Paul Hollander

New Light on the Roots of Radicalism. The "'68 Generation" Analysed

Almost twenty years have passed since the beginning of the student protest movement and the upsurge of political radicalism in the United States (and, shortly thereafter, elsewhere in the West.) The passage of time has not provided a consensus in the interpretation of these events, nor have historians or social scientists found convincing and widely accepted explanations for them. What most people mean by "the sixties" started in 1964 and faded away around 1972-73; not surprisingly, what has been written about this period tends to reflect an author's predisposition towards and experiences of it. In the United States at any rate, the closest thing to a conventional wisdom about radical student protest and the 1960s has been that it was a time of "lofty ideals", "youthful idealism", and an exhilarating if transient sense of "community."

If in retrospect the anti-intellectualism and intolerant selfrighteousness of many of the student radicals (and of their mentors) have been deemed less appealing and acceptable than they seemed in the heat of the political action and drama, their attitudes and politics are still defended in much of the media and academia as honourable. Of all those reminiscing, in recollections and appraisals of the '60s, some were then in their prime, others outright young, in college or graduate school. Hence, in many minds, the politics of the 1960s and being young, youthful, and hopeful are irresistibly associated - an essential factor for the analysis of that era.

Whatever the "mature" judgment of history or social history, one thing already appears clear: that the discontinuity between the '60s and '70s (and early '80s) has been vastly exaggerated. The '60s were not some isolated eruption without antecedent and after-effects. Although Tom Wolfe was not incorrect in labelling the 1970s as the "Me Decade" in seeming contrast to the public-spirited '60s, the differences were not quite so pronounced, and were not simply matters of selfcentredness-versus-public-spirited generosity. Individualism already flourished in the '60s, with millions of young people insisting on "doing their own thing", bent on instant gratification, and propelled by a wide range of hedonistic impulses. It is possible to some degree to differentiate between the political and apolitical aspects of that decade by employing the concepts of cultural-versus-political radicalism; but the two strands were in practice intertwined. Some of the political militant radicals might well have been puritanical radicals, but most also found it important to smoke dope, listen to rock music and engage in some variant of unconventional sexual behaviour. It is the savage rejection of Western political institutions and social order and a determined individualism and hedonism that ties together the '60s and the '70s. The level of political activism has declined, but the attitudes and beliefs giving rise to such activism have clearly persisted into the 1980s.

Moreover, many wrong lessons have been learned. For instance, although it has become increasingly difficult to persist in entertaining illusions about the good-natured humanity and popularity of Uncle Ho's North Vietnamese Communists and the good life they brought to the masses, it is still obligatory in many circles to profess deep shame about the US opposing a regime that was to give us the "Boat People." Furthermore, losing a war against one of the most repressive and militaristic regimes in our times led many to conclude - including high-level policy-makers - that the US should retreat from virtually all global involvements and refrain from using military force to defend its interests. Today what President Carter scornfully called "the inordinate fear of Communism" has receded so far that American eites are no longer disturbed even by the rise of pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban regimes on their very doorstep, their "backyard" in Central America and the Caribbean. Many of the same activists who idealised the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese now protest against American involvement in Central America and idealise the Marxist guerrillas of that region. "Grenada" becomes "another Viet Nam." Much of the media follows suit. On the American campuses the spirit of the 1960s persists in the virtual institutionalisation of estrangement, and in the habits of self-censorship exercised by professors and university administrators to avoid disruptions by radicals. Hence the drastic constriction of subjects in courses of studies, in topics for visiting speakers, and of the whole range of controversial opinion in academia.

Accordingly Stanley Rothman's and Robert Lichter's "Roots of Radicalism" [1] is a major contribution to understanding the social and political movements and the spirit of the 1960s. There is nothing quite like this massive, ambitious, and thorough study, which combines and successfully integrates social-historical, sociological, social-psychological, and psychoanalytic perspectives in an attempt to come to grips with complex social phenomena. If read with an open mind it will change many preconceptions and stereotypes about the period and its major protagonists. It will also confirm certain impressions with a formidable array of data, both quantitative and qualitative.

The authors' research procedures included a survey questionnaire administered during 1971-73 at four large American universities, to over 1,100 students drawn from both random and probability samples; they were also given various "projective" tests. A small group of students were given additional "'intensive clinical interviews" and further projective tests. In 1974-75 the authors administered similar questionnaires to 120 non-student radicals or former student activists (early New Leftists). These radical adults were compared to a sample of non-radicals - "business and professional people active in community affairs in a small northeastern city." There was a European counterpart to the American study, involving 230 students at two West German universities. The authors supplemented such data with an abundance of printed source materials about the period and its major protagonists (although they overlooked the writings of the American historian D. M. Potter, on alienation, changing authority relations, and problems of identity formation in recent times, which are highly relevant and complementary to their work).

It is impossible here to enumerate, let alone discuss, all the interesting and sometimes striking findings and propositions of this study and its sophisticated methodology. Broadly speaking, its major contributions lie in providing new insights and data about the relationship between politics and personality, family background and political-attitude formation, the sources of alienation and rejection of society, and attitudes towards political power, violence, and authority. It will surely compel a rethinking of the social history of the 1960s and of the conceptions of American society which arose at the time (and are still with us). More specifically, it represents a new departure in understanding the roots of both Jewish and non-Jewish radicalism, the differences and similarities between them, and how they were welded into a single (if ultimately fragmented) social-political movement.

Rothman and Lichter have not been the first to note that radical movements on the Left tend to attract a disproportionate number of Jews. Thus, for example, in 1970 a survey in the US found that 23% of all Jewish college students considered themselves "Far Left" when only 4% of Protestants and 2% of Catholic students defined themselves as such. They found in their samples that Jewish students "were three times as likely as non-Jews to engage in frequent protests and twice as likely to lead or organize protests... by every measure we employed, Jews made up a majority of the New Left on these campuses."

Children of Jewish academics were found to be "by far the most radical group studied, much more so than the children of non-Jewish academics."

Even after the Protest Movement had peaked, Jews continued to be disproportionately represented during the 1970s in a wide variety of "counter-cultural" or "anti-Establishment" organisations such as the various anti-nuclear groups, anti-DNA-research, and Gay-Liberation movements, and were prominently represented in consumer groups, radical jurists, and in Left-wing research organisations (e.g. the Institute of Policy Studies). The combination of liberal-Left leanings and a concentration in certain key occupations and elite colleges and universities helps to explain the Jewish influence on the protest movements of the 1960s. (A 1968 study found that they accounted for 20% of the faculty in elite colleges and universities; 12% of the faculty of law schools, but 38% of elite law schools; while 25% of all social scientists were Jewish at elite schools.) Their role in the mass media was equally significant. A 1969 study found that 27% "of those working for the most influential media outlets... were of Jewish background." They also played an important role in the so-called underground press of the 1960s.

* * *


Two major questions must be asked about the protest movements of the 1960s, indeed about the protest movements of any period. The first is why they erupted at a particular time (given the endemic nature of some of the ostensible targets of protest). The second is what exactly motivated the participants, or in what measure one should look for explanation in the socio-political setting as distinct from certain shared characteristics of the protestors or revolutionaries. At both the beginning and the end of "Roots of Radicalism" the authors note - and it is gradually becoming more and more evident - that neither concern over "racial injustice" nor American involvement in the Viet Nam war by themselves offer satisfactory explanations of the 1960s, and especially of the steadily widening nature of the social criticism and estrangement which emerged.

A third major question about the radicalism and radicals of the '60s involves the sources, the genesis, of social criticism. Was it primarily a response to visible and self-evident evils of the socio-political environment? Or was there something in the nature, make-up, and the conditions of life of the critics? Considering the fact that, if not the absolute majority, the vanguard and leadership of the radical student movement were "children of privilege", it is certainly tempting to subscribe to the still widely accepted view that theirs was a wholly idealistic outpouring of action and emotion, since they themselves had little to gain either from the anti-War protest (they enjoyed college draft deferments) or from the struggle for civil rights (they were white) or from the protest against inequality (they were well-off).

The most influential assessments of the radical students of the period were highly positive and laudatory. They included social-scientific studies which

"agreed that the student movement represented the best in their societies... Researchers concluded early that radical students were dedicated to free speech and the rights of minorities. In many cases they came to this conclusion simply by asking students whether they believed in free speech... "


Students were, however, rarely asked about their willingness to extend such rights to groups they despised on ideological grounds. Rothman & Lichter thoroughly examine and expose the weakness of many such studies carried out by authors sympathetic to the students in the first place (the best-known being Kenneth Keniston); and they point to the typical confusion of "idealistic political pronouncements with personality traits" characteristic of much of this research and of the liberal-Left perceptions of the student radicals. They note in passing that even the notorious Felix Dzerzhinski, the founder of the Cheka and of what subsequently became the KGB, was given to pronouncements about loving people and flowers. They might also have added Stalin's famous statement about the importance of carefully nurturing the masses like plants in a nursery.

Perhaps the most striking among their propositions - and one likely to provoke the greatest controversy - is that (among the Jewish radicals, at any rate) a major component of the idealism, the identification with "the underdog", rested on other than disinterestedly idealistic motives.

"Many white radicals supported "black power" as a surrogate expression of their own hostility against the Establishment. The black underclass was finally fulfilling the role in which it had been long cast - as the vanguard of a revolt against the American Dream."


Nor was the phenomenon entirely new.

"The identification of some Jewish males and females with the Russian proletariat during the Soviet revolution, with Irish and Italian workers during the 1930s, and with the black underclass or Third World nations during the 1960s may have reflected motives beyond mere sympathy with the underdog… in both the 1930s and the 1960s many Jewish radicals were projecting their own needs and desires upon those groups."


They go on to observe:

"For some Jewish radicals, then, it is not only the oppression of Third World nations that attracts them as they move from cause to cause but, rather, the imagined virility of these nations and their powerful leaders... As Abbie Hoffman described Fidel Castro: "Fidel sits on the side of a tank rumbling into Havana... The tank stops in the city square. Fidel lets the gun drop to the ground, slaps his thigh and stands erect. He is like a mighty penis coming to life…""

"As agents of the oppressed, and the justly violent oppressed in particular, they could treat their own aggressive urges as morally legitimate... This identification helps [the radical] deny his own aggressiveness. He speaks and acts not for himself but for the worthy cause whose emissary he has become... The projection of positive feelings onto the "people" or "the oppressed" is matched by the negative emotions projected onto the oppressors..."

"Students, too, could be victims, could enjoy the righteousness that comes from persecution."


In short, "many radicals identified with black and third world militants as a psychological means of incorporating their power."

* * *


These findings, which fly in the face of the conventional wisdom about the motives of the young radicals [2], derive from a more general and far-reaching theory of Jewish radicalism and of the authors' new perspectives on Jewish marginality and an associated estrangement. For one thing, unlike many other Western intellectuals they do not believe that alienation automatically confers a clearer view of social realities:

"... marginality can also serve to narrow one's vision. The oppressed may see only the worst side of a culture or social system."


As the authors see it, then, political radicalism, as tar as such American Jewish groups are concerned, stems from a broader and more basic hostility toward the social order, from a predisposition to reject a social system which defines them (or had defined them) as outsiders. This attitude explains both the attraction of universalistic ideologies such as Marxism, and the interest in other oppressed groups victimised by the system.

What gives such ethnic radicalism a unique character - besides the long history of Jewish persecution and marginality - is, according to Rothman & Lichter, the Jewish family structure and its impact on attitudes toward authority and the handling of aggression. Two aspects of the Jewish experience and character-formation appear to be of particular significance.

"Faced by persecutors too powerful to resist physically, Jewish families of the diaspora gradually came to place tremendous emphasis upon inhibiting the direct expression of physical aggression, particularly by male children... Survival called for the creation of controls that became an integral part of character structure."


The corresponding presence of weak fathers became typical of many Jewish families, and "Jewish radicals were the only group to perceive their families as matriarchal."

In other words, the Jewish radicals' identification with the tough Third World guerrillas (especially the Viet Cong), rioting Negroes, Black Panthers, and other victimised yet assertive groups, had a strong compensatory flavour. Some groups like The Weathermen quite consciously cultivated toughness, and modelled (or imagined they had modelled) themselves on such groups. The investigations reported in this study revealed the radicals' preoccupation with power and authority, again contrary to widespread belief among liberals that authoritarianism is the preserve of Right-wing elements.

"The traditional authoritarian [the image of which was enshrined in studies like that of Theodor Adorno's "Authoritarian Personality"] deflects his hidden hostilities onto outsiders and outgroups. The inverse authoritarian [i.e., the New Left radical] unleashes his anger directly against the powers that be while taking the side of the world's "victims" and "outcasts"."


Moreover, the widespread rejection of authority during the 1960s was highly selective rather than reflecting a generalised mistrust of all authorities. The same radicals who felt the mildest academic regulations intolerable and repressive (and parental authority altogether intolerable) were capable of extreme submissiveness toward groups, authority figures, and symbols that they admired, e.g., Blacks, the Viet Cong, Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Mao, and the repressive systems which they represented. As Rothman & Lichter shrewdly point out,

"Their temporary opposition to authority is part of a quest for a new authority that can command their wholehearted loyalty."


Presumably an authority that is not hesitant, ridden with doubt, and lacking in strength and determination.

The broader implication is, of course, that political attitudes and beliefs often stem from non-political sources. None of this reduces the radicals to "a bunch of neurotics" or "spoiled brats" as the hostile stereotype had it. None the less, the findings make it clear that there is a difference between what is manifest and what is latent, between professed intentions and underlying motives. The authors, however, are fully aware that it is under particular historical circumstances that the psychological or personality variables assume causal significance in explaining mass movements:

"As political and cultural authority declined in the 1960s, so did the authority of the family and ego strength. Such is always the case in revolutionary (or pseudo-revolutionary) eras. At such times people seize the opportunity to act upon fantasies that they normally keep under control. All such fantasies contain universal elements, but their content is also partly determined by the cultural norms of the society in which the individual lives."


Another major contribution of this volume is the systematic delineation and explanation of the differences between Jewish and non-Jewish radicals. Until now, the lack of a clear understanding of these highly patterned differences has led to wildly contradictory theories about radicalism and the part played in its development by family background. Here are some of the findings concerning these two groups:

"About half the Jewish students were raised in a liberal or leftist political milieu... By contrast only 1% of the non-Jews rated their fathers as "Radical democrats," and not a single non-Jewish subject came from a socialist background."

"Jewish radicals were more than twice as likely as non-Jews to see radical publications [in their homes when they were growing up] while non-Jewish radicals were three times as likely as Jews to see conservative journals."

"Among Jews, the more radical the child, the more radical he or she perceived the father. Among non-Jews, this pattern was reversed: the more radical the child, the more conservative the father."


The inquiry into the family background of adult radicals turned up similar results, i.e., "the tendency of Jewish radicals to come from relatively politicized and leftist family backgrounds." Furthermore, "Jewish radicals [again, in the adult sample] were drawn primarily from intellectually and economically privileged backgrounds, while non-Jewish radicals were drawn more heavily from the bottom of the status hierarchy." There were also suggestive differences between Jewish and non-Jewish radicals in regard to participation in dangerous contact sports (Jewish participation being far more limited) and even in driving habits, with "non-Jewish radicals driving aggressively" whereas their Jewish peers were "less likely to use automobiles as instruments of self-assertion." All in all, it appeared from the accumulated data that

"Non-Jewish radicals seemed most likely to lack impulse control and to express aggression directly. Jewish radicals on the other hand were more timid physically. Their participation in the Movement may have provided a means of gaining strength by uniting with a powerful force."


Participation in the radical activism of the 1960s, therefore, had different functions and meanings for Jewish and non-Jewish radicals. Certainly Jews constituted initially the major force and much of the leadership in the Movement, diluted, as time went by, by the influx of the non-Jewish element. These two types of radicalism were in turn related to different patterns of child-rearing and family background, and after reading "The Roots of Radicalism" we can better comprehend the peculiarly personal element often observed in 1960s politics. I refer to the self-conscious orientation toward self-transcendence, self-expression, personal problem-solving through political action and immersion, and the conversion of public issues into highly personal concerns.

* * *


The findings of the German study were similar to the American, especially in regard to the development of radicalism among non-Jewish students. Thus,

"German radicals gave little indication of continuing family traditions of leftist ideology or behaviour. Instead they seemed to be actively rebelling against parents who were either genuinely conservative or insufficiently radical to satisfy their more fervent children... The most important finding is that radicals had significantly greater power needs and conflicts than non-radicals... The German radicals closely resembled their American non-Jewish counterparts in both their social diversity and psychological homogeneity. They exhibited the same political and personal rejection of their parents and the same power complex which they apparently resolved by adopting the negative identity of the social outlaw... An emotional alliance with the third world served the same needs some American radicals fulfilled by attaching themselves to the Black Panthers."


In conclusion the authors point out that the current "absence of overt protest has not meant a return to 1950s quietism. Elite campuses have become bastions of Left-liberal and radical social criticism..." Moreover, many of the views and values of the 1960s have become institutionalised, and absorbed by groups other than college students as a general shift to the Left has occurred.

I should note, finally, that since the book was written, overt protest and street politics have revived - without quite reaching the level of the late 1960s and early '70s. This resurgence of protest, focused on US aid to anti-Communist regimes in Central America and on Western efforts aimed at restoring the military balance between NATO and the Soviet Union, is in some ways more ominous than that of the earlier vintage. Today the elements of wilful self-delusion are even stronger than they were in the 1960s, and the issues more singularly focused on international affairs. The upsurge of "Unilateralism" is a far more devastating symptom of Western alienation and loss of collective will than protest against American involvement in faraway Viet Nam. Likewise, treating the rise of pro-Soviet regimes in Central America as inconsequential is a related form of collective self-delusion rooted in wishful thinking. Until other writers, equally sensitive and thoughtful, follow Rothman & Lichter in examining carefully the current crop of activists (including members of the clergy), we shall not authoritatively know what blend of idealism, self-delusion, alienation or fear (this time of manifest Soviet power) presents itself as a wholly rational and highly ethical protest against "American imperialism... wasteful military expenditures... and the risk of nuclear war."

[1] "Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left" By Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter. Oxford University Press

[2] Perhaps, in part, because it is in general so difficult for Americans to be critical of the young, because of the Rousseauian tendency in American culture to connect the young and youthfulness with many human virtues: idealism, nobility, selflessness, candour, purity, sincerity, authenticity...