 12. 3 Gen. 3, 9. 24-25 II Cor. 3, 6. 28 Gen. 3, 9.

2-6 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XIV, 68-69 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 326, 23-327, 5; PL 14, 309B-C). 36-37 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, xv, 23 (PL 34, 208).

5 et] *codd.*, esse Schenk] (327, 4) 19 quempiam] quampiam HMR *rectius ut uidetur* 35 quid] quia R (*a. corr.*)

they could hide themselves is none other than the secret places of man's thought and conscience. But, Ambrose goes on, 'He Who looks into our souls and our thoughts and penetrates even to our innermost mind said to Adam: "Adam, where are you"? In what way does God speak? With a corporeal voice? Not so, but by that power which is greater than any possible voice of the body, and which pours forth oracles; the Voice which the Prophets have heard, the Voice which the faithful hear, the Voice which the impious do not understand'. Anyone who examines closely the meaning of such discussions may see for himself that Paradise is not a localised or particular piece of woodland on earth, but a spiritual garden sown with the seeds of the virtues and planted in human nature, or, to be more explicit, is nothing else but the human substance itself created in the image of God, in which the Tree of Life, that is the Word and Wisdom of God, gives fruit to all life; and in the midst of which streams forth the Fountain of all good things, which again is the Divine Wisdom. There that fig-tree which is the Divine Law has its roots, of which the true and spiritual interpretation is the fruit of life to those who eat (that is understand it devoutly and perfectly), while the perverse and carnal interpretation according to the letter is the empty and unfruitful leaves (275) with which the transgressors of the Divine Law strive to cover their faults by deceitful excuses, daring even to place the blame upon the Lawgiver Himself, or upon the devil, or upon some other person, or comparing these faults with deeds which the holy Patriarchs symbolically performed, interpreting them literally in a carnal sense without at all understanding the spiritual meaning, and bringing forward such examples taken from the Holy Scriptures as relevant to their transgression, of whom the Apostle aptly says: 'The letter kills but the spirit makes alive'.

In this intelligible Paradise God goes walking. For He is the guardian and inspector of the garden which He has made in His image and likeness. His is the voice which cannot be expounded: 'Adam where are you?' This is the voice of the Creator rebuking human nature (276). It is as if He said: Where are you now after your transgression? For I do not find you there where I know that I created you, nor in that dignity in which I made you in My image and likeness, but I rebuke you as a deserter from blessedness, a fugitive from the true light, hiding yourself in the secret places of your bad conscience, and I enquire into the cause of your disobedience. Do you suppose that I do not know what you have done or whither you have fled or how, in fear of My voice, you have concealed yourself or in what way you came to a late recognition of your nudity, that is, of the purity and simplicity of nature (277), in which you were created? Have you not gone through all this because you have eaten of the tree of which I commanded that

The voice of
God

praeceperam tibi ne comederes, comedisti? Nam si non comedisses, non fortassis uocem deambulantis in te creatoris tui timeres, nec a facie ipsius fugeres, nec nuditatem tuam, quam praeuaricando perdidisti, cognouisses.

De ligno autem interdicto et in superioribus multa iam diximus, 5
Gregorium Nyseum sequentes, et nunc iterum breuiter dicendum 842B
arbitror, nobilissimi magistri Maximi monachi sensum introducentes.
Ipse siquidem lignum scientiae boni et mali uisibilem creaturam,
quam homo, creatorem suum deserens, secutus est esse intelligit.
Cui (uidelicet creaturae uisibili) et delectatio uoluptatis inest, et 10
anxietatis occasio et mortis, quasi quidam mixtus fructus ex bono
falso libidinis et malo sequentis tristitiae. Nulla enim delectatio
uisibilis creaturae est, quam non sequatur egestas; egestatem uero
sequitur anxietas mortisque tristitia. Et quamuis arridente uoluptate
lateat anxietas et causa mortis, simul tamen humanae animae 15
insunt, simulque incipiunt. Latet enim anxietas sub quadam falsa
pulchritudine uoluptatis, et est ueluti quidam mixtus fructus ex
libidine apparente et anxietate latente. Deficiente uero uoluptate et 842C
delectatione uisibilis creaturae, nuda per se atque aperta remanet
anxietas, quae nascitur ex egestate defectuque uisibilis boni. 20

Hinc praefatus Maximus: *Fortassis, inquit, lignum esse scientiae boni
et mali uisibilem creaturam qui dixerit, non a ueritate aberrabit: uoluptatis
nanque et anxietatis factricem naturaliter habet perceptionem. Aut, quoniam
et rationes habet spirituales uisibilium creatura et intellectum nutriendas,
et iterum naturalem potentiam sensum delectantem, intellectum uero 25
subuertentem, lignum scientiae boni et mali appellata est: boni quidem habet
scientiam spiritualiter considerata, mali uero scientiam corporaliter assumpta.
Passionum nanque fit magistra corporaliter eam accipientibus, diuinorum eis 842D
obliuionem inferens. Propter quod homini interdixit intermittens interim eius
perceptionem deus, ut prius (maxime quippe erat iustum) per participationem 30
gratiae propriam cognoscens causam, datamque per gratiam immortalitatem,
per huiusmodi ligni perceptionem ad impassibilitatem consummatus,
et inconuersibilitatem, sicut deus deificatione factus, innocue cum deo
communionem dei disceptaret creaturas, et earum reciperet scientiam, ut deus
et non homo, eandem habens deo per gratiam eorum quae sunt sapienter 843A*

234.21-236.2 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* Introductio
286-306 (CCSG 7, p. 36; PG 90, 257C-260A).

5 de] repetitio ligni interdicti *titulum mg. add.* J 21 scientiae] sciens *Steel* (36, 286)
22 qui dixerit] dicens quis *Steel* (36, 287) 23 aut] iterum *add. Steel* (36, 289)
26 scientiae] sciens *Steel* (36, 292) 26 appellata] appellatum *Steel* (36, 292)
26 quidem] siquidem *HM* 29 quod] fortassis *add. Steel* (36, 296) 32 ligni]
om. Steel (36, 299) 32 consummatus] consummans *Steel* (36, 300) 33 sicut] iam *add.*
HMR Steel (36, 300) 35 et] sed *Steel* (36, 302)

you were not to eat? For if you had not eaten perhaps you would not fear the voice of your Creator as He walks within you, nor flee from His face, nor have become aware of the nakedness which you lost when you sinned.

Now although about the Forbidden Tree itself we have already said 22
a great deal in the preceding chapters, taking Gregory of Nyssa as our
guide, I think we must speak a little more, briefly, about it, introducing
this time the exposition of that most noble master, the monk Maximus.
For he understands the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil to
be the visible creature which man followed when he abandoned his
Creator. For within the visible creature there is for him a voluptuous
delight and the occasion of anxiety and death, which is a kind of mix-
ture of the false good of lust and the evil of the sorrow which is to
follow. For there is no pleasure provided by the visible creature which
is not followed by want: and want is followed by anxiety and the sorrow
of death. And although when pleasure smiles, the anxiety and cause
of death lie hidden, they are already there in the human soul, being
born at the same instant (278). The anxiety lies concealed beneath
the false beauty of pleasure and it is a kind of fruit compounded of
manifest lust and latent anxiety. But when pleasure and delight in the
visible creature begin to fade there remains revealed in all her naked-
ness the anxiety which is born of the want of the visible good which is
no more.

The said Maximus writes as follows: 'Were a man to say that the
Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil is the visible creature,
he would not be far wrong. For partaking of it naturally produces
pleasure and anxiety. Or since the creature possesses both spiritual
principles of visible things and the principles which nourish the mind,
and again a natural power of delighting the sense, but of corrupt-
ing the mind, it is called the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of
Evil. For considered under its spiritual aspect it has the knowledge
of good, but taken corporally it has the knowledge of evil. For to
those who receive that knowledge with their bodies it becomes the
mistress of the passions, bringing upon them forgetfulness of divine
things. Therefore God for a while intervened to forbid man to partake
of that tree, so that first, as was very just, he might by participation
of grace learn his proper Cause, and the immortality with which he
was through grace endowed, and might through partaking of this tree
be perfected in impassibility and immutability. And, made as God by
deification, he might by communion with the Deity judge creatures
without harm to himself and have knowledge of them as God and no
longer as man, having through grace in wisdom the same knowledge

notitiam, per ipsam ad deificationem animi atque sensus transmutationem. Sic accipiendum de ligno, iuxta omnibus ualentem coaptari anagogen.

Intuere quam pulchre, quam aperte quid sit lignum scientiae boni et mali exponit. Est enim, ut ipse ait, uisibilium rerum natura, quae, spiritualiter in rationibus suis intellecta, scientiam boni et spiritualem 5 fructum intelligentibus eam praestat; carnaliter uero et libidinoso appetentibus, et intemperate et contra leges diuinas abutentibus mortiferam infert scientiam. Ac per hoc non in ipsa natura causa mali est constituta, sed in abutentium intemperantia. Et haec est ipsa mulier uel, ut ita dicam, hoc est illud lignum, de quo dominus dicit: 10 *Qui uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est in corde suo.* Materialium siquidem superficies rerum, dum sit naturaliter pulchra, incaute et libidinoso sensibus eam considerantium mortis infert occasionem. Visibilem nanque creaturam ad hoc deus 15 condidit, ut per eam, sicut per inuisibilem, laus eius cumularetur, et cognosceretur ipse non quid est, sed quia est, unus totius creaturae uisibilis et inuisibilis conditor. Ideoque interdixit deus humanae naturae uisibilis creaturae cognitione delectari, priusquam ueniret ad perfectionem sapientiae, in qua posset deificata de rationibus rerum uisibilium cum deo disputare, nec illa mulier (carnalis 20 uidelicet sensus) ad delectationem materialis creaturae extrinsecus consideratae ualeret uirum (animum dico) attrahere, si prius creatoris cognitionem quam creaturae uellet habere. Ordo itaque diuinae legis erat primum creatorem cognoscere eiusque ineffabilem pulchritudinem, deinde creaturam rationabili sensu mentis nutibus 25 obtemperante considerare, totamque ipsius pulchritudinem, siue interius in rationibus, siue exterius in formis sensibilibus, ad laudem creatoris referre. Hunc autem diuinae legis ordinem homo superbiendo spernens, creatoris sui amorem et cognitionem materialis creaturae exteriori pulchritudini postposuit, ac per hoc, 30 periculum diuinae indignationis incurrit, mortemque corporis et animae totiusque naturae perditionem incidit, quia diuinae legis iustissimam pulcherrimamque seriem seruare neglexit.

Haec de ligno prohibito sensus honorabilium diuinae scripturae 843D expositorum perspicientes diximus. Hunc etiam sensum sanctus 35

11-12 Math. 5, 28.

16 Celeberrima est apud Eriugenam haec distinctio inter *quia est* et *quid est*. De qua consulatur *Periphyseon* II, 585B-C. 589A-C. 590C-D; IV, 771B-C; V, 1010D, etc.

1 ad] et HM, R (corr. ex ad) 2 sic] itaque hic add. Steel (36, 305) 16 ipse] om. HMR 18 uisibilis . . . cognitione] uisibili creatura HMR 22 ualeret] sup. l. R², possit R⁰ (ab R² cancellatum) 22 uirum . . . dico] eum H, M (sup. l.), om. R 22-23 si prius . . . uellet habere] om. HMR 33 seruare] seruase R, seruasse HM 35 diximus] mg. R², om. R⁰ 35 etiam] sup. l. R², om. R⁰

of the things that are as God has, because of the transmutation of mind and sense itself to deification. This is the interpretation of the Tree which must be accepted according to a spiritual understanding which meets all the considerations'.

See how beautifully and how clearly he explains the meaning of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and of Evil. It is, he says, the nature of visible things, which when comprehended in a spiritual sense in its principles provides the knowledge of good and a spiritual fruit to those who comprehend it. But those who incontinently lust after it in carnal concupiscence, and put it intemperately to a use contrary to the laws of God it infects with a deadly knowledge. Thus the cause of evil is not implanted in nature itself, but in the intemperance of those who use her wrongly. And this is that woman, or, I might say, that tree, of whom the Lord says: 'Whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart'. For the outward appearance of material things, although it is in its nature beautiful, gives occasion of death to those who with their senses incautiously and lustfully consider it. For God created the visible creature to this purpose, that through it, as likewise through the invisible, His glory might abound, and that He might be known – not as to what He is, but that He is (279) – to be the One Creator of the whole creature, visible and invisible (280). And for that reason God forbade human nature to take pleasure in knowing the visible creature until it had attained the perfection of wisdom, in which having achieved deification it might reason together with God concerning the principles of visible things. Nor could that woman, that is to say, carnal sense, have enticed that man, that is to say, mind, to delight in the material creature exteriorly considered, if he had wished to possess the knowledge of the Creator before that of the created. The order of the Divine Law, then, was first to know the Creator and His ineffable beauty, and then to contemplate the creature with the reasonable sense controlled by the dictates of the mind, and to refer all its beauty to the glory of the Creator, whether the inner beauty of the principles or the outward beauty of the sensible forms. But man in his pride despising this order of the Divine Law, placed the love and knowledge of his Creator beneath the outward beauty of the material creature, and thus incurred the danger of the wrath of God, and fell into the death of the body and the soul and the destruction of his whole nature, for he neglected to observe the most just and beautiful order of the Divine Law.

In speaking thus of the Forbidden Tree I have had regard for the interpretations of reputable commentators of holy Scripture. The

pater Augustinus in XI exameri sui introduxit: *Non autem, inquit, ignoro quibusdam esse uisum festinatione praeuertisse illos homines appetitum scientiae boni et mali, et immaturo tempore percipere uoluisse quod eis dilatum oportunitus seruabatur; idque egisse temptatorem, ut praecerpando quod nondum talibus congruebat, offenderent in deum et ab eius rei 844A utilitate alienarentur exclusi atque damnati, ad quam, si suo tempore, 6 sicut deus uolebat, accederent, possent ea salubriter perfrui. Si forte lignum illud non ad proprietatem, ut uerum lignum et uera poma eius, sed ad figuram uelint accipere, habeant exitum aliquem recta fide ueritateque probabilem. Sed praefatus magister Augustinus uidetur hunc sensum 10 de spirituali paradiso nec refellere nec laudare, more suo solito, quo duos paradisos astruit esse, unum quidem terrenum localemque secundum proprietatem rerum sensibilibum, alterum uero omnino spiritualem, ad cuius figuram terrenus ille atque sensibilis factus est.*

A. Qui sic de ligno prohibito sensere, non mihi uidentur ueritate 844B recedere. Veri siquidem simile est, ualdeque rectae ratiocinationi 16 congruum, ut arbitror, hominem uetito fructu uesci inchoantem (cognitione uidelicet sensibilis materiae per corporeos sensus abuti praesumentem) ex ligni uitae dulcedine (hoc est ab internae contemplationis, in qua et ad quam conditus est, deliciis) iustissimo 20 conditoris iudicio expulsum fuisse existimari. Nam si rationabili naturalique ordine ingrederetur, id est, si causae omnium rerum theoria primum quidem, deinde rationum secundum quas et in quibus omnia facta sunt perfecta intentione frueretur, neque intelligibili esca ligni uitae (interno uidelicet diuinae sapientiae 25 contuitu) recluderetur, neque esu illiciti pomi (cognitione scilicet 844C uisibilis materiae) congruo maturoque tempore perfectae suae sapientiae, qua deum et consequenter creaturam absque ullo errore ullisque carnalis concupiscentiae delectationibus cognosceret, prohiberetur. Impossibile quippe est cognitionem creaturae impedire 30 rationabili animae, in qua perfecta contemplatio creatoris incipit lucere. Vbi uero speculatio naturae conditae conditoris cognitionem praecedit, quoniam phantasiis et illecebris rerum sensibilibum carere non potest, nunquam error deerit, nisi in his qui diuini radii splendore superfusi, rectae contemplationis semitas carpunt, seipsos 35 et deum suum quaerentes, in quibus profecto creatoris cognitio

1–10 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litt.* XI, xli, 56 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 375, 24–376, 8; PL 34, 452). 35–36 AVGVSTINVS, *De quantitate animae* xiv, 24 (PL 32, 1049). Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 587D–588A. *Expositiones in Hier. cael.* I, 125–126 (CCCM 31, p. 4; PL 122, 129C).

I inquit] inquit HMR 7 perfrui] hoc diximus add. H, M (sup. l.) 7 forte] propter aliquos ut add. H, M (sup. l.) 10 augustinus] om. HMR 15 uidentur] a add. H, M (sup. l.) 22–23 causae . . . theoria] causa . . . theoriae H, M (corr. ex theoria) 26 neque] ab add. H, M (sup. l.) 238.36–240.1 in quibus . . . praecedit] om. HMR

same interpretation is introduced by the holy Father Augustine into the Eleventh Book of his *Hexaemeron*: 'But I am not unaware that it is the opinion of some that it was by their overhastiness that those first human beings anticipated their desire for the knowledge of good and evil, and because they wished, before the time was ripe, for that which was being reserved for them at a more opportune occasion (281); and that the object of the tempter's action was that by plucking too soon fruit that was not yet suitable for them they might offend against God, and, exiled and damned, they might be debarred from the use of that, which if had they approached it at the proper time, as God willed, they could have profitably enjoyed. These things we have spoken for the benefit of such as may wish to take that tree not in the literal sense of a real tree with real fruit, but in a figurative sense, so that they may come to some conclusion that can be approved by right belief and truth'. But our master Augustine seems neither to support nor reject this theory of a spiritual Paradise: this is his usual approach: that there were two Paradises, the one earthly and local and possessing the properties of sensible nature, the other entirely spiritual, in the image of which the earthly and sensible one was made (282).

A. Those who hold such opinions concerning the Forbidden Tree do not seem to me to depart from the truth: for it is likely and quite in accordance, I think, with sound reason that man should have been driven by the most righteous judgment of his Creator away from the sweetness of the Tree of Life, that is to say, from the delights of the internal contemplation, in which and for which he was created, at the very moment that he began to feed on the Forbidden Tree, that is, to presume to make improper use of the sense knowledge of sensible matter. For if he had followed the natural and rational procedure, that is, if he had first devoted the whole of his attention to the contemplation of the Cause of all things, and then of the principles according to which and in which all things were made, he would neither have been excluded from the intelligible food of the Tree of Life, which is the internal awareness of the Divine wisdom, nor have been prohibited from tasting the forbidden apple, which is the knowledge of visible matter, at the ripe and convenient time when that wisdom should have been perfected by which he should know first God and then the creature without error and without taking delight in the lusts of the flesh. For it is impossible that knowledge of the creature could be an impediment to the rational soul, in which the perfect contemplation of the Creator begins to shine forth (283). But where the observation of created nature precedes the knowledge of the Creator, there is no way of escaping the phantasies and beguilements of sensible things. Consequently there cannot be freedom from error save in those who, bathed in the splendour of the Divine ray (284), take the path of right contemplation and seek themselves and their God (285); for in these the knowledge of

creaturae cognitionem praecedit. Non ergo creatura mala est, neque eius cognitio, sed peruersus rationabilis animae motus, quo conditoris speculationem deserit, et seipsam libidinoso illicitoque appetitu in amorem sensibilis materiae mortiferis gressibus flectit, unde, nisi prius diuina gratia liberata, redire non poterit. *Humana siquidem natura*, ut ait sanctus Augustinus, *idonea fuit per liberum arbitrium uulnerare se; iam uero uulnerata et sauciata, idonea non est per liberum arbitrium sanare se*. Sed ad ea quae restant, ratiocinationis iter est carpendum.

N. Quid restat? Nonne de paradiso satis est dictum? Nam dum crimen in mulierem, ut attenuaret mulieris causam et suam, remouit, de remotione criminis, qua obiurgatus diuina uoce Adam culpam in eum qui sibi mulierem dedit, deque ipsius mulieris remotione, qua causam praeuaricationis in serpentem refert, quoniam ab expositoribus sanctae scripturae satis est discussum, non necessarium arbitror dicere.

A. Necessarium quidem, ualdeque utile. Potest enim fieri ut fortassis quis existimet remotiones ipsas, quibus et uir in mulierem sibi a deo datam (ac per hoc in mulieris datorem), mulier autem in serpentem occasionem peccati remouit, ratas iustasque apologias fuisse, ultioneque indignas, nisi uera ratione conuincantur, ac mox iniusti et reprehensibiles refellantur, meritoque ad cumulum iustissimae poenae delicti pertinere iudicentur.

N. Ponamus itaque ipsius scripturae uerba: *Dixit, inquit, Adam: Mulier, quam dedisti sociam mihi, dedit mihi de ligno, et comedi*. Dic, quaeso, Adam, quis tibi mulierem dedit? Deus, inquis, qui eam formauit. Quaero a te: cur deus eam formauit, tibi que dedit? Cur te dormiente (hoc est mentis contuitum a contemplatione ueritatis in amorem carnalis coniugii coniuente) costam de latere tuo traxit, de qua mulierem fecit, quam tibi peccanti seque deserenti dedit? Cur non eodem modo, quo te fecit, mulierem quam tibi daret fecerit? Tu ipse de terrena humo merito, qui caelestia deserens terrena elegisti, factus est. Mulier tua ex latere tuo sumpta est congruenter, quoniam causa praeuaricationis tuae ex teipso orta est. Respondebis, credo: Haec omnia deus fecit quia uoluit, et ideo sic fecit quia sic faciendum praeuidit, qui *omnia, quaecunque uoluit, fecit*. Sed adhuc

24-25 Gen. 3, 12. 36 Ps. 113, 11.

5-8 AVGVSTINVS, *Sermo 156*, ii, 2 (PL 38, 850).

1 mala] nulla R (a. corr.) 10 nonne] non HM 10-12 dum crimen . . . uoce adam] de remotione criminis qua obiurgatus diuina uoce adam culpam remouit in mulierem et ut attenuaret mulieris causam remouit HMR 22 iniusti] iniustae HMR 29 coniuente] conuertente HM 34 ex teipso orta est] p. ras. mg. R²

the Creator precedes the knowledge of the creature. Therefore, the creature is not evil, nor is the knowledge of it evil, but the perverse motion of the rational soul abandons the contemplation of her Creator and turns herself with lustful and illicit longing to the love of sensible matter, pursuing a fatal path from which 'unless she is first set free by the grace of God', there can be no return. For, as St. Augustine says, because human nature possesses free will she is capable of doing herself injury. But once she is wounded and disabled she is no longer capable through free will of healing herself'. But now we must discuss the matters which still remain to be discussed.

N. What remains? Has not enough been said about Paradise? For of the action of the man when, rebuked by the voice of God, he brought the charge against the woman in order to attenuate his and her guilt by laying the blame upon Him Who had given him the woman, and of the action of the woman herself in transferring the cause of transgression to the serpent, I do not think it is necessary to speak, for the matter has been sufficiently discussed by the commentators of Holy Scripture.

A. On the contrary, I think it both useful and necessary. For there may be those who think that these accusations by which the man laid the blame for sin upon the woman whom God had given him, and thus upon the Giver of the woman, and the woman upon the serpent, are reasonable and justifiable defences excusing them from punishment, unless they are refuted by right reason and rejected as unjustified and reprehensible and shown to deserve the highest penalty which sin may be awarded.

N. Let us consider the words of Scripture itself: 'Adam said, The woman You gave me to be my companion, gave me of the tree and I did eat'. Tell me, Adam, who gave you the woman? The Lord, you say, Who made her. And why did He make her and give her to you? Why, when you were sleeping, that is to say, when you were deliberately turning the attention of your mind from the contemplation of truth to the love of a carnal spouse, did He take the rib from your side and make of it a woman and give her to you when you were sinning and abandoning Him? Why did He not make the woman whom He was to give you in the same way as He made yourself? You yourself, as is fit in one who chose earthly things for heavenly things, were made of the dust of the earth. It is fitting that the woman should have been taken out of your side, seeing that the cause of your transgression originated from yourself. You will reply, I think, that 'God made all these things because He willed them'. And so He made them, because He foresaw

a te quaero: Quare sic uoluit mulierem tibi facere? Quis, inquires, diuinae uoluntatis causas potest inuestigare? *Quis enim cognouit sensum domini?* Ignoras igitur qua ratione deus fecit mulierem quam tibi dedit? Ignoro, inquis, si non in adiutorium propagationis et multiplicationis humanae naturae, quae in me primitus facta est, et
5 ex me auspiciu[m] procreationis accepit.

Hic tibi occurro, ueraque ratione talem intentionem repello. Non enim humana natura ignominiosae generationis ex masculino
845D et femina in similitudine irrationabilium animalium indigeret, si
superbiendo, suaeque simplicitatis (in qua ad imaginem dei condita
10 est) pulchritudinem spernendo, modum angelicae multiplicationis
(qui omnino, ut saepe iam dictum est, sexuum copula caret) non
desereret. Quaere itaque aliam rationem, qua possis asserere
cur tibi mulier data est; ista siquidem, quam posuisti, falsa est.
846A Imago enim dei, ad quam homo factus est, omni sexu libera est et
15 absoluta. Aliam, dicis, ignoro, praeter eam quam introduxi et a te
infirmatam uideo. Miror cur te dicis ignorare ea quae propter tuam
inoboedientiam atque superbiam facta sunt. Ego autem, qui in te
peccaui, et peccando mortuus sum, non ignoro. Clamat enim in me
inconcussa et apertissima ratio – quod etiam approbat multorum
20 patrum auctoritas – quod si humana natura in ipsa simplicissima
sincerissimaque diuinae imaginis beatitudine permaneret, nulli sexui
succumberet, nullam contumeliosam propagationem sicut insipientia
animantia subiret. Quoniam uero in dignitate illa, in qua condita est,
perseuerare noluit, sed ignobiliter inter caetera animalia multiplicari
25 elegit, idem ipse conditor quicquid facturum et futurum esset homo,
846B peruerso motu liberae uoluntatis perditus, praeuidit, duplicem
sexum, per quem propagaretur bestiarum instar, superaddidit. Quid
ergo remoues in mulierem praeuaricationis tuae occasionem, cum in
teipso superbiendo deumque tuum spernente, ac per hoc deserente,
30 faciendae mulieris causa praecesserit?

Quod etiam diuina ironia apertissime declarat, quae dicit: *Non est bonum solum hominem esse; faciamus ei adiutorium simile.* Ac si aperte
diceret: Non uidetur homini, quem ad imaginem et similitudinem
nostram fecimus, bonum esse solum (hoc est simplicem atque
35 perfectum) uniuersaliterque diuisione naturae in sexus, ad
similitudinem angelicae naturae, absolutum permanere, sed pronum
846C procliuumque ad terrenos coitus pariter cum bestiis ruere, ac sic
unitatem naturae per carnalem generationem sexusque corporeos
seminaliter multiplicare, caelestium numerorum multiplicationis
40

2–3 Rom. 11, 34. 32–33 Gen. 2, 18.

28 quem] scripsi: quam F, quam HJMPR 32 ironia] nota diuinam yroniam glossam
mg. add. J 36 uniuersaliterque] sine add. H, M (p. ras.)

that they were so to be made, Who made all things whatever He willed. But I am still asking you why He thus desired to make for you a woman. You will answer: Who can investigate the causes of the Will of God? 'For who knows the sense of the Lord?' You do not know, therefore, for what reason God made the woman whom He gave you? I do not, you will say, unless it were for assistance in procreation and in the multiplication of the human nature which was made in me in the beginning and received from me the beginning of its propagation.

Here I disagree with you and refute your contention by sound reason. For human nature would not have required the shameful mode of procreation by male and female which resembles that of the irrational animals if it had not by pride and contempt of the beauty of its simplicity in which it was created in the image of God abandoned the angelic mode of propagation which, as I have now said many times, is entirely independent of the sexual act. So you must look for another reason why the woman was given you. For the one which you have put forward is false. The image of God in which man was made is free and independent of all sexuality. I know of no other reason, you (Adam) reply, save that which I have given and which I perceive that you have refuted. I am surprised to hear you say that you are ignorant of those things which happened as a result of your pride and disobedience. For I, who have sinned in you and in sin have died (286), am not ignorant. For there cries out in me a very clear and irrefutable reason, and one which bears the authority of many of the Fathers. If human nature had remained in that most pure and most simple bliss of the Divine image, it would never have succumbed to sexuality, nor ever have been subjected to the shameful manner of procreation of the irrational living creatures. But since it was not willing to continue in that dignity in which it was created, but chose to propagate its species ingloriously among the other animals, its Creator Himself, foreseeing all things which man would do and be, when he had been destroyed by the perverse motion of his free will, added to his nature the two-fold sex to enable him to breed like the beasts. Why then do you transfer to the woman the guilt of your transgression, when it was from yourself, from your own pride and contempt and consequent desertion of God that the cause of the making of the woman proceeded?

This is also made quite clear by God's ironical words (287): 'It is not good for man to be alone. Let Us make for him a companion like him'. The meaning is: Man whom We have made in Our image and likeness does not think it good to be alone, that is, to be a simple and perfect nature, abiding everywhere without the division of his nature into sexes, being wholly in the likeness of the angelic nature, but prefers to tumble down headlong into earthly couplings like the beasts and so to multiply out of his seed the unity of his nature through carnal generation and the sexual organs of his body, holding in contempt the

dignitate contempta. Faciamus ergo ei adiutorium simile, quo id quod appetit peragere possit, feminam uidelicet, quae similiter ut masculus fragilis ac lubrica terrenas appetat concupiscentias. Et hoc est quod per anticipationem scriptura profert Geneseos dicens: *Masculum et feminam fecit eos*, uasa uidelicet procreandae carnaliter 5
prolis, sprete dignitate diuinae imaginis spiritualisque numerositatis. Cur itaque praeuaricationis tuae causam, quae in teipsum refunditur, in mulierem, quam tibi creator tuus dedit, uel certe in ipsum creatorem remouere conaris? Talis itaque remotio criminis nil defensionis contulit, cumulum uero damnationis exaggerauit. 10

Sed fortassis quis dicat quod nos coniugium prolisque procreationem reprehendimus, dum diuisionem naturae humanae in masculum et feminam (quorum copula et coniugium et filiorum propagatio naturaeque augmentatio perficitur) merito peccati fuisse affirmamus. Cui respondebimus: Coniugia non reprehendimus, 15
si legitima sint prolisque procreandae non libidinis perpetrandae appetitu copulata, utriusque sexus fide castaque pudicitia seruata. Immo etiam laudamus, quia et a deo concessa sunt et iussa: *Crescite*, enim inquit, *et multiplicamini, et implete terram*. Vterque quoque sexus, sine quo carnale conubium fieri non potest, quod a deo factus 20
sit, nullus catholicorum ambigit. Ait enim scriptura: *Masculum et feminam fecit eos*. Item alibi: *Quod deus coniunxit, homo non separet*. Carnalia uero coniugia, etsi legitima sint et religiosi hominibus coniuncta, libidinoso illicitoque motu carnalis pruritus carere non posse incunctanter affirmamus. Non enim aliunde nascentes 25
in carne paruuli, nisi inde, aeternae mortis reatum attrahunt, quos solum catholicae ecclesiae baptisma ab ipso reatu liberat. 847B
asserimus quoque copulas illas carnales, quibus humana localiter et temporaliter natura propagatur, non necessarias fore, si homo suae naturae multiplicationem ad similitudinem pecorum fieri, caelestium 30
numerositate deserta, non eligeret, sicut ait Dauid: *Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis*.

Sed redeamus ad responsum mulieris, culpae suae occasionem in serpentem remouentis. *Dixit dominus deus ad mulierem: Quare hoc 35
fecisti? Quae respondit: Serpens decepit me, et comedi*. Et tu, mulier, quare remoues crimen tuum in serpentem, cum tu ipsa sis tuae culpae creatrix? Serpens ipse, in quem culpam refundis, in teipsa repit. Serpens tuus tua carnalis concupiscentia est atque delectatio, quae ex 847C

5 Gen. 1, 27. 18-19 Gen. 1, 28. 21-22 Gen. 1, 27. 22 Matth. 19, 6. 31-33 Ps. 48, 13, 21. 35-36 Gen. 3, 13.

11 quod] *om. R* 11 nos] *om. HMR* 16-17 prolisque . . . seruata] *mg. R² (a. corr.)*, prolisque . . . seruatis *HM, R² (p. corr.)*, *om. R⁰* 23 et] in *add. HMR* 24 libidinoso] tamen *add. M* 37 (tu)ae culpae] *p. ras. R²*

mode of propagation of the heavenly host. Let Us then make for him a companion like him through whom he can perform what he longs to do, that is to say, a woman who is fragile and unstable like the male, and is eager for earthly lusts. This is indicated in the Scriptures, in Genesis, by anticipation (288): 'Male and female created He them', vessels, that is, for the carnal procreation of offspring, since the dignity of the spiritual propagation and of the Divine image were now despised. Why then do you attempt to transfer the cause of your transgression, which is attributable to yourself, to the woman whom your Creator gave you, or at any rate to the Creator Himself? Such a shift of the charge is no defence but rather an aggravation of the offence.

But perhaps someone will say that in maintaining that the division of human nature into male and female, by which sexual intercourse and matrimony and procreation and the increase of the species are made possible, was the penalty of transgression, we are attacking wedlock and the procreation of children. To such we would reply: We do not attack wedlock so long as it is a legitimate union for the purpose of procreating children and not for the gratification of lust, and so long as the faith and chaste modesty of each sex is preserved. Indeed we praise this institution since it is permitted and ordained by God. For He says: 'Increase and multiply and replenish the earth'; and none of the orthodox would doubt that each sex, without which carnal intercourse could not take place, is created by God. For the Scripture says: 'Male and female created He them', and in another place: 'What God has joined let no man put asunder'. On the other hand we unhesitatingly affirm that carnal intercourse, although it be legitimate and the union of God-fearing persons, cannot be unaffected by the lustful and illicit itch of the flesh. For it is from this that children born after the flesh inherit the guilt of everlasting death, a guilt from which they are freed only by baptism into the Catholic Church (289). We further declare that those carnal couplings whereby human nature is propagated in space and time would not have been necessary if man had not chosen to adopt a method of procreation similar to that of the beasts of the field in exchange for the angelic mode of increasing his nature. Thus David says: 'Man did not understand that he was in honour and came to compare himself with the irrational beasts of the field, and was made like them'.

But let us turn now to the reply of the woman, in which she passes the blame for her sin on to the serpent. 'The Lord God said to the woman, why have you done this? She replied. The serpent deceived me and I did eat'. And you, woman, why do you transfer the charge to the serpent when you yourself are the creator of your sin? The very serpent to whom you attribute the fault creeps within yourself: carnal concupiscence and delight are your serpent, which is begot upon the

irrationabilis animae motu in sensu corporeo gignitur. Frustra igitur
mulier (sensus uidelicet carnalis) culpam suam in serpentem (hoc
est in delectationem irrationabilem, cuius ipsa auctor est) remouet.
Non enim materialium rerum illicita delectatio ortum duxit ex
natura, sed ex peccatricis animae imperfectis irrationalibusque
motibus per corporeos sensus in amorem sensibilibus rerum
mortifero appetitu erumpentis. Neque antiquus hostis ad uirum
animae (animum dico, ad imaginem dei factum) accessum haberet,
nisi prius per insitam corporeo sensui (qui est ueluti quaedam
mulier animi) delectationem, quasi per quendam colubrum, ipsum
corporeum sensum seduceret; quemadmodum neque animus in
rerum materialium perniciose delectatione et abusiua perfructione
corporeo sensui consentiret, si prius in ipso superba praesumptio
non praecederet. Superbia itaque animi carnalisque sensus illicita
delectatio, sibi inuicem copulatae, naturam humanam mortis
damnationi tradiderunt. De qua sola Christi humilitas et spiritualium
rerum in animabus fidelium delectio eandem reuocat liberatque
naturam. Non habes itaque, mulier, in quem culpam tuam remoueas,
nisi in teipsam, dum illicitae delectationis tuae, in quam culpam
conaris remouere, conuinceris auctor esse.

Vbi pulchre diuinorum uerborum textum animaduertere debemus.
Ea siquidem, quae simul facta sunt absque temporalium morularum
interstitiis, propter nostram tarditatem carnalesque sensus, quibus
originali peccato corrupti locis temporibusque succumbimus, ordine
quodam mirabili, mysticorum sensuum plenissimo, ueluti locis
temporibusque peracta contexuit. Primo itaque interrogatur uir
(hoc est animus), nec immerito, dum omni paradiso humanae
naturae praesit, eumque custodire, ne in eo diuinum praeceptum
uiolaretur, debuit. Ac sic interrogatur: *Adam, ubi es?* Ac si diceret:
Adam, qui priusquam peccasses, ultra omnia loca et tempora
constitutus fueras, responde nunc, praeuaricator, ubi es? Eras
in caelo, sicut angelica creatura, beatus; nunc in terris es, sicut
bruta animalia, superbus. Sermo conuertitur ad mulierem, et ab
ea quaeritur cur sic fecerit. Vbi notandum quod non confestim
uiro et mulieri sententia inquiringis iudicis profertur, sed ueluti
spatium improbae excusationis corrigendae conceditur, locusque
indulgentiae praeparatur. Postremo uero, dum ad serpentem
peruenitur, non ille interrogatur, nec ei spatium remotionis culpae in
aliud uel aliquem praebetur, quia non potuit (quoniam primordialis

29 Gen. 3, 9.

3 remouet] *mg. R², om. R⁰* 7 erumpentis] *irrupentis H, uel ir(rumpentis) sup. L*
add. M 10 colubrum] *colubrem R* 12 abusiua] *om. HMR* 17 delectio] *delectatio F*
(corr. ex delectio), HMP 18 mulier] *in quid uel add. MR, inquit uel H* 38-39 in aliud
uel aliquem] *om. HMR*

corporeal sense by the motion of the irrational soul. Vainly, then,
does the woman, that is, the carnal sense, transfer her blame upon
the serpent, that is, upon irrational delight, of which she herself is the
origin. For the illicit delight in material things does not spring from
nature but from the imperfect and irrational motions of the sinning
soul who in her fatal lustfulness bursts through the corporeal sense
into the love of sensible things. And the ancient enemy in the guise
of a serpent would not have had access to the male part of the soul,
that is, the mind which is created in the image of God, unless first he
had seduced the corporeal sense through a delight placed in the cor-
poreal sense, which is, so to speak, a woman: and the mind would not
have consented to the pernicious delight in material things and the
abused enjoyment of the corporeal sense if proud presumption had
not already existed in it. So the pride of the mind and the illicit delight
of the corporeal sense by coupling together gave human nature over
to death; from which only the humility of Christ and the love of spir-
itual things in faithful souls win her back and set her free. So there
is nobody, woman, to blame for your guilt save yourself, for you are
proved to be yourself the author of that illicit desire upon which you
attempt to shift the blame.

In this connection we ought to study well the text of the Divine
words, which, because of the sluggishness of our wits and the carnal
senses which subject us, corrupted by our original sin, to this spatio-
temporal existence, has set out – as though taking place in space and
time, but in a marvellous order full of mystic meaning – things which
occurred simultaneously and which are not divided by any intervals of
time (290). Thus the first to be interrogated is appropriately enough
the man, that is, mind, for he presides over the whole Paradise of
human nature and should properly be the guardian who sees that the
Divine Precept is not violated. And he is interrogated thus: ‘Adam,
where are you?’ Of which the meaning is: Adam, you who before
you sinned were established beyond all space and time, where are you
now, transgressor; answer Me? You were in heaven, a blessed creature,
like the angels: you are now on earth, proud creature, like the brutes.
Then it is the woman’s turn to be questioned, and she is asked why
she did what she did. Note here that the sentence of the examining
judge is not given upon the man and the woman immediately, but
time seems to be allowed for the correction of their wicked excuses,
and space is made ready for indulgence. At last, however, when the
serpent’s turn comes, he is not interrogated, nor is any time allowed
him to shift the blame on to some other person or thing, for that he
could not do, being the primordial cause of all evil; but the sentence

De diuina
maledictione

causa totius malitiae fuit), sed continuo sententiam iusti iudicis
sustinuit: *Ait enim dominus ad serpentem: Quia fecisti hoc, maledictus*
es inter omnia animantia et bestias terrae. Animaduerte quod neque
uiro, neque mulieri, sed soli serpenti maledicitur. Non enim
deus maledicit ea quae fecit, sed benedicit. Animus autem et
5 sensus creatura dei sunt. Carnalis uero delectatio extra diuinam
conditionem irrationabilibus humanae animae passionibus orta est,
ideoque diuinæ sententiæ seueritati succumbit, quia extra naturæ
a deo factæ superuenit. Quid enim aliud est diuina maledictio, nisi
848D eorum, quæ extra naturam sunt eamque contaminant, iustissima et
10 irreuocabilis damnatio?

Quæ sint autem animantia illa et bestiae terrae, inter quæ
849A carnalis delectatio, per quam diabolus seducit animam, et in
qua ueluti principali sede habitat, pulcherrime et copiosissime
sanctus Ambrosius in libro de paradiso exposuit: sunt enim omnes
15 irrationabiles passionibus nostræ naturæ, quam terræ
uocabulo diuina commemorat scriptura. Et ne mireris quod mixtim
ac ueluti indiscrete et carnalis delectatio et astutia diabolica in figura
serpentis significatur. Aliquando enim ipsum diabolus absolute
coluber ille conformat, aliquando libidinosum deceptæ ab eo
20 carnalis animæ (hoc est carnaliter uiuentis) appetitum, aliquando
confuse et indistincte utrumque – et alterum in altero concatenatim
– insinuat. Nec immerito: alterum enim sine altero separabiliter esse
849B non potest. Vbicunque enim fuerit libidinosus animæ contuitus, ibi
absque mora aderit immundi spiritus accessus. Vbicunque autem
25 assit diabolicæ astutiæ introitus, ibi non deerit uniuersalis malitiæ
pruritus. In quocunque autem corporeo sensu (qui in figura mulieris
ponitur) hæc duo conuenerint, necessario illicitus esus illicitæ
escae, hoc est materialium rerum pulchritudine sequetur abusus,
quæ mortem animæ infert. Cuius mortis mors corporis umbra est.
30 De maledictione autem, qua serpens damnatus est, deque sententiis,
quæ in mulierem inque uirum suum Adam prolatae sunt, in quibus
plus misericordiæ intelligitur quam uindictæ, superfluum uidetur
849C mihi nunc dicere. Quod enim a sanctis patribus satis est explanatum
35 explanare fortassis uidebitur non necessarium. Et quod in illorum

2–3 Gen. 3, 14.

12–17 AMBROSIVS, *De paradiso* XI, 51–53 (CSEL 32, 1, pp. 307, 25–310, 9; PL 14, 299C–300C). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 831C–832D. 31–33 ANONYMVS, *In Genesim*, 202–206 (E. Jeuneau, *Etudes érigéniennes*, Parisiis 1987, pp. 577–578). Cf. *Periphyseon* V, 864B, 875C, 953B.

8 seueritati succumbit] *p. ras. R*² 8–9 naturæ . . . factæ] naturam a deo factam
HMR 9 superuenit] repperitur *HMR* 9–11 quid enim aliud . . . damnatio]
mg. R^s, *om. R*^l 29 pulchritudine] uel (pulchritudin)is *sup.l. add. M. Vi iam supra*
(752A) notauit, Eriugena aliquando construit substantiuum nomen abusus ac si uerbum sit.
Vnde abusus pulchritudine pro abuti pulchritudine posuit

of the righteous Judge follows on him immediately, 'for God says to
the serpent: Because you have done this, you are cursed among all
animals and among the beasts of the field'. Notice that neither the
man nor the woman but only the serpent is cursed. For God does not
curse the things which He made, but blesses them; and mind and sense
are both creations of God. But carnal delight arose outside of Divine
creation from the irrational passions of the human soul, and therefore
comes under the severity of the Divine sentence, because it supervenes
from outside on the nature which was created by God (291). So this
cursing by God is nothing else but the most righteous and irrevocable
condemnation of the things which are outside nature and defile it.

But the significance of those living creatures and beasts of the field,
including carnal delight, by means of which the devil seduces the soul
and in which he lives as it were in his principal abode, is excellently
and exhaustively expounded by St. Ambrose in his book *On Paradise*.
They are all the irrational passions of our rational nature which is sig-
nified in Scripture by the word 'earth'. Do not let it surprise you that
both carnal delight and the subtlety of the devil are indiscriminately
signified as though mingled together under the figure of the serpent:
for sometimes the serpent is a direct representation of the devil him-
self; at others of the lustful appetite of the carnal soul, that is, the soul
which lives according to the flesh, which is caught in his toils; at others
again he is a confused and indistinct representation of both, implying
that the one is involved in the other, for the one cannot exist in separa-
tion from the other. For wherever there is a lustful sighting in the soul,
there at once will be an entrance for the unclean spirit; and wherever
there is an entrance for his diabolical subtlety, there will be present
the itch of universal evil. And in whatever corporeal sense, which is
signified by the woman, these two come together, there must neces-
sarily follow the illicit tasting of the forbidden fruit, that is the wrong
use of the beauty of material objects (292): and this brings death to
the soul, of which death the death of the body is the shadow. But
concerning the curse which damned the serpent and the sentences
which were delivered upon the woman and her husband Adam, sen-
tences in which there was more of mercy than of vengeance (293), I
think it would be superfluous for me to speak now. For it will doubt-
less not be considered necessary for me to expound what has already
been satisfactorily expounded by the holy Fathers; for why, it might be

The Divine
curse

scriptis planissime plenissimeque inuenitur, cur a nobis, forte quis dicet, quasi melius explanaturi, repetitur? Quod absit de nobis existimari, cum illorum uestigia uix ualeamus consequi.

A. Non necessarium plane uideretur, si hoc solum non obstaret. Mirum nanque uidebitur, et rationi textuique disputationis 5 inconueniens, cur, cum paene omnia, quae de natura paradisi spiritualis deque his, quae in eo facta fuisse scriptura commemorat, dicenda uidebantur, quamuis cursim breuiterque, sanctorum patrum sententias sequens tetigeris, hunc solum locum omnino intactum ac transitorie praetermissum silentio uenerabaris. Ac per hoc non 849D omnino oportet te talia praeteruolare, sed plane et compendiose 11 percurrere.

N. Audiamus ergo diuinae indignationis in colubrum examen: *Super pectus tuum, inquit, gradieris, et terram comedes cunctis diebus uitae tuae.* Serpentem in hoc loco in figura et diabolicae astutiae, 15 et carnalis delectationis, et ambarum in se inuicem indiscrete et inseparabiliter amplexarum, diuinam scripturam posuisse diximus.

A. Pulchre et luculenter, et a ueritate non alienum.

De pectore serpentis N. Huius serpentis pectus est prudentia carnis, in qua diabolicae 850A fraudis calliditas dominatur. Inanis quoque et falsiloqua sapientia, 20 quae animum non aedificat sed inflat, pectus eius est. Carnalis itaque prudentia et inanis fallaxque sophia pectus serpentis est. Quas deus destruet: *Perdam, inquit, sapientiam sapientum, et prudentiam prudentum reprobabo.* Sed si quaeris qualis differentia sit inter carnis prudentiam et inanem philosophiam, hanc discretionis accipe 25 formulam. Prudentia carnis est falsa uirtus, quae uitia uirtutum coloribus tingit, quae malitiam bonitati simulatorie conformat, quae turpitudinem honestatis habitu exornat, ipsas uero simplices uerasque uirtutes dissimulat, ac mentis obtutibus, ne illarum sinceram faciem possit agnoscere, subtrahendo occultat; ac sic 850B carnales sensus decipit, animasque deludit, fallacibusque phantasiis 31 falsarum uirtutum obruit, mortisque aeternae tenebris opprimit. Inanis uero inutilisque sapientia est – cuius exemplum maxime in iudaeis perfidis uenenosisque hereticis uiget – quae litteram diuinae historiae solummodo sequitur, spiritum uero (hoc est mysticum 35

14–15 Gen. 3, 14. 23–24 I Cor. 1, 19.

15–17 Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 849A.

1 planissime plenissimeque] plenissime planissimeque HM 2 explanaturi] explanaturis corr. F, explanatis HM, explanatum P 26 formulam] (quid)intersit inter carnis prudentiam et inanem philosophiam titulum mg. add. J 27 simulatorie] simulatoriae FP 29 dissimulat] desimulat corr. R 31 (carnal)es] corr. R², carnaliter R⁰ 34 uenenosisque hereticis] om. HMR

asked, should we repeat what has been made so clear and treated so fully in their writings, as though we thought we could produce a better explanation? God forbid that this should be thought of us, who are barely able to follow in their footsteps.

A. It certainly would not seem necessary if this were the only matter that gave rise to no problem. But it will seem strange and inconsistent with the method and exposition of your discourse if, after having considered it proper to touch on practically all that the Scripture has recorded concerning the nature of the spiritual Paradise and the things that were created in it, although your disquisition was little more than a cursory and brief epitome of the opinions of the holy Fathers, this one passage you should leave wholly untouched, passing it by in awed silence. Therefore it is not right that you should entirely ignore these matters, but rather give a brief but adequate account of them.

N. Let us address ourselves then to the consideration of the divine 24 indignation against the serpent: 'On your belly shall you go, and you shall eat earth all the days of your life'. We have already said that in this passage the Scripture describes the serpent as signifying both the subtlety of the devil, and the indulgence of the flesh, and both bound together in an indiscriminate and indissoluble embrace.

A. Good, and lucid, and not inconsistent with the truth.

N. The belly of this serpent is the prudence of the flesh in which 25 The belly of the serpent the cunning of the devil's deceitfulness is dominant. And his belly is also empty and false-sounding wisdom which does not edify the mind but only inflates it (294). Thus the serpent's belly is both carnal prudence and empty and false wisdom, both of which God shall bring to destruction: 'I shall destroy the wisdom of the wise and the prudence of the prudent shall I reprove'. But if you ask what is the difference between the prudence of the flesh and empty philosophy (295), here is a formula which discriminates the one from the other: The prudence of the flesh is the false virtue which paints the vices with the colours of virtues; which shades wickedness to resemble goodness; which clothes baseness in the garment of honour: but the true and simple virtues it conceals, by drawing them out of the sight of the mind so that it may not be able to recognise their pure face, and thus it deceives the carnal senses and deludes and ruins souls with deceitful images of false virtues and brings them down to the darkness of eternal death. But empty and useless wisdom is best exemplified among the perfidious Jews and venomous heretics; it is the wisdom which follows only the letter of Holy Scripture, and hates, despises, neglects and has no knowledge of the spirit or mystical

intellectum) odit, spernit, negligit, ignorat, quae de natura rerum falsas inanesque fabulas, absque ulla uerisimilitudine, ad illudendas carnalium animas machinatur, naturalium rationum, secundum quas uniuersa creatura facta est, ueritate contempta, inusitatorum uerborum pomposum grandiloquumque leporem uentilans, seu fallacium propositionum syllogismorumque contortis crinibus ueritatis formam, qua incautos decipiat, simulans. 850C

His itaque duabus pectus serpentis (hoc est diabolica astutia carnaliumque delectationum illecebra) componitur, super quod (pectus dico) serpens ille graditur (hoc est exaltatur), et de quo glorificatur, totum hominem supplantans. Et hoc ex uerbis propheticis datur intelligi. Non enim simpliciter dixit 'super pectus tuum reppes', uel 'serpes', sed figurate: *Super pectus tuum gradieris*. Nemo quippe proprie praedicat de serpente 'animal gressibile', sed 'reptile'. Omne autem animal quod repit a terra non erigitur, sed per terram trahitur; omne uero quod graditur, priusquam gradiatur, de terra erigitur. Ergo *super tuum pectus gradieris*, hoc est, super astutiam et calliditatem tuam (quae inani sapientia carnalique prudentia composita est), qua hominem deceptum fefellisti, inque tuam potestatem redegisti, peccatorumque funiculis alligasti, aeternaeque mortis uoragine mersisti, in superbiam erigeris; et ad incrementa uitiorum, inque tuae damnationis cumulum, in cordibus infidelium tuae malitiae profectibus elatus et chenodoxus deambulabis. *Et terram comedes*, hoc est, terrena appetentium terrenis cogitationibus carnalibusque desideriis mortiferisque actionibus uesceris. *Cunctis diebus uitae tuae*, hoc est, quanto tempore in humana natura regnum tuum, ueluti quaedam falsa lux, arriserit et praeualuerit. Non enim aeternaliter imaginem dei regnabis et uinces, sed aut specialiter in Christo redemptore de potestate tua liberabitur adhuc in hac uita detenta, aut generaliter in fine mundi, quando *nouissima inimica mors* per eundem Christum dei uerbum *destruetur*, et uniuersaliter humana natura in pristinum statum restituetur.

Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et semen tuum, et semen illius. Mulier est sensus corporeus, naturaliter humanae naturae insitus. Per quam, in his uidelicet qui perfecti sunt, uisibilis creaturae

13 Gen. 3, 14. 17 Gen. 3, 14. 25–26 Gen. 3, 14. 30–31 I Cor. 15, 26. 33 Gen. 3, 15.

23 "Est enim chenodoxus (χενόδοξος), id est uane gloriosus, qui propter suam et non propter diuinam gloriam uirtutem accommodat, laboribusque propriis non subsistentes ex hominibus laudes comparat" (MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 56, scholion 4; CCSG 22, p. 16, 20–23; PG 90, 585D).

8 duabus] *sup. l. R², om. R⁰* 14 nemo . . . praedicat] non enim proprie praedicatur HMR 15 repit] reppit FR 18 inani] *om. HMR* 21 uoragine] uoraginem HM, R (*a. corr.*)

sense of it (296); it is that which deludes the souls of carnal men by empty inventions entirely devoid of truth about the nature of the universe, despising the truth of the natural principles in accordance with which the universal creature was created, and showing off by the use of strange expressions its pompous and grandiloquent style, or disguising itself by means of the tortuous intricacies of fallacious propositions and syllogisms, under the form of truth, to deceive the unwary (297).

Of these two vices, therefore, that is to say, the subtlety of the devil and the enticement of fleshly indulgence, the belly of the serpent is composed. It is upon this – his belly, that is – that the serpent walks, that is, on which he is raised and of which he boasts, usurping the human state. This may be understood from the words of the Prophet: for he did not simply say: 'Upon your belly shall you creep or crawl', but, figuratively, 'On your belly shall you walk'. This of course is a figurative expression; for no one would claim that the serpent was literally a 'walking animal' and not a 'creeping' one. But no creeping animal goes erect upon the earth: they all drag themselves along the ground. But everything which walks must before it starts to walk be raised from the ground. Therefore 'On your belly shall you walk' means: You shall be raised up in pride upon your subtlety and cunning, which is composed of empty wisdom and carnal prudence, by which you have deceived deluded man and reduced him to your power, and have bound him in the chains of sin, and have merged him in the whirlpool of eternal death; and you shall walk towards the increase of vices and the accumulation of your damnation, elated and vainglorious (298) in the success of your evil in the hearts of infidels. 'And earth shall you eat' means: You shall feed upon the earthly cogitations, and the carnal desires and the deadly deeds of those who hanker after earthly things. 'All the days of your life' means for as long as your kingdom, like a false light, shall shine and prevail over human nature. For not forever will you reign a conqueror over the Divine image, but either man will, while yet in this life, be set free from your power, that is in Christ the Redeemer, or generally at the end of the world (299), when 'death the last enemy will be destroyed', through the same Christ Who is the Word of God, and human nature will be universally restored to its pristine state.

'I shall place enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed'. Woman is the corporeal sense which is naturally implanted in human nature, through which – in those, that is, who are perfect – the beauty of the visible creature is referred to the glory

The food of
the serpent

pulchritudo ad laudem creatoris refertur. Inter quam (mulierem dico) et serpentem (hoc est libidinosam delectationem materialis pulchritudinis diabolicamque calliditatem in ea possidentem) magna inimicitia a deo constituta est. Mulier quippe (hoc est perfectus perfectorum sensus) odit materialium rerum carnalem appetitum, serpens uero spiritualium diuinarumque uirtutum inimicum habet desiderium. *Et semen tuum et semen illius.* Semen mulieris est rerum uisibilium perfecta naturalisque ac multiplex cognitio, omni errore sublato. Ad hoc enim in homine corporeus sensus constitutus est, ut sensibilibus et intelligibilibus per medietatem phantasiarum internuntius fieret. Semen uero serpentis innumerabilium delictorum mortiferum incrementum esse nemo recte philosophantium ignorat. *Ipsa conteret caput tuum.* Caput huius serpentis, hoc est initium, duabus ueluti partibus conflatur: omnis enim malitia ex motu irrationabili rationabilis naturae et ex inuidiosa diaboli astutia ortum originemque sumpsit. Quod caput in sensu perfectorum fidelium conteritur. Non enim eos diabolica fallit astutia, neque primae suggestioni latenter surrepti praestant introitum, seu irrationabili motui accommodant accessum. Caput illud, dum unum putatur, in infinitum numerum diuiditur, quia uniuersalis malitia in tantum multiplex est, ut nulla pars ipsius sit, ex qua uenenosa uitiorum genimina non crescant. Quae omnia mulier illa, de qua Salomon ait: *Mulierem fortem quis inueniet* (uirtus uidelicet et sapientia), in sensibus fidelium perfectorum comminuit.

Quam mulierem Propheta psalmographus alloquitur dicens: *Tu confregisti capita draconis, dedisti eum escam populis Aethiopum.* Populi Aethiopum sunt multitudines gentium quae in Christum praefatae mulieris typo praefiguratiue crediderunt, de quibus Esaias ait: *Populus qui sedebat in tenebris uidit lucem magnam.* Aethiopes enim 'tenebrosi' aut 'humiliati' translationis proprietate dicuntur. Quorum theoria gentilium populis conuenienter coaptatur, qui ante aduentum ueri luminis (quod est dei uerbum) tenebrosi erant, caligine uidelicet ignorantiae mortisque aeternae densissima nebula septi; sed mox humiliati (fidem accipientes), illuminati sunt, et

7 Gen. 3, 15. 13 Gen. 3, 15. 23 Prou. 31, 10. 26 Ps. 73, 14. 29 Is. 9, 2.

24 Cf. *Carmina* II, vi, 15-16 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 536). 29-30 "Aethiopes, tenebrosi" (Loewe-Goetz, *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum* V, 164. 33). 254.31-256.3 AVGVSTINVS, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* Ps. 73, 14 (CCSL 39, pp. 1014-1015; PL 36, 938-939). CASSIODORVS, *Expositio Psalmorum* Ps. 73, 14 (CCSL 98, pp. 679-680; PL 70, 531B-C).

1-2 mulierem dico] *mg. R², om. R⁰* 10-11 ut sensibilibus . . . fieret] *mg. R^x, om. R⁰* 14 huius] *sup. l. R²* 16 sumpsit] *assumpsit R (a. corr.)* 24 et] *sup. l. R²* 26 aethiopum] *ethiopum FHJM* 27 aethiopum] *ethiopum FHJM* 27 christum] *fortis add. HM, mg. R²* 28 praefiguratiue] *praefiguratiuae J, figuratum MR, figurarum H*

of God. Between this, that is to say, the woman, and the serpent, who is the lustful indulgence in material beauty and the subtlety of the devil which resides in it, a great enmity has been established by God. For the woman, that is to say, the perfect sense of the perfect, hates the carnal desire for material things, but the serpent has a hostile intent towards spiritual and divine virtues. 'And between your seed and her seed'. The seed of the woman is the perfect, natural and multiple knowledge of visible things, free from all error. For it is to this end that corporeal sense is established in man, that by means of phantasies it might become the intermediary between the sensibles and the intelligibles. But the seed of the serpent is the deadly increase of innumerable transgressions, a fact of which no true philosopher is ignorant. 'She shall bruise your head'. The head, or beginning, of the serpent is compounded as it were of two parts: for every evil has taken its origin from the irrational motion of rational nature and the hateful subtlety of the devil: and this head is bruised in the sense of the faithful who are perfect, because the subtlety of the devil does not deceive them, nor do they offer any entry to the secret and creeping approach of the first promptings of sin, nor do they accommodate access to the irrational motion. Although that head is regarded as one, it is divided into a number that is infinite, for the universal evil is so manifold that there is no part of it from which the seeds of the vices may not spring; and this multitude is crushed by that woman - to whom Solomon is referring when he says: 'Who shall find a virtuous woman'. that is to say, virtue and wisdom - in the senses of the faithful who are perfect.

The Prophetic Author of the Psalms refers to this woman when he says: 'You have broken the heads of the dragon and have given him as food for the people of the Ethiopians'. The peoples of the Ethiopians are the multitudes of the nations, which believed in Christ symbolically in the form of this woman of whom Isaiah says: 'The people which sat in darkness have seen a great light'. For by Ethiopians are meant, according to a proper translation, those who are 'darkened' or 'humbled', and this allegory may be appropriately applied to the peoples of the gentiles who, before the coming of the True Light, Which is God the Word, were in darkness, that is to say, were surrounded by the darkness of ignorance and the most dense cloud of eternal death (300). But when they have humbled themselves and accept the faith, they are enlightened and refreshed

The seed of the woman and that of the serpent

The head of the serpent

The consideration passes from sense to wisdom

spiritualibus epulis reficiuntur, quas de capitibus draconis contritis (hoc est totius malitiae numerositatibus deuictis) diuina praeparat sapientia. De hoc dracone idem Psalmista loquitur: *Draco iste, quem formasti ad illudendum ei*. Draco iste, inquit, diabolus profecto corpusque illius uniuersale (hoc est totius malitiae plenitudo), ipse est quem formasti, ut illudatur ei a sanctis tuis. Qui ipsius perniciosis fallacibusque insidiis illudunt, dum artes malitiae, quibus bonitatis munimina machinatur destruere, patefactas exprodunt, malleisque uirtutum principia nequitiæ, quæ ab eo pullulant, confringunt. Cui sententiæ congruit quod ait sanctus Iob: *Hoc est initium figmenti dei, quod fecit ut illudatur ab angelis eius*.

Cur autem draco iste spiritualis, cum omnibus suis membris, quæ eius malitiam sequuntur, formatio dei uel figmentum dicitur, duobus modis intelligi potest. Primum quidem quia omnes apostatæ angeli omnesque homines eorum sequaces, quantum naturaliter subsistunt, a deo conditi sunt, figmentum eius non incongrue formatioque esse creduntur. Deinde, quod talia symbolica uerba in talibus diuinæ scripturæ sententiis non semper naturam daemonum malorumque hominum, in qua eos conditor omnium bonorum substituit, sed ea quæ, merito utriusque (angelicæ uidelicet et humane) creaturæ inoboedientiæ, superaddita sunt essentiæ in eis conditæ, significant, ut sunt corpora aëria daemonum, terrena quoque mortaliaque hominum membra, quæ incunctanter in poenam peccati simplicitati naturæ a deo constitutæ adiuncta esse credenda et intelligenda sunt. Sed utrum natura daemonum a corporibus ab isto aere sibi adiunctis liberabitur, sicut humana natura, sui redemptoris gratia adiuta, resurrectionis momento animalibus corruptibilibusque corporibus absoluetur, alius disserendi locus est.

Et nunc breuiter colligendum quod corpora illa naturalia, quæ in conditione angelicæ naturæ facta sunt, quemadmodum caelestes uirtutes quæ nunquam creatorem suum deseruere, ita etiam apostatæ uirtutes inseparabiliter et aeternaliter possidebunt, quoniam spiritualia et incorruptibilia sunt; superaddita uero eis ex qualitatibus huius mundi merito nequitiæ suæ, ueluti quaedam indumenta ueterascentia, cum ipso (de quo sumpta sunt) mundo peritura credibile est. Quod igitur Propheta ait: *Draco iste, quem*

3-4 Ps. 103, 26. 10-11 Iob 40, 14 (19 iuxta LXX). 256.36-258.1 Ps. 103, 26.

6-11 AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XI, 15 (CCSL 48, p. 335; PL 41, 330). *De Genesi ad litt.* XI, xx, 27 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 352-353; PL 34, 439-440). Cf. *Periphyseon* V, 927D. 28 Cf. *Periphyseon* V, 884C-885A. 993C-995C.

8 exprodunt] *codd.*, intellige explodunt 9 uirtutum] *sup. l. R^s*, principium *R^o* (ab *R^s* cancellatum) 9 cui] cuius *HMR* 20-21 angelicæ uidelicet et humane] *om. HMR* 29-36 et nunc breuiter . . . credibile est] *om. HMR*

by a spiritual repast, which the Divine Wisdom prepares (301) from the bruised heads of the dragon, that is, from the pluralities of universal evil which He has overcome. The Psalmist says of this dragon: 'The dragon himself which You have formed to be deluded'. The dragon himself, the devil, He says, and his universal body, that is, the plenitude of universal evil, is that which You have formed to be deluded by Your saints who outwit his pernicious and deceitful ambush, lay bare and destroy the stratagems of evil with which he attempts to demolish the bastions of goodness, and shatter with the hammers of the virtues the principles of evil which sprout from him in abundance. This opinion is consistent with the words of the holy Job: 'This is the beginning of the creation of God, which He created that it might be outwitted by his angels' (302).

But how can that spiritual dragon with all his members which follow after him in evil be called a Divine creation or formation? There are two ways in which he may be called so. Firstly, because all the rebellious angels and all men who follow them have been created, in so far as they subsist in their natures, by God, they are not improperly called a Divine creation and formation. Secondly, because symbolical expressions like these, which occur in such passages of Scripture as these, do not always signify the natures of demons or wicked men in which the Creator of all things established them, but rather those parts which were added, as a punishment for the disobedience of both the angelic and the human creature, to the essence which was created in them: for example, the aerial bodies of demons and the earthly and mortal members of men, which should unhesitatingly be accepted and understood as the penalty for transgression, which has been added to the simplicity of the nature which was created by God. But as to whether the nature of the demons shall be set free from the aerial bodies which have been added to it in the same way as human nature, assisted by the grace of its Redeemer, shall at the moment of the Resurrection be liberated from its animal and corruptible bodies, must be discussed in another place.

And now a brief summary (303). Not only the celestial powers which never abandoned their Creator, but also the rebellious powers shall eternally and inseparably possess those natural bodies which were made at the creation of the angels, for these bodies are spiritual and therefore incorruptible. But what is added thereto from the qualities of this world in punishment for their wickedness grows old as a garment with the world from which it was taken and so may be regarded as perishable. Therefore when the Prophet says: 'That dragon which You formed to be outwitted', it seems that we should

The unclean
body super-
added to the
spirit

formasti ad illudendum ei, possumus sic accipere, quia non uidetur a ueritate distare, ut in draconis significatione mortiferam astutiam diaboli membrorumque eius, siue in angelis siue in hominibus malis; 'figmenti' uero seu 'formationis' uocabulo, quia sic diuersitas interpretum ecclesiae usibus ex aebraico transtulit eloquio, aut naturam eorum, secundum quam a deo substituta sunt priusquam peccarent, aut ea quae propter superbiam suam eis superaddita intelligamus. Sed qualicumque modo accipiamus figmentum seu formationem, hoc est siue de natura siue de naturae superadditis, ad illudendum ei a sanctis hominibus sanctisque angelis diabolus cum suo toto corpore formatus est, non iuxta quod naturaliter factus, sed iuxta quod superbiendo suaeque naturae dignitatem deserendo futurus. Illudetur enim a sanctis eius angelis, remanentibus quippe illis bona uoluntate et conditoris gratia fixi in ea felicitate, in qua creati sunt. Ille superba ignorantia, qua se casurum non praesciuerat – nam si praesciret, fortassis sibi praeuideret ne caderet – deceptus, inuidiaeque liuore inflatus, in suam sponte delapsus est miseriam. Iusti uero homines, creatoris sui ac redemptoris pietate liberati et illuminati, illudunt ei, dum ipsum latenter forma boni coloratum uirtutumque similitudine uitia mortiferumque malitiae uenenum suggerentem sentientes, mox caput eius conterunt, escamque spiritualem (diuinam uidelicet prudentiam, quae uitia uirtutibus secernit, ne subdola uersutia eos fallere ualeat) internae discretionis dentibus comminuunt, uerique boni sinceris dapibus, omni mixtura mali purgatis, uescuntur. Neque illorum mulierem (hoc est sensum) materialium rerum pulchritudo decipit, per quam antiquus coluber, libidinosa delectatione mediante, mortifera uitiorum uenena in imprudentium animos diffundit. Conterit ergo mulier (hoc est sensus malitiam bonitate discernens) fortioris mulieris (dei uerbi dico) uirtutibus incitata, mota, adiuta, roborata, et ad perfectionem actionis et contemplationis perducta, caput serpentis et capita (diabolicae uidelicet suggestionis illecebrosaeque delectationis primordia). Vnde eis laetitia diuinaeque efficitur refectio. Qualis enim maior laetitia est spiritualiter in hac uita degentibus, quam serpentinae libidinosasque diaboli uersutias in seipsis primo conuincere, ac deinde simplicioribus se in actione et intelligentia fidelibus, ne et ipsi eisdem deceptoris insidiis capiantur, propalare?

De sapientum dentibus, quibus caput serpentis comminuunt

5 aebraico] hebraico HMP 6-7 priusquam peccarent] mg. R², om. R⁰ 7 suam] sup. l. R² 7 superaddita] sunt add. HM 9 superadditis] superadditas F (a. corr.), P 14 fixi] p. ras. R² (aut R¹), FJP, fixis HM (illis . . . fixi . . . creati: hoc ἀνακόλουθον, ex imperfecta correctione forsan ortum, cum uetustioribus codicibus seruauit) 22 uitia] a add. HM 25 mulierem] mulieres HMR, mulierum P 25 sensum] sensus HMR 27-28 in . . . animos] imprudentium animis HMR 35 in seipsis] mg. R^x, om. R⁰

not be far from the truth in taking him to mean by the dragon the deadly subtlety of the devil and his members whether found in angels or in evil men; and by the 'creation' or 'formation' (for there is a difference in the interpretations of the Hebrew expression which have been made for the service of the Church) (304), either their nature in which before their fall they were established by God, or that which was added to them in consequence of their pride. But in whatsoever way we interpret creation and formation, whether as nature, or as what is added to nature, the devil with his whole body was made to be outwitted by the saints and the holy Angels not as to the nature in which he was created, but as to his future state when through pride he should have abandoned the dignity of his nature. For he will be outwitted by the Angels of God because by goodwill and the grace of their Creator they remain fixed in that state of happiness in which they were created; whereas he, deceived by his proud ignorance which prevented him from foreknowing his fall (for had he known perhaps he would have taken steps to avoid it), and puffed up with the rage of envy (305), of his own will tumbled into his misery. But righteous men who have been set free and enlightened by their devotion towards their Creator and Redeemer outwit him when, seeing through his disguise of goodly shape and the speciousness with which he tempts them into vice, and the deadly poison of wickedness, at once bruise his head, and grind with the teeth of inward discrimination the spiritual food – which is the Divine prudence, and which distinguishes vices from virtues (306) so that no subtle guile may deceive them – and feed on the pure banquets of the true Good which are cleansed from all admixture of evil. Nor is their woman, that is, their sense, deceived by the beauty of material objects, through which by the mediation of lustful delight the ancient serpent pours the deadly poison of the vices into the minds of imprudent men. Therefore the woman, or sense, which distinguishes evil from good, incited, moved, assisted, supported and led to the perfection of action and contemplation by the virtues of the Stronger Woman, which is the Word of God, bruises the head of the serpent and the primordial heads of diabolical suggestion and crafty delights – whereby the aforesaid righteous men win joy and divine refreshment. For what greater joy can there be for those who spend their lives after the spirit than first to conquer in themselves the serpentine and lustful wiles of the devil, and then to warn those of the faithful who are less advanced in action and contemplation than they, lest they too be captivated by the same tricks of the deceiver?

The teeth of the wise with which they crush the serpent's head

De calcaneo mulieris *Et tu insidiaberis calcaneo eius.* Calcaneum mulieris (quae est AICΘHCIC) rerum sensibilibium phantasiae sunt, hoc est imagines, quae de corporalibus numeris in quinquepartito sensu exprimuntur. Ac per hoc, calcaneum illud quinquepartitum esse necesse est. Diuiditur enim in quinque notissima sentiendi organa, uisum dico, 5
audium, olfactum, gustum, tactumque. Quorum quaedam quidem 854A
longe extra molem corpoream sentientis extenduntur, ut uisus et
auditus. Solem nanque, lunamque, caeteraque sidera longe ab eo
loco, quo corpusculi mei moles ambitur, posita sentio. Vbi enim
sunt, ibi ea sentio in radiis oculorum meorum, qui illuc nulla mora 10
interstante eriguntur, in quibus phantasiae praedictorum siderum
formantur. Videsne igitur quam longe praefata femina calcaneum
suum in organo uidendi extendit? Similiter de his quae prope
uel in mediis spatiis uidentur intelligendum. Non alio modo de
audiendi officio naturalis organi consideratio edocet. Auditus 15
siquidem extra corporis spatia foras erumpit, ut sonorum seu uocum
formulas in seipso expressas recipiat, siue longe siue prope, ictu
aeris effectas. Quaedam uero intra terminos corporis continentur, 854B
ut est olfactus et gustus, ut multis de natura sensuum disputantibus
uidetur. Non desunt tamen qui sensum olfaciendi foras autumant 20
prosilire. Quorum opinionem non possumus spernere: longiuscule
enim a corporibus nostris bene seu aliter olentia sentimus. De
tactu autem nemo phisicorum dubitat quod et intra corpus et extra
suum peragat officium: solus enim et sine aliis sensibus uim suam
exercet. Nullus uero aliorum quattuor absque illius cooperatione 25
ministerium suum ualet adimplere. Nam et uisus non potest uidere,
nisi tetigerit quod uidet; nec auditus audire, nisi tetigerit quod audit;
nec olfactus olfacere, si non tetigerit quod olet; neque gustus gustare,
si non tetigerit quod gustat. Animaduerte itaque mulieris calcaneum 854C
quinquepartitum sensum sensibilibium rerum phantasiis formatum, 30
cui serpens callidus insidiatur. Insidiatur enim sensui uidendi, dum
pulchritudinem formarum colorumque incautis animabus perniciose
suadet concupiscere. Eadem ratione de armonia uocum, de suauitate
odorum, de saporum, eorumque quae tactus attingit delectationibus
intelligendum arbitror. Quae omnia, dum improuide (hoc est carnali 35
cupiditate) concupita per corporeum sensum ab anima percipiuntur,
mortiferum diuinorum mandatorum transgressionis efficiunt
uenenum, omniumque delictorum semina nutriunt. Et hoc est quod
superius insinuat scriptura ubi ait: *Vidit igitur mulier quod bonum*

1 Gen. 3, 15. 260.39–262.2 Gen. 3, 6.

5 diuiditur] de sensibus *titulum mg. add. R²* 8 lunamque] et lunam *HM* 13 organo]
organum *HMR* 18 quaedam] quidam *HM* 28 si non tetigerit . . . gustare] *mg. R¹*,
om. R⁰ 29 mulieris calcaneum] *om. HMR* 31 cui serpens callidus insidiatur] *mg. R¹*,
om. R⁰

'And you shall lay siege to her heel'. The heel of the woman, who is *αἰσθησις*, (sense) is the phantasies of sensible things, that is to say, the heel
images which are imprinted by the corporeal numbers (307) upon the
five senses. Therefore that heel must be five-fold. For it is divided into
the familiar five organs of sense, namely, sight, hearing, smell, taste
and touch. Now some of these extend far beyond the framework of the
perceiving body, like sight and hearing. For I behold the sun and the
moon and the other stars which are situated far from that place where
the mass of my little body roams. For where they are, there I behold
them in the rays of my eyes which dart out thither without a moment's
delay, and in which are formed the phantasies of the afore-mentioned
stars. You see then how far, in the organ of vision, this woman can
extend her heel. The same applies to those things which are near, or in
the middle distance. We find the same property in the function of the
natural organ of hearing. For hearing fares forth from the confines
of the body to receive imprinted upon it the forms of sounds or voices
which are produced by the clashing of bronze either from near or
from afar. But others of the senses, in the opinion of many who study
their nature, are retained within the limits of the body, such as smell
and taste. But there are some who think that the sense of smell leaps
out of the body, and their opinion is not to be despised; for we can
smell odours, either good or otherwise, which originate at some little
distance from our bodies. But as to touch no physicist doubts but
that it operates both inside and outside the body. For it exercises its
power alone and without the other senses, whereas none of the other
four can without its co-operation fulfil its function: neither can vision
see unless it touches what it sees, nor hearing hear unless it touches
what it hears, nor smell smell unless it touches what it smells, nor taste
taste unless it touches what it tastes. This, then, is the heel of the
woman, the five-fold sense formed by the phantasies of sensible things,
to which the subtle serpent lays siege. To the sense of sight it lays siege
when it persuades unwary souls to lust dangerously after the beauty of
shapes and colours. And we must think in the same way of the melody
of voices, the suavity of odours and the delights of savours and of those
things which are within the reach of the sense of touch. All these
things, when perceived by the soul through the corporeal sense with
imprudent desire, that is, with carnal concupiscence, distil the mortal
poison of disobedience to the divine precepts, and nourish the seeds
of all the sins. This is what is meant by the earlier Scriptural passage, in
which it is said: 'Therefore the woman saw that the tree was good to eat

esset lignum ad uescendum, et pulchrum oculis, aspectuique delectabile; et tulit de fructu illius, et comedit, deditque uiro suo, mulierem uidelicet figurate exteriorem sensum appellans, rerum sensibilibum phantasiis delectatum atque deceptum, uiri autem appellatione animum significans, qui sensui corporeo illicite consentiens corrumpitur, hoc est, a contemplatione intimae ueritatis segregatur. 5

De erumpnis et conceptibus mulieris
 Mulieri quoque dixit: Multiplicabo erumpnas tuas et conceptus tuos; in labore paries filios. Vbi aperte datur intelligi quod, si homo non peccaret, non solum interiori intellectu, uerum etiam exteriori sensu naturas rerum et rationes summa facilitate, omni ratiocinationis necessitate absolutus, purissime contemplaretur. Postquam uero peccauit, per organa exterioris sensus non nisi solas sensibilibum superficies, et quantitates, et qualitates, situs quoque et habitudines, caeteraque quae corporeo sensui succumbunt, animus percipit. Et haec omnia, non per seipsa, sed per eorum phantasias attingit, quas secum tractans suum iudicium saepissime fallitur, ac per hoc non sine multiplicibus studiorum laboribus, quos erumpnas mulieris scriptura nominat, ad multiplices conceptus (id est ad inchoationes intelligibilium rerum intelligentiae) atque filios (hoc est rectas rationes de natura rerum) procreandos per eundem sensum potest peruenire. Propterea autem erumpnas et conceptus filiosque exteriori sensui diuina deputat auctoritas, quoniam omne studium sapientiae omnisque mentis conceptio, puraue ueritatis cognitio a sensibus corporis auspiciis sumunt, ab inferioribus ad superiora, et exterioribus ad interiora ratione gradatim ascendente. 25

Et sub uiri potestate eris, et ipse dominabitur tui. In hoc loco naturalis ordinis humanae naturae restitutio diuina uoce promittitur, et in antiquum statum conditionis reuersio. Ordo siquidem naturalis esset, si animus sui creatoris potestati subditus atque oboediens semper ei adhaereret, deinde sensus potestatem nutumque animi libenter sequeretur, corpus autem sensui succumberet. Sic nanque pax et armonia ipsius creaturae et in seipsa et cum creatore suo fieret. Iam uero, post transgressionem diuini mandati, talis ordo ad quem conseruandum creatus est homo, talisque pax et unitas creatoris et creaturae perturbatus est. Homo siquidem sponte sua, nulla occasione cogente, rerum sensibilibum amore corruptus, deum suum deseruit, cui adhaerere solum bonum est nostrae substitutionis, et non aliud. Ideoque deus superbiam humanae naturae spernere

7-8 Gen. 3, 16. 26 Gen. 3, 16. 37 Ps. 72, 28.

21-25 AVGVSTINVS, *De Trinitate* XIV, iii, 27-30 (CCSL 50, p. 426; PL 42, 1039).

1 aspectuique] aspectuque HMR 24 et] ab add. H, M (sup. l.) 30 semper ei] om. HMR 30 sensus] sensum HM 37 nostrae substitutionis] humanae naturae HMR 38 spernere] substernere H, M (p. corr.)

and fair to look upon and of a pleasing aspect, and she took of the fruit and did eat, and gave to her husband'. The woman here is a figurative expression of the exterior sense, which is entranced and deceived by the phantasies of sensible things, while the man signifies the mind, which by illicitly consenting to the corporeal senses, is corrupted, that is to say, separated from the contemplation of the innermost truth.

To the woman also He said: 'I will multiply your sorrows and your conceptions: in labour shall you bring forth your sons'. Here it is clearly given to understand that if man had not sinned he would have contemplated the natures and the principles of all things in a most pure manner with the utmost ease not only with the interior intellect but also with the exterior sense, for he would have been freed from the necessity of all logical discourse. But after he had sinned, the mind perceives through the corporeal sense only the surfaces of sensible things, with their quantities and qualities, their positions, their conditions, and the other aspects which submit to corporeal perception. And all these it reaches not in themselves, but through their phantasies, in interpreting which its judgment very frequently errs. Therefore not without the manifold labours of study, which Scripture calls the sorrows of the woman, can he arrive by means of the same sense at a multitude of conceptions, that is, at the rudiments of an understanding of intelligible beings, and at the procreation of sons, that is to say, of right judgments concerning nature. Now it is for this that the Divine Authority imposes upon the exterior sense the sorrows and the conceptions and the sons: because every work of wisdom, and every conception of the mind, and pure knowledge of truth takes its origin from the bodily sense, for reason ascends step by step from lower to higher things, and from outer to inner (308).

'And you shall be under the authority of the man, and he shall be lord over you'. Here the Divine voice promises the restoration of the natural order of human nature, and the Return to the condition in which it was first created (309). For the natural order should be as follows: the mind subordinated to the authority of its Creator and remaining ever obedient to Him; and then the sense freely subject to the authority and injunction of the mind; and finally the body subordinated to the sense. For so the creature would be at peace and in harmony in itself and with its Creator. But now after the transgression of the Divine Mandate, this order, for the preservation of which man was created, and this peace and communion between Creator and created, is upset. For of his own accord and under no compulsion but corrupted by his love of sensible things, man has abandoned his God; although there is no other 'good' in our substance but to 'abide in' Him. Therefore God, wishing to

25
The woman's
sorrows and
conceptions

uolens, propriis suis irrationabilibus libitisque motibus hominem permisit abuti, ut in seipso probaret quid sui conditoris gratia meritumque oboedientiae, et quid irrationabilis motus superbaque mandati transgressio sibi conferret. Ac per hoc, ueluti diuortium quoddam maris et feminae subsecutum est inter animum et sensum. Non enim obtemperat sensus corporeus iussionibus animi iuxta leges naturae. Quod diuortium Apostolus aperte pulchreque expressit dicens: *Mente serui legi dei, carne autem legi peccati*, carnem uidelicet carnalem sensum appellans, qui rationabilibus animi motibus, etiam in his qui perfecti sunt, inoboediens resistit. Et alibi: *Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captiuantem me in lege peccati*. Animaduerte discidium legis mentis et legis carnalis sensus, quae dominatur in membris carnaliter uiuentium, repugnat mentibus spiritualium in mortalibus membris ad exercitationem uirtutis. Ideoque 'lex peccati', id est carnalis sensus, ab Apostolo nominatus est. Sed hoc discidium diuortiumque animi et sensus, quando restaurabitur natura et ad naturalem ordinem reuocabitur, in pacem spiritualis naturalisque coniugii uertetur, quando corpus sensui, sensus animo, animus deo subditus et oboediens erit. Hoc etiam apertius datur nobis intelligi, si septuaginta editionem intendamus: *Et ad uirum tuum conuersio tua; et ipse tui dominabitur*. Quibus uerbis apertissime intelligitur reditus humanae naturae in pristinum ordinem.

Quod autem uiro dictum est: *Maledicta terra in opere tuo*, et caetera quae sub forma maledictionis uidentur esse scripta, non facile patent. Qualis sit illa terra, cui merito praeuaricationis animi (qui est uir humanae naturae) maledicatur? Et qualis sit illa maledictio: utrum indignationis seueritas sit, an quaedam mystica obiurgatio? Et cur non ipse animus, qui uocem mulieris audiens uetitumque fructum comedens peccauit, maledictum sustinuit? Et in quibus laboribus comedit maledictam terram? Et qui sunt dies uitae animi? Qualesque spinas et tribulos germinet terra illa, quasque herbas eius comedit? Quis sudor? Quis uultus? Qualis reditus animi in terram, de qua sumptus est? Quis puluis? Haec omnia si secundum historiam (hoc est secundum rerum sensibilibium, quae in hac ac de hac terra hominibus habitabili fiunt) accipiantur, sicut multis

8 Rom. 7, 25. 10-12 Rom. 7, 23. 21 Gen. 3, 16 (*iuxta LXX*). 24 Gen. 3, 17.

20-21 Eadem uersionem eiusdem uersiculi (Gen. 3, 16) sequuntur AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XV, vii, 108-109 (CCSL 48, p. 462; PL 41, 445); *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, xix, 29 (PL 34, 211) et HIERONYMVS, *Hebraicae Quaestiones in Genesim*, Lagarde 7, 19 (CCSL 72, p. 6).

10 in his] *hic desinit R* 13 dominatur] dominantur *H* 26 patent] parent uel patent *H* 26 praeuaricationis] *om. H* 32 illa] *om. HM* 35 sensibilibium] *codd., subaudi: proprietatem*

humiliate the pride of human nature, permitted man to abuse his own irrational but willed motions, so that he might himself become a proof of what the grace of his Creator and the reward of obedience would have conferred on him, and what the irrational emotions and the proud transgression of God's Mandate would bring on him. And hereupon there followed a kind of divorce between the male and the female, that is, between mind and sense. For the corporeal senses did not obey the precepts of mind according to the laws of nature. And this divorce has been clearly and beautifully alluded to by the Apostle: 'In my mind I serve the law of God, but in my flesh the law of sin'. By flesh he means the carnal sense which disobediently resists the rational motions of the mind even in those who are perfect. In another place he writes: 'I see in my members another law which contends with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin'. You see here the discord between the law of the mind and the law of carnal sense, which dominates the members of those who live according to the flesh, and contends with the minds of those, who live according to the spirit in mortal members, for the exercise of virtue, and for that reason is called by the Apostle the 'law of sin', that is, of carnal sense. But when our nature is restored and recalled to its proper order, this discord and divorce of mind and sense shall be changed into the peace of a spiritual and natural wedlock, in which the body will conform and be subject to the sense, the sense to the mind, and the mind to God. This becomes clearer to us if we examine the Septuagint text: 'And your turning shall be towards your husband, and he shall be lord over you'; words which express most clearly the Return of human nature to its former order (310).

Now in the words to man which seem to be written in the form of a curse, 'And the earth shall be accursed in your work', etc.: it is not easy to see what is meant by that earth which is accursed in punishment for the transgression of the mind, which is the male part of human nature; nor what is meant by the curse itself, whether it is the severity of God's wrath, or a kind of mystical rebuke; nor is it clear to see why the mind itself, which committed the fault by listening to the voice of the woman and eating the forbidden fruit, did not incur the curse; nor what those labours may be in which man eats of the accursed earth, nor what the days of the life of the mind, nor of what kind are the thorns and tares which that earth is to bring forth, nor its grass which man eats, nor the sweat, nor the face, nor the return of the mind into the earth from which it was formed, nor the dust. No problem, or at least, no very serious one, arises if these things are given, as by many authors, an historical interpretation, that is to say, are regarded as sensible objects

auctoribus placuit, aut nullam aut leuissimam quaestionem gignunt. Sin uero in ipsa humana natura, sicut et caetera quae de paradiso praedicta sunt, intelligantur, non parua indigent indagazione. Quod autem et secundum rerum factarum proprietatem accipiuntur, et tamen propheticam flagitant intentionem, sanctus Augustinus in XI exameri sui testatur his uerbis: "Quia audisti uocem mulieris tuae, et edisti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi de eo solo non edere, maledicta terra in operibus tuis. In tristitiis edes illam omnes dies uitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi. Et edes foenum agri. In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec conuertaris in terram, ex qua sumptus es, quia terra es et in terram ibis." Hos, inquit, esse in terra labores humani generis quis ignorat? Et quia non essent, si felicitas quae in paradiso fuerat teneretur, non est utique dubitandum. Ac per hoc etiam proprie uerba haec primitus accipere ne pigeat; seruanda tamen est et expectanda significatio prophetae, quam maxime hic intuetur dei loquentis intentio. Videsne quemadmodum iubet hunc locum sanctae scripturae et proprie et figurate accipi? Sed quid uult illa figura prophetica, in praefato sui libro non explanat. Sed si explanaret, fortassis nobis sufficeret, nec aliam expositionem quaereremus. Non autem explanat. Quaeramus igitur breuiter, deo duce, quid sibi uolunt talia diuini eloquii uerba.

A. Quaeramus. Non enim intacta praetermittenda sunt.

N. Sufficit, ut arbitror, de talibus responsionem beati Maximi monachi ponere. Sed ut apertius ipsa responsio patefiat, eiusdem sciscitatio praeponenda est.

A. Aliter fieri non oportet.

N. Proponit itaque in quinto Scoliarum capitulo, hoc pacto: *Quae sit maledicta terra in operibus Adam secundum ΑΝΑΓΟΓΗΝ? Et quid in tristitiis eam comedere? Et quid post germinationem spinarum tribulorumque herbam comedere? Et postremo quid in sudore uultus sui panem comedere? Et quidem nunquam uisus est homo terram comedens neque herbam; neque panem manducantes, iuxta iudicium historiae, in sudore uultus comedunt.*

RESPONSIO. *Ipsa terra maledicta in operibus Adam caro est Adam, semper facta per opera Adam, dico autem passiones cognoscentis animi, maledicta*

6-11 Gen. 3, 17-19.

6-15 AVGVSTINVS, *De Genesi ad litt.* XI, xxxviii, 51 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 373, 1-13; PL 34, 450). 266.26-268.25 MAXIMVS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 5 (CCSG 7, pp. 64-67; PG 90, 277B-280B).

2 paradiso] ipso HM 3 intelligantur] intelligenda HM 4 factarum] facturarum H 9 et] uel FP 14 ne] non HM 14 est] esse HM 15 quemadmodum] quomodo HM 17 sui] suo M (corr. ex sui) 22 sufficit] sufficit HM 26 capitulo] nota scol(ias) glossam mg. add. J 27 ΑΝΑΓΟΓΗΝ] FJP (intellige ἀναγωγῆν), anagogen HM 31 manducantes] comedentes H 33 cognoscentis] codd. (γεωθέντος; CCSG 7, p. 65, 11)

occurring on this earth, which is inhabited by man, and arise from it. But if they are taken as referring to human nature itself, as in the case of the earlier discussion about Paradise, they require a considerable amount of elucidation. In the opinion of St. Augustine, they are, on the one hand, to be taken as actual historical events, and, on the other, as containing a prophetic meaning, as he writes in the Eleventh Book of the *Hexaemeron*: "Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I had commanded you that of that only you should not eat, the earth is accursed in your works. In sorrow shall you eat of it all the days of your life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth for you, and you shall eat the grass of the field. In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread until you are changed into the earth from which you were taken: for earth you are and into earth shall you return". Who does not know', he asks, 'that these are the labours of the human race on earth? And it is not to be doubted that these labours would not be, if the happiness that had existed in Paradise had been maintained. There is therefore no objection in taking the words in the first instance in their normal meaning. But we should also look for and preserve the prophetic significance which particularly at this point is intended by God when He speaks'. You see how he bids us that this text of Holy Scripture be given both a literal and a figurative interpretation? He does not, however, in this book of his explain what the prophetic and figurative meaning is. Had he done so, I think it would have been sufficient for us, and we should not have asked for another explanation: but since he does not, let us, with the help of God, hold a brief enquiry into the meaning of these words which were spoken by God.

A. Let us do so. For they should not be passed over altogether.

N. It will be sufficient, I think, to put forward the solution of the blessed monk Maximus: and in order that that solution may be expressed the more clearly, let us indicate the question he asks.

A. We could do no otherwise.

N. In the Fifth Chapter of his *Scholia*, then, he proposes the following problem: 'What is the allegorical interpretation of the earth which is accursed in the works of Adam, and his eating of it in sorrow, and his feeding on the grass of the field after the growth of thorns and thistles, and lastly his eating of bread in the sweat of his face? For no man was ever seen eating earth or grass, nor is it recorded in the judgment of history that man ever ate bread in the sweat of his face.

'Answer: The earth itself, accursed in the works of Adam, is the flesh of Adam: that earth is always created by the works of Adam. These works are the passions of his knowing (311) mind. It is cursed with

uirtutum (ueluti diuinorum operum) infructuositate. Quam cum anxietate multa tristitiaque comedit, breui secundum ipsam uoluptate perfruens. Quae caro pro ipsa corruptibili perfruentia germinat ei cogitationes et curas (ueluti spinas) magnasque temptationes atque periclitationes (ueluti tribulos) et, contra rationem, furorem et concupiscentiam langide eum 5
undique compungentes, ut uix possit eius (carnis uidelicet) sanitatem 857C
incolumitatemque (ueluti foenum marcidum) acquirere atque manducare (hoc est consequi). Et tunc, post multam atrocitatem reuolutionem, in sudore uultus (hoc est in ipsa secundum sensum humilitate atque labore) in operosae considerationis sensibilibus, uelut panem ad constitutionem habendo 10
praesentis uitae occasionem, siue per artem, siue per aliam quandam huic uitae distributam machinationem.

Alia theoria An magis terra est Adam cor, maledictum per praeuaricationem accipiens caelestium bonorum ablationem. Quam terram per practicam purgat uita philosophiam multis comedit tribulationibus, purgatam per conscientiam 15
maledictione operum turpitudinis. Et iterum germinatas in ea (instar spinarum) cogitationes circa corporum generationem ac (ueluti tribulos) 857D
circa incorporalium prouidentiam iudiciumque scatentes opiniones ratione purgans, physicam (ueluti foenum) carpit spiritualiter theoriam. Et sic, quasi in sudore uultus, scibili intelligentiae secundum scientiam uultu 20
incorruptibilem theologiae comedit panem, solum uere uitalem et comedentium se conseruantem ad incorruptibilitatem generationem. Terra itaque est bene comesa, ipsa per actionem cordis purgatio; foenum uero, ipsa secundum naturalem theoriam eorum quae facta sunt scientia; panis autem, uera 858A
secundum theologiam mysteriorum doctrina. Hactenus Maximi. 25

Arbitror autem dies uitae animi, quibus terram cordis sui purgando laborat, non hos solummodo, quibus praesentis uitae tempora uoluuntur corpusque ab anima uegetatur, uerum etiam et illud spatium temporale, quo animae, regimen corporis deserentes, in alia uita, donec corpora sua recipiant, morantur, significare. Nam 30
et in hac uita, qua simul corpus et anima degunt, et in altera post mortem corporis (hoc est solutionem eius reditumque in quattuor mundi elementa, ex quibus est collectum atque compositum) usque ad finem mundi corporumque resurrectionem diemque iudicii, purgari animas posse credimus. Hi sunt igitur dies quibus animus 858B
terram cordis sui comedit, hoc est actione purgationis utitur. Nam 36
post finem rerum sensibilibus nullum purgationis actum legimus fore, post reditum naturae in pristinam puritatem. Et fortassis hoc

2 uoluptate] uoluptatem M, uoluntatem H 5 langide] languide HM Steel (64, 16) 9 in²] om. HM Steel (64, 20) rectius ut uidetur 15 multis . . . tribulationibus] per multas comedit tribulationes HM Steel (66, 26) 16 germinatas] FJP Steel (66, 28), germinans HM 16 ea] eo HM Steel (66, 28) 23-24 secundum naturalem . . . autem uera] om. HM 25 maximi] maximus H, M (corr. ex maximi) 28 uerum] uelum H 29 quo] quod H 33 est] om. H

a barrenness of virtues, that is, of the works of God. This earth he eats in anxiety and much sorrow, enjoying its own brief pleasure. And this flesh, through this corrupting enjoyment, spawns in him thoughts and cares like thorns, and great temptations and dangers like thistles, and irrational fury and concupiscence, which all prick him languidly on all sides: so that it is well nigh impossible for him to get and feed on, that is, achieve, the health and integrity of that' flesh, 'for it is like hay that has withered: and then after many appalling vicissitudes he eats bread in the sweat of his face, (that is, the humility and toil of the sense), the bread of the exacting consideration of sensible things (bread, as it were, necessary for the continuation of this life) through discipline or some other technique devised for this life.

'Or is the earth rather the accursed heart of Adam which through transgression is deprived of celestial goods? This earth, through practical philosophy, he eats with many tribulations, purged as it is through consciousness (because of the curse) of the baseness of its works; again, subjecting to reason thoughts germinated in it (like thorns) concerning the generation of bodies, and teeming ideas (like thistles) concerning the providence and judgment of incorporeals, he crops, spiritually, as it were grass, a physical contemplation. And thus, as though in the sweat of his face, with the knowable face (312) of intelligence that is knowledge, he eats the incorruptible bread of theology, the bread which alone is the bread of life and which preserves the generation of those who eat of it to incorruptibility. So the eating of the earth well is the purgation of the heart through action; the grass is knowledge itself based on the contemplation of the nature of those things which have been created: but the bread is true doctrine based on the theology of the mysteries'. Thus far the words of Maximus.

Now I think that the days of the life of the mind, in which it toils purging the earth of its heart, signify not only those days through which the seasons of the present life pass and in which the body is sustained by the soul, but also that temporal interval in which the souls, relinquishing the control of their bodies, abide in another life until they take back their bodies. For we believe that souls can be purged both in this present life, which soul and body spend together, and in the other life after the death of the body, that is, after its dissolution and its return into the four cosmic elements from which it was gathered up and composed, until the end of the world and the resurrection of bodies and the day of judgment. These then are the days in which the mind eats the earth of its heart, that is, performs the function of purgation. For after the end of the sensibles we read that no further purgation will be practised, for then will have occurred the return of nature to its original purity. And perhaps

Another view
Practical
(philosophy)
purges vices

Physical pur-
ifies harmful
ideas on the
nature of
things

Theology
supplies the
bread of
sound theory

Souls, their
bodies dis-
solved, can
be purged
up to the day
of judgment

significat quod dictum est: *donec conuertaris in terram de qua sumptus es*. Ac si aperte diceret: Tanto tempore in purgationis tuae per actionem et scientiam laboribus sudabit uultus tuus (hoc est rationabilis inquisitio ueritatis), donec conuertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, hoc est in soliditatem incommutabilem primordialium causarum, ex quibus originem ducis. Non enim ulterius sudabis, dum illuc perueneris.

Quod autem nomine terrae felicitas aeternae uitae stabilitasque primordialium causarum, ex quibus omnia quae sunt oriuntur, significetur, multis diuinae scripturae locis aperte innuitur. Verbi gratia, Abraham dictum est: *Egredere de terra tua, et de cognatione tua, et de domo patris tui, et ueni in terram quam monstrauero tibi*. Et post aliquanta: *Profectus inde Abraham in terram australem, et habitauit inter Cades et Assur*, inter sanctificationem uidelicet et beatificationem, inter quas in aeterna requie omnis sanctorum felicitas constituta est. Sanctificati enim (hoc est omni contagione corporis et animae purgati) beate iuxta leges naturae uicturi sunt. Et si quis aliam Assur interpretationem (quae est Mesopotamia) considerauerit, pulcherrimam praesentique negotio conuenientissimam theoriae occasionem inueniet. Mesopotamia quippe 'media inter flumina' et est et dicitur. Nunquid autem credibile est habitationem sanctarum animarum totiusque humanae naturae restauratae alibi futuram, nisi inter media spiritualium uirtutum flumina, ex fonte omnium bonorum manantia? Et quid aliud praeter idipsum per reppromissionis terram, ad quam dei populus ductus est, aegyptiaca captiuitate seruituteque liberatus, mystice significabatur? Haec est terra uiuentium, in qua sancti *duplicia possidebunt*, hoc est, corporis et animae felicitatem. De hac etiam dominus ipse ait: *Beati mites, quoniam ipsi possidebunt terram*.

Quod autem sequitur: *quia terra es, et in terram ibis*, uel, sicut in alia interpretatione continetur, *quia puluis es, et in puluerem reuerteris*, potest sic intelligi ut, quoniam natura animi, quae ad imaginem et similitudinem dei facta est, ex fertili terra primitiuarum causarum sumpsit exordium, in eam iterum credamus necessario redituram. Si

1 Gen. 3, 19. 11-12 Gen. 12, 1. 13-14 Gen. 20, 1. 27 Ps. 26, 13 et alibi. 27 Is. 61, 7. 28-29 Matth. 5, 4. 30 Gen. 3, 19 (iuxta LXX). 31 Gen. 3, 19 (iuxta Vulgatam).

14 HIERONYMVS, *Liber interpretationis hebraicorum nominum*, Lagarde 4, 4 et 15, 28 (CCSL 72, pp. 63 et 78). 30 Eadem uersionem eiusdem uersiculi (Gen. 3, 19) sequebatur AVGVSTINVS, *De ciuitate dei* XIII, xv, 22. xxiii, 46. XX, xx, 42. 73 (CCSL 48, pp. 396. 406. 734. 735; PL 41, 387. 396. 688. 689). *De Genesi ad litt.* XI, xxxviii, 51 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 373; PL 34, 450).

9 primordialium] primordialium H 14 inter sanctificationem . . . beatificationem] hoc est inter sanctificationem et aequanimitatem HM 17 beate] aequanimiter HM 34 iterum] igitur HM

this is the meaning of the text, 'Until you return to the earth from which you were taken', which could be interpreted: For such a length of time your face, that is, the rational enquiry into truth, will sweat from the labours of your purgation in practice and theory, until you return to the earth from which you were taken, that is to say, into the immutable stability of the primordial causes, from which you derive your origin (313). When you have arrived there you will sweat no longer.

Now there are many Scriptural passages which clearly indicate that by the term 'earth' is meant the bliss of eternal life and the stability of the primordial causes, from which all things which are have their origin. For instance, to Abraham it is said: 'Go forth from your country and from your kin and from your father's house, and come to the land which I shall have shown you', and somewhat later: 'Abraham set out thence and came to a southern country, and dwelt between Cades and Assur', that is, between sanctification and beatification (314), where all the bliss of the saints is established in eternal rest. For being sanctified, that is, being purged from every disease of body and soul, they shall live in bliss according to the laws of nature. And if we consider another meaning of Assur, which is Mesopotamia, we shall find a more estimable subject for contemplation and one most apt to the present matter. For Mesopotamia is so called because it is in the midst between the rivers. Now, are we to believe that the abode of the holy souls and of the whole of restored human nature will be anywhere but in the midst between the rivers of the virtues? - these rivers which flow from the Source of all good things? And what else but this is mystically signified by the Land of Promise to which the people of God were led after they had been set free from the Egyptian captivity and slavery? This is the 'land of the living', in which the saints 'shall possess a double blessing', that of the body and that of the soul. It is of this too that the Lord Himself speaks when He says: 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth'.

But the following phrase, 'Earth you are and into earth shall you return, or', according to another version. 'For dust you are and into dust shall you return' can be understood as follows: Since the mind's nature, which is made in the image and likeness of God, took its origin from the fertile soil of the primordial causes, we therefore believe that it must of necessity return there. And if it be asked why

Cades signifies sanctification, Assur beatification

Assur, Mesopotamia

Earth you are, and into earth shall you return

autem quaeritur cur praefata terra in alia interpretatione pulueris nomine significatur, non alia ratio reddenda est, nisi quia, sicut ex puluere istius sensibilis terrae omnia quae de ea nascuntur nascendi causam accipiunt, ita omnium rerum uisibilium et inuisibilium multiplex numerositas ex primordialium causarum fertilitate procreatur, inque eandem finito mundo regredietur. Haec autem dicimus, non simplicitatem eorum qui hunc locum diuinae scripturae secundum historiam accipiunt redarguentes, qui solutionem humani corporis in quattuor mundi huius elementa, solius terrae nomine generaliter significata, per haec uerba scripturae significari conantur asserere, non animaduertentes quanta suo sensui uidentur aduersari. Si enim de solutione corporis diuina uox talia protulit, cur uiro soli praedixit? Cur non etiam et mulieri, cuius corpus non minus soluitur? Deinceps, cur totum hominem soluendum diuina animaduersio indicit, cum extremae eius tantummodo partes uilissimaeque (corpus uidelicet corporeusque sensus) soluantur? Animae autem naturalis simplicitas, omni compositione libera, nequaquam solutionem recipit, sed perpetuo insolubilis manet, siue rationabiliter, siue irrationabiliter se moueat. Nisi forte dicant hunc locum usu frequentissimo sanctae scripturae sinecdochicos accipiendum, ut a toto pars intelligatur. Nec mirum, si non de ipso animo, sed de solo uirili sexu, intra quem etiam femineus consignificatur, talia dicta esse arbitrantur. Postremo, cur non aduertant quod in his uerbis plus restitutio corporis promittitur, quam solutio uel corruptio? Nam dum corpus corruptibile atque mortale destruitur, tunc ad incorruptibile immortaleque reuocatur. Nullius enim corpus in corruptionem est reuersurum. Non ergo haec uerba reditum in hanc terram, sed potius reditum in spiritualem naturam praesagiunt. Sed eligat quis quid sequatur. Ego autem quod mihi uerisimilius uisum est, ex sanctorum patrum sententiis, Ambrosii dico et Augustini, necnon et uenerabilis Gregorii Nazanzeni (qui et Nyseus dicitur), expositorisque eius, Maximi uidelicet monachi, ratiocinationis occasionem sumens, tibi interroganti partimque exponenti protuli.

Et quoniam prolixitas huius uoluminis quaedam ex his, de quibus in eius exordio nos dicturos esse promisimus, nunc exponere non admittit, in alium librum differenda sunt. De reditu quippe

19-21 Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 560A; IV, 744C. 800A. 31 Cur Gregorius Nazianzenus et Gregorius Nyssenus in unum confundantur, ex praua interpretatione Cassiodori *Historiae Tripartitae* (VIII, viii, 45-48 et IX, xiii, 24-27; CSEL 71, p. 480 et p. 509) explanari posse innuitur in *Études érigéniennes*, Parisiis 1987, pp. 343-344.

4 rerum] om. H 13 cuius] cui HM 20 sinecdochicos] *codd.*, intellige *συνεκδοχικῶς* 28 praesagiunt] praesagunt M 29 quid] quod HM 31 dicitur] nota gregorium nazanzenum eundem esse quem et Nyseum *glossam mg. add. J* 35 promisimus] promissimus FJ

in the other interpretation this earth is given the name of dust, there can be no other reason than that, as it is from the dust of the sensible earth that all things born of earth take the cause of their birth, so the numerical multiplicity of all things visible and invisible is generated from the fertility of the primordial causes, and at the end of the world shall return to it again. But we do not say this in refutation of the simplicity of those who accept the truth of this Scriptural passage as historical, and who try to maintain that these words signify the dissolution of the human body into the four elements of this world, which are generally included under the single general term of earth, not perceiving how much they are at variance with its sense. For if the voice of God spoke thus about the dissolution of the body, why was it predicted of the man alone? Why not of the woman also, whose body is no less destined for dissolution? Again, why does the Divine reproach condemn the whole man to dissolution, when it is only the lowest and least valuable parts of him, namely the body and the bodily sense, that are dissolved, while the natural simplicity of the soul, free from all compositeness, by no means undergoes dissolution, but, remains forever indissoluble, whether its movements are rational or irrational? Unless perhaps they would say that we are to take this passage as a synecdoche, a figure which occurs very frequently in Holy Scripture, whereby the part is understood from the whole. This is possible if the words are taken to refer not to the mind itself but only to the male sex which is extended to include the female sex. Finally why do they not observe that the words speak not so much of dissolution or corruption as of restoration? For at the very moment when the corruptible and mortal body is destroyed, it is recalled to the incorruptible and immortal. For the body of no one is destined to return to corruption. So these words foretell the return, not into this earth, but rather to the spiritual nature. But let each choose the theory he will: I, however, taking my reasoning from the opinions of the holy Fathers, of Ambrose and Augustine, and also of the venerable Gregory of Nazianzus who is also called the Nyssaean (315), and of his commentator Maximus the monk, have put what seemed to me the more probable opinion before you, sometimes in answer to your questions, sometimes in comments upon your expositions.

As there are certain things which at the beginning of this book we promised to discuss, but which its lengthiness has prevented us from mentioning, we must postpone the examination of them to the next volume (316). For it was our purpose to treat at length of

naturarum in primordiales causas, inque eam naturam quae nec
 creat nec creatur (quae profecto deus est) latius intra huius libri
 terminos tractare proposuimus. Sed si impatiens es donec de diuina
 natura cognoscas, qua ratione nec creare nec creari dicitur, breuiter
 praelibabo. Diuina itaque natura propterea creditur non creari, 5
 quoniam primitiua omnium causa est, ultra quam nullum principium
 est, a quo possit creari. Quoniam uero post reditum uniuersitatis
 conditae uisibilium et inuisibilium in suas primordiales causas,
 quae in ipsa (diuina uidelicet natura) continentur, nulla ulterius
 natura ex ea procreabitur, seu in species sensibiles intelligibilesue 860C
 multiplicabitur – nam in ipsa unum erunt, sicut nunc et semper 11
 in causis unum sunt – non immerito nihil creare et creditur et
 intelligitur. Quid enim creabit, dum omnia in omnibus ipsa sola
 fuerit? Itaque, si tibi uidetur, huius libri progressio pedem retrahat,
 ne longius incedat. 15

A. Videtur plane; et iam dudum finem postulat.

FELICITER EXPLICUIT.

5 praelibabo] quomodo diuina natura nec creat nec creatur *titulum mg. add. J*, quare
 diuina natura dicitur nec creare nec creari *titulum mg. add. HM* 11 et semper] *om.*
HM 17 feliciter explicuit] *FJ*, explicit III *H*, explicit liber quartus ΠΗΡΥΦΙΧΩΝ
 ΜΗΡΙΜΟΙ *M, om. P*

the Return of the natures into their primordial causes and into that
 Nature which neither creates nor is created, that Nature which is God
 Himself, within the framework of the same Book. But if you are impa-
 tient to know why it is said of the Divine Nature that It neither creates
 nor is created, I will say a few words here by way of foretaste. The
 Divine Nature, therefore, for this reason is believed not to be created 27
 because It is the Primal Cause of all, and there is no principle bey-
 ond It from which It can be created. On the other hand, because
 after the Return of the created universe of things visible and invis-
 ible into its primordial causes which are contained within the Divine
 Nature, there is no further creation of nature from the Divine Nature
 nor any propagation of sensible or intelligible species; for in It all will
 be One, just as even now in their causes they are One and always are
 so. Therefore we can rightly believe and understand that this Nature
 creates nothing. For what should It create when It alone is all in all
 things? And now, if you agree, let us put an end to this book lest it run
 on too far.

A. I quite agree, for it has been calling for an end for some time.

THE END

NOTES ON TEXT AND TRANSLATION

by

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1. [741C] Eriugena gives here the name *Physiologia* to the work which he calls elsewhere *Periphyseon*: cf. *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* II, 1038, IV, 100, XI, 102–103 (CCCM 31, pp. 48, 68, 160). The *Periphyseon* is called *Physiologia* in a manuscript originating from the monastery of St. Eucharius of Trier: London, British Library, Additional 11035, f. 9^r: 'Liber Physiologiae Iohannis Scottigenae'. This manuscript, which contains Book I of the *Periphyseon* only, was formerly believed to date from the X–XI centuries: P. Lehmann, 'Mitteilungen aus Handschriften', in *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung*, Jahrgang 1930, Heft 2 (Munich, 1930) p. 5; I. P. Sheldon-Williams, ed. *Iohannis Scotti Eriugena Periphyseon . . . Liber Primus* (Dublin, 1968), pp. 17–18. Professor Bernhard Bischoff dated it more precisely as belonging to the end of the eleventh century: B. Bischoff, *Mittelalterliche Studien. Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur Schriftkunde und Literaturgeschichte* II (Stuttgart, 1967), p. 254. Concerning the title *Physiologia* given to the *Periphyseon*, see D. J. O'Meara, 'The Concept of Natura in John Scottus Eriugena (*De diuisione naturae* Book I)', *Vivarium* 19 (1981), pp. 126–145, especially p. 142, n. 39.

2. [741C] Eriugena wrote ΥΠΕΡΟΥΣΙΩΔΗΣ in place of ὑπερουσιώδης – which makes two mistakes in one word! The spelling ούσιάδης – a defective one from our point of view – is customary in Eriugena. We find it in the glossary of Martin of Laon (MS Laon, Bibl. Mun. 444, f. 291^r; ed. E. Miller, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque nationale. . .* 29,2 (Paris, 1880), p. 186). In the present edition I have observed scrupulously the Greek spelling of manuscript R (Rheims, Bibliothèque municipale 875).

3. [742C] Eriugena read Epiphanius in a manuscript which was probably written in Greek uncials with very few, if any, signs of accentuation. Accordingly it was hard for him to distinguish between οὔχουν (*therefore not*) and οὐχοῦν, a particle that may be either interrogative (*not therefore? not then?*) or inferential (*therefore*); see Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, revised by Gordon M. Messing (Cambridge, MA, 1984), chapters 2951–2953. Although Eriugena translated both οὔχουν and οὐχοῦν in the same way – *Non ergo*, i.e. 'certainly not' – he was too perspicacious not to realize that, in some instances, such a translation was nonsensical. In these cases he considered that *Non ergo* stood for *Nonne*, an interrogative particle requiring an affirmative answer. Cf. *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* I, 219–234. III, 360–371. VI, 70–74. VII, 751–760. XIII, 299–304 (CCCM 31, pp. 6–7, 64–65, 88, 111, 174). In this way the clumsiness of the translation (*Non ergo*) was corrected, for *Nonne* corresponds precisely to the interrogative function of οὐχοῦν. See R. Roques, *Libres sentiers vers l'érigénisme* (Rome, 1975), p. 105. Keeping the policy which I have followed in my edition of the Latin translation of Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua ad Iohannem* (CCSG 18, p. LXX) I have put a question mark at the end of any sentence beginning with *Non ergo*, whenever this *Non ergo* has to be

interpreted as *Nonne*. However, the English translation – ‘therefore’ for *Non ergo* – corresponds to the inferential function of οὐκοῦν: it is faithful not only to the Greek text, but also to Eriugena’s understanding of this text.

4. [743C] The words in *Mind, Reason and Sense* have been added in the margin of manuscript R (f. 264v) by *i*¹. The original version of the manuscript reads as follows: ‘In this book (*Periphyseon* III) we also gave considerable attention to the Pfimordial Causes, to God and to His image, and we enquired. . .’. The phrase ‘His image’ clearly refers to man (Gen. 1, 25–26). In adding the marginal gloss, ‘in Mind, Reason and Sense’, the author insists on the fact that man has been created according to the image of the God who is One and Three. And since it is primarily in his soul that man bears the image of God (*Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, vi, 19–21; SC 180, p. 232; PL 122, 321A), it was natural to look in the human soul for this image of the most holy Trinity. According to Augustine, the human soul bears an image of the Trinity because we can distinguish in it these three terms: *esse, uelle, scire (nosse)*. See P. Hadot, ‘L’image de la Trinité dans l’âme chez Victorinus et chez saint Augustin’ in *Studia Patristica* VI, 4 (TU 81) (Berlin, 1962), pp. 409–442.

Eriugena knows of the triad *esse, nosse, uelle*, as explained by Augustine, *Confessiones* XIII, xi, 12 (CCSL 27, pp. 247–248; PL 32, 849–850): cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 770C; V, 942A. But he prefers the Neoplatonic triad, οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια (*essentia, uirtus, operatio*), a favourite triad of Iamblichus (*De mysteriis* II, 1; ed. T. Gale (Oxford, 1678), p. 39; ed. É. des Places (Paris, 1966), p. 77), of Proclus (*Elementatio theologica* 169; ed. E. Dodds (Oxford, 1963), p. 146, 24–25), of Dionysius the Areopagite (*On Celestial Hierarchy* XI, 2; SC 58^{bis}, p. 143; PG 3, 284D and *On Divine Names* IV, 23; ed. Suchla, p. 170, 16–17; PG 3, 724C) and of Maximus the Confessor (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 1539–1540; CCSG 18, p. 97; PG 91, 1184D). The words οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια are found also in Pseudo-Augustine, *Categoriae Decem* 5, 102, 115 (*Aristoteles Latinus* I, 5, pp. 134, 156, 160) and are listed in the Glossary of Martin of Laon: MS Laon, Bibl. Mun. 444, f. 290^r–290^v; ed. E. Miller, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque nationale* . . . 29,2 (Paris, 1880), pp. 181–183. Eriugena is familiar with another triad which he encountered in Maximus the Confessor (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 119–121; CCSG 18, p. 48; PG 91, 1112D), that of the faculties of human knowledge: νοῦς, λόγος, αἴσθησις (Mind, Reason, Sense). The *Annotationes in Marcianum* (7, 16; ed. Lutz, p. 11, 23–24) reproduces it faithfully. Subsequently, perhaps under the influence of Gregory of Nyssa (*De imagine* 5; PG 44, 137B–C; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 214, 12–24), Eriugena was led to replace αἴσθησις by δῖάνοια, a faculty which he sometimes calls ‘interior sense’ (*sensus interior*) and sometimes ‘memory’ (*memoria*). In the Glossary of Martin of Laon we read: ‘δῖάνοια, sensus’ (MS Laon, Bibl. Mun. 444, f. 289^r; ed. E. Miller, *Notices et extraits* . . . , p. 179). It is this last triad (Mind, Reason, Interior Sense) in which one sees an image of the divine Trinity: *Periphyseon* II, 568D–579A; *Comment in eu. Ioh.* IV, v, 26–36 (SC 180, pp. 304–306; PL 122, 336B).

For Eriugena, these various triads coincide. The three terms of the Augustinian triad, *esse, uelle, scire*, correspond to those of the Neoplatonic triad, *essentia, uirtus, operatio*: *Periphyseon* V, 942A–B. In its turn, this last triad coincides with that of the faculties of knowledge. Mind (νοῦς, *mens*)

corresponds to being (οὐσία, *essentia*), Reason (λόγος, *ratio*) corresponds to power (δύναμις, *uirtus*), Interior Sense (δῖάνοια) corresponds to operation (ἐνέργεια, *operatio*): *Periphyseon* II, 570A–C. These three faculties of knowledge are in man a created image of the Creating Trinity. The Creating Trinity is Father, Son, Holy Spirit; the created trinity is Mind, Reason, Sense: *Periphyseon* II, 567A–580A.

5. [743C] In the second book of Maccabees (7,28), we read that God created the world *ex nihilo* (out of nothing). According to Eriugena, this Nothingness is God Himself: *Periphyseon* III, 683B; *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* IV, 72–78 (CCCM 31, p. 67). See G. Piemonte, ‘Notas sobre la *Creatio de nihilo* en Juan Escoto Eriugena’, *Sapientia* 23 (1968), pp. 37–58, 115–132. Heiric of Auxerre will echo this bold exegesis: *Vita sancti Germani*, Inuocatio, 43–48 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 434).

Since God is absolutely transcendent, beyond all being, He can be called Non-being. This doctrine derives from Dionysius the Areopagite: ‘Cause of being to all, but Himself Non-being, as He is beyond every being’ (*On Divine Names* I, 1; ed. Suchla (Berlin–New York, 1990), p. 109, 15–16; PG 3, 588B; PL 122, 1113C; quoted in *Periphyseon* I, 510A). Eriugena goes so far as to say that ‘often in the Scriptures God Himself is called by that name of Non-being’ (*Periphyseon* III, 684D–685A). As Sheldon-Williams has pointed out, ‘this Divine Name is not, of course, scriptural, but Eriugena attributed it to the Ps.-Dionysius, whom he regarded as “apostolic” and therefore of scriptural authority’ (ed. *Periphyseon* III, p. 316).

6. [743C] See *Periphyseon* III, PL 682D–683B, 689A–690A.

7. [743C] The last version (*FJP*) reads: ‘up to the sixth day’. The earlier versions (*HMR*) read: ‘up to the fifth day’.

8. [743C] Willemien Otten points out that the theme of the ‘return’ (*reditus*) introduced by Eriugena at the beginning of Book IV interrupts the sequence of the Biblical exegesis (Gen. 1) initiated in *Periphyseon* III, 690B. The anticipation of this theme, according to W. Otten, may reveal a philosophical purpose, namely that of stressing the central role played by man in the universal return. See W. Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leiden, 1991), pp. 107–114.

9. [744A] The words announcing a fifth book (*suique prolixitate cogente in quintum librum porrectus*) do not appear in the earlier versions. They were added later either by Eriugena himself, or by a scribe working under his direction, or by a Carolingian ‘editor’ of the *Periphyseon*. It is quite likely that Eriugena had first planned to complete his dialogue in four books, according to the fourfold division of Nature. The magnitude of the subject (*prolixitate*) made another book necessary, and so the words announcing a fifth book were added at the beginning of the fourth.

However, this addition contradicts what was affirmed just a few lines above (743C): ‘Let this fourth book . . . be the last (*finem constituat*)’. Once it was decided to extend the work to a fifth book, the statement, ‘Let this fourth book . . . be the last’, should have been deleted. We have here an example of the incomplete corrections which are not uncommon in the *Periphyseon*, and practically inevitable where the work is in a constant state of revision. Whoever has corrected proofs has experienced this.

10. [744A] The 'Ocean of Divinity' is nothing other than Holy Scripture. This is a well-known Patristic theme. Maximus the Confessor, some of whose writings Eriugena had translated, speaks of 'the infinite ocean of the sayings of the Spirit' (*Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, Introductio, ed. C. Laga – C. Steel, CCSG 7, p. 18, 25 and p. 19, 20–21). St. Ambrose writes: 'The Gospel is the sea' (*Exameron* V, 7, 17; CSEL 32, p. 152, 13–18). Echoing Luke (5,4) Ambrose recommends, as Eriugena, too, will do much later, that one should set sail upon the sea without fear: *Noli timere sinus eius, . . . Si tempestas est, pete altum et profundum* (*Exameron* V, 7, 17; p. 151, 25 and p. 152, 22). Again, Boethius, as many Stoics had done before, praises the man who is not troubled by the rage or threat of the sea (*Consolatio Philosophiae* I, Metrum IV, 1–10). Nevertheless, 'it is difficult to resist the thought that this passage reflects Eriugena's earlier insular background' (J. J. O'Meara, 'Translating Eriugena' in *Jean Scot écrivain*, ed. G. H. Allard (Montréal–Paris, 1986), p. 125). However personal the description of the sea and navigation, Eriugena is indebted for his vocabulary to the Latin poets, as in the following expressions: *ueliuolum pelagus* (CCCM 50, p. 3, 19; PL 122, 355B), *Neptuni limes, caerulearum tumultus* (MGH, Epistulae VI, p. 158, 29–30; PL 122, 1031B), *carbasus* (*Periphyseon* IV, 744A), etc. The latter is explained: 'Carbasus, uelum de lino albo' (*Glossae diuinae historiae* 559; ed. J. Contreni – P. Ó Néill). See E. A. Jeuneau, 'Le symbolisme de la mer chez Jean Scot Érigène' in *Le néoplatonisme. Colloque international du CNRS, Royaumont, 9–13 Juin 1969* (Paris, 1971), pp. 385–392 (repr. *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 289–296).

11. [744B] Holy Scripture, first compared to a perilous sea, is now compared to a harsh land. This land is not harsh by nature, but is so as a consequence of the first sin (Gen. 3, 17–19). This passage has often been misunderstood (see *Quatre thèmes érigéniens*, Montréal–Paris 1978, p. 52). Its apparent obscurity should not necessarily be imputed to the author himself, but rather to his Carolingian 'editors'. These have not only introduced marginal notes into the text, but have also introduced them in the wrong places. Here the words, *hoc est diuinorum intellectuum exilem densitatem*, instead of being put in apposition to the words *spinas et tribulos*, have been separated from them by the participle, *germinantem*. On the other hand, the *diuini intellectus* signify the spiritual senses, the theological meanings which derive from the letter of Scripture itself: *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, iii, 43; iv, 46; vi, 16, 35, 38, 91, etc. (SC 180, pp. 340, 346, 358, 360, 366; PL 122, 343A, 344A, 345D, 346B, 348A). As God has commanded Adam (Gen. 2,15), human reason (*ratio*) must cultivate the soil of Holy Scripture, i.e. extract from the letter the spiritual sense hidden in it. As a result of the first sin, this task became painful and harsh. Thorns and thistles choke the seed (Matth. 13,7). The field of Holy Scripture produces for human reason (*sibi*) only a meagre crop of spiritual meanings. Certainly, thorns and thistles do not represent the spiritual meanings (*diuini intellectus*) of Holy Scripture for these form the crop. However, as the thorns and thistles are responsible for the meagreness of the crop (*exilem densitatem*), Eriugena says, by hypallage, that the Holy Scripture produces 'thorns and thistles', i.e. a meagre crop of spiritual meanings. The agricultural image makes sense: the farmer judges the quality of his harvest by the weight of the sheaf. The same theme is developed later

on (855A–B) in the allegorical exegesis of the pain of childbirth. Therefore, the French translation of this passage, to be found in M. Cappuyens, *Jean Scot Érigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain–Paris, 1933), pp. 293–294, must be corrected. The same is true of the English translation: *Eriugena. Periphyseon (The Division of Nature)*, translated by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, revised by John J. O'Meara (Montreal–Washington, 1987), p. 383.

12. [744B] The working of divine grace in man – *ducente, adiuuante, cooperante, mouente, perficiente* – is also evoked in *Periphyseon* I, 593B5; IV, 753C1, and in the letter forming the preface to the translation of the *Ambigua ad Iohannem* (CCSG 18, p. 3, 2, 14). Some of these participles (*adiuante, cooperante*) have an Augustinian flavour: *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, xviii, 31 (CSEL 60, p. 102, 15; PL 44, 169); *De gratia et libero arbitrio* XVII, 33 (PL 44, 901), etc.

13. [744C] The figure of speech, synecdoche, by which part is named but the whole understood, is to be found in Donatus, *Ars Maior* (H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini* IV (Leipzig, 1864), p. 400, 25–29; L. Holtz, *Donat et la tradition de l'enseignement grammatical. Etude et édition critique* (Paris, 1981), p. 669, 11–14). The immediate source of Eriugena could be Augustine, as indicated in the apparatus of sources to the Latin text.

14. [744C] 'All the souls . . . were seventy-five'. The original version (*R*, f. 265v) reads *septuaginta* (seventy), which agrees with the text of the Vulgate (Gen. 46,27). Subsequently, the word *quinque* was added above the line by *i*¹. This correction makes the quotation conform to the reading of the Septuagint (ed. J. W. Wevers (Göttingen, 1974), p. 439) and the *Vetus Italica* (ed. B. Fischer (Freiburg, 1951–1954), p. 476). It is thus a learned correction which can be attributed very likely to the author himself. However, in the discourse of Stephen (*Acts* 7,14) Jacob is said to have come down to Egypt with seventy-five souls. Cf. *Annotations in Marcianum*, ed. Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge, MA, 1939), p. 94, 30.

15. [745A] Concerning the translation of the term ὑπόστασις, see Boethius, *Contra Eutychem*, 3 (ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand and S. J. Tester (Cambridge–London, 1978), pp. 84–93). Knowing Greek, Eriugena preferred *substantia*, a literal Latin translation of the Greek ὑπόστασις. Since the time of Augustine, however, the word *persona* had replaced *substantia* as the translation of ὑπόστασις: Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, viii–ix (10); CCSL 50, pp. 216–217; PL 42, 917–918. Eriugena was well aware of this substitution: *Periphyseon* II, 567B–C, 613A–C; IV, 786C; V, 894B, 921A, 1018B. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxiv, 11–14 (SC 180, p. 110; PL 122, 299C–D). Sheldon-Williams, quite legitimately, chose to translate *substantia* by 'Substance', in order, no doubt, to provoke in the modern reader a feeling of surprise comparable to that experienced by the reader of the ninth century, when he read Eriugena's words: 'God is Trinity and Unity, that is, three Substances in one Essence' (*Periphyseon* II, tr. Sheldon-Williams, p. 95).

16. [745B–746B] This quotation of Epiphanius caught the attention of Johannes Dräseke. A comparison between Gale's and Floss' editions led him to believe that the former was more reliable than the latter: J. Dräseke, *Johannes Scotus Erigena und dessen Gewährsmänner in seinem Werke De Diuisione Naturae Libri V, Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche*, 9,2 (Leipzig, 1902; repr. 1972), pp. 34–36. Dräseke went as far as to conclude that the

edition of Schlüter (Münster, 1838), being a mere reproduction of that of Gale, was to be preferred to the edition of Floss: *Op. cit.*, p. 40. This view can be refuted. Admittedly, in a few places, the edition of Gale, based on manuscript *M* which contains an earlier version, does not carry some of the mistakes which mar the last version, particularly in the quotations of Greek Fathers. However, if the text edited by Gale seemed better to Dräseke, it was because, in some cases, he found it closer to the Greek than was the edition of Floss. Again, if Dräseke thought that the edition of Gale was more faithful to the Greek, this was because Gale had assiduously corrected the text of the *Periphyseon* and, in the case of Greek quotations, had substituted his own translations for those of Eriugena. In the case of Epiphanius, he probably used the Greek text edited by Denys Petau (Paris, 1622). And so, where Dräseke thought that Gale's edition was superior to that of Floss, Gale had been deliberately unfaithful to the Latin manuscripts. For instance, Gale printed *ab Adamo* (p. 161, 58), *quem* (p. 162, 12), *uos . . . armemini* (p. 162, 15), *ut impleatur* (p. 162, 19–20). In each case, Gale's Latin text is made to fit the Greek: ἀπὸ Ἀδάμ, ὄν, ὑμεῖς . . . ὀπλίσασθε, ἵνα πληρωθῆ (Sancti Patris Nostri Epiphanius Constantiae sive Salaminis in Cypro Episcopi Operum Omnium Tomus Secundus . . . Editio noua (Cologne, 1682), 96D. 97B–C; GCS 25, p. 114, 7–8. 24. 27 and p. 115, 6–7). In each case Gale is unfaithful to Eriugena's text, for none of these readings is supported by the manuscripts of the *Periphyseon*. However, the edition of Floss (PL 122) is faithful to the manuscripts: *in Adam* (745C3), *sic* (745D5), *nos . . . armari* (746A4–5), *impleta* (746A12–13). In all of these instances, therefore, Floss was well advised not to follow Gale. The correction *ab Adamo* was particularly unfortunate, for the name *Adam* is indeclinable in Eriugena's Latin.

17. [747A] The soul is the better part (*melior medietas*) of the living animal; its lower part (*minor medietas*) is the body. Concerning the diverse meanings of *medietas* in Eriugena's thought, see G. H. Allard, 'Medietas chez Jean Scot', in *Begriff und Metapher*, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1990), pp. 95–107.

18. [747B] The original version of the Rheims manuscript (*R*) displays perfect symmetry between the two elements of the comparison: 'quemadmodum super naturam *ex uestris diuersis criminibus* ueluti templum . . . construxistis, ita *ex lapidibus uirtutum* . . . domum pretiosam . . . reaedificetis'. The words *deo conditam* added by *i*^l before *uestris* evidently disrupt the balance of the phrase. The second version is grammatically poorer than the first, but doctrinally richer. Eriugena wished to insist upon this fundamental point: that only the nature of the human being has been created by God and that only that nature is imperishable. As he says further on, sins – the works of a perverse will and not of God – do not last forever. The image of living stones cut by the divine sculptor, can be found in liturgical texts: see *Urbs beata Ierusalem dicta pacis uisio* v. 10–12 (vi–viii saec.), ed. A. S. Walpole, *Early Latin Hymns* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 379.

19. [747C–D] Concerning this biblical quotation (I Cor. 10,11) see Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 22 (CCSG 7, pp. 136–147; PG 90, 317B–324D).

20. [748C] The words placed here in parentheses do not exist in the original version of the Rheims manuscript (*R*). They were added by *i*^l partly between

the lines and partly in the margin. In the successive versions they have been integrated into the text; in the final version *quoniam* has been replaced by *nam*. By adding these words, Eriugena announces the thesis he is about to demonstrate, namely, that the knowledge of all things had been created in man *causaliter et primordialiter*. Just as the primordial causes are contained in the Word of God, so the concepts (*notiones*) of all things are contained in human nature. In this way, too, man, created according to the image of God, mirrors the divine model.

21. [748D] Contrary to his habit, Eriugena does not avail himself of the Septuagint in commenting on this verse (Gen. 1,24). And with good reason: the Septuagint does not contain the words 'after their species', which are the point of departure for his exposition. Thus the Latin text of the Vulgate allows him to develop a theme which he has found in his Greek sources, more precisely in Maximus the Confessor. He mentions this in the letter which serves as the preface to his translation of the *Ambigua ad Iohannem* (CCSG 18, p. 4). In fact one finds in Maximus the following distinctions: *generalissimum genus* (γενικώτατον γένος) and *generaliora genera* (γενικώτερα γένη), *species* (εἶδη) and *specialissimae species* (εἰδικώτατα εἶδη) (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 1387–1399, CCSG 18, p. 92; PG 91, 1177B–C). See J. Pépin, 'Humans and Animals: Aspects of Scriptural Reference in Eriugena's Anthropology', *Eriugena: East and West (VIIIth International Symposium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenan Studies), Chicago and Notre Dame, 18–20 October 1991*, ed. B. McGinn and W. Otten (Notre Dame, 1994) 179–206.

22. [749A] These two movements of dialectic, the descent from genus to species, on the one hand, and the ascent from species to genus, on the other, are called by Maximus the Confessor *diastole* (*diuisio, distinctio*) and *systole* (*collectio, contractio*) respectively: see *Maximi Confessoris Ambigua ad Iohannem*, *Marginalia ad Amb. VI*, 1390–1409 (CCSG 18, pp. 270–271). Elsewhere Eriugena calls the movement of division *διαρετικὴ*, and the inverse movement *ἀναλυτικὴ*: *Expositiones in Hierarchiam Caelestem* VII, 575–603 (CCCM 31, pp. 106–107). Our author returns many times to this subject: *Periphyseon* I, 463A–B, 472A–B, 486B; V, 868D–869A, etc.

Concerning Eriugena and dialectic, see J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre* (Cambridge, 1981); G. d'Onofrio, *Fons Scientiae. La dialettica nell'Occidente tardo-antico* (Naples, 1986); 'Die Überlieferung der dialektischen Lehre Eriugenas in den hochmittelalterlichen Schulen' in *Eriugena Redivivus*, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1987), pp. 47–76; 'Disputandi disciplina. Procédés dialectiques et *logica vetus* dans le langage philosophique de Jean Scot' in *Jean Scot écrivain*, ed. G. H. Allard (Montréal–Paris, 1986), pp. 229–263; W. Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leiden, 1991), pp. 89–94.

23. [749A] The 'mother of arts', as Eriugena calls dialectic (*Periphyseon* V, 870B), is not merely a human contrivance (*humanis machinationibus facta*), but in fact corresponds to reality. This opinion had already been announced by Plotinus: 'It (dialectic) is not just bare theories and rules; it deals with things and has real beings as a kind of material for its activity; it approaches them methodically and possesses real things along with its theories' (*Enneads* I, 3, 5, 10–12; tr. A. H. Armstrong). On this point Eriugena agrees with Plotinus, but

he feels compelled to justify this opinion with a biblical reference. In commanding the earth (Gen. 1,24) 'to bring forth living creatures according to their *genus*, cattle and creeping things and beasts of the earth according to their *species*', God intends that *genus* and *species* (which are the subjects of dialectic) are not simply concepts, but realities. They are produced by the earth so to speak, and earth means 'solidity of nature'. According to this allegorical interpretation common in Eriugena, they are rooted in nature itself: *Periphyseon* IV, 747A–B, 747D–748B.

24. [749A–B] Eriugena leads us slowly to the conclusion of his long exegesis of Genesis. As God contains in himself the primordial causes, so human nature contains in itself the notions (*notiones, notitiae*) of all created realities (774A–B). The 'hidden depths of nature' (*abditi profundique naturae sinus*) is a favourite expression of Eriugena, who uses it often when he speaks of the primordial causes: *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 235–242. The adverbs *causaliter* and *primordialiter* apply equally to the primordial causes: PL 122, 579C5, 616A14–15, 663D3–4. In *Periphyseon* II, the earth of the first verse of Genesis designates the primordial causes; here (748C, 749A–B) it designates more particularly human nature, which contains the notions of all created realities, both visible and (as we shall see later on) invisible. Edward A. Synan pointed out to me the corresponding lines from Herman Melville's *Moby Dick*: 'O Nature, and O soul of man! how far beyond all utterance are your linked analogies! not the smallest atom stirs or lives on matter, but has its cunning duplicate in mind' (ch. 70, *in fine*).

25. [749B–C] The original version of the Rheims manuscript (*R⁰*) reads: 'Omne siquidem quod in natura hominis praeter intellectum et rationem cognoscitur, . . .'. Later *i¹* added the adjective *animalis* above the substantive *hominis*. The Pauline distinction (I Cor. 2, 14–15) between 'unspiritual man' (*ψυχικός άνθρωπος, animalis homo*) and 'spiritual man' (*πνευματικός άνθρωπος, spiritualis homo*) will be dealt with later on (755D–756B).

26. [749C] The exploration of the spiritual sense of Scripture is an unending quest: 'Sacrae scripturae interpretatio infinita est' (*Periphyseon* II, 560A). This is so because God, the author of the Scriptures, is Himself infinite: *Periphyseon* III, 690B; V, 919C–D); *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxxii, 42–43 (SC 180, p. 182); *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* VI, 34–42 (CCCM 31, pp. 87–88).

27. [749C] Cassiodorus had compared the Psalter to a peacock: *Institutiones* I, 4 (ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937), p. 21, 14–19; PL 70, 1115C–D). However, this image is used here by Eriugena in a new sense, which owes nothing to Cassiodorus. On this point Eriugena is completely original (see *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 262–265). He has, moreover, reshaped his text. Although the erasures in *R* prevent us from recovering the original reading of the text as it stood before the interventions of *i¹*, it seems that *M* has preserved an echo of it. This later manuscript reads: 'in one and the same small portion of the same feather' (*in una eademque eiusdem pennae portiuncula*). Wishing to sharpen the focus of the image even further, the author has modified it thus: 'in one and the same *point* of a tiny portion of the same feather'. It is this version that has been kept here.

28. [749D] *Ex secretis creaturae sinibus* (18, 27–28): see *Études érigéniennes* pp. 235–238.

29. [750A] *Per poros occultos corporalis creaturae* (18, 32–33). This is the reading of all the manuscripts as well as that of Honorius' *Clavis Physicae* (233, 16–17; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 184). The reading *corporales* is not attested in any manuscript. Introduced by Thomas Gale, it has been preserved by Floss. This has led the translators to construe the words *corporales creaturae* (nominative plural) as the subject of *eructant*. In fact, *corporalis creaturae* is a genitive modifying *poros*. It is necessary to correct the French translation (which I have proposed in *Études érigéniennes*, p. 233) as well as the English (Sheldon-Williams (Montréal–Paris, 1987), p. 390). A tentative translation might read: 'From this nature, as from a most ample fountain, are derived streams (cf. Prov. 5,16), so to speak; and they gush forth in a variety of individual forms through the hidden channels of corporeal creation.' A similar comparison is to be found in Eriugena's translation of Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, Introductio, Scholion 5: 'Aqua per occultos naturae meatus per omnia corpora genita et gignentia ad multiplicationem corporum diffunditur' (CCSG 7, p. 42, 15–17). This part of Scholion 5 is lacking in the Greek text available to us. Was it contained in the Greek manuscript used by Eriugena? See P. Meyvaert, 'Eriugena's Translation of the *Ad Thalassium* of Maximus: Preliminaries to an Edition of this Work', *The Mind of Eriugena. Papers of a Colloquium, Dublin 14–18 July 1970*, eds. J. J. O'Meara and L. Bieler (Dublin, 1973), p. 81.

30. [750B] In the final version, this passage differs clearly from the earlier ones. Whereas in the earlier versions the author of Genesis is shown as wishing to separate (*abiungere*) the creation of man from that of the other animals, in the last version he is said to wish to conjoin (*adiungere*) the creation of man and that of the other animals. The *Clavis Physicae* (234, 12; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 185) also reads *abiungere*, which seems to make better sense. It is not impossible that *adiungere* is simply a scribal error for *abiungere*, and should not be considered as part of a later version.

31. [751B–C] Eriugena cites the same verse (Gen. 1,24) first according to the Vulgate, and then according to the Septuagint. There are two differences: first, where the Vulgate speaks of *iuumenta*, the Septuagint speaks of *quadrupedia* (τετραπόδα); secondly, where the Vulgate says *secundum species suas*, the Septuagint says *secundum genus* (κατὰ γένος). The Vetus Latina (ed. B. Fischer, pp. 23–24) conforms to the Septuagint. Eriugena would seem to depend, here as elsewhere, on Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, 11 (CSEL 28,1, pp. 74–75; PL 34, 285–286).

32. [751C] The basis of the allegorical interpretation according to which 'cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth' (Gen. 1,24) symbolize the movements of the soul is found in Origen: *In Genesim Homiliae* I, 11.16 (GCS 29, pp. 12–13, p. 20, 5–8; PG 12, 154A–D, 159A–B).

33. [751C] The long passage (22, 30–24, 12) which I have put in parentheses can be considered as a marginal gloss introduced into the text, although it is already in the original version of manuscript *R*. To 'improve' the text judged by him obscure, Thomas Gale thought it useful to add the words *recte dixeris* (p. 165, 29) and *attributos* (p. 165, 31) which Floss preserved (PL 122, 752A9.12). Neither addition is supported by the manuscript tradition. Therefore both must be eliminated. Gale was probably puzzled

by the phrase *in abusione sensibilibus creaturis*, in which the complement of a noun (*abusio*) is an ablative (*creaturis*). As I said elsewhere (p. 24, critical apparatus, n. 14), this construction is familiar to Eriugena, particularly in *Periphyseon* V: *rationabili bono irrationabilis abusio* (974A), *abusione liberi arbitrii bono* (975A), *naturalibus bonis abusione* (975B), *naturalibus bonis illicita abusio* (976A). Eriugena may have been influenced here by his translations from Greek. Certainly the complement of *παράχρησις* (*abusio*), in Greek, is a genitive, and one would expect to find in the Latin translation the genitive for the complement of *abusio*. The Greek genitive, however, must sometimes be translated in Latin by an ablative, a case that does not exist in Greek. Eriugena found great difficulty in deciding when and whether he had to render in Latin the Greek genitive by a genitive or by an ablative: see G. Théry, 'Scot Érigène traducteur de Denys', *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 6 (1931), p. 233. His choice for the complement of *παράχρησις* was generally an ablative: *τῇ παραχρήσει τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων*, *per abusionem naturalibus potentiis* (Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 572; CCSG 18, p. 39; PG 91, 1097C11–12). See also *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XXXVII, 100–101 (quoted in *Periphyseon* II, 537B). 130–131; CCSG 18, pp. 183. 184; PG 91, 1309A9–10. D5–6).

34. [751C–D] Eriugena has recourse here to a type of explication as popular in Antiquity as in the Middle Ages: etymology. The noun *iumentum* (cattle) derives from the verb *iuare* (to help, assist). See Augustine, *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* V, 38 (CCSL 33, p. 296, 751; PL 34, 764), Isidore of Seville, *Ety-mologiae* XII, i, 7. For further instances, see *Thesaurus Latinae Linguae*, under the entry *iumentum*.

35. [752A] In Genesis 1,24, where the Vulgate speaks of *iumenta* (cattle), the Septuagint speaks of *quadrapedia* (τετράποδα, four-footed things). The first term has led to an etymological interpretation; the second leads to an arithmetical one. Etymology and arithmetic are two important keys to medieval exegesis.

36. [752B] See *Periphyseon* II, 570C–571A.

37. [753A] As Gregory of Nyssa had done before him, and as Pascal was to do after him, Eriugena marvels at, and asks himself about, human nature: 'neither angel nor beast' Pascal will say (*Pensée* 358 Br.); at once angel and beast, according to Eriugena. One can thus posit these two contradictory propositions: 'Man is animal, Man is not animal'. While for Pascal, who certainly acknowledged the greatness of man, this contradiction illustrates man's misery and his need for a Saviour, Eriugena sees in this contradiction itself a sign of the dignity of human nature, since, as we shall see later on, it attests to the fact that the human being is created according to the image of God. Few Christian authors show such audacity.

38. [753A] The dual nature of the human being has been established by the allegorical exegesis of Gen. 1,24. But this point is so important for his thesis that Eriugena feels the need to support it with three quotations from the New Testament. All three come from the letters of Paul. In the first, the Apostle contrasts the 'unspiritual man' with the 'spiritual man' (I Cor. 2, 14–15); in the second, the 'outer man' with the 'inner man' (II Cor. 4,16); in the third, the mind with the flesh (Rom. 7,25). Gregory of Nyssa commented on

the first (I Cor. 2, 14–15): *De imagine* 8 (PG 44, 148A–B). It is not easy to translate the Pauline phrase *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* or *animalis homo* (I Cor. 2,14) into English. The authors of a nineteenth-century English version of the *De imagine* of Gregory of Nyssa used the term 'natural' to translate the adjective *ψυχικός*, in accordance with the usage of their time: *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893; repr. Grand Rapids, Michigan, n.d.), p. 394. In a more recent edition of the Bible, however, the Pauline phrase *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος* is translated as 'the unspiritual man': *The New Covenant Commonly Called The New Testament of Our Lord And Saviour Jesus Christ. Revised Standard Version . . . Revised A.D. 1946. Second Edition 1971*, p. 156.

39. [753B–C] See above, *Periphyseon* IV, 744A.

40. [754A] Gregory of Nyssa dismisses the hypothesis of a plurality of souls: *De imagine* 15 (PG 44, 176B; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 230, 21–29, cited in *Periphyseon* IV, 792C).

41. [754B–C] The doctrine which states that the soul is totally present throughout the entire body as well as in each of its parts is explained by St. Augustine (*De origine animae hominis* [Epistula 166], PL 33, 722; *De immortalitate animae* XVI, 25, PL 32, 1034), and by Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae* III, 2 (CSEL 11, p. 155, 8–13; PL 53, 761B). See J. Pépin, 'Une nouvelle source de saint Augustin . . .' in *Revue des Études anciennes* 66 (1964), 86–89.

42. [754C–D] To the highest of the faculties of knowledge, which the Greeks call *νοῦς*, Eriugena gives various names: *mens* (Mind), *Animus* (here translated: Spirit), *intellectus* (Intellect): *Periphyseon* II, 574B; *Comment in eu. Ioh.* IV, v, 13–17 (SC 180, pp. 302–304; PL 122, 336A).

43. [754D] Eriugena recapitulates here the various 'motions' (*motus*) of the soul which he has enumerated above. First, the three superior motions, in which he sees an image of the most holy Trinity: Mind, Reason, Interior Sense (743C), then the inferior motions, namely the Augmentative and Nutritive (752B). These last two motions are classified under the joint heading 'Vital Motion'.

44. [755B] See below, note 56.

45. [755B] Eriugena found this division of creation into five parts – corporal, vital, sensitive, rational, and intellectual – in Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 8 (PG 44, 144D–145A; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 217, 3–14; cited in *Periphyseon* III, 735D–736A).

46. [755C] As we have seen above (note 4), Eriugena calls the third term of the triad of the faculties of knowledge (*διάνοια*) sometimes Interior sense (*sensus interior*), sometimes Memory (*memoria*).

47. [755D–756A] As St. Augustine says in a passage that will be quoted further on (844D): 'Indeed human nature was capable, by free will, of doing itself an injury. But once it is wounded and disabled, it is no longer capable through free will of healing itself.'

48. [756A–B] This entire passage, which discusses the Pauline distinction (I Cor. 2, 14–15) between unspiritual man (*animalis homo*) and spiritual man (*spiritualis homo*), has been reworked by *i*¹. Concerning this reworking, see M.

Zier, 'The Shape of the Critical Edition of Periphyseon IV' in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo*: eds. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), pp. 490–492.

49. [756B] The earlier versions read: *secundum bonam uoluntatem diuina gratia praeuentam, actam, uitii purgatam, uirtutum ornamentis redimitam* ('in accordance with the good will that divine Grace anticipates, moves, purifies from vices, and adorns with the wreath of virtues'). The scribe of manuscript *M*, not having understood that the word *actam* is the passive participle of the verb *agere* (Rom. 8,14; Augustine, *Enarr. in ps.* 118, v. 131 [Sermo XXVI.4], PL 37, 1581), has divided it in two (*ac tam*), which in turn requires a correlative *quam* for grammatical symmetry: *ac tam uitii purgatam quam uirtutum ornamentis redimitam*. This reading, retained by Gale (p. 167, 46), has weak manuscript authority. In the last version, the past participle *actam* and the noun *uitii* have been replaced by the phrase *actu et scientia*. Such a change is in all likelihood an author's correction. To be sure, the phrase *actu et scientia* is part of the Eriugenian vocabulary: *Periphyseon* V, 1017A; *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* IV, iii,24. VI, i,11–12. ii,15–20. 61–63. iv,20–24. 58–60. vi,7–11 (SC 180, pp. 294. 326–328. 330. 336. 344. 348. 358; PL 122, 334A. 340B. 341A. 341D. 343C. 344A–B. 345D), etc.

50. [756C] In this instance I have made an exception to my rule of reproducing word for word the text of the last version, i.e. deviating as little as possible from manuscripts *FJP*. Here, however, it seems that the readings attested by *FJP* are less likely to be a new redaction, but rather the result of a wrong reading. In effect, where the manuscripts *HMR* have *praepositionem*, the manuscripts *FJP* have *propositionem*. This incorrect reading in *FJP* probably brought about other errors in the sentence as a whole. The earlier version of this passage had already been corrected by *i*¹, who (*R*, f. 276r) not only added the words *uerbi gratia*, but made two other significant corrections. He provided the final letter of *controversie* with a cedilla, thus demonstrating his careful attention to the use of diphthongs. Finally, he added two small signs indicating word-separation between the prefix *in* and the word which follows (*differentiae*). We should thus understand him to say: 'You will find that, in many cases, this prefix, i.e. "in", has the value of difference and not of contradiction.' Similarly, the *Clauis Physicae* reads: 'Praepositio "in" habet in multis uirtutum differentiae, non autem controuersiae' (243, 7; ed. P. Lucentini p. 191).

51. [756D–757A] The word *proloquium*, according to the terminology of Martianus Capella, designates what the grammarians call a 'proposition', i.e. a statement that can be either true or false: Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis* IV, 389–390 (ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1983), p. 131, 5–7; ed. A. Dick (Leipzig, 1925), p. 186, 9–12). See *Annotationes in Marcianum* (186,10), ed. C. E. Lutz, p. 100, 14–16. The rules concerning the opposition of propositions, described by Aristotle (περὶ ἐρμηνείας 7;17a38–b37), were accessible to the Latins thanks to the translation of Boethius (*Aristoteles Latinus* II, I, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Bruges–Paris 1965), pp. 11–12), and to his commentaries: *In librum de interpretatione editio prima* (PL 64, 319C–325A); *In librum de interpretatione, editio secunda* (PL 64, 468A–479B). It should be said that Eriugena here mixes the

terminology of Martianus Capella (*proloquia*) with that of Boethius (*contradictoria*): C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1927), p. 23, n. 87.

52. [757C] In Socratic fashion, the master leads his disciple towards the intended conclusion. The master contents himself with asking the questions; the disciple, properly interrogated, has found the answer by himself. Of all the creatures mentioned in Genesis, man is the only one who has been formed in the image of God. He is thus the only one about whom it is possible simultaneously to make two contradictory propositions. This is a sign of his nobility, since it confirms his resemblance to the divine Model. If one can formulate contradictory propositions about God (e.g. God is good, God is not good), which are both true, it is because God transcends affirmation and negation. Similarly, if one can legitimately formulate contradictory propositions about man (man is an animal, man is not an animal), it is because man transcends all the other animals.

53. [758C] The beginning of *De imagine*, chapter III, differs as to whether we read it in *Periphyseon* IV, 758C or in the full Eriugenian version of this text as it has been edited by Cappuyns (*RTAM* 32 (1965), pp. 212, 40–213, 1), and as it is contained in manuscript *C*. The critical apparatus of Forbes' edition mentions no Greek manuscript that could support the version of the *De imagine* supplied by the *Periphyseon*: see *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 124–125. Therefore, in spite of the introductory phrase which announces a word for word quotation – *his uerbis edocet, inquit* – what we have here seems to be a paraphrase of Gregory's text. I think it useful to give a translation of the Greek (PG 44, 133C): 'But it is right that we should not leave this point without consideration, namely that this immense world and its parts having been laid as an elemental foundation for the formation of all things, their creation is, so to speak, "improvised" by the Divine power and exists at once upon His command; while according to the Scriptures deliberation precedes the making of man, and the Maker first establishes a design of what is to occur . . . and to what archetype it is fitting that he (man) should bear a likeness . . .' (revised from *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 390).

54. [759B] The words 'in its own subsistence' (*in subsistentia sua*) are absent from the earlier versions (*HMR*). This phrase can be considered a gloss, initially intended to explain the words 'in its own world' (*in mundo suo*), and subsequently introduced into the text. It is worth noting that the author, quoting himself a little further on (760A), does not repeat the words 'in its own subsistence'.

55. [759C] This magnificent passage from *De Mystica Theologia* of Dionysius had already captured the attention of Eriugena in *Periphyseon* I, 510C. In the original version of Book IV in the Rheims manuscript (*R*, f. 278^r) it has been added in the margin. Its introduction into the text in the last version makes the sentence more difficult to understand, because the continuity between the quotation from Augustine and John 12,26 has been disrupted: 'After such a lofty, lengthy exhortation, the citation from the Gospel seems rather out of place, and its relationship with the foregoing argument has been lost' (M.

Zier, 'The Shape of the Critical Edition of Periphyseon IV' in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo*: eds. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), p. 494).

56. [760A] St. Gregory the Great had this to say concerning Mark 16,15: 'By the phrase *every creature*, man is signified . . . Therefore it is enough to preach the gospel to man in order to preach the gospel to every creature' (*Homiliae XL in euangelia* XXIX, 2; PL 76, 1214A–B). Eriugena interprets this Gospel verse in the same way: cf. *Periphyseon* II, 536B; V, 912A and *Vox spiritualis* XIX, 21–24 (SC 151, p. 296; PL 122, 294B). One wonders if this is an example of the well-known philosophical topic of the microcosm. It is, but with two qualifications: first, with regard to terminology, and secondly, with regard to doctrine. Concerning terminology we must observe that Eriugena uses the term *microcosm* once in the whole *Periphyseon*, and that only when he quotes Gregory of Nyssa (*Periphyseon* IV, 793C). In this passage Gregory violently attacks and sarcastically ridicules the Greek philosophers who held such a doctrine: 'How mean and how unworthy of the majesty of man are the fancies of some heathen writers, who magnify humanity, as they suppose, by their comparison of it to this world! For they say that man is a little world, composed of the same elements as the universe. Those who bestow on human nature such praise as this by a high-sounding name (microcosm), forget that they are dignifying man with the attributes of the gnat and the mouse: for they too are composed of these four elements' (*De imagine* 17[16], PG 44, 177D–180A, as translated in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 404).

Concerning doctrine, we must remember that the word *cosmos* (κόσμος) by which the Greeks designated the world, means order, beauty, ornament. For the Greeks, the world is a reality, ordered and beautifully adorned. When Eriugena says that man is a world (*mundus*), he uses this word in the Greek sense (*ornatus*). Now, the beauty of man and his adornment do not come from his elemental composition through which he resembles the visible universe; rather, they derive from his having been created in the image of God: *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, vi, 15–24 (SC 180, pp. 230–232; PL 122, 321A). Moreover, if man is an epitome of creation, he is an epitome not only of the visible universe of corporeal realities, but also of the invisible universe of pure spirits: *Periphyseon* III, 733B; IV, 755B; V, 912B–C.

57. [760A] Concerning the division of creation into five parts (corporeal, vital, sensitive, rational, and intellectual), see note 45.

58. [760B] Eriugena will explain below (800B–803A) how one should conceive the relationship between the real body (the spiritual body that man would have possessed, had he not sinned) and the material body (superadded as a consequence of sin) which is not the true body, but only the envelope and vestment of the true body.

59. [760C] Through sin death has entered the world: Rom. 5,12, 6,23.

60. [761A–B] The doctrine expounded here – a perfectly orthodox one – is that of the hypostatic union. The Son of God, Wisdom of the Father (Col. 2,3), Word by whom all things were created (John 1,3) has assumed human nature in the unity of his Person (ὑπόστασις). But it is necessary to remember what has been said above (note 15), namely that Eriugena translates the Greek ὑπόστασις by *substantia* (substance).

61. [762C] Eriugena alludes here to the Platonic definition of δαίμων (it should be kept in mind that the good δαίμονες were traditionally identified with the angels). Of course, such a definition cannot be found in the *Timaeus* itself, but rather in the commentary of Calcidius on Plato's *Timaeus*: 'Daemon (δαίμων) est animal rationale immortale patibile aethereum diligentiā hominibus impertiens' (Calcidius, *In Platonis Timaeum commentarius* 135; ed. Waszink, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1975), p. 175, 16–18). Cf. *Annotationes in Marcianum* 64,7, ed. Lutz, p. 67, 26.

62. [762C] In Book III of *Periphyseon* (732D) Eriugena is more critical of Plato: 'I say nothing of Plato lest I should be thought to be one of his sectaries, but he defines the angels as rational immortal animals'.

63. [763A] This is one of the major themes of Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine*: that the resurrection (ἀνάστασις) to come is nothing other than the restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) of the dignity that man had lost through sin, and which makes him equal to the angels (ισάγγελος). See Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 18[17] (PG 44, 188C–D; ed. M. Cappuyns, pp. 236, 35–237, 4). This text is cited below, *Periphyseon* IV, 797D–798A.

64. [764A–B] Again we find in the Rheims manuscript (*R*, f. 282r) a pattern of corrections carried out by *i*¹: the addition (upper margin) of a biblical quotation (I Cor. 15,44), p. 52, line 16; the substitution of *inuenitur* for *est* and *quae non* for *quoniam* (lines 17 and 18); the addition (bottom margin) of a whole sentence: *Noli moles corporeas . . . subsistit potentia* (lines 19–22). In the last, Eriugena stresses the power of the pupil of the eye in a way that echoes Augustine in *De quantitate animae* XIV, 24 (CSEL 89, pp. 159, 23–160, 6; PL 32, 1048).

65. [764C] The Latin text in its final version reads *responsum* (p. 52, line 36). The very first version of the Rheims manuscript before erasure (*R*⁰) read: *responsum est*. The *est* has been erased, but remains discernible beneath the erasure (*R*, f. 282r, l.18).

66. [764C] The five predicables – genus, species, difference, substance and accident – were known through the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, translated by Boethius (*Isagoge Porphyrii*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus I, 6–7 (Bruges–Paris, 1966)), as well as from the *De Nuptiis* of Martianus Capella (*De Nuptiis* IV, 344–348, ed. J. Willis, pp. 111–113; ed. A. Dick, pp. 157–160). The first of these five predicables, generally called *genus*, is called here *essentia*. Eriugena provides us with an explanation of this substitution: 'Sursum est generalissimum genus, ultra quod nullus intellectus potest ascendere, quod a Graecis dicitur οὐσία, a nobis essentia' (*Annotationes in Marcianum*, 157, 17, ed. Lutz, p. 93, 11–13).

67. [765B] For the second person singular form of the future tense of *praeterire* (to pass over), Eriugena uses indifferently the forms *praeteries* and *praeteribis*.

68. [765C] Knowledge, whether of the intellectual, rational or sensible order, presupposes a union of the knowing subject and object known: 'Saint Maximus says that whatever the intellect shall have been able to comprehend, that it itself becomes. Therefore, to the extent that the mind comprehends virtue, to that extent it becomes virtue itself' (*Periphyseon* I, 449D–450A; tr. I. P. Sheldon-Williams). The attempts made by scholars to identify this

quotation from Maximus – e.g. *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, PG 91, 1088D, 1113B, 1220A–B – are not convincing. See CCSG 18, p. lxxxiii.

69. [766C] Here Professor John J. O'Meara requested that I include the following note: 'Discipline, that is, one of the liberal arts. See 774C: *natural disciplines which are called liberal*. Geometry is given as an instance'.

70. [767C] The 'divine Ray' (*diuinus radius*) is a phrase familiar from Dionysius the Areopagite: δεκτικὰ τῆς ἀρχιφώτου καὶ θεαρχικῆς ἀκτίνος and τῆς θείας ἀκτίνος μετέχουσιν (*On Celestial Hierarchy* III, 5 and XIII, 3; PG 3, 165A7–8 and 301C4), translated respectively by Eriugena as: *receptiua principalis luminis et diuini radii* and *diuino participant radio* (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* III, 116–117 and XIII, 206–207; CCCM 31, pp. 59 and 171). Other examples can be found at: PG 3, 121B3–4. B12–13. 260D5. 337A8–9. 397D3. 504D4–5. 537C9. 568D7. 588A9. C14. 592D1. 701A8. C14. One also finds in Dionysius the phrase 'the ray of divine darkness': τοῦ θεοῦ σκοτόντος ἀκτῖνα (PG 3, 1000A2: *diuinarum tenebrarum radium*, PL 122, 1173A9–10, quoted above, 759C). Divine light cannot be contemplated directly: its force dazzles the beholder. Such is the theme of *repercussio* frequently evoked by Eriugena: 'reuerenter uultus suos (hoc est contemplationis aciem) diuino radio repercussi defendunt' (*Periphyseon* III, 668A); 'luce ueritatis repercussus' (700B); 'inaccessibili luce repercussus' (1012C), etc. In *Periphyseon* V, 920C, the theme of *repercussio* is introduced in the form of a gloss intended to explain a text of Dionysius (*Epist.* I; PL 122, 1177A–B; PG 3, 1065A) concerning the divine darkness. A related theme is that of *reuerberatio*: 'Illa luce reuerberantur ueritatis' (Augustine, *De quantitate animae* XXXIII, 75; PL 32, 1075). See P. Courcelle, *Les Confessions de saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire* (Paris, 1963), p. 53, n. 2, and G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs. Annotations érigéniennes* (Paris, 1988), p. 109. Here, however, *repercussio* is used in a more positive than negative sense. The divine ray blinds anyone beholding it directly; it illuminates when contemplated as reflected in God's creation. The light of the sun diffuses itself equally over all things, but all things do not receive it equally: the sun's rays pass through (*penetral*) glass and air; they are bounced back (*repercutitur*) by hard stone, and they are mirrored (*resultat*) in the clouds (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* IX, 407–411, CCCM 31, p. 145). The clouds symbolize theophanies, created manifestations of the invisible God: *Periphyseon* V, 998B–1000C. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxv, 88–95 (SC 180, p. 124; PL 122, 302B).

71. [767D] The words 'though not as to what it is, but as to the fact that it is' express an important point in the thought of Eriugena, which will be treated further on (771B–C). In fact, it is likely that we have here a note (marginal or interlinear) which has been introduced into the text. It is thus legitimate to put it in parentheses, so that the reader may more easily perceive the thread of the argument: the adjectives *coessentialis* and *coequalis* which describe the Persons of the creating Trinity (*Periphyseon* II, 610A; IV, 741C) apply to this created trinity of the human soul: Mind, Skill, and Art.

72. [768A] This entire passage (768A–769D) has been profoundly reworked in manuscript R, both by *i*¹ and by the Carolingian scribes recopying the author's notes, or writing down what he dictated. Certain revisions are purely

stylistic. As a matter of fact, as Mark Zier has rightly noted, they often result from doctrinal preoccupations: 'The second stage (of the text) clearly emphasizes the identity between the divine ideas and the real substance of all things, and links these convictions grammatically with the substance of human nature' (Mark Zier, 'The Shape of the Critical Edition of Periphyseon IV' in *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo*, eds. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), p. 495). The most remarkable feature of this revision is its appearance on the page: it takes the form of a long note starting in the top margin and continuing down the left margin of folio 285v in R (see the edition, p. 64, 10–20). This note obviously disrupts the sequence of the earlier versions and weakens the dialogue between master and disciple. From another point of view, however, it is of great interest: it may well be that we have here an echo of the discussions that the teaching of Eriugena might have provoked among his students. Moreover, it was not all written down at the same time: one can distinguish in effect four layers. Layer I (*Nec uereor eos . . . circa substantiam*; And I am not afraid . . . to the substance) and Layer III (*ibi siquidem simplex . . . partium superans*; for there it is simple . . . grouping of parts) are written in Caroline minuscule. Layer II (*ex his quae per generationem . . . nihil horum est*; from the attributes . . . is none of these) and Layer IV (*dum de ea . . . negat quid esse*; For that alone . . . what it is) are written by *i*¹. These different layers, each of which completes the idea of the previous one and does not necessarily require further explanation, have been added successively: the layers which follow represent not merely the passing of the manuscript from one scribe to the other, but rather the return of the author to the text at various times for the purpose of amplifying the point made in the previous layer. The alternation of hands indicates to us something about the way in which Eriugena collaborated with the Carolingian scribes charged with the recopying of his work.

73. [768C] The definition of man discussed here has a long history, as one can see in the note that accompanies the Latin text. It is remarkable that Eriugena's criticism of this definition agrees with that which Sextus Empiricus had made, namely that it does not define the human being itself, but only its accidents (τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: *Aduersus dogmaticos* VII, 269). For Marius Victorinus, the only true definition is the definition according to substance, in Greek, οὐσιώδης (*Liber de definitionibus*, ed. Th. von Stangl, *Tulliana et Mario-Victoriniana. Programm des K. Luitpold-Gymnasiums in München für das Studienjahr 1887–1888* (Munich, 1888), p. 7, 10–21; P. Hadot, *Marius Victorinus. Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris, 1971), p. 337, 10–21; PL 64, 895C–D). Eriugena is of the same opinion: *Periphyseon* I, 483C–D. Now in Book IV, his objection to the definition is that it is not in fact οὐσιώδης, as they claim it is. In this he disagrees with Isidore of Seville (*Etymologiae* II, xxix, 2). But Isidore, precisely on this point, is dependent on Cassiodorus (*Institutiones* II, iii, 14): see J. Fontaine, *Isidore de Séville et la culture classique dans l'Espagne Wisigothique* (Paris, 1959), pp. 634–636). For Eriugena a definition is οὐσιώδης only if it reveals the existence (*quia est*) but not the essence (*quid est*). This represents an original combination of elements, drawn from Marius Victorinus and Cassiodorus, in combination with a famous proposition from Greek sources (Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor), namely, that

although it is within our power to know existence (*quia est*), the knowledge of essence (*quid est*) is inaccessible to us.

74. [770C] The Son of God is the Mind of the universe, or rather He is the universe: 'Animus itaque (id est intellectus) omnium dei filius est. Ipse est enim, ut ait sanctus Augustinus, intellectus omnium, immo omnia' (*Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvii, 75–77; SC 180, p. 138; PL 122, 304C). Goulven Madec (*Annotations érigéniennes* (Paris, 1988), pp. 80, 101, 114) suggests as a possible source: 'Intellectus, in quo uniuersa sunt, uel ipse potius uniuersa' (Augustine, *De ordine* II, ix, 26; ed. W. M. Green (Utrecht, 1956), p. 133, 17–18; CSEL 63, p. 165, 24; PL 32, 1007). The theme appears frequently in Eriugena: cf. *Periphyseon* I, 486A; II, 559A–B; III, 632D, 659A, etc.

75. [770C] Here we find the Augustinian triad: *nosse, esse, uelle*. See note 4.

76. [770C] The two adjectives, *causalis* and *causatiuus*, frequently occur in Eriugena's works. Their exact meaning is made clear when we compare them with their Greek equivalents. *Causalis* is a translation for αἰτιος, *causatiuus*, a translation for αἰτιατός. The former is active (*causing*), the latter passive (*caused*). Eriugena regularly renders αἰτιος by *causalis* and αἰτιατός by *causatiuus*: Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* I, 6; II, 8; IX, 6.7 (ed. Suchla, pp. 118, 132, 212; PG 3, 596A–B, 645C, 913D, 916A; PL 122, 1117B8–9, 1124A5–8, 1162A12–13, B11–12), etc. Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 578–579.1183 (CCSG 18, pp. 63, 84, 268; PG 91, 1136B12–13, 1165B12), etc. In *Periphyseon* I, 458, there appears to be an echo of Maximus, *Amb.* VI, 578–579. Commenting on *Periphyseon* III, 639C, I. P. Sheldon-Williams (his edition, p. 311) suggests that the Greek equivalent of *causatiuus* is αἰτιατικός (a grammatical term referring to the accusative case). This information is misleading, in my opinion, for αἰτιατός (a barbarism according to the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* I, 1107) is generally rendered into Latin by *causatiuus* in Eriugena's translations. However, this 'barbarism' was familiar not only to Dionysius and Maximus, as we have seen, but also to Proclus: *The Elements of Theology* 35 (ed. Dodds, p. 38).

77. [770C–D] The words *procedens* and *reuersura* evoke the central theme of *Periphyseon*: procession (*processio*) and return (*reuersio*).

78. [770D–771A] Eriugena invokes here the doctrine borrowed from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, cited above (770C) under the name of *Hexaemeron*: see note to the Latin text. In *Periphyseon* III, 704B we read: 'One and the same thing is made known . . . in its causes, in another way in its effects.'

79. [771C] One of the fundamental theses of Eriugenian thought is that we cannot know the essence of God (*quid est*). Eriugena found this thesis in the Greek Fathers whom he had read, notably in Dionysius: 'To know and to contemplate what (the superessential and hidden Godhead) is (ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν) is impenetrable (ἀβρατος) to all beings' (*Div. Nom.* I,2; ed. Suchla, p. 110; PG 3, 588C). We find many echoes of this Dionysian thesis in Maximus the Confessor, e.g. *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XII, 24–32 (CCSG 18, p. 123; PG 91, 1221D–1224A). According to Eriugena, God is incomprehensible, not only for His creatures, but also for Himself. If God could know 'what He is' he would be limited by a definition, since according to Aristotle, a definition is a sentence stating 'what a thing is' (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι): Aristotle, *Metaph.*

Φ. 1031a12; *Topics* I, 5, 101b39, tr. Boethius, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Leiden, 1969), p. 9. If there were a definition of God, even a definition, the access to which would be exclusively reserved to Himself, God would not be absolutely infinite: the Infinite cannot be circumscribed by a definition. If God could know 'what He is' (*quid sit*), He would be a *quid* (a something), therefore a finite thing. Although a creature, and thus finite, man bears in him the image of God. And because he resembles God, he does not know in any way his essence (*quid sit*), but only his existence (*se esse*). See W. Beierwaltes, 'Das Problem des absoluten Selbstbewusstseins bei Johannes Scotus Erigena (*Diuina ignorantia summa ac uera est sapientia*)', in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 73 (1966), pp. 264–284, reprinted in *Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Darmstadt, 1969), pp. 484–516.

80. [771C] See above, 758A.

81. [771C] Eriugena combines here two different ideas, one borrowed from Dionysius the Areopagite (often cited), and the other from Augustine. See SC 180, p. 126, nn. 20 and 21.

82. [771D] It has been seen above (note 37) that the contradiction that establishes human nature is the sign that man is in the image of God. Now there is a new paradox: it is because man bears in himself the image of God that he does not know what he is. The image would be less perfect if man were to know his essence. For then he would be limited by a definition, and he would not be the image of an infinite and indefinable God. There is in man an infinitude that is in the image of the divine Infinite. This infinitude, that makes man a mystery to himself, becomes in Eriugena a sign of his grandeur as it reflects the mystery of God himself. For this doctrine, Eriugena is indebted to Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 11 (PG 44, 156AB; Cappuyns, p. 221, 22–30; quoted in 788D–789A). See R. Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nyssa* (Brussels–Paris, 1951), pp. 77–78; B. McGinn, 'The Negative Element in the Anthropology of John the Scot', in *Jean Scot Érigène et l'histoire de la philosophie*, ed. R. Roques (Paris, 1977), pp. 315–325.

83. [771D] The absolute transcendence of God is affirmed here, and that at three levels: that of language (God is beyond all that may be said), that of intellect (He is beyond all that may be understood), that of being (He is above all being). The immediate source of this idea is to be found in Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* I, 1. 5 (Suchla, p. 108, 8–9, 115, 19–116, 13; PG 3, 588A, 593A–B). *On Mystical Theology* 5 (PG 3, 1045D–1048A), etc.

A gloss copied by *i*² in the manuscript, Laon, BM 55, summarizes this doctrine quite neatly: 'If God could be spoken, He would not be ineffable; if He could be understood, He would not be beyond every understanding; if He "were", He would not be above all being' (*Études érigéniennes*, p. 584).

84. [772A–B] Eriugena enumerates here nine of the ten Aristotelian predicaments that he knew from the *Categoriae decem* of pseudo-Augustine (the paraphrase of Themistius) and from *De Nuptiis* of Martianus Capella: See the notes of I. P. Sheldon-Williams in his edition of *Periphyseon* I, pp. 232–234 (nn. 98–109). The enumeration in the present case does not follow the usual order. Moreover, two of the predicables (difference and property) are inserted among the categories. It is important to recognize that *positio* is another name for *situs*, and *habitus* is the equivalent of *habitus*: cf. *Periphyseon* I, 466A,

473C–D. But it is evident that Eriugena wished to enumerate only nine categories (the accidents that inhere in substance), and exclude the tenth, i.e. substance (οὐσία), precisely to establish the thesis central to his understanding of human nature: that there simply does not exist a definition of human nature according to substance (οὐσιώδης).

85. [772B] Holy Scripture declares that the human and the angelic natures are either the same or very similar: 'Thou madest him (man) a little less than angels' (Ps. 8,6). This biblical verse recurs in *Periphyseon* II, 575A; IV, 798A13. In the latter instance it occurs in a quotation from Gregory of Nyssa.

86. [772B] Properly speaking, the qualification *intellectualis* is applied strictly to the nature of angels, even as *rationalis* is applied strictly to the nature of man: *Periphyseon* II, 552C; III, 733A; V, 915A. 1008C–D. *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* II, 1016–1026. III, 62–68. IV, 146–148 (CCCM 31, pp. 47–48. 57. 69). Nevertheless, an angel may be described as *rationalis* and a man as *intellectualis*, for man and angel possess both intellect and reason: *Periphyseon* III, 732C.

87. [773C] The nine orders of celestial essences are distributed into three hierarchies. The first hierarchy includes Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones; the second, Dominions, Virtues and Powers; the third, Principalities, Archangels and Angels. Here Eriugena speaks only of the superior orders, those of the first hierarchy who are always 'around' God (περὶ θεόν, *circa Deum*: Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Celestial Hierarchy* VI, 2; SC 58^{bis}, p. 104; PG 3, 200D). Cf. *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* VI, 101–120; CCCM 31, p. 89. Their presence with God is less 'a standing before' than a 'revolving', a perpetual moving (ἀεκίνητον) around God (περὶ τὰ θεῖα): Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Celestial Hierarchy* VII, 1 (SC 58^{bis}, pp. 106–107; PG 3, 205B–C). Not only the celestial essences, but also every rational (human) and intellectual (angelic) creature revolves around God by the movement of contemplation. Moreover, every creature, whether visible or invisible, is involved in this motion: 'This circular or, to be more precise, this spherical movement around the Supreme Good, as if it were around a fixed centre, is common to all creatures, visible and invisible, although not all are moved equally. For the nearer they are to it (the centre) . . . the more rapid their revolution' (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* VII, 101–145; CCCM 31, pp. 94–95). Only the superior orders who are closer to God are perpetually occupied with the contemplation of the Truth.

88. [773C] Just as there are two types of darkness, the one caused by absence of light, the other by excess of light, so too, there are two types of ignorance. The first type of darkness is that of which the Apostle speaks: 'once you were darkness' (Eph. 5,8). The second type of darkness (γνόφος, *caligo*) is that which enveloped the peak of Sinai when Moses ascended it, the darkness where God dwells (Ex. 20,21): Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Mystical Theology* I, 1.3 (PG 3, 997A–B. 1000C9–11). The first darkness is a total absence of light. The second, on the contrary, results from a superabundance of light: too strong for human vision, this light stuns us, 'even as the sun, which when viewed directly, becomes darkness' (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* X, 54–58; CCCM 31, p. 153; PL 122, 224B). One can speak of ignorance in the same way. There is an ignorance caused by lack of knowledge, the ignorance of the true good:

τὴν ἀγνοσίαν τοῦ ὄντως καλοῦ (Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* II, 5 (PG 3, 393D2–394A1), *ignorantia summi boni* (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* III, 63–64; CCCM 31, p. 57). There is another ignorance that is above knowledge, the ignorance of the divine: ἡ κατὰ θεὸν ἀγνοσία, ἡ παντελῆς ἀγνοσία (Dionysius the Areopagite, *Letters* I; PG 3, 1065A). This ignorance results from the transcendence, beyond discourse and intellect, of the object to be understood: τῆς ὑπὲρ λόγον καὶ νοῦν καὶ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ὑπερουσιότητος ἀγνοσία (Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* I, 1; ed. Suchla, p. 108, 8–9; PG 3, 588A5–6). See also *On Mystical Theology* I, 3. II, 1 (PG 3, 1001A4–5. 1025A). If one can speak of ignorance on the part of the superior orders of the hierarchy, it is only of this ignorance of the divine, which is above knowing. On the other hand, the inferior orders are not exempt from the other type of ignorance which is a lack of knowledge. Therefore, they are to be instructed, 'illuminated' by the superior orders.

89. [773C] The Greek term ἄγγελος in its primary sense means messenger. One can thus use the name of 'angel' in a general way for all the pure spirits of whatever rank of the hierarchy: each of the orders of the hierarchy, from the highest to the lowest, communicates the illuminations which it has received from above to the order below it.

But the name 'angel', properly speaking, designates the lowest rank of the celestial hierarchy: cf. *Periphyseon* V, 863D. This last rank communicates to man the messages which it has received from the superior orders. Cf. *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* V, 107–114 (CCCM 31, p. 85). Therefore, as the angels are mediators for human beings, in the same way, the orders superior to the angels are mediators for each other and finally for the angels themselves. 'All the superior orders are called angels in a general way because they are messengers, each to the other, of the divine illuminations . . . In the same way the lowest order, properly called the angelic, is for us the messenger of these same illuminations' (*Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* V, 107–114; p. 85).

90. [773D] The five predicables are given here once again. See note 66.

91. [774B] If one were to keep to an elementary level of teaching (*simplex doctrina*), one would say that man is a species belonging to the genus animal, and that such is his place in creation. This position is held by those whom, because they stick to the literal meaning of Scripture, Eriugena calls *simplices*, or *caruales*: *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, iv, 1–10. vi, 1–60 (SC 180, pp. 342. 356–362; PL 122, 343A–B. 345C–346D). But if one were to observe these things on a higher plane, the perspective is reversed: one would thus no longer say 'that man was brought forth in the genus of the animals, but rather that every genus of animals was brought forth in him'. This reversal of perspective is achieved thanks to the study of the spiritual senses of Scripture, in other words, thanks to allegorical exegesis. Although Eriugena knew the word *allegoria* and its derivatives, he used more often the terms *contemplatio*, *speculatio*, *theoria*, all three of which are equivalents for the Greek θεωρία (SC 180, pp. 397–402). The *speculatrix ratio* here conveys more or less the same idea as that expressed by the *ratio theoriae* found in his commentary on the Gospel of John (VI, iii, 17; SC 180, p. 338; PL 122, 342C). As we have seen above (notes 20 and 21), the affirmation that every genus of animal was brought forth in man depends upon an allegorical interpretation of Genesis 1,24: 'Let the earth bring forth

living animal in its genus, cattle and reptiles and beasts of the field after their species'. The earth here is none other than human nature. The earth symbolizes the solidity of nature created by God: *Periphyseon* IV, 747A–B, 747D–748B. Human nature is thus that earth in which every genus of animal was brought forth, but it is human nature taken in its ideal state. Now, it is in Christ and in particular, the risen Christ, that this nature can be considered in its integrity. It is of Him that the Psalm (145,4) says: 'His spirit shall go forth and shall return again to his homeland'. Eriugena explains that 'his homeland' is nothing but the pristine state of human nature (*Periphyseon* IV, 748A). In order to interpret correctly Eriugena's assertions concerning human nature, it is necessary to situate them in their context, namely Christology. If one can say that all things have been created in human nature, it is because that nature has been taken up and restored by Christ, of whom it is written: 'In Him all things were created . . . visible and invisible' (Col. 1,16).

92. [774C] Where the last version reads *cuius* (p. 80, 8), the earlier versions (*HMR*) as well as the *Clavis Physicae* 256 (ed. P. Lucentini, p. 206, 59) have *quarum*. These versions seem better, for concrete geometrical figures are the images (*figurae*) not of the discipline itself (arithmetic), but of the archetypes (*rationes, λόγοι*) of that discipline.

93. [775A] This passage calls to mind a chapter of the *De docta ignorantia* (I, 14) of Nicholas of Cusa: 'Quod infinita linea sit triangulus' (An infinite line is a triangle): *Nikolaus von Kues Werke (Neuausgabe des Strassburger Drucks von 1488)*, Bd. 1 ed. P. Wilpert (Berlin, 1967), pp. 16–17. However, this passage is omitted in the *Clavis Physicae* of Honorius, read and annotated by Nicholas of Cusa himself: Honorius Augustodunensis, *Clavis Physicae*, ed. P. Lucentini (Rome, 1974), p. 206.

94. [775B] Concerning the qualities from which the elements are formed, see below, note 186.

95. [775B] This point has been confirmed above (769C–D) through the authority of Boethius.

96. [775D–776A] The words 'and spiritual body in his first creation' were absent from the earlier versions, as witnessed by the manuscripts *HMR* and by the *Clavis Physicae* (256, 20; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 207). These earlier versions were clearly more vigorous and coherent than the last. In fact, after having affirmed that the better part of man's creation comprises two elements, soul and spiritual body, Eriugena is really interested only in the first, i.e. the soul, which alone is said to have been made by the divine breath. This addition, however, is quite probably authentic. The author felt the need to clarify an important point of doctrine, namely, that man is not only a soul, and that even without sin, he is composed of soul and body: *Periphyseon* IV, 800A. But this body is a spiritual body. The formula *corpus spirituale* (σῶμα πνευματικόν) comes from St. Paul (I Cor. 15,44). Eriugena refers to it frequently: *Periphyseon* II, 584C; IV, 760B, 764A; V, 884B, 901D, 987A, C. The theme of spiritual body is broached in *Periphyseon* II, 583B; IV, 760A–B, 800B–802A.

97. [776A] Concerning the divine ray, see note 70.

98. [776B] The first version (which I called *R⁰* in the critical apparatus) read: *nec ego praecedo scientiam mei*. By way of erasures and superscriptions, *i¹* changed it into: *nec tamen me praecedit scientia mei*. This correction does

not significantly change the meaning, but it is part of a pattern of modifications which suggests that the passage concerning the *Cogito* is one that had preoccupied Eriugena. The corrections made by *i¹* in this folio of the Rheims manuscript (*R*, f. 291r), whether stylistic or substantive, have been executed at the same time, unlike the successively added layers of emendation at *Periphyseon* IV, 768A–769D (see note 72).

99. [776B] This passage has been modified by *i¹* in the Rheims manuscript (*R*, f. 291r). The original version, to the extent that one can recover the text beneath the erasures, probably read: 'Et si omne quod potest nescire seipsum, nescire non potest se esse'. It appears that *i¹* scraped away the two last words (*se esse*) and began to write: *ignorare seipsum esse*, the four first letters of which (*igno-*) he wrote over the erasure, and the rest above the line. It seems that this correction was intended to avoid a repetition: the verb *ignorare* was meant to replace the second *nescire*. In making this correction, *i¹* forgot to erase or to cancel the second *nescire*. As we have seen before, incomplete corrections abound in *Periphyseon*: they are a normal phenomenon when they are author's corrections. The result of this incomplete correction is this: 'Et si omne quod potest nescire seipsum, nescire non potest ignorare seipsum esse'. It is important to note that the comma between *seipsum* and *nescire* exists in *R* (f. 291^r), but not in *M* (p. 147B). Gale, to whom *R* was not available, may be excused for punctuating the sentence differently: 'Et si omne quod potest nescire seipsum nescire, non potest ignorare seipsum esse' (p. 178, 31–32). Floss followed Gale, but replaced the first *nescire* with *scire* (776B10): 'Et si omne, quod potest scire seipsum nescire, non potest ignorare seipsum esse.' Nowadays, no serious editor of the *Periphyseon* would dare to move the comma, which is after *seipsum* in the manuscript *R*, and put it after *nescire*. Therefore, to make sense of this difficult passage, the most economical solution is to understand it as a text incompletely corrected: *i¹*, in replacing the repetitious *nescire* with *ignorare*, simply forgot to erase the former.

100. [776B–C] The words 'But if anyone . . . altogether dead' were added by *i¹* in the bottom margin of folio 291r of the Rheims manuscript. The two previous corrections made by *i¹* in 776B were stylistic in nature: *nec tamen me praecedit scientia mei* instead of *nec ego praecedo scientiam mei* on the one hand, the substitution of *ignorare* for *nescire* on the other. Here we have to deal with a more substantial addition. These lines call to mind the Augustinian *Cogito*: Augustine, *De civitate dei* XI, 26 (CCSL 48, pp. 345–346; PL 41, 339–340); *De trinitate* X, x, 14 (CCSL 50, pp. 327–328; PL 42, 981). They may call to mind as well the Cartesian *Cogito*: E. Gilson, *René Descartes. Discours de la Méthode. Texte et commentaire* (Paris, 1947), 4^e partie, pp. 31–40. Concerning the medieval tradition of the *Cogito*, see E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–298; B. Stock, 'Intelligo me esse: Eriugena's Cogito' in *Jean Scot Erigène et l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1977), pp. 328–335. Speaking of *Periphyseon* IV, 776B–C, Henry Bett wrote: 'The *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, which is the point of departure of all modern philosophy, is clearly anticipated by Eriugena in a very remarkable passage . . . But Eriugena borrowed the thought, as he did so much else, from Augustine' (H. Bett, *Johannes Scotus Erigena. A Study in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1925), pp. 138–139). For a different approach

to Eriugena's *Cogito*, see W. Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leiden, 1991), pp. 184–189, 207–208, 210–211.

101. [777B] Eriugena mentions here the thesis that he will develop further on, namely, that man, created in a 'state of dignity (τιμῆ, honour)' which made him equal to the angels, reduced himself through his sin to the level of an irrational beast: τοῖς κτήνεσιν τοῖς ἀνοήτοις, *iumentis insipientibus* (Ps. 48, 13). This lamentable state is most obvious in the propagation of the human species by means of sex, a mode of propagation qualified as bestial (κτηνώδης, *pecorinus*). The words 'as the wisest of the Greeks maintain with the most convincing arguments' were added by *i*¹ in the bottom margin of folio 291v of the Rheims manuscript. By 'the wisest of the Greeks' Eriugena means Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor.

102. [777C–D] Sin (the leprosy of the soul) does not deprive man of his keenness of mind (*acies mentis*) by which he can know God (*Periphyseon* II, 531C), nor did the Fall extinguish in him the desire for eternal life (*Periphyseon* V, 867C–868B).

103. [778A] The phrase *excepta subiecti ratione* was used by Eriugena to point out the only difference which exists between the divine model and His image: cf. *Periphyseon* II, 585A. 586B. For this, Eriugena is indebted to Gregory of Nyssa who, speaking of the likeness of Caesar stamped on a coin (Matth. 22, 19–21), comments: 'We learn from this that the likeness of the representation of Caesar consists in the figure (πρόσχημα, *figura*), but the difference lies in the subject that receives it (ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, *in subiecto*). Similarly, in the present discussion, where instead of sensible representations (ἀντι χαρακτήρων), we consider the notions of divine and human nature in which the likeness lies, we find a difference. We see this difference in the subject (ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, *in subiecto*): there uncreated, here created' (*De imagine* 17[16], PG 44, 184D; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 235, 4–9; quoted below, 796C).

104. [778A–B] Eriugena makes an allusion here to the divinization through which man is called to become by grace that which God is by nature: Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 358–384 (CCSG 18, p. 33; PG 91, 1088A–C; quoted in *Periphyseon* V, 879C–880A).

105. [778D–779A] Among Christian thinkers, the act of creation is generally conceived of as speech: 'For He spoke (*dixit*), and it came to be (*et facta sunt*)' (Ps. 32,9). For Neoplatonic thinkers, and notably for Plotinus, the act of creation is generally conceived of as seeing (θεωρία): see Plotinus, *Enneads* III. 8. 3. 17–24. Eriugena, who in other passages (*Vox spiritualis* VIII, 7–9; SC 151, pp. 236–238; PL 122, 287C) follows the traditional view of the Christian thinkers, seems to align himself here with the Neoplatonic perspective. Similarly in *Periphyseon* III (678A–B) he says: 'We have clearly deduced, as I think, that the divine Goodness saw and always has seen those things that were to be made . . . And the things that He saw were not other than the things that He made, but the things He saw were to be made were the things that He made . . . And all the things which He has always seen, He has always made. For in Him sight does not precede act, because act is co-eternal with sight, especially since for Him it is not one thing to see and another to act, but His sight is His act. For He sees by acting and by seeing He acts.' However, this

approach to the act of creation as a seeing may find support in the exegesis of Gen. 22,14 (The Lord sees) as well as of Gen. 1,10 (And God saw that it was good): cf. *Periphyseon* III, 673C–677D; 704B–C. This perspective on the act of creation is in perfect accord with one of the two etymologies of the word God favoured by Eriugena: the word θεός (God) derives from the verb θεωρῶ (I contemplate), and means *He who contemplates* (*Periphyseon* I, 452B–C. 459D–460A). The connection of this theme of vision with Neoplatonic θεωρία may be found in his commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*. Explaining why Dionysius used the verbs ὁρᾶν and εἶναι in preference to the nouns ὄρασις and οὐσία (*Cael. Hier.* XIII, 1; PG 3, 301D) Eriugena states: 'Dionysius put infinitives instead of nouns. From this fact one may clearly understand that to God Himself, and to every rational and intellectual creature as well, it is not one thing to be, and yet another thing to be light; not one thing to be light, and yet another thing to see, i.e., to grasp intellectually (*intelligere gnostica uirtute*). For to them, to be and to shine and to see are the same thing: their being is light and vision' (*Expositiones in Hierarchiam Caelestem* XIII, 253–258; CCCM 31, p. 173; PL 122, 240B). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, iv, 21–24 (SC 180, p. 218; PL 122, 318C). See 'The Neoplatonic Themes of *Processio* and *Reditus* in Eriugena', in *Dionysius* 16 (1992), pp. 10–17.

106. [779B] 'The divine Intellect is all things'. This is a statement that recurs several times in Eriugena's works: *Periphyseon* II, 559A–B; III, 632D–633A. 659A. It is attributed to Augustine in Eriugena's *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvii, 75–77 (SC 180, p. 138; PL 122, 304B–C). See above, n. 74.

107. [779C] This passage has been reworked by the author. The original version read: 'sed quod una eademque aliter in causis aeternis substat, aliter in effectibus speculatur'. The second version, as modified by *i*¹ reads: 'sed quod unam eandemque aliter in causis aeternis subsistentem, aliter in effectibus intellectam mens speculatur'. In the original version, the verb (*speculatur*) was taken as a passive; in the version corrected by *i*¹, it is a deponent. The passive form *speculari* (to be observed) is attested in medieval Latin: R. E. Latham, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources* (London, 1965), p. 447.

108. [780B] The words *quod etiam in summis hominibus, quorum primitiae in caelestibus sunt, fieri incipit* (780B) have been written by *i*¹ in the upper margin of folio 294r of the Rheims manuscript. Another mention of the *summi homines* appears in 778C. The word *primitiae* (first fruits) alludes to I Cor. 15, 20, 23, and perhaps to Apoc. 14, 4. The risen Christ is 'the first fruits' of the human nature: 'Primitiae ipsius, humanitatem Christi dico' (*Periphyseon* V, 921C).

109. [780B] 'as I said' i.e. in *Periphyseon* IV, 765C.

110. [780B–C] The manuscripts of the *Periphyseon* on which this edition is based (*FJPR*) read unanimously: '*quid intelligis*', whereas the manuscripts *HM* and the *Clavis Physicae* (259, 21; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 211) read: '*quod intelligis*'.

111. [780C] 'A perfect number is that which is equal to its own parts' (Euclid, *Elementa* VII, definitio 22; ed. I. L. Heiberg–E. S. Stamatis (Leipzig, 1970), p. 105). Nicomachus of Gerasa comments on this definition and gives two examples for it, namely the numbers six and twenty-eight: Nicomachus of Gerasa, *Introduction to Arithmetic* I, xvi, 2; ed. R. Hoche (Leipzig, 1866), pp. 39–40; English translation by Martin Luther D'Ooge (New York, 1926), p. 209. The

teaching of Nicomachus was available to the Latin world through Boethius, *De Arithmetica* I, 19 (ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. 41, 6–16; PL 63, 1097D). The number six is particularly important because it is the only number among the first ten (the Pythagorean decade) that is equal to the sum of its factors: $3 (= 6 / 2) + 2 (= 6 / 3) + 1 (= 6 / 6) = 6$. See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ii, 2–3 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 94–96; PL 34, 296–297), Calcidius, *In Timaeum Platonis commentarius* 38 (ed. J. H. Waszink² (Leiden, 1975), p. 87), Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* I, vi, 12 (ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), p. 20), Martianus Capella, *De nuptiis* VII, 736 (ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1983), p. 265). Cf. *Periphyseon* III, 655C–656A.

112. [780C] Eriugena will declare a little further on (800A) that man is not only a soul, but a soul united to a body. But here he claims that the true self is none other than intellect ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta$). In this he follows a well established patristic tradition. Basil of Caesarea wrote: 'We are soul and intellect ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\zeta$), in that we have been fashioned to the image of the Creator' (*Attende tibi ipsi* III; ed. Rudberg, p. 26, 17–18; PG 31, 204A). His brother, Gregory of Nyssa, did not think otherwise: *De imagine* 5 (PG 44, 137B–C; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 214, 12–18). Similarly, commenting on the biblical verse ($\pi\rho\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\chi\epsilon\ \sigma\epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$, *attende tibi ipsi*, Deut. 4, 9), St. Ambrose writes: 'Aliud enim sumus nos, aliud sunt nostra, alia quae circa nos sunt. Nos sumus, hoc est anima et mens' (*Exameron* VI, vii, 42; CSEL 32, 1, p. 233, 15–17).

113. [784A] The example of the oar which appears to be broken when it is dipped in the water was already cited in Book III, 725B.

114. [784A] The rare word *specilla*, meaning a mirror, is to be found in Augustine, *De quantitate animae* V, 9 (PL 32, 1040). *Epistulae* III, 3 (CSEL 34, 1, p. 7, 17; PL 33, 65). It appears in the *Expositiones in Hier. cael.* II, 903 (CCCM 31, p. 44) and in the *Glossae diuinae historiae* (67), where it is accompanied by an Irish gloss: 'Dextralia, id est specilla, scádercc'. The editors of the *Glossae*, John Contreni and Pádraig Ó Néill, explain: 'scádercc, mirror(s)'. *Specilla* is listed also in R. E. Latham, *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources* (London, 1965), p. 447. The variant *speculo* has been chosen by Gale (p. 182, 33) and by Floss (PL 122, 784A).

115. [784A] The echo is defined as an image of the voice (*imago uocis*) by Marius Victorinus and Isidore of Seville, as I have indicated in the notes to the Latin text. Eriugena uses this definition several times in his works: *De praedestinatione* III, 1 (CCCM 50, p. 19, 39–40; PL 122, 365B); *Periphyseon* V, 914A; *Glossae diuinae historiae* 574 (ed. J. Contreni–P. Ó Néill); *Expositiones in Hier. cael.* II, 899–905 (CCCM 31, p. 44).

116. [784A] The examples given here (the apparently broken oar, the reversed face in the mirror, the towers that seem to move to those sailing, the echo) are to be found in Augustine, *Soliloquia* II, vi, 10, 12 (CSEL 89, p. 58, 10–13, p. 60, 7–19; PL 32, 889, 890).

117. [784C] For the sake of clarity, the long sentence beginning at 783C and ending at 784C has been divided into several sentences in the English translation. In fact, the subordinate clause of this sentence (*Quoniam uero . . . triplex modus est*) is separated from its principal clause (*triplex sentiendi modus . . . constituitur*) by thirty lines of a text, itself overloaded with interpolated clauses. In the original version of the Rheims manuscript, these parenthetical clauses

are less numerous than in the last versions (*FJP*), although they are numerous enough to make the text difficult to read. We are therefore led to think that not even the original version of *R* represents the first stage of the *Periphyseon*. At the same time, these various supplements, added either by *i*¹ in *R* or by unknown scribes in the exemplar from which manuscripts *FJP* were copied, throw a significant light on the process by which certain parts of the *Periphyseon* were shaped. We should probably think of this process in terms of successive alluvia, or of materials delivered to a construction site, waiting for an architect to decide their disposition in the final structure of the building.

118. [784C] It is no longer a matter of human nature in general, but of one particular man, one individual human being: a single individual man is greater than the entire visible universe. In favour of this thesis Eriugena does not invoke any specific authority, either biblical or patristic, but rather reason (*uerissima ratio*). However, the doctrine according to which human nature is more precious than the whole visible universe is traditional and may be found both in Augustine (see following note) and in Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* 3 (PG 44, 133C–136A; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 213): 'That the nature of man is more precious than all the visible creation'. It is perhaps not inappropriate to quote Pascal here: 'L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser: une vapeur, une goutte d'eau suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, puisqu'il sait qu'il meurt et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien' (*Pensées*, ed. L. Brunschvicg 347 [63] H.3; ed. J. Chevalier 264, Series 'La Pléiade' (Paris, 1954), pp. 1156–1157).

119. [784D] I have been unable to identify precisely the passage of Augustine to which Eriugena alludes here. The doctrine, however, is Augustinian in tone: see Augustine, *De duabus animabus* IV, 4 (CSEL 25, p. 55, 4–12; PL 42, 96); *De libero arbitrio* III, xi, 34 (CCSL 29, p. 295, 42–44; PL 32, 1288); *De uera religione* XLI, 77. LV, 109 (CCSL 32, p. 238, p. 257, 38–40; PL 34, 156–157, 170).

120. [785B] See Augustine, *De quantitate animae* XIV, 24 (CSEL 89, pp. 159, 23–160, 6; PL 32, 1048).

121. [785D] As we have seen before (780C), the number six is a perfect number, being equal to the sum of its factors. The fact that the world has been created in six days, and that man was created on the sixth day shows the perfection both of man and of the universe: *Periphyseon* III, 655D–656A. Following Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, vii, 14 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 103, 16–21; PL 34, 301) and *De ciuitate dei* XI, 30 (CCSL 48, p. 350; PL 41, 343–344), Eriugena explains: 'It must be noted that the number six is not perfect because in it God finished all things that He wished to create; but He created His works in it because through the perfection of this number the perfection of His works would be revealed' (*Periphyseon* III, 656AB).

122. [786A] Dionysius says that the Godhead ($\theta\epsilon\alpha\rho\chi\iota\alpha$) is celebrated as Trinity 'through the tri-hypostatic manifestation of the superessential fecundity ($\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\eta\eta\ \tau\rho\iota\sigma\upsilon\pi\acute{o}\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\upsilon\ \gamma\omicron\nu\mu\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\phi\alpha\nu\sigma\iota\nu$, *propter subsistentem ter superessentialis foecunditatis expressionem*)', and also as cause of all things because it brought forth into being all things 'through its

being-producing goodness (διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς οὐσιοποιὸν ἀγαθότητα, *per eius substantificam bonitatem*): *De diu. nom.* I, 4 (ed. Suchla, p. 113; PG 3, 592A; PL 122, 1115AB).

123. [786B] See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, vi, 12 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 10; PL 34, 250–251). Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 555CD. *Comment in eu. Ioh.* I, xxvii, 88–92 (SC 180, pp. 140–142; PL 122, 304CD).

124. [786C] In the Vulgate we read (Gen. 1,26): 'He said'; in the Septuagint and in the *Vetus Latina*: 'God said'. See *Vetus Latina 2. Genesis*, ed. B. Fischer (Freiburg, 1951–1954), p. 25. Augustine quotes this verse according to the *Vetus Latina: De Genesi ad litteram* VI, ii, 3 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 171, 11; PL 34, 339).

125. [786C] The plural form (*faciamus*, let us make) in Genesis 1, 26 has been traditionally understood by the Christian exegetes, both Greek and Latin, as befitting the speech of God the Father addressing the two other Persons of the Holy Trinity. See Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Iudaeo* 62 (ed. J. C. T. Otto, I, 1, 3rd ed. (Jena, 1876), pp. 216–220; PG 6, 617A–620B). Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum* II, 18 (ed. and tr. Robert M. Grant (Oxford, 1970), pp. 56–57; PG 6, 1081AB). Irenaeus, *Aduersus haereses* IV, xx, 1 (SC 100, pp. 624–627; PG 7, 1032AB). Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 6 (PG 44, 140B–C; ed. M. Cappeluyens, p. 215, 3–6). Jerome, *Commentarii in Esaiam* III, vi, 8 (CCSL 73, p. 90, 6–9); *Commentarii in Michaeam* II, v, 6 (CCSL 76, p. 486, 238–243). Augustine, *Sermones de uetere testamento* I, 5 (CCSL 41, p. 5; PL 38, 25–26); *De Genesi ad litteram* III, xix, 29 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 85, 13–86, 4; PL 34, 291–292); *De trinitate* VII, vi, 12 (CCSL 50, p. 266, 140–146; PL 42, 946). Concerning the plural *faciamus*, Hrabanus Maurus wrote: 'unitas sanctae trinitatis aperte commendatur' (*Comment. in Genesim* I, 7; PL 107, 459B). Similarly, Eriugena wrote (786B): 'et unitas diuinae naturae et trinitas apertissime praedicatur'. It is worth noticing that the earlier versions (HMR) and the *Clauis Physicae* have *phuralitas* instead of *trinitas*: 'diuinae naturae unitas et pluralitas aperte praedicatur' (*Clauis Physicae* 267, 15, ed. P. Lucentini, p. 215).

126. [786C] See Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 8 (PG 44, 144D–145A; ed. M. Cappeluyens, p. 217, 3–14, cited in *Periphyseon* III, 735D–736A). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 755B.

127. [786D] This is clearly expressed in a homily attributed to Gregory of Nyssa: *De creatione hominis*, Homilia I (ed. H. Hörner (Leiden, 1972), p. 10, 8–9; PG 44, 261C). Concerning the authenticity of this homily see M. Geerard, *Clauis Patrum Graecorum*, no. 3215.

128. [786D–787A] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* III, xx, 30 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 86, 5–17; PL 34, 292). *De trinitate* XII, vii, 12 (CCSL 50, p. 366, 70–85; PL 42, 1004–1005). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, vi, 19–21 (SC 180, p. 232; PL 122, 321A).

129. [787A] Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 567A–580A; IV, 743C.

130. [787B] Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 754B–C.

131. [787B] A full account of the various categories of numbers (occursors, progressors, recorders, rational, intellectual) is given in *Periphyseon* III, 731C–732A. See Augustine, *De musica* VI, vi, 16 (PL 32, 1172). It is worth noting that the words by which each category of number is described in 787B (*qui primi . . . suscipiunt, qui . . . introducunt, qui memoriae commendant*) were written by *i*,

either in the margin or above the line in *R*, f. 299v. They correspond to the definitions of occursor, progressor, and recorder numbers given in *Periphyseon* III, 731C. Concerning the role of arithmology in Eriugena's thought see D. J. O'Meara, 'The Metaphysical Use of Mathematical Concepts in Eriugena', in *Begriff und Metapher*, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1990), pp. 142–148.

132. [787C–D] Although Eriugena is certainly original here, one cannot help but think that he might have been indebted to such texts as the following: 'Eadem una est anima. Quae dum contemplatur spiritus est, dum sentit sensus est, dum sapit animus est, dum intelligit mens est, dum discernit ratio est, dum consentit uoluntas est, dum recordatur memoria est, et dum membra uegetat anima est' (Isidore of Seville, *De differentiis rerum* II, cap. 29, n. 97; ed. F. Arevalo (Rome, 1802), pp. 96–97; PL 83, 84B). This text is quoted in the *Collectio Hibernensis* LXV, 2: *Die irische Kanonensammlung*, ed. H. Wasserschleben² (Leipzig, 1885), p. 233. See J. Fontaine, *Isidore de Séville et la culture classique dans l'Espagne Wisigothique* II (Paris 1959), p. 691, n. 2.

133. [788A] Eriugena has just said that 'it is not in respect of his body that man is created in the image of God', but in respect of his soul; more precisely, in respect of the higher part of his soul, namely Mind, Reason, Interior Sense (786C–787A). But 'a more careful examination of the human soul' reveals its simplicity. It is as a whole that the human soul performs its various activities (787AD). And so, the 'soul penetrates the whole frame of its body but cannot be bounded by it'. The soul is 'neither lesser in its minor offices nor magnified in its greater [offices]': *nec minor in minoribus suis officiis nec maior in maioribus* (787D). These last words echo Augustine, *De origine animae hominis* [= *Epistula* 166] I, 4 (PL 33, 722) and Cassiodorus, *De anima* 2 (PL 70, 1284B–C). In this the human soul resembles God, according to the image and after the likeness of Whom it was created: it is present in every part of the body, as God is present in every part of the universe. If we were to use vocabulary which is not Eriugenian, we would say that the soul is present and active in the microcosm as God is present and active in the macrocosm. In fact this is what we read in a Commentary on Genesis (F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Biblicum Medii Aevi*, 7194) once attributed to Remigius of Auxerre: 'In anima quippe imaginem dei habemus. Quod deus in maiori mundo, hoc anima in corpore nostro operatur; unde et microcosmos graece uocatur, id est minor mundus. Deus enim extra mundum positus non excluditur, intra mundum includitur, et praesidendo sustentat, et sustentando praesidet, et circumdando implet, et implendo circumdat; sic et anima nec extra corpus posita excluditur a corpore, nec intra corpus includitur, sed ubique tota, ubique integra' (PL 131, 57A–B). This Commentary has been attributed recently to Haymo of Auxerre: B. Edwards, 'In Search of the Authentic Commentary on Genesis by Remigius of Auxerre' in *L'École carolingienne d'Auxerre . . . Entretiens d'Auxerre 1989*, ed. D. Iogna-Prat, C. Jeudy and Guy Lobrichon (Paris, 1991), pp. 399–412. The source of this idea could be Claudianus Mamertus, *De statu animae* III, 2 (CSEL 11, p. 155, 8–13; PL 53, 761B). However, the terms in which Eriugena speaks of the human soul (*ψυχή*, *anima*) here may be compared with what Gregory of Nyssa says of the human mind (*νοῦς*, *animus*): 'The mind is not confined (*περιέχεται*, *comprehenditur*) to any part of us, but is equally in all and through

all, neither surrounding anything without, nor being enclosed within anything' (*De imagine* 16 [15], PG 44, 177B; ed. M. Cappuyns p. 231, 26–28; quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 792D). Such ideas circulated widely during the Middle Ages thanks to a small anonymous treatise called *De dignitate humanae conditionis* (Stegmüller, 1104) attributed sometimes to Ambrose (PL 17 [edition of 1845], 1015–1018), sometimes to Augustine (PL 40, 1213–1214) and sometimes to Alcuin (PL 100, 565–568; J. Marenbon, *From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 158–161). We find an echo of them in Benedict of Aniane, *Munimenta fidei* 7, 30–34 (ed. J. Leclercq, *Analecta Monastica* I [Studia Anselmiana 20] (Vatican City, 1948), p. 35) and in Israel Scottus (ed. E. Jeuneau, in *Études érigéniennes* p. 661, 12–18 and pp. 680–684). For a more detailed account of the theme see P. L. Reynolds, *God, Cosmos and Microcosm*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1986, esp. pp. 301–317.

134. [788A] It is because the human soul bears in herself the image of God that she cannot know what she is. See above, 771B–D and *Periphyseon* II, 585B–C.

135. [788C] The Latin version is scarcely intelligible. The Greek text reads: ἕτερόν τινα χρῆ πάντως αὐτόν παρὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν [variant: αἰσθητὴν] ὑποτίθεσθαι φύσιν, ὡς ἂν μή τις ποικίλα τῷ νοητῷ συμμιχθεῖη (PG 44, 153D). The meaning is: 'One must suppose that it (the mind) is something else besides the sensitive [variant: sensible] nature, so that no variation may attach to an intelligible thing'. Several causes explain the failure of the Latin version. First Eriugena confused the verb ὑποτίθεσθαι (middle voice of ὑποτίθημι) with the middle voice of ὑφίστημι. Now, he generally translates the latter by *substituere*. Cf. *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 199 (CCSG 18, p. 27; PG 91, 1080A5), etc., and see Jean Scot, *Homélie sur le Prologue de Jean*, SC 151 (Paris, 1969), pp. 333–335. Moreover, he seems to have found in his Greek exemplar the neuter plural ποικίλα (*uaria*) instead of the singular feminine ποικίλα (*uarietas*): see *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), pp. 156–157. Then he translated συμμιχθεῖη (passive voice) by *commisceat* (active voice). Finally two words were added, neither of which has its equivalent in Greek. The preposition *per*, absent from the original version of *R* (f. 300^v), was added above the line by *i*¹; the noun *simplicitati*, absent from the earlier versions, appears only in the last. Neither addition improved the text.

136. [789A] Eriugena's translation is defective here also. Actually the Greek text (PG 44, 156A–B) translates thus: 'If, on the one hand, the nature of the image could be comprehended and, on the other, the primal exemplar were to remain above comprehension, this contradiction between the attributes (τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων) of the two natures would prove the defect of the image'. Eriugena failed to recognize in the verb κατελαμβάνετο a passive voice; he took it as a deponent. Then neglecting the particles (μέν . . . δέ), he made τὸ πρωτότυπον (*the primal exemplar*) a direct complement of this verb. Moreover, he understood the feminine article (ἡ) as if it were a conjunction (εἰ), an understandable mistake, since the two words were already being pronounced in the same way, as they are today. Finally, he translated the participle διημαρτημένον by *quod oportet peccatum*, a mistake of the same kind: the first two letters of the Greek participle (δι-) being pronounced as

δεῖ (*oportet*). Since the phrase *quod oportet* (789A) does not make good sense, the verb *inuenitur* was later added above the line by *i*¹ (*R*, f. 301^r), an addition which does not throw much light on a particularly clumsy translation. In 764A an *inuenitur* was also added above the line by *i*¹ (*R*, f. 282^r). Dionysius Exiguus' rendering of the same passage is unquestionably better than Eriugena's: 'Quod si imaginis natura comprehendi potest cum primaeua forma in sua incomprehensibilitate permaneat, ex hac ipsa contrarietate, qua comprehenditur, esse dissimilis comprobatur' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 159; PL 67, 361C). In spite of his inability to render in Latin each and every sentence of the Greek text, Eriugena did not fail to grasp the general meaning of a passage which contains one of the most original features of Gregory's anthropology, i.e. that by his not knowing what he is, man resembles God. For an appraisal of the merits of Eriugena's translation in comparison with that of Dionysius Exiguus, see P. Levine, 'Two Early Latin Versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa's περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου', in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), pp. 473–492.

137. [789B] A gloss added by *i*¹ in the margin and between the lines in *R* (f. 301^r) interrupts the quotation in order to comment on what Gregory of Nyssa said about nature, matter and form. It is worth noticing that this commentary on a Greek author is based on an 'etymology' or a play on words – *natura, natal* – which makes sense only to a Latin reader.

138. [789C] This gloss is reproduced here according to the last version. The text of the earlier versions, as added by *i*¹ above the line in *R* (f. 301^r), was longer: 'i.e. it forms nature by means of mind, it forms matter by means of nature'.

139. [789C] The Latin verb – *redarguitur* – shows that Eriugena used a Greek manuscript in which one could read διηλέγθη, which is the reading of the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 148^r, and not διηλέγθη (ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 126; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 72A; PG 44, 161D9). See *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 170.

140. [789C] The text edited here is that of the last version: '*Deformis enim res quaedam est per seipsam materia ordine naturae mutato*'. In the earlier versions we read: '*Informis enim res quaedam est per seipsam materia et imperfecta*'. The latter is certainly a more accurate translation of the Greek (PG 44, 161D10–11), because in it the two epithets assigned by Gregory of Nyssa to matter are correctly rendered in Latin. The first (ἄμορφος) is traditional: Plato, *Timaeus* 50d. 51a; Aristotle, *Physics* 1,7. 191a 10; Plotinus, *Enneads* II, 4, 10, 22–23. V, 9, 3, 19–20. The second epithet (ἀκατάσκευος) calls to mind ἀκατασκευάστος (Genesis 1,2), the Latin equivalent of which is *incomposita*: *Vetus Latina* 2. *Genesis*, ed. B. Fischer, p. 6. Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 548A. 555A. In *Periphyseon* II, 548B Eriugena gives a philosophical account of matter in the framework of a commentary on Genesis 1,2. Dionysius Exiguus, however, translated the present passage as follows: '*Informis enim quaedam res et incomposita est ipsa materies per se*' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 171; PL 67, 364D). Both Dionysius and Eriugena used a Greek exemplar, in which the

word χρῆμα was inserted between τι and καθ' ἑαυτήν, as it is in the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 148^r: see *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . .*, ed. Forbes, p. 170.

141. [790D] Here Eriugena echoes Augustine: 'Between our mind by which we know the Father Himself, and the Truth through which we know Him, no creature intervenes' (*De uera religione* LV, 113; CCSL 32, p. 259, 122–125; PL 34, 172; quoted in *Periphyseon* II, 531B and IV, 759C). Cf. *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* IV, 406–408. VII, 829–830 (CCCM 31, pp. 75, 113). *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* IV, v, 29–30 (SC 180, p. 306; PL 122, 336B).

142. [791A] See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I, v, 10 (CSEL 28, 1, p. 9, 1–10; PL 34, 250).

143. [791C] This statement may be considered as a summary of the words of Gregory of Nyssa that follow immediately. Elsewhere Eriugena has written: 'Every motion starts from some beginning and tends towards some end in which once it has arrived it comes to rest' (*Periphyseon* I, 514B). Immediately after (514B–515C) he says that such is the teaching of Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 20–22. 52–54. 61–76. 99–101. 107–126 (CCSG 18, pp. 21–25; PG 91, 1069B–1076A).

144. [792C] The Latin ablative – *conformatione* – shows that Eriugena used a Greek exemplar in which he read not συγκρότημά τι, as in the standard editions (ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 152; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 81A; PG 44, 176B3), but συγκροτήματι, as in the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 157^r.

145. [793A] As edited by Floss (PL 122, 793A1) the text reads: 'in uasis, in cadis'. The words *in uasis* are certainly a gloss, meant to explain the relatively rare noun *cadus* (κάδος), meaning a jar. In the earlier versions (*HMR*) the words *in uasis* are lacking.

146. [793A] The passive voice – *circumprehenditur* – seems to indicate that Eriugena read οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνεται and not οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τι (PG 44, 177B13). The reading περιλαμβάνεται is that of Forbes' edition: *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 194. The editors of the English translation of Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* write: 'It does not seem of much consequence whether we read περιλαμβάνεται with Forbes and the MSS., and treat it as of the middle voice, or περιλαμβάνει τι with the Paris Edit. The reading περιλαμβάνεται, taken passively, obscures the sense of the passage' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 404). On the other hand, the singular (*incorporale*) of the Latin version shows that Eriugena translated a Greek exemplar in which he found τὸ ἀσώματον instead of τὰ ἀσώματα (PG 44, 177B13). In the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 158^v, for instance, we read: οὐ γὰρ περιλαμβάνεται τὸ ἀσώματον.

147. [793C] Eriugena misunderstood Gregory of Nyssa here. The words ἔξωθεν τινες (PG 44, 177D) cannot mean 'derived from external things' (*ex his quae extra sunt*), but rather: 'certain persons from those outside', a way of alluding to heathen philosophers. See G. W. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* s.v. ἔξωθεν. Dionysius Exiguus' rendering of ἔξωθεν τινες – *nonnulli externorum* – is more accurate: *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt*

Omnia I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 195; PL 67, 372B). Similarly, ἡ ἔξωθεν παιδευσίς (Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 8; PG 44, 144D8, Cappuyns p. 217, 2) means pagan culture or learning. See also Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* III, 323–324 (CCSG 18, p. 31; PG 91, 1085A13).

148. [794A] The Latin version – *ad eum conuertitur* – shows that Eriugena read συντρεπόμενον (*turning with*) instead of συντροφόμενον (*being bred up with, being companion of*), which is given by various editions: ed. Johann Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 162; ed. Gilles Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 84; ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 196; PG 44, 180B6). In fact, Gregory of Nyssa speaks here of 'that which constantly dwells with evil and grows up with it' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa*, p. 404).

149. [794B] The Latin translation is loose here. The words used by Gregory of Nyssa in order to define his approach are: στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπόνοιας (PG 44, 180C1–2). It was particularly unfortunate that the first of these words was translated by *speculationibus*, for στοχασμός means 'conjecture'. Eriugena was more successful when in his version of *De imagine* 17[16] (PG 44, 185A12; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 235, 20) he translated the same word by *coniecturis* (797A). The term ὑπόνοια also means 'conjecture' and was used to signify a covert meaning such as is conveyed by myths and allegories. In fact Plutarch informs us that the word ἀλληγορία, in his time, has replaced the word ὑπόνοια: Plutarch, *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* 19EF (*Plutarch's Moralia with an English Translation*, tr. Frank Cole Babbitt, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1949), pp. 100–101). Again, Dionysius Exiguus' translation of στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπόνοιας – *quibusdam coniecturis atque suspicionibus* – was more accurate: *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 197; PL 67, 372D, where we read *coniectationibus* instead of *suspicionibus*).

150. [794C] In this passage Eriugena has correctly rendered the sense of the Greek text: the Latin *manuductio* (Cappuyns, p. 233, 8) is a good equivalent for χειραγωγή (PG 44, 180D2). The purpose of Gregory of Nyssa is to lead his reader by the hand from the text of the Bible (Gen. 1,26) to the theory which he has elaborated himself and which he offers here not as a dogma, but rather as an hypothesis.

151. [794C] The Latin translation (*in his quae coram sunt*) is inaccurate. The Greek adverb ἔμπροσθεν means 'above', and not 'in the presence of' (*coram*). In fact, Gregory sends the reader to 'what he has said above' (ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: PG 44, 180D7), namely in *De imagine* 6 (PG 44, 140B; ed. M. Cappuyns, pp. 214, 25–215, 14), a chapter of which no extract is quoted in *Periphyseon*. Dionysius Exiguus' translation of ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν is: 'in superioribus' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 199; PL 67, 373A). The rendering *coram* for ἔμπροσθεν is customary in Eriugena's translations: *Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 356 (CCSG 18, p. 56; PG 91, 1124D10). *Vox spiritualis* XVI, 4–10 (SC 151, p. 278; PL 122, 292B). *Comment. in eu. Iohannis* I, xxiii, 40–45 (SC 180, p. 108; PL 122, 299B). See Sven Lundström, *Lexicon errorum interpretum latinorum* (Uppsala, 1983), p. 52.

152. [794C] The Latin translation – *fideli diuina scriptura* – is defective here. It shows that Eriugena read πιστῆς (*faithful*) instead of ἐπίσης (*equally*): PG 44, 180D12. No variant for ἐπίσης is mentioned in the edition of Forbes (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland 1855), p. 198). In Dionysius Exiguus' version we find *aequaliter* (ed. Forbes, p. 199; PL 67, 373B), an indication that Dionysius read ἐπίσης, and not πιστῆς. In other places, Eriugena himself translates ἐπίσης by *aequaliter*: PG 44, 177B6. 185C8–9. D1. D4; ed. M. Cappuyns, pp. 231, 27. 235, 37. 236, 3. 5, quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 792D. 797B–C.

153. [794C–D] The heresy of the 'Anomoeans', a radical wing of Arianism, the leader of which was Eunomius, asserted that the Son was unlike (ἀνόμοιος) the Father in the Holy Trinity. Gregory of Nyssa refuted this heresy in a previous chapter: *De imagine* 6 (PG 44, 140B; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 214, 45–215, 14). This refutation was based on Genesis (1,26). In the present chapter, he will come back to the same biblical verse (*De imagine* 17[16]; PG 44, 180D–181A; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 233, 11–16), not to argue against the heretics this time, but in order to explain how the present miserable condition of human nature can be in accord with the divine teaching that it has been created in the image and after the likeness of God.

154. [794D] Following his usual practice of translating the two Greek particles οὐκοῦν and οὐκουν in the same way, Eriugena first wrote: *Non itaque*. This error was changed by *i*^l, who corrected *Non* to *Nonne* (*R*, f. 306^r). See note 3.

155. [795C] Eriugena's translation is inadequate here. Before developing his theory concerning the creation of man, Gregory makes a rhetorical caveat. He foresees that his reader might object that he is approaching his subject from far away (πρόρρωθεν: PG 44, 181D4). It is very likely that such a term (πρόρρωθεν) has in the present context a twofold meaning: rhetorical and doctrinal. It is an error of form for an orator to start his discourse by considerations brought from afar, i.e. foreign to the subject. Likewise, it is inappropriate for a Christian bishop to rely on pagan authorities. This adverb – πρόρρωθεν, from afar – should be paired with another, namely ἔξωθεν used by Gregory (PG 44, 177D). In fact, in the passage that follows Gregory will borrow the premises of his argumentation from an authority that lies far away from the text on which he will comment: for the text is biblical and the authority that he will use to interpret it is heathen, i.e. Plato.

156. [795D–796A] Gregory summarizes here the beginning of the solemn discourse of Timaeus in Plato's dialogue: 'Let us state the reason why the framer of this universe of change framed it at all. He was good, and what is good has no particle of envy in it; being therefore without envy he wished all things to be as like himself as possible' (*Timaeus* 29E; tr. Desmond Lee, London 1976, p. 42).

157. [796A] Gregory skilfully combines Genesis and Timaeus. The doctrine that man is created in the image of God and after His likeness (Gen. 1,26) agrees with Plato's statement that the framer of the universe wanted all things to resemble himself as much as possible (*Timaeus* 29E), that they be as good as himself (30A).

158. [796A–B] Since the framer of the universe, as Plato says, wished 'that all things be good, and as far as possible, nothing be imperfect' (*Timaeus* 30A), the list of all the goods which have been bestowed upon human nature would be too long to enumerate. For this reason, Holy Scripture summarizes them in one statement: man was created in the image of God (Gen. 1,26). This means that every form of good and every virtue is contained in him. However, one of these gifts must be singled out, namely freedom, for without freedom, there is no virtue. And here again Gregory relies on Plato's authority: ἀρετῇ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, virtue has no master over her (*Republic* X, 617E).

159. [796B] The fundamental difference between the Model (God) and the Image (Man) lies in the fact that the former is uncreated, the latter created: see above, n. 103. That uncreated nature is immutable, while created nature is mutable, is a matter, says Gregory, of universal consensus: συνομολογείται πάντη καὶ πάντως. But the words by which he formulates this point of universal consensus – τὴν μὲν . . . ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄνευ ἀλλοιωσεως συστήναι (184C) – remind us of Plato: ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται (*Phaedo* 78D). See also *Sophist* 248A. For similar statements in Gregory of Nyssa, see M. Aubineau, *Grégoire de Nyssa. Traité de la virginité*, SC 119 (Paris, 1966), p. 396, n. 1.

160. [796C] The Latin translation – *imaginationum* (796C) for ἀντὶ χαρακτήρων (PG 44, 184D6) – makes the text almost unintelligible. I suspect that Eriugena, reading a manuscript written in Greek capitals without clearly indicated word separation, considered the two Greek words mentioned above as a compound noun (ἀντιχαρακτήρων), a genitive complement of λόγον. Hence the meaningless phrase: *secundum praesentem rationem imaginationum*. In fact, ἀντὶ χαρακτήρων means: 'instead of imprints'. Dionysius Exiguus translated: 'ita et in praesenti ratione pro figuris ea quae sunt . . . cernentes' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 205; PL 67, 374D). In the Gospel example of the coin (Matth. 22, 19–21), we considered imprints (χαρακτήρας). Now, instead of (ἀντὶ) material imprints, we consider ἐπιθεωρούμενα. This past participle, used here as a noun, appears in Plotinus: παρακολούθημα οἶον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἐκάστη οὐσίᾳ (*Enneads* VI, 6, 5, 1–2), which A. H. Armstrong translates: 'an accompaniment of each substance and something observed in it'. The opposition here is between a material thing (χαρακτήρ) and an intellectual notion (ἐπιθεωρούμενον). This last word contains two elements: a root, θεωρούμενον, indicating the mental object of speculation (θεωρία), and a prefix, ἐπί, stating that this speculation concerns only the 'surface', so to speak, of the substance, i.e. the accidents. Regarding the root, we must bear in mind that contemplation (θεωρία) is based on Holy Scripture and often equated with the spiritual interpretation of it by Alexandrine, Cappadocian and other Fathers: see G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1978), p. 649. Τὰ ἐπιθεωρούμενα τῇ τε θεῖα φύσει καὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, therefore, are the notions of divine and human nature as contemplated in the light of a spiritual interpretation of Holy Scripture. See also Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* III, i, 15 (GNO 2, p. 9, 4–6). Gregory insists on the fact that the ἐπιθεωρούμενα reveal the accidents and not the

substance: *Contra Eunomium* III, v, 60 (GNO 3, p. 182, 9–13). He sometimes stresses this point by phrases such as τῶν ἕξωθεν ἐπιθεωρουμένων: *De anima et resurrectione* (PG 46, 53D–54A; *Contra Eunomium* I, 655 (GNO 1, p. 214, 22–24); *In Ecclesiasten*, Oratio VII (GNO 5, p. 415, 2–4). Our knowledge of divine and human natures attains only to ἐπιθεωρούμενα, since we can know neither the divine nor human substance. Now, when we compare the ἐπιθεωρούμενα of the divine nature to those of the human nature, we find a likeness and a difference. And as we learn from the example of the coin, this difference lies in the subject: there uncreated, here created. See R. Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez saint Grégoire de Nysse* (Brussels–Paris, 1951), p. 26–27.

161. [796C] Both Model (God) and Image (Man) are endowed with freedom. The difference between Model and Image, we have been told, lies in the subject: there immutable, here mutable. In God freedom is rooted in His unchangeable essence, in man in a changeable one. And so, while divine freedom cannot make God lose His eternal bliss, human freedom includes the possibility for man to deviate from the state of blessedness in which he was created. This state of happiness was on a par with that of the angels. Using his freedom badly, man chose to exchange this angelic way of life for a bestial one. For this choice he himself is responsible, not God: ‘Man himself became the discoverer of evil. He did not discover an evil that would have come from God, for God did not create death (Wisdom 1,13). Man, in a way, is the creator and maker of evil’ (*On Virginity* XII, 19–22; SC 119, p. 402; PG 46, 369C; tr. V. Woods Callahan (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 43, with a few changes). As Plato said just after the passage of the *Republic* (X. 617E) quoted above (121,1): ‘God is blameless’. See also *Republic* II, 379C. But although man alone is the cause of his wrong choice, God foresaw it. And lest man, His beloved creature, be unable to complete the number of intellectual beings preordained by the divine plan, He imposed upon His own image, as a superstructure (*supermachinatus est*), a mode of reproduction appropriate to the state which man had himself chosen, namely the differentiation of sex. For this, see *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 343–364.

162. [796D] The Latin version – *ad quid destillaret per suam uirtutem suamque potentiam humanae uoluntatis motus* – does not express faithfully the thought of Gregory of Nyssa. Firstly the words *uirtus*, *potentia*, *uoluntas* are weak translations of the Greek terms ἀτοκρατές, αὐτεξούσιον (free will) and προαίρεσις (faculty of free choice). Secondly, *destillare* does not convey clearly the metaphorical meaning of the Greek verb ῥέπω. Gregory compares the human will to a balance: exercising a choice is like tipping the scale. On this metaphor see M. Harl, ‘L'image de la pesée: étude des mots ῥέπω et ῥοπή’, *Revue des Études grecques* 74 (1961), p. XIII. Concerning αὐτεξούσιον, see M. Harl, ‘Problèmes posés par l'histoire du mot τὸ αὐτεξούσιον: liberté stoïcienne et liberté chrétienne’ in *Revue des Études grecques* 73 (1960), pp. XXVII–XXVIII. Concerning προαίρεσις, see J. M. Rist, ‘Prohairesis: Proclus, Plotinus et alii’, in *De Jamblique à Proclus*, Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'Antiquité classique, Entretiens, 21 (Vandoeuvres–Genève, 1974), pp. 103–122. Instead of *destillaret* Thomas Gale (p. 189, 26) printed *inclinaret*. This is an accurate translation of ῥέπει, but it is not found in a single manuscript of the *Periphyseon*.

163. [796D] The same Latin word *super* is used by Eriugena to translate two different Greek prepositions, ὑπέρ (over, above) and ἐπί (upon). In composition ὑπέρ indicates a superiority, an abundance, something exceeding the average, e.g. ὑπερούσιος, *superessentialis*, above being. The meaning of ἐπί in compound words is quite different: it indicates an addition, something adventitious. Think, for instance, of the word ‘epiphenomenon’, meaning ‘something that appears in addition; a secondary symptom’ (OED). The verb *supermachinatus est*, by which Eriugena translates the Greek ἐπιτεχνᾶται (PG 44, 185A6), indicates that the division of sexes is something which has been added to human nature, although this division is in no way part of human nature, in so far as it has been created according to the image of God. The same idea is expressed by the past participle of the verb *superintroducere* in the Eriugena’s translation of Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* 21, Scholia 4 and 5 (CCSG 7, p. 132, 17–25). Another word used by Gregory of Nyssa to convey the adventitious quality of sexuality in the divine image (man) is that of implanting, engrafting: ἐμφύτευσας (PG 44, 189D5), *inserens* (Cappuyns, p. 237, 33; quoted in *Periphyseon* IV, 798D). Sexuality is neither bad nor superfluous. It is not bad, because it has been created by God. It is not superfluous, because it is a device for the propagation of the human race, indeed a device made necessary by man’s sin.

164. [797A] The Latin – *in mutabiliori possidet natura* – is seriously unfaithful to the Greek: τῇ ἀλογωτέρᾳ προσφκείωται φύσει (PG 44, 185A8–9). First, the verb *possidet* does not correspond perfectly to προσφκείωται: while the latter means ‘to be associated with’, the former is often understood by Eriugena as meaning *residere* (to abide, to reside). See, for instance: ‘Sanctae siquidem scripturae in omnibus sequenda est auctoritas, quoniam in ea ueluti quibusdam suis secretis sedibus ueritas possidet’ (*Periphyseon* I, 509A); ‘ubi falsitas possidet’ (*Periphyseon* IV, 826A). In another passage Eriugena gave a more correct translation of προσφκείωσθαι (PG 91, 1109D4), namely *familiaris fieri*: *Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 84 (CCSG 18, p. 46). The most serious mistake, however, is the translation *mutabiliori* (more mutable) for ἀλογωτέρᾳ (more irrational). The most likely explanation I can see for this is to suppose that Eriugena, failing to recognize in ἀλογωτέρᾳ the comparative form of ἄλογος (irrational), took it for the comparative form of ἀλλοιωτός (mutable). In fact *mutabilis* is the Eriugenan translation for ἀλλοιωτός (PG 91, 1169 C14): *Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 1280 (CCSG 18, p. 88). Dionysius Exiguus translated more correctly the phrase τῇ ἀλογωτέρᾳ προσφκείωται φύσει: ‘irrationabilis naturae propinquare uidetur’ (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 205; PL 67, 375A). Eriugena’s mistranslation makes perfect nonsense. How could Gregory of Nyssa say (PG 44, 185A8) that the distinction between male and female is a property of the mutable nature, just after he had stated (PG 44, 184C9–12) that mutability is a property of the created nature as such? (See note 159). Had not human nature sinned, it would not have had this distinction and yet would have remained mutable. In Gregory of Nyssa’s mind the division of

sexes is associated, not with mutability, but rather with irrationality, an attribute of the beasts. One must remember that in classical and patristic Greek τὰ ἄλογα means 'the beasts': Liddell-Scott, *A Greek-English Lexikon*, s.v. ἄλογος.

165. [797A] The Latin – *consequentis* – does not correspond to the Greek εἰκότων (PG 44, 185A12). The edition of Forbes mentions here the variant εἰκότων (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia I*, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 206). Now, Eriugena translates τὸ εἶδος (from εἶκος) by *consequens*: *Ambigua ad Iohannem VI*, 70 (CCSG 18, p. 46; PG 91, 1109B15). Similarly he translates the adverb εἰκότως by *consequenter*: *Ambigua ad Iohannem VI*, 172. 882. 1017. XII, 16. XVI, 21 (CCSG 18, pp. 49. 73. 78. 122. 133; PG 91, 1116A14. 1152A1. 1157C1. 1221D1. 1237B6).

166. [797A] As I said in a note appended to the Latin text, the correction introduced by Gale (p. 189, 33) and by Floss (PL 122, 797A7), i.e. *gymnasio*, must be eliminated, and the reading of the manuscripts, i.e. *gymnasia*, must be restored. The Greek word γυμνασία means *exercitatio*, according to the Glossary of Martin of Laon (MS Laon, Bibl. mun. 444, f. 279^v and 291^v; ed. E. Miller in *Notices et Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale et autres bibliothèques* 29,2 (Paris, 1880), pp. 135 and 187), and this is a correct translation. It is possible that for a certain portion of his career, Eriugena did not distinguish clearly between the feminine γυμνασία and the neuter γυμνάσιον, for in the *Annotationes in Marcianum* (152,3) we read: 'gymnasium, exercitatio' (ed. Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge, MA, 1939), p. 82, 10). In one of his poems, however, he correctly uses the neuter plural 'Attica gymnasia': *Carmina VII*, i, 6 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 547; PL 122, 1029A). Nevertheless, Eriugena read εἰ δεῖ (*si oportet*) instead of εἶδει, which prevented him from understanding the phrase γυμνασίας εἶδει (*by way of exercise*). Dionysius Exiguus translated more correctly: 'exercitii loco' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia I*, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 207; PL 67, 375B1).

167. [797A] What God created in the first creation was not an individual human being, but the fullness (πλήρωμα) of the human race. This statement is the starting point of the demonstration by which Gregory of Nyssa 'conjecturally' tries to explain how the sexual differentiation may be in agreement with the doctrine of man as an image of God. It is important, therefore, to establish this point firmly. Where could we find firmer foundations than in Holy Scripture itself? Gregory points out that in the passage on which he is commenting (Gen. 1, 26–27) no proper name is given to the human being created by God. It is only further on in the Biblical narrative (Gen. 2,16) that the name 'Adam' appears. Let us observe first that Gregory's statement is true only for the Greek text of the Bible, since in the Hebrew, the word 'Adam' is to be found also in Gen. 1,26, 27; 2,5, all passages where the Septuagint uses ἄνθρωπος. In the first chapter of Genesis, however, the Hebrew 'Adam' is no more a proper name than the Greek ἄνθρωπος. Consequently, in the phrase 'God created man in His image' (Gen. 1,27), the word 'man' – Adam in Hebrew, ἄνθρωπος in Greek – is indeterminate (ἀόριστον). By this indeterminateness Holy Scripture would have us understand that all mankind is included in man's creation. At this stage, the name given to the being which was created in God's image is not that of an individual man (οὐχ ὁ τις) but

that of the universal human nature (ἄλλ' ὁ καθόλου). An erroneous reading of Eriugena – ἄλλο instead of ἄλλ' ὁ – has resulted in the meaningless translation: 'non aliud quoddam uniuersaliter est'.

168. [797B] Eriugena's translation – *oportet enim nil deo infinitum* – is misleading here. Gregory wrote: χρῆ γὰρ θεῶ μηδὲν ἀόριστον ἐν τοῖς γεγενημένοις παρ αὐτοῦ νομίζειν (PG 44, 185B10–11), 'one must consider that for God no thing is indeterminate among the things which came into being from Him'. For as Gregory says, perhaps alluding to the Book of Wisdom (11,20), the Wisdom of the Creator gave to every being its measure and its limits. This point is important to remember if we wish to understand the reasoning of Gregory. Dionysius Exiguus' translation of this passage is more accurate: 'Oportet enim deo nichil indefinitum in his quae ab eo creata sunt aestimare, sed singulis eorum quae sunt esse modum certissimum creatoris sapientia terminatum' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia I*, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 207; PL 67, 375B).

169. [797C] The Latin – *post uniuersitatis consummationem* – suggests that Eriugena used a Greek manuscript in which he read μετὰ for *post*, as in the editions of Loewenklau (Basle 1567, p. 176) and of Forbes (Burntisland 1855, p. 208), and not κατά, as in the editions of Morel (Paris 1638, p. 89A) and of PG 44, 185C15. See M. Naldini, 'Per una esegesi del *De hominis opificio* di Gregorio Nisseno (cap. V et XVI)' in *Studi italiani di filologia classica*, nuova serie 45 (1973), p. 121, n. 4.

170. [797C] When we read that God created man in His image, by 'man' we must understand: not a single individual. Adam is not a proper name; Adam means the whole human race. It is the whole human race in its fullness (πλήρωμα: PG 44, 185C) that is created in the image of God. See R. Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez saint Grégoire de Nyse* (Brussels–Paris, 1951), pp. 78–88. E. Corsini, 'Plérôme humain et plérôme cosmique chez Grégoire de Nyse', in *Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nyse. Actes du Colloque de Chevetogne (22–26 septembre 1969)*, ed. M. Harl (Leiden, 1971), pp. 111–126. P. Chrestou, 'Τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πλήρωμα κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ Γρηγορίου Νύσσης' in *Κληρονομία* 4 (1972), pp. 41–62.

171. [797D] The fourth version has 'the glory' (*gloria*), while the earlier versions had 'the grace' (*gratia*), which is a more accurate translation of the Greek: χάρις (PG 44, 188C11). It is possible that *gloria* was substituted for *gratia* when the introductory words (*Et ne mireris . . . agimus gratia*) which are lacking in the earlier versions were added. The motive for this substitution, probably merely rhetorical, may have been to avoid the repetition of *gratia*. In any case, the general meaning of the sentence is not affected by this substitution. What Gregory sets forth here – perhaps with some rhetorical effect: ἀνάστασις (resurrection) 'equals' ἀποκατάστασις (restoration) – is the logical principle upon which the following demonstration is based: the resurrection promised us will be nothing other than the restoration of humanity's primordial status. Therefore, if we knew what the status of man will be after the resurrection, we would know also what it was before sin, or what it would have been, had man not sinned. Now we know what the life of risen humanity is: 'They are like angels (ισάγγελοι); they are sons of God, being sons of the

resurrection' (Luke 20,36). Consequently, we know what man's status would have been, had man not sinned.

172. [798A] The editions of the Greek text read as follows: δῆλον ὅτι [*variant*: δηλονότι] ὁ πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως βλος ἀγγελικός τις ἦν (ed. Johann Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 182; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 90C; ed. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 210; PG 44, 188D2–3), i.e. 'Life before the transgression was a kind of angelic life'. The translation which we find in the *Periphyseon* – *profecto ante ruinam angelus quidam erat* – indicates that the Greek manuscript used by Eriugena offered a different text, very similar to what we read in the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 165^v: δῆλον ὅτι πρὸ τῆς καταπτώσεως ὡς ἄγγελός τις ἦν. Therefore Eriugena read καταπτώσεως (*ruinam*, 'fall') instead of παραβάσεως (*praeuaticationem*, 'transgression') and ὡς ἄγγελός τις ('like an angel') instead of βλος ἀγγελικός τις ('a kind of angelic life'). His version agrees with that of Dionysius Exiguus: 'Homo ante ruinam quidam angelus habebatur' (ed. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 211; PL 67, 376C9–10).

173. [798A] The Latin translation is seriously defective here. First, the conditional particle ἂν (PG 44, 189A6) is translated *fortassis* (perhaps). This is what Eriugena generally does: see G. Théry, 'Scot Érigène traducteur de Denys' in *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 6 (1931), p. 235. In the present passage, however, the adverb *fortassis* introduces into the Latin a nuance of uncertainty which is not to be found in the Greek. More important, Eriugena read κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ('according to the same man') instead of κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ('in the same way'). In fact, what Gregory says is: 'Therefore (οὐκοῦν) in the same way (as with the angels), if no turning away, no deviation from our honourable state of equality with the angels had resulted from sin, we ourselves should have had no need of marriage in order to multiply' (PG 44, 189A). Eriugena may have some excuse for reading κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον instead of κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, if his Greek exemplar contained the variant which we find in the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 165^v: οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν τρόπον. See *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 210.

174. [798B] The active voice of the verb (*coartat*) suggests that Eriugena read στενοχωρεῖ, a variant to be found in some manuscripts: see *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 212. The version of Dionysius Exiguus contains also the active voice: *coarctet* (ed. G. H. Forbes, p. 213; PL 67, 376D10). In the editions of the Greek text, however, we read στενοχωρεῖται (ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 182; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 90D; PG 44, 189A13). Hence Thomas Gale (p. 190, 11) corrected the translation of Eriugena and wrote: *coarctatur*.

175. [798B] Gregory's demonstration proceeds *more geometrico*. Its starting point is the theory – 'theorem' (θεώρημα: PG 44, 189C3) – previously established, namely that nothing must be left undetermined in the wisdom of the Creator. When God, to Whom everything is present, creates the fullness (πλήρωμα) of the human race, He determines at the same time the number of souls which will fulfil this plenitude (PG 44, 189C). But since He foresees that man will fall from the high estate which made him equal to the angels, and therefore, be deprived of the angelic way of propagation, He anticipates

man's fall and implants in him the mode of propagation appropriate to the new estate that man would choose.

176. [798C] The variant *bonam uoluntatem*, which we find in several manuscripts as well as in the editions of Gale (p. 190, 25) and of Floss (PL 122, 798C8), is a mistake. Gregory of Nyssa does not speak of 'good will' here, but of a will that does not go directly (μὴ εὐθυποροῦσαν, *non recte euntem*) to the good (πρὸς τὸ καλόν, *ad bonum*). Elsewhere Eriugena translates the verb εὐθυπορεῖν by *recte iter agere*, and the noun εὐθυπορία by *rectum iter*: Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* VI, 423. XXXVIII, 279 (CCSG 18, pp. 58. 196; PG 91, 1128C11. 1329A10).

177. [798C] Gregory of Nyssa speaks of 'those who had fallen into sin': τοῖς εἰς ἁμαρτίαν κατολισθήσασιν (PG 44, 180D2). Eriugena seems to have had some difficulty in grasping the meaning of the verb κατολισθάνω/κατολισθαίνω (*to slip, to sink down*). His translation – *in peccatum annullatis* – is less accurate than that of Dionysius Exiguus: 'his qui peccato laberentur' (ed. G. H. Forbes, p. 213; PL 67, 377B10). Gale (p. 190, 27) corrected Eriugena's translation and wrote: 'in peccatum lapsis'.

178. [798D–799A] The move from his angelic status to a bestial one was man's free choice. The implanting in him of sexuality, a device appropriate to his new status has been God's providential decision. Sexuality, therefore, is not bad, for it has been created by God and serves God's design concerning the number of souls predetermined in the πλήρωμα. But it is not as good as would have been the angelic mode of multiplication. God is blameless; as for man, he is more to be pitied than to be blamed because of his wretchedness. According to Gregory this is how we must understand Psalm 48,13. The Greek text says that the mode of generation which man received in consequence of the fall is *transitory, subject to flux* (τὴν ῥοώδη ταύτην γένεσιν): ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 186; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 91D; ed. G. H. Forbes, p. 214; PG 44, 189D12–1192A1. The translation of Eriugena – *animalem generationem* – agrees with that of Dionysius Exiguus: *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 215; PL 67, 377C5. Both Dionysius and Eriugena seem to have used a Greek exemplar in which, instead of ῥοώδη (*fluxilem*), they read ζφώδη (*animalem*), a variant mentioned by Forbes in his edition (*op. cit.*, p. 214).

179. [799C] These many questions emerging on all sides bring to mind the many memories by which Augustine is beset: 'Quaedam cateruatim se prouunt et, dum aliud petitur et aliud quaeritur, prosiliunt in medium quasi dicentia: Ne forte nos sumus?' (*Confessiones* X, viii, 12, 10–12; CCSL 27, p. 161; PL 32, 784).

180. [799C] Before approaching a new question, and in order to arouse the curiosity of his reader, Eriugena takes pleasure in stressing its importance. A question may be 'non spernenda': *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxxiii, 1 (SC 180, p. 188; PL 122, 313A); *Expositiones in Hier. Cael.* IX, 129 (CCCM 31, p. 137; PL 122, 211B); *Periphyseon* III, 611A. It may be considered also as 'non parua' (*Periphyseon* I, 485A. IV, 791A. V, 961D), 'non otiosa' (*Periphyseon* IV, 824C), 'non ex superfluo interposita' (*Periphyseon* IV, 800B), 'diligenti consideratione inuestiganda' (*Periphyseon* V, 885C), etc. The phrase 'impetum facit' may be a

reminiscence of Augustine: *Sermo 153* II, 3 (PL 38, 826); *Contra litteras Petilianae* III, xxi, 24 (CSEL 52, p. 180, 17–18; PL 43, 359).

181. [801A] Having said that the form (τὸ εἶδος) remains the same under the various changes which our body undergoes, Gregory of Nyssa sets aside the change that happens owing to illness: 'We must except from this statement (ὑπεξαίρεσθω δὲ τοῦ λόγου) the change which happens to the form as the result of disease' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 418). Eriugena, however, understood τοῦ λόγου as referring to the Word of God. The gloss *deum uidelicet*, which explains *uerbum*, was added by *i*¹ above the line in *R* (f. 311^v).

182. [801B] The Latin *facies* is too vague, for the Greek says: προσωπεῖον (*a mask*). On the other hand, the phrase 'per *informatem* deformitas' is nonsensical. In the full text of Eriugena's translation, as published by Cappuyns, we read: 'per *infirmatē* deformitas' (ἡ κατὰ τὴν νόσον ἀμορφία). Thus we must understand that 'the deformity of sickness takes possession of the form like some strange mask'.

183. [801B] The word *uerbum* was added by *i*¹ in *R* (f. 311^v) over an erasure. It is unlikely that the Greek τῷ λόγῳ refers to the Word of God. The phrase ἡς τῷ λόγῳ περιαιρεθείσης (PG 44, 228A1) has been translated as follows: 'Quam si ei cogitando adimamus' (ed. J. Loewenklaus (Basel, 1567), p. 263; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 117D; PG 44, 227A). Jean Laplace interprets τῷ λόγῳ as meaning: 'par la pensée' (SC 6, p. 212), as does J.-Y. Guillaumin: *Grégoire de Nysse. La création de l'homme*, Series 'Pères dans la foi' (Bar-le-Duc, 1982), p. 144. On the contrary the editors of the English translation quoted in previous notes comment: 'The word, that is of the Prophet, or of the Saviour, as in the cases cited' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 418, n. 4).

184. [801B] Once again the full text of Eriugena's translation, as published by Cappuyns, proves to be better than that of the *Periphyseon*. In the latter we read: *obscurata* . . . *facies*, and in the former: *occultata* . . . *species*, which is a more accurate translation of the Greek: τὸ κεκρυμμένον . . . εἶδος (PG 44, 228A3). In manuscript *R* (f. 311^v) the word *obscurata* has been written by *i*¹ over an erasure.

185. [801B] The thought of Gregory of Nyssa is hardly recognizable in the Latin version. First, the verb προσφύεται means 'to be attached to, to hang upon', and not 'to be inserted in' (*inseritur*). Eriugena may have confused προσφύεται with a derivative form of ἐμφυτεύω ('to implant, to engraft'), a verb which he translates rightly by *inserere*: PG 44, 189D5; ed. Cappuyns, p. 237, 33. Secondly, he did not realize that τῷ θεοειδεῖ is the complement of προσφύεται. Hence the dative *animae* was added in the last version of the *Periphyseon* as a complement to *inseritur*. The noun *corpus* is an intelligent gloss explaining the adjective *fluxile* (τὸ ῥέον) taken substantively. Finally we may observe that the Greek exemplar translated by Eriugena probably read τοῦτο (ed. G. H. Forbes, p. 272) instead of τούτῳ (PG 44, 228A13). An English version of the Greek text could be: 'It is not that which is subject to flux and change by way of alteration, but this stable and unalterable element in

our composition that is allied to the element of our soul which bears the likeness of God' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 418, with a few changes).

186. [801D] Eriugena is alluding here to a theory which he found in Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 24 (PG 44, 212D–213C; ed. M. Cappuyns, pp. 245–246; quoted in *Periphyseon* I, 502B–503A). According to this theory, matter (ὕλη) results entirely from qualities (ποιότητες), such as colour, weight, etc., each of which is in itself immaterial (ἄϋλον) and spiritual (νοητόν). The concurrence (συνδρομή) of these immaterial qualities gives birth (ἀποτίσκει) to matter. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée. Essai sur la philosophie religieuse de Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris 1942; reprinted 1988), pp. 20–23.

187. [801D] Eriugena deals with the qualitative forms in *Periphyseon* I (495B–496B) and III (701C–702B).

188. [802A] The word *signaculum* added after *uestimentum* does not belong to the earlier versions. It is absent from the *Clavis Physicae* 273, 7 (ed. P. Lucentini, p. 221) as well. Actually *signaculum* is the Latin word used by Eriugena to translate the Greek σφραγίς (seal): Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 27 (PG 44, 228B6. B7; ed. M. Cappuyns, p. 251, 22. 23). In 802D we are told that *signaculum* stands for exterior body: 'The exterior and material body is the seal of the interior body'. One can easily imagine how the word *signaculum* might first have been written in a manuscript above the word *uestimentum* as a gloss, and in a later stage of the manuscript tradition was introduced into the text.

189. [802A] Eriugena may have thought here of the Book of Wisdom (11,24): 'For thou lovest all things that exist and hast loathing for none of the things which thou hast made', or of the Second Letter of Peter (3,9): 'The Lord is . . . not wishing that any should perish'. The doctrine here alluded to was that of Origen as well: 'To this end the Creator made all things that they should be, and those things that were made in order that they should be cannot not be' (*De Principiis* III, vi, 5; GCS 22, p. 287, 4–5; PG 11, 338B; quoted in *Periphyseon* V, 930C).

190. [803A] 'That is not true which does not eternally abide'. In his Homily on the Prologue to St John's Gospel Eriugena declares: 'Where there is question of immutable truth alone, there one must think of eternity alone' (*Vox spiritualis* VI, 12–14 (SC 151, p. 228; PL 122, 286B; J. J. O'Meara, *Eriugena* (Oxford, 1988), p. 162). By these concise formulas Eriugena neatly summarizes a doctrine which has an unquestionably Augustinian flavour. Augustine holds that Truth and Eternity are one and the same, i.e. God Himself: 'O aeterna ueritas et uera caritas et cara aeternitas, tu es deus meus' (*Confessions* VII, 10; CSEL 33, p. 157, 16–17; PL 32, 742). According to him such an equation – Truth = Eternity – is supported by Plato's *Timaeus* (29C), as translated by Cicero: 'Quantum enim ad id quod ortum est aeternitas ualet, tantum ad fidem ueritas' (*Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum*, ed. F. G. A. Mullach, vol. 2 (Paris, 1881), p. 158B; quoted in *De consensu euangelistarum* I, xxxv, 53, PL 34, 1070). See W. Beierwaltes, *Deus est Veritas. Zur Rezeption des griechischen Wahrheitsbegriffes in der*

frühchristlichen Theologie', in *Pietas. Festschrift für Bernhard Kötting*, ed. E. Dassmann-K. Suso Frank (Münster im Westfalen, 1980), pp. 15–29.

191. [803A] Goulven Madec admits that the theme is certainly Augustinian, but says that it is difficult to point out with certainty the actual text quoted by Eriugena here. However, he mentions the following passages in Augustine's works: *De uera religione* XLIX, 97 (CCSL 32, p. 250, 61–67; PL 34, 165), *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* xxxviii, 10 (CCSL 36, p. 343, 21–22; PL 35, 1680), *Sermones* VI, iii, 4. VII, 7. CXIX, i, 1 (PL 38, 61. 66. 673). See G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs. Annotations érigéniennes* (Paris, 1988), p. 118.

192. [803B] According to G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs. Annotations érigéniennes* (Paris, 1988), p. 118, this is an overstatement of the disciple. In addition to the first book of the *On the Baptism of Young Children* (i.e. *De peccatorum meritis* I, ii, 2–iii, 3; CSEL 60, pp. 4, 3–5, 20; PL 44, 109–111) here quoted (803B–804B), one could mention also: *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, xix, 30–xxviii, 39 (CSEL 28,1, pp. 192, 27–200, 9; PL 34, 351–356); *De ciuitate Dei* XIII, xxi–xxiii. xxiv, 6 (CCSL 48, pp. 404–408, 412–413; PL 41, 394–397, 402–403).

193. [804A] The word *praeceptis* (to his precepts) is not found in the earlier versions (manuscripts *HMR*). Its addition in the last version is more probably the result of a gratuitous correction than that of a critical examination of the manuscript tradition.

194. [804A] The conjunction *et* between *hoc* and *mortale* is absent from the earlier versions (manuscripts *HMR*). In fact, the Maurists responsible for the edition of the *De peccatorum meritis* mention that four excellent manuscripts read: *animale hoc mortale habens corpus* (PL 44, 111, n. 1), which agrees with the earlier versions of the *Periphyseon*.

195. [804C] See J. J. O'Meara, *The Creation of Man in St. Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram*, 'The Saint Augustine Lecture Series' (Augustinian Institute, Villanova University, 1980).

196. [804C–D] 'The Theologian' is the title usually given by the Greeks to Gregory Nazianzen. Here, however, Eriugena obviously means Gregory of Nyssa. Such a confusion occurs several times from Book III to Book V of the *Periphyseon*: M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Érigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain–Paris, 1933), pp. 176–178. The starting point of this confusion could be a misinterpretation of two passages of Cassiodorus' *Historia Tripartita* copied by i^2 in manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Lat. 14088, f. 1^r. In the first passage (VIII, 8) Gregory Nazianzen appears to be the brother of St. Basil: 'Fuit ergo Gregorius antiquus iste discipulus Origenis, et alter Nazianzenus (*sic*) fraterque Basilii' (CSEL 71, p. 480, 45–48; PL 69, 1116B). This is a poor translation, for the Greek text says clearly: 'To summarize, there were three Gregoryses: the older one who was a disciple of Origen, the Nazianzen, and the brother of Basil' (Socrates Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastica Historia* IV, xxvii, 7–8, ed. R. Hussey (Oxford, 1853), pp. 545–546). In the second passage (IX, 13) the brother of Basil is said to be Gregory of Nyssa: 'Gregorio Nyseno Basillique germano' (CSEL 71, p. 509, 27; PL 69 1129D). Hence the reader could conclude that the brother of St. Basil was sometimes called Gregory of Nyssa, sometimes Gregory Nazianzen. The fact that i^2 , who belonged to the circle of Eriugena, put together these two different passages seems to indicate

that the *Historia Tripartita* may have been the cause of the unfortunate confusion between Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory Nazianzen which one finds in the *Periphyseon*.

197. [804C–D] Concerning this passage, in which Eriugena ingenuously confesses his embarrassment when faced with a lack of agreement between two great authorities, his eagerness to follow Gregory of Nyssa, and yet his reluctance to disagree with Augustine, see J. J. O'Meara, 'Magnorum Virorum Quendam Consensum Velimus Machinari' (804D). Eriugena's Use of Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* in the *Periphyseon*, in *Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen*, Vorträge des III. Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums. Freiburg im Breisgau, 27.–30. August 1979, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1980), pp. 105–116.

198. [805B] The words 'namely, concupiscence and joy, fear and grief', are not part of the text of Augustine quoted here. Nevertheless, the names of these four basic passions (*affectus*, πάθη) of the human soul are traditional: von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III, 377–420. Their list is to be found in Augustine himself: 'illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem, timorem, laetitiam, tristitiam' (*De ciuitate dei* XIV, iii, 27–28; CCSL 48, p. 417; PL 41, 406). According to the Stoics, the blessed life is necessarily free from every passion: von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III, 443–455. Consequently the bliss which the first human creatures enjoyed in paradise could not but exclude the four basic passions listed by Augustine.

199. [805C] As Goulven Madec rightly observed (*Jean Scot et ses auteurs* . . . , p. 119) the negative *non* before the verb *adipisceretur* is an erroneous addition. It is absent from the original version of *R*, and was added later above the line by i^1 .

200. [806A] Goulven Madec (*Jean Scot et ses auteurs* . . . , p. 119) pointed out that the text of Augustine quoted here is certainly defective, for it reads: 'certa securitas peccatorum neminemque moriturum' (*a firm security from sin, and that no one would die*). The modern editions of Augustine read differently: 'certa securitas peccatorum neminem, neminemque moriturum' (*a firm guarantee that no one would sin, and that no one would die*). See *De ciuitate dei* XIV, x, 36–37 (CCSL 48, p. 431; PL 41, 417).

201. [806C] The last words of Augustine's quotation – *infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris* – seem to be reminiscent of Virgil: 'Coniugis infusus gremio' (*Aeneid* VIII, 406).

202. [806D] Perhaps there is a touch of irony, if not of sarcasm, in this conclusion. See *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 332–334.

203. [807B] Augustine interprets this Biblical verse (Jn 5, 17) in the same way: *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, x–xii, 20–23 (CSEL 28,1, pp. 106–110; PL 34, 303–305).

204. [807B] One of the premisses of this enthymeme is borrowed from Ecclesiasticus (18,1): 'Qui uiuit in aeternum creauit omnia simul'.

205. [807C] See note 4.

206. [808A] Eriugena refers here to the *Ambigua ad Iohannem* (CCSG 18), in which Maximus comments, not on Gregory of Nyssa, but on Gregory Nazianzen. See note 196.

207. [808B] The word *consequentia* may be either feminine singular or neuter plural. In the present passage it changes gender and number according to the various versions of the *Periphyseon*. In the last we read: 'Et consequentia peccati praecesserunt . . .', while the earlier versions (*HMR*) have: 'Et consequentia peccati praecesserunt . . .'. The *Clavis Physicae* (276, 11; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 224) agrees with the earlier versions. The context seems to favour the neuter plural: 'peccati consequentia in homine et cum homine simul concreauit', 'haec autem sunt consequentia peccati' (807C), 'eorum consequentia facta sunt . . . Consequentia autem dico dilectionem et odium' (808B).

208. [809A] The Latin grammarians distinguished three classes in the past tense of verbs: pluperfect (*uixerat*), perfect (*uixit*), imperfect (*uiuēbat*). The latter is called 'inceptive' (*inchoatiua*) according to Charisius, Diomedes, Probus (H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini* I, pp. 168, 9–12. 336, 12–15; IV, p. 159, 39–40), Sedulius Scottus, *In Donati Artem Maiorem* II (CCCM 40B, p. 227, 49–58), etc. See B. Löfstedt, *Der hibernolateinische Grammatiker Malsachanus* (Uppsala, 1965), p. 208, 1–7.

209. [809A–B] According to the editions of Gale (p. 196, 8) and Floss (PL 122, 809A15–B1) the last sentence of Augustine's quotation reads: 'Non enim scriptura tempus expressit, quantum interfuerit temporis . . .'. The last word (*temporis*) does not appear in Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* IX, iv, 8 (CSEL 28,1, p. 272, 25–26; PL 34, 396), and rightly so, for the repetition *tempus . . . temporis* is a mistake, or at least clumsy, and can hardly be attributed to as great a stylist as Augustine. In fact the word *temporis* does not appear in the *Periphyseon* itself, neither in its last version (*FJP*) nor in the genuine text of its first version (*R*); it appears in *M* (p. 161b) and *H* (f. 91^r) only. A close examination of *R* (f. 319^r) allows us to understand how it was wrongly introduced there. The responsibility seems to lie with *i*², who may have been led to place the word here by a comparison with what Eriugena writes in 810C: 'praesertim cum nulla auctoritas uel diuina uel humana tradiderit quantum temporis in paradiso, priusquam peccaret, feliciter uixerit'.

Folio 319^r of *R* is the first folio of quire 41, a quire which shows a change in the layout of the page: while quires 39 (a quaternion) and 40 (a binion) have eighteen lines a page (except folio 314^r which has seventeen lines only), quires 41–43 have twenty lines a page. According to the original version the first line of folio 319^r reads as follows: 'Haec enim species praeteriti ab his qui uerborum significationes acute perspiciunt . . .'. Later on, *i*¹ supplied the noun *temporis* in the upper margin. After this addition the line reads: 'Haec enim species praeteriti temporis ab his qui . . .'. Another more substantial addition was made – no doubt under the author's editorship – by two scribes, in Caroline minuscule, the first of whom wrote the extract from the *De Genesi ad litteram* of Augustine (*Quod etiam . . . natum Cain*) in the upper margin, and the second the acerbic comment on it (*Fuisse autem . . . qui potest*) partly in the upper margin and partly in the right. Finally *i*² added a mark to indicate that the word *temporis* (written by *i*¹) was to be placed after the verb *interfuerit*. This mark explains how the word *temporis* was introduced after *interfuerit* in *M* and in *H*. Nevertheless, these two manuscripts read *species praeteriti temporis*, and not, with the original version of *R*, *species praeteriti*.

210. [810A] 'Neque enim cecidit si talis est factus' is the correct reading, based on the manuscripts *FJPR*. The reading 'sed talis est factus', which appears in *H* and *M* only, has been chosen by Gale (p. 196, 33) and by Floss (PL 122, 810A5). Willemien Otten has pointed out that this erroneous choice led some commentators to believe that both Augustine and Eriugena held that the devil was created evil. See on this W. Otten, *The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena* (Leiden, 1991), p. 148, n. 44.

211. [810A] While the last version (*FJP*) has *praescientia* (foreknowledge), the earlier versions have *sapientia* (wisdom), which is the reading of Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, xxiii, 30 (CSEL 28,1, p. 355, 20; PL 34, 441). The *Clavis Physicae* (277, 11; ed. P. Lucentini p. 226) agrees with the earlier versions.

212. [810B] Concerning the things that 'in the divine dispensation' are eternally made, cf. *Periphyseon* III, 640B–D, where Eriugena is indebted both to Augustine and to Bede. See G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988), pp. 68–69, and B. Stock, 'In search of Eriugena's Augustine' in *Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen*, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1980), pp. 86–92.

213. [810D] For this development Eriugena is indebted to Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, xvi, 21. xix, 25. xxiii, 30 (CSEL 28,1, pp. 348, 20–349, 13. 352, 15–17. 355, 10–356, 4; PL 34, 437. 439. 441).

214. [811C] According to a traditional interpretation, Jericho signifies 'moon'. Because of its constantly changing phases the moon is a symbol of failing (*defectus*) and instability. It is perhaps not out of place to notice a difference between the earlier versions and the last one here. Though minor in appearance, this difference may be significant for a study of the transmission of the text. While in the earlier versions (*HMR*) and in the *Clavis Physicae* (279, 18; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 228) we find a preposition (*in*) before *instabilitatemque*, we find none in the last version (*FJP*). The text of the earlier versions, however, is the result of a correction made by *i*², who seems to have read the original version of *R* as follows: 'in defectum in stabilitatemque'. Thus he thought it necessary to add a second *in* above the line and before *stabilitatemque*.

215. [811C] While the last versions say that man 'had abused' (*abusus*) the natural goods, the earlier versions and the *Clavis Physicae* (279, 20; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 228) say that he 'was despoiled' (*spoliatus*) of these goods.

216. [812B] The reading *bonam uoluntatem*, which is the reading of *M*, is a mistake. It was reproduced by Gale (p. 197, 46). Floss, who had followed Gale in 798C, was better inspired in the present passage, where he chose *bonum* in preference to *bonam* (PL 122, 812B3). As I have said before (note 176), Gregory of Nyssa does not speak of 'good will' here, but of a will that does not go directly (*μη εὐθυποροῦσαν, non recte euntem*) to the good (*πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ad bonum*).

217. [812B] Concerning the Latin translation *in peccatum annullatis*, see above, note 177. In this present passage also Gale (p. 197, 49) corrected the manuscripts and wrote: *in peccatum lapsis*.

218. [812C] It has been explained (note 196) how Eriugena was led to confuse Gregory of Nyssa with Gregory Nazianzen, also called Gregory the Theologian. Whereas he knew Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* directly, the works of Gregory the Theologian were accessible to him mainly through

extracts quoted by Maximus the Confessor. In the present passage, Eriugena alludes to Gregory Nazianzen's 'Sermon On Baptism' (*Oratio 40*, 2; PG 36, 360C–361A), quoted by Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem XXXVIII*, 1–10 (CCSG 18, p. 187; PG 91, 1316A–B).

219. [813B] According to an allegorical interpretation of Genesis, for which Eriugena is indebted to St. Ambrose, the man (Adam) represents the intellect (δ νοῦς, *masculine*), and the woman (Eve) the sense (η αἰσθησις, *feminine*). See below, 815C–D.

220. [814A] Concerning Eriugena's attitude towards the authority of the Fathers of the Church, see G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988), pp. 16–17.

221. [814B] That prudence and caution are important in the search for truth is a recurring theme in Eriugena. See *Études érigéniennes*, pp. 275–283 (*La prudence et la lenteur*).

222. [814C] The correct reading is *colubrum*, not *coluber*: see G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988), p. 121. The *Clavis Physicae* (282,7; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 230) does not reproduce word for word the passage of the *De ciuitate dei* quoted here by Eriugena, but gives a summary of it: 'inter quae etiam coluber . . . erat'.

223. [815C] Although the allegorical interpretation of the categories of male and female can be found in Origen, modern historians think that St. Ambrose is more likely to be indebted to Philo for this interpretation: 'In us Mind corresponds to Man, the Senses to Woman' (Philo of Alexandria, *De opificio mundi* 165, ed. L. Cohn in *Philonis Alexandrini Opera*, ed. Cohn-Wendland I (Berlin, 1896), p. 57, 14–15; translation F. H. Colson and G. H. Withaker (London, 1929), p. 131). See R. A. Baer, *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female*, Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums III (Leiden, 1970); H. Savon, *Saint Ambroise devant l'exégèse de Philon le Juif* (Paris, 1977), vol. 1, p. 26 and vol. 2, p. 23, n. 4.

224. [815C] In substituting *uoluntatem* (which is the reading of the manuscripts) with *uoluptatem* Gale (p. 199, 43) and Floss (PL 122, 815C5) made an intelligent correction, because Philo, whom Ambrose is following here, claims that the senses (α ισθησεις) are to pleasure (η δονή) what panders (μ αστροποι) are to the courtesan: Philo, *De opificio mundi* 166, ed. L. Cohn, in *Philonis Alexandrini Opera*, ed. Cohn-Wendland I, Berlin 1896, p. 58; translation F. H. Colson and G. H. Withaker, London 1929, p. 131. Moreover, *uoluptatem* is what we read in Ambrose himself (CSEL 32,1, p. 271, 9). Nevertheless, I have kept *uoluntatem* in my edition, because this erroneous reading may have appeared in the copy of the *De paradiso* used by Eriugena. However, by correcting the patristic texts quoted in the *Periphyseon* Gale made it impossible for the reader to retrace the manuscripts of these texts which were available to the author. See E. Jeauneau, 'Le *De paradiso* d'Ambroise dans le livre IV du Periphyseon', in COΦIHC MAHTOPEC. *Hommage à Jean Pépin* (Paris, 1992), pp. 561–571.

225. [818A–B] See Eriugena's *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, vi, 52–60 (SC 180, pp. 360–361, 397–402; PL 122, 346C–D).

226. [818C–D] 'And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them' (Gen. 3,21). Concerning the allegorical

interpretation of the garments of skins see J. Pépin, *La tradition de l'allégorie de Philon d'Alexandrie à Dante*. II. *Études historiques* (Paris, 1987), pp. 146–165. Jean Pépin points out that the opinion of Origen on the garments of skins was probably less categorical than Eriugena maintains. Similarly it is an exaggeration to claim that 'almost all authors, Greek and Latin, follow Origen in his theory of the tunics of skin'. In fact, Pierre-Daniel Huet, bishop of Avranches, listed several authors, both Greek and Latin, who strongly opposed Origen's interpretation: *Origeniana*, lib. II, cap. ii, quaestio 12, 8 (*Origenis in Sacras Scripturas Commentaria . . . Pars Prior* (Rothomagi, 1668), p. 168; PG 17, 1057D–1059B). It is interesting to compare the present passage with *Periphyseon* II, 583B–584D.

227. [819A] Eriugena translated ἴσως ('perhaps') in various ways: *aequaliter*, *aeque*, *utique*, *fortassis*, *recte*. We find examples of these various renderings in his translation of Maximus the Confessor's *Ambigua ad Iohannem*: ἴσως is translated *aeque* in IV, 35, 53, VI, 190, 205 (CCSG 18, pp. 43, 50; PG 91, 1104 C12, 1105A15, 116C11, 1117A4); *aequaliter* in VI, 730 (CCSG 18, p. 68; PG 91, 1144A11); *utique* in III, 131 and VI, 1902 (CCSG 18, pp. 25 and 109; PG 91, 1076A11 and 1204A2); *fortassis* in VI, 1160 (CCSG 18, p. 83; PG 91, 1164D4); *recte*, in VI, 514, 694 (CCSG 18, pp. 61, 67; PG 91, 1132D10, 1141B4). In the present passage (PG 44, 196C) the translation *recte* for ἴσως is particularly unfortunate. As a matter of fact, chapter 20[19] of the *De imagine* is a refutation of the opinion mentioned in the title: 'Against those who say that the enjoyment of the good things we hope for will consist again in meat and drink'. Since the first sentence of this chapter states precisely the proposition which is to be refuted, it is clear that, in this context, the adverb ἴσως cannot mean 'rightly', but only 'perhaps'. Here is an English version of the first sentence: 'But someone perhaps will say that man will not be returning to the same form of life, if, as it seems, we formerly existed by eating, and shall hereafter be free from that function' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V: *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 409).

228. [819B] For Eriugena, the Biblical phrase *omne lignum* ($\pi\alpha\nu$ ξύλον) means either 'the tree called *Every*' or 'the tree called *All*'. John J. O'Meara preferred the latter, Peter Dronke the former: 'Eriugena's Earthly Paradise', *Begriff und Metapher. Vorträge des VII Internationalen Eriugena-Colloquiums*, ed. W. Beierwaltes (Heidelberg, 1990), pp. 213–229.

229. [819C] Those who say that in the garden of Eden man needed a material food in order to subsist could adduce in support of their opinion the order God gave to man: 'Eat food from all tree ($\pi\alpha\nu$ ξύλον) in Paradise' (Gen. 2,16). Gregory of Nyssa dismisses this argument as irrelevant. Indeed, the food which man is ordered to eat is not a material, but a spiritual one. Consequently the tree from which this food is collected is not material either. The adjective $\pi\alpha\nu$ (*omne*, 'all') has to be taken as the proper name of this tree. In order to help the reader grasp this particular interpretation of Gen. 2,16, I have introduced inverted commas in the Latin text: '*omne*' *lignum* means the tree called 'All', the 'All-tree'. On the other hand, the choice of the gerund *sanando* to translate ὑγιαίνωσ (*'healthily'*) shows that Eriugena confused this

Greek adverb with some form of a verb like ὑγιαίνω or ὑγιαίνω. Hence his awkward translation: *sanando esurienti* instead of *salubriter esurienti*.

230. [819C] The Latin version – *lex naturae* – does not correspond to the standard Greek text: ὁ λόγος (ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 198; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 96A; PG 44, 197A1). The word *naturae* is a gloss, which appears only in the last version of the *Periphyseon*. The reading *lex*, however, shows that Eriugena was using a Greek manuscript in which he read ὁ νόμος and not ὁ λόγος: see *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia I*, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), pp. 222–223. The Greek exemplar used by Dionysius Exiguus also contained ὁ νόμος: ‘Quis dabit ei qui salubriter esurit lignum illud quod est in paradiso, quod omne bonum prorsus amplectitur, cui nomen est omne, cuius participationem lex homini tribuit?’ (ed. Forbes, p. 223; PL 67, 380A).

231. [819C] The Latin version is misleading here. The Latin *ratione* is inadequate to render the Greek λόγος. Eriugena was well aware that λόγος may be translated by various Latin words – *uerbum, ratio, causa, sermo* – which he enumerates in *Periphyseon III*, 642A–D. Nevertheless, he was not always successful in deciding which one of these words suited the context. We have seen above (note 181) that he could translate λόγος by *uerbum* (meaning the Word of God) where the Greek text speaks only of ‘the present statement’. In another passage, however, he used the word *ratio* (meaning ‘human reason’), where the Greek text speaks of the Word of God: *Ambigua ad Iohannem VI*, 910 (CCSG 18, p. 74; PG 91, 1152C). In the present passage, Gregory of Nyssa observes that the word πᾶν, which is a general term (γενικὸς λόγος), means ‘every form of good thing’. Moreover Eriugena failed to understand that an adverb with ἔχειν is often used for an adjective with the verb ‘to be’ (H. W. Smyth–G. M. Messing, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, MA, 1964), 1438). Hence the awkward translation: *apud seipsam connaturaliter habet* for πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συμφυῶς ἔχει. This Greek phrase was translated by Dionysius Exiguus as follows: ‘sibi cognata [variant: cognita] est’ (ed. Forbes, p. 223; PL 67, 380A).

232. [819C] The Greek text says: Τίς δέ με τῆς συμμιγοῦς τε καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζουσης τοῦ ξύλου γεύσεως ἀποστήσει; (PG 44, 197A4–5). Eriugena’s translation, both in its full text, as published by Cappuyns, and in the earlier versions of the *Periphyseon* reads: ‘Quis me commixto et utroque ligni gustu segregabit?’ (ed. Cappuyns, p. 240, 24–25). It is correct, although the Latin pronoun *utroque* is inadequate to render the Greek verb ἐπαμφοτερίζω (‘to be ambiguous, to be doubtful’). The last version, in which the conjunction *et* (τε καὶ) was replaced by the preposition *ex*, is even more inadequate. It could lead the reader to think of a food mixed from both trees: Eriugena, *Periphyseon (The Division of Nature)*, translated by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Revised by John J. O’Meara (Montreal–Washington, 1987), p. 474. In fact, the mixed food is the fruit of one and the same tree, a tree which is called sometimes the ‘Mixed tree’, sometimes the ‘Tree of the knowledge of good and evil’ (823A). In other words, Gregory of Nyssa means: ‘Who shall keep me from tasting the (other) tree, a tasting which is of a mixed and ambiguous sort?’

233. [819C] Those who are ‘keen sighted’ (διορατικώτεροι) know how to distinguish between the two trees of paradise, mentioned in Gen. 2.9. One

is the ‘All-tree’ (τὸ πᾶν), the other is the ‘Mixed tree’ (τὸ συμμικτόν). The former is identical with the tree of life: its fruit is life. The latter is identical with the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (τὸ ξύλον τοῦ εἰδέναι γνωστὸν καλοῦ καὶ πονηροῦ): its fruit is death.

234. [819C] While the standard editions say ‘the interpretation of this text’ (τοῦ λόγου τούτου: ed. J. Loewenklaue (Basel, 1567), p. 200; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 96B; PG 44, 197A12), a Greek manuscript of Paris says ‘the interpretation of this law’ (τοῦ νόμου τούτου: Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 170^v). The Greek exemplar translated by Eriugena contained the reading τοῦ νόμου. And this was also the case of the exemplar translated by Dionysius Exiguus: *Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia I*, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 225; PL 67, 380B).

235. [820A] Here again, the Greek exemplars used both by Eriugena and by Dionysius Exiguus agree in reading ὁ νόμος (‘the law’), while the standard editions read ὁ λόγος (PG 44, 197B5). The manuscript of Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 171^r has ὁ νόμος.

236. [820B] The Latin *insitam* is inadequate to express the Greek ἐπληθισμένον (PG 44, 197C6), meaning “decked as with flowers, adorned”.

237. [820B] Here Professor John J. O’Meara requested that I include the following note: ‘The term *gnoston* is glossed as *scibile* (“knowable”) at 823A. The active “knowing” is suggested for Genesis 2,9 (Septuagint) in Liddell and Scott’s *Lexicon*’.

238. [821A] The swamp (βόρβορος, *palus*) is a Platonic and Neoplatonic theme: Plato, *Phaedo* 69b, 110a. *Republic* VII, 533d; Plotinus, *Enneads* I, 6,5, 44–45. I, 6,6, 3–6. I, 8,13, 14–26. VI, 7,31, 25–27. Intemperance (ἀκολασία, *intemperantia*) is a vice opposed to σωφροσύνη: Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* II, 7; 1107B5–6. The theme of the swamp occurs often in Gregory of Nyssa: twenty-nine instances are listed in C. Fabricius–D. Ridings, *A Concordance to Gregory of Nyssa* (Göteborg, 1989). This swamp is ill-smelling (δυσώδης, *foetida*): Gregory of Nyssa, *In Ecclesiasten Homiliae VIII* (GNO 5, 387, 19. 399, 18); *De imagine* 21[20] (PG 44, 200A14). On this theme see M. Aubineau, ‘Le thème du “bourbier” dans la littérature grecque profane et chrétienne’, *Recherches de science religieuse* 47 (1959), pp. 185–214; P. Courcelle, ‘Le thème littéraire du bourbier dans la littérature latine’, *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Comptes rendus des séances de l’année 1973*, pp. 273–289.

239. [821A] The theme of the bait or allurement (δέλεαρ, *illecebra*) is a Platonic one: ‘Pleasure, the strongest lure of evil’ (ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ: *Timaeus* 69d; tr. J. Warrington (London, 1965), p. 98). Gregory of Nyssa has recourse to it readily. Fifteen instances of δέλεαρ and δελέαμα are listed in his works: C. Fabricius–D. Ridings, *A Concordance to Gregory of Nyssa* (Göteborg, 1989). See P. Courcelle, ‘Escae malorum (Timée 69d)’, *Hommages à Léon Herrman, Series Latomus* 44 (1960), pp. 244–252; M. Aubineau, *Grégoire de Nyse. Traité de la virginité*, SC 119 (Paris, 1966), p. 506, n. 3.

240. [821A] The Greek text (standard version) of this passage is: οὕτω καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐγκεκρυμμένην ἔχοντα τὴν διαφθοράν, αἰρετὰ παρὰ τὴν πρώτην δοκεῖ (PG 44, 200B2–4). In the full text of the Eriugenian version, as it has been edited by Cappuyns and as it is contained in manuscript C, we read: ‘sic habent et caetera peccata occultam differentiam habentia

per primam delectationem . . . eximia uidentur' (ed. Cappuyns, p. 242, 7–8). Some peculiarities of this translation catch the eye. First Eriugena read in his Greek exemplar διαφοράν instead of διαφθοράν. In fact, the MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. Coislin 235, f. 172r contains διαφοράν and not διαφθοράν. Such was also the case of the Greek exemplar translated by Dionysius Exiguus. Secondly, we see that the noun *delectationem* has no corresponding word in the Greek text. Eriugena was probably led to supply *delectationem* because he did not recognize the adverbial phrase παρά τὴν πρώτην, meaning 'the first time': Liddell-Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1968), 1535B. Finally the adjective *eximia* – which would be perhaps an acceptable translation for ἐξάρητα – is inadequate for ἀρετά ('worth choosing', 'eligible'). The result of these various mistakes is that the translation of Eriugena is less accurate than that of Dionysius Exiguus: 'Sic et caetera peccatorum permixtam prorsus habent differentiam, quae acceptissima primo putantur aspectu' (*Sancti Patris Nostri Gregorii Nysseni . . . Quae Supersunt Omnia* I, ed. G. H. Forbes (Burntisland, 1855), p. 227; PL 67, 381B). In this passage of Gregory of Nyssa quoted in the *Periphyseon* Eriugena (or his 'editors') introduced some corrections which served only to damage the text further: *occultam* was transformed into *occulta*, *propriam* replaced *per primam*. Thomas Gale devoted to this passage a note full of errors: *Joannis Scoti Erigenae De Divisione Naturae Libri Quinque diu desiderati . . .* (Oxford, 1681), Appendix, p. 78. See *Giovanni Scoto nel suo tempo*, eds. C. Leonardi and E. Menestò (Spoleto, 1989), pp. 472–474.

241. [821A] Here Gregory of Nyssa explains why 'the tree of knowledge of good and evil' has been called a 'Mixed tree'. The reason is the ambiguity (ὁμωνυμία, *cognominatio*) of the word 'good' (καλόν, *bonum*): the fruit of this tree is good in appearance, but evil in reality. The same epithet, therefore, applies both to that which is really good and to that which only appears to be so. It is because of this ambiguity that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is a 'mixed tree'.

242. [821B] Two lacunas make this sentence difficult to understand. First a translation for the words ἄλλο τι νομιζόμενον (PG 44, 200C5) is missing both in the full Eriugenan version of this text (ed. Cappuyns, p. 242, 19 and MS C) and in all versions of the *Periphyseon*. The second lacuna corresponds, in the Greek text, to the following words: ἀνακρινόμενον, οὗ τὴν γνώσιν, τουτέστι τὴν διὰ τῆς πείρας (200 C6–7). Nevertheless the translation of these words is found in the full Eriugenan version of the text as edited by Cappuyns: *apparens, cuius scientia, hoc est per experimentum* (p. 242, 20). Its omission, both in the MS C (f. 138^v) and in all versions of the *Periphyseon* can be attributed to the carelessness of a copyist, who skipped the words between the first *experimentum* and the second (homoeoteleuton). Here is an English translation of the sentence, in which the words missing in the *Periphyseon* are printed in italics: 'But evil is many-coloured and fairly adorned, *being esteemed to be one thing and revealed by experience as another, the knowledge of which (that is its reception by experience) is the principle and the cause of death and destruction*' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V : *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 410, with

a few changes). The word *causa* is one of those by which Eriugena translates ὑπόθεσις: see CCSG 18, p. 275. The participle *apparens* suggests that the Greek exemplar used by Eriugena read ἀναφαινόμενον (ed. J. Loewenklaue, (Basel, 1567), p. 204; ed. G. Morel (Paris, 1638), p. 98B; ed. G. H. Forbes, p. 228B) rather than ἀνακρινόμενον (PG 44, 200C6).

243. [821C] Eriugena's translation – *mulieri manifestauit* – is unfaithful to the Greek: πῖθανός ἐφάνη τῇ γυναικί (PG 44, 200C14), (the serpent) 'appeared to the woman to be persuasive', i.e. 'he appeared to her to speak convincingly' (*A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Second Series, vol. V : *Gregory of Nyssa* (New York, 1893), p. 410).

244. [821C] Several mistakes contribute to obscure the Latin translation of this passage. First Eriugena chose to translate the Greek substantive (καρποφορία) by a Latin adjective (*fructifera*). Then he translated the Greek adjective (σύμμικτος, nominative) by a Latin substantive (*mixturae*, genitive). More unfortunate, perhaps, was the rendering of the genitive absolute (τοῦ λόγου τὸν νοῦν ἐρμηνεύοντος) by *intellectum ratione interpretante*. In fact, the term λόγος here designates the text on which Gregory is commenting, and νοῦς stands for 'sense'. According to Gregory of Nyssa the Biblical text itself (τοῦ λόγου) explains (ἐρμηνεύοντος) the sense (τὸν νοῦν) in which the 'Mixed tree' has been called 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil'.

245. [821C] The word *pessimum* may be considered as a gloss, meant to warn the reader that the adjective *nouissimum* (the last) is to be interpreted as *pessimum* (the worst), a very intelligent observation, for that is the meaning of ἔσχατος here: Liddell-Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1968), 700A.

246. [821C] Such praise of human nature occurs several times in Gregory of Nyssa: *De imagine* 2 (PG 44, 132D; ed. Cappuyns, p. 212, 8–9); *De uirginitate* 12, 2, 52–53 (SC 119, pp. 406–408; PG 46, 372B).

247. [822A] The Latin Middle Ages knew that *Eden* means 'delights' through Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, ix, 12 (PL 34, 202) and Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* XIV, iii, 2. Eriugena, however, found confirmation for this 'etymology' in Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 20[19] (PG 44, 196D; ed. Cappuyns, p. 240, 17; quoted above, 819B).

248. [822B–C] It is perhaps worth noting that the theme of the *microcosm*, rejected by Gregory of Nyssa as tainted with pagan philosophy (*De imagine* 17[16]; PG 44, 177D–180A; ed. Cappuyns, p. 232), is reintroduced here thanks to an allegorical interpretation of the four elements. Concerning the three faculties of knowledge (Sense, Reason and Mind), see above, note 4. For another allegorical explanation of the four elements, see Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XVII, 53–142 (CCSG 18, pp. 138–140; PG 91, 1245A–1249A).

249. [822C–D] The same images – 'secret recesses' (*secreti sinus*), 'hidden channels' (*occultissimi pori*) – have been used above, 749D–750A.

250. [823A] For the sake of clarity and in order to facilitate the understanding of difficult texts, Eriugena often chose not to use a word for word translation. He justified this practice in many places, e.g. in his *Expositiones in Hierarchiam Caelestem* VII, 970–973, 984–986 (CCCM 31, p. 117). See 'Jean Scot Érigène et le grec', *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 41 (1979), pp. 44–46; repr. in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris, 1987), pp. 126–128.

251. [823B] According to Augustine Christ, the divine Wisdom, is the tree of life in the 'spiritual paradise', but in the terrestrial paradise a material tree of life was created to signify the spiritual tree: *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, v, 9 (CSEL 28,1, p. 237, 3–8; PL 34, 376). On the other hand Eriugena says that the 'tree planted by streams of water' (Psalm 1,3) is Christ himself, 'the fountain head of Wisdom': *Expositiones in Hierarchiam Caelestem* I, 550–560 (CCCM 31, p. 16; PL 122, 139D–140A).

252. [823C–D] Compare with *Periphyseon* I, 451D, 453B, 454A; II, 592C–D, 596A–B, 616C; III, 619C, 621A–B, 621D–622A, 622B–C, 644B, 650B, 678A, 704B; IV, 741C, 778B, 813C, 826A; V, 903C, 994C–D, etc. Eriugena is indebted here to Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 1–6 (ed. Suchla (Berlin, 1990), pp. 143–150; PG 3, 693A–701B; PL 122, 1128D–1132A) and perhaps to Boethius, *Opuscula sacra* III (PL 64, 1311D–1314C; ed. H. F. Stewart–E. K. Rand (London, 1953), pp. 42–50). The phrase *substantiale bonum* is to be found in Augustine, *De uera religione* XX, 38 (quoted above, 815A). Its Greek equivalent – οὐσιώδεις ἀγαθόν (Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 1; ed. Suchla, p. 143, 12; PG 3, 693B5–6) – is translated *substancialia bonum* by Hilduin (G. Théry, *Études dionysiennes*, II. *Hilduin traducteur de Denys. Édition de sa traduction* (Paris, 1937), p. 197, 2) and *essentiale optimum* by Eriugena (PL 122, 1129A1).

253. [823D] See Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 7 (ed. Suchla (Berlin, 1990), pp. 150–153; PG 3, 701C–704C; PL 122, 1132A–1133B).

254. [824D–825C] Eriugena is right in saying that the different parts of human nature, as enumerated here, are to be found in Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine*, especially in chapters 8 and 15[14] (PG 44, 144D–145C and 173D–176B; ed. Cappuyns, pp. 217, 3–14 and 230, 3–29; quoted in *Periphyseon* III, 735D–736A and IV, 792A–B). However, in 755B he spoke of a fivefold division, but here he speaks of a sixfold one. The change from the fivefold to the sixfold division was made possible because he divided sense into two distinct faculties: bodily sense (*quinquepertitus corporeus sensus*) and inner sense (*interior sensus*). The number six, as we have seen above (notes 111 and 121), is a perfect number: as the six days in which God completed His creative work show the perfection of the universe, in the same way the six parts of human nature show the perfection of this nature. Moreover, this new division allows us to find in the human soul a trinitarian image (see note 4). Finally, the sixfold division enables us to understand how the two trees, the tree of life and that of the knowledge of good and evil, may both be said to be in the middle of the mystical paradise, which is human nature itself.

255. [826A] It was a common Neoplatonic tenet that evil is not a substance. Eriugena could have found this doctrine both in Augustine and in Dionysius: Augustine, *Confessions* VII, 12; *De moribus Manichaeorum* II, viii, 11 (PL 32, 743; 1350); Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 20, 31 (ed. Suchla pp. 164, 22–165, 2, 176, 16–177, 1; PG 3, 717B, 732C; PL 122, 1139A6–9, 1145A13–15).

256. [826C] οὐδεις γὰρ εἰς τὸ κακὸν ἀποβλέπων ποιεῖ ἢ ποιεῖ (Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 31; ed. Suchla p. 176, 16; PG 3, 732B; PL 122, 1145A12–13). See above, 821B–C.

257. [828A] While the good is simple, uniform and stranger to all duality, evil is manifold, variform (ποικίλον, *uarium*): Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 21[20] (PG 44, 200C4; ed. Cappuyns, p. 242, 19). Evil is causeless (ἀνάκτιον, *incausale*): Dionysius the Areopagite, *On Divine Names* IV, 30, 35 (ed. Suchla, pp. 175, 16, 180, 3; PG 3, 732A3, 736B9; PL 122, 1144C15, 1146D3–4).

258. [828B–D] The description of the 'wise man' may be reminiscent of Augustine, who says that the good angels refer the whole of creation to the glory of God (*referentes ad illius laudem*): Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, xxiv, 41 (CSEL 28,1, p. 124, 3–4, 11; PL 34, 313). The description of the 'greedy man' is certainly indebted to Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 21[20] (PG 44, 200A–B; ed. Cappuyns, p. 242, 3–9; quoted above, 820D–821A). In describing the beautiful vessel 'made of pure gold and set with most precious jewels, endowed with the loveliest form, fit for the use of a king' Eriugena may have had in mind some of the works of art he could admire at the court of Charles the Bald. In fact the Abbey of Saint-Denis housed until the French Revolution the so called 'Coupe des Ptolémées', which was mounted on a foot of gold beset with gems, and was given by Charles the Bald to the royal abbey. See B. de Montesquiou-Fezensac and D. Gaborit-Chopin, *Le trésor de Saint-Denis* (Paris, 1977), pp. 54–56; E. Panofsky, *Abbot Suger. On The Abbey Church of St.-Denis and Its Art Treasures*, 2nd edition (Princeton, 1979), pp. 217–218.

259. [829A] Had man not sinned, he would have been able to pass from the earthly life to the eternal bliss without the interruption of death: 'sine interpositione mortis' (Augustine, *Enchiridion* 28, 104 (PL 40, 281). See also *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, xxv–xxvi, 36–37 (CSEL 28, 1, pp. 197–198; PL 34, 354); *De ciuitate dei* XIV, x, 35–39 (CCSL 48, p. 431; PL 41, 417–418; quoted above, 806A). Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 822B.

260. [831B] Eriugena alludes here to Gregory of Nyssa's *De imagine* 20[19] (PG 44, 196C–197B; ed. Cappuyns, p. 240, 4–241, 8), a passage he quoted above, 819A–820A.

261. [833A] It was through Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 54–58 (GCS 25, pp. 63–69; PG 43, 112A–120C) that Eriugena became acquainted with Origen's allegorical interpretation of the terrestrial paradise. See above, 818B–C.

262. [833A] The controversy between Origen and Epiphanius about the terrestrial paradise has to do with the interpretation of the words of St. Paul: 'I know a man in Christ who . . . was caught up to the third heaven . . . And I know that this man was caught up into Paradise' (II Cor. 12, 2–3). According to Epiphanius we must understand that the Apostle was caught up to the third heaven first, and then into Paradise: *Ancoratus* 54 (GCS 25, p. 63, 10–64, 8). According to Eriugena to be caught up to the third heaven is to be caught up into Paradise. See also Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, i, 2, xxxiv, 65 (CSEL 28,1, p. 379–380, 430–431; PL 34, 454–455, 482).

263. [833B] See below, 836C–D.

264. [833C] Eriugena alludes here to the rhetorical figure of speech known as prolepsis (πρόληψις, *anticipatio*). See below, 837A–B.

265. [833C–D] For the theory of the two creations Eriugena is indebted to Gregory of Nyssa, *De imagine* 17[16] (PG 44, 181A–B; ed. Cappuyns, p. 233, 16–32; quoted above, 794D–795B).

266. [834B] In quoting Gen. 2,8 Eriugena combines the Septuagint and the Vulgate. However, although he chose to read a *principio* (Vulgate), instead of κατὰ ἀνατολὰς (Septuagint), he understood the Latin *principium*, not in its temporal sense ('beginning'), but in its causal sense (ἀρχή, 'principle'). We must remember that, for Eriugena, the first verse of Genesis – *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram* – means: 'In the Principle (i.e. in His Word, in His Son) God the Father created heaven and earth'. Cf. *Periphyseon* II, 546A–B, 549A, 552A, 556A–B; V, 907B; *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, xii, 39–44 (SC 180, pp. 272–274; PL 122, 330A–B).

267. [834C] There are four ways in which two things may be said to be prior, one to the other: time, dignity, origin, eternity. Cf. *De praedestinatione* IX, 154–161 (CCCM 50, p. 61; PL 122, 393B–C).

268. [834D] Here we read: 'quomodo usus corporis habuit Adam?', but in Schenkl's edition we read: 'quomodo clausos oculos corporis habuit Adam?' (CSEL 32,1, p. 323, 6). The latter reading, which was introduced by Thomas Gale into his edition (p. 210, 3–4), is not to be found in any of the manuscripts of the *Periphyseon*.

269. [835C] Goulven Madec rightly quotes Augustine here: 'Sic autem quodam genere locutionis nescire Filius dicitur quod non docet, id est nescire dicitur quod nescire nos facit' (*Enarrationes in psalmos XXXVI*, i, 1 (CCSL 38, p. 336, 15–17; PL 36, 355). See G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988), pp. 93–94, 122.

270. [836C] The Eriugenian distinction between *datum* and *donum* is based on James 1,17. It occurs frequently: *Periphyseon* III, 631C–632A, V, 903A–906B, 985A; *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* I, 23–47 (CCCM 31, pp. 1–2; PL 122, 127B–D); *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* III, ix, 44–74 (SC 180, pp. 252–254; PL 122, 325B–326A), etc. 'Every perfect creature consists of nature and grace. Hence it comes about that every essence is called a "datum", every virtue a "donum".' (*Periphyseon* III, 631D; translation I. P. Sheldon-Williams in *Scriptores Latini Hiberniae* XI, p. 55).

271. [836D] Concerning the garments of skins, see note 226.

272. [837A–B] The figure of speech called πρόληψις (*prolepsis*) is listed by Donatus among the *schemata*: *Ars Maior* III, 5 (H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini* IV, p. 397, 12–14). The *hysteropteron* is listed by the same grammarian among the *tropi*: *Op. cit.* III, 6 (ed. cit., p. 401, 4–7). *Prolepsis* was known in the Latin world under various names: *praesumptio*, *praecoccupatio*, *anticipatio*. See L. Holtz, *Donat et la tradition de l'enseignement grammatical* (Paris, 1981), pp. 193–194. Eriugena was not the first to appeal to this rhetorical figure in order to interpret a Biblical text. Prosper of Aquitaine, for instance, commented in this way on verse 23 of Psalm 104: 'Potest per anticipationem, id est prolepsim, sic dictum accipi ut quod futurum erat quasi factum dictum sit' (PL 51, 299D).

273. [840B–C] The text of Ambrose, as quoted by Eriugena, seems to be better in several passages than the text edited by Schenkl. For instance, in *Periphyseon* IV, 840B–C we read: 'Quid est deambulatio illius qui ubique semper est?' ('What is meant by the walking of Him Who is always everywhere?'),

but in Schenkl's edition (CSEL 32,1, p. 325, 17–18) we read: 'Quae est deambulatio dei, qui ubique semper est?' ('What is the walking of God, who is always everywhere?').

274. [840C] Here again the text of Ambrose, as quoted in *Periphyseon*, seems to be better than that of Schenkl's edition. While in the latter (CSEL 32,1, p. 326, 6) we read: 'quia iusti mens', in the former we read: 'quamvis timens'. Although not a single manuscript of the *Periphyseon* available to him had *quia iusti mens*, Thomas Gale introduced this reading into his edition (p. 213, 10), and Floss (PL 122, 840C12) followed him. We know that Gale usually corrected the Patristic quotations according to the printed editions he had at his disposal. In the present case he may have borrowed the reading *quia iusti mens* from a seventeenth-century edition such as *Sancti Ambrosii Mediolanensis Episcopi Opera ex Editione Romana . . .* (Paris, 1661), vol. I, 128F. It is worth noting that in manuscript *J* (f. 76^v) the original reading – *timens* – has been corrected to *iusti mens*. In this case manuscript *J* offers a contaminated text, for the reading *iusti mens* is not an authorized correction, but rather a variant borrowed from a manuscript of Ambrose's *De paradiso* and introduced into the text of the *Periphyseon*. We also find in Gale's edition (p. 213, 10) the variant *solummodo* instead of *solum deo*. In this case, Gale followed his own manuscript (*M*, p. 175B10).

275. [841C] Eriugena combines two different pairs of antagonistic notions of Paulinian inspiration: Letter (*Littera*) and Spirit on one side (II Cor. 3,6), Flesh (*Caro*) and Spirit on the other (Rom. 7, 5–6, 8, 1–13, Gal. 5,17, etc.). In contrast with the spiritual interpretation of the Bible, the literal interpretation is said to be carnal: 'carnaliter intelligere, spiritualiter intelligere' (*Periphyseon* IV, 843A). Those who interpret Holy Writ spiritually, in other words, those who, starting from the *littera*, ascend to the *intellectus* are called *spirituales*; those who cannot rise above the *littera* are called *carnales*. Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, vi (SC 180, pp. 356–366; PL 122, 345C–348B). The epithet *carnales* applies to the Pharisees (*Comment. in eu. Ioh.* IV, i, 23), to the Jews (*Op. cit.* IV, i, 32), to Israel (*Op. cit.* IV, i, 65), to people in general (*Op. cit.* VI, ii, 43, 45, iii, 39): SC 180, pp. 280, 282, 332, 334, 340; PL 122, 331A, 331B, 332A, 341C, 343A, etc.

276. [841D] 'Quid est ergo: *Adam ubi es?* . . . Non ergo interrogatio est, sed increpatio. De quibus, inquit, bonis, de qua beatitudine, de qua gratia, in quam miseriam cecidisti?' (Ambrose, *De paradiso* XIV, 70 (CSEL 32,1, p. 328, 7–10)).

277. [842A] Adam's nakedness is the symbol of the simplicity of his nature before the fall according to Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XLI, 60–69 (PG 91, 1353B–1356A; CCSG 18, pp. 214–215). In fact Maximus is commenting here on Gregory Nazianzen (*Oratio* XLV, 8; PG 36, 632C6): γυμνὸν τῆ ἀπλότητι, *nudum simplicitate*. The same interpretation of Adam's nudity is to be found in Augustine: 'illa simplicitas quae nuditatis nomine significata est' (*De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II, xv, 23; PL 34, 208).

278. [842B] One could think here of Lucretius (*De Rerum Natura* IV, 1133–1134):

Medio de fonte leporum
Surgit amari aliquid quod in ipsis floribus angat.

Whether Eriugena had read Lucretius or not, he was certainly indebted to Maximus the Confessor, for in the passage of the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* quoted here (Introductio 287–288. 329–330; CCSG 7, p. 36 and p. 37; PL 90, 257C) Maximus plays on the words ἡδονή (pleasure) and ὀδύνη (pain): the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the symbol of the visible creation, which produces both pleasure and pain. Eriugena translated ὀδύνη (pain) by *anxietas*: Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem* XLIV, 25 (CCSG 18, p. 220; PG 91, 1361C10). Maximus treats more fully the pair ἡδονή (*uoluptas*) – ὀδύνη (*anxietas*) in *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* LXI (CCSG 22, pp. 84–113; PG 90, 628A–645C).

279. [843B] See note 79.

280. [843B] The Nicene Creed states that God is the Maker of all things visible and invisible (*uisibilium omnium et inuisibilium*).

281. [843D] According to some Fathers of the Church, original sin consisted, for our first parents, in rushing headlong at knowledge before the time was ripe. In other words our first parents, who were psychologically children, instead of passing through the stages which God had foreseen as pedagogically advisable during their acquisition of knowledge, upset this schedule and hurried off in reckless pursuit of a kind of knowledge which they were not yet sufficiently mature to receive. See Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum* II, 25 (ed. R. M. Grant (Oxford, 1970), pp. 66–68; ed. J. C. Th. Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi*, vol. 8 (Jena, 1861; repr. 1969), pp. 124–128; PG 6, 1092A–C).

282. [844A] See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, i, 1 (CSEL 28,1, p. 229; PL 34, 371), quoted above, 814B.

283. [844B–C] We have seen earlier (798A) that ‘man before the Fall was a kind of angel’. Hence it follows that human knowledge would have been like that of the angels, had man not sinned. Now, ‘the angels see the causes of the lower creatures . . . first in God, then in themselves’ (*Periphyseon* I, 446C). They ‘do not use corporeal senses for knowledge of sensible things . . . but know inwardly within themselves the “reasons” of the things which they perceive’ (*Periphyseon* IV, 762C).

284. [844C] Concerning the ‘Divine Ray’, see note 70.

285. [844C] The phrase *seipsos et deum suum quaerentes* (‘those who seek themselves and their God’) is Augustinian: *De quantitate animae* XIV, 24 (PL 32, 1049). The text of Augustine is quoted in *Periphyseon* I, 587D–588A. Cf. *Periphyseon* IV, 771C; V, 926C; *Expositiones in Hierarchiam caelestem* I, 125–126 (CCCM 31, p. 4; PL 122, 129C), etc.

286. [846A] See Rom. 5, 12; 7, 10.

287. [846B] On divine irony (*diuina ironia*), see ‘Jean Scot et l’ironie’, in *Jean Scot écrivain*, ed. G. H. Allard (Montréal–Paris, 1986), pp. 13–27 (repr. in *Études érigéniennes* (Paris, 1987), pp. 323–337).

288. [846C] See above, 837A–B.

289. [847A–B] Concerning the guilt (*reatus*) from which men and women are freed by baptism, see *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxxi, 32–36. xxxiii, 38–51 (SC 180, pp. 170–172. 192–194; PL 122, 310B–C. 313 C–314A).

290. [848A–B] Curiously enough Eriugena states here a principle for Biblical exegesis, which seems to echo a principle on which Greek philosophers based their interpretation of pagan myths: ‘Myths, if they are really myths, should divide what they say into parts by introducing intervals of time’ (Plotinus, *Enneads* III, 5, 9, 24–25). See also Sallustius, *De diis et mundo* IV, 9 (ed. G. Rochefort (Paris, 1960), p. 8); Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum* [30A], ed. E. Diehl, I (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 382, 30–383, 1. In fact, Eriugena is probably indebted to Origen here: ‘Perfacile est omni uolenti congregare de scripturis sanctis quae scripta sunt quidem tamquam facta, non tamen secundum historiam competenter et rationabiliter fieri potuisse credenda sunt’ (*De Principiis* IV, iii, 1 (GCS 22, p. 324, 23–25; PG 11, 378B). Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* VI, v, 44–62 (SC 180, pp. 352–354; PL 122, 345A–B).

291. [848C] In the last version we read: ‘extra naturae a deo factae superuenit’. In the earlier versions, with which the *Clavis Physicae* (300, 33–34; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 244) agrees, we read: ‘extra naturam a deo factam reperitur’.

292. [849B] Concerning the ablative complement of *abusio*, see note 33.

293. [849B] ‘More of mercy than of vengeance’. Eriugena insists on this idea: *Periphyseon* II, 540B–C; IV, 864B; V, 953B.

294. [850A] See I Cor. 8,1.

295. [850A] The ‘prudence of the flesh’ (*prudencia carnis*) is a Paulinian phrase: Rom. 8,6. In ‘empty philosophy’ (*inanis philosophia*) one can hear an echo of Col. 2,8: ‘Videte ne quis uos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam’.

296. [850B] The criticism addressed to the Jews by Eriugena is that of confining themselves to the literal sense of the Bible and rejecting its spiritual (or mystical) sense: *Comment. in eu. Ioh.*, III, iv, 1–10 (SC 180, pp. 216–218; PL 122, 318A–B). Now, ‘the spirit of the Law is Christ himself’: *Comment. in eu. Ioh.*, IV, i, 29–38 (SC 180, p. 280; PL 122, 331B). The epithet *perfidus* usually applies to the Jews (SC 180, p. 94, n. 1), but occasionally to heretics as well: *Vox spiritualis* VI, 23–24 (SC 151, p. 228; PL 122, 286C). Heresy is poisonous: ‘uenenosa contagio’ (*Vox spiritualis* VI, 20–21; SC 151, p. 228; PL 122, 286C). However, the ‘venomous heretics’ are mentioned neither in the earlier versions (*HMR*) nor in the *Clavis Physicae* (300, 47; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 244).

297. [850B] In order to deceive men and women the devil uses the resources both of rhetoric and dialectic. The devices of rhetoric are grandiloquence, empty and sonorous words: see Eriugena’s introductory verse to his translation of Maximus the Confessor, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, Versus 25–30 (CCSG 18, p. 14). The devices of dialectic are ‘tortuous intricacies of fallacious propositions and syllogisms’. On this last point Eriugena is probably indebted to the description of Lady *Dialectica* in Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis* IV, 327–328: ‘contortis stringens effamina nodis’, ‘cui crines tortuosi decente inflexione crispati et nexiles uidebantur’ (ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1983), p. 105, 21 and p. 106, 17). Cf. *Annotationes in Marcianum*, ed. Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge, MA, 1939), p. 81.

298. [850D] The noun κενοδοξία (*cenodoxia*, vain glory) was known in the Latin world: ‘cenodoxiae, quod sonat uana seu inanis gloria’ (Cassian, *De institutis coenobiorum* V,i (CSEL 17, p. 81, 21–22; PL 49, 203A; SC 109, p. 190)). See in particular Cassian, *Op. cit.*, Book XI. In the Glossary of Martin of Laon,

we read: 'Κενοδοξία, id est uana gloria. Κενός enim inanis et uacuuus, δόξα gloria. Idem et iactantia, quae est soror superbiae' (MS Laon, Bibl. mun. 444, f. 293^r; ed. E. Miller in *Notices et Extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale et autres bibliothèques* 29, 2 (Paris, 1880), pp. 190–191). Eriugena, however, came across the noun κενοδοξία and the adjective κενόδοξος (*cenodoxus*, vain-glorious) while translating Maximus the Confessor, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* XXX, Responsio 16–18. Scholia 8–10; LVI, Scholia 18–23 (CCSG 7, pp. 218. 220; 22, p. 16). The other epithet given here to the serpent (*elatus*) applies to the 'Ruler of this world' (Jn 12, 31) in Eriugena's *Carmina* II, vi, 13 (ed. Traube, MGH, PLAC III, p. 536; PL 122, 1229B).

299. [851A] This point of doctrine will be explained more fully in *Periphyseon* V, 912B–C.

300. [851D–852A] Cf. *Vox spiritualis* XII, 1–13 (SC 151, pp. 258–260; PL 122, 290A–B).

301. [852A] An allusion to the banquet of divine Wisdom: 'Wisdom has built her house, she has set up her seven pillars. She has slaughtered her beasts, she has mixed her wine, she has also set her table' (Prov. 9, 1–2).

302. [852B] This verse of the Book of Job (40, 14 according to the Vulgate; 40, 19 according to the Septuagint) is quoted here according to the Septuagint and to the 'Vetus Latina': *Bibliorum Sacrorum Latinae Versiones Antiquae seu Vetus Italica*, ed. P. Sabatier, I (Rheims, 1743), p. 904. According to the Vulgate the same verse reads: 'He (Be'hemoth) is the beginning of the ways of the Lord; let him who made him bring near his sword'. It is likely that Eriugena had access to the version of the 'Vetus Latina' for Job 40,14 through quotations to be found in Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei* (XI, 15) and *De Genesi ad litteram* (XI, xx, 27), as indicated in the footnotes to the Latin text.

303. [852C–D] This brief summary is lacking in the earlier versions (*HMR*). It seems logical to conclude that the words *Et nunc breuiter . . . credibile est* have been added after Book V was completed, for how could an author summarize (*colligendum*) something not yet treated? The passages where this question is dealt with are probably *Periphyseon* V, 884C–885A. 993C–995C. Whether this 'brief summary' was added in the last version by Eriugena himself or by some of his Carolingian editors, is open to discussion.

304. [853A] The two words – *formatio, figmentum* – are conceived of by Eriugena as two different translations of the same Hebrew word. To translate, for him, is to adapt a foreign language to the usage (*usibus*) of people who speak a different tongue:

Auribus Aebracis notum si dixero *pascha*,
Vsibus Ausoniae *transitus* est habilis.

(*Carmina* II, iii, 1–2; MGH, PLAC III, p. 531; PL 122, 1225B). See also *Carmina* VII, i, 8 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 547; PL 122, 1029A).

305. [853B] In absolute contrast with God in whom there is no particle of envy (see note 156), the devil is intrinsically envious. The devil is envious of man: *Periphyseon* V, 938A–B; *Carmina* IV, i, 60–66 (MGH, PLAC III, p. 544; PL 122, 1234A).

306. [853B] The prudence of the flesh (*prudentia carnis*) 'paints the vices with the colours of virtues' (850A–D). On the contrary, godly prudence

(*diuina prudentia*) carefully distinguishes vices from virtues. This is, in fact, the role assigned by Maximus the Confessor to prudence (*φρόνησις*): *The Four Centuries on Charity* II, 26; ed. A. Ceresa-Gastaldo (Rome, 1963), p. 102; PG 90, 992B–C; P. Sherwood in *Ancient Christian Writers. The Works of the Fathers in Translation*, 21 (New York, 1955), p. 157. Cf. *Comment. in eu. Ioh.* I, xxx, 85–96. xxxii, 47–49. *Vox spiritualis* II, 18–20 (SC 180, pp. 164–166. 184. 151, 210–212; PL 122, 309A–B. 312B. 284B–C).

307. [853D] On corporeal numbers (*corporales numeri*), cf. *Periphyseon* I, 464B. III, 731C. 734C. See note 131.

308. [855B] Eriugena may be reminiscent of Augustine here: 'ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendentes, uel ab exterioribus ad interiora ingredientes' (*De trinitate* XIV, iii, 5; CCSL 50, p. 426, 29–30; PL 42, 1039). See G. Madec, *Jean Scot et ses auteurs* (Paris, 1988), p. 123.

309. [855B] Eriugena's interpretation of Gen. 3,16 is very original. In the words by which God foretells the punishment that will befall the woman, Eriugena sees the first announcement of the restoration of human nature. This 'optimistic' exegesis was made possible by an allegorical interpretation of the Biblical narrative: man stands for mind, woman for sense. The terms *restauratio* (*ἀποκατάστασις*) and *reuersio* (*ἐπάνοδος, ἐπιστροφή*) are traditional to designate the third element of the Neoplatonic triad: *μονή, πρόδος, ἐπιστροφή*. We find the same 'optimistic' tone in the interpretation of Gen. 3,22 at the beginning of *Periphyseon* V (859D–861A).

310. [856A–B] Eriugena is correct here. The text of the Septuagint supports his interpretation of Gen. 3,16, because the word *conuersio* (*ἀποστροφή*) calls to mind *reuersio* (*ἐπιστροφή*), a technical term used to designate the movement by which all things return to their Principle.

311. [857B] The Greek text speaks of 'the mind that became earth': τοῦ γεωθέντος νοῦ (CCSG 7, p. 65, 11). Eriugena confused the aorist passive participle of the verb *γεόδομαι* ('to become earth') with a form of the verb *γινώσκω*, perhaps *γνωσθέντος*. His translation distorts the thought of Maximus the Confessor.

312. [857D] Eriugena seems to have read *προσώπω* (*uultu*) instead of *τρόπω* (*modo*). Hence the nonsensical phrase: 'the knowable face of intelligence'!

313. [858B] Solidity and stability are two characteristics of earth: *Periphyseon* III, 702C, 714A. IV, 747A–B, 749B, 777B. V, 892A. The first verse of Genesis – *In the Beginning God made heaven and earth* – is to be understood: 'In His Word God created all at once the causes of the intelligible and of the sensible essences' (*Periphyseon* I, 554C–D). The name 'heaven' signifies the primordial causes of the intelligible and celestial essences; the name 'earth', those of the sensible things (546B). See R. Roques, *Libres sentiers vers l'érigénisme* (Rome, 1975), pp. 131–194. The Eriugenian interpretation of Gen. 3,19 is as optimistic as that of Gen. 3,16. The phrase *donec conuertaris* (Septuagint: *ἕως τοῦ ἀποστρέψαι*) echoes the *conuersio* (*ἀποστροφή*) of Gen. 3,16 and calls to mind the theme of the universal return.

314. [858C] The *Clauis physicae* (300, 143; ed. P. Lucentini, p. 247) agrees with the earlier versions in reading: 'hoc est inter sanctificationem et aequanimitatem'.

315. [860A] See note 196.

316. [860A–B] The same word – *prolixitas* – is used at the beginning (744A) and at the end (860A) of Book IV to justify the existence of the fifth book. However, contrary to what we observe in the former (744A), we find no evidence that the text has been reworded in the latter (860A–B). The most obvious explanation for this is that the words *suique prolixitate cogente in quintum librum porrectus* were added in 744A after the present passage had been written.