

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

A. H. ARMSTRONG

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

V

ENNEADS

V. 1-9



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CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	vii
SIGLA	ix
ORDO ENNEADVM <i>and</i> ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS	x
ENNEAD V.	
1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES	5
2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST	55
3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND	67
4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE	137
5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT, AND ON THE GOOD	151
6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE	199
7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS	219
8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY	233
9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING	283

PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS IV-V

The text of these volumes, except in a few places, is that of the second volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer, *Plotini Opera II* Oxford Classical Texts, 1977. The editors, translator, and publishers have agreed that somewhat fuller critical notes should be appended to the Greek text than in the first three volumes of the Loeb Plotinus. These critical notes show clearly all places where the printed text departs from the manuscripts and all places where the text of these volumes differs from that of the Oxford Plotinus (H-S²): as a result of the extensive critical revision of the text of their first edition which the editors undertook in the preparation of the Oxford text, and in which the translator to a modest degree participated (hence the use of the first person plural in the notes where the changes are agreed by all), these latter are very few (26 in the Fourth Ennead, 7 in the Fifth). A number of them are corrections adopted by the editors after the publication of the Oxford Plotinus II and recorded in *Addenda et Corrigenda ad Textum et Apparatum Lectionum* in III (1982) pp. 304-325.

A word of explanation and apology is due to the reader for the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes and that of these two. The translator's work was completed (except for

PREFACE

minor corrections and revisions) in 1976: but as the result of the agreement between the Oxford University Press and the Loeb Classics the volumes could not have been published with the Greek text before 1979. The subsequent delay was due to the financial stringencies which beset all academic publishing at the present time.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

- A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A¹ = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
S = Berolinensis Gr. 375.
N = Monacensis Gr. 215.
M = Marcianus Gr. 240.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
V = Vindobonensis philosophicus Gr. 226.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
D = Marcianus Gr. 209.
- w = AE
x = BRJ
y = USM
z = QL
- Enn.^a = wxUC
Enn.^b = A^{lms}xUC
- mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
* = consensus editorum sequentium cum editore nominato
ital. = cod. vel ed. Eusebii
- H-S¹ = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio maior
H-S² = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio minor (= OCT)
B-T = Beutler-Theiler
Dodds = CQ 28 (1934) 47-53

V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the tenth in Porphyry's chronological order, in which the first great treatise on the One (VI. 9) is the ninth. It is a fine example of the way in which metaphysical reflection and personal spiritual life are always indissolubly united in Plotinus. The treatise does indeed, as its title indicates, give an account of the "three primary hypostases", the three great realities of Plotinus's world, in ascending order, Soul, Intellect, and the One, and argues vigorously, if sometimes obscurely, for Plotinus's distinctive views of their differences and derivations one from the other. But it is not a text-book exposition of an abstract metaphysical system which does not involve or commit writer or reader, but an "ascent of the mind to God" which recalls man to an understanding of his true nature and dignity and guides him on his way to his ultimate goal. The first two chapters give a vivid picture of the soul's alienation and self-forgetfulness here below and remind it of its true nature in language of a power unsurpassed in the *Enneads*; then we are shown how, having returned to an understanding of our true nature as soul, we find transcending it Intellect and the One or Good, and are brought to see how the Good must transcend and generate Intellect. After a doxographical digression in Chapters 8 and 9 designed mainly to show (probably against contemporary objections) that what Plotinus is expounding is the true doctrine of Plato, we return in the last three chapters to a reminder of how we, being soul, can find Intellect and the One within us, and a final

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

exhortation not to be distracted by our superficial mundane consciousness but to turn inwards and "listen to the voices from on high".

Synopsis

The souls of men have forgotten their Father and their true nature in their desire to belong to themselves which has led them into self-alienation and self-contempt and an ignorant admiration of material things. Two ways to convert them and lead them back up to God: one is to show how contemptible material things are, the other, better one, is to remind the soul of its high birth and value. Soul must know itself to know whether it is capable of knowing higher things (ch. 1). Every soul must remember that it made the whole universe: if it frees itself from illusion and attains to true peace it will see the great soul to which it is akin giving life and light and beauty to the world which is dead and worthless without it, keeping the heavens in motion and giving divinity to the sun and other heavenly bodies (ch. 2). When you have understood the nature of soul, go on to the next stage on the way to God, and grasp Intellect, the soul's upper neighbour, and see how soul is an image of Intellect and depends on it and is perfected by it (ch. 3). Intellect is the archetype of this visible universe, containing all that is in it in the eternal fulness of which Kronos is a symbol. How its eternal living reality is properly expressed in the categories of Plato's *Sophist* (ch. 4). Where does Intellect come from? The One. Number is posterior to and produced by the One and it is number (and so in another way the One) which gives Intellect its structure (ch. 5). How the One produces Intellect without movement or turning away from itself, as an eternal radiation from its perfection, and how Intellect determines itself as the perfect unity-in-diversity of the intelligible world by its return to the One, and in its turn produces Soul, as all that is perfect must produce (chs. 6-7). Confirmation that this is the true doctrine of

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

Plato, and of Parmenides, at least as improved by Plato (ch. 8). Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles also agree in essentials, but Aristotle, though he makes the first principle separate and intelligible, makes the mistake of thinking it a self-knowing intellect and introduces incoherence into the intelligible world by his doctrine of the plurality of unmoved movers (ch. 9). How we find Soul, Intellect, and the One within ourselves (chs. 10-11). Final exhortation to turn inwards and concentrate our attention so that we hear the voices from on high (ch. 12).

V. 1. (10) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΙΩΝ
ΑΡΧΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ

1. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς
πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν
οὔσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ
ἐκείνον; ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ τόλμα
5 καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ
βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. τῷ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ
ἐπειδὴ περ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσαι, πολλῶ τῷ κινεῖσθαι
παρ' αὐτῶν κεχρημένα, τὴν ἐναντίαν δραμοῦσαι
καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν πεποιημένοι, ἡγνόησαν
καὶ ἑαυτὰς ἐκεῖθεν εἶναι ὡσπερ παῖδες εὐθύς
0 ἀποσπασθέντες ἀπὸ πατέρων καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
πόρρω τραφέντες ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
πατέρας. οὐτ' οὖν ἔτι ἐκείνον οὔτε ἑαυτὰς ὀρῶ-
σαι, ἀτιμάσασαι ἑαυτὰς ἀγνοία τοῦ γένους,
τιμήσασαι τὰλλα καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτὰς

¹ τόλμα was a Neopythagorean name for the Indefinite Dyad (for which see below ch. 5) "because it separated itself from the One": cp. Plutarch *De Iside et Osiride* 75, 381 F; Iamblichus *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* 7, 19 and 9, 6 de Falco (quoting Anatolius, the third-century Aristotelian professor at Alexandria who became a Christian bishop). Plotinus several times in the *Enneads* takes up this Pythagorean idea and sees the root of all multiplicity, that is of all reality other than and inferior to the One or good, in an audacious act of self-assertion, a will to independent existence. This is applied

V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY
HYPOSTASES

1. What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity¹ and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were clearly delighted with their own independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible, they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world; just as children who are immediately torn from their parents and brought up far away do not know who they themselves or their parents are. Since they do not any more see their father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and honour other things, admiring everything rather than themselves, and,

to Intellect's coming into separate existence at VI. 9. 5. 29 (where the word *τολμήσας* is used); cp. III. 8. 8. 32-6. And the passage here about the τόλμα of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word τόλμα is not used there, but cp. ἀρχεῖν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς lines 15-16, with τὸ βουληθῆναι ἑαυτῶν εἶναι here. See further Naguib Baladi *La Pensée de Plotin* (Paris 1970), which is entirely concerned with the theme of audacity in Plotinus, and my discussion in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* 242-5.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

θαυμάσασαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκπλαγείσαι καὶ
 15 ἀγασθεῖσαι καὶ ἐξηρητημένοι τούτων, ἀπέρρηξαν
 ὡς οἶόν τε ἑαυτὰς ὧν ἀπεστράφησαν ἀτιμάσασαι·
 ὥστε συμβαίνει τῆς παντελοῦς ἀγνοίας ἐκείνου ἢ
 τῶνδε τιμῆ καὶ ἢ ἑαυτῶν ἀτιμία εἶναι αἰτία.
 ἅμα γὰρ διώκεται ἄλλο καὶ θαυμάζεται, καὶ τὸ
 θαυμάζον καὶ διώκον ὁμολογεῖ χεῖρον εἶναι.
 20 χεῖρον δὲ αὐτὸ τιθέμενον γιγνομένων καὶ ἀπολ-
 λυμένων ἀτιμωτάτων τε καὶ θνητότατον πάντων ὧν
 τιμῆ ὑπολαμβάνον οὔτε θεοῦ φύσιν οὔτε δύναμιν
 ἂν ποτε ἐν θυμῷ βάλοιτο. διὸ δεῖ διττὸν γίνεσθαι
 τὸν λόγον πρὸς τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, εἴπερ τις
 ἐπιστρέφει αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ
 25 ἀνάγοι μέχρι τοῦ ἀκροτάτου καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ πρώτου.
 τίς οὖν ἐκάτερος; ὁ μὲν δεικνύς τὴν ἀτιμίαν τῶν
 νῦν ψυχῇ τιμωμένων, ὃν ἐν ἄλλοις δίμην ἐπιπλέον,
 ὁ δὲ διδάσκων καὶ ἀναμνησκων τὴν ψυχὴν οἶον
 τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς ἀξίας, ὃς πρότερός ἐστιν
 ἐκείνου καὶ σαφηνισθεὶς κακείνου δηλώσει. περὶ
 30 οὗ νῦν λεκτέον· ἐγγὺς γὰρ οὗτος τοῦ ζητουμένου
 καὶ πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς ἐκείνον. τὸ γὰρ ζητοῦν ἐστι
 ψυχὴ, καὶ τί ὃν ζητεῖ γνωστότερον αὐτῇ, ἵνα αὐτῇ

XX
¹ Plotinus seems to have in mind the sort of melancholy commonplace, contrasting the transitoriness of human life with the ceaseless self-renewal of non-human nature, which found its finest expressions in the Latin poetry of the first century B.C., e.g. Catullus 5, Horace *Odes* IV. 7; cp. [Moschus] *Elegy on Bion* 99-104 (which may have inspired Catullus).

² Editors disagree on where, if anywhere, in the *Enneads*

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

astonished and delighted by and dependent on these [earthly] things, they broke themselves loose as far as they could in contempt of that from which they turned away; so that their honour for these things here and their contempt for themselves is the cause of their utter ignorance of God. For what pursues and admires something else admits at the same time its own inferiority; but by making itself inferior to things which come into being and perish and considering itself the most contemptible and the most liable to death of all the things which it admires¹ it could not possibly have any idea of the nature and power of God. One must therefore speak in two ways to men who are in this state of mind, if one is going to turn them round to what lies in the opposite direction and is primary, and to lead them up to that which is highest, one, and first. What, then, are these two ways? One shows how contemptible are the things now honoured by the soul, and this we shall develop more amply elsewhere,² but the other teaches and reminds the soul how high its birth and value are, and this is prior to the other one and when it is clarified will also make the other obvious. This is what we must speak about now; it is close to the subject of our investigation and will be useful for that other discourse. For that which investigates is the soul, and it should know what it

this fuller treatment is to be found, and it seems better to suppose with Harder that Plotinus may never have carried out his plan for a full-scale discourse on contempt of this world, at any rate in writing—perhaps because he found it very hard really to despise our world of sense, though he sometimes felt he ought to do so, and when challenged by people who really despised and hated it (the Gnostics) he defended its beauty and goodness passionately (cp. II. 9).

πρότερον μάθη, εἰ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ζητεῖν, καὶ εἰ ὄμμα τοιοῦτον ἔχει, ὅσον ἰδεῖν, καὶ εἰ
προσῆκει ζητεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλότρια, τί δεῖ; εἰ
35 δὲ συγγενῆ, καὶ προσῆκει καὶ δύναται εὔρεῖν.

2. Ἐνθυμείσθω τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο πᾶσα
ψυχῆ, ὡς αὐτὴ μὲν ζῶσα ἐποίησε πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα
αὐτοῖς ζωὴν, ἃ τε γῆ τρέφει ἃ τε θάλασσα ἃ τε ἐν
ἀέρι ἃ τε ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρα θεῖα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον,
5 αὐτὴ δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανόν, καὶ αὐτὴ
ἐκόσμησεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει φύσις οὐσα
ἑτέρα ὦν κοσμεῖ καὶ ὦν κινεῖ καὶ ἃ ζῆν ποιεῖ· καὶ
τούτων ἀνάγκη εἶναι τιμιωτέραν, γιγνομένων
τούτων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὅταν αὐτὰ ψυχῆ ἀπολείπη
ἢ χορηγῆ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐσα ἀεὶ τῷ μὴ ἀπο-
10 λείπειν ἑαυτήν. τίς διὲν τρύπος τῆς χορηγίας τοῦ
ζῆν ἐν τε τῷ σύμπαντι ἐν τε τοῖς ἐκάστοις, ὧδε
λογιζέσθω. σκοπέσθω δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν
ἄλλη ψυχῆ οὐ μικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη
ἀπαλλαγείσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς
ἄλλας ἡσυχίᾳ τῇ καταστάσει. ἡσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ
15 ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ
σώματος κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον·
ἡσυχος μὲν γῆ, ἡσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ ἀήρ καὶ

¹ This phrase is taken from Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9. The whole account of soul's cosmic activity here is inspired by *Phaedrus* 245C5ff. and *Laws* X 895A5ff.

² This passage made a deep impression on both St. Basil (*Hom. X V de fide* II 131c-d Garnier=PG 31, 465A-B; *De Spiritu* I 320C-322A Garnier=PG 20, 768B-772B—Basil is here making extensive use of the whole passage I. 29-3. 10) and St. Augustine, whose adaptation of it in his account of

is as an investigating soul, so that it may learn first about itself, whether it has the power to investigate things of this kind, and if it has an eye of the right kind to see them, and if the investigation is suitable for it. For if the objects are alien, what is the point? But if they are akin, the investigation is suitable and discovery is possible.

2. Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it made all living things itself, breathing life into them, those that the earth feeds and those that are nourished by the sea, and the divine stars in the sky; it made the sun itself, and this great heaven, and adorned it itself, and drives it round itself, in orderly movement; it is a nature other than the things which it adorns and moves and makes live; and it must necessarily be more honourable than they, for they come into being or pass away when the soul leaves them or grants life to them, but soul itself exists for ever because "it does not depart from itself".¹ This is how soul should reason about the manner in which it grants life in the whole universe and in individual things. Let it look at the great soul, being itself another soul which is no small one, which has become worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the things that have bewitched the other souls, and is established in quietude. Let not only its encompassing body and the body's raging sea be quiet, but all its environment: the earth quiet, and the sea and air quiet, and the heaven itself at peace.² Into

the spiritual experience which he shared with his mother at Ostia is deservedly famous (*Confessions* IX 10. 25ff.). The *σώματος κλύδων* may be inspired by Plato *Timaeus* 43B5; for the metaphor cp. the oracle of Apollo on Plotinus (*Porphyrus Life* 22. 25-6 and 30-4).

αὐτὸς οὐρανὸς ἀκήμων.¹ νοεῖτω δὲ πάντοθεν εἰς
αὐτὸν ἐστῶσα ψυχὴν ἔξωθεν οἶον εἰσρέουσαν καὶ
εἰσχυθεῖσαν καὶ πάντοθεν εἰσιούσαν καὶ εἰσλάμπου-
20 σαν· οἶον σκοτεινὸν νέφος ἡλίου βολαὶ φωτίσασαι
λάμπειν ποιοῦσι χρυσοειδῆ ὄψιν διδοῦσαι, οὕτω τοι
καὶ ψυχὴ ἔλθοῦσα εἰς σῶμα οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκε μὲν
ζωὴν, ἔδωκε δὲ ἀθανασίαν, ἤγειρε δὲ κείμενον.
ὁ δὲ κινηθεὶς κίνησιν αἰδιον ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἐμφρόνως
25 ἀγούσης ζῶον εὐδαιμον ἐγένετο, ἔσχε τε ἀξίαν
οὐρανὸς ψυχῆς εἰσοικισθείσης ὣν πρὸ ψυχῆς σῶμα
νεκρὸν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ, μᾶλλον δὲ σκότος ὕλης καὶ
μὴ ὄν καὶ ὁ στυγέουσιν οἱ θεοί, φησί τις.
γένοιτο δ' ἂν φανερωτέρα αὐτῆς καὶ ἐναργεστέρα ἢ
δύναμις καὶ ἡ φύσις, εἴ τις ἐνταῦθα διανοηθείη,
30 ὅπως περιέχει καὶ ἄγει ταῖς αὐτῆς βουλήσῃσι τὸν
οὐρανόν. παντὶ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει τούτῳ, ὅσος
ἐστίν, ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὴν καὶ πᾶν διάστημα καὶ μέγα
καὶ μικρὸν ἐψύχεται, ἄλλου μὲν ἄλλη κειμένου τοῦ
σώματος, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ὠδί, τοῦ δὲ ὠδί ὄντος, καὶ
τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίας, τῶν δὲ ἄλλην ἀπάρτησιν ἀπ'
35 ἀλλήλων ἐχόντων. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲ
μέρει αὐτῆς ἐκάστω κατακερματισθεῖσα [μορίῳ
ψυχῆς]² ζῆν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα ζῆ τῆ ὅλη, καὶ
πάρεστι πᾶσα πανταχοῦ τῷ γεννήσαντι πατρὶ
ὁμοιομένη καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ κατὰ τὸ πάντη.
καὶ πολὺς ὢν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλη ἐν ἐστὶ τῆ
40 ταύτης δυνάμει καὶ θεὸς ἐστὶ διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος

¹ ἀκήμων (silens) Schwyzler (*Mus. Helv.* 37, 1980): ἀμείνων
ARJ^{pc}: ἀμείνω EBJ^{ac}UC.

² om. Basilus: delevimus, ut glossam ad μέρει αὐτῆς.

this heaven at rest let it imagine soul as if flowing in
from outside, pouring in and entering it everywhere
and illuminating it: as the rays of the sun light up
a dark cloud, and make it shine and give it a golden
look, so soul entering into the body of heaven gives
it life and gives it immortality and wakes what lies
inert. And heaven, moved with an everlasting mo-
tion by the wise guidance of soul, becomes a "for-
tunate living being" and gains its value by the in-
dwelling of soul; before soul it was a dead body,
earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter
and non-existence, and "what the gods hate", as
a poet says.¹ The power and nature of soul will
become still clearer and more obvious if one considers
here how it encompasses the heaven and drives it by
its own acts of will. For soul has given itself to the
whole magnitude of heaven, as far as it extends, and
every stretch of space, both great and small, is
ensouled; one body lies in one place and one in
another, and one is here and another there; some
are separated by being in opposite parts of the
universe, and others in other ways. But soul is
not like this and it is not by being cut up that it
gives life, by a part of itself for each individual thing,
but all things live by the whole, and all soul is present
everywhere, made like to the father who begat it in
its unity and its universality. And by its power the
heaven is one, though it is multiple with one part in
one place and one in another, and our universe is a

¹ The phrase is used of Hades in *Iliad* 20. 65.

ὄδε. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεός, ὅτι ἔμφυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρον, καὶ ἡμεῖς, εἴπερ τι, διὰ τοῦτο νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι. τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι. ὁμοειδῆς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα, καὶ
 45 ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῆς λαβῶν κεκαθαυμένην, εὐρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχῆ, καὶ τιμιώτερον παντὸς τοῦ ὃ ἂν σωματικὸν ἦ. γῆ γὰρ πάντα· κἂν πῦρ δὲ ἦ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ καίον αὐτοῦ; καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων σύνθετα, κἂν ὕδωρ αὐτοῖς προσθῆς κἂν ἀέρα. εἰ δ' ὅτι ἔμφυχον
 50 διωκτὸν ἔσται, τί παρείς τι ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον διώκει; τὴν δὲ ἐν ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἀγάμενος σεαυτὸν ἀγασαι.

3. Οὕτω δὲ τιμίον καὶ θείου ὄντος χρήματος τῆς ψυχῆς, πιστεύσας ἤδη τῷ τοιοῦτῳ θεὸν μετιέναι μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἀνάβαινε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον πάντως που οὐ πόρρω βαλεῖς· οὐδὲ πολλὰ τὰ
 5 μεταξύ. λάμβανε τοίνυν τὸ τοῦ θείου τούτου θειώτερον τὸ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω γειτόνημα, μεθ' ὃ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἡ ψυχῆ. καίπερ γὰρ οὐσα χρήμα οἶον ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, εἰκὼν τίς ἐστι νοῦ· οἶον λόγος ὃ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω τοι

¹ Heraclitus, Diels B 96.

² Plotinus has perhaps remembered the unusual word *γειτόνημα* from Plato *Laus* IV 705A4, but if so he has forgotten the singularly inappropriate context—the sea in Plato would be a “bitter and briny neighbour” to the city for which a site is being considered.

god by the agency of this soul. And the sun also is a god because it is ensouled, and the other heavenly bodies, and we, if we are in any way divine, are so for this reason: for “corpses are more throwable away than dung”.¹ But that which is for the gods the cause of their being gods must necessarily be a divinity senior to them. But our soul is of the same kind, and when you look at it without its accretions and take it in its purified state you will find that very same honourable thing which [we said] was soul, more honourable than everything which is body. For all bodily things are earth; and even if they are fire, what would its burning principle be [but soul]? And the same is true of all things compounded of these, even if you add water to them, and air as well. But if the bodily is worth pursuing because it is ensouled, why does one let oneself go and pursue another? But by admiring the soul in another, you admire yourself.

3. Since the soul is so honourable and divine a thing, be sure already that you can attain God by reason of its being of this kind, and with this as your motive ascend to him: in all certainty you will not look far; and the stages between are not many. Grasp then the soul's upper neighbour,² more divine than this divine thing, after which and from which the soul comes. For, although it is a thing of the kind which our discussion has shown it to be, it is an image of Intellect; just as a thought in its utterance is an image of the thought in soul, so soul itself is the expressed thought of Intellect,³ and its

³ The distinction here made between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* (the thought in the mind) and the *λόγος προφορικός* (the thought expressed) first appears in Stoic logic: cp. *SVF* II 135.

καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἦν
 10 προῖεται ζωὴν εἰς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν· οἷον πυρὸς τὸ
 μὲν ἡ συνοῦσα θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἦν παρέχει. δεῖ δὲ
 λαβεῖν ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἐκρέουσιν, ἀλλὰ μένουσαν μὲν τὴν
 ἐν αὐτῷ, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην. οὔσα οὖν
 ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερά ἐστι, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς
 καὶ ἡ τελείωσις ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν οἷον πατρὸς
 15 ἐκθρέψαντος, ὃν οὐ τέλειον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐγέννη-
 σεν. ἢ τε οὖν ὑπόστασις αὐτῆ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὁ τε
 ἐνεργεία λόγος νοῦ αὐτῆ ὄρωμένου. ὅταν γὰρ
 ἐνὶδῃ εἰς νοῦν, ἐνδοθεν ἔχει καὶ οἰκεία ἃ νοεῖ καὶ
 ἐνεργεῖ. καὶ ταύτας μόνας δεῖ λέγειν ἐνεργείας
 ψυχῆς, ὅσα νοερώς καὶ ὅσα οἰκοθεν· τὰ δὲ χεῖρω
 20 ἄλλοθεν καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς τῆς τοιαύτης. νοῦς οὖν
 ἐπὶ μᾶλλον θειοτέραν ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ πατὴρ εἶναι καὶ
 τῷ παρεῖναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ μεταξὺ ἡ τὸ ἑτέροις εἶναι,
 ὡς ἐφεξῆς μέντοι καὶ ὡς τὸ δεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ὡς
 εἶδος· καλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ νοῦ ὕλη νοοειδῆς οὔσα καὶ
 ἀπλή. οἷον δὲ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ταῦτῳ μὲν ταύτη
 25 δῆλον, ὅτι κρεῖττον ψυχῆς τοιαύτης οὔσης.

4. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶνδε· κόσμον αἰσθητὸν
 τόνδε εἴ τις θαυμάζει εἰς τε τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ
 κάλλος καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῆς φαρᾶς τῆς αἰδίου

whole activity, and the life which it sends out to establish another reality; as fire has the heat which remains with it and the heat which it gives. But one must understand that the activity on the level of Intellect does not flow out of it, but the external activity comes into existence as something distinct. Since then its existence derives from Intellect soul is intellectual, and its intellect is in discursive reasonings, and its perfection comes from Intellect, like a father who brings to maturity a son whom he begat imperfect in comparison with himself. Soul's establishment in reality, then, comes from Intellect and its thought becomes actual in its seeing of Intellect. For when it looks into Intellect, it has within it and as its own what it thinks in its active actuality. And we should call these alone activities of the soul, all it does intellectually and which spring from its own home; its inferior activities come from elsewhere and belong to a soul of this inferior kind. Intellect therefore makes soul still more divine by being its father and by being present to it; for there is nothing between but the fact that they are different,¹ soul as next in order and as the recipient, Intellect as the form; and even the matter of Intellect is beautiful, since it has the form of Intellect and is simple. But what Intellect is like is clear from this very fact that it is superior to soul which is of such great excellence.

4. But one might see this also from what follows: if someone admires this perceptible universe, observing its size and beauty and the order of its ever-

¹ Cp. V. 8. 7. 13, where the phrase οἰδενὸς δὲ μεταξὺ ὄντος is used of the intelligible and material universes.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

ἀποβλέπων καὶ θεοὺς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ, τοὺς μὲν
 5 ὄρωμένους, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀφανεῖς ὄντας, καὶ
 δαίμονας καὶ ζῶα φυτὰ τε πάντα, ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον
 αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀληθινώτερον ἀναβὰς κάκει πάντα
 ἰδέτω νοητὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ αἰδία ἐν οἰκείᾳ
 συνέσει καὶ ζωῇ, καὶ τούτων τὸν ἀκήρατον νοῦν
 προστάτην, καὶ σοφίαν ἀμήχανον, καὶ τὸν ὡς
 10 ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον θεοῦ κόρου καὶ νοῦ
 ὄντος. πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἀθάνατα περιέχει,
 νοῦν πάντα, θεὸν πάντα, ψυχὴν πᾶσαν, ἐστῶτα αἰεί.
 τί γὰρ ζητεῖ μεταβάλλειν εἴ ἔχων; ποῦ δὲ
 μετελλθεῖν πάντα παρ' αὐτῷ ἔχων; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 αὔξειν ζητεῖ τελειότατος ὢν. διὸ καὶ τὰ παρ'
 15 αὐτῷ πάντα τέλεια, ἵνα πάντῃ ἢ τέλειος οὐδὲν
 ἔχων ὅ τι μὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὃ
 μὴ νοεῖ· νοεῖ δὲ οὐ ζητῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχων. καὶ τὸ
 μακάριον αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐπίκτητον, ἀλλ' ἐν αἰῶνι
 πάντα, καὶ ὁ ὄντως αἰών, ὃν μιμνῆται χρόνος
 περιθέων ψυχὴν τὰ μὲν παριείς, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβάλλων.
 20 καὶ γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα αὐτῷ περὶ ψυχῆν· ποτὲ γὰρ
 Σωκράτης, ποτὲ δὲ ἵππος, ἐν τι αἰεὶ τῶν ὄντων· ὃ δὲ
 νοῦς πάντα. ἔχει οὖν [ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ]¹ πάντα ἐστῶτα
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ ἔστι μόνον, καὶ τὸ "ἔστιν" αἰεί,
 καὶ οὐδαμοῦ τὸ μέλλον—ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τότε—οὐδὲ τὸ
 παρεληλυθός—οὐ γὰρ τι ἐκεῖ παρελήλυθεν—ἀλλ'
 25 ἐνέστηκεν αἰεὶ ἅτε τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα οἶον ἀγαπῶντα

¹ del. Harder.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

lasting course, and the gods in it, some of whom are seen and some are invisible, and the spirits, and all animals and plants, let him ascend to its archetypal and truer reality and there see them all intelligible and eternal in it, in its own understanding and life; and let him see pure Intellect presiding over them, and immense wisdom, and the true life of Kronos, a god who is fulness and intellect.¹ For he encompasses in himself all things immortal, every intellect, every god, every soul, all for ever unmoving. For why should it seek to change when all is well with it? Where should it seek to go away to when it has everything in itself? But it does not even seek to increase, since it is most perfect. Therefore all things in it are perfect, that it may be altogether perfect, having nothing which is not so, having nothing in itself which does not think; but it thinks not by seeking but by having. Its blessedness is not something acquired, but all things are in eternity, and the true eternity, which time copies, running round the soul, letting some things go and attending to others. For around Soul things come one after another: now Socrates, now a horse, always some one particular reality; but Intellect is all things. It has therefore everything at rest in the same place, and it only is, and its "is" is for ever, and there is no place for the future for then too it is—or for the past—for nothing there has passed away—but all things remain stationary for ever, since they are the same, as if

¹ The quaint etymology of Plato *Cratylus* 396B6-7 is in Plotinus' mind here: but there *κόρος* signifies τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκέραιον τοῦ νοῦ. For Plotinus, here and elsewhere, the word *κόρος* is applied to Intellect or Soul in its two meanings of "satiety" (signifying the plenitude of intelligible being) and "bcy" (the son of the Father, the One): cp. ch. 7 below and III. 8. 11; V. 8. 12-13.

ἑαυτὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν νοῦς καὶ ὄν
 ἔστι καὶ τὸ σύμπαν πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶν ὄν, ὃ μὲν νοῦς
 κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν ὑφίστασθαι τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὄν τῷ νοεῖσθαι
 τῷ νῷ διδόν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦ δὲ νοεῖν
 30 αἴτιον ἄλλο, ὃ καὶ τῷ ὄντι· ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἅμα
 αἴτιον ἄλλο. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ συνπάρχει
 καὶ οὐκ ἀπολείπει ἄλληλα, ἀλλὰ δύο ὄντα τοῦτο τὸ
 ἐν ὁμοῦ νοῦς καὶ ὄν καὶ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον, ὃ μὲν
 νοῦς κατὰ τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ δὲ ὄν κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον.
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ νοεῖν ἑτερότητος μὴ οὔσης καὶ
 35 ταυτότητος δέ. γίνεται οὖν τὰ πρῶτα νοῦς, ὄν,
 ἑτερότητος, ταυτότητος· δεῖ δὲ καὶ κίνησιν λαβεῖν
 καὶ στάσιν. καὶ κίνησιν μὲν, εἰ νοεῖ, στάσιν δέ,
 ἵνα τὸ αὐτό. τὴν δὲ ἑτερότητα, ἢ ἢ νοοῦν καὶ
 νοούμενον. ἢ ἢ ἀφέλης τὴν ἑτερότητα, ἐν γενόμε-
 νον σιωπήσεται· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοηθείσιν ἑτέροις
 40 πρὸς ἄλληλα εἶναι. ταῦτόν δέ, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ
 κοινὸν δέ τι ἐν πᾶσι· καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἑτερότητος.
 ταῦτα δὲ πλείω γενόμενα ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν
 ποιεῖ· καὶ τὸ ποιὸν δὲ ἢ ἐκάστου τούτων ιδιότητος,
 ἐξ ὧν ὡς ἀρχῶν τᾶλλα.

¹ Plotinus is here paraphrasing what Plato says about eternal intelligible being in *Timaeus* 37E5-38B3 (though it is not certain whether Plato was thinking like Plotinus of timeless eternity and not rather of changeless duration). Plotinus follows the *Timaeus* here in insisting that all things in Intellect are stationary, but when he turns, as he so often does, later in the chapter (lines 35ff.) to apply the "Platonic

they were satisfied with themselves for being so.¹ But each of them is Intellect and Being, and the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect making Being exist in thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought. But the cause of thinking is something else, which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other than themselves. For they are simultaneous and exist together and one does not abandon the other, but this one is two things, Intellect and Being and thinking and thought, Intellect as thinking and Being as thought. For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness. These then are primary, Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness; but one must also include Motion and Rest. One must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there may be thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of thought, also, must have otherness in relation to each other. But one must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some common unity; and the distinctive quality of each is otherness. The fact that there are several of these primaries makes number and quantity; and the particularity of each makes quality, and from these as principles everything else comes.

categories" of *Sophist* 254Dff. to Intellect he has to introduce κίνησις, the motion of thought, into it (lines 36-7); and he sometimes goes much further than here in introducing the movement which seems inseparable from our concepts of life and thought into the intelligible world: cp. V. 8. 3-4 and VI. 7. 13.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

5. Πολὺς οὖν οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ· τῇ δὲ
 ὑπάρχει ἐν τούτοις εἶναι συναφθείσῃ, εἰ μὴ ἀποστα-
 τεῖν ἐθέλοι. πελάσασα οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ οἶον ἐν
 γενομένη ζῆ ἀεί.¹ τίς οὖν ὁ τοῦτον γενήσας; ὁ
 5 ἀπλοῦς καὶ ὁ πρὸ τοιούτου πλήθους, ὁ αἴτιος τοῦ καὶ
 εἶναι καὶ πολὺν εἶναι τοῦτον, ὁ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ποιῶν.
 ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶτος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸ δυνάδος τὸ
 εἶν, δεύτερον δὲ δυὰς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς γεγενημένη
 ἐκεῖνο ὀριστὴν ἔχει, αὐτῇ² δὲ ἀόριστον παρ' αὐτῆς·
 ὅταν δὲ ὀρισθῇ, ἀριθμὸς ἤδη· ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὡς οὐσία·
 10 ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχή· οὐ γὰρ ὄγκοι τὰ πρῶτα
 οὐδὲ μεγέθη· τὰ γὰρ παχέα ταῦτα ὕστερα, ἃ ὄντα
 ἡ αἴσθησις οἴεται. οὐδὲ ἐν σπέρμασι δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν
 τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὀρώμενον· τοῦτο δὲ ἀριθμὸς
 καὶ λόγος. ὁ οὖν ἐκεῖ λεγόμενος ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἡ
 δυὰς λόγοι καὶ νοῦς· ἀλλὰ ἀόριστος μὲν ἡ δυὰς τῷ
 15 οἶον ὑποκειμένη λαμβανομένη, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὁ ἐξ

¹ Seidel, et testatur Theol. VIII. 129: ζῆτεῖ Enn.* defendunt Henry (États 196) et Cilento.

² Ficinus: αὐτῇ Enn.

¹ The "dyad" here is the indefinite life or sight which is the first moment in the timeless formation of Intellect by procession from and return upon the One. See V. 4. 2. 4-10, where the ἀόριστος ὄψις of Intellect is explicitly identified

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

5. This god, then, which is over the soul, is multiple; and soul exists among the intelligible realities in close unity with them, unless it wills to desert them. When it has come near then to him and, in a way, become one with him, it lives for ever. Who is it, then, who begat this god? The simple god, the one who is prior to this kind of multiplicity, the cause of this one's existence and multiplicity, the maker of number. For number is not primary: the One is prior to the dyad, but the dyad is secondary and, originating from the One, has it as definer, but is itself of its own nature indefinite; but when it is defined, it is already a number, but a number as substance; and soul too is a number.¹ For masses and magnitudes are not primary: these things which have thickness come afterwards, and sense-perception thinks they are realities. Even in seeds it is not the moisture which is honourable, but what is unseen: and this is number and rational principle. Therefore what is called number in the intelligible world and the dyad are rational principles and Intellect; but the dyad is indefinite when one forms an idea of it by what may be called the substrate, but each and

with the ἀόριστος δυὰς; and for a fuller exposition of this very important doctrine VI. 7. 16-17 and V. 3. 11. 1-12; cp. also the account of "intelligible matter" in II. 4. 1-5. For the dyad as τόλμα see Chapter 1, n. 1. For Plotinus's full treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Numbers, briefly and obscurely referred to in this chapter, see VI. 6 *On Numbers*. For the doctrine of the Ideal Numbers and their generation from the One and the Indefinite Dyad in Plato (as reported by Aristotle) and the Old Academy see, in the first instance, P. Merlan in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* (Cambridge 1970) Part I, Chapter 2, and the references there given.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶδος ἕκαστος, οἷον μορφωθέντος τοῖς γενομένοις εἶδεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ· μορφοῦται δὲ ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον παρὰ τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλον δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ, οἷον ὄψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόησις ὄρασις ὁρώσα ἄμφω τε¹ ἓν.

6. Πῶς οὖν ὄρα καὶ τίνα, καὶ πῶς ὅλως ὑπέστη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου γέγονεν, ἵνα καὶ ὄρα; νῦν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει, ἐπιποθεῖ δὲ τὸ θρυλλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς, πῶς ἐξ ἑνός τοιούτου ὄντος, οἷον λέγομεν τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ὅτι οὖν εἴτε πλήθος εἴτε δυὰς εἴτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔμεινεν ἐκείνο ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, τοσοῦτον δὲ πλήθος ἐξεργύη, ὃ ὄραται μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐκείνο ἀξιούμεν. ὦδε οὖν λεγέσθω θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένοις οὐ λόγῳ γεγωνῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκείνον, εὐχέσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον δυναμένους μόνους πρὸς μόνον. δεῖ τοίνυν θεατὴν, ἐκείνου ἐν τῷ εἶσω οἷον νεῶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, μένοντος ἡσύχου ἐπέκεινα ἀπάντων, τὰ οἷον πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἡδη ἀγάλματα ἐστῶτα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαλμα τὸ πρῶτον ἐκφανὲν θεῶσθαι πεφηνὸς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· παντὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ δεῖ τι εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ κινεῖται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐκείνῳ μηδενὸς μὴ τιθώμεθα αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι μετ' αὐτὸ

¹ ἄμφω τε (et ambo Ficinus) Sleeman, et testatur Theol. VIII. 135: ἄμφω τὸ Enn., Perna, Creuzer: ἀμφὶ τὸ Kirshhoff, Müller: (καὶ) ἄμφω τὸ Volkmann*.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

every number which comes from it and the One is a form, as if Intellect was shaped by the numbers which came to exist in it; but it is shaped in one way by the One and in another by itself, like sight in its actuality; for intellection is seeing sight, and both are one.

6. How then does it see, and whom does it see? And how did it come into existence at all and arise from the One so as to be able to see? For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One. Let us speak of it in this way, first invoking God himself, not in spoken words, but stretching ourselves out with our soul into prayer to him, able in this way to pray alone to him alone.¹ The contemplator, then, since God exists by himself as if inside the temple, remaining quiet beyond all things, must contemplate what correspond to the images already standing outside the temple, or rather that one image which appeared first; and this is the way in which it appeared: everything which is moved must have some end to which it moves. The One has no such end, so we must not consider that it moves. If anything comes

¹ The only explicit reference to genuine prayer in Plotinus (though his whole philosophy is prayer in this sense). Prayer to lesser deities for material needs is for him a magical activity: see IV. 4. 30-39.

γίνεσθαι, ἐπιστραφέντος αἰεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γεγονέναι. ἐκποδῶν δὲ ἡμῶν ἔστω
 20 γένησις ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων
 ποιούμενοις· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὴν γένεσιν προσάπτου-
 τας αὐτοῖς <ἀποδόσει>¹ αἰτίας καὶ τάξεως [αὐτοῖς
 ἀποδώσει]¹ τὸ ὄν γινόμενον ἐκεῖθεν οὐ κινήθentos
 φατέον γίνεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ κινήθentos αὐτοῦ τι
 γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ
 25 τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ οὐ δεύτερον. δεῖ ὄν
 ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ
 προσενύσαντος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὄλως κινή-
 θentos ὑποστήναι αὐτό. πῶς ὄν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι
 περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον; περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν
 30 ὡσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος.
 καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἕως μένει, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας
 ἀναγκαῖαν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸ ἕξω αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς
 παρουσίας δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρητημένην
 ὑπόστασιν, εἰκόνα οὖσαν οἷον ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ·
 35 πῦρ μὲν τὴν παρ' αὐτοῦ θερμότητα· καὶ χιῶν οὐκ
 εἴσω μόνον τὸ ψυχρὸν κατέχει· μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα
 εὐώδη μαρτυρεῖ τοῦτο· ἕως γάρ ἐστι, πρόεισί τι
 ἐξ αὐτῶν περὶ αὐτά, ὧν ἀπολαύει ὑποστάντων ὁ

¹ ἀποδόσει transposuimus, αἰτίας genetivus (testatur Theologia): αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσει (-δόσει cod. Ottobonianus: -δώσει H-S¹⁻²) deleuimus; distinctio ante τὸ tollenda.

into being after it, we must think that it necessarily does so while the One remains continually turned towards itself. When we are discussing eternal realities we must not let coming into being in time be an obstacle to our thought; in the discussion we apply the word "becoming" to them in attributing to them causal connection and order, and must therefore state that what comes into being from the One does so without the One being moved: for if anything came into being as a result of the One's being moved, it would be the third starting from the One, not the second, since it would come after the movement.¹ So if there is a second after the One it must have come to be without the One moving at all, without any inclination or act of will or any sort of activity on its part. How did it come to be then, and what are we to think of as surrounding the One in its repose? It must be a radiation from it while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs round it, springing from it continually while it remains unchanged. All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their

¹ Cp. what is said about the unnecessary multiplication of hypostases in II. 9. 1.

πλησίον. καὶ πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾶ· τὸ
 δὲ αἰεὶ τέλειον αἰεὶ καὶ αἰδίον γεννᾶ· καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ
 40 ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾶ. τί οὖν χρή περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου
 λέγειν; μηδὲν ἄπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν.
 μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτόν νοῦς καὶ δεύτερον· καὶ γὰρ
 ὄρᾳ ὁ νοῦς ἐκείνον καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκείνος
 δὲ τούτου οὐδέν· καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος
 νοῦ νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἀπάντων νοῦς, ὅτι
 45 τᾶλλα μετ' αὐτόν· οἶον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ
 ἐνέργειά τις, ὡσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου. ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς
 μὲν ἀμυδρὸς ὁ λόγος—ὡς γὰρ εἶδωλὸν νοῦ—ταύτη
 καὶ εἰς νοῦν βλέπειν δεῖ· νοῦς δὲ ὡσαύτως πρὸς
 ἐκείνον, ἵνα ἢ νοῦς. ὄρᾳ δὲ αὐτόν οὐ χωρισθείς,
 ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτόν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν, ὡς οὐδὲ
 50 ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ. ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννήσαν καὶ τοῦτο
 ἀγαπᾶ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνου τὸ γεννήσαν
 καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἢ τὸ
 γεννήσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ
 ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι.

7. Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν· δεῖ
 γὰρ σαφέστερον λέγειν· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι δεῖ πως
 εἶναι ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον καὶ ἀποσώζειν πολλὰ
 αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιότητα πρὸς αὐτό, ὡσπερ καὶ
 5 τὸ φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου. ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἐκείνο. πῶς
 οὖν νοῦν γεννᾶ; ἢ ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτό

¹ A striking example of the often misunderstood metaphor of "emanation", on which see my contribution to *The*

existence.¹ And all things when they come to per-
 fection produce; the One is always perfect and
 therefore produces everlastingly; and its product is
 less than itself. What then must we say about the
 most perfect? Nothing can come from it except
 that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is
 next to it in greatness and second to it: for Intellect
 sees it and needs it alone; but it has no need of
 Intellect; and that which derives from something
 greater than Intellect is intellect, which is greater
 than all things, because the other things come after
 it: as Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of
 Intellect, just as Intellect is of the One. But soul's
 expression is obscure—for it is a ghost of Intellect—
 and for this reason it has to look to Intellect; but
 Intellect in the same way has to look to that god,
 in order to be Intellect. But it sees him, not as
 separated from him, but because it comes next after
 him, and there is nothing between, as also there is
 not anything between soul and Intellect. Every-
 thing longs for its parent and loves it, especially
 when parent and offspring are alone; but when the
 parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily
 with him and separate from him only in otherness. ✕

7. But we say that Intellect is an image of that
 Good; for we must speak more plainly; first of all
 we must say that what has come into being must be
 in a way that Good, and retain much of it and be a
 likeness of it, as light is of the sun. But Intellect
 is not that Good. How then does it generate
 Intellect? Because by its return to it it sees: and

*Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philo-
 sophy* Part III, Chapter 15, 239–41.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

έώρα· ἡ δὲ ὄρασις αὐτῆ νοῦς. τὸ γὰρ καταλαμ-
 βάνον ἄλλο ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ νοῦς· αἴσθησιν γραμ-
 μῆν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· ἄλλ' ὁ κύκλος τοιοῦτος οἶος
 μερίζεσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οὕτως. ἢ καὶ ἐνταῦθα
 10 ἐν μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν δυνάμει πάντων. ὧν οὖν ἐστι
 δυνάμει, ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως οἶον σχιζομένη ἢ
 νόησις καθορᾶ· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦν νοῦς. ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ'
 αὐτοῦ ἔχει ἡδὴ οἶον συναίσθησιν τῆς δυνάμεως,
 ὅτ' δύναιται οὐσίαν. αὐτὸς γοῦν δι' αὐτὸν καὶ ὀρίζει
 τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει καὶ ὅτι οἶον
 15 μέρος ἔν τι τῶν ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἢ οὐσία, καὶ
 ῥώννυται παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν

¹ Several scholars have thought that the subject of *έώρα* in this sentence is the One or Good, which is certainly the subject of *γεννᾶ* in the preceding sentence. Henry and Schwyzer now accept this view (see their *Addenda ad Textum in Plotini Opera* III. p. 397). The sentence would then mean "The One by its return to itself sees: and this seeing is Intellect." But this simple identification of Intellect with the self-vision of the One does not agree with anything else which is said about the relationship of the two hypostases in the *Enneads*; and it seems to me most unlikely that Plotinus would ever have spoken of the One as "returning" upon itself and seeing itself as the unity-in-multiplicity which is Intellect: for in his thought there can be absolutely no

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

this seeing is Intellect.¹ For that which apprehends something else is either sense-perception or intellect; (sense-perception is a line etc.)² but the circle is of a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual apprehension] is not so. There is One here also, but the One is the productive power of all things. The things, then, of which it is the productive power are those which Intellect observes, in a way cutting itself off from the power; otherwise it would not be Intellect. For Intellect also has of itself a kind of intimate perception of its power, that it has power to produce substantial reality. Intellect, certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and because its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened

separation from itself or multiplicity in the One. The development of one side of his thought about this ultimate and mysterious relationship, on the line which appears to have been followed by Porphyry, might lead to a conclusion something like this. But I do not think it should be read back into Plotinus himself without better evidence than the present ambiguous passage supplies. I therefore, with Cilento, Igal and others, suppose an abrupt change of subject (by no means unprecedented in Plotinus) and take *αὐτό* as non-reflexive ("it", not "itself") and understand that Plotinus is expounding his normal doctrine that Intellect constitutes itself by returning in vision or contemplation upon the One (cp. ch. 5, n. 1).

² We need not suppose any corruption of the text here if, with Igal, we assume that Plotinus is briefly reminding his readers of an analogy which would be familiar to them, in which sense perception is compared to a line, intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. (These early treatises were written for circulation only to a few intimate associates, for whom this sort of summary reminder would be sufficient: cp. Porphyry *Life* ch. 4.)

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου. ὄρα δὲ αὐτῷ ἐκείθεν,
οἷον μεριστῷ ἐξ ἀμερίστου, καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ
νοεῖν καὶ πάντα, ὅτι ἐκείνος μηδὲν τῶν πάντων·
20 ταύτη γὰρ πάντα ἐξ ἐκείνου, ὅτι μὴ τινι μορφῇ
κατείχετο ἐκείνος· μόνον γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ· καὶ εἰ¹
μὲν πάντα, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἂν ἦν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνο
οὐδὲν μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ νῷ, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ πάντα [ἐν
τοῖς οὖσιν ἂν ἦν].² διὸ καὶ οὐσίαι ταῦτα· ὠρίσται
γὰρ ἤδη καὶ οἷον μορφὴν ἕκαστον ἔχει. τὸ δὲ ὄν
25 δεῖ οὐκ ἐν ἀορίστῳ οἷον αἰωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὄρω
πεπηχθαι καὶ στάσει· στάσις δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς
ὀρισμὸς καὶ μορφή, οἷς καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει.
ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ἀξίας³ νοῦ τοῦ
καθαρωτάτου μὴ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς
φῦναι, γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα πάντα σὺν αὐτῷ
30 γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ
θεοὺς νοητούς· πλήρη δὲ ὄντα ὧν ἐγέννησε καὶ
ὥσπερ καταπιόντα πάλιν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν μηδὲ
ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς ὕλην μηδὲ τρυφήναι παρὰ τῇ Ῥέᾳ,
ὡς τὰ μυστήρια καὶ οἱ μῦθοι οἱ περὶ θεῶν αἰνίτ-
τονται Κρόνον μὲν θεὸν σοφώτατον πρὸ τοῦ Δία
35 γενέσθαι ἃ γεννᾷ πάλιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, ἧ καὶ

¹ Harder: ὁ vel ὁ Ἐνν.

² del. Kirchoff, Volkmann*, Harder (qui πάντα quoquedel.),
iteratum e lin. 21.

³ Igal (*Emerita* 39, 1971, 157): ἀξίος Ἐνν.: ἀξίον δὲ Harder,
H.S.¹.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

by the One and made perfect in substantial existence
by and from it. But Intellect sees, by means of
itself, like something divided proceeding from the
undivided, that life and thought and all things come
from the One, because that God is not one of all
things; for this is how all things come from him,
because he is not confined by any shape; that One
is one alone: if he was all things, he would be
numbered among beings. For this reason that One
is none of the things in Intellect, but all things
come from him. This is why they are substances;
for they are already defined and each has a kind of
shape. Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in
the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit and sta-
bility; and stability in the intelligible world is
limitation and shape, and it is by these that it receives
existence. "Of this lineage"¹ is this Intellect of
which we are speaking, a lineage worthy of the purest
Intellect, that it should spring from nowhere else
but the first principle, and when it has come into
existence should generate all realities along with
itself, all the beauty of the Ideas and all the intelli-
gible gods; and it is full of the beings which it has
generated and as it were swallows them up again, by
keeping them in itself and because they do not fall
out into matter and are not brought up in the house
of Rhea; as the mysteries and the myths about the
gods say riddlingly that Kronos, the wisest god,
before the birth of Zeus took back and kept within
himself all that he begat, and in this way is full and

¹ A phrase from *Iliad* 6. 211, applied by Plato (*Republic*
VIII. 547A4-5) to the birth of civil strife in his ideal state—
another curious case of Plotinus remembering Plato's words
but, apparently, forgetting their context (ep. ch. 3, n. 2, p. 19).

πλήρης καὶ νοῦς ἐν κόρω· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φασι Δία
γεννᾶν κόρον ἤδη ὄντα· ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾶ νοῦς,
νοῦς ἂν τέλειος. καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα γεννᾶν ἔδει,
καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὔσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι.
κρείττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ
40 γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ἔλαττον ὄν εἶδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ,
ἀόριστον μὲν ὡσαύτως, ὀριζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γεν-
νήσαντος καὶ οἷον εἰδοποιούμενον. νοῦ δὲ γέννημα
λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοούμενον· τοῦτο δ'
ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ
ἕχνος ἐξήρημένον ἐκείνου, κατὰ θάτερα μὲν
45 συνηγμένον ἐκείνω καὶ ταύτῃ ἀποσιμπλάμενον καὶ
ἀπολαύον καὶ μεταλαμβάνον αὐτοῦ καὶ νοῦν, κατὰ
θάτερα δὲ ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν μετ' αὐτό, μᾶλλον δὲ
γεννῶν καὶ αὐτό, ἃ ψυχῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι χείρονα·
περὶ ἂν ὕστερον λεκτέον. καὶ μέχρι τούτων τὰ
θεῖα.

8. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος τριτὰ τὰ
πάντα περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα—φησὶ γὰρ
πρῶτα—καὶ δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ
περὶ τὰ τρίτα τρίτον. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοῦ
5 αἰτίου εἶναι πατέρα αἰτίον μὲν τὸν νοῦν λέγων·
δημιουργὸς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῶ· τοῦτον δὲ φησὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι ἐκείνω. τοῦ αἰτίου δὲ

¹ For this interpretation of the myth and play on *Kóros*—*kóros* cp. ch. 4 and n. 1 there.

² Plotinus's invariable assumption that the product or offspring must be inferior to the producer or parent, which he rather strangely asserts here, is borne out by our experience in this world. Did he consider himself inferior to his parents?

³ Cp. ch. 1, n. 2, p. 13.

is Intellect in satiety; and after this they say he begat Zeus who is then his Koros [that is, boy and satiety]¹; for Intellect generates soul, since it is perfect Intellect. For since it was perfect it had to generate, and not be without offspring when it was so great a power. But its offspring could not be better than it (this is not so even here below) but had to be a lesser image of it,² and in the same way indefinite, but defined by its parent and, so to speak, given a form. And the offspring of Intellect is a rational form and an existing being, that which thinks discursively; it is this which moves round Intellect and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, united to it on one side and so filled with it and enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, but, on the other side, in touch with the things which came after it, or rather itself generating what must necessarily be worse than soul; about these we must speak later.³ This is as far as the divine realities extend.

8. This is the reason why Plato says that all things are threefold "about the king of all"—he means the primary realities—and "the second about the second and the third about the third". But he also says that there is a "father of the cause", meaning Intellect by "the cause": for Intellect is his craftsman; and he says that it makes Soul in that "mixing-

νοῦ ὄντος πατέρα φησὶ τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπέκεινα
 νοῦ καὶ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ὄν
 καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὴν ἰδέαν λέγει· ὥστε Πλάτωνα εἰδέναι
 10 ἐκ μὲν τὰγαθοῦ τὸν νοῦν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν.
 καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ καινοὺς μηδὲ νῦν,
 ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρήσθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τοὺς
 δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι μαρτυ-
 ρίοις πιστωσαμένους τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς
 εἶναι τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν.
 15 ἤπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς
 τοιαύτης δόξης καθόσον εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔτιθετο
 νοῦν, καὶ τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐτίθετο
 "τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι" λέγων.
 καὶ ἀκίνητον δὲ λέγει τοῦτο—καίτοι προστιθεὶς
 τὸ νοεῖν—σωματικὴν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐξαίρων ἀπ'
 20 αὐτοῦ, ἵνα μὲν ὡσαύτως, καὶ ὄγκῳ σφαίρας
 ἀπεικάζων, ὅτι πάντα ἔχει περιελημμένα καὶ ὅτι
 τὸ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἐν δὲ λέγων ἐν
 τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν αἰτίαν εἶχεν ὡς τοῦ
 ἐνὸς τούτου πολλὰ εὐρισκομένον. ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλά-
 25 τῶν Παρμενίδης ἀκριβέστερον λέγων διαιρεῖ ἀπ'

¹ Plotinus begins his demonstration that his doctrine of the Three Hypostases is the true doctrine of Plato with a favourite text from the Platonic *Letter* II 312E1-4, which he also cites in I. 8. 2 and VI. 7. 42 and alludes to in III. 5. 8. He goes on to refer to supporting texts from *Letter* VI 323D2-5 and *Timaeus* 34Bff. and 41D4-5. Plotinus always identifies Plato's craftsman with his own Intellect, never with Soul, whose function in making the physical universe he sees as subordinate and instrumental: cp. V. 8. 7.

bowl" he speaks of.¹ And the father of Intellect which is the cause he calls the Good and that which is beyond Intellect and "beyond being".² And he also often calls Being and Intellect Idea: so Plato knew that Intellect comes from the Good and Soul from Intellect. And [it follows] that these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been an interpretation of them, relying on Plato's own writings for evidence that these views are ancient.³ And Parmenides also, before Plato, touched on a view like this, in that he identified Being and Intellect and that it was not among things perceived by the senses that he placed Being, when he said "Thinking and Being are the same". And he says that this Being is unmoved—though he does attach thinking to it—taking all bodily movement from it that it may remain always in the same state, and likening it to "the mass of a sphere", because it holds all things in its circumference and because its thinking is not external, but in itself.⁴ But when he said it was one, in his own works, he was open to criticism because this one of his was discovered to be many. But Parmenides in Plato speaks more accurately, and distinguishes from each

² Another very favourite passage from Plato *Republic* VI 509B8-10.

³ The belief that the true doctrines are present, but often not explicit, in the writings regarded as traditionally authoritative is, for obvious reasons, essential for pagan and Christian traditionalists of the first centuries A.D. (and for Christian traditionalists later): cp. Origen *De Principiis* I 3.

⁴ The references are to Parmenides Diels B 3 (cited also at I. 4. 10. 6 and III. 8. 8. 8) and B 8, 26 and 43.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

ἀλλήλων τὸ πρῶτον ἓν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἓν, καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων, καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλὰ. καὶ σύμφωνος οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἔστι ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς τρισίν.

9. Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ νοῦν καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμιγῆ λέγων ἀπλοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς τίθεται τὸ πρῶτον καὶ χωριστὸν τὸ ἓν, τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς δι' ἀρχαιότητα παρήκε. καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὸ ἓν οἶδεν ἀίδιον καὶ νοητὸν· τὰ γὰρ σώματα γίνονται αἰεὶ καὶ ρέοντα. τῷ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ νεῖκος μὲν διαιρεῖ, ἡ δὲ φιλία τὸ ἓν—ἀσώματον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο—τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ὡς ὕλη. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ὑστερον χωριστὸν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ νοητὸν, νοεῖν δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ λέγων πάλιν αὖ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖ· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα νοητὰ ποιῶν καὶ τσαυτά, ὅποσαι ἐν οὐρανῷ σφαῖραι, ἕν' ἕκαστον ἕκαστην κινή, ἄλλον τρόπον λέγει τὰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἢ Πλάτων, τὸ εὐλογον οὐκ ἔχον ἀνάγκην τιθέμενος. ἐπιστήσει δ' ἂν τις, εἰ καὶ εὐλόγως· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ πάσας πρὸς μίαν σύνταξιν συντελούσας πρὸς ἓν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον βλέπειν. ζητήσει δ' ἂν τις τὰ πολλὰ νοητὰ εἰ ἐξ ἑνός ἔστιν αὐτῷ τοῦ πρώτου, ἢ πολλαὶ αἰ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς

¹ Plato *Parmenides* 137C-142A, 144E5 and 155E5. The interpretation of the *Parmenides* adopted here may be Neopythagorean: see E. R. Dodds "The *Parmenides* of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'", *C.Q.* 22 (1928) 129-42. Note the sharp distinction made between the historical Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides. Plotinus always cites the Pre-Socratics (including Pythagoras) to provide supplementary corroboration of the doctrines which he finds in Plato. He does not regard them as traditional authorities on the same level as Plato, and often thinks they are wrong

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

other the first One, which is more properly called One, and the second which he calls "One-Many" and the third, "One and Many".¹ In this way he too agrees with the doctrine of the three natures.

9. And Anaxagoras also, when he says that Intellect is pure and unmixed, posits that the first principle is simple and that the One is separate, but he neglects to give an accurate account because of his antiquity. Heraclitus also knows that the One is eternal and intelligible: for bodies are always coming into being and flowing away. And for Empedocles Strife divides, but Love is the One—he too makes it incorporeal and the elements serve as matter.² Later, Aristotle makes the first principle separate and intelligible, but when he says that it knows itself, he goes back again and does not make it the first principle; and by making many other intelligible realities, as many as the heavenly spheres, that each particular intelligible may move one particular sphere, he describes the intelligible world in a different way from Plato, making a probable assumption which has no philosophical necessity. But one might doubt whether it is even probable: for it would be more probable that all the spheres, contributing their several movements to a single system, should look to one principle, the first. And one might enquire whether Aristotle thinks that the many intelligibles derive from one, the first, or whether there are many primary principles in the

(as Parmenides here), confused or obscure (cp. the remark about Anaxagoras at the beginning of the next chapter).

² The references are to Anaxagoras Diels B 12, Empedocles B 26, 5-6, and the sort of general account of the teachings of Heraclitus given in Diogenes Laertius IX 8 (= Diels A 1).

ἀρχαί· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνός, ἀνάλογον δηλονότι
 ἔξει ὡς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς αἰ σφαῖραι ἄλλης ἄλλην
 περιεχούσης, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ἔξω κρατούσης· ὥστε
 20 περιέχοι ἂν κάκεῖ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κόσμος νοητὸς
 ἔσται· καὶ ὡσπερ ἐνταῦθα αἰ σφαῖραι οὐ κεναί,
 ἀλλὰ μεστή ἄστρον ἢ πρώτη, αἰ δὲ ἔχουσι ἄστρο,
 οὕτω κάκεῖ τὰ κινούμενα πολλὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔξει καὶ
 τὰ ἀληθέστερα ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ἀρχή, κατὰ
 συντυχίαν αἰ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται· καὶ διὰ τί συνέσονται
 25 καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνί-
 αν ὁμοιοῦσιν; πῶς δὲ ἴσα πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ καὶ
 κινούμενα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ αἰσθητά; πῶς δὲ καὶ πολλὰ
 οὕτως ἀσώματα ὄντα ὕλης οὐ χωριζούσης; ὥστε
 τῶν ἀρχαίων οἱ μάλιστα συντασσόμενοι αὐ τοῖς
 Πυθαγόρου καὶ τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ Φερεκίδους
 30 δὲ περὶ ταύτην μὲν ἔσχον τὴν φύσιν· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
 ἐξεργάσαντο ἐν αὐτοῖς αὐτῶν λόγοις, οἱ δὲ οὐκ
 ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀγράφοις ἐδείκνυον συνουσίαις
 ἢ ὅλως ἀφείδαν.

10. "Ὅτι δὲ οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν ἔχειν, ὡς ἔστι μὲν
 τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἓν, οἷον ἤθελεν ὁ λόγος δεικ-
 νύναι ὡς οἶόν τε ἦν περὶ τούτων ἐνδείκνυσθαι,
 ἔστι δὲ ἐφεξῆς τὸ ὄν καὶ νοῦς, τρίτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ This criticism of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover(s) expounded by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* Λ looks rather like a Platonic development of that made by Theophrastus *Metaphysics* II 7-9 Ross-Forbes; but the resemblance is not close enough for us to assume that Plotinus had read Theophrastus.

intelligible world; and if they derive from one, the situation will clearly be analogous to that of the heavenly spheres in the sense-world, where each contains the other and one, the outermost, dominates; so that there too the first would contain the others and there will be an intelligible universe; and, just as here in the sense-world the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of heavenly bodies and the others have heavenly bodies in them, so there also the moving principles will have many realities in them, and the realities there will be truer. But if each is primary principle, the primary principles will be a random assembly; and why will they be a community and in agreement on one work, the harmony of the whole universe? And how can the perceptible beings in heaven be equal in number to the intelligible movers? And how can the intelligibles even be many, when they are incorporeal, as they are, and matter does not divide them¹? For these reasons those of the ancient philosophers who took up positions closest to those of Pythagoras and his successors (and Pherecydes)² held closely to this nature; but some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings, others did not do so in written works but in unwritten group discussions,³ or left it altogether alone.

10. It has been shown that we ought to think that this is how things are, that there is the One beyond being, of such a kind as our argument wanted to show, so far as demonstration was possible in these matters, and next in order there is Being and

² Cp. Pherecydes Diels A 29.

³ This may possibly be a reference to Plotinus's master Ammonius: cp. Longinus in Porphyry *Life* ch. 20.

5 φύσις, ἣδη δέδεικται. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει τριττὰ
 ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν καὶ
 παρ' ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς—χωριστὰ γὰρ ταῦτα—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς
 αἰσθητῶν ἔξω, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ "ἔξω"
 ὥσπερ κάκεινα τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ ἔξω· οὕτω καὶ
 10 τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷον λέγει Πλάτων τὸν εἶσω
 ἄνθρωπον. ἔστι τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ
 θεῖόν τι καὶ φύσεως ἄλλης, ὅποια πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῆς
 φύσις· τελεία δὲ ἡ νοῦν ἔχουσα· νοῦς δὲ ὁ μὲν
 λογιζόμενος, ὁ δὲ λογιζέσθαι παρέχων. τὸ δὴ
 λογιζόμενον τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδενὸς πρὸς τὸ
 15 λογιζέσθαι δεόμενον σωματικοῦ ὄργανου, τὴν δὲ
 ἐνέργειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν καθαρῷ ἔχον, ἵνα καὶ λογιζέσθαι
 καθαρῶς οἶόν τε ἦ, χωριστὸν καὶ οὐ κεκρυσμένον
 σώματι ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ νοητῷ τις τιθέμενος οὐκ ἂν
 σφάλλοιο. οὐ γὰρ τόπον ζητητέον οὐ ἰδρύσομεν,
 ἀλλ' ἔξω τόπου παντὸς ποιητέον. οὕτω γὰρ τὸ
 20 καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἔξω καὶ τὸ ἄυλον, ὅταν μόνον
 ἦ οὐδὲν ἔχον παρὰ τῆς σώματος φύσεως. διὰ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἔτι ἔξωθεν φησιν ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν
 ψυχὴν περιέβαλεν ἐνδεικνύμενος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐν
 τῷ νοητῷ μένον· ἐπὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπικρύπτων¹ ἐπ'

¹ Heintz apud Harder: ἐπι κρύπτων (-τον E) Enn.

¹ The phrase comes from Plato *Republic* IX 587A7. Plotinus uses it again at I. 1. 10. 15 (see my note there). This

Intellect, and the nature of Soul in the third place. And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also in ourselves. I do not mean in [ourselves as] beings of the sense-world—for these three are separate [from the things of sense]—but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception; "outside" here is used in the same sense as those realities are also said to be "outside" the whole universe: so the corresponding realities in man are said to be "outside", as Plato speaks of the "inner man".¹ Our soul then also is a divine thing and of a nature different [from the things of sense], like the universal nature of soul; and the human soul is perfect when it has intellect; and intellect is of two kinds, the one which reasons and the one which makes it possible to reason. Now this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning, but preserves its activity in purity in order that it may be able to engage in pure reasoning, one could without mistake place, as separate and unmixed with body, in the primary intelligible realm. For we should not look for a place in which to put it, but make it exist outside all place. For this is how it is by itself and outside and immaterial, when it is alone and retains nothing from the nature of body. This is the reason why Plato says of the universe also that the craftsman wrapped the soul round it "from outside", indicating the part of the soul which remains in the intelligible; and he said obscurely about us that the soul is "on

whole chapter shows clearly Plotinus's sense of the inadequacy of spatial metaphors and the need of using them conspicuously and critically.

ἄκρα εἶρηκε τῇ κεφαλῇ. καὶ ἡ παρακέλευσις δὲ
 25 τοῦ χωρίζειν οὐ τόπῳ λέγεται—τοῦτο γὰρ φύσει
 κεχωρισμένοι ἐστίν—ἀλλὰ τῇ μὴ νεύσει καὶ ταῖς
 <μῇ>¹ φαντασίαις καὶ τῇ ἀλλοτριότητι τῇ πρὸς τὸ
 σῶμα, εἴ πως καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ψυχῆς εἶδος ἀναγάγοι
 τις καὶ συνενέγκαι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα
 30 αὐτῆς ἰδρυμένον, ὃ μόνον ἐστὶ σώματος δημι-
 ουργὸν καὶ πλαστικὸν καὶ τὴν πραγματείαν περὶ
 τοῦτο ἔχον.

11. Οὕσης οὖν ψυχῆς τῆς λογιζομένης περὶ δικαί-
 ων καὶ καλῶν καὶ λογισμοῦ ζητοῦντος εἰ τοῦτο δί-
 καιον καὶ εἰ τοῦτο καλόν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἐστῶς
 τι δίκαιον, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ λογισμὸς περὶ ψυχῆν
 5 γίγνεται. ἢ πῶς ἂν λογίσαιτο; καὶ εἰ ὅτε μὲν
 λογίζεται περὶ τούτων ψυχῆ, ὅτε δὲ μὴ, δεῖ τὸν
 <μῇ>² λογιζόμενον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἔχοντα τὸ δίκαιον
 νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν νοῦ ἀρχὴν καὶ
 αἰτίαν καὶ θεόν—οὐ μεριστοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ
 10 πολλοῖς αὖ θεωρεῖσθαι καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν δυναμένων

¹ Page, collato III. 6. 5. 25.

² τὸν <μῇ> Dodds (Select Passages 52): supra τὸν ser. μῆ A³
 (non Ficinus): <μῇ> τὸν Creuzer *.

¹ The references are to Plato *Timaeus* 36E3 and 80A5 (cp. 44D-E). Plotinus probably uses the word ἐπικρύπτων (an emendation, but a convincing one), which suggests deliberate obscurity, because he did not believe, and therefore did not think that Plato believed, that the soul, or any part of it, was actually located in any part of the body. For his explanation of the Platonic texts in terms of the activation of the brain and other organs by powers of the omnipresent soul see IV. 3. 23.

top in the head".¹ And his exhortation to separate ourselves is not meant in a spatial sense—this [higher part] of soul is naturally separated—but refers to our not inclining to the body, and to our not having mental images, and our alienation from the body²—if by any chance one could make the remaining form of soul ascend, and take along with us to the heights that of it which is established here below, which alone is the craftsman and modeller of the body and is actively concerned with it.

11. Since, then, there exists soul which reasons about what is right and good, and discursive reasoning which enquires about the rightness and goodness of this or that particular thing, there must be some further permanent rightness from which arises the discursive reasoning in the realm of soul. Or how else would it manage to reason? And if soul sometimes reasons about the right and good and sometimes does not, there must be in us Intellect which does not reason discursively but always possesses the right, and there must be also the principle and cause and God of Intellect.³ He is not divided, but abides, and as he does not abide in place he is contemplated in many beings, in each and every one of those capable of receiving him as another self,⁴ just

¹ The exhortation to separation is probably Plato *Phaedo* 67C-D. Plotinus always interprets this text, as he does here, as referring to inner detachment, not spatial separation: cp. III. 6. 5.

² A striking affirmation of the transcendence of the One over Intellect. (For the problem involved see the beginning of the first chapter of V. 2 and n. 1 there.)

⁴ Is Plotinus remembering here Aristotle's use of the same striking phrase for a friend, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός (*Nicomachean Ethics* IX 4. 1163a31-2; cp. 1169b6-7, 1170b6)?

δέχεσθαι οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο. τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐφαπτόμεθα καὶ σύνεσμεν καὶ ἀνηρ-
15 τήμεθα· ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ οἱ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ.

12. Πῶς οὖν ἔχοντες τὰ τηλικαῦτα οὐκ ἀντι-
λαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλά, οἱ δὲ οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν; ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς καὶ τὸ
5 πρὸ νοῦ αἰεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ψυχὴ δέ—τὸ ἀεικίνητον—οὕτως. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἤδη αἰσθητόν, ἀλλὰ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς, ὅταν εἰς αἰσθησιν ἴη· ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργοῦν ἕκαστον μὴ μεταδιδῶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, οὕτω δι' ὅλης ψυχῆς ἐλήλυθεν. οὕτω οὖν γινώσκουμεν ἅτε μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
10 ὄντες καὶ οὐ μόριον ψυχῆς ἀλλ' ἡ ἅπασα ψυχὴ ὄντες. καὶ ἔτι ἕκαστον τῶν ψυχικῶν ζῶν¹ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ αἰεὶ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ γνωρίζειν, ὅταν μετάδοσις γένηται καὶ ἀντίληψις. δεῖ τοίνυν, εἰ τῶν οὕτω παρόντων ἀντίληψις ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἰς τὸ εἶσω ἐπιστρέφειν, κάκεῖ

¹ A^{3ms} (*quandiu vivit* Ficinus), Creuzer*: ζῶων A^{ac}EBxUC.

¹ The metaphor of circle, centre and radii, referred to in ch. 7 (see n. 2) and often used elsewhere in the *Enneads* (cp. e.g. IV. 2. 1. 24-9, where it is used of the relationship of immaterial indivisible being to the divisible material quasi-reality of the sense-world). It can be used at any level of the hierarchy to describe the combination of immanent

as the centre of a circle exists by itself, but every one of the radii in the circle has its point in the centre and the lines bring their individuality to it.¹ For it is with something of this sort in ourselves that we are in contact with god and are with him and depend upon him; and those of us who converge towards him are firmly established in him.

12. Why then, when we have such great possessions, do we not consciously grasp them, but are mostly inactive in these ways, and some of us are never active at all? They are always occupied in their own activities, Intellect, and that which is before Intellect, always in itself, and soul, which is in this sense "ever-moving". For not everything which is in the soul is immediately perceptible, but it reaches us when it enters into perception; but when a particular active power does not give a share in its activity to the perceiving power, that activity has not yet pervaded the whole soul.² We do not therefore yet know it, since we are accompanied by the perceptive power and are not a part of soul but the whole soul. And further, each soul-part, since it is always living, always exercises its own activity by itself; but the discovery of it comes when sharing with the perceptive power and conscious awareness takes place. If then there is to be conscious apprehension of the powers which are present in this way, we must turn our power of apprehension inwards,

presence and transcendent separateness which Plotinus sees when he is trying to describe the relationship of a relatively complex and multiple derived reality to its simpler and more unified source.

² For the doctrine of consciousness mentioned here see IV. 3. 30 and n. 1 there.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 1.

15 ποιεῖν τὴν προσοχὴν ἔχειν. ὡςπερ εἴ τις ἀκούσαι
ἀναμένων ἦν ἐθέλει φωνήν, τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν
ἀποστὰς τὸ οὖς ἐγείροι πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον τῶν ἀκου-
στῶν, ὅποτε ἐκείνο προσέλθοι, οὕτω τοι καὶ
ἐνταῦθα δεῖ τὰς μὲν αἰσθητὰς ἀκούσεις ἀφέντα, εἰ
μὴ καθόσον ἀνάγκη, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ ἀντι-
20 λαμβάνεσθαι δύναμιν φυλάττειν καθαρὰν καὶ ἔτοι-
μον ἀκούειν φθόγγων τῶν ἄνω.

ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

and make it attend to what is there. It is as if someone was expecting to hear a voice which he wanted to hear and withdrew from other sounds and roused his power of hearing to catch what, when it comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard; so here also we must let perceptible sounds go (except in so far as we must listen to them) and keep the soul's power of apprehension pure and ready to hear the voices from on high.

V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER THE FIRST

Introductory Note

THIS very short treatise, the eleventh in Porphyry's chronological order, is by no means a mere fragment or sketch. It is a brief but carefully considered statement of the basic doctrine of the Three Hypostases, distinguished by a particular emphasis on their continuity. There is one life extending unbroken through all the descending stages from the One to the soul or life-principle in plants. At the beginning Plotinus shows himself vividly aware of the great difficulty which inevitably arises when any attempt is made to state a doctrine of the Transcendent Absolute in discursive philosophical language: how can we sufficiently emphasise the transcendence of the source of reality without cutting it off altogether from the reality of which it is the source? A rather disproportionate amount of the treatise (the last lines of the first of its two chapters and nearly the whole of the second) seems to be devoted to the lowest stage in the expansion of the one life, the "nature" or life-principle in plants. But, as Bréhier saw (see his introductory *Notice*, Vol. V, pp. 31-2 of his edition), this is because Plotinus thought that it was at this point that objections to his doctrine of continuity might most easily arise because of the apparent discontinuity and fragmentation of soul at this level.

Synopsis

The One is all things and none of them. How Intellect comes from the One and Soul from Intellect, and how

THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST

higher soul generates its own image, the sensitive and vegetative life-principle which extends as far as plants (ch. 1). The different levels of soul; a difficulty about the plant-soul: what happens to it when a piece of the plant is cut off? Again, all things are the One and not the One: it is all like one long continuous life (ch. 2).

V. 2. (11) ΠΕΡΙ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ
ΤΑΞΕΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Τὸ ἓν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἓν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως πάντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἶον ἐνέδραμε· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐπω ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἔσται. πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἀπλοῦ ἐνός οὐδεμιᾶς ἐν ταυτῷ φαινομένης
5 ποικιλίας, οὐ διπλόης οὕτινος ὄτουοῦν; ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, διὰ τοῦτο ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα τὸ ὄν ἦ, διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς οὐκ ὄν, γεννητῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ· καὶ πρώτη οἶον γέννησις αὐτῆ· ὄν γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ δεῖσθαι οἶον ὑπερερρῦν καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν
10 ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. καὶ ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐποίησεν, ἢ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔσται πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. οὗτος οὖν ὡν οἶον ἐκείνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ δύναμιν
15 προχέας πολλήν—εἶδος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ—
58

V. 2. ON THE ORIGIN AND ORDER OF
THE BEINGS WHICH COME AFTER
THE FIRST

1. The One is all things and not a single one of them¹: it is the principle of all things, not all things, but all things have that other kind of transcendent existence; for in a way they do occur in the One; or rather they are not there yet, but they will be. How then do all things come from the One, which is simple and has in it no diverse variety, or any sort of doubleness? It is because there is nothing in it that all things come from it: in order that being may exist, the One is not being, but the generator of being. This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple power—this is a likeness of it—just as

¹ Cp. Plato *Parmenides* 160B2-3.

ὡσπερ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε· καὶ αὕτη
 ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο μένοντος
 ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς μένοντος τοῦ
 πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. ἢ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ
 κινήθεισα ἐγέννα εἶδωλον. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα,
 20 ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προελλθοῦσα δὲ εἰς κίνησιν
 ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γεννᾷ εἶδωλον αὐτῆς αἴσθησιν
 καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ ἀπῆρτηται οὐδ' ἀποτέμνηται· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
 καὶ ἡ ἄνω¹ ψυχὴ μέχρι φυτῶν φθάνειν· τρόπον γάρ
 τινα φθάνει, ὅτι αὐτῆς τὸ ἐν φυτοῖς· οὐ μὴν πᾶσα
 25 ἐν φυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ γιγνομένη ἐν φυτοῖς οὕτως ἐστίν,
 ὅτι ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον προέβη εἰς τὸ κάτω ὑπόστασιν
 ἄλλην ποιησαμένη τῇ προόδῳ καὶ προθυμῳα τοῦ
 χείρονος· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τὸ νοῦ ἐξηρητη-
 μένον μένειν τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾷ.

2. Πρόεισιν οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς ἔσχατον καταλει-
 πομένου αἰεὶ ἐκάστου ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἔδρᾳ, τοῦ δὲ
 γεννωμένου ἄλλην τάξιν λαμβάνοντος τὴν χείρονα·
 ἕκαστον μέντοι ταῦτὸν γίνεται ὡς ἂν ἐπίσπῃται, ἕως
 5 ἂν ἐφέπηται. ὅταν οὖν ψυχὴ ἐν φυτῷ γίνηται, ἄλλο
 ἐστὶν οἶον μέρος τὸ ἐν φυτῷ τὸ τολμηρότατον καὶ
 ἀφρονέστατον καὶ προεληλυθὸς μέχρι τοσοῦτου·

¹ Harder: ἀνθρώπων Enn., Perna—Volkmann: del. Bréhier.

that which was before it poured it forth. This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement generates its own image, which is sensation and the principle of growth in plants.¹ Nothing is separated or cut off from that which is before it. For this reason the higher soul seems to reach as far as plants; and in a way it does reach so far, for the life-principle in plants belongs to it; it is certainly not all in plants, but it has come to be in plants in the sense that it has extended itself down to their level, and produced another degree of being by that extension, in desire of its inferior. The part before this, which is immediately dependent on Intellect, leaves Intellect alone, abiding in itself.

2. So it goes on from the beginning to the last and lowest, each [generator] remaining behind in its own place,² and that which is generated taking another, lower, rank; and yet each becomes the same as that upon which it follows, as long as it does continue to follow upon it. When therefore soul comes to exist in a plant, what is in the plant is a kind of different part of it, the most audacious and stupid part of it and the one which has proceeded

¹ For the relationship of this immanent principle of life and growth, or "nature", to higher soul see III. 8. 1-5; for its relationship to body see IV. 4. 18-20.

² Cp. IV. 8. 10 (the phrase was perhaps suggested by Plato *Timaeus* 42E5-6).

ὅταν δ' ἐν ἀλόγῳ, ἢ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις κρα-
 τήσασα ἤγαγεν· ὅταν δὲ εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ὅλως ἐν
 λογικῷ ἢ κίνησις, ἢ ἀπὸ νοῦ ὡς νοῦν οὐκείων
 10 ἐχούσης καὶ παρ' αὐτῆς βούλησιν τοῦ νοεῖν ἢ ὅλως
 κινεῖσθαι. πάλιν δὴ ἀναστρέφωμεν· ὅταν φυτόν
 ἢ τὰ παραφύομενα ἢ κλάδων τὰ¹ ἄνω τις τέμῃ,²
 ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ψυχῇ ποῦ ἀπελήλυθεν; ἢ ὅθεν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἀποστασα τόπῳ· ἐν οὖν τῇ ἀρχῇ· εἰ δὲ τῆν ῥίζαν
 15 διακόψειας ἢ καύσειας, ποῦ τὸ ἐν τῇ ῥίζῃ; ἐν
 ψυχῇ· οὐ γὰρ³ εἰς ἄλλον τόπον ἐλθοῦσα. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰ ἀναδράμοι· εἰ
 δὲ μὴ, ἐν ἄλλῃ φυτικῇ, οὐ γὰρ στενοχωρεῖται· εἰ
 δ' ἀναδράμοι, ἐν τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς δυνάμει. ἀλλ'
 ἐκείνῃ ποῦ; ἐν τῇ πρὸ αὐτῆς· ἢ δὲ μέχρι νοῦ, οὐ
 20 τόπῳ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ἦν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς πολὺ μάλ-
 λον οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, ὥστε οὐδὲ αὐτῇ. οὐδαμοῦ οὖν
 οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὁ μηδαμοῦ, καὶ πανταχοῦ οὕτως
 ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ προελθοῦσα εἰς τὸ ἄνω σταίῃ ἐν τῷ
 μεταξὺ πρὶν πάντῃ εἰς τὸ ἀνωτάτῳ γενέσθαι,
 μέσον ἔχει βίον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μέρει αὐτῆς
 25 ἔστηκε. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνος καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνος·
 ἐκείνος μὲν, ὅτι ἐξ ἐκείνου· οὐκ ἐκείνος δέ, ὅτι

¹ Kirchhoff*: τῶν Δ^π ΒxUC: τοῦ Δ^π E.

² <τι> τέμῃ Creuze: (ed. Paris.).

³ οὐ γὰρ coniectimus: οὐκ Enn.

this far; when it comes to exist in an irrational
 animal, the power of sense-perception has prevailed
 and brought it there¹: but when it comes to a man,
 either the movement is wholly in the soul's reasoning
 part or it comes from Intellect, since the soul has an
 intellect of its own and a self-originated will to think,
 or in general to be in motion. Now let us go back
 [to plant-souls]: when someone cuts off either the
 side-shoots or the tops of the branches, where has
 the soul in this part gone? Where it came from;
 for it did not move spatially away; so it is in its
 principle. But if you were to cut up or burn the
 root, where would the soul in the root be? In soul,
 for it has not gone to another place; but it could
 be in the same place—but in another if it ran up
 again [to the higher soul]; if it did not, it would be
 in another plant-soul, for it is not cramped for room;
 but if it ran up again, it would be in the power before
 it. But where is that power? In the power before
 itself; but that reaches as far as Intellect, not
 spatially; for none [of these soul-parts] was in
 space; but Intellect is still more emphatically not
 in space, so that neither is this [higher] soul. Since
 therefore it is nowhere, but in that which is no-
 where, it is in this way also everywhere, but if as
 it proceeds upwards it stops in the middle before
 completely reaching the highest, it has a medium
 life and stays in that [middle] part of itself. All
 these things are the One and not the One: they are
 he because they come from him; they are not he,
 because it is in abiding by himself that he gives

¹ For a fuller exposition see III. 4. 2, where it is explained
 what sort of souls get into lower animals and plants, and
 why.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 2.

ἐκεῖνος ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένων ἔδωκεν. ἔστιν οὖν οἶον
ζωὴ μακρὰ εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθεῖσα, ἕτερον ἕκαστον
τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐφεξῆς, συνεχές δὲ πᾶν αὐτῷ,
ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῇ διαφορᾷ, οὐκ ἀπολλύμενον ἐν
30 τῷ δευτέρῳ τὸ πρότερον. τί οὖν ἢ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς
γενομένη; οὐδὲν γεννᾷ; ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι. σκεπτέον
δὲ πῶς ἀρχὴν ἄλλην λαβόντας.

THE BEINGS AFTER THE FIRST

them. It is then like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the later. What, then, about the soul which comes to exist in plants? Does it not generate anything? Yes, that in which it is. But we must investigate how it does so by taking a different starting-point.

V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, the forty-ninth in Porphyry's chronological order, was written towards the end of the life of Plotinus (*Life* ch. 6). With another very late work which Porphyry placed at the beginning of the *Enneads*, I. 1 (53) *What is the Living Being, and What is Man*, it represents the last, most fully developed and clarified stage of Plotinus's long reflection upon human nature and human thinking (Porphyry's observation at the end of Chapter 6 of the *Life* on the failing of his master's power apparent in these last treatises, written after Porphyry had left him, should not be taken too seriously). It is particularly concerned with the relationship of the intelligent soul which is our true self to the hypostasis Intellect which in one way transcends us, but which in another way we can become, and to the One beyond Intellect and being which the soul seeks to touch and to see by the light which is itself. The last eight chapters of the treatise are a demonstration as powerful as anything in Plotinus of the need to go beyond Intellect to find the first principle of reality and the soul's true end. The treatise shows, perhaps more clearly than any other in the *Enneads*, the stimulation of the thought of Plotinus by critical reflection on what Aristotle says about Intellect and the exposition of Aristotelian doctrine by the great commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, a near-contemporary of his own. (For Plotinus's knowledge of Aristotle and of the commentaries of Alexander and other Peripatetics see *Life* chapter 14.)

ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

Synopsis

If there is to be genuine self-thinking, there must be something simple which thinks itself: for one part of a thing to think another part is not really self-thinking. Perhaps soul does not think itself, but Intellect must do so (ch. 1). An investigation of the activity of reasoning soul, which is what we ourselves are, in its intermediate position between sense-perception below it and Intellect above it (chs. 2-3). How we can transcend ourselves and become Intellect (ch. 4). How the man who has become Intellect sees himself: he finds that Intellect is identical with intelligible reality; both are one single actuality (ch. 5). How we can teach our soul, when we have descended from Intellect, to understand what intellect is by observing its traces in our own intellectuality and recognising their derivation from the true Intellect, which is not a practical intellect (ch. 6). Intellect's knowledge of God implies its self-knowledge; its peace and quiet is its own self-directed activity. Soul acts and produces here below in and by its contemplation, which is an image of the entirely self-directed contemplation of Intellect (ch. 7). Intellect's vision of itself is not like perception here below: it is light seeing itself; this light of Intellect shines on the soul and makes it truly intelligent, so that by becoming like Intellect it is able to see Intellect (ch. 8). The highest part of soul is an image of Intellect, a light from Intellect, and by it we can know what Intellect is like and attain to it; but soul has many lives and levels, and one must start one's quest of Intellect from the level one has reached (ch. 9). Is there need to postulate an ultimate principle beyond Intellect? Intellect, since it sees itself, must be in some sense multiple, not absolutely one and simple. If it was absolutely without parts, it could not think itself or say anything intelligible about itself: the One can only be touched, not thought, and has no need to think itself (ch. 10). How Intellect as sight not yet seeing tries to apprehend the One, but only succeeds

ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES

in attaining a multiple image of it which is Intellect itself; the One or Good is not one of all things, but before all things (ch. 11). There must be unity before multiplicity, the One before the many activities of Intellect. The One remains absolutely at rest, and Intellect springs from it like light from the sun (ch. 12). The One is not a "something" and is therefore ineffable and unthinkable and does not think itself: only a complex whole can say "I am existent" (ch. 13). We cannot speak or think the One, but can be aware of it in the way which those who are possessed by a god are aware of the god possessing them (ch. 14). The One gives or makes Intellect, which is all things together in one; it is the productive power in which the things which are distinct in Intellect pre-exist in absolute unity; this is the opposite of the passive potency of matter (ch. 15). There must be something other than the First, which must be multiple: the perfect life of Intellect, which depends on the Good, better than life and intellect (ch. 16). This dependence on the Good is the reason for the perfect self-sufficiency of Intellect. The birth-pangs of the soul: utter inadequacy of thought and discursive reason to satisfy its longing or express what it experiences in its union with the One. The ultimate sudden illumination, when we see God by his own light, if we let everything go (ch. 17).

V. 3. (49) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΝΩΡΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ
ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ

1. ἼΑρα τὸ νοοῦν ἑαυτὸ ποικίλον δεῖ εἶναι, ἵνα ἐνί
τινι τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα θεωροῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγηται
νοεῖν ἑαυτό, ὡς τοῦ ἀπλοῦ παντάπασιν ὄντος οὐ
δυναμένου εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ
5 κατανόησιν; ἢ οἷόν τε καὶ μὴ σύνθετον ὄν νόησιν
ἴσχειν ἑαυτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ διότι σύνθετον λεγόμενον
νοεῖν ἑαυτό, ὅτι δὴ ἐνί τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα νοεῖ,
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τῇ αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνοιμεν αὐτῶν
τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος φύσιν, οὐκ
ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς νοεῖν αὐτό. οὐ γὰρ τὸ
10 πᾶν ἔσται ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἐγνωσμένον, μὴ κάκεινον
τοῦ νοήσαντος τὰ ἄλλα τὰ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ ἑαυτὸ
νενοηκότος, ἔσται τε οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ αὐτὸ
ἑαυτό, ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἄλλο. δεῖ τοίνυν θέσθαι καὶ
ἀπλοῦ κατανόησιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο πῶς, σκοπεῖν,
εἰ δυνατόν, ἢ ἀποστατέον τῆς δόξης τῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ
15 ἑαυτὸ νοεῖν τι ὄντως. ἀποστῆναι μὲν οὐν τῆς
δόξης ταύτης οὐ πάνυ οἷόν τε πολλῶν τῶν ἀτόπων
συμβαίνοντων. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ψυχῇ δοίημεν τοῦτο
ὡς <οὐ>¹ πάνυ ἄτοπον ὄν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ νοῦ τῇ

¹ F^{3s} (= Ficinus)R^{2s}.

V. 3. ON THE KNOWING HYPOSTASES
AND THAT WHICH IS BEYOND

1. Does that which thinks itself have to be complex, in order that it may with one of its constituents contemplate the rest, and so be said to know itself, on the supposition that the absolutely simple would not be able to return to itself and the intellectual grasp of itself? Or is it possible for that which is not composite also to have an intellectual awareness of itself¹? For that which is said to think itself because it is composite, just because it thinks the rest with one of its constituents, as in sense-perception we might grasp our own shape and the rest of our bodily nature, would not have true self-intellection; for it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and this will be, not what we are looking for, a thing which thinks itself, but one thing thinking another. One must, then, assume that a simple thing thinks itself, and investigate as far as possible how it does so, or else one must abandon the opinion that anything really thinks itself. Now to abandon this opinion is not very possible, since many absurdities follow from its abandonment; for even if we do not attribute self-thinking to the soul on the ground that this is not very absurd, yet it is absolutely

¹ For a fuller discussion of this see ch. 5.

φύσει διδόναι παντάπασιν ἄτοπον, εἰ τῶν μὲν
 ἄλλων γνώσιν ἔχει, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐν γνώσει καὶ
 20 ἐπιστήμη καταστήσεται. καὶ γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἕξω ἢ
 αἰσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦς ἀντιλήψεται, καί, εἰ βούλει,
 διάνοια καὶ δόξα· εἰ¹ δὲ νοῦς τούτων γνώσιν ἔχει
 ἢ μὴ, σκέψασθαι προσήκει· ὅσα δὲ νοητά, νοῦς
 δηλονότι γινώσεται. ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὰ μόνον ἢ καὶ ἑαυ-
 τόν, ὃς ταῦτα γινώσεται; καὶ ἄρα οὕτω γινώσεται
 25 ἑαυτόν, ὅτι γινώσκει ταῦτα μόνον, τίς δὲ ὧν οὐ
 γινώσεται, ἀλλ' ἂ μὲν αὐτοῦ γινώσεται ὅτι γινώσκει,
 τίς δὲ ὧν γινώσκει οὐκέτι; ἢ καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ
 ἑαυτόν; καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος καὶ μέτροι τίνος σκεπτόν.

2. Πρῶτερον δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ζητητέον, εἰ δοτέον
 αὐτῇ γνώσιν ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τί τὸ γινώσκον ἐν αὐτῇ
 καὶ ὅπως. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὸν αὐτῆς αὐτόθεν
 ἂν φαίμεν τοῦ ἕξω εἶναι μόνον· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τῶν
 5 ἔνδον ἐν τῷ σώματι γινομένων συναίσθησις εἶη,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν ἕξω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἀντίληψις· τῶν
 γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι παθημάτων ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνε-
 ται. τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῇ λογιζόμενον παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς
 αἰσθήσεως φαντασμάτων παρακειμένων τὴν ἐπίκρι-
 σιν ποιούμενον καὶ συνάγον καὶ διαιροῦν· ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ

¹ Igal: ὁ Enn.

absurd not to attribute it to the nature of intellect, and suppose that it has knowledge of everything else but is not in a state of knowledge and understanding of itself.¹ For it will be, not intellect, but sense-perception (and, if you like, discursive thought and opinion) which is aware of external things; and it is appropriate to consider whether intellect has knowledge of them or not; but obviously intellect is going to know everything which is intelligible. Will it then know the intelligibles only, or itself as well, which is to know them? And will it know itself in such a way that it knows the intelligibles alone but does not know who it is, but will know that it knows the intelligibles which belong to it, but will not yet know who it is? Or will it know both what belongs to it and itself? And we must consider in what way and to what extent it knows itself.²

2. First we must enquire about the soul, whether we should grant it knowledge of itself, and what is that which knows in it, and how. We could say at once that its perceptive part is perceptive only of what is external; for even if there is a concomitant awareness of what goes on inside the body, yet even here the apprehension is of something outside the perceptive part; for it perceives the experiences in its body by its own agency, but the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing them; and, as for

¹ Ficino's inserted negative (see critical note) seems to me necessary to the sense here. There is an apparent reminiscence of this passage in Augustine *De Trinitate* IX 3, 3 (PL 42, 962).

² Cp. Augustine *De Trinitate* X 3, 5 (PL 42, 976).

- 10 τῶν ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἰόντων ἐφορᾷ οἶον τοὺς τύπους, καὶ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτους τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σύνεσιν ἔτι προσλαμβάνει ὥσπερ ἐπιγινώσκον καὶ ἐφαρμόζον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τύποις τοὺς νέους καὶ ἄρτι ἦκοντας· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἀναμνήσεις φαίμεν ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς μέχρι
- 15 τοῦδε ἰστάμενος τῇ δυνάμει ἢ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στρέφεται καὶ γινώσκει ἑαυτόν; ἢ ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνεκτέον τοῦτο. γινώσκει μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ τούτῳ τῷ μέρει διδόντες—νοῦν γὰρ αὐτὸν φήσομεν—καὶ ὄπη διοίσει τοῦ ἐπάνω ζητήσομεν, μὴ δὲ διδόντες
- 20 ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον ἤξομεν τῷ λόγῳ βαδίζοντες, καὶ τὸ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ" ὃ τί πῶς ἐστὶ σκεψόμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ κάτω δώσομεν, τίς ἢ διαφορά τοῦ νοῦ ἐαυτὸ σκεψόμεθα· εἰ γὰρ μηδεμία, ἤδη τοῦτο νοῦς ὁ ἄκρατος. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄρα ἐπιστρέφει ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ αὐτό; ἢ οὐ·
- 25 ἀλλὰ ὧν δέχεται τύπων ἐφ' ἐκάτερα τὴν σύνεσιν ἴσχει. καὶ πῶς τὴν σύνεσιν ἴσχει, πρῶτον ζητητέον.
3. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις εἶδεν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἔδωκε τὸν τύπον τῇ διανοίᾳ· ἢ δὲ τί φησιν; ἢ οὐπω οὐδὲν ἔρει, ἀλλ' ἔγνω μόνον καὶ ἔστη· εἰ μὴ ἄρα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν διαλογίζοιτο "τίς οὗτος," εἰ
- 76

the things which come to it from Intellect, it observes what one might call their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with these; and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognising the new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it: this process is what we should call the "recollections" of the soul. And does the intellect of the soul come to the end of its power and stop at this point, or does it turn back upon itself and know itself? This must certainly be attributed to Intellect. If, then, we grant self-knowledge to this part of soul—for we shall admit that it is an intellect—we shall also enquire how it differs from the Intellect above; but if we do not grant it [to the intellect in soul] we shall come to that higher Intellect as we advance in our argument, and we shall consider what "itself knowing itself" means. But if we grant it here too, in the lower intellect, we shall investigate what the difference in self-thinking [between lower and higher intellect] is; for if there is none, this part of soul is already pure Intellect.¹ Does then this reasoning part of the soul itself return upon itself? No, it does not. It has understanding of the impressions which it receives from both sides. And we must first enquire how it has understanding.

3. Well, then, sense-perception sees a human being and gives its impression to discursive reason. What does reason say? It will not say anything yet, but only knows, and stops at that; unless perhaps it asks itself "Who is this?" if it has met the person

¹ For the phrase νοῦς ἄκρατος cp. Anaxagoras Diels A 15 and for the sense B 12.

5 πρότερον ἐνέτιχε τούτῳ, καὶ λέγει προσχρωμένη
τῇ μνήμῃ, ὅτι Σωκράτης. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐξελίττοι τὴν
μορφὴν, μερίζει ἂ ἢ φαντασία ἔδωκεν· εἰ δέ, εἰ
ἀγαθός, λέγοι, ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἔγνω διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως
εἴρηκεν, ὃ δὲ εἴρηκεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἤδη παρ' αὐτῆς
10 ἀγαθὸν πῶς ἔχει παρ' αὐτῆ; ἢ ἀγαθοειδής ἐστι,
καὶ ἐπερρώσθη δὲ εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου
ἐπιλάμποντος αὐτῆ νοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καθαρὸν τῆς
ψυχῆς τοῦτο καὶ νοῦ δέχεται ἐπικείμενα ἴχνη. διὰ
τί δὲ οὐ τοῦτο νοῦς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ψυχῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ
αἰσθητικοῦ ἀρξάμενα; ἢ ὅτι ψυχὴν δεῖ ἐν λογισμοῖς
15 εἶναι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα λογισμένης δυνάμεως ἔργα.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐ τούτῳ τῷ μέρει δόντες τὸ νοεῖν
ἑαυτὸ ἀπαλλαξόμεθα; ἢ ὅτι ἔδομεν αὐτῷ τὰ ἔξω
σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν, νῆ δὲ ἀξιοῦμεν
ὑπάρχειν τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σκοπεῖσθαι.
ἀλλ' εἴ τις φήσει "τί οὖν κωλύει τοῦτο ἄλλη δυνάμει
20 σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ;" οὐ τὸ διανοητικὸν οὐδὲ τὸ
λογιστικὸν ἐπιζητεῖ, ἀλλὰ νοῦν καθαρὸν λαμβάνει.
τί οὖν κωλύει ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν καθαρὸν εἶναι; οὐδέν,
φήσομεν· ἀλλ' ἔτι δεῖ λέγειν ψυχῆς τοῦτο; ἀλλ' οὐ
ψυχῆς μὲν φήσομεν, ἡμέτερον δὲ νοῦν φήσομεν,
25 ἄλλον μὲν ὄντα τοῦ διανοουμένου καὶ ἐπάνω βεβη-
κότα, ὅμως δὲ ἡμέτερον, καὶ εἰ μὴ συναριθμοῦμεν
τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς. ἢ ἡμέτερον καὶ οὐχ
ἡμέτερον· διὸ καὶ προσχρώμεθα αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ προσ-
χρώμεθα—διανοία¹ δὲ αἰεί—καὶ ἡμέτερον μὲν

¹ R^{2ms} (*cogitatione* Ficinus), Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchoff*:
διάνοια Enn., H-S¹.

before, and says, using memory to help it, that it is Socrates. And if it makes the details of his form explicit, it is taking to pieces what the image-making power gave it; and if it says whether he is good, its remark originates in what it knows through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from itself, since it has a norm of the good in itself. How does it have the good in itself? Because it is like the good, and is strengthened for the perception of this kind of thing by Intellect illuminating it: for this is the pure part of the soul and receives the reflection of intellect coming down upon it. But why is this not intellect, and the rest, beginning from the power of sense-perception, soul? Because it must be soul that is engaged in reasoning; and all this is the work of a reasoning power. But why do not we give self-thinking to this part, and finish with the subject? Because we gave this part the task of observing what is outside it and busying itself with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to observe what belongs to itself and what is within itself. But if someone is going to say "What prevents this part of soul from observing what belongs to itself by another power?" he is not looking for the power of discursive reasoning or rationality, but is grasping pure Intellect. What then prevents pure Intellect from being in soul? Nothing, we shall reply. But ought we to go on to say that it belongs to soul? But we shall not say that it belongs to soul, but we shall say that it is our intellect, being different from the reasoning part and having gone up on high, but all the same ours, even if we should not count it among the parts of soul, yes, really, it is ours and not ours; for this reason we use it and do not use it—

χρωμένων, οὐ προσχρωμένῳ δὲ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. τὸ
 30 δὴ προσχρηῆσθαι τί ἐστίν; ἄρα αὐτοὺς ἐκείνο
 γινομένους, καὶ φλεγγομένους ὡς ἐκείνος; ἢ κατ'
 ἐκείνων· οὐ γὰρ νοῦς ἡμεῖς· κατ' ἐκείνου οὖν τῷ
 λογιστικῷ πρώτῳ δεχομένῳ. καὶ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα
 δι' αἰσθήσεως κἂν <μη>¹ ἡμεῖς οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι·
 ἀρ' οὖν καὶ διανοούμεθα οὕτως καὶ διὰ <νοῦ>²
 35 νοοῦμεν οὕτως; ἢ αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ λογιζόμενοι καὶ
 νοοῦμεν τὰ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ νοήματα αὐτοί· τοῦτο
 γὰρ ἡμεῖς. τὰ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνεργήματα ἄνωθεν
 οὕτως, ὡς τὰ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κάτωθεν, τοῦτο
 ὄντες τὸ κύριον τῆς ψυχῆς, μέσον δυνάμει διττῆς,
 χείρονος καὶ βελτίονος, χείρονος μὲν τῆς αἰσθήσεως,
 40 βελτίονος δὲ τοῦ νοῦ. ἀλλ' αἰσθησις μὲν αἰεὶ
 ἡμέτερον δοκεῖ συγκεχωρημένον—αἰεὶ γὰρ αἰσθα-
 νόμεθα—νοῦς δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ ὅτι μὴ αὐτῷ
 αἰεὶ καὶ ὅτι χωριστός· χωριστός δὲ τῷ μὴ
 προσενεύει αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον πρὸς αὐτόν
 45 εἰς τὸ ἄνω βλέποντας. αἰσθησις δὲ ἡμῶν ἄγγελος,
 βασιλεὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκείνος.

¹ κἂν μὴ Igal: καὶ Enn.

² Igal: διανοοῦμεν Enn.

¹ See critical note. I agree with Igal in seeing here an etymological explanation of διανοούμεθα. Cp. ch. 6, 20-2, which makes it clear that for Plotinus διανοεῖσθαι = διὰ νοῦ νοεῖν.

² The term "separate" (χωριστός) comes from Aristotle *De Anima* 430a17. Here as elsewhere Plotinus takes Aristotle's thought about Intellect as the starting-point of his own reflections. Plotinus goes on to make it clear that his intellect is the divine Intellect which is "king of heaven and

but we always use discursive reason—and it is ours when we use it, but not ours when we do not use it. But what is this "using"? Is it when we become it and speak like it? No, in accord with it: for we ourselves are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord with it by our rational power which first receives it. For we perceive through perception, even if it is not we ourselves who are the perceivers: do we then reason like this, and think through Intellect like this¹? No, it is we ourselves who reason and we ourselves make the acts of intelligence in discursive reasoning; for this is what we ourselves are. The activities of Intellect are from above in the same way that those of sense-perception are from below; we are this, the principal part of the soul, in the middle between two powers, a worse and a better, the worse that of sense-perception, the better that of Intellect. But it is generally agreed that sense-perception is always ours—for we are always perceiving—but there is disagreement about Intellect, both because we do not always use it and because it is separate; and it is separate because it itself does not incline towards us, but we rather look up towards it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king.²

earth" in Plato *Philebus* 28C7-8. Though this goes far beyond anything in the text of the *De Anima*, Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose commentaries Plotinus knew (*Life* ch. 14, 13), had identified the "active Intellect" of the *De Anima* with the divine Intellect which is Aristotle's First Cause, the Unmoved Mover (*Alexander De Anima* 89, 22-3 Bruns, cp. *Mantissa* 110-13 Bruns, where Alexander is to some extent following an earlier commentator, either Aristoteles of Messene or, according to Zeller's not certainly necessary emendation of the text, Aristocles).

4. Βασιλεύομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅταν κατ' ἐκείνον·
κατ' ἐκείνον δὲ διχῶς, ἢ τοῖς οἷον γράμμασιν
ὡσπερ νόμοις ἐν ἡμῖν γραφεῖσιν, ἢ οἷον πλη-
ρωθέντες αὐτοῦ ἢ καὶ δυναθέντες ἰδεῖν καὶ
5 αἰσθάνεσθαι παρόντος. καὶ γινώσκομεν δὲ αὐτοὺς
τῷ <τῷ>¹ τοιούτῳ ὁρατῷ τὰ ἄλλα μαθεῖν [τῷ
τοιούτῳ]² ἢ κατὰ³ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν γινώσκουσαν
τὸ τοιοῦτον μαθόντες αὐτῇ τῇ δυνάμει ἢ καὶ
ἐκεῖνο γινόμενοι, ὡς τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν
διττὸν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν γινώσκοντα τῆς διανοίας
τῆς ψυχικῆς φύσιν, τὸν δὲ ὑπεράνω τούτου, τὸν
10 γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἐκείνον γινόμε-
νον· κἀκεῖνω ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν αὐτὸ οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπον
ἔτι, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἄλλοι γενόμενον καὶ συναρ-
πάσαντα ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω μόνον ἐφέλκοντα τὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἄμεινον· ὃ καὶ δύναται μόνον πετε-
ροῦσθαι πρὸς νόησιν, ἵνα τις ἐκεῖ παρακαταβοῦτο
15 ἃ εἶδε. τὸ δὲ διανοητικὸν ὅτι διανοητικὸν ἄρα
οὐκ οἶδε,⁴ καὶ ὅτι σύνεσιν τῶν ἔξω λαμβάνει, καὶ
ὅτι κρίνει ἃ κρίνει, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κανόνισιν,
οὓς παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ ἔχει, καὶ ὡς ἔστι τι βέλτιον
αὐτοῦ, <ὃ> οὐ⁵ ζητεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχει πάντως δῆπου;
20 ἀλλ' ἄρα τί ἐστὶν αὐτὸ [ὃ]⁶ οὐκ οἶδεν ἐπιστάμενον
οἶδόν ἐστι καὶ οἶα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ; εἰ οὖν λέγοι,
ὅτι ἀπὸ νοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δεύτερον μετὰ νοῦν καὶ
εἰκὼν νοῦ, ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα οἷον γεγραμ-
μένα, ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ γράφων καὶ ὁ γράψας, ἄρ' οὖν

¹ suspic. H-S¹, ser. B-T.

² del. Steinhart, Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchoff*.

³ ἢ κατὰ H-S recte: κατὰ Stark: ἢ καὶ Enn.

⁴ Creuzer* (novit Ficinus): εἶδε(ν) AJUC, H-S¹: ἴδε(ν) WBR.

⁵ ὃ οὐ A^{3m} (= Ficinus) R^{2m}, Creuzer*: οὐ Enn. (ὃ nominativus, cf. V. I. 4. 16).

4. But we too are kings, when we are in accord
with it; we can be in accord with it in two ways,
either by having something like its writing written
in us like laws, or by being as if filled with it and
able to see it and be aware of it as present. And we
know ourselves by learning all other things by such
a vision, either learning a vision of this kind according
to the knowing power, by that very power itself, or
ourselves becoming it; so that the man who knows
himself is double, one knowing the nature of the
reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above
this man, who knows himself according to Intellect
because he has become that Intellect; and by that
Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as
man, but having become altogether other and snatch-
ing himself up into the higher world, drawing up only
the better part of soul, which alone is able to be
winged for intellection,¹ with which someone there
keeps by him what he sees. But really does not the
part which reasons discursively know that it is the
reasoning part, and that it gains understanding of
the things outside it, and that it judges what it
judges, and that it does so by the rules in itself which
it has from Intellect, and that there is something
better than itself, which does not seek, but totally
possesses? But does it not know what this is itself,
when it knows what kind of thing it is and what its
works are? If, therefore, it says that it is from
Intellect and second after Intellect and an image of
Intellect, having in itself everything as if written
[in it], as the one who writes and has written is

¹ One of Plotinus's continual allusions to the *Phaedrus* myth, Plato *Phaedrus* 246ff.

⁶ del. Theiler, ut correctionem ad lin. 17 falso loco insertam.

στήσεται μέχρι τούτων ὁ οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς,
 25 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλη δυνάμει προσχρησάμενοι νοῦν αὐ
 γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατοικήμεθα ἢ ἐκεῖνον μετα-
 λαβόντες ἐπεὶ περ κάκεινος ἡμέτερος καὶ ἡμεῖς
 ἐκεῖνον, οὕτω νοῦν καὶ αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα; ἢ
 ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως, εἴπερ γνωσόμεθα, ὃ τί ποτ'
 30 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν νῶ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτό." ἔστι δὴ νοῦς τις
 αὐτὸς γεγονώς, ὅτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀφείς ἑαυτοῦ τούτῳ
 καὶ τοῦτον βλέπει, αὐτῷ δὲ ἑαυτόν. ὡς δὴ οὖν
 νοῦς ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾷ.

5. Ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλῳ μέρει ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο μέρος αὐτοῦ
 καθορᾷ; ἀλλ' οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἔσται ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ
 ὁρώμενον· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ "αὐτὸ ἑαυτό." τί οὖν, εἰ
 5 πᾶν τοιοῦτον οἶον ὁμοιομερές εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ ὁρῶν
 μὴδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ ὁρωμένου; οἷτω γὰρ ἴδαν
 ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ὃν ταῦτόν αὐτῷ εἶδεν
 ἑαυτόν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ
 ὁρώμενον. ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπος ὁ μερισμὸς
 ἑαυτοῦ· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριεῖ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ
 τύχην· καὶ ὁ μερίζων δὲ τίς; ὁ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν
 10 τάττων ἑαυτὸν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι; εἴτα πῶς
 ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται ὁ θεωρῶν ἐν τῷ θεωρουμένῳ
 τάξας ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῷ
 θεωρουμένῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν. ἢ γνοὺς ἑαυτὸν οὕτω
 θεωρούμενον ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦντα νοήσει· ὥστε οὐ
 15 θεωρούμενον ἀλλ' οὐ θεωροῦντα εἶδε· καὶ οὕτως
 ἔσται ἄλλον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑαυτὸν ἑωρακώς. ἢ
 προσθήσει παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τεθεωρηκότα, ἵνα
 τέλειον αὐτὸν ἢ νενοηκώς. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ τὸν
 τεθεωρηκότα, ὁμοῦ καὶ τὰ ἑωραμένα. εἰ οὖν ἐν

there [in Intellect], will one who knows himself as far as this stop there, but shall we by using another power as well behold also the Intellect which knows itself, or, having a part in that Intellect, since that belongs to us and we belong to it, shall we in this way know Intellect and ourselves? Yes, we must so know, if we are to know what "self-knowledge" in Intellect means. A man has certainly become Intellect when he lets all the rest which belongs to him go and looks at this with this and himself with himself: that is, it is as Intellect he sees himself.

5. Does he then see himself with another part of himself? But in this way one would be the seer, and the other the seen; but this is not "self-knowledge". What, then, if everything of this kind is, in a way, composed of exactly similar parts, so that the seer does not differ in any way from the seen? First of all, the division of itself into parts is absurd: for how will it divide? Certainly not at random; and who is the divider? The one who sets himself on the contemplating or on the contemplated side? Then, how will the contemplator know himself in the contemplated when he has set himself on the contemplating side? For the contemplating is not in the contemplated. Knowing himself in this way, he will know himself as contemplated but not as contemplating; so that he will not know himself completely or as a whole; for what he saw, he saw as contemplated but not as contemplating: and so he will have been seeing another, but not himself. Or perhaps he will add from himself the one who has contemplated, in order that he may have perfect knowledge of himself. But if he adds the one who has contemplated, he at the same time adds what he

τῇ θεωρίᾳ ὑπάρχει τὰ θεωρημένα, εἰ μὲν τύποι
 20 αὐτῶν, οὐκ αὐτὰ ἔχει· εἰ δ' αὐτὰ ἔχει, οὐκ ἰδὼν
 αὐτὰ ἐκ τοῦ μερίσαι αὐτὸν ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἦν πρὶν
 μερίσαι ἑαυτὸν καὶ θεωρῶν καὶ ἔχων. εἰ τοῦτο, δεῖ
 τὴν θεωρίαν ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ θεωρητῷ, καὶ τὸν
 νοῦν ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μὴ
 ταῦτόν, οὐκ ἀλήθεια ἔσται· τύπον γὰρ ἔξει ὁ
 ἔχων τὰ ὄντα ἕτερον τῶν ὄντων, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 25 ἀλήθεια. τὴν ἄρα ἀλήθειαν οὐχ ἑτέρου εἶναι δεῖ,
 ἀλλ' ὁ λέγει, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι. ἐν ἄρα οὕτω νοῦς
 καὶ τὸ νοητόν καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ πρῶτον ὄν τοῦτο καὶ
 δὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς τὰ ὄντα ἔχων, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ
 αὐτὸς τοῖς οὖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν
 30 ἓν, πῶς διὰ τοῦτο τὸ νοοῦν νοήσει ἑαυτό; ἢ μὲν
 γὰρ νόησις οἶον περιέξει τὸ νοητόν, ἢ ταῦτόν τῷ
 νοητῷ ἔσται, οὕτω δὲ ὁ νοῦς δῆλος ἑαυτὸν νοῶν.
 ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν ταῦτόν—ἐνέργεια
 γὰρ τις τὸ νοητόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δύναμις οὐδέ γ'
 ἀνόητον¹ οὐδὲ ζωῆς χωρὶς οὐδ' αὖ ἐπακτόν τὸ
 35 ζῆν οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ἄλλω ὄντι, οἶον λίθῳ ἢ ἀψίχῳ
 τινί—καὶ οὐσία ἢ πρώτη τὸ νοητόν· εἰ οὖν
 ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια καὶ καλλίστη δὴ,
 νόησις ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐσιώδης νύσις· καὶ γὰρ
 ἀληθεστάτη· νόησις δὴ τοιαύτη καὶ πρώτη οὐσα
 καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ
 40 νοῦς οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἢ δὲ

¹ Theiler, *testatur* Epistola 61: γε νοητόν Enn.*

sees. If then the things contemplated are in the contemplation, if what are in it are impressions of them, then it does not have them themselves; but if it has them themselves it does not see them as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it divided itself. But if this is so, the contemplation must be the same as the contemplated, and Intellect the same as the intelligible; for, if not the same, there will not be truth; for the one who is trying to possess realities will possess an impression different from the realities, and this is not truth. For truth ought not to be the truth of something else, but to be what it says. In this way, therefore, Intellect and the intelligible are one, and this is reality and the first reality, and also the first Intellect which possesses the real beings, or rather is the same as the real beings. But if the intellection and the intelligible are one, how because of this will that which thinks think itself? For the intellection will in a way encompass the intelligible, or be the same as the intelligible, and Intellect will not yet be clearly thinking itself. But if intellect and intelligible are the same—for the intelligible is something active and actual: for it is certainly not a potentiality (and not unintellectual either), nor is it without life, nor again are life and thought brought in from outside to something else, as if to a stone or something lifeless—then the intelligible is the primary substance. If then it is active actuality, and the first active actuality and the fairest, it is the first intellection and substantial intellection: for it is the truest; but an intellection of this kind which is primary and primarily intellective will be the first Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is

νόησις ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιώδες
 αὐτοῦ δυνάμει. εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ
 ἐνέργεια, ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἐν δὲ
 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· ἐν ἅμα πάντα
 ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν. εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις
 45 αὐτοῦ τὸ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοητόν αὐτός, αὐτὸς ἄρα
 ἑαυτὸν νοήσει· νοήσει γὰρ τῇ νοήσει, ὅπερ ἦν
 αὐτός, καὶ νοήσει τὸ νοητόν, ὅπερ ἦν αὐτός. καθ'
 ἐκάτερον ἄρα ἑαυτὸν νοήσει, καθότι καὶ ἡ νόησις
 αὐτὸς ἦν, καὶ καθότι τὸ νοητόν αὐτός, ὅπερ ἐνόει
 τῇ νοήσει, ὃ ἦν αὐτός.

6. Ὁ μὲν δὴ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν εἶναί τι τὸ αὐτὸ
 ἑαυτὸ κυρίως νοεῖν. νοεῖ οὖν ἄλλως μὲν ἐπὶ
 ψυχῆς ὄν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κυριώτερον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ψυχὴ ἐνόει ἑαυτὴν ὅτι ἄλλου, ὃ δὲ νοῦς ὅτι αὐτός
 5 καὶ οἶος αὐτός καὶ ὅστις καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
 φύσεως καὶ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς αἰτόν. τὰ γὰρ ὄντα
 ὁρῶν ἑαυτὸν ἐώρα καὶ ὁρῶν ἐνεργείᾳ ἦν καὶ ἡ
 ἐνέργεια αὐτός· νοῦς γὰρ καὶ νόησις ἐν· καὶ ὅλος
 ὅλῳ, οὐ μέρει ἄλλο μέρος. ἀρ' οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ
 λόγος ἔδειξεν, οἷον καὶ ἐνεργείαν πιστικὴν ἔχειν;
 10 ἡ ἀνάγκη¹ μὲν οὕτως, πειθὼ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ
 ἡ μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν νῷ, ἡ δὲ πειθὼ ἐν ψυχῇ. ζητού-
 μεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμεῖς πεισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῷ
 καθαρῶ θεᾶσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἕως
 ἡμεῖν ἄνω ἐν νοῦ φύσει, ἠρκοῦμεθα καὶ ἐνοοῦμεν

¹ A^{pc}, Kirchhoff*, cf. VI. 4. 4. 5: ἀνάγκη A^{ac}EBxUC, H-S¹.

it one and its intellection another: for in this way
 again its substantiality would be potential. If then
 it is actuality and its substance is actuality, it is one
 and the same with its actuality; but being and the
 intelligible are also one with the actuality. All
 together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelli-
 gible. If therefore Intellect's intellection is the in-
 telligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself
 think itself: for it will think with the intellection
 which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which
 it is itself. In both ways, then, it will think itself,
 in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible
 is itself which it thinks in its intellection and which
 is itself.

6. The argument, then, has demonstrated that
 self-thinking in the proper and primary sense is
 something which exists. The thinking is different
 when it is in soul but is more properly thinking in
 Intellect. For the soul [we observed] thought itself
 as belonging to another, but Intellect did so as itself,
 and as what and who it is, and [it started its thinking]
 from its own nature and thought by turning back
 to itself. For in seeing the real beings it saw itself,
 and in seeing it was in act, and its actuality was
 itself: for Intellect and intellection are one; and it
 thinks as a whole with the whole of itself, not one
 part of itself with another. Has then our argument
 demonstrated something of a kind which has the
 power to inspire confidence? No, it has necessity,
 not persuasive force; for necessity is in Intellect
 but persuasion in the soul. It does seem that we
 seek to persuade ourselves rather than to behold
 truth by pure intellect. For while we were above
 in the nature of Intellect, we were satisfied and

καὶ εἰς ἕν πάντῃ συνάγοντες ἐωρῶμεν νοῦς γὰρ
 15 ἦν ὁ νοῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγων, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ
 ἡσυχίαν ἦγε συγχωροῦσα τῷ ἐνεργήματι τοῦ νοῦ.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνταῦθα γεγενήμεθα πάλιν αἰ καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ,
 πειθῶ τινα γενέσθαι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον ἐν εἰκόνι τὸ
 ἀρχέτυπον θεωρεῖν ἐθέλοντες. ἴσως οὖν χρὴ τὴν
 ψυχὴν ἡμῶν διδάξαι, πῶς ποτε ὁ νοῦς θεωρεῖ
 20 ἑαυτόν, διδάξαι δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁ νοερόν πως,
 διανοητικὸν αὐτὸ τιθέμενοι καὶ τῇ ὀνομασίᾳ
 ὑποσημαίνοντες νοῦν τινα αὐτὸ εἶναι ἢ διὰ νοῦ τὴν
 δύναμιν καὶ παρὰ νοῦ αὐτὸ ἴσχειν. τούτῳ τοίνυν
 γινώσκειν προσήκει, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ ὅσα ὄρα
 γινώσκει καὶ οἶδεν ἃ λέγει. καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ¹ εἴη ἃ
 25 λέγει, γινώσκει ἂν ἑαυτὸ οὕτω. ὄντων δὲ ἡ
 ἄνωθεν αὐτῷ γινομένων ἐκεῖθεν, ὅθεν περ καὶ
 αὐτό, συμβαίνοι ἂν καὶ τούτῳ λόγῳ ὄντι καὶ
 συγγενῇ λαμβάνοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ ἴχνεσιν
 ἐφαρμόττοντι² οὕτω τοι γινώσκειν ἑαυτό. μετα-
 θέτω τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν τὴν εἰκόνα, ὅς
 30 ἦν ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς νοουμένοις ἀληθέσι καὶ ὄντως
 οἶσι καὶ πρώτοις, καὶ ὅτι μὴ οἶόν τε τοῦτον τὸν
 τοιοῦτον ἐκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι—ὥστε εἴπερ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ἐστι καὶ σὺν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶ, νοῦς
 ἐστιν (ἀνόητος δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἴη) ἀνάγκη
 συνεῖναι αὐτῷ τὴν γνώσιν ἑαυτοῦ—καὶ ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ
 35 οὐτός, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο αὐτῷ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἢ
 τὸ νῶ μόνον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πρακτικὸς γε οὗτος·
 ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντι τῷ πρακτικῷ καὶ μὴ ἐν
 αὐτῷ μένοντι εἴη ἂν τῶν μὲν ἔξω τις γνώσις,

¹ R^{fc}, Kirchlhoff *: αὐτὸς wBR^{ac}JUC.

² Kirchlhoff*: -όττοντα Enn.

[really] thought and saw, gathering all things into one; for it was Intellect thinking and speaking about itself, and the soul kept quiet and went along with the working of Intellect. But since we have come to be here below again and in soul, we seek for some kind of persuasion, as if we wanted to contemplate the archetype in the image. Perhaps, then, we ought to teach our soul how Intellect contemplates itself, and to teach that part of the soul which is in some way intellectual, since we call it discursively intelligent and by this naming indicate that it is a kind of intellect or that it has its power through and from Intellect.¹ This therefore should know that in its own case too it comes to know what it sees and knows what it speaks. And if it was what it speaks, then it would in this way know itself. But since the things which it speaks are above, or come to it from above, whence it also comes itself, it could happen to it, since it is a rational principle and receives things akin to it, and fits them to the traces in itself, in this way to know itself. Let it then transpose the image to the true Intellect, the one [we observed] which was the same as the truths it thought which are really existent and primary, both because it was not possible for it, being of such a kind, to be outside itself—so that if it is in itself and with itself, and that which it is, is Intellect (there could not even be an unintelligent intellect), its knowledge of itself must necessarily accompany it—and because it is in itself and has no other function and no other substance than to be Intellect. For it is certainly not a practical intellect: as the practical intellect looks to the outside and does not stay in itself, it

¹ Cp. ch. 3, n. 1.

ἀνάγκη δὲ οὐκ ἔνεστιν, εἴπερ τὸ πᾶν πρακτικὸς εἴη, γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν. ᾧ δὲ μὴ πράξις—οὐδὲ γὰρ
 40 ὄρεξις τῷ καθαρῷ νῷ ἀπόντος—τούτῳ ἡ ἐπιστροφή
 πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐσα οὐ μόνον εὐλογον ὑποδείκνυσιν,
 [τὴν ἑαυτοῦ]¹ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναγκαίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν
 (ἑαυτοῦ)² γνῶσιν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ
 εἴη πράξεως ἀπηλλαγμένῳ καὶ ἐν νῷ ὄντι;

7. Ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν θεωρεῖ, εἴπομεν ἄν. ἀλλ' εἰ
 τὸν θεὸν γινώσκειν αὐτὸν τις ὁμολογήσει, καὶ
 ταύτῃ συγχωρεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ ἑαυτὸν
 γινώσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅσα ἔχει παρ' ἐκείνου
 5 γινώσεται, καὶ ἃ ἔδωκε, καὶ ἃ δύναται ἐκείνος.
 ταῦτα δὲ μαθὼν καὶ γνοὺς καὶ ταύτῃ ἑαυτὸν
 γινώσεται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τι τῶν δοθέντων αὐτός,
 μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα τὰ δοθέντα αὐτός. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 κάκεινο γινώσεται κατὰ³ τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ
 μαθὼν, καὶ ἑαυτὸν γινώσεται ἐκεῖθεν γενόμενος καὶ
 ἃ δύναται κομισάμενος· εἰ δὲ ἀδυνατήσῃ ἰδεῖν
 10 σαφῶς ἐκεῖνον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἴσως αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ
 ὀρώμενον, ταύτῃ μάλιστα λείποιτ' ἂν αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν
 ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰδέναί, εἰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τοῦτό ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 εἶναι τὸ ὀρώμενον. τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ δοίημεν αὐτῷ
 ἄλλο; ἡσυχίαν, νῆ Δία. ἀλλὰ νῷ ἡσυχία οὐ νοῦ
 15 ἐστὶν ἔκστασις, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡσυχία τοῦ νοῦ σχολήν

¹ del. Volkmann*.

² transposuimus.

³ Stark: καὶ Enn.*: del. Theiler.

¹ The idea that God can only be known through his powers was widespread: cp. Cicero *De Divinatione* I 79; Philo *De Posteritate Caini* 167. It did not of course satisfy Plotinus, for whom direct vision of and union with God (the One or

could have a kind of knowledge of the things outside, but if it was altogether practical, there would be no necessity in it of knowing itself. But the Intellect which has no practical activity—pure Intellect does not even have a desire for what is absent from it—for this the return upon itself demonstrates that its knowledge of itself is not only probable but necessary. For [otherwise] what could its life be, being free from practical activity and in intellect?

7. “But it contemplates God”, we might say. But if anyone is going to admit that it knows God, he will be compelled to agree that it also knows itself. For it will know all that it has from him, and what he gives, and what his power is. But when it has learnt and knows this, then in this way also it will know itself: for it is itself one of his gifts, or, rather, itself all of his gifts. If then it comes to know that [Good], learning by his powers, it will come to know itself since it comes from there and has received what it can¹: but if it cannot see him clearly, since perhaps that seeing is the sight itself, then especially in this way it will remain for it to see and know itself, if this seeing is being the sight itself. For what else should we give it? Peace and quiet, of course. But peace and quiet for Intellect is not going out of Intellect, but the peace and quiet of Intellect is an activity taking its rest from all other

Good] was possible. The idea that knowledge of God and self-knowledge go together was also widespread and goes back to Plato [?] *Alcibiades* I 133C.

ἀγουσα ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνέργεια· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἷς ἔστιν ἡσυχία ἐτέρων, καταλείπεται ἢ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐνέργεια καὶ μάλιστα, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὸ εἶναι οὖν ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐδέν, πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια· πρὸς αὐτῷ
 20 ἄρα. ἑαυτὸν ἄρα νοῶν οὕτω πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἴσχει. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τῷ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. ἔδει γὰρ πρῶτον ἐν¹ ἑαυτῷ, εἶτα καὶ εἰς ἄλλο, ἢ ἄλλο τι ἤκειν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὁμοιούμενον αὐτῷ, οἷον καὶ πυρὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον ὄντι πυρὶ καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχοντι πυρὸς
 25 οὕτω τοι καὶ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ δυνηθῆναι ποιῆσαι ἐν ἄλλῳ. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργεια, ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ τὸ μὲν ὅσον πρὸς νοῦν αὐτῆς οἷον εἶσω, τὸ δ' ἔξω νοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω. κατὰ θάτερα μὲν γὰρ ὁμοίωται ὅθεν ἤκει, κατὰ θάτερα δὲ καίτοι ἀνομοιωθεῖσα ὁμῶς ὁμοίωται καὶ
 30 ἐνταῦθα, εἴτε πράττοι, εἴτε ποιῶν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πράττουσα ὁμῶς θεωρεῖ καὶ ποιῶσα εἶδη ποιεῖ, οἷον νοήσεις ἀπηρτισμένας, ὥστε πάντα εἶναι ἴχνη νοήσεως καὶ νοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον προϋόντων καὶ μιμουμένων τῶν μὲν ἐγγύς μᾶλλον, τῶν δὲ ἐσχάτων ἀμυδρὰν ἀποσφῶζόντων εἰκόνα.

8. Πυῖον δὲ τι ὄρα τὸ νοητὸν ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ποιῶν τι² ἑαυτὸν; ἢ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν οὐδὲ³ δεῖ ζητεῖν, οἷον τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι χρῶμα ἢ σχῆμα· πρὶν

¹ J, Kirchoff*: om. wBRUC, H.S.¹

² B-T: ποιῶν δὲ τι . . . ποιῶν τι Enn.*: ποιῶν δὲ τί . . . ποιῶν τι H.S.¹

³ Perna*: οὐτε Enn., H.S.¹

¹ For the doctrine that all action is simultaneously contemplation, and the extension of contemplation down to the

activities, since for other beings also, which are left in peace and quiet by other things, there remains their own proper activity, above all for those whose being is not potential but actual. The Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is directed; so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself. For if anything comes from it, it is in itself and directed to itself. For it had to be first in itself, then also directed to something else, or with something else coming from it made like itself, just as it is since fire is previously fire in itself and has the activity of fire that it is able to produce a trace of itself in another. Again, Intellect is an activity contained in itself, and, as for soul, the part of it directed to Intellect is, so to speak, within, and the part outside Intellect directed to the outside. In one part, then, it is made like that from which it comes, in the other even in its unlikeness it is made like, even here below in its action and production; for its action is simultaneously contemplation, and in its production it produces forms, which are like intellections carried out in practice, so that all things are traces of intellection and Intellect proceeding according to their archetype, the ones near it representing it closely, and the last and lowest keeping a faint image of it.¹

8. But as what sort of thing does Intellect see the intelligible, and as what sort of thing does it see itself? As for the intelligible, one should not look for something like colour or form in bodies; for

last and lowest activities of soul, see the first seven chapters of the treatise *On Contemplation* (III. 8).

γὰρ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα· καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὁ
 5 ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι τοῖς ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὐ ταῦτα·
 ἀόρατα γὰρ τῇ φύσει καὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
 ἐκεῖνα. καὶ ἔστι φύσις ἢ αὐτῇ ἐκεῖνων καὶ τῶν
 ἐχόντων, οἷον ὁ λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ ἡ
 ἔχουσα ψυχὴ ταῦτα. ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν οὐχ ὄρᾳ ἂ ἔχει·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐγέννησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ αὐτῇ
 15 εἶδωλον καὶ οἱ λόγοι· ὅθεν δὲ ἦλθε, τὸ ἐναργὲς καὶ
 τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτως, ὅθεν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστι
 καὶ αὐτῷ· τοῦτο δ' εἴαν μὴ ἄλλου γένηται καὶ
 ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐδὲ μένει· εἰκόνοι γὰρ προσήκει
 ἐτέρου οὔσαν ἐν ἐτέρῳ γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη
 ἐκεῖνου ἐξηρητημένη· διὸ οὐδὲ βλέπει, ἅτε δὴ φῶς
 20 ἰκανὸν οὐκ ἔχον, κἂν βλέπη δέ, τελειωθὲν ἐν ἄλλῳ
 ἄλλο καὶ οὐχ αὐτὸ βλέπει. ἀλλ' οὖν τούτων ἐκεῖ
 οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὄρασις καὶ τὸ ὄρατὸν αὐτῇ ὁμοῦ καὶ
 τοιοῦτον τὸ ὄρατὸν οἷον ἢ ὄρασις, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις
 οἷον τὸ ὄρατὸν. τίς οὖν αὐτὸ ἐρεῖ οἷόν ἐστιν; ὁ
 ἰδίων· νοῦς δὲ ὄρᾳ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ὄψις φῶς
 οὔσα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνωθεῖσα φωτὶ, φῶς ὄρᾳ· χρώματα
 γὰρ ὄρᾳ· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ δι' ἐτέρου, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῆς, ὅτι
 μηδὲ ἕξω. ἄλλῳ οὖν φωτὶ ἄλλο φῶς ὄρᾳ, οὐ δι'
 ἄλλου. φῶς ἄρα φῶς ἄλλο ὄρᾳ· αὐτὸ ἄρα αὐτὸ
 ὄρᾳ. τὸ δὲ φῶς τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ μὲν ἐλλάμψαν
 ἐφώτισε· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ νοερὰν ἐποίησε· τοῦτο δ'

¹ From Plato *Timaeus* 52C2-4.

the intelligibles exist before the existence of these; and the rational forming principle in the seeds which produce these are not form and colour; for both these and still more the intelligibles are naturally invisible. And they and those which possess them have the same nature, as do also the rational principle in the seed and the soul which possesses these [invisible principles of colour and form]. But the soul does not see what it possesses; for it did not even generate them, but this soul as well as the rational forming principles is an image; but that from which it came is the clear and the true and the primary, and so belongs to itself and exists for itself; but this [image], if it does not belong to something else and exist in something else, does not persist; for "it is proper to an image, since it belongs to something else, to come to exist in something else";¹ unless it is in close dependence on that original. It does not even see, therefore, because it does not have enough light, but if it does see, it does not see itself but another thing perfected in something else. But there is none of this in the intelligible world, but there seeing and the seen coincide, and the seen is like the seeing and the seeing like the seen. Who then will tell what it is like? The seer: and Intellect is the seer. For here below also sight, since it is light, or rather united with light, sees light: for it sees colours; but in the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but through itself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect therefore sees one light with another, not through another. Light then sees another light: it therefore itself sees itself. And this light shining in the soul illuminates it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that

25 ἔστιν ὁμοίωσεν ἑαυτῷ τῷ ἄνω φωτί. οἶον οὖν
 ἔστι τὸ ἔχνος τὸ ἐγγενόμενον τοῦ φωτός ἐν ψυχῇ,
 τοιοῦτον καὶ ἔτι κάλλιον καὶ μείζον αὐτὸ νομίζων
 καὶ ἑναργέστερον ἐγγύς ἂν γένοιο φύσεως νοῦ καὶ
 νοητοῦ. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπιλαμφθὲν τοῦτο ζωὴν
 ἔδωκε τῇ ψυχῇ ἑναργεστέραν, ζωὴν δὲ οὐ γεν-
 30 νητικὴν· τὸναντίον γὰρ ἐπέστρεψε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὴν
 ψυχὴν, καὶ σκιδνασθαι οὐκ εἴασεν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾶν
 ἐποίησε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγλαίαν· οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ
 αἰσθητικὴν, αὕτη γὰρ ἔξω βλέπει καὶ [οὐ μάλλον]¹
 αἰσθάνεται· ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀληθῶν
 λαβῶν οἶον βλέπει <οὐ>² μάλλον τὰ ὁρατά, ἀλλὰ
 35 τὸναντίον. λέιπεται τοίνυν ζωὴν νοεράν προσ-
 εληφέναι, ἔχνος νοῦ ζωῆς· ἐκεῖ γὰρ τὰ ἀληθῆ.
 ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ πρῶτον φῶς
 ἑαυτῷ λάμπον πρῶτως καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ λαμπηδόν,
 λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ λαμπόμενον, τὸ ἀληθῶς νοητόν,
 40 καὶ νοοῦν καὶ νοούμενον, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὁρώμενον καὶ
 οὐ δεόμενον ἄλλου, ἵνα ἴδῃ, αὐτῷ ἀνταρκές πρὸς τὸ
 ἰδεῖν—καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὄρα αὐτό ἐστι—γιγνωσκόμενον καὶ
 παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ, ὡς καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν
 γνώσιν αὐτοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι· ἢ πόθεν ἂν
 ἔσχομεν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ; τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οἶον
 45 σαφέστερον μὲν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ, ἡμᾶς δὲ δι'
 αὐτοῦ· διὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λογισμῶν ἀνάγεσθαι
 καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸ εἰκόνα θεμένην
 ἑαυτὴν εἶναι ἐκείνου, ὡς τὴν αὐτῆς³ ζωὴν ὑδαλμα
 καὶ ὁμοίωμα εἶναι ἐκείνου, καὶ ὅταν νοῆ, θεοειδῆ

¹ del. Igal.² Kirchhoff.³ R^{smg}, Kirchhoff* (*suum* Ficinus): αὐτὴν wBxU.

is, it makes it like itself, the light above. For if you consider that it is like the trace of light that comes to be in the soul and still more beautiful and greater and clearer, you will come near to the nature of Intellect and the intelligible. And again, this illumination gives the soul a clearer life, but a life which is not generative; on the contrary it turns the soul back upon itself and does not allow it to disperse, but makes it satisfied with the glory in itself; and it is certainly not a life of sense-perception either; for sense-perception looks outside and perceives the external world; but he who has received that light of the true realities sees, so to speak, the visible things no better, but their opposite. The remaining possibility, then, is for the soul to have received an intelligent life, a trace of the life of Intellect: for the true realities are there. But the life and activity¹ of Intellect is the first light shining primarily for itself and an outshining upon itself, at once illuminating and illuminated, the truly intelligible, both thinker and thought, seen by itself and needing no other that it may see, supplying itself with the power of seeing—for it is itself what it sees—known to us by that very power, so that the knowledge of it comes to us through itself; otherwise from where should we have the ability to speak about it? It is such a kind that it apprehends itself more clearly, but we apprehend it by means of it; by reasonings of this kind our soul also is led back up to it, considering itself to be an image of Intellect, as its life is a reflection and likeness of

¹ Again a reminiscence of Aristotle's description of divine Intellect: cp. *Metaphysics* A 7. 1072b27.

καὶ νοοειδῆ γίγνεσθαι· καὶ εἴαν τις αὐτὴν¹ ἀπαιτῆ
 50 ὅποιον ὁ νοῦς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ τέλος καὶ πᾶς, ὁ
 γινώσκων πρῶτως ἑαυτόν, ἐν τῷ νῷ αὐτὴν πρῶτον
 γενομένην ἢ παραχωρήσασαν τῷ νῷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
 ὧν ἔσχε τὴν μνήμην ἐπ' αὐτῆ, ταῦτα δὴ² ἔχουσαν³
 55 δύνασθαι ἀμνηστέην ἐκεῖνον, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνω πρὸς τὸ
 ἀκριβέστερον ὁμοιωμένης, ὅσον ψυχῆς μέρος εἰς
 ὁμοιότητα νῷ δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

9. Ψυχὴν οὖν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ ψυχῆς θειότατον
 κατιδεῖν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νοῦν εἴσεσθαι ὃ τι ἐστί.
 γένοιτο δ' ἂν τοῦτο ἴσως καὶ ταύτη, εἰ ἀφέλοις
 πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ δηλονότι
 5 σαυτοῦ, εἶτα καὶ τὴν πλάττουσαν τοῦτο ψυχὴν
 καὶ τὴν αἰσθησιν δὲ εὖ μάλα, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ καὶ
 θυμοῦς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας φλυαρίας, ὡς
 πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν νεούσας καὶ πάνυ. τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν
 αὐτῆς τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ εἰκόνα ἔφαμεν νοῦ σφύζουσάν
 10 τι φῶς ἐκεῖνου, οἷον ἡλίου μετὰ τὴν τοῦ μεγέθους
 μὲν οὖν τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἂν τις συγχωρήσειεν ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡλίον εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ ὠρμημένον
 καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν μεῖναν, ἄλλο δὲ ἐξ ἄλλου αἰεὶ
 προῖον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆν
 15 ἴκη. ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἡλίον θήσεται ἐν
 ἡλίον σώματος. ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ νοῦ φῶς τι περὶ

¹ Kirchoff*: αὐτὸν Enn., H-S¹.

² Kirchoff*: δὲ Enn., H-S¹.

³ Kirchoff*: ἔχουσα Enn.

it, and when it thinks it becomes godlike and intellect-
 like; and if one asks it what sort of thing is that
 perfect universal Intellect which has primary know-
 ledge of itself, it first comes to be in Intellect or
 makes room for Intellect to exercise its activity, and
 shows itself really in possession of the things of
 which it has the memory in itself, so that through soul
 which is its image one can in some way see Intellect,
 through the soul which is brought more precisely to
 its likeness, as far as a part of soul can come to
 likeness with Intellect.

9. It is probable, then, that he who intends to
 know what Intellect really is must know soul, and
 the most divine part of soul. This could happen
 also in this way, if you first of all separated the body
 from man (and, obviously, from yourself), and then
 the soul which forms it and, very thoroughly, sense-
 perception and desires and passions and all the rest
 of such fooleries,¹ since they incline so very much
 towards the mortal. What remains of soul is this
 which we said was an image of Intellect preserving
 something of its light, like the light of the sun which,
 beyond its spherical mass, shines around it and from
 it. Now one would not concede that the light of
 the sun exists by itself which is around the sun itself,
 springing from it and remaining around it, though one
 light comes from another, always going forth from
 that before it until it reaches us on the earth; but
 one will place all of it, including that which is around
 the sun itself, in something else, so as not to assume
 that there is a space, that under the sun, which is
 empty of body. But the soul has arisen from In-

¹ Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 66C3.

αὐτὸν γενομένη ἐξήρτηται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνον, οἷτε τόπος αὐτῆ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἐν ἀέρι, αὐτῆ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τοιαύτη καθαρὰ, ὥστε καὶ ἐφ' αὐτῆς
 20 ὁρᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τε αὐτῆς καὶ ἄλλης τοιαύτης. καὶ αὐτῆ μὲν περὶ νοῦ συλλογιστέα οἷος ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς σκοπουμένη, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὐ συλλογιζόμενος περὶ αὐτοῦ· πάρεστι γὰρ αἰεὶ αὐτῷ, ἡμεῖς δέ, ὅταν εἰς αὐτόν· μεμέρισται γὰρ ἡμῶν ἢ ζωῆ καὶ πολλαὶ ζωαί, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οὐδὲν δέταται ἄλλης ζωῆς ἢ
 25 ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ὡς παρέχει ἄλλοις παρέχει, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ δέταται τῶν χειρόνων, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ παρέχει τὸ ἔλαττον ἔχων τὸ πᾶν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἔχρη ἔχων τὰ πρῶτα, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὦν ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ τις ἀδυνατεῖ [τὴν πρώτην]¹ τὴν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν ἔχειν καθαρῶς νοοῦσαν,
 30 δοξαστικὴν λαβέτω, εἶτα ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀναβαινέτω. εἰ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο, αἰσθησιν ἐμπλατύτερα τὰ εἶδη κομιζομένην, αἰσθησιν δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς μεθ' ὧν δύναται καὶ ἤδη ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσιν οὔσαν. εἰ δὲ βούλεται τις, καταβαίνων καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γεννώσαν ἴτω μέχρι καὶ ὧν ποιεῖ· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν ἀναβαινέτω
 35 ἀπὸ ἐσχάτων εἰδῶν εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα ἀνάπαλιν εἶδη, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς τὰ πρῶτα.

10. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ταύτη. εἰ δὲ ² τὰ ποιηθέντα μόνον, οὐκ ³ ἂν ἦν ἔσχατα. ἐκεῖ δὲ πρῶτα τὰ ποιοῦντα, ὅθεν καὶ πρῶτα. δεῖ οὖν ἅμα καὶ τὸ

¹ del. Dodds (*Gnomon* 33, 1961, 708), ut glossam ad τὴν τοιαύτην.

² εἰ δὲ Enn.: οὐδὲ H.S. ¹ falso.

³ Müller: οὐ γὰρ Enn.

tellec as a light around it and is immediately dependent on it and not in something else but around it, and has no place, for neither has Intellect. So the light of the sun is in the air, but the soul itself which is of this kind is pure, so that it itself and any other soul of the same kind can see it by itself. And soul must draw conclusions about what Intellect is like, starting its investigation from itself, but Intellect knows itself without drawing conclusions about itself; for it is always present to itself, but we are only so when we attain to it; for our life is divided and we have many lives, but Intellect has no need of another life or other lives, but the lives which it gives, it gives to others, not to itself: for it has no need of the worse, nor does it give itself the less when it has the all, nor the traces of reality when it has the primary realities, or rather does not have them, but is them itself. But if someone is unable to grasp this kind of soul which thinks purely, let him take the soul which forms opinions, and then ascend from this. But if he cannot even do this, let him take sense-perception which acquires the forms in broader extension and sense-perception by itself with its powers which is already in the forms. But if someone wants to, let him descend to the generative soul and go right on to what it makes, and then ascend from there, from the ultimate forms to the forms which are ultimate in the opposite sense, or, rather, to the primary forms.

10. So much for this. But if there were only the things which are made, there would be no ultimate realities. But in the intelligible world the principles which make are primary; it is because they make that they are primary. The primary principle, then,

ποιούν είναι και ἐν ἄμφω· εἰ δὲ μή, δεήσει πάλιν
 5 ἄλλου. τί οὖν; οὐ δεήσει πάλιν <τοῦ>¹ ἐπέκεινα
 τούτου; ἢ ὁ μὲν νοῦς τούτο; τί οὖν; οὐχ ὄρα
 ἑαυτόν; ἢ οὗτος οὐδὲν δεῖται ὀράσεως.

Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο εἰς ὕστερον· νῦν δὲ πάλιν λέγωμεν—
 οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ἢ σκέψις—
 λκτέον δὲ πάλιν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν δεηθῆναι τοῦ
 10 ὄραν ἑαυτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἔχειν τὸ ὄραν ἑαυτόν,
 πρῶτον μὲν τῷ πολὺν εἶναι, εἶτα καὶ τῷ ἐτέρου
 εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀρατικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὀρατικὸν
 ἐκείνου, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ ὄρασι εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ
 ὄντος τινὸς ἄλλου ὄρασι δεῖ εἶναι, μὴ δὲ ὄντος
 μᾶτην ἔστί. δεῖ τοίνυν πλείω ἐνός εἶναι, ἵνα
 15 ὄρασις ἦ, καὶ συνεκπίπτειν τὴν ὄρασι τῷ ὀρατῷ,
 καὶ τὸ ὀρώμενον τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πλήθος εἶναι ἐν
 παντί. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἐν πάντῃ εἰς τί ἐνεργῆσει,
 ἀλλὰ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον ὃν πάντῃ στήσεται· ἢ
 γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· εἰ δὲ μή εἴη ἄλλο, τὸ
 20 δὲ ἄλλο, τί καὶ ποιήσει; ἢ τοῦ προβήσεται; διὸ
 δεῖ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἢ περὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸ πολὺ
 τι εἶναι, εἰ μέλλοι ἐνεργεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ μή τι
 προελεύσεται ἐπ' ἄλλο, στήσεται· ὅταν δὲ πᾶσαι
 στάσι, οὐ νοήσει. δεῖ τοίνυν τὸ νοεῖν, ὅταν νοῆ, ἐν

¹ Müller: <ἄλλου> Volkman, H-S¹.

¹ Cp. Plato *Republic* I 352D5-8.

² An inappropriate reminiscence of Plato *Philebus* 63B7-8, where Plato seems to be saying that the "class" of pleasures should not be kept alone and isolated from the "class" of

and the making principle must coincide, and both must be one: if not, there will be need of yet another. What then? Is there not a need of that which is beyond Intellect? Or is Intellect this? What then? Does it not see itself? This one has no need of seeing.

But this we will deal with later. Now let us say again—for our investigation is not about some casual matter¹—we ought to repeat that this Intellect needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of itself, first because it is multiple, and then because it belongs to another, and must necessarily be a seer, and a seer of that other, and its seeing is its substance; for the existence of something else is a necessary condition of seeing, and if there is nothing else seeing is useless. There must, then, be more than one, that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must be an universal multiplicity. For what is absolutely one has nothing to which to direct its activity but since it is "alone isolated"² will remain absolutely immobile. For in so far as it is active, there is one thing after another: but if there is not one thing and then another, what will it make, or where will it proceed? Therefore that which is active must either be acting on something else, or must itself be a multiple thing, if it is to be active within itself. But if a thing is not going to go forth to something else, it will be immobile; but when it is altogether immobile, it will not think. The thinking principle, then, when it thinks, must be in two parts, and either

kinds of knowledge. Plotinus does not always remember or advert to the context of the Platonic phrases which come into his mind.

25 *δυσὶν εἶναι, καὶ ἢ ἕξω θάτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἄμφω,*
καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ἑτερότητι τὴν νόησιν εἶναι καὶ ἐν
ταυτότητι δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· καὶ εἶναι τὰ κυρίως
νοούμενα πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἕτερα.
καὶ πάλιν αὖ ἕκαστον τῶν νοουμένων συνεκφέρει
τὴν ταυτότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἑτερότητα· ἢ τί
νοήσει, ὃ μὴ ἔχει ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο; καὶ γὰρ εἰ
 30 *ἕκαστον λόγος, πολλά ἐστι. καταμανθάνει τοῖνυν*
ἑαυτὸ τῷ ποικίλον ὀφθαλμὸν εἶναι ἢ ποικίλων
χρωμάτων. εἰ γὰρ ἐνὶ καὶ ἁμερεῖ πρυσβάλλοι,
ἠλογήθη· τί γὰρ ἂν ἔχοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν, ἢ τί
συνεῖναι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὸ ἁμερές πάντη εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν
δέοι, δεῖ πρότερον λέγειν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν· ὥστε καὶ
 35 *οὕτως πολλά ἂν εἶναι, ἵνα ἐν εἴῃ. εἴθ' ὅταν λέγῃ*
“εἰμὶ τόδε”, τὸ “τόδε” εἰ μὲν ἕτερόν τι αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ,
ψεύσεται· εἰ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, πολλά ἐρεῖ ἢ
τοῦτο ἐρεῖ “εἰμὶ εἰμὶ” καὶ “ἐγὼ ἐγώ.” τί οὖν, εἰ δύο
μόνα εἴη καὶ λέγοι “ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο”; ἢ ἀνάγκη
 40 *καὶ ἀριθμὸς ἤδη καὶ πολλά ἄλλα. δεῖ τοῖνυν τὸ*
νοοῦν ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον
κατανοούμενον ὃν ποικίλον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἔσται νόησις
αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ θίξις καὶ οἶον ἐπαφή μόνον ἄρρητος
καὶ ἀνόητος· προνοοῦσα οὕπω νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ
τοῦ θιγγάνοντος οὐ νοοῦντος. δεῖ δὲ τὸ νοοῦν

¹ Again the “Platonic Categories”; cp. Plato *Sophist* 254D-E.

one must be external to the other or both must be in the same, and the thinking must be in otherness, and necessarily also in sameness; and the proper objects of thought must be the same and other in relation to the intellect. And, yet again, each of the things which are being thought brings out along with itself sameness and otherness¹; or what will the thinker think which does not contain one and then another? For certainly if each one is a rational principle, it is many. So it comes to know itself by being an eye which sees a variety of images or by being an object of varied colours. For if it directed its gaze to a single object without parts, it would be without thought or word: for what would it have to say about it, or to understand? For if the absolutely partless had to speak itself, it must, first of all, say what it is not; so that in this way too it would be many in order to be one. Then when it says “I am this”, if it means something other than itself by “this”, it will be telling a lie; but if it is speaking of some incidental property of itself, it will be saying that it is many or saying “am am” or “I I”. Well then, suppose it was only two things and said “I and this”. It would already be necessary for it to be many: for, as the two things are diverse and in the manner of their diversity, number is present and many other things. Therefore the thinker must apprehend one thing different from another and the object of thought in being thought must contain variety; or there will not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a sort of contact without speech or thought; pre-thinking because Intellect has not yet come into being and that which touches does not think. But

45 μηδὲ αὐτὸ μένειν ἀπλοῦν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸ
νοῆ· διχάσει γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, κἂν σύνεσιν δῶ τὴν
σιωπῶσαν.¹ εἶτα οὐδὲ δεήσεται οἶον πολυπραγμο-
νεῖν ἑαυτό· τί γὰρ καὶ μαθήσεται νοῆσαν; πρὶν
γὰρ νοῦν νοῆσαι ὑπάρξει² ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑαυτῶ. καὶ
50 γὰρ αὐτὸ πόθος τις καὶ ἡ γνώσις ἐστὶ καὶ οἶον
ζητήσαντος εὔρεσις. τὸ τοῦνυν διάφορον πάντῃ
αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ μένει, καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ,
ὃ δ' ἐξελίττει ἑαυτό, καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη.

11. Διὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ πολὺς, ὅταν τὸ
ἐπέκεινα ἐθέλη νοεῖν, ἐν³ μὲν οἷν αὐτὸ ἐκείνο,
ἀλλ' ἐπιβάλλειν θέλων ὡς ἀπλῶ ἐξείσιν ἄλλο ἀεὶ
λαμβάνων ἐν αὐτῷ πληθυνόμενον· ὥστε ὄρμησε
5 μὲν ἐπ' αὐτὸ οὐχ ὡς νοῦς, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄψις οἷπυ
ἰδοῦσα, ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἔχουσα ὅπερ αὐτῇ ἐπλήθυνεν·
ὥστε ἄλλου μὲν ἐπεθύμησεν ἀορίστως ἔχουσα ἐπ'
αὐτῇ φάντασμα τι, ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἄλλο λαβοῦσα ἐν
αὐτῇ αὐτὸ πολὺ ποιήσασα. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἔχει
τύπον τοῦ ὁράματος· ἢ οὐ παρεδέξατο ἐν αὐτῇ
10 γενέσθαι. οὗτος δὲ πολὺς ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐγένετο, καὶ
οὕτως⁴ γνοῦς εἶδεν αὐτό, καὶ τότε ἐγένετο
ἰδοῦσα ὄψις. τοῦτο δὲ ἦδη νοῦς, ὅτε ἔχει, καὶ ὡς
νοῦς ἔχει· πρὸ δὲ τούτου ἐφειυς μόνον καὶ

¹ Page: σιωπῆν Enn.

² Schwyzzer: πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ νοῆσαι ὑπάρξει H-S²: πρὸ γὰρ νοῦ
νοῆσαι ὑπάρχει Enn.

³ Dodds (loc. cit.): εἰ Enn.: νοεῖ Kirchhoff*: εἰς suspic.
Cilento: οὐ Theiler. ⁴ Kirchhoff*: οὗτος ὡς Enn., H-S¹.

¹ H-R Schwyzzer now wishes to read in line 2, instead of
ἐπιβάλλειν, the better attested MS reading ἐπιθάλλειν: "to
flower upon the One in its simplicity" instead of "to attain
to the One in its simplicity". His reasons seem to me strong

the thinker must not itself remain simple, especially
in so far as it thinks itself: for it will duplicate itself,
even if it gives an understanding which is silent.
Then [the One] will not need to make a kind of fuss
about itself: for what will it learn by thinking itself?
For what it is will belong to itself before Intellect
thinks. Also, knowledge is a kind of longing for
the absent, and like the discovery made by a seeker.
But that which is absolutely different remains itself
by itself, and seeks nothing about itself; but that
which explicates itself must be many.

11. Therefore this multiple Intellect, when it
wishes to think that which is beyond, [thinks] that
itself which is one, but in wishing to attain to it in
its simplicity¹ comes out continually apprehending
something else made many in itself; so that it
moved to it not as Intellect but as sight not yet
seeing, but came out possessing the multiplicity
which that sight itself made; so that it desired one
thing, having vaguely in itself a kind of image of it,
but came out having grasped something else which
it made many in itself. The sight, again, certainly
has the impression of what is seen: otherwise it would
not have allowed it to come into existence in itself.
But this impression became many out of one, and so
Intellect knew it and saw it, and then it became a
seeing sight. It is already Intellect when it possesses
this, and it possesses it as Intellect; but before this

but not certainly convincing, and the change might have con-
siderable implications for our understanding of Plotinus's
thought about the relationship of the One and Intellect. But
it certainly deserves serious consideration.

ἀτύπωτος ὄψις. οὗτος οὖν ὁ νοῦς ἐπέβαλε μὲν
 ἐκεῖνω, λαβὼν δὲ ἐγένετο νοῦς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἐνδεόμενος¹
 καὶ γενόμενος καὶ νοῦς καὶ οὐσία καὶ νόησις, ὅτε
 15 ἐνόησε· πρὸ γὰρ τούτου οὐ νόησις ἦν τὸ νοητὸν
 οὐκ ἔχων οὐδὲ νοῦς οὐπω νοήσας. τὸ δὲ πρὸ
 τούτων ἢ ἀρχὴ τούτων, οὐχ ὡς ἐνυπάρχουσα. τὸ
 γὰρ ἀφ' οὗ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ
 ἕκαστον, οὐχ ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἀπάντων. οὐ
 τοίνυν ἐν τι τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ πάντων, ὥστε
 20 καὶ πρὸ νοῦ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοῦ ἐντὸς τὰ πάντα·
 ὥστε καὶ ταύτη πρὸ νοῦ· καὶ εἰ τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ
 τὴν τάξιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν πάντων, καὶ ταύτη πρὸ
 πάντων. οὐ δὴ δεῖ, πρὸ ὧν ἐστι, τούτων ἐν τι
 εἶναι, οὐδὲ νοῦν αὐτὸν προσερεῖς· οὐδὲ τὰγαθὸν
 οὖν· εἰ σημαίνει ἐν τι τῶν πάντων τὰγαθόν, οὐδὲ
 25 τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ τὸ πρὸ πάντων, ἔστω οὕτως ὠνομασ-
 μένον· εἰ οὖν νοῦς, ὅτι πολὺς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν
 αὐτὸ οἶον παρεμπροσθόν, κὰν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἦ, πληθύνει, δεῖ
 τὸ πάντη ἀπλοῦν καὶ πρῶτον ἀπάντων ἐπέκεινα νοῦ
 εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ νοήσει, οὐκ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 30 νοῦς ἔσται· ἀλλὰ εἰ νοῦς ἔσται, καὶ αὐτὸ [τὸ]²
 πλήθος ἔσται.

¹ Igal: ἐνδιάμενος BR^{ac}(prob., sed *ιάμενος* eras.)JUC:
 ἐνδιαθέμενος w, P^{cmu}*.

² del. Kirchoff*.

¹ Of the many conjectures which have been made to replace
 the corrupt MSS reading ἐνδιάμενος (see H-S critical note)
 Igal's ἐνδεόμενος seems to me the best, and I adopt it in the
 text. Intellect only constitutes itself as Intellect because it
 eternally falls short in its endeavour to reach the One and

it is only desire and unformed sight. So this Intellect had an immediate apprehension of the One, but by grasping it became Intellect, perpetually in need [of the One] and having become at once Intellect and substance and intellection when it thought¹; for before this it was not intellection since it did not possess the intelligible object, nor Intellect since it had not yet thought. But that which is before these is their principle, not as immanent in them; for it is not that from which something comes which is immanent, but the parts of which it is constituted; but that from which each individual thing comes is not an individual thing, but other than all of them. It is not, then, one of all things but before all things, so that it is before Intellect; again, all things are certainly in Intellect; so in this way too it is before Intellect; and if what comes after it has the position of being all things, in this way too it is before all things. It must not be one of the things before which it is, and you are not to call it Intellect; not even the Good, then: no, not even this if "the Good" means one of all things; but if it means that which is before all things, let the name stand. If, then, Intellect is Intellect because it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if it derives from Intellect, is a kind of internal occurrence which makes it many, that which is absolutely simple and first of all things must be beyond Intellect. And certainly if it is going to think, it will not be beyond Intellect, but will be Intellect; but if it is Intellect, it itself will be multiplicity.

therefore is perpetually in need of and perpetually desires the One: cp. III. 8. 11. 23-4 καὶ ἐφίεμος αἰεὶ καὶ αἰεὶ τυγχάνων.

12. Καὶ τί κωλύει οὕτω πλήθος εἶναι, ἕως ἔστιν οὐσία μία; τὸ γὰρ πλήθος οὐ συνθέσεις, ἀλλ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ τὸ πλήθος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ μὴ οὐσίαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς
 5 ἐνέργειαν ἔρχεται, οὐ πλήθος μὲν, ἀτελές δὲ πρὶν ἐνεργῆσαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δὲ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ τὸ πλήθος, τοσαύτη ἔσται ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, ὅσον τὸ πλήθος. τοῦτο δὲ τῷ μὲν νῶ συγχωροῦμεν, ὧ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ ἀπεδίδομεν, τῇ δὲ ἀρχῇ πάντων οὐκέτι. δεῖται¹ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ
 10 πολλοῦ τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ παντός τὸ ἐν πρῶτον. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὕτως φασί· σύνθεσις γὰρ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄντων τίς ἀνάγκη ἦδη καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τι εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ πολλά; ἢ διεσπασμένα ἔσται ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ πολλά, ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν ἐπὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν
 15 κατὰ τύχην ἰόν. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦ νοῦ ἀπλοῦ ὄντος φήσουσι τὰς ἐνεργείας προελθεῖν· ἦδη μὲν τι ἀπλοῦν τὸ πρὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τίθενται. εἶτα τὰς ἐνεργείας μενούσας αἰεὶ καὶ ὑποστάσεις αἰεὶ θήσονται.² ὑποστάσεις δὲ οὐσαι ἔτεραι ἐκείνου, ἀφ' οὗ εἰσιν, ἔσονται, μένοντος μὲν ἐκείνου ἀπλοῦ,
 20 τοῦ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐφ'³ ἑαυτοῦ πλήθους ὄντος καὶ

¹ Enn., defendit Theiler: δεῖ Kirchhoff*, H-S¹.

² αἰεὶ θήσονται coniectimus: αἰσθήσονται Enn.

³ Kirchhoff*, Cilento, B-T: ἀφ' Enn., H-S¹.

12. But what prevents it from being a multiplicity in this sense, as long as it is one substance? For the multiplicity [of Intellect] is not a plurality of compositions, but its activities are the multiplicity. But if its activities are not substances, but it passes from potency to active actuality, it is not a multiplicity, but imperfect before it becomes actual and active in its substance. But if its substance is activity, and its activity is its multiplicity, then its substance is just as large as the multiplicity. But we allow this to Intellect, to which we attributed self-thinking, but not any more to the principle of all things. But there is a need for the One from which the many derives to exist before the many: for in every number-series the one comes first. But in the case of a number-series people do say this; for the successive numbers are [the result of] composition; but in the series of realities, what necessity is there now for there to be some one here too from which the many derive? [If there is not] the many will be separated from each other and will each come by chance from a different direction to their composition. But they will say that the activities proceed from the one Intellect which is simple¹: so already they assume that what comes before the energies is something simple. Then of course they will always assume that the activities abide for ever and are substantial realities; but, being substantial realities, they will be other than that from which they come, since that remains simple, but what comes from it is in itself multiplicity and depends on

¹ "They" are the Peripatetics, who asserted the simplicity of the Divine Intellect: cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* 109, 37-110, 3 Bruns.

ἐξηρητημένον ἀπ' ἐκείνου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνου
 ποθέν ἐνεργήσαντος αὐταὶ ὑπέστησαν, κάκει πλῆθος
 ἔσται· εἰ δ' αὐταὶ εἰσω αἱ πρώται ἐνεργεῖαι, τὸ
 δεύτερον ποιήσασαι, εἰάσασαι¹ δὲ ἐκείνο, ὃ πρὸ
 τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ὃν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, μένειν, τῷ
 25 δευτέρῳ τῷ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν συστάντι τὰς
 ἐνεργείας ἂν παραχωρήσ(ει)αν.² ἄλλο γὰρ αὐτό,
 ἄλλο αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴ αὐτοῦ
 ἐνεργήσαντος. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἔσται ἡ πρώτη
 ἐνέργεια ὁ νοῦς· οὐ γὰρ οἷον προθυμήθη νοῦν
 γενέσθαι, εἴτα ἐγένετο νοῦς τῆς προθυμίας μεταξὺ
 30 αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ γεννηθέντος νοῦ γενομένης·
 οὐδ' αὖ ὅλως προθυμήθη, οὕτω τε γὰρ ἦν ἀτελής
 καὶ ἡ προθυμία οὐκ εἶχεν ἢ τι προθυμηθῆ· οὐδ' αὖ
 τὸ μὲν εἶχε τοῦ πράγματος, τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶχεν·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τι, πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἔκτασις. ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι,
 εἴ τι ὑπέστη μετ' αὐτόν, μένοντος ἐκείνου ἐν
 35 τῷ αὐτῷ ἦθαι ὑπέστη. δεῖ οὖν, ἵνα τι ἄλλο
 ὑποστῆ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ πανταχοῦ
 ἐκείνο· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἡ πρὸ τοῦ κινηθῆναι κινήσεται,
 καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νοῆσαι νοήσει, <ἡ>³ ἡ πρώτη ἐνέργεια
 αὐτοῦ ἀτελής ἔσται ὀρμὴ μόνον οὔσα. ἐπὶ τί
 οὖν ὡς ἀτυχοῦσά⁴ του ἐφορμᾶ; εἰ κατὰ λόγον

¹ Igal: ποιήσασα Enn.

² Igal: ἄς παραχωρήσαν Enn.

³ R²⁸ (vel Ficinus), Creuzer, Kirchhoff*.

⁴ Theiler: ὠδε τυχοῦσα Enn.*

¹ The text of this sentence is corrupt. I adopt provisionally Igal's conjectures in lines 23 and 25. See critical note.

² The reference is to *Timaeus* 42E5-8, where the Demiurge ends his own activity and leaves detailed work on the human

that [simple principle]. For if these activities come into existence because the principle started to be active from some point, then there will be multiplicity there in the principle; but if they themselves are the first activities, then, making the second reality, and allowing that which is before these activities and exists by itself to remain [inactive], they would cede the activities to the second reality which has come together out of the activities¹: for it itself is one thing, and the activities proceeding from it another, since they do not proceed from its activity. If this is not so, Intellect will not be the primary activity; for the One did not in some sort of way want Intellect to come into being, with the result that Intellect came into being with the wanting as an intermediary between the One and the generated Intellect; for if this was so, the One would be incomplete, and also the wanting would have nothing to want; and again, it could not have one part of the thing [which it wanted] and not have another; for there was not anything at all to which the impulse could be directed. But it is clear that, if anything came into existence after him, it came into existence "while he remained in his own proper state".² Therefore, in order that anything else may exist, it is necessary that the One should keep absolutely quiet by itself: otherwise, it will move before there is movement, and think before there is thinking, or its first activity will be incomplete, since it will be only an [objectless] drive. For at what is it to aim, as if it was missing something? If we are to make

body to the younger gods. It is interesting that Plotinus applies it to the One, who exercises no activity at all, though he is the source of all subsequent creativity.

40 θησόμεθα, τὴν μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οἶον ρυείσαν ἐνέργειαν
ὡς ἀπὸ ἡλίου φῶς νοῦν¹ θησόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν
νοητὴν φύσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῇ νοητῷ
ἐστηκότα βασιλεύειν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξώσαντα ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐκφανέν—ἢ ἄλλο φῶς πρὸ φωτὸς
45 ποιήσομεν—ἐπιλάμπειν δὲ αἰεὶ μένοντα ἐπὶ τοῦ
νοητοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτέμνεται τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδ'
αὐτὸν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ τοιοῦτον οἶον μὴ οὐσία εἶναι
οὐδ' αὖ οἶον τυφλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁρῶν καὶ γινώσκον
ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρῶτον γινώσκον. τὸ δὲ ὡσπερ
ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, οὕτως καὶ ἐπέκεινα γνώσεως, οὐδὲν
δεόμενον ὡσπερ οὐδενός, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ γινώσκου.
5 ἄλλ' ἔστιν ἐν δευτέρῃ φύσει τὸ γινώσκον. ἐν
γὰρ τι καὶ τὸ γινώσκον. τὸ δὲ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ
“τι” ἐν. εἰ γὰρ τι ἐν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ τὸ γὰρ
“αὐτὸ” πρὸ τοῦ “τι.”

13. Διὸ καὶ ἀρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. ὃ τι γὰρ ἂν
εἴπῃς, τί ἔρεῖς. ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἐπέκεινα πάντων καὶ
ἐπέκεινα τοῦ σεμνοτάτου νοῦ” ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι μόνον
ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὄνομα ὄν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὔτε τι τῶν
5 πάντων οὔτε ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὴδὲν κατ'
αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνδέχεται, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σημαίνειν
ἐπιχειροῦμεν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀπορώμεν
“ἀναίσθητον οὐκ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐδὲ παρακολουθοῦν
ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲ οἶδεν αὐτό,” ἐκεῖνο χρὴ ἐνθυμείσθαι,
ὅτι ταῦτα λέγοντες ἑαυτοὺς περιτρέπομεν ἐπὶ

¹ R^{2ms} (*intellectum* Ficinus): τι οὐκ ἔνν.*

¹ A free paraphrase of Plato *Republic* VI 509B9-10, with *Noῦς* (quite naturally for Plotinus) replacing *οὐσία*. This is followed by a reference to the other great source-text in

a rational statement, we shall state that the first activity, which, so to speak, flows from it like a light from the sun, is Intellect and the whole intelligible nature, but that he himself, staying still at the summit of the intelligible, rules over it: he does not thrust the outshining away from himself—or we shall make another light before light—but he irradiates for ever, abiding unchanged over the intelligible. For what comes from him has not been cut off from him, nor is it the same as him, nor is it the sort of thing not to be substance, or to be blind, but it sees and knows itself and is the primary knower. But the One, as it is beyond Intellect, so is beyond knowledge, and as it does not in any way need anything, so it does not even need knowing; but knowing has its place in the second nature. For knowing is one thing; but that is one without the thing; for if it is one thing it would not be the absolute One: for “absolute” comes before “something”.

13. It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a “something”. But “beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect” is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and “has no name”,¹ because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs to ourselves about it. But when we raise the difficulty “Then it has no perception of itself and is not even conscious of itself and does not even know itself”, we should consider that by saying this we are turning ourselves round and going in the opposite

Plato for the doctrine of the One, the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (142A3).

10 τὰναντία. πολὺ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιούμεν γνωστὸν καὶ
 γνώσει ποιούντες καὶ διδόντες νοεῖν δεῖσθαι τοῦ
 νοεῖν ποιούμεν· κἄν σὺν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν ἦ, περιττὸν
 ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὅλως τὸ
 νοεῖν πολλῶν εἰς ταῦτό¹ συνελθόντων συναίσθησις
 εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, ὅταν αὐτό τι ἑαυτὸ νοῆ, ὃ δὴ καὶ
 15 κυρίως ἐστὶ νοεῖν· ἐν δὲ ἕκαστον αὐτό τί ἐστὶ καὶ
 οὐδὲν ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἕξω ἔσται ἡ νόησις, ἐνδεές
 τε ἔσται καὶ οὐ κυρίως τὸ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ πάντη
 ἀπλοῦν καὶ αὐταρκες ὄντως οὐδὲν δεῖται· τὸ δὲ
 δευτέρως αὐταρκες, δεόμενον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ, τοῦτο
 δεῖται τοῦ νοεῖν ἑαυτό· καὶ τὸ ἐνδεές πρὸς αὐτό
 20 ὄν τῷ ὅλῳ πεποίηκε τὸ αὐταρκες ἰκανὸν ἕξ
 ἀπάντων γενόμενον, συνὸν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ εἰς αὐτό
 νεῦον.² ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις πολλοῦ τινος
 αἰθησίς ἐστι· καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. καὶ ἡ
 νόησις προτέρα οὖσα εἴσω εἰς αὐτὸν ἐπιστρέφει
 δηλονότι πολὺν ὄντα· καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον
 25 εἶπη “ὄν εἰμι,” ὡς ἐξευρών λέγει καὶ εἰκότως
 λέγει, τὸ γὰρ ὄν πολὺ ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ, ὅταν ὡς εἰς
 ἀπλοῦν ἐπιβάλη καὶ εἶπη “ὄν εἰμι,” οὐκ ἔτυχεν
 οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος. οὐ γὰρ ὡς λίθον λέγει
 τὸ ὄν, ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ, ἀλλ’ εἴρηκε μῶ ῥήσει πολλά.
 τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὄντως εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἔχρος

¹ Harder B-T: αὐτὸ Enn.*

² Theiler: τοῦτο Enn.*

¹ The reference is to the *συν-* of *συναίσθησις* which is not literally translatable into English. At the beginning of his writing period Plotinus does not see this reference to multiplicity in *συναίσθησις* and uses it of the One (with an “as if”): cp. V. 4. 2. 18.

direction. For we are making it many when we make it object of knowledge and knowledge, and by attributing thought to it we make it need thought: even if thought goes intimately with it, thought will be superfluous to it. For in general thought seems to be an intimate consciousness of the whole when many parts come together in the same thing; [this is so] when a thing knows itself, which is knowing in the proper sense: each single part is just itself and seeks nothing; but if the thinking is of what is outside, the thoughts will be deficient, and not thought in the proper sense. But that which is altogether simple and self-sufficient needs nothing; but what is self-sufficient in the second degree, but needs itself, this is what needs to think itself; and that which is deficient in relation to itself achieves self-sufficiency by being a whole, with an adequacy deriving from all its parts, intimately present to itself and inclining to itself. For intimate self-consciousness is a consciousness of something which is many: even the name bears witness to this.¹ And thinking, which is prior, turns inward to Intellect which is obviously multiple; for even if it only says this, “I am existent”, it says it as a discovery, and says it plausibly, for existence is multiple: since if it concentrated its gaze on itself as something simple and said “I am existent”, it would not attain either itself or existence. For it does not mean something like a stone by existence, when it is speaking the truth, but says many things in one word.² For this being—which is meant to

² The emphasis here on the intrinsic multiplicity of Intellect is very striking.

30 ἔχον τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται, ὃ οὐδὲ ὄν διὰ τοῦτο
λέγοιτ' ¹ ἄν, ὡσπερ εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, πολλὰ
ἔχει. τί οὖν; ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐ νοηθήσεται; ἢ
ἔρημον καὶ μόνον ἐὰν ἐβελήσης λαβεῖν, οὐ
νοήσεις· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ ἔστι,
κἂν ἄλλο τι εἴπῃς, ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, εἴ τί
35 ἔστιν ἀπλούστατον ἀπάντων, οὐχ ἔξει νόησιν
αὐτοῦ· εἰ γὰρ ἔξει, τῷ πολὺ ² εἶναι ἔξει. οὐτ' οὖν
αὐτὸ νοεῖν οὐτ' ἔστι νόησις αὐτοῦ.

14. Πῶς οὖν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἢ λέγο-
μεν μὲν τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ λέγομεν οὐδὲ
γνώσιν οὐδὲ νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ. πῶς οὖν λέγομεν
περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ μὴ αὐτὸ ἔχομεν; ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τῇ
5 γνώσει, καὶ παντελῶς οὐκ ἔχομεν; ἀλλ' οὕτως
ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ
λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ λέγομεν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὃ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐ
λέγομεν· ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ὑστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν.
ἔχειν δὲ οὐ κωλύμεθα, κἂν μὴ λέγωμεν. ἀλλ' ὡσπερ
οἱ ἐνθουσιῶντες καὶ κάτοχοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
10 κἂν εἰδέειν, ὅτι ἔχουσι μείζον ἐν αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ
εἰδῶσιν ὃ τι, ἐξ ὧν δὲ κινήσεται καὶ λέγουσιν, ἐκ
τούτων αἰσθησὶν τινα τοῦ κινήσαντος λαμβάνουσιν
ἑτέρων ὄντων τοῦ κινήσαντος, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς κινδου-

¹ Kirchoff*: λέγοι ARCP^c: λέγει EBJUC^{bc}.

² Kirchoff*: ποῦ E^{mu}.

¹ Again the inappropriate reference to *Philebus* 63B7-8 (cp. ch. 10, n. 2).

² Again a reminiscence of Plato *Parmenides* 142A1-5.

³ This passage seems to owe something to Plato's description of the inspiration of poets in *Ion* 533-4 (cp. especially *ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι* 533E6-7). It is interesting that Plotinus finds this poetic possession (for Plato a state far

be real being and not what has a trace of being, which would not even be called being because of this trace, but is as image to archetype—contains many things. Well, then, will not each of these many things be thought? Now if you want to grasp the “isolated and alone”,¹ you will not think; but absolute being is multiple in itself, and if you speak of something else, being contains it. But if this is so, if anything is the simplest of all, it will not possess thought of itself: for if it is to possess it, it will possess it by being multiple. It is not therefore thought, nor is there any thinking about it.

14. How then do we ourselves speak about it? We do indeed say something about it, but we certainly do not speak it, and we have neither knowledge or thought of it.² But if we do not have it in knowledge, do we not have it at all? But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. But we are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. But just as those who have a god within them and are in the grip of divine possession may know this much, that they have something greater within them, even if they do not know what, and from the ways in which they are moved and the things they say get a certain awareness of the god who moves them,³ though these are not the same as the mover; so we seem to be

inferior to the clear knowledge of the philosopher) a suitable analogy for our highest awareness, that of the One, and that it is for him a kind of knowledge (though not knowledge of the One) which it certainly is not for Plato.

νεύομεν ἔχειν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὅταν νοῦν καθαρὸν ἔχωμεν,
 15 χρώμενοι, ὡς οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον νοῦς, ὁ δούς οὐσίαν
 καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τούτου τοῦ στοίχου, αὐτὸς δὲ οἶος
 ἄρα, ὡς οὐ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον τούτου, ὃ λέγο-
 μεν "ὄν," ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεόν καὶ μείζον ἢ λεγόμενον,
 ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς κρεῖττων λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσ-
 εως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὦν ταῦτα.

15. Ἄλλὰ πῶς παρασχών; ἢ τῷ ἔχειν (ἢ τῷ
 μὴ ἔχειν).¹ ἀλλ' ἂ μὴ ἔχει, πῶς παρέσχεν; ἀλλ'
 εἰ μὲν ἔχων, οὐχ ἀπλοῦς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχων, πῶς ἐ-
 αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπλοῦν τάχ'
 5 ἂν τις δοίη—καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο ζητηθεῖν ἂν, πῶς ἐ-
 τοῦ πάντη ἐνός· ἀλλ' ὅμως δὲ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οἶον ἐκ
 φωτὸς τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περίλαμψιν—πῶς δὲ πολλά;
 ἢ οὐ ταῦτόν ἐμελλε τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνω. εἰ οὖν
 μὴ ταῦτόν, οὐδέ γε βέλτιον· τί γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἐνός
 βέλτιον ἢ ἐπέκεινα ὄλως; χεῖρον ἄρα· τοῦτο δὲ
 10 ἔστιν ἐνδεέστερον. τί οὖν ἐνδεέστερον τοῦ ἐνός;
 ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶν· πολλά ἄρα· ἐφιέμενον δὲ ὅμως τοῦ
 ἐνός· ἐν ἄρα πολλά. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶν τῷ εἶν
 σῶζεται καὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ ἐστί, τούτῳ· μὴ γὰρ
 εἶν γενόμενον, κἂν ἐκ πολλῶν ἦ, οὐπω ἔστιν ὃ ἂν²
 εἴποι τις αὐτό. κἂν ἕκαστον ἔχη λέγειν τις ὃ ἔστι,

¹ A^{3mg} (*an potius non habendo* Ficinus), Creuzer, cf. *Epistola*
 139: ἢ μὴ ἔχειν Perna, Kirckhoff*.

² ὃ ἂν de Strycker optime: ὄν Enn.: ἂν Kirckhoff: ὃ τ. Igal.

¹ ἐν πολλά is from Plato *Parmenides* 144E5 (the Second
 Hypothesis, which Plotinus, following an older tradition of
 exegesis probably Neopythagorean referred to his second
 Hypostasis, Intellect).

disposed towards the One, divining, when we have
 our intellect pure, that this is the inner intellect,
 which gives substance and everything else which
 belongs to this level, but that he is not only of a kind
 not to be these, but something higher than what we
 call "being", but is more and greater than any-
 thing said about him, because he is higher than speech
 and thought and awareness; he gives us these, but
 he is not these himself.

15. But how does he give them? By having them,
 or by not having them? But how did he give what
 he does not have? But if he has them, he is not
 simple; if he does not have them, how does the
 multiplicity come from him? One might perhaps
 grant that he gives one simple thing from himself—
 yet there would be room for enquiry how this could
 come from the absolute One; but all the same one
 can speak of the radiance from him, as from a light—
 but how can he give many things? Now what comes
 from him could not be the same as himself. If then
 it is not the same, it cannot of course be better: for
 what could be better than the One or in any way
 transcend him? It must then be worse; and this
 means more deficient. When then is more deficient
 than the One? That which is not one; it is there-
 fore many; but all the same it aspires to the One:
 so it is a one-many.¹ For all that is not one is kept
 in being by the one, and is what it is by this "one":
 for if it had not become one, even though it is com-
 posed of many parts, it is not yet what one would
 call "itself".² And if it is possible to say of each
 individual part what it is, one says it because each

² Cp. III. 8. 10. 20-8.

15 τῷ ἐν ἑκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι λέγει, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ¹
 ἔστι.² τὸ δέ, ὃ μὴ πολλὰ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἤδη οὐ
 μετουσίᾳ ἐνός ἐν, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ ἐν, οὐ κατ' ἄλλου,
 ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτο, παρ' οὗ πως καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν
 τῷ ἐγγύς, τὰ δὲ τῷ πόρρω. ἐπεὶ [δέ]³ τὸ μετ'
 αὐτὸ⁴ καὶ ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸ δῆλον ποιεῖ τῷ τὸ πλήθος
 20 αὐτοῦ ἐν πανταχοῦ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ πλήθος ὄν
 ὅμως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ διακρῖναι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις, ὅτι
 ὁμοῦ πάντα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ,
 ἕως ζωῆς μετέχει, ἐν πολλά· ἀδυνατεῖ γὰρ δεῖξαι
 αὐτὸ ἐν πάντα. αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκείνο ἐν πάντα, ὅτι μετὰ
 τὴν⁵ ἀρχήν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐν ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐν.
 25 τὸ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ᾧδέ πως ἐπιβρίσαντος τοῦ
 ἐνός πάντα μετέχον τοῦ ἐν, καὶ ὁτιοῦν αὐτοῦ
 πάντα αὐ καὶ ἐν. τίνα οὖν πάντα; ἢ ὧν ἀρχὴ
 ἐκείνο. ὅπως δὲ ἐκείνο ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων; ἄρα,
 ὅτι αὐτὰ σφίξει ἐν ἑκαστον αὐτῶν ποιήσασα εἶναι;
 ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὑπέστησεν αὐτά. πῶς δὲ; ἢ τῷ πρότερον
 30 ἔχειν αὐτά. ἀλλ' εἴρηται, ὅτι πλήθος οὕτως ἔσται.
 ἀλλ' ἄρα οὕτως εἶχεν ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα· τὰ δ'

¹ sc. τῷ ἐν εἶναι.

² coniecimus: ἐτι Enn.

³ del. Theiler.

⁴ Harder: μὲν ταὐτὸ ἐνν.*

⁵ Igal: μεγάλην Enn.

of them is one and it is it because of this very fact. But that which does not already have many parts in itself is not one by participation in the One, but is the One itself, not the "one" predicated of something else but because it is this One from which, somehow, the others derive their oneness, some [in a greater degree] because they are near and others [in a lesser degree] because they are far away. For that which comes immediately after it shows clearly that it is immediately after it because its multiplicity is a one-everywhere; for although it is a multiplicity it is at the same time identical with itself and there is no way in which you could divide it, because "all things are together"¹; for each of the things also which come from it, as long as it participates in life, is a one-many: for it cannot reveal itself as a one-all. But [Intellect] does reveal itself as a one-all, because it comes after the origin: for its origin is really one and truly one. But that which comes after the origin is, somehow, under the pressure of the One, all things by its participation in the One, and each and every part of it is both all and one. What then are "all things"? All things of which that One is the principle. But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them exist? Yes, and because it brought them into existence. But how did it do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it had them in such a way as not to be distinct: they are distinguished on the second

¹ Anaxagoras Diels B 1 (the original mixture of all things, which was not in the least like the Plotinian World of Forms).

ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ. ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἤδη· τὸ δὲ δύναμις πάντων. ἀλλὰ τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς δυνάμεως; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἡ ὕλη δυνάμει λέγεται, 35 ὅτι δέχεται· πάσχει γάρ· ἀλλ' οὗτος ἀντιτεταγμένως τῷ ποιεῖν· πῶς οὖν ποιεῖ ἂ μὴ ἔχει; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε· μηδ' ἐνθυμηθεῖς ὃ ποιήσει, ποιήσει ὁμῶς. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν, ὅτι, εἴ τι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δεῖ παρ' αὐτό· ἄλλο δὲ ὄν οὐχ ἔν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνο. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, δύο δέ, ἀνάγκη ἤδη καὶ 40 πλῆθος εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἔτρρον καὶ ταῦτόν ἤδη καὶ ποιὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ¹ μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐκείνου, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη· ὅτι δὲ πλῆθος καὶ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐν τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ θεωρεῖται, ἀπορήσαι ἄξιον· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ ἔτι ζητητέα.

16. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλαχοῦ εἴρηται, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι δύναμις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμήχανος δύναμις, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων πιστωτέον, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐστὶ μηδὲ τῶν 5 ἐσχάτων, ὃ μὴ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν ἔχει. ἐκεῖνα δὲ νῦν λεκτέον, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις οὐκ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν καὶ

¹ w, Perna*: δεῖ BxUC, H-S¹.

¹ A good clarification of what Plotinus means when he uses the ambiguous phrase *δύναμις πάντων* of the One (cp. III. 8. 10. 1; V. 4. 1. 36; VI. 7. 32. 31).

² Again the "Platonic Categories": cp. Plato *Sophist* 254E5-255A1.

level, in the rational form. For this is already actuality; but the One is the potency of all things. But in what way is it the potency? Not in the way in which matter is said to be in potency, because it receives: for matter is passive; but this [material] way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to making.¹ How then does the One make what it does not have? It does not do it casually, nor reflecting on what it will make, but all the same it will make. Now it has been said that, if anything comes from the One, it must be something different from it; and in being different, it is not one: for if it was, it would be that One. But if it is not one, but two, it must necessarily also be many: for it is already the same and different and qualified and all the rest.² And that what comes from the One is certainly not one, may be taken as demonstrated; but it is worth querying the proposition that it is a multiplicity, and a multiplicity of the sort which is observed in what comes after it; and the necessity of there being anything after the One remains to be enquired into.

16. It has been said elsewhere that there must be something after the first, and in a general way that it is power, and overwhelming power³; and the point has also been made that this is to be believed on the evidence of all other things, because there is nothing, even among the things on the lowest level, which does not have power to produce. But we now have to add this further point, that, since in things which are generated it is not possible to go

³ Cp. e.g. II. 9. 3; IV. 8. 6. For the One as *δύναμις* see n. 1 above.

μάλλον εἰς πλῆθος ἰέναι, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκάστων
 ἀπλουστέρα ἢ αὐτά.¹ κόσμον τοίνυν τὸ ποιήσαν
 αἰσθητὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη κόσμος αἰσθητὸς αὐτό, ἀλλὰ
 10 νοῦς καὶ κόσμος νοητός· καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τοίνυν
 τὸ γεννήσαν αὐτὸ οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε κόσμος νοητός,
 ἀπλούστερον δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἀπλούστερον κόσμον νοη-
 τοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τούτου
 ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ πολὺ, οὐκ ἀρχὴ
 τούτου, ἀλλ' ἄλλο πρὸ τούτου. σιστηῆναι οὖν δεῖ εἰς
 15 ἐν ὄντως παντός πλήθους ἔξω καὶ ἀπλότητος
 ἡστινοσοῦν, εἴπερ ὄντως ἀπλοῦν. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ
 γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς, τὸ δὲ ἦν
 δηλονότι οὐ λόγος; εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτου ἦν, πῶς οὖν οὐκ
 ἐκ λόγου λόγος; καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ;
 20 τί γὰρ ἔχον αὐτοῦ² ἀγαθοειδὲς λέγεται; ἄρ' ἔχον
 τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς
 τὸ ἀγαθόν; τὸ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ζητοῦμεν ὃν τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν. ἢ πρότερον ἐκεῖνο, οὐ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι δεήσει,
 ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, βέλτιον ἀποστήναι· ἄρ' οὖν
 τὸ ζῆν ὡσαύτως μένοντα ἐπὶ τούτου ἐκουσίως; εἰ
 25 οὖν ἀγαπητὸν τούτῳ τὸ ζῆν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν ζητεῖ
 ἔοικε τοίνυν διὰ τούτου τὸ ὡσαύτως, ὅτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ
 παρόντα. ἀλλὰ πάντων ἤδη παρόντων τούτῳ

¹ Kirchoff*: ἡ αὐτὴ Enn., Cilento, H-S¹.

² R^{pc}, Kirchoff* (Illius Ficinus): αὐτοῦ wBR^{ac}JUC, Perna, Creuzer, H-S.

upwards but only to go downwards and move further
 towards multiplicity, the principle of each group of
 things is simpler than they are themselves. There-
 fore that which makes the world of sense could not
 be a world of sense itself, but must be an intellect
 and an intelligible world; and that which is before
 this and generates it could not be intellect or an
 intelligible world, but simpler than intellect and
 simpler than an intelligible world. For many does
 not come from many, but this [intelligible] many
 comes from what is not many: for this would not be
 the principle if it was also many itself, but something
 else before it. There must therefore be a concen-
 tration into a real one outside all multiplicity and
 any ordinary sort of simplicity, if it is to be really
 simple. But how is what comes from it a multiple
 and universal rational form, when it is obviously not
 a rational form? And if it is not this why does
 rational form come not from rational form [but
 something else]? And how does what is like the
 Good come from the Good? What does it have
 from the Good in virtue of which it is called "like
 the Good"? Is it unchanging stability? What has
 this to do with the Good? For we seek stability
 because it is one of the goods. We seek that
 before stability from which it will not be necessary
 to depart, because it is the Good; but if it was not
 the Good, it would be necessary to go away from it.
 Is it then having a stable life and abiding willingly
 with it [which is "desirable"]? If then its life is
 satisfactory to it, it is clear that it seeks nothing;
 so its stability seems to be for this reason, that what
 is there present to it is sufficient for it. But its life
 is satisfactory because all things are present to it,

ἀγαπητὸν τὸ ζῆν καὶ δὴ οὕτω παρόντων, οὐχ ὡς
 ἄλλων ὄντων αὐτοῦ. εἰ δ' ἡ πᾶσα ζωὴ τούτῳ καὶ
 ζωὴ ἑναργῆς καὶ τελεία, πᾶσα ἐν ταύτῳ ἡσυχὴ καὶ
 30 πᾶς νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ οὔτε ζωῆς οὔτε νοῦ
 ἀποστατεῖ. αὐτάρκης οὖν ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεῖ·
 εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ζητεῖ, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃ ἐζήτησεν ἄν, εἰ
 μὴ παρῆν. ἔχει οὖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τριούτον
 ὄν, ὃ δὴ ζωὴν καὶ νοῦν εἵπομεν, ἢ ἄλλο τι συμβεβη-
 35 κὸς τούτοις. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν ἄν εἴη
 ἐπέκεινα τούτων. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἐκείνο, δηλονότι ζωὴ
 πρὸς ἐκείνο τούτῳ ἐξημμένη ἐκείνου καὶ τὴν
 ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσα ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο ζῶσα·
 ἐκείνο γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἀρχή. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐκείνο ζωῆς
 εἶναι κρεῖσσον καὶ νοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἐπιστρέψει πρὸς
 40 ἐκείνο καὶ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν
 ἐκείνῳ ὄντος, καθὸ τοῦτο ζῆν, καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν
 τούτῳ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντος, ὃ τι δήποτε
 ἔστι τοῦτο.

17. Τί οὖν ἔστι κρεῖττον ζωῆς ἐμφροεστάτου καὶ
 ἀπταιστού καὶ ἀναμαρτήτου καὶ νοῦ πάντα ἔχοντος
 καὶ ζωῆς πάσης καὶ νοῦ παντός; ἐὰν οὖν λέγωμεν
 "τὸ ποιῆσαν ταῦτα," καὶ πῶς ποιῆσαν; καί, μὴ
 5 φανῆ τι κρεῖττον, οὐκ ἄπεισιν ὁ λογισμὸς ἐπ' ἄλλο,
 ἀλλὰ στήσεται αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀναβῆναι διὰ γε
 ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ αὐτάρκες ἐκ πάντων

¹ If we keep here, as we should, the MSS reading *καὶ*, this sentence expresses very well that shrinking from the doctrine of the One beyond Intellect with which Plotinus was quite familiar (it was shared by his fellow-pupil of Ammonius,

and present in such a way that they are not other than it. But if it has all life, and a clear and perfect life, then every soul and every intellect is in it, and no part of life or intellect is absent from it. It is sufficient then for itself and seeks nothing; but if it seeks nothing, it has in itself what it would have sought, if it was not present. Therefore it has in itself the Good, which is either something of the sort which we called life and intellect, or something else which is an incidental accompaniment of these. But if this is the Good, there would be nothing beyond life and intellect. But if there is that something beyond, it is clear that the life of this other is directed to that and dependent on that, and has its existence from that and lives towards that; for that is its principle. That, therefore, must be better than life and intellect; thus the other will turn towards it both the life which is in it, a kind of image of the life in that in so far as this lives, and the intellect in it, a kind of representation of what is in that, whatever this may be.

17. What then is better than the wisest life, without fault or mistake, and than Intellect which contains all things, and than universal life and universal Intellect? If we say "That which made them"—well, how did it make them? And, in case something better may appear,¹ our train of thought will not go on to something else but will stop at Intellect. But there are many reasons for going higher, particularly the fact that the self-sufficiency of Intellect which results from its being composed of

Origen the Platonist). It was probably felt by many Platonists (and of course all Aristotelians) in his time, as it was by Christian theologians then and later.

- ἕξω ἔστιν· ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν δηλονότι ἐνδεές· καὶ ὅτι ἕκαστον [τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνός]¹ μετέληφε καὶ μετέχει <τοῦ αὐτοῦ>² ἐνός, οὐκ αὐτὸ ἐν. τί οὖν τὸ οὐδ
- 10 μετέχει, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ ὁμοῦ τὰ πάντα; ἀλλ' εἰ ποιεῖ ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ τῆ ἐνός παρουσία αὐταρκές τὸ πλήθος αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, δηλονότι ποιητικὸν οὐσίας καὶ αὐταρκείας ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ οὐκ ὄν οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα ταύτης καὶ ἐπέκεινα αὐταρκείας.
- 15 Ἄρκει οὖν ταῦτα λέγοντας ἀπαλλαχθῆναι; ἢ ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ ὠδίνει καὶ μᾶλλον. ἴσως οὖν χρῆ αὐτὴν ἤδη γενῆσαι ἀίξασαν πρὸς αὐτὸ πληρωθείσαν ὠδίνων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐπαστέον, εἴ ποθὲν τινα πρὸς τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐπωδὴν εὔροισμεν. τάχα δὲ
- 20 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἤδη λεχθέντων, εἰ πολλάκις τις ἐπάδοι, γένοιτο. τίς οὖν ὥσπερ καινὴ ἐπωδὴ ἄλλη; ἐπιθέουσα γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι καὶ ὧν μετέχομεν ἀληθῶν ὁμῶς ἐκφεύγει,³ εἴ τις βούλοιο εἰπεῖν καὶ διανοηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ περ δεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἵνα τι εἴπη, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαβεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διέξοδος· ἐν
- 25 δὲ πάντῃ ἀπλῶ διέξοδος τίς ἔστιν; ἀλλ' ἄρκει κἄν νοερῶς ἐφάσθαι· ἐφασάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντῃ μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν λέγειν, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι. τότε

¹ delevimus: τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνός Harder, H-S¹, B-T.

² coniesimus: <τοῦ αὐτοῦ> H-S².

³ Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchoff* (aufugii Ficinus): εἰσφεύγει wBUC, H-S¹: εἰσφεύγει x.

all things is something which comes to it from outside: each of the things of which it is composed is obviously insufficient; and because each of them has participated in the absolute One and continues to participate in it, it is not the One itself. What then is that in which it participates, which makes it exist, and all things along with it? If it makes each individual thing exist, and it is by the presence of the One that the multitude of individual things in Intellect, and Intellect itself, is self-sufficient, it is clear that it, since it is the cause of existence and self-sufficiency, is not itself existence but beyond it and beyond self-sufficiency.

Is that enough? Can we end the discussion by saying this? No, my soul is still in even stronger labour. Perhaps she is now at the point when she must bring forth, having reached the fulness of her birth-pangs in her eager longing for the One. But we must sing another charm to her, if we can find one anywhere to allay her pangs. Perhaps there might be one in what we have said already, if we sang it over and over again. And what other charm can we find which has a sort of newness about it? The soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the truths we know if someone tries to express them in words and discursive thought; for discursive thought, in order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after another: this is the method of description; but how can one describe the absolutely simple? But it is enough if the intellect comes into contact with it; but when it has done so, while the contact lasts, it is absolutely impossible, nor has it time, to speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to reason about it. One must believe one has seen,

δὲ χρὴ ἑωρακέναί πιστεύειν, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης
 φῶς λάβῃ· τοῦτο γὰρ [τοῦτο τὸ φῶς] ¹ παρ'
 30 αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός· καὶ τότε χρὴ νομίζειν παρεῖναι,
 ὅταν ὡσπερ θεὸς ἄλλος [ὅταν] ¹ εἰς οἶκον καλοῦντός
 τινος ἔλθων φωτίσῃ· ἢ μὴδ' ἔλθων οὐκ ἐφώτισεν.
 οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφώτιστος ἄθεος ἐκείνου·
 φωτισθεῖσα δὲ ἔχει, ὃ ἐζήτει, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος
 35 τάληθινὸν ψυχῆ, ἐφάσασθαι φωτὸς ἐκείνου καὶ
 αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου φωτί, ἀλλ' αὐτό,
 δι' οὗ καὶ ὄρα. δι' οὗ γὰρ ἐφωτίσθη, τοῦτό ἐστιν,
 ὃ δεῖ θεάσασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιον διὰ φωτὸς ἄλλου.
 πῶς ἂν οὖν τοῦτο γένοιτο; ἀφελε πάντα.

¹ del. Kirchoff*.

when the soul suddenly takes light ¹: for this is from him and he is it; we must think that he is present when, like another god whom someone called to his house, he comes and brings light to us: for if he had not come, he would not have brought the light. So the unlightened soul does not have him as god; but when it is enlightened it has what it sought, and this is the soul's true end, to touch that light and see it by itself, not by another light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing. It must see that light by which it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his own. How then can this happen? Take away everything!

¹ The suddenness and unexpectedness of the final vision is an important feature of Plotinus's descriptions of it—it is not something one can plan for and bring about when one wishes: cp. VI. 7. 36. 18–9. It has antecedents in Plato *Symposium* 210E4–5 and *Letter VII* 341C7–D1.

V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST, AND ON THE ONE

Introductory Note

THIS little treatise is the seventh in Porphyry's chronological order. It deals with much the same subject-matter as the tenth treatise in the chronological order, *On The Three Primary Hypostases* (V. 1), and may be a kind of preliminary study for it, but the treatment is very different, much more schematic and scholastic, and without the "protreptic" element, the exhortation to the soul to rediscover its true nature and origin and so ascend to the Good.

In the second chapter the One or Good is spoken of, in a way unusual in Plotinus, as the Intelligible, and is said to have a higher sort of thinking than that of Intellect. In his later writings Plotinus avoids this sort of language, and is careful to rule out any suggestion that the One is a sort of higher Intellect.

Synopsis

There must be a hierarchy of beings, ascending in order to the First Principle. This must be the absolutely simple One, and because it is absolutely perfect, and everything which is perfect produces, it must produce the next reality, the One-Many (ch. 1). How and why the One produces Intellect: explanation of the Platonic doctrine of the derivation of Forms and Numbers from the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The conscious inner life

THAT WHICH IS AFTER THE FIRST

of the Intelligible (the First Principle). Besides its primary activity which is itself it has, like all things, a secondary activity distinct from itself: this is Intellect, which is all things, the whole world of living being; the One is therefore beyond being (ch. 2).

V. 4. (7) ΠΩΣ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΤΟ
ΜΕΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ
ΕΝΟΣ

1. Εἴ τι ἔστι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἐκείνου
εἶναι ἢ εὐθύς ἢ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνο διὰ
τῶν μεταξὺ ἔχειν, καὶ τάξιν εἶναι δευτέρων καὶ τρί-
των, τοῦ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου ἀναγομέ-
5 νου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου ἐπὶ τὸ δεύτερον. δεῖ μὲν γάρ τι
πρὸ πάντων εἶναι ἀπλοῦν, τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἕτερον
τῶν μετ' αὐτό, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, οὐ μεμιγμένον τοῖς
ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις παρ-
εἶναι δυνάμενον, ὄν ὄντως ἓν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἴτα
ἓν, καθ' οὗ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὐ μὴ λόγος
10 μῆδὲ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται
εἶναι οὐσίας—εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἔσται συμβάσει
ἔξω πάσης καὶ συνθέσεως καὶ ὄντως ἓν, οὐκ ἂν
ἀρχὴ εἴη—αὐταρκέστατόν τε τῷ ἀπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ
πρῶτον ἀπάντων· τὸ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρῶτον ἐνδεές τοῦ
πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τό τε μὴ ἀπλοῦν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπλῶν
15 δεόμενον, ἢ ἢ ἐξ ἐκείνων. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἓν μόνον
δεῖ εἶναι· ἄλλο γὰρ εἰ εἴη τοιοῦτον, ἓν ἂν εἴη τὰ

¹ Again the two foundation texts from Plato's dialogues

V. 4. HOW THAT WHICH IS AFTER
THE FIRST COMES FROM THE FIRST,
AND ON THE ONE

1. If there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must either come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between, and there must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back to the first and the third to the second. For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is "no concept or knowledge" of it; it is indeed also said to be "beyond being".¹ For if it is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple is in need of its simple components so that it can come into existence from them. A reality of this kind must be one alone: for if there was another of this kind, both would be

for the Neoplatonic doctrine of the One beyond being: *Parmenides* 142A3-4 and *Republic* 509B9.

ἄμφω. οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώματα λέγομεν δύο, ἢ τὸ ἐν
 πρῶτον σώμα. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄπλοῦν σώμα, γινόμενόν
 τε τὸ σώμα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχή· ἢ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἀγέννητος·
 20 μὴ σωματικὴ δὲ οὐσα, ἀλλ' ὄντως μία, ἐκείνο ἂν εἴη
 τὸ πρῶτον. εἰ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον εἴη,
 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἄπλοῦν εἴη· ἐν ἄρα πολλὰ ἔσται. πύθεν
 οὖν τοῦτο; ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυ-
 χίαν, οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐκείνο πάντων ἀρχή. πῶς οὖν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ πρώτου; εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάντων
 25 τελεώτατον καὶ δύναμις ἢ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν
 ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις
 καθάσον δύνανται μιμῆσθαι ἐκείνο. ὅ τι δ' ἂν τῶν
 ἄλλων εἰς τελείωσιν ἴη, ὀρώμεν γεννῶν καὶ οὐκ
 ἀνεχόμενον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένειν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ποιοῦν,
 οὐ μόνον ὅ τι ἂν προαίρεσιν ἔχη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα φύει
 30 ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὲ μεταδίδοντα
 ἑαυτῶν καθόσον δύνανται· οἶον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει,
 καὶ ψύχει ἢ χιών, καὶ τὰ φάρμακα δὲ εἰς ἄλλο
 ἐργάζεται οἶον αὐτά—πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ
 δυνάμιν ἀπομιμούμενα εἰς ἀιδιότητά τε καὶ ἀγα-
 θότητα. πῶς οὖν τὸ τελεώτατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον
 35 ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὐτῷ σταίη ὥσπερ φθονήσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ
 ἀδυνατήσαν, ἢ πάντων δύναμις; πῶς δ' ἂν ἔτι

¹ Plato *Phaedrus* 245D1.

² The absence of *φθόνος*, the selfish, grudging wish to keep one's good to oneself which is the opposite of truly divine generosity, is a cardinal feature of Plato's thought about the

one. For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into being, but not the first principle; and "the first principle has not come into being"¹; if then it was a principle which was not bodily, but was truly one, that [other of this kind] would be the First. If then there is something else after the First, it cannot still be simple: it will therefore be a One-Many. Whence, then, does this come? From the First: for it certainly does not come about by chance, and if it did the First would no longer be the principle of all things. How then does it come from the First? If the First is perfect, the most perfect of all, and the primal power, it must be the most powerful of all beings and the other powers must imitate it as far as they are able. Now when anything else comes to perfection we see that it produces, and does not endure to remain by itself, but makes something else. This is true not only of things which have choice, but of things which grow and produce without choosing to do so, and even lifeless things, which impart themselves to others as far as they can: as fire warms, snow cools, and drugs act on something else in a way corresponding to their own nature—all imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity. How then could the most perfect, the first Good, remain in itself as if it grudged to give of itself² or was impotent, when it is the productive power of all things? How would it then still be the

divine (and a conscious challenge to older Greek ideas): cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247A7 and *Timaeus* 29E1-2.

ἀρχὴ εἴη; δεῖ δὴ τι καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι, εἴπερ
 ἔσται τι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παρ' αὐτοῦ γε ὑποστάντων.
 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη. [δεῖ δὴ καὶ
 40 τιμιώτατον εἶναι τὸ γεννῶν τὰ ἐφεξῆς]¹ δεῖ δὴ καὶ
 τιμιώτατον εἶναι τὸ γεννώμενον καὶ δεύτερον
 ἐκείνου τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον εἶναι.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ νοῦς ἦν τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦ ἐνδεέσ-
 τερον, προσεχέστερον δὲ νῶ καὶ ὅμοιον δεῖ εἶναι.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τὸ γεννῶν, νοῦν εἶναι ἀνάγκη.
 διὰ τί δὲ οὐ νοῦς, οὐ ἐνέργειά ἐστι νόησις; νόησις
 5 δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὄρωσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστραφεῖσθαι
 καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἶον ἀποτελειουμένη [καὶ τελειου-
 μένη],² ἀόριστος μὲν αὐτῇ³ ὡσπερ ὄψις, ὀρίζομένη
 δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ. διὸ καὶ εἴρηται· ἐκ τῆς ἀορίσ-
 του δυνάδος καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ εἶδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς. διὸ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά,
 10 σύνθεσιν τε ἐμφαίνων, νοητὴν μέντοι, καὶ πολλὰ
 ὄρων ἤδη. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς νοητὸν, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ νοῶν· διὸ δύο ἤδη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῶ μετ'
 αὐτὸ νοητὸν· ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ὁ νοῦς
 οὗτος; τὸ νοητὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μένον καὶ οὐκ ὄν
 ἐνδεές, ὡσπερ τὸ ὄρων καὶ τὸ νοοῦν—ἐνδεές δὲ
 15 λέγω τὸ νοοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο—οὐκ ἔστιν οἶον
 ἀναίσθητον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
 σὺν αὐτῷ, πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ζῶν ἐν αὐτῷ

¹ om. C: del. Harder.

² ἀποτελειουμένη Volkmann: ἐποτελουμένη καὶ τελειουμένη
 Enn., H-S¹.

³ Kirchhoff*: αὐτῇ Enn., H-S¹.

Principle? Something must certainly come into
 being from it, if anything is to exist of the others
 which derive their being from it: that it is from it
 that they come is absolutely necessary. That which
 is generated by it must certainly also be most
 honourable, and though it is second to the Principle
 must be better than all else.

2. If, then, the generator itself is Intellect, what
 is generated by it must be more defective than
 Intellect, but fairly close to it and like it; but since
 the generator is beyond Intellect, it is necessary that
 what is generated should be Intellect. But why is
 the generator not Intellect, whose active actuality is
 thinking? Thinking, which sees the intelligible
 and turns towards it and is, in a way, being per-
 fected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is
 defined by the intelligible. This is why it is said:
 from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the
 Forms and Numbers: that is, Intellect.¹ For this
 reason Intellect is not simple but many; it manifests
 a composition, of course an intelligible one, and
 already sees many things. It is, certainly, also
 itself an intelligible, but it thinks as well: so it is
 already two. And it is also a different intelligible
 by being posterior to the One itself. But how does
 this Intellect come from the Intelligible? The
 Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient,
 like that which sees and thinks—I call that which
 thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible,
 but it is not like something senseless; all things
 belong to it and are in it and with it. It is com-
 pletely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and

¹ See note 1 to ch. 5 of V. 1.

καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ
οἰονεὶ συναισθήσει οὐσα ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ καὶ νοήσει
ἐτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν. εἴ τι οὖν μένοντος
20 αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο γίνεται,
ὅταν ἐκεῖνο μάλιστα ἢ ὃ ἐστι. μένοντος οὖν
αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἦθει ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν τὸ
γινόμενον γίνεται, μένοντος δὲ γίνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν
ἐκεῖνο μένει νοητὸν, τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται νόησις·
νόησις δὲ οὐσα καὶ νοοῦσα ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο—ἄλλο
25 γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει—νοῦς γίνεται, ἄλλο οἶον νοητὸν
καὶ οἶον ἐκεῖνο καὶ μίμημα καὶ εἰδωλον ἐκείνου.
ἀλλὰ πῶς μένοντος ἐκείνου γίνεται; ἐνέργεια ἢ
μὲν ἐστὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ἢ δ' ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκάστου·
καὶ ἢ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἕκαστον,
ἢ δὲ ἀπ' ἐκείνης, ἣν δεῖ παντὶ ἔπρασθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης
30 ἐτέραν οὐσαν αὐτοῦ· οἶον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἢ μὲν
τίς ἐστὶ συμπληροῦσα τὴν οὐσίαν θερμότης, ἢ δὲ
ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἤδη γινομένη ἐνεργούντος ἐκείνου τὴν
σύμφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐν τῷ μένειν πῦρ. οὕτω δὲ
κάκεϊ· καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖ μένοντος αὐτοῦ
35 ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἦθει ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος
καὶ συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἢ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπό-

¹ This passage stands alone in the *Enneads* in the clarity with which it attributes a kind of thinking to the One: cp. *Introductory Note* and n. 1 (p. 119) to ch. 13 of V. 3. The view which Plotinus adopts here is close to that of Numenius, whose First God is an Intellect (frs. 16 and 17 des Places, 25 and 26 Leemans), but an Intellect, it would seem, whose thinking is ineffably superior to that of the Second God or Demiurge who contemplates the Forms and makes the world.

all things in itself, and its thinking of itself is itself, and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness, in everlasting rest and in a manner of thinking different from the thinking of Intellect.¹ If, then, something comes into being while the Intelligible abides in itself, it comes into being from it when it is most of all what it is. When, therefore, the Intelligible abides "in its own proper way of life",² that which comes into being does come into being from it, but from it as it abides unchanged. Since, therefore, it abides as Intelligible, what comes into being does so as thinking: and since it is thinking and thinks that from which it came—for it has nothing else—it becomes Intellect, like another intelligible and like that Principle, a representation and image of it. But how, when that abides unchanged, does Intellect come into being? In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance, and another which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the activity which is native to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so there, while the Principle abides "in its own proper way of life", the activity generated from the perfection in it and its coexistent activity acquires substantial existence, since it comes from

² Plato *Timaeus* 42E5-6 (quoted again below).

στασι λαβοῦσα, ἅτε ἐκ μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μεγίστης μὲν οὖν ἀπασῶν, εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἦλθεν· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ἦν. καὶ ἐκεῖνο μὲν δύναμις πάντων, τὸ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πάντα. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
 40 τὰ πάντα, ἐκεῖνο ἐπέκεινα τῶν πάντων· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα οὐσίας· καὶ εἰ τὰ πάντα, πρὸ δὲ πάντων τὸ ἔν οὐ τὸ ἴσον ἔχον τοῖς πᾶσι, καὶ ταύτη δεῖ ἐπέκεινα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τι νοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ οὐ ζωὴ οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν· νοῦς δὲ καὶ ὄν ταυτόν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν
 45 πραγμάτων ὁ νοῦς—ὡσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν αἰσθητῶν—προόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς νοῦς τὰ πράγματα, εἴπερ μὴ εἶδη αὐτῶν κομίζεται. πόθεν γάρ; ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔν· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ πράγματα.

a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being and substance: for that Principle is "beyond being". That is the productive power of all things, and its product is already all things. But if this product is all things, that Principle is beyond all things: therefore "beyond being"; and if the product is all things but the One is before all things and not on an equality with all things, in this way too it must be "beyond being". That is, also beyond Intellect; there is, then, something beyond Intellect. For being is not a dead thing, nor is it not life or not thinking; Intellect and being are one and the same thing; for Intellect does not apprehend objects which preexist it—as sense does sense-objects—but Intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms from somewhere (for where could it get them from?). But it is here with its objects and the same as and one with them: the knowledge of things without matter is its objects.¹

¹ Here again Plotinus is taking Aristotle's doctrine of intellect as his starting-point: cp. *Categories* 7. 8a11 (on the priority of sense-objects to sense) and *De Anima* Γ 4. 430a2-5 and 7. 431b17 (on the identity of intellect with its objects).

V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE NOT
OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT, AND ON THE
GOOD

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the third section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33), which Porphyry divided and inserted in various places in the *Enneads* without regard to the original order (see Introductory Notes to II. 9 and III. 8). It is best read after V. 8 with which it is completely continuous: the last sentence of V. 8 directly introduces the argument which occupies the first three chapters of V. 5. The two treatises together form the second "ascent to the Good" in the great work. The first, in III. 8, starts at the bottom, with Nature, the lowest form of Soul. This one begins at the stage immediately below the Good, with Intellect, Real Being or the World of Forms, which we discover within ourselves as soon as we make any progress in genuine contemplation. In V. 8 the beauty of the intelligible world was considered in depth, and it was already clearly indicated that its intelligibility was non-discursive. In the first three chapters of the present treatise we pass from the beauty to the truth of Intellect, and its absolute identity with the intelligible objects, the Forms, is powerfully argued. Then follows a demonstration that the One or Good beyond Intellect and Being must exist, leading into one of the most impressive accounts in the *Enneads* of its transcendent and ineffable nature and the strange kind of direct awareness by which we apprehend it. In Chapter 12 there is a return to the

INTELLIGIBLES NOT OUTSIDE INTELLECT

theme of intelligible beauty and it is shown how, wrongly apprehended, it can distract us from the Good. Chapter 13 sums up the argument, and prepares the way for the polemical appendix refuting Gnostic ideas of spiritual reality which occupies II. 9.

Synopsis

The truth of Intellect (and what can be truer than absolute Intellect) depends on its identity with its objects (ch. 1). These intelligible objects which are Intellect are real, living, thinking being: no proof of their absolute truth is necessary or possible (ch. 2). The image of the court procession in which Intellect immediately precedes the King (ch. 3). Demonstration that the One must exist from a consideration of the nature of number (chs. 4-5). That Being proceeds from the One is confirmed by etymology (ch. 5). The One is beyond form and substance, for if it was form or substance it would be a particular being, not the origin of all: it is therefore unknowable and ineffable (ch. 6). Intellect sees it by an inner light identical with itself (ch. 7). The mysterious coming and going of the vision of the One, which is not a movement of the One, but of Intellect (ch. 8). The One is not in anything, therefore it is everywhere: body is in Soul, Soul in Intellect, Intellect in the One (ch. 9). The One is the transcendent source of all else, unlike all which he produces (ch. 10). The infinity of the One: he is utterly unlike the sense-perceived objects which most people think are real (ch. 11). The Good and intelligible beauty: indifference of the Good to all he has made (ch. 12). We must not think that the Good has anything in himself, even good: this would detract from his absolute simplicity (ch. 13).

V. 5. (32) ΟΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΞΩ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ ΤΑ
ΝΟΗΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ

1. Τὸν νοῦν, τὸν ἀληθῆ νοῦν καὶ ὄντως, ἄρ' ἂν τις
φαίη ψεύσεσθαι ποτε καὶ μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοξάσειν;
οὐδαμῶς. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἔτι νοῦς ἀνοηταίων εἴη;
δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸν αἰεὶ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴδ' ἂν ἐπιλαθέσθαι
5 ποτέ, τὴν δὲ εἰδῆσιν αὐτῷ μήτε εἰκάζοντι εἶναι
μήτε ἀμφίβολον μὴδ' αὐτὸν παρ' ἄλλου οἶον ἀκούσαντι.
οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τινά τις
φαίη δι' ἀποδείξεως, ἀλλ' οὖν αὐτόθεν αὐτῷ ἐναργῆ
τιν' ¹ εἶναι. καίτοι· ὁ λόγος φησὶ πάντα· πῶς γὰρ
καὶ διοριεῖ τις τὰ τε αὐτόθεν τὰ τε μή; ἀλλ' οὖν,
10 ἃ συγχωροῦσιν αὐτόθεν, πόθεν φήσουσι τούτων τὸ
ἐναργὲς αὐτῷ παρεῖναι; πόθεν δὲ αὐτῷ πίστιν,
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, παρέξεται; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς
αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην,
ἀπιστεῖται, μὴ ποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ'
15 ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ

¹ Cilento: π Enn., H-S ¹.

V. 5. THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES ARE
NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT,
AND ON THE GOOD

1. Could anyone say that Intellect, the true and
real Intellect, will ever be in error and believe the
unreal? Certainly not. For how could it still be
Intellect when it was being unintelligent? It must,
then, always know and not ever forget anything,
and its knowing must not be that of a guesser, or
ambiguous, or like that of someone who has heard
what he knows from someone else. Nor, certainly,
can it depend on demonstration. For even if any-
one did say that some of the things it knows were
known by demonstration, some, all the same, would
be immediately self-evident to it. (The argument in
fact says that all things it knows are self-evident:
for how is one going to distinguish those which are
from those which are not?) But anyhow, as regards
the things of which they agree that Intellect's
knowledge is immediate, where do they say that the
self-evidence comes to it from? From where will it
acquire the confidence that things are so? For
there is a lack of confidence about even those
objects of sense-perception which seem to inspire
the strongest confidence in their self-evidence,
whether their apparent existence may be not in the
underlying realities, but in the ways the sense-
organs are affected, and they need intellect or dis-

νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινούντων· ἐπεὶ καὶ συγκε-
 χωρημένου ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις εἶναι αἰσθητοῖς,
 ὧν ἀντίληψιν ἢ αἰσθησις ποιήσεται, τό τε γνωσ-
 κόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως τοῦ πράγματος εἰδωλὸν ἐστι
 καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ αἰσθησις λαμβάνει·
 20 μένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω. ὁ δὲ νοῦς γινώσκων καὶ τὰ
 νοητὰ γινώσκων, εἰ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα γινώσκει, πῶς
 μὲν ἂν συντύχοι αὐτοῖς; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μή, ὥστε
 ἐνδέχεται μὴ γινώσκειν ἢ τότε ὅτε συνέτυχε, καὶ
 οὐκ αἰεὶ ἔξει τὴν γνώσιν. εἰ δὲ συνεζεύχθαι φήσου-
 σι, τί τὸ συνεζεύχθαι τοῦτο; ἔπειτα καὶ αἱ νοήσεις
 25 τύποι ἔσονται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐπακτοὶ καὶ πλη-
 γαί. πῶς δὲ καὶ τυπώσεται, ἢ τίς τῶν τοιούτων ἢ
 μορφή; καὶ ἢ νόησις τοῦ ἔξω ὥσπερ ἢ αἰσθησις.
 καὶ τί διοίσει ἢ τῷ ὑμικροτέρων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι;
 πῶς δὲ καὶ γινώσεται, ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως; πῶς
 30 δέ, ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἕκασ-
 τον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ αἰ τῆς
 κρίσεως ἀρχαί, αἷς πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐταὶ ἔξω,
 καὶ ἢ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ. εἶτα κάκεῖνα ἀναίσθητα καὶ
 ἄμοιρα ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ, ἢ νοῦν ἔχει. καὶ εἰ νοῦν
 ἔχει, ἅμα ἐνταῦθα ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ὡδί, καὶ
 35 ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς οὗτος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου ζητήσομεν,

¹ Total confidence in sense-perception was characteristic of the Epicureans: cp. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Mathem.* VIII 9 and VII 203 (*Against the Logicians* II 9 and I 203 Bury) = Epicurea fr. 244 and 247 Usener. The Sceptics were naturally

cursive reason to make judgments about them; for even if it is agreed that they are in the underlying sense-realities which sense-perception is to grasp, that which is known by sense perception is an image of the thing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself: for that remains outside.¹ Now when Intellect knows, and knows the intelligibles, if it knows them as being other than itself, how could it make contact with them? For it is possible that it might not, so that it is possible that it might not know them, or know them only when it made contact with them, and it will not always possess its knowledge. But if they are going to say that the intelligibles and Intellect are linked, what does this "linked" mean? Then the acts of intelligence will be impressions; but if this is what they are, they come to it from outside and are impacts. But then how will the impressions be made, and what shape are things like intelligibles? And intellection will be of what is external, just like sense-perception. And in what way will it differ from sense-perception, except by grasping smaller objects? But how, also, will it know that it really grasped them? And how will it know that this is good or beautiful or just? For each of these will be other than it, and the principles of judgment on which it will rely will not be in itself, but these too will be outside, and that is where truth will be. Then again, either the intelligibles are without perception and without any share of life or intelligence, or they have intelligence. And if they have intelligence, both are here in them at once, truth is here and this is the primary Intellect,

much concerned to refute this position. But the argument Plotinus uses here is Platonic rather than Sceptic.

πῶς ἔχει ἢ ἐνταῦθα ἀλήθεια, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ ὁ
 νοῦς εἰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μὲν καὶ ἅμα, δύο δὲ καὶ ἕτερα,
 ἢ πῶς; εἰ δ' ἀνόητα καὶ ἄνεν ζωῆς, τί ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ
 διῆ προτάσεις οὐδὲ ἀξιώματα οὐδὲ λεκτά·
 40 ἤδη γὰρ ἂν καὶ αὐτὰ περὶ ἐτέρων λέγοι, καὶ οὐκ
 αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα εἶη, ὅλον τὸ δίκαιον καλόν, ἄλλου τοῦ
 δικαίου καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ὄντος. εἰ δ' ἀπλᾶ φήσουσι,
 δίκαιον χωρὶς καὶ καλόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ἔν τι
 οὐδ' ἐν ἐνὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ διεσπασμένον
 ἕκαστον. καὶ ποῦ καὶ κατὰ τίνας διέσπασται τό-
 45 πους; πῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς συντεύξεται ὁ νοῦς περιθέων;
 πῶς δὲ μενεῖ; ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πῶς μενεῖ¹; τίνα δ'
 ὅλως μορφὴν ἢ τύπον ἔξει; εἰ μὴ ὡσπερ ἀγάλματα
 ἐκκείμενα χρυσᾷ ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὸς ὑλης ὑπὸ τινος
 πλάστου ἢ γραφέως πεποιημένα; ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο,
 ὁ θεωρῶν νοῦς αἰσθησις ἔσται. διὰ τί δὲ τὸ μὲν
 50 ἔστι τῶν τοιούτων δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τι;
 μέγιστον δὲ πάντων ἐκείνο· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα
 δοίη τις ταῦτα ἔξει εἶναι καὶ τὸν νοῦν αὐτὰ

¹ BUPe, Creuzer*: μένει wxU^{ac}C, H-S¹.

¹ Here Plotinus is arguing against those who see the knowledge of Intellect in terms of discursive logic, whether Aristotelian or Stoic. For "premises" cp. Aristotle *Anal. Priora* A 1, 24a16: for "axioms" and "expressions" cp. *SVF* II 132 and 136.

² In this passage Plotinus is arguing against contemporary Platonists like Longinus, who held that the Platonic Forms were external to and separate from Intellect (cp. Proclus *In Tim.* I. 322. 24 Diehl and, for Porphyry's original acceptance

and we shall proceed to investigate how truth and the intelligible and Intellect are related [in this unity-in-duality]: are they together in one and the same reality, but also two and diverse, or how are they related? But if they are without intelligence and life, what sort of realities are they? They are certainly not "premises" or "axioms" or "expressions"; for then they would only say something about other things and would not be the things themselves, as when [one says] "Justice is beautiful", though justice and beauty are different [from the words used].¹ But if they are going to say that justice and beauty are simple realities, justice by itself and beauty by itself, then first of all, the intelligible will not be a unity or in a unity, but each intelligible will be cut off from the others. Well, then, where will they be, and over what regions will they be dispersed? And how will Intellect encounter them when it runs round looking for them? And how will it stay in its place? How will it remain identical with itself? Whatever sort of shape or imprint will it receive from them? Unless we assume that they are like images set up, made of gold or some other material by a sculptor or engraver? But if this is so, the intellect which contemplates them will be sense-perception. And why should one of things like these be righteousness, and another something else?² But the greatest objection of all is this. If one grants that the objects of thought are as completely as possible outside In-

of this position and conversion, *Life of Plotinus* 18). He seems to have in mind particularly a very literal interpretation of the vision of the Forms in his favourite Phaedrus myth: cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247D-E.

οὕτως ἔχοντα θεωρεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ μήτε τὸ ἀληθές αὐτῶν ἔχειν διεψεῦσθαί τε ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς θεωρεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινὰ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖνα·
 55 θεωρήσει τοίνυν αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτά, εἶδωλα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοιαύτῃ λαβῶν. τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἶδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὐτῷ λαβῶν τὰ ψευδῆ ἔξει καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές. εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰδήσει, ὅτι τὰ ψευδῆ ἔχει, ὁμολογήσει ἄμοιρος ἀληθείας εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοήσει
 60 καὶ οἰήσεται τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν οὐκ ἔχων, διπλάσιον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος γενόμενον πολὺ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτὸν ἀποστήσει. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἐνεστὶν ἀλήθεια, ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δόξα οὐσα ἄλλο
 65 παραδέχεται ἄλλου ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο δὲ παραδέχεται ἔχει. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἀλήθεια ἐν τῷ νῷ, οὗτος μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος νοῦς οὔτε ἀλήθεια ἔσται οὔτε ἀληθεία νοῦς οὔτε ὅλως νοῦς ἔσται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἄλλοθί που ἡ ἀλήθεια ἔσται.

2. Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ οὔτε ἔξω τὰ νοητὰ ζητεῖν, οὔτε τύπους ἐν τῷ νῷ τῶν ὄντων λέγειν εἶναι, οὔτε τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποστρεφόντας αὐτὸν ἀγνωσίαν τε τῶν νοητῶν ποιεῖν καὶ ἀνυπαρξίαν καὶ ἔτι αὐτὸν τὸν
 5 νοῦν ἀναιρεῖν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ καὶ γνώσιν δεῖ καὶ ἀλήθειαν εἰσάγειν καὶ τὰ ὄντα τηρεῖν καὶ γνώσιν τοῦ τί ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ποῖόν τι ἕκαστον, ἅτε εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἴχνος ἴσχυοντος,

¹ Plotinus is here deriving δόξα from δέχομαι, by way of the adjective δόχος.

tellect, and that Intellect contemplates them as absolutely outside it, then it cannot possess the truth of them and must be deceived in everything it contemplates. For they would be the true realities; and on this supposition it will contemplate them without possessing them, but will only get images of them in a knowledge of this sort. If then it does not possess the true reality, but only receives in itself images of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. If, then, it knows that what it has is false, it will admit that it has no part in truth; but if it does not know even this, and thinks it has the truth when it has not, the falsehood in it will be doubled and will set it far away from the truth. (This is the reason, I think, why there is no truth in the senses, only opinion: opinion is opinion because it receives, and what it receives is different from that from which it receives it.)¹ So if there is not truth in Intellect, then an intellect of this sort will not be truth, or truly Intellect, or Intellect at all. But then truth will not be anywhere else either.

2. One must not, then, look for the intelligibles outside, or say that there are impressions of the real beings in Intellect, or by depriving it of truth make the intelligibles unknowable and non-existent and finally abolish Intellect itself. But, since one must bring in knowledge and truth and watchfully preserve reality and the knowledge of what each thing is—but not [only] the knowledge of each thing's qualities,² since [if we only had that] we should have an image and a trace of realities, and not possess

² For the important distinction between the thing itself and its quality (or "what it is like") cp. Plato *Letter VII* 342E ff.

ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὰ ἔχοντας καὶ συνόντας καὶ συγκρα-
 θέντας αὐτοῖς, τῷ ἀληθινῷ νῷ δοτέον τὰ πάντα.
 10 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἰδείη, καὶ ἀληθινῶς εἰδείη, καὶ
 οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιλάβοιτο οὐδ' ἂν περιέλθοι ζητῶν, καὶ ἡ
 ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἔδρα ἔσται τοῖς οὐσι καὶ
 ζήσεται καὶ νοήσει. ἃ δὲ πάντα περὶ τὴν μακα-
 ριωτάτην φύσιν δεῖ ὑπάρχειν· ἢ ποῦ τὸ τίμιον καὶ
 σεμνὸν ἔσται; καὶ γὰρ αἶ οὕτως οὐδ' ἀποδείξεως
 15 δεῖ οὐδὲ πίστεως, ὅτι οὕτως—αὐτὸς γὰρ οὕτως καὶ
 ἐναργῆς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ—καὶ εἴ τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἴ τι μετ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι αὐτός—καὶ οὐδεὶς
 πιστότερος αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτοῦ—καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖ τοῦτο
 καὶ ὄντως· ὥστε καὶ ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφων-
 οῦσα ἄλλῃ ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτὴν ἄλλο
 20 λέγει, <ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει>,¹ καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ὃ ἔστι, τοῦτο
 καὶ λέγει. τίς ἂν οὐκ ἐλέγξειε; καὶ πόθεν οἴσει
 τὸν ἔλεγχον; εἰς γὰρ ταῦτόν ὁ φερόμενος ἔλεγχος
 τῷ προειπόντι, κὰν κομίση ὡς ἄλλο, φέρεται εἰς
 τὸν ἐξαρχῆς εἰπόντα καὶ ἔν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο
 ἀληθέστερον ἂν εὔροις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

3. Μία τοίνυν φύσις αὕτη ἡμῖν, νοῦς, τὰ ὄντα
 πάντα, ἡ ἀλήθεια· εἰ δέ, θεὸς τις μέγας· μάλλον
 δὲ οὐ τις, ἀλλὰ πᾶς ἀξιοῖ ταῦτα εἶναι. καὶ θεὸς
 αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ θεὸς δεύτερος προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν
 5 πρὶν ὄραν ἐκείων· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερ-
 ἰδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἶον κρηπίδους, ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ

¹ Theiler.

and live with and be fused with the realities them-
 selves—we must attribute all [real existences] to the
 true Intellect. For in this way it will also know
 them, and know them truly and will not forget
 them or go round looking for them, and the truth
 will be in it and it will be the foundation of all
 realities and they will live and think. All this must
 belong to the most blessed nature: or where will
 its honour and majesty be? And then again, it will
 need no proof and no confirmation that it is so, for
 it is so, and is manifest to itself—and if there is any-
 thing before it, Intellect knows clearly that this is
 what it derives from, and if there is anything after
 it, it knows clearly that this is itself—and nobody
 can confirm this about it better than itself—and it
 knows clearly that all this is there in the intelligible
 world, and really there. So that the real truth is
 also there, which does not agree with something
 else, but with itself, and says nothing other than
 itself, but it is what it says and it says what it is.
 Who then could contradict it, and where would he
 bring his contradiction from? For the contradic-
 tory answer would coincide with the preceding
 statement, and even if one introduces it as different,
 it is brought into conformity with and is one with the
 original statement: for you could not find anything
 truer than the truth.

3. We have here, then, one nature, Intellect, all
 realities, and truth: if so, it is a great god; or,
 better, not just a god, but it demands as of right
 that this which it is is universal god. This nature is
 god, and the second god revealing himself before
 we see that other one: he, the First, is enthroned
 above and set firm on high on Intellect in this its

ἐξήρτηται. ἔδει γὰρ ἐκείνον βαίοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινὸς μηδ' αὐτὸ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προῖόν, οἶον πρὸ μεγάλου βασιλέως πρόεισι μὲν
 10 πρῶτα ἐν ταῖς προόδοις τὰ ἐλάττω, αἰεὶ δὲ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ σεμνότερα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ περὶ βασιλέα ἤδη μᾶλλον βασιλικώτερα, εἶτα τὰ μετ' αὐτὸν τίμια· ἐφ' ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις βασιλεὺς προφαίνεται ἐξαίφνης αὐτὸς ὁ μέγας, οἱ δ' εὐχονται καὶ προσκυνοῦσιν, ὅσοι μὴ προσηλθόν
 15 ἀρκεσθέντες τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ὀφθεύουσιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἄλλος, οἱ τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ προῖόντες ἄλλοι αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖ βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἄλλοτριῶν ἄρχων, ἀλλ' ἔχων τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ βασιλείαν, ἅτε τῆς ἀληθείας βασιλεὺς καὶ ἂν κατὰ φύσιν κύριος τοῦ
 20 αὐτοῦ ἀθροῦ γεννήματος καὶ θεοῦ συντάγματος, βασιλεὺς βασιλέως καὶ βασιλέων καὶ πατῆρ δικαιοτέρον ἂν κληθεῖς θεῶν, ὃν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ταύτη ἐμμήσατο τὴν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος θεωρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ προπάτορος οἶον ἐνέργειαν εἰς ὑπόστασιν οὐσίας.

4. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιήσασθαι εἰς ἓν καὶ ἀληθῶς ἓν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἓν, ἀπολλὰ ὄντα μετοχῆ ἑνὸς ἓν—δεῖ δὲ τὸ μὴ μετοχῆ

¹ The remarkable correction of the metaphor here should be noted. The First towers above Intellect like a statue on its pedestal or an Oriental king on his throne, but is in no way supported or elevated by it. Intellect is totally dependent for its existence on That of which it is called the "pedestal".

beauty, like a pedestal, and the pedestal, Intellect, hangs from it.¹ For the First in its progress could not take its stand upon something soulless, nor immediately upon Soul, but there must be an inconceivable beauty going out before it, as in the procession before a great king the lesser ranks go first, and then in succession the greater and after them the yet more majestic and the court which has still more of royal dignity, and then those who are honoured next after the king; and after all these the great king himself is suddenly revealed, and the people pray and prostrate themselves before him—those at least who have not gone away beforehand, satisfied with what they saw before the coming of the king. Now in our example the king is a different person from those who go before him; but the king there in the higher world does not rule over different, alien people, but has the most just, the natural sovereignty and the true kingdom; for he is king of truth and natural lord of all his own offspring and divine company, king of the king and of the kings, and more rightly than Zeus called the father of the gods; Zeus imitates him in this way also in that he is not satisfied with the contemplation of his father but aspires to, we might say, the active power with which his grandfather establishes reality in being.²

4. We have said, then,³ that the ascent must be made to a one, and this means truly one, but not one like all other things which are multiple and one by participation in a one—the One must be grasped

² The usual identification of the Three Hypostases with the successive mythological chief gods, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus.

³ In the first part of this work, III. 8. 10–11.

ἐν λαβεῖν μηδὲ τὸ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν ἢ πολλά—καὶ ὅτι ὁ
 5 μὲν νοητὸς κόσμος καὶ ὁ νοῦς μᾶλλον ἐν τῶν ἄλλων,
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἐγγυτέρω αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός, οὐ μὴν τὸ
 καθαρῶς ἐν, εἴρηται. τί δὲ τὸ καθαρῶς ἐν καὶ
 ὄντως καὶ οὐ κατ' ἄλλο, νῦν θεάσασθαι ποθοῦμεν,
 εἴ πη δυνατόν. χρή τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ἄξει πρὸς ἐν,
 καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἔτι προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ στήναι
 10 παντελῶς δεδιότα αὐτοῦ ἀποστατήσαι μηδὲ
 τοῦλάχιστον μηδὲ εἰς δύο προελθεῖν. εἰ δὲ μή,
 ἔσχατος δύο, οὐκ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν, ἀλλὰ ἄμφω ὕστερα.
 οὐ γὰρ θέλει μετ' ἄλλου οὔτε ἐνός οὔτε ὅποσου οὐδὲ
 συναριθμεῖσθαι οὐδ' ὅλως ἀριθμεῖσθαι· μέτρον γὰρ
 αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ μετρούμενον, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ οὐκ
 15 ἴσον, ἵνα σὺν αὐτοῖς· εἰ δὲ μή, κοινόν τι ἔσται ἐπ'
 αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναριθμουμένων, κάκεινο πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ· δεῖ δὲ μηδέ. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὁ οὐσιώδης
 ἀριθμὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδέ γε ὁ ὕστερος τούτου, ὁ
 τοῦ ποσοῦ· οὐσιώδης μὲν ὁ τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ παρέχων,
 τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ὁ τὸ ποσὸν μετ' ἄλλων ἢ ἔτι¹ μὴ μετ'
 20 ἄλλων, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸς τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς
 τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν
 ἀπομιμουμένη τὴν ἐν τοῖς προτέροις ἀριθμοῖς

¹ Theiler: ὅτι Ess., Petna, Creuzer. ὅτι Creuzer (ed. Paris.), Kirchoff*: ἔτι ὁ A^{3ms} (= Ficinus): ἔτι ὁ Cilento.

¹ "Essential number" is Platonic Ideal Number. For the way in which Plotinus understands the Platonic Ideal Numbers, see the treatise *On Numbers* VI. 6 [34] to which he refers forward at the end of this chapter.

that is not one by participation and is not as much
 many as one—and that the intelligible universe and
 Intellect are more one than all other things, and
 there is nothing nearer the One itself, but all the
 same this is not the pure One. Now we long to
 see, if it is in any way possible, what is the pure,
 real One, unrelated to anything else. At this point,
 then, you must rush to one, and not any longer add
 anything to it, but stand absolutely still in fear of
 departing from it, and not progress the least little
 way towards two. If not, you get two, and not a
 two which contains the One, but [a two of which]
 both units are posterior to it. For it will not be
 included in the count with another one, or another
 number of any size; it will not be counted at all:
 for it is a measure and not measured, and it is not
 equal to the other units so as to be one of their
 company; otherwise, there will be something in
 common between it and those which are included
 in the count with it, and that something in common
 will be before the One itself; but there must be
 nothing [before the One itself]. It does not even
 belong to the category of essential number, and so
 certainly not to that which is posterior to it of
 quantitative number¹ (substantial number is that
 which continually gives existence, quantitative num-
 ber is that which gives quantity when it is with other
 numbers, and still when it is not with other numbers,
 if this [which is not with other numbers] really is a
 number). Since the nature which belongs to the
 numbers in the class of quantitative number, imitat-
 ing in relation to the one which is their principle the
 relationship of the nature in the prior [substantial]

φύσις πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἐν οὐκ ἀναλίσκουσα τὸ ἐν
οὐδὲ κερματίζουσα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
δυσάδος γενομένης ἔστι μονὰς ἢ πρὸ τῆς δυσάδος, καὶ
25 οὐχ ἢ ἐν τῇ δυσάδι μονὰς ἑκατέρα οὐδ' ἑτέρα
ἐκείνη. τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ὀποτεραοῦν; εἰ οὖν
μηδετέρα αὐτῶν, ἄλλη ἐκείνη καὶ μένουσα οὐ¹
μένει. πῶς οὖν ἕτεροι ἐκείναι; καὶ πῶς ἢ δυὰς
ἐν; καὶ εἰ ταῦτό ἐν, ὅπερ ἐν ἑκατέρῃ τῇ περι-
εχομένῃ ἢ μετέχειν τῆς πρώτης φατέον, ἀλλὰς
30 δὲ ἧς μετέχουσι, καὶ τὴν δυσάδα δέ, καθὼς ἐν,
μετέχειν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως
στρατὸς ἐν καὶ οἰκία. καὶ αὕτη πρὸς τὸ συνεχές
οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ὡς εἶναι ἐν, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἐν.
ἄρ' οὖν αἱ μὲν μονάδες ἄλλως αἱ ἐν πεντάδι καὶ
δεκάδι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τὸ ἐν τῇ πεντάδι πρὸς τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐπὶ
35 τῆς δεκάδος τὸ αὐτό; ἢ, εἰ ναῦς πᾶσα πρὸς πᾶσαν,
μικρὰ πρὸς μεγάλην, καὶ πόλις πρὸς πόλιν, καὶ
στρατὸς πρὸς στρατόν, ταῦτό ἐν καὶ ἐνταῦθα· εἰ
δὲ μηδ' ἐκεῖ, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα. εἰ γὰρ τινες περὶ
τούτων ἀπορίαι, ὕστερον.

5. Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐπανιτέον λέγουσιν, ὅτι μένε
τὸ πρῶτον τὸ αὐτό, κἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνηται ἕτερα.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς μένοντος μὲν τοῦ ἐν,
ποιούντος δὲ ἄλλου, ὁ ἀριθμὸς γίνεται κατ' αὐτό.²
5 ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν ὄντων μένει μὲν πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν· μένοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐκ

¹ B-T: οὐ Enn., H-S¹.

² (idem atque 3 ἄλλου) w. Perna, Müller: κατὰ ταῦτό ΒxUC,
H-S¹: κατ' αὐτό <τὸ ἐν> Volkmann*: κατὰ τὸ <ἐν> Theiler.

numbers to the real One, does not exist by expending
or breaking up its one, but when a dyad comes to be,
the monad before the dyad exists, neither each of
the two units in the dyad nor one of them is the
monad in the dyad. For why should it be one of
them more than the other? If then it is neither of
them, it is different, and remains where it remains.
How then are those [two units of the dyad] different?
And how is the dyad one? and is it the same one,
which is in each of the two terms comprised in the
dyad? It must be maintained that they participate
in the first monad, but are other than that in which
they participate, and the dyad, in so far as it is one,
also participates, but not in the same sense: for an
army and a house are not one in the same way. A
house is one in virtue of its continuous structure, not
by substantial unity or quantitative unity. Are then
the monads in the number five and the number ten
different, but is the one in the number five the same
as the one in the number ten? Now if every ship
is the same as every other ship, small the same as
great, and every city the same as another city or
army the same as another army, then here also the
one is the same; but if not in those other cases, then
not here either. If there are any difficulties about
this, we will deal with them later.

5. But we must go back to that point where we
said that the First remains the same even if other
things come into being from it. In the case of
numbers, then, the one remains unchanged, but
another one makes number, and number comes into
existence on the model of it; but in the case of
that which truly exists, here the One still more
remains unchanged before the real beings; but

ἄλλο ποιεῖ, εἰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ αὐτὸ
 γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα. καὶ ὡσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀριθμῶν ἦν τοῦ πρώτου—τῆς μονάδος—ἐπὶ πᾶσιν
 εἶδος πρώτως καὶ δευτέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσης
 10 ἐκάστον μεταλαμβάνοντος τῶν ὑστερον αὐτῆς,
 οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν μετὰ τὸ
 πρῶτον ἔχει τι ἐκείνου οἷον εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ κεῖ
 μὲν ἢ μετάληψις τὸ ποσὸν ὑπέστησεν αὐτῶν,
 ἐνταῦθα δὲ [τὸ ἴχνος τοῦ ἐνός] ¹ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῖς
 ὑπεστήσατο, ὡστ' εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἴχνος <τοῦ> ²
 ἐνός. καὶ τὸ εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο—ἢ τῆς οὐσίας
 15 δηλωτικὴ ὀνομασία—ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν εἶ τις λέγει
 γεγονέναι, τάχ' ἂν τύχοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. τὸ γὰρ τοι
 λεγόμενον ὄν τοῦτο πρῶτον ἐκείθεν οἷον ὀλίγον
 προβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἠβέλησεν ἔτι πρόσω εἰλθεῖν,
 μεταστραφὲν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶσαι ἔπτη, καὶ ἐγένετο
 οὐσία καὶ ἐστία ³ ἀπάντων οἷον ἐν φθόγγῳ
 20 ἐναπερείσαντος αὐτὸν τοῦ φωνοῦντος ὑφίσταται τὸ
 ἐν δηλοῦν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ τὸ ὄν σημαῖον τὸ
 φθεγξάμενον, ὡς δύναται. οὕτω τοι τὸ μὲν
 γενόμενον, ἢ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι, μίμησιν ἔχοντα ἐκ
 τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ ῥέντα. ἢ δὲ ἰδοῦσα καὶ
 ἐπικινηθεῖσα τῷ θεάματι μιμουμένη ὁ εἶδεν ἔρρηξε
 25 φωνὴν τὴν “ὄν” καὶ “τὸ εἶναι” καὶ “οὐσία” καὶ
 “ἐστίαν.” οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ φθόγγοι θέλουσι σημήναι
 τὴν ὑπόστασιν γεννηθέντος ὡδίνι τοῦ φθεγγομένου
 ἀπομιμούμενοι, ὡς οἷον τε αὐτοῖς, τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ
 ὄντος. ON TOS

¹ del. Theiler.

² transpos. Theiler.

³ Vitranga, Müller*: ἐστὼ Enn.

while it remains unchanged, it is not another which makes, if the real beings are modelled on the One, but the one itself is sufficient to generate reality. And, as there in the case of numbers, the form of the first, the monad, was in all of them primarily or secondarily, and each of the numbers which come after the monad did not participate in it equally, so here too each of the beings which come after the First has in itself a kind of form of it. Their participation made the quantity of the numbers exist, but here it gives beings substantial existence, so that being is a trace of the One. And if someone says that this word *einai* [being]—which is the term which signifies substantial existence—has been derived from the word *hen* [one] he might have hit upon the truth. For this which we call primary being proceeded, so to speak, a little way from the One, but did not wish to go still further, but turned inwards and took its stand [*estē*] there, and became substance [*ousia*] and hearth [*hestia*] of all things; it is like what happens in the utterance of the sound: when the utterer presses on it *hen* is produced which manifests the origin from the One and *on* [being] signifying that which uttered, as best it can. Thus that which came to exist, substance and being, has an image of the One since it flows from its power; and the [soul] which sees it and is moved to speech by the sight, imaging what it saw, cried out “*on*” and “*einai*”, and “*ousia*” and “*hestia*”. For these sounds intend to signify the real nature of that produced by the birth-pangs of the utterer, imitating, as far as they are able, the generation of real being.

6. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς τις ἐθέλει, λελέχθω.
 τῆς δὲ γενομένης οὐσίας εἶδους οὐσης—οὐ γὰρ δι
 ἄλλο τι ἂν τις εἴποι τὸ ἐκείθεν γενόμενον—καὶ
 εἶδους οὐ τινός, ἀλλὰ παντός, ὡς μὴ ἂν ὑπολιπεῖν τι
 5 ἄλλο, ἀνάγκη ἀνεῖδον ἐκεῖνο εἶναι. ἀνεῖδον δὲ ὄν
 οὐκ οὐσία· τόδε γὰρ τι δεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τοῦτο
 δὲ ὠρισμένον· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὡς τόδε·
 ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ὃ τόδε
 εἴρηκας εἶναι. εἰ ὄν τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ, τί
 τῶν ἐν τούτῳ ἐκεῖνο ἐρεῖς; οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων
 10 ὄν μόνον ἂν λέγοιτο ἐπέκεινα τούτων. ταῦτα δὲ
 τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ ὄν· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα ὄντος. τὸ γὰρ
 ἐπέκεινα ὄντος οὐ τόδε λέγει—οὐ γὰρ τίθησιν—
 οὐδὲ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγει, ἀλλὰ φέρει μόνον τὸ οὐ
 τοῦτο. τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν οὐδαμοῦ αὐτὸ περιλαμ-
 15 βάνει· γελοῖον γὰρ ζητεῖν ἐκείνην τὴν ἄπλετον
 φύσιν περιλαμβάνειν· ὃ γὰρ τοῦτο βουλόμενος
 ποιεῖν ἀπέστησεν αὐτὸν καὶ τοῦ ὀπωσοῦν καὶ κατὰ
 βραχὺ εἰς ἵχνος αὐτοῦ ἰέναι· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἦντ
 νοητὴν φύσιν βουλόμενος ἰδεῖν οὐδεμίαν φαντασίαν
 αἰσθητοῦ ἔχων θεάσεται ὃ ἔστιν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ
 20 αἰσθητοῦ, οὕτω καὶ ὃ θεάσασθαι θέλων τὸ ἐπέκεινα
 τοῦ νοητοῦ τὸ νοητὸν πᾶν ἀφείς θεάσεται, ὅτι μὲν
 172

6. But these [etymologies] are to be taken as anyone wishes. Since the substance which is generated [from the One] is form—one could not say that what is generated from that source is anything else—and not the form of some one thing but of everything, so that no other form is left outside it, the One must be without form. But if it is without form it is not a substance; for a substance must be some one particular thing, something, that is, defined and limited; but it is impossible to apprehend the One as a particular thing: for then it would not be the principle, but only that particular thing which you said it was. But if all things are in that which is generated [from the One], which of the things in it are you going to say that the One is? Since it is none of them, it can only be said to be beyond them. But these things are beings, and being: so it is “beyond being”.¹ This phrase “beyond being” does not mean that it is a particular thing—for it makes no positive statement about it—and it does not say its name, but all it implies is that it is “not this”. But if this is what the phrase does, it in no way comprehends the One: it would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature; for anyone who wants to do this has put himself out of the way of following at all, even the least distance, in its traces; but just as he who wishes to see the intelligible nature will contemplate what is beyond the perceptible if he has no mental image of the perceptible, so he who wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when

¹ Yet again the phrase from Plato *Republic* VI 509B9; its usual companion, the negative conclusion of the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, appears below (line 12).

ἔστι διὰ τούτοις μαθῶν, οἷον δ' ἔστι τοῦτο ἀφείς.
 τὸ δὲ "οἷον" σημαίνει ἂν τὸ οὐχ οἷον· οὐ γὰρ ἐν
 οὐδὲ τὸ "οἷον," ὅτω μὴδὲ τὸ "τί." ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς
 ταῖς ἡμετέροις ὠδίσιν ἀποροῦμεν ὃ τι χρὴ λέγειν,
 25 καὶ λέγομεν περὶ οὐ ῥήτου, καὶ ὀνομάζομεν
 σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες, ὡς δυνάμεθα. τάχα
 δὲ καὶ τὸ "ἐν" ὄνομα τοῦτο ἄρσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ
 πολλά. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ συμ-
 βολικῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐσήμαινον ἀποφάσει τῶν
 πολλῶν. εἰ δὲ θέσις τις τὸ ἐν, τό τε ὄνομα τό τε
 30 δηλούμενον, ἀσαφέστερον ἂν γίνοιτο τοῦ εἰ μὴ τις
 ὄνομα ἔλεγεν αὐτοῦ· τάχα γὰρ τοῦτο ἔλεγετο, ἵνα
 ὁ ζητήσας, ἀρξάμενος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὁ πάντως¹
 ἀπλότητός ἐστι σημαντικόν, ἀποφήση τελευτῶν
 καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς τεθὲν μὲν ἴσον οἷόν τε καλῶς τῷ
 θεμένῳ οὐκ ἄξιον μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἰς δήλωσιν τῆς
 35 φύσεως ἐκείνης, ὅτι μὴδὲ ἀκουστόν ἐκείνο μὴδὲ
 τῷ ἀκούοντι δεῖ συνετὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινί, τῷ
 ὁρῶντι. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὁρῶν εἶδος ζητεῖ βλέπειν,
 οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἴσεται.

7. Ἡ ἐπειδὴ διττὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖα βλέπειν, οἷον
 ἐπὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔραμα αὐτῷ, τὸ
 εἶδος τὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τὸ δὲ δι' οὐ ὄρα τὸ εἶδος
 αὐτοῦ, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ἕτερον
 5 ὃν τοῦ εἶδους, αἴτιον δὲ τῷ εἶδει τοῦ² ὀρᾶσθαι, ἐν
 μὲν τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶδους συνορῶμενον· διὸ

¹ Theiler: πάντων Enn.

² A^cR^{pc}C², Perna*: τὸ A^cE^BR^ac^JU^C.

¹ For this Pythagorean etymology cp. Plutarch *Isis and Osiris* 381F.

he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that it is by means of the intelligible, but what it is like by letting the intelligible go. But this "what it is like" must indicate that it is "not like": for there is no "being like" in what is not a "something". But we in our travail do not know what we ought to say, and are speaking of what cannot be spoken, and give it a name because we want to indicate it to ourselves as best we can. But perhaps this name "One" contains [only] a denial of multiplicity. This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated it to each other by the name of Apollo, in negation of the multiple.¹ But if the One—name and reality expressed—was to be taken positively it would be less clear than if we did not give it a name at all: for perhaps this name [One] was given it in order that the seeker, beginning from this which is completely indicative of simplicity, may finally negate this as well, because, though it was given as well as possible by its giver, not even this is worthy to manifest that nature; since that cannot be heard, nor may it be understood by one who hears, but, if at all, by one who sees. But if the seer tries to look at a form, he will not know even that.

7. For, again, actual seeing is double; take the eye as an example, for it has one object of sight which is the form of the object perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium through which the form of its object is perceived, which is also itself perceptible to the eye; it is different from the form, but is the cause of the form's being seen; it is seen concurrently in the form and with the form; this is the

οὐκ ἐναργῆ τότε δίδωσι τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ, ἅτε τοῦ ὄμματος τετραμμένου πρὸς τὸ πεφωτισμένον· ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ παρ' αὐτό, ἀθρόα εἶδε προσβολῆ, καίτοι καὶ τότε εἶδεν ἐπεριδόμενον
 10 ἄλλω, μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ γενόμενον, μὴ πρὸς ἑτέρω, οὐ δύναται ἢ αἴσθησις λαβεῖν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τάχ' ἂν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξέφυγεν, εἰ μὴ ὄγκος ὑπέκειτο¹ αὐτῷ στερεώτερος. εἰ δέ τις φῶς πᾶν εἶναι αὐτὸν λέγει, τοῦτο ἂν τις λάβῃ πρὸς δῆλωσιν τοῦ λεγόμενου· ἔσται γὰρ φῶς ἐν οὐδενί
 15 εἶδει τῶν ἄλλων ὄρωμένων, καὶ ἴσως ὄρατὸν μόνον· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ὄρατὰ οὐ φῶς μόνον. οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψις· ὄρα μὲν καὶ αὕτη δι' ἄλλου φωτὸς τὰ πεφωτισμένα ἐκεῖνη τῇ πρώτῃ φύσει, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντος ὄρα· νεύουσα μέντοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν καταλαμπομένων φύσιν ἤττον αὐτὸ ὄρα· εἰ
 20 δ' ἀφήσει τὰ ὄρώμενα καὶ δι' οὗ εἶδεν εἰς αὐτὸ βλέπει, φῶς ἂν καὶ φωτὸς ἀρχὴν ἂν βλέπει. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μὴ ὡς ἔξω ὃν δεῖ τὸν νοῦν τοῦτο τὸ φῶς βλέπειν, πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἰτέον, ὅς ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ τὸ ἔξω φῶς οὐδὲ τὸ ἀλλότριον εἴωται, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ ἔξω οὐκείῳν τι καὶ μᾶλλον στιλπνό-
 25 τερον ἐν ἀκαρεῖ θεᾶται, ἢ νύκτωρ ἐν σκότῳ [πρὸ αὐτοῦ]² ἐξ αὐτοῦ προπηδήσαντος, ἢ ὅταν μηδὲν ἐβελήσας τῶν ἄλλων βλέπειν προβάλλοιτο πρὸ

¹ Harder: ἐπέκειτο Enn.

² del. MacKenna, Harder, Theiler.

¹ Here Plotinus is assuming, for the purposes of his illustration, the common doctrine, that sight takes place through a medium. But in his fuller (and earlier) discussion of the

reason why it affords no clear perception of itself, since the eye is directed to the illuminated object; but when there is nothing there but the medium, the eye sees it by an instantaneous immediate perception, though even then it sees it based upon something different, but if it is alone and not resting on something else the sense is not able to grasp it.¹ For even the light of the sun which it has in itself would perhaps escape our sense of sight if a more solid mass did not lie under it. But if someone said that the sun was all light, one might take this as contributing to the explanation of what we are trying to say; for the sun will then be light which is in no form belonging to other visible things, and will be, perhaps, purely visible: for the other visible objects are not pure light. This, then, is what the seeing of Intellect is like; this also sees by another light the things illuminated by that first nature, and sees the light in them; when it turns its attention to the nature of the things illuminated, it sees the light less; but if it abandons the things it sees and looks at the medium by which it sees them, it looks at light and the source of light. But since Intellect must not see this light as external, we must go back again to the eye; this will itself sometimes know a light which is not the external, alien light, but it momentarily sees before the external light a light of its own, a brighter one; it either springs out from itself at night in the dark or, when the eye does not want to look at anything else, it lowers the

problem in IV. 5 (29) he rejects the medium theory and holds that sense-perception takes place through the universal sympathy of the All.

αὐτοῦ τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων φύσιν τὸ φῶς ὁμῶς
προφέρειν, ἢ καὶ πιέσαντος τοῦ ἔχοντος τὸ ἐν
αὐτῷ φῶς ἴδοι. τότε γὰρ οὐχ ὄρων ὄρα καὶ
30 μάλιστα τότε ὄρα· φῶς γὰρ ὄρα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα
φωτοειδῆ μὲν ἦν, φῶς δὲ οὐκ ἦν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ
νοῦς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καλύψας καὶ συναγαγὼν
εἰς τὸ εἶσιν μηδὲν ὄρων θεάσεται οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν
ἄλλῳ φῶς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν
ἐφ' αὐτοῦ ἐξαίφνης φανέν, ὥστε ἀπορεῖν ὅθεν
35 ἐφάνη, ἐξῶθεν ἢ ἐνδον, καὶ ἀπελθόντος εἰπεῖν
"ἐνδον ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐνδον αἶ."

8. Ἡ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν πόθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
πόθεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἔρχεται οὔτε ἀπεισιν οὐδαμοῦ,
ἀλλὰ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται· διὸ οὐ χρὴ
διώκειν, ἀλλ' ἡσυχῇ μένειν, ἕως ἂν φανῆ, παρα-
5 σκευάσαντα ἑαυτὸν θεατῆν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς
ἀνατολᾶς ἡλίου περιμένει· ὁ δὲ ὑπερφανὴς τοῦ
ὀρίζοντος—ἐξ ὠκεανοῦ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί—ἔδωκεν
ἑαυτὸν θεάσασθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὕτως δέ, ὅν
μιμνῆται ὁ ἥλιος, ὑπερσχήσει πόθεν; καὶ τί
ὑπερβαλὼν φανήσεται; ἢ αὐτὸν ὑπερσχῶν τὸν
10 νοῦν τὸν θεώμενον· ἐστήξεται μὲν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς
τὴν θέαν εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν βλέπων,
ἐκεῖ ἑαυτὸν πᾶς τρέπων καὶ διδοῦς, στὰς δὲ καὶ
οἶον πληρωθεὶς μένους εἶδε μὲν τὰ πρῶτα καλλίως
γενόμενον ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστῖλβοντα, ὡς ἐγγὺς
ὄντος αὐτοῦ. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἦει, ὡς τις προσεδόκα,
15 ἀλλ' ἦλθεν ὡς οὐκ ἐλθῶν· ὥφθη γὰρ ὡς οὐκ
178

eyelids before it and all the same sends out light, or the eye's possessor squeezes it and sees the light in it. For then in not seeing it sees, and sees then most of all: for it sees light; but the other things which it saw had the form of light but were not light. Just so Intellect, veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward, when it is not looking at anything will see a light, not a distinct light in something different from itself, but suddenly appearing, alone by itself in independent purity, so that Intellect is at a loss to know whence it has appeared, whether it has come from outside or within, and after it has gone away will say "It was within, and yet it was not within."

8. But one should not enquire whence it comes, for there is no "whence": for it does not really come or go away anywhere, but appears or does not appear. So one must not chase after it, but wait quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contemplate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun rising over the horizon ("from Ocean", the poets say)¹ gives itself to the eyes to see. But from where will he of whom the sun is an image rise? What is the horizon which he will mount above when he appears? He will be above Intellect itself which contemplates him. For Intellect will be standing first to its contemplation, looking to nothing but the Beautiful, all turning and giving itself up to him, and, motionless and filled somehow with strength, it sees first of all itself become more beautiful, all glittering, because he is near. But he did not come as one expected, but came as one who did not come:

¹ Cp. e.g. Homer: *Iliad* 7. 421-2.

ἐλθών, ἀλλὰ πρὸ πάντων παρών, πρὶν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐλθεῖν. εἶναι δὲ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀπίοντα, ὅτι μὴ οἶδε ποῦ δεῖ μένειν καὶ ποῦ ἐκείνος μένει, ὅτι ἐν οὐδενί. καὶ εἰ οἶόν τε ἦν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ μένειν μηδαμοῦ—οὐχ
 20 ὅτι ἐν τόπῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐν τόπῳ ἀλλ' ὅλως μηδαμοῦ—ἦν ἂν αἰεὶ ἐκείνον βλέπων· καίτοι οὐδὲ βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὦν καὶ οὐ δύο. νῦν δέ, ὅτι ἐστὶ νοῦς, οὕτω βλέπει, ὅτε βλέπει, τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ. θαῦμα δὴ, πῶς οὐκ ἐλθὼν πάρεστι, καὶ πῶς οὐκ ὦν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου
 25 μὴ ἔστιν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως αὐτόθεν θαυμάσαι, τῷ δὲ γινόντι, τὸ ἐναντίον εἶπερ ἦν, θαυμάσαι· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ δυνατόν εἶναι, ἵνα τις καὶ θαυμάσῃ. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε·

9. πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ τῷ πεποιηκότι ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἶπερ εἴη τι μετὰ τὸ ποιήσαν αὐτό· ἅτε γὰρ γενόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλου καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν δεηθὲν ἄλλου, ἄλλου δεῖται
 5 πανταχοῦ· διόπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ. πέφυκεν οὖν τὰ μὲν ὑστατα ἐν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν ὑστάτοις, τὰ δ' [ἐν πρώτοις]¹ ἐν τοῖς προτέροις καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἕως εἰς τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχὴν ὄν.² ἀρχὴ δέ, ἅτε μηδὲν ἔχουσα πρὸ αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἔχει ἐν ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ·

¹ del. Page, Harder, B-T.

² πρῶτον ἀρχὴν ὄν coniectimus: πρῶτον ἀρχῆς Enn*: πρῶτον ἀρχὴ ὄν Harder, H-S: πρὸ ἀρχῆς Theiler: πρῶτον ἐλθῆς suspic. de Strzycker.

¹ This passage is one of the most difficult in the *Enneads* to reconcile with the imposing descriptions of the changeless eternity of Intellect which we find elsewhere, notably in the

for he was seen, not as having come, but as being there before all things, and even before Intellect came. It is Intellect which comes, and again Intellect which goes away, because it does not know where to stay and where he stays, that is in nothing.¹ And if it was possible for Intellect to abide in that nowhere—I do not mean that Intellect is in place: it is no more in place than he is, but [in that sense] absolutely nowhere—it would always behold him, or rather not behold him, but be one with him, not two. But as it is, because it is Intellect, it sees him, when it does see him, with that of it which is not Intellect. It is really a wonder how he is present without having come, and how, though he is nowhere, there is nowhere where he is not. One can, certainly, be surprised in this way at the first moment, but one who knows would be surprised if the opposite was true; but, rather, the opposite could not even happen for one to be surprised at. For this is how it is:

9. Everything which is brought into being by something else is either in that which made it or in another thing, if there is something after what made it; for, in that it is brought into being by something else and needed something else for its coming into being, it needs something else at every point: and this is why it is also in something else. The last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those before them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle. But the Principle, since it has nothing before it, has not anything else to be in; but since it

first six chapters of the treatise *On Time and Eternity* III. 7. Plotinus here seems to be speaking directly from his own experience, without considering the metaphysical implications.

μη̄ ἔχουσα δ' ἐν ὅτῳ αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων ἐν
 10 τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν γὰ ἄλλα περιείληφε πάντα αὐτῆ·
 περιλαβοῦσα δὲ οὐτ' ἐσκεδάσθη εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ ἔχει
 οὐκ ἐχομένη. ἔχουσα δὲ καὶ αὐτῆ οὐκ ἐχομένη οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὅπου μη̄ ἔστιν· εἰ γὰρ μη̄ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔχει.
 δε δὲ μη̄ ἔχεται, οὐκ ἔστιν· ὥστε ἔστι καὶ οὐκ
 ἔστι, τῷ μὲν μη̄ περιέχεσθαι οὐκ οὔσα, τῷ δ'
 15 εἶναι παντὸς ἐλευθέρῃ οὐδαμοῦ κωλυμένη εἶναι.
 εἰ γὰρ αὐ κекάλυται, ὥρισταί ὑπ' ἄλλου, καὶ τὰ
 ἐφεξῆς ἄμοιρα αὐτοῦ, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ὁ θεός, καὶ
 οὐδ' ἂν ἔτι ἐφ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δουλεύων τοῖς μετ'
 αὐτόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τινι ἐκεῖ ἐστιν, οὐ ἔστιν
 ὅσα δὲ μη̄ ποῦ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μη̄. εἰ γὰρ μη̄
 20 ἐνθαδὶ, δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλος αὐτὸν κατέχει τόπος, καὶ
 ἐνθαδὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὥστε ψεῦδος τὸ οὐ ποῦ. εἰ οὖν
 ἀληθὲς τὸ οὐ ποῦ καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ ποῦ, ἵνα μη̄ ἐν
 ἄλλῳ, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀποστατοῖ. εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἀπο-
 στατεῖ οὐ ποῦ ὢν, πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ὡδί, τὸ δὲ ὡδί· οὐ μὴν
 25 οὐδ' ὅλον ὡδί· ὥστε ὅλον πανταχοῦ οὐδενὸς
 [ἐνός]¹ ἔχοντος αὐτὸ οὐδ' αὐ μὴ ἔχοντος· ἐχομένου
 ἄρα ὄτουοῦν. ὅρα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὅτι, ἐπεὶ

¹ om. Q: del. Kirchhoff*.

has nothing else to be in, and the other things are in those which come before them, it encompasses all the other things. But in encompassing them it is not dispersed into them and it possesses them without being possessed. But certainly, if it possesses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in which it is not: for if it is not in anything, it does not possess it. But if it is not possessed, it is not there. So it is there and not there; it is not there because it is not in the grasp of anything, but because it is free from everything it is not prevented from being anywhere. For if, on the other hand, it was prevented, it would be limited by something else, and what comes next would be without a share in it, and God would go just so far, and would not be independent but a slave to the beings which come after him. The things, therefore, which are in something are there where they are; but everything which is not somewhere has nowhere where it is not. For if it is not here, it is clear that another place contains it, and it is here in something else, so that the "not somewhere" is false. If therefore the "not somewhere" is true and the "somewhere" is false (so that it may not be in something else), it will not be absent from anything. But if it is not absent from anything and is not anywhere, it is everywhere independent. And one part of it is not here and another there: it is not even here as a whole; so that it is everywhere as a whole; nothing possesses it or does not possess it; that is, everything is possessed by it.¹ Observe the universe also, that,

¹ The starting-point of this discussion of the placelessness of the One is to be found in phrases of Plato's *Parmenides*: op. 138B5, 144B2, 131B.

μηδεὶς κόσμος πρὸ αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐν κόσμῳ αὐτὸς
οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τόπῳ· τίς γὰρ τόπος πρὶν κόσμον
εἶναι; τὰ δὲ μέρη ἀνηρημένα εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν
30 ἐκείνῳ. ψυχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἐν
αὐτῇ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τόπος τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ
ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν νῶ, σῶμα δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ, νοῦς δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ·
τούτου δὲ οὐκέτι ἄλλο, ἢν' ἂν ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἐν
ὄτωσιν ἄρα· ταύτῃ οὖν οὐδαμῇ. ποῦ οὖν τὰ
ἄλλα; ἐν αὐτῷ. οὔτε ἄρα ἀφέστηκε τῶν ἄλλων
35 οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχον
αὐτό, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἔχει τὰ πάντα. διὸ καὶ ταύτῃ
ἀγαθὸν τῶν πάντων, ὅτι καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἀνήρηται
πάντα εἰς αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλως. διὸ καὶ ἀγαθώτερα
ἕτερα ἐτέρων, ὅτι καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἕτερα ἐτέρων.

10. Ἄλλὰ σὺ μὴ μοι δι' ἐτέρων αὐτὸ ὄρα· εἰ δὲ
μή, ἔχνος ἂν ἴδοις, οὐκ αὐτό· ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη
τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι λαβεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὃν καθαρὸν
οὐδενὶ μινύμενον μετεχόντων ἀπάντων αὐτοῦ
5 μηδενὸς ἔχοντος αὐτό· ἄλλο μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν
τοιούτον, δεῖ δὲ τι τοιούτον εἶναι. τίς ἂν οὖν τῇν
δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἔλοι ὁμοῦ πᾶσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὁμοῦ
πᾶσαν, τί ἂν τις αὐτοῦ διαφέρει; κατὰ μέρος ἄρα;
ἀλλὰ προσβαλεῖς μὲν ἀθρόως ὃ προσβάλλων, ὅλον
δὲ οὐκ ἀπαγγελεῖς· εἰ δὲ μή, νοῦς νοῶν ἔση, κἂν

¹ That body is in soul is Platonic doctrine: cp. Plato *Timaeus* 36E. Plotinus here develops it powerfully to

since there is no universe before it, it is not itself in a universe, nor again in place: for what place could there be before a universe existed? But its parts are dependent on it and in it. But Soul is not in the universe, but the universe in it: for body is not the soul's place, but Soul is in Intellect and body in Soul,¹ and Intellect in something else; but there is nothing other than this for it to be in: it is not, then, in anything; in this way therefore, it is nowhere. Where then are the other things? In it. It has not, then, gone away from all other things, nor is God himself in them, nor is there anything which possesses the First, but it possesses everything. Therefore it is in this way also the Good of everything, because all things have their being directed towards it and depend upon it, each in a different way.² Therefore some things are better than others, because some things have more existence than others.

10. But do not, I beg you, look at it through other things: otherwise you might see a trace of it, not itself; but consider what this might be which it is possible to grasp as existing by itself, pure, mixed with nothing, in which all things have a share, though nothing has it: for there is nothing else like this, but there must be something like this. Who, then, could capture its power all together as a whole? For if one did capture it all together as a whole, why would one be different from it? Does one then grasp it partially? But when you concentrate on it, you will do so totally, but you will not declare

establish, again, the placeless omnipresence of the One.

² A remarkable example of the ease with which Plotinus interchanges masculine and neuter, "personal" and "impersonal" ways of speaking of the First Principle.

10 τύχης, ἐκκῶός σε¹ ἐκφεύξεται, μᾶλλον δὲ σὺ αὐτόν.
 ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ὄρᾳς, ὅλον βλέπε· ὅταν δὲ νοῆς, ὃ τι
 ἂν μνημονύσης αὐτοῦ, νόει, ὅτι τὰγαθόν—ζωῆς
 γὰρ ἔμφρονος καὶ νοεράς αἴτιος δύναμις ἦν, ἀφ' οὗ
 ζωῆ καὶ νοῦς ὃ τί <τε>² οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ὄντος—
 ὅτι ἔν—ἀπλοῦν γὰρ καὶ πρῶτον—ὅτι ἀρχή—ἀπ'
 15 αὐτοῦ γὰρ πάντα· ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κίνησις ἢ πρώτη—οὐ
 γὰρ³ ἐν αὐτῷ—ἀπ' αὐτοῦ στάσις, ὅτι αὐτὸς μὴ
 ἐδῶτο· οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται οὐδ' ἔστηκεν· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ εἶχεν οὔτε ἐν ᾧ στήσεται οὔτε ἐν ᾧ κινήθησε-
 ται· περὶ τί γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τί ἢ ἐν τίνι; πρῶτος γὰρ
 αὐτός. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πεπερασμένος [εἶναι]⁴ ὑπὸ
 20 τίνος γάρ; ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἄπειρος ὡς μέγεθος· ποῦ
 γὰρ ἔδει προελθεῖν⁵ αὐτόν ἢ ἵνα τί γένηται αὐτῷ
 οὐδενὸς δεομένῳ; τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἢ⁶ δύναμις ἔχει·
 οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ποτὲ οὐδ' ἐπιλείβει, ὅπου καὶ τὰ μὴ
 ἐπιλείπαντα δι' αὐτόν.

11. Καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τούτῳ τῷ μὴ πλέον ἐνὸς
 εἶναι μηδὲ ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ ὀριεῖ τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ· τῷ
 γὰρ ἐν εἶναι οὐ μεμέτρηται οὐδ' εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἤκει.
 οὔτ' οὖν πρὸς ἄλλο οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ πεπεραυται·
 5 ἐπεὶ οὕτως ἂν εἶη καὶ δύο. οὐδὲ σχῆμα τοίνυν,
 ὅτι μηδὲ μέρη, οὐδὲ μορφή. μὴ τοίνυν ζήτει
 θνητοῖς ὁμμασι τοῦτο, οἷον φησιν ὁ λόγος, μηδ'

¹ Müller*: ἐκείνος δὲ wBxUC, H-S¹: ἐκεῖνο δὲ z.

² ὃ τί <τε> (et quidquid) coniceimus: ὅτι Enn.*: ἔτι Theiler.

³ οὐ γὰρ Harder: οὐκ Enn.

⁴ del. Beutler.

⁵ z, Kirchoff*: προσελθεῖν wBxUC, H-S¹.

⁶ Harder, B-T: ἢ Enn.

the whole: otherwise, you will be [only] Intellect thinking, and, even if you attain, he will escape you, or rather you will escape him. But when you see him, look at him as a whole; but when you think him, think whatever you remember about him, that he is the Good—for he is the productive power of thoughtful, intelligent life, from whom come life and intelligence and whatever there is of substance and being—that he is One—for he is simple and first—that he is the Principle—for all things come from him: from him comes the first movement (for it is not in him); from him comes rest, because he had no need of rest: for “he does not move, nor does he stand still”¹; for he has no place to stand still in and no place to move in: for round what or to what or in what [should he move]? For he is the First. But he is not limited: for by what? But he is not unlimited like a magnitude either: for where should he proceed to, or what should he intend to gain when he lacks nothing? But he has infinity in the sense of power: for he will never be otherwise, or fail, since the things which do not fail exist through him.

11. And this has infinity by not being more than one, and because there is nothing in which anything belonging to it will find its limit: for by being one it is not measured and does not come within range of number. It is therefore not limited in relation to itself or to anything else: since if it was it would be two. It has no shape, then, because it has no parts, and no form. Do not, then, seek to see with mortal eyes this as our account describes it, nor to

¹ The One's transcendence of the “Platonic Categories” of Intellect (cp. Plato *Sophist* 254D5) is expressed in the language of the first hypothesis of the *Parmeniades* (139B3).

ὅτι οὕτως ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἂν τις ἀξιόσκει πάντα
 αἰσθητὰ <ἀ>¹ εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνων τὸ μάλιστα
 πάντων ἀναιρεῖ. ἃ γὰρ ἡγείται τις εἶναι μάλιστα,
 10 ταῦτα μάλιστα οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ μέγα ἡττόν ἐστι.
 τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἀρχὴ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ κυριώτερον αὐ
 τῆς οὐσίας· ὥστε ἀντιστρεπτόν τὴν δόξαν· εἰ δὲ
 μή, καταλελείφη ἔρημος θεοῦ, οἶον οἱ ἐν ταῖς
 ἑορταῖς ὑπὸ γαστριμαργίας πλήσαντες ἑαυτοῦς,
 ὧν οὐ θέμις λαβεῖν τοὺς εἰσιόντας πρὸς τοὺς θεοῦς
 15 νομίσαντες μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνα ἐναργέστερα εἶναι τῆς
 θεάς τοῦ θεοῦ, ᾧ ἑορτάζειν προσήκει, οὐ μετέσχον
 τῶν ἐκεῖ ἱερῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὁ
 θεὸς οὐχ ὁράμενος ἀπιστεῖσθαι ποιεῖ ὡς οὐκ ὦν
 τοῖς ἐναργέσι νομίζουσι μόνον, ὁ τῇ σαρκὶ μόνον
 ἴδοιεν· οἷον εἴ τινας διὰ βίου κοιμώμενοι ταῦτα μὲν
 20 πιστὰ καὶ ἐναργῆ νομίζουεν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὀνείρασι, εἰ
 δὲ τις αὐτοὺς ἐξεγείρειεν, ἀπιστήσαντες τοῖς διὰ
 τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνεωγότων ὀφθεῖσι πάλιν καταδαρ-
 θάνοιεν.

12. Χρῆ δὲ βλέπειν ᾧ ἕκαστα δεῖ αἰσθάνεσθαι,
 ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν ἄλλα, ὡσὶ δὲ ἕτερα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ὡσαύτως· καὶ τῷ νῷ πιστεύειν ἄλλα ὄραν, καὶ
 μὴ τὸ νοεῖν ἀκούειν νομίζειν ἢ ὄραν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
 5 τοῖς ὡσὶν ἐπιτάττοιεν βλέπειν, καὶ τὰς φωνὰς οὐκ
 εἶναι, ὅτι μὴ ὄρῶνται. χρῆ δὲ ἐννοεῖν, ὡς εἰσιν
 ἐπιλησμένοι, οὐ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς νῦν ποθοῦσι καὶ
 ἐφίενται αὐτοῦ. πάντα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἐκεῖνου καὶ
 ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ φύσεως ἀνάγκη, ὥσπερ ἀπομεμαν-

¹ Igal.

see that it is in the way in which someone would
 expect it to be who assumes that all things are
 perceived by the senses, by which supposition he
 eliminates that which is most real of all. For the
 things which one thinks are most real, are least
 real; and the [materially] large has less genuinc
 existence. But the First is the principle of existence
 and, again, more authentic than substantial reality.
 So reverse your way of thinking, or you will be left
 deprived of God, like the people at festivals who by
 their gluttony stuff themselves with things which it
 is not lawful for those going in to the gods to take,
 thinking that these are more obviously real than
 the vision of the god for whom they ought to be
 celebrating the festival, and take no part in the rites
 within. Yes, in these our rites also the god, since
 he is not seen, creates disbelief in his existence in
 those who think that that alone is obviously real
 which they see only with the flesh; as if people who
 slept through their life thought the things in their
 dreams were reliable and obvious, but, if someone
 woke them up, disbelieved in what they saw with
 their eyes open and went to sleep again.

12. One must perceive each thing by the appro-
 priate organ, some things with the eyes, others with
 the ears, and so on. One must believe, also, that
 one sees other things with the intellect, and not think
 that intellectual perception is seeing or hearing,
 which would be like insisting that the ears should see
 and that sounds do not exist because they are not
 visible. And we must consider that men have for-
 gotten that which from the beginning until now
 they want and long for. For all things reach out
 to that and long for it by necessity of nature, as if

τευμένα, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οὐ δύναται εἶναι.¹ καὶ τοῦ
 10 μὲν καλοῦ ἤδη οἶον εἶδόντι καὶ ἐγγρηγορόσῃ ἢ
 ἀντίληψι καὶ τὸ θάμβος, καὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἢ
 ἔγερσις· τὸ δ' ἀγαθόν, ἅτε πάλαι παρὸν εἰς ἔφεσσαν
 σύμφυτον, καὶ κοιμωμένοις πάρεστι καὶ οὐ θαμβεῖ
 ποτε ἰδόντας, ὅτι σύνεστιν αἰεὶ καὶ οὐποτε ἢ
 ἀνάμνησις· οὐ μὴν ὀρώσιν αὐτό, ὅτι κοιμωμένοις
 15 πάρεστι. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρωσις, ὅταν παρῆ,
 ὀδύνας δίδωσιν, ὅτι δεῖ ἰδόντας ἐφίεσθαι. δεύτερος
 ἂν οὗτος ὁ ἔρωσις καὶ ἤδη συνιέντων μᾶλλον δεύτερον
 μνηεὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι· ἢ δὲ ἀρχαιοτέρα τούτου
 καὶ ἀναίσθητος ἔφεσις ἀρχαιοτέρον φησι καὶ
 τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ πρότερον τούτου. καὶ οἶονται δὲ
 20 τὰγαθὸν λαβόντες ἀρκεῖν αὐτοῖς ἅπαντες· εἰς γὰρ
 τὸ τέλος ἀφίχθαι· τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὔτε πάντες εἶδον
 γενόμενόν [τὸ] ² τε καλὸν αὐτῷ οἶονται εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ αὐτοῖς, οἷα καὶ τὸ τῆδε κάλλος· τοῦ γὰρ
 ἔχοντος τὸ κάλλος εἶναι. καὶ καλοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖν
 ἀρκεῖ, κἂν μὴ ᾧσι· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οὐ δόξῃ ἐθέλουσιν
 25 ἔχειν. ἀντιποιοῦνται γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦ πρώτου
 καὶ φιλονεικοῦσι καὶ ἐρίζουσι τῷ καλῷ, ὡς καὶ
 αὐτῷ γεγονότι ὡσπερ αὐτοί· οἶον εἴ τις ὑστερος
 ἀπὸ βασιλείας τῷ μετὰ βασιλεία εἰς ἀξίωσιν ἴσην
 βούλοιο ἰέναι, ὡς ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνω
 γεγεννημένος, ἀγνοῶν ὡς ἀνήρηται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς

¹ F^{ms} (esse Ficinus) R^{ms} Q^{pc} L^{ac}, Creuzer*: εἶδέναι wBx UCQ^{sc} L^{pc}, Perna, H-S¹.

² del. Theiller: τὸ ἐτ καλὸν del. Müller*.

divining by instinct that they cannot exist without
 it. The grasp of the beautiful and the wonder and
 the waking of love for it come to those who, in a
 way, already know it and are awake to it. But the
 Good, since it was there long before to arouse an
 innate desire, is present even to those asleep and
 does not astonish those who at any time see it,
 because it is always there and there is never recol-
 lection of it; but people do not see it, because it is
 present to them in their sleep. But the passionate
 love of beauty, when it comes, causes pain, because
 one must have seen it to desire it. Beauty is shown
 to be secondary because this passionate love for it
 is secondary and is felt by those who are already
 conscious. But the more ancient, unperceived de-
 sire of the Good proclaims that the Good itself is
 more ancient and prior to beauty. All men think
 that when they have attained the Good it is sufficient
 for them: for they have reached their end. But
 not all see beauty, and when it has come into
 existence they think it is beautiful for itself and not
 for them; this applies also to beauty here: it belongs
 to the one who has it. And it is enough for people
 to seem to be beautiful, even if they are not really;
 but they do not want to have the Good in seeming
 only.¹ Then they dispute the first place with beauty
 and wrangle contentiously with it, considering that it
 has come into being like themselves. It is as if
 someone who holds the lowest rank at court were to
 want to attain equal honour with the man who
 stands next to the king, on the ground that they
 both derive from one and the same source; he does

¹ Cp. Plato *Republic* 505D.

30 εἰς βασιλέα, ἔστι δὲ ἐκεῖνος πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ' οἷν ἢ
 τῆς πλάνης αἰτία τὸ μετέχειν ἄμφω τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ
 πρότερον τὸ ἐν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι κάκει τὸ
 μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ οὐ δεῖται τοῦ καλοῦ, τὸ δὲ
 καλὸν ἐκεῖνου. καὶ ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡπιον καὶ προσ-
 35 αὐτῷ· τὸ δὲ θάμβος ἔχει καὶ ἐκπληξιν καὶ
 συμμιγῇ τῷ ἀλγύνοντι τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ γὰρ αὖ
 καὶ ἔλκει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας, ὥσπερ
 ἀπὸ πατρὸς τὸ ἐρώμενον· νεώτερον γάρ· τὸ δὲ
 πρεσβύτερον οὐ χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, ὃ καὶ τὴν
 δύναμιν προτέραν ἔχει· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ
 40 μετ' αὐτὸ οὐ πᾶσαν, ἀλλ' ὅση μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπ'
 αὐτοῦ. ὥστε ἐκεῖνος καὶ ταύτης κύριος, οὐ
 δεηθεὶς οὕτως τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενομένων, ἀλλὰ πᾶν
 καὶ ὅλον ἀφείς το γενόμενον, ὅτι μὴ εἰδέτο μηδὲν
 αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ αὐτός, οἷος καὶ πρὶν τυττυ
 γεννῆσαι. ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐμέλημεν αὐτῷ μὴ γενο-
 45 μένου· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλω δυνατὸν ἦν γενέσθαι ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ, ἐφθόνησεν ἂν· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν
 γενέσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ὃ μὴ γέγονε γενομένων
 τῶν πάντων. αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἦν τὰ πάντα, ἵν' αὖ
 ἐδεήθη αὐτῶν, ὑπερβεβηκῶς δὲ τὰ πάντα οἶός τε
 ἦν καὶ ποιεῖν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐᾶσαι εἶναι
 50 αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὢν.

¹ For a full discussion of this remarkable account of how intelligible beauty can distract us from the Good and an attempted reconciliation of it with the equally remarkable VI. 7. 22, in which intelligible beauty considered without the

not realise that though he too depends on the king the other ranks before him. The cause of the error is that both participate in the same and the One is before both, and that in the higher world also the Good itself does not need beauty, though beauty needs it. The Good is gentle and kindly and gracious, and present to anyone when he wishes. Beauty brings wonder and shock and pleasure mingled with pain. It even draws those who do not know what is happening away from the Good, as the beloved draws a child away from its father; for Beauty is younger.¹ But the Good is older, not in time but in truth, and has the prior power: for it has all power; that which comes after it has not all power, but as much as can come after it and derive from it. The Good then is master also of this derived power. He does not need the things which have come into being from him, but leaves what has come into being altogether alone, because he needs nothing of it, but is the same as he was before he brought it into being. He would not have cared if it had not come into being; and if anything else could have been derived from him he would not have grudged its existence; but as it is, it is not possible for anything else to come into being: all things have come into being and there is nothing left. He was not all things: if he was he would have needed them; but since he transcends all things he can make them and let them exist by themselves while he remains above them.

light or grace which plays upon it from the Good is totally unattractive, see my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" in *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy . . . offered to C. J. de Vogel* (Assen 1975) 160-62.

13. "Ἐδει δὲ καὶ τἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ μηδέν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀγαθόν. ὁ γὰρ ἔξει, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ τῷ κυρίως καὶ πρώτως
5 ἀγαθῷ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὔτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν μήτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχει. εἰ οὖν "οὐδὲν ἔχει," μόνον καὶ ἔρημον τῶν ἄλλων ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τἀγαθὸν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν, οὐδέτερα δὲ τούτων ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἔχων τῷ μηδέν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ δ' ἄρα τις
10 ὁτιοῦν αὐτῷ προστίθῃσιν, ἢ οὐσίαν ἢ νοῦν ἢ καλόν, τῇ προσθήκῃ ἀφαιρεῖται αὐτοῦ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. πάντα ἄρα ἀφελὼν καὶ οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπὼν οὐδέ τι ψευσάμενος, ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῷ, εἴασε τὸ "ἔστιν" οὐδὲν καταμαρτυρήσας τῶν οὐ παρόντων, οἷον οἱ μὴ ἐπιστήμη τοὺς ἐπαίνους
15 ποιοῦμενοι, οἱ ἐλαττοῦσι τὴν τῶν ἐπαινουμένων δόξαν προστιθέντες αὐτοῖς ἃ τῆς ἀξίας αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐλάττω, ἀποροῦντες ἀληθεῖς εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων τοὺς λόγους. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς μηδὲν τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων προστιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα ἰὼν ἐκεῖνος
20 τούτων αἴτιος ἦ, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸς ταῦτα. καὶ γὰρ αὐ φύσις ἀγαθοῦ οὐ πάντα εἶναι οὐδ' αὐ ἐν τι τῶν πάντων· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν τοῖς ἅπασιν, ὑπὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ὄν τοῖς πᾶσι διαφέροι ἂν τῷ

13. But since he is the Good and not a good, he must have nothing in himself, since he does not even have good in himself. For what he will have is either good or not good; but that which is not good cannot be in the Good, the authentically and primarily Good, nor does the Good have the good. If then he does not have what is not good or what is good, he has nothing. If then "he has nothing" he is "alone and isolated"¹ from all other things. If then the other things are either goods, but not the Good, or not goods, and he has neither of these, he has nothing and is the Good by having nothing. But then if anyone adds anything at all to him, substance or intellect or beauty, he will deprive him of being the Good by the addition. If then one takes away everything and says nothing about him and does not say falsely about anything that it is with him, he allows him his "existence" without attributing to him anything which is not there, as those do who compose inartistic panegyrics, and diminish the reputation of those who are being praised by adding matters inferior to their worth, since they are incapable of making true speeches about their subjects. We also, then, must not add any of the things which are later and lesser, but say that he moves above them and is their cause, but not that he is them. For, again, it is the nature of the Good not to be all things and not to be any one of them; for [if he were] he would come under one and the same classification as all of them, and if he came under the same classification, he would differ only

¹ Again the inappropriate reference to *Philebus* 63B7-8. See V. 3. 10, note 2.

ἰδίῳ μόνον καὶ διαφορᾷ καὶ προσθήκῃ. ἔσται
 τοῖνυν δύο, οὐχ ἓν, ὧν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, τὸ
 25 κοινόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν. μικτόν ἄρα ἔσται ἐξ
 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ· οὐκ ἄρα καθαρῶς
 ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ πρώτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη πρώτως,
 οὐ μετέχον παρὰ τὸ κοινόν γεγένηται ἀγαθόν.
 μεταλήψει μὲν δὴ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν· οὐ δὲ μετέλαβεν,
 οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων [οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν πάντων τὸ
 30 ἀγαθόν].¹ ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν—δια-
 φορὰ γάρ, καθ' ἣν τοῦτο τὸ σύνθετον ἦν ἀγαθόν—
 δεῖ αὐτῷ παρ' ἄλλου εἶναι. ἦν δὲ αὐτὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ
 μόνον ἀγαθόν· πολλῶν ἄρα τὸ ἀφ' οὗ μόνον ἀγαθόν.
 τὸ ἄρα πρώτως καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τε πάντα τὰ
 ὄντα ἀναπέφανται ἡμῖν καὶ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ
 35 οὐδὲν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἀμιγῆς πάντων καὶ
 ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ αἴτιον τῶν πάντων. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ
 κακοῦ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα οὐδ' αὖ ἐξ ἀδιαφόρων.
 κρεῖττον γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου· τελειότε-
 ρον γάρ.

¹ del. Theiler, ut glossam.

by his individuality and specific difference and some
 added attribute. Then he would be two and not
 one, and one of the two, what was common to him
 and the others, would be not good, and one would
 good; he would, then, not be purely and primarily
 good, but that would be by participating in which,
 over and above what was in common, he became
 good. So the nature of the Good would be good by
 participation; and what it participated in would not
 be any one of all things. But if this Good was in
 the composite thing—for it would be the specific
 difference by which the composite was good—it
 would have to derive from something else. But it
 was simply and solely good; so, much more, that
 from which it derived was good. That which is
 primary and the Good has therefore been revealed
 to us as above all realities, and only good, and
 having nothing in itself, but unmixed with all things
 and above all things and cause of all things. For
 the beautiful and the real beings certainly do not
 come from the bad, or from things indifferent. For
 the maker is better than what is made, because more
 complete.

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS
BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON
WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE
SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, the twenty-fourth in Porphyry's chronological order, immediately follows in that order the great work VI. 4-5 (22-3): *On the Reason why Being is everywhere all present, One and the Same*. In this Plotinus had laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the *Enneads* on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very much into the background. In the present treatise he seems concerned to make clear that the distinctions between the hypostases were still real and important to him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation of the First Principle, the One which does not think, from the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a unity-in-duality with Being. He knew this to be one of the most controversial parts of his philosophy, and argues his position here, as he often does elsewhere in the *Enneads*, against both Aristotle and his followers and those Platonists who had made the First Principle a transcendent Intellect. The Third Hypostasis, Soul, is mentioned rather incidentally, and only to help his readers to see how the primary thinking of Intellect, from which the unthinking perfection of the One is to be distinguished, differs from the secondary thinking of human minds in their normal state.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

Synopsis

The difference between thinking something else and thinking oneself: the latter is more of a unity, though still a unity-in-duality (ch. 1). Reasons why before this self-thinking unity-in-duality there must be a pure unity, which because it is simply one does not think (ch. 2). There must be something absolutely simple before any one-in-many or whole of parts (ch. 3). Further reasons why there must be the Good before Intellect: comparison of Good, Intellect and Soul to light, the sun and the moon (ch. 4). The Good does not think itself because thought is always a movement of something else towards the Good in which the thinker is established in being and attains self-knowledge (ch. 5). The Good is pure actuality without any secondary activity; the essential multiplicity of the Second Hypostasis, at once being, living and thinking, which the Good transcends and is beyond thinking as he is beyond being; his gift to all others is not an impossible knowledge of him, but to be with him, who is their Good, and to grasp him as far as they can (ch. 6).

V. 6. (24) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΠΙΕΚΕΙΝΑ
ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΜΗ ΝΟΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ
ΠΡΩΤΩΣ ΝΟΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ
ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ

1. Τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ νοεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αὐτό,
ὃ ἤδη φεύγει μᾶλλον τὰ δύο εἶναι. τὸ δὲ πρότερον
λεχθὲν βούλεται καὶ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἤττον δύναται· παρ'
αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ὄρᾶ, ἕτερόν γε μὴν ὄν ἐκείνου.
5 τὸ δὲ οὐ κενώριται τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ συνὸν αὐτῷ
ὄρᾶ ἑαυτό. ἄμφω οὖν γίνεταί ἐν ὄν. μᾶλλον οὖν
νοεῖ, ὅτι ἔχει, καὶ πρώτως νοεῖ, ὅτι τὸ νοοῦν δεῖ
ἐν καὶ δύο εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἐν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦν,
ἄλλο τὸ νοούμενον ἔσται—οὐκ ἂν οὖν πρώτως
νοοῦν εἴη, ἔτι ἄλλου τὴν νόησιν λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ
10 πρώτως νοοῦν ἔσται, ὅτι ὁ νοεῖ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς αὐτοῦ,
ὥστε οὐδ' αὐτό· ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὡς αὐτό, ἵνα κυρίως νοῆ,
τὰ δύο ἐν ἔσται· δεῖ ἄρα ἐν εἶναι ἄμφω—εἴτε ἐν μὲν,
μὴ δύο δὲ αὐ ἔσται, ὃ τι νοήσει οὐχ ἔξει· ὥστε
οὐδὲ νοοῦν ἔσται. ἀπλοῦν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν δεῖ
εἶναι· μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ τριοῦτον ὄν ἔλοι ἀπὸ

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH
IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK,
AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY
AND WHAT THE SECONDARY
THINKING PRINCIPLE

1. There is a difference between one thing thinking
another and something thinking itself; the latter
goes further towards escaping being two. The
former wants to escape being two and think itself,
but is less capable of it; for it has what it sees with
itself, but none the less it is different from it. But
the latter is not substantially distinct [from its object],
but keeps company with itself and so sees itself. It
becomes a pair, therefore, while remaining one. It
thinks more genuinely, therefore, and thinks pri-
marily, because the thinking principle must be one
and two. For if it is not one, that which thinks and
that which is thought will be different—it would not
therefore be the primary thinker, because if the
thought it had was of something else it will not be
the primary thinker because it does not have what
it thinks as [thought] of itself, so that it does not
think itself; or if it has what it thinks as itself, so
that it may think authentically, the two will be one:
it must therefore be one and a pair—but if it is, on
the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing
to think: so that it will not even be a thinking prin-
ciple. It must, then, be simple and not simple.

15 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβαίνων· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ διαιρεῖν ῥᾶδιον,
καὶ ῥᾶον ἂν τις τὸ διπλοῦν ἴδοι. εἰ οὖν τις διπλοῦν
φῶς ποιήσῃ, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸ ἦττον, τὸ δὲ
νοητὸν αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ καθαρώτερον, εἶτα ποιήσῃ
καὶ τὸ ὄρων ἴσον εἶναι φῶς τῷ ὄρωμένῳ, οὐκ
20 ἔχων ἔτι χωρίζειν τῇ διαφορᾷ ἐν τὰ δύο θήσεται
νοῶν μὲν, ὅτι δύο ἦν, ὄρων δὲ ἥδη ἓν· οὕτω νοῦν
καὶ νοητὸν αἰρήσει. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ
δύο ἐν πεποηκάμεν, τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἐξ ἐνός ἐστι
δύο, ὅτι νοεῖ, ποιοῦν αὐτὸ δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄν, ὅτι
νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτό, ἓν.

2. Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρώτως νοοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἥδη ἄλλως
νοοῦν, τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ πρώτως νοοῦντος οὐκ ἂν
ἔτι νοοῖ· νοῖν γὰρ δεῖ γενέσθαι, ἵνα νοῖ, ὄντα δὲ
νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἔχειν καὶ πρώτως νοοῦντα ἔχειν τὸ
5 νοητὸν ἐν αὐτῷ. νοητὸν δὲ ὄν οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν καὶ
νοοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν καὶ νοεῖν· ἔσται γὰρ οὐ μόνον
νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοοῦν, πρώτόν τε οὐκ ἔσται δύο
ὄν. ὁ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίῃ μὴ
οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὁ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν
νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν
10 κυρίως ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ νοητὸν ἑτέρῳ ὁ τε νοῦς τὸ
204

One could get a better idea of its being like this if one made the ascent from soul; for in soul it is easy to make the distinction, and one could see the doubleness more easily. If then one were to imagine a double light, the soul as lesser and that which it thinks as purer light, and then imagine that the seeing light is equal to the seen, one would not be able any more to separate them by the difference [in quality] and would suppose the two to be one, thinking that they were two, but seeing them as one; in this way one will grasp Intellect and its object. Now we in our discourse have made one out of two; but [in reality] the reverse is true and two came from one, making itself two because it thinks, or, better, because it thinks it is two and because it thinks itself, one.

2. If then one is the primary thinking principle, and the other is already thinking in a different way, that which is beyond the primary thinking principle will no longer think; for in order to think it would have to become intellect, and if it was intellect it would have to have an object of thought, and if it was thinking in the primary sense it would have to have its object in itself. But it is not necessary for everything which is an object of thought to have a thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then] it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker, and, since it is two, will not be the first. And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is object for something else,

ἐπιβάλλον τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ
 εἰλεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ὃ νοεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ
 τοῦ νοητοῦ. τότε οὖν τέλειον, ὅταν ἔχη; ἔδει δὲ
 πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τέλειον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ τῆς οὐσίας.
 15 ᾧ ἄρα τὸ τέλειον ὑπάρξει, πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τοῦτο ἔσται·
 οὐδὲν ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ τοῦ νοεῖν· ἀντάρκης γὰρ πρὸ
 τούτου· οὐκ ἄρα νοήσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα οὐ νοεῖ, τὸ
 δὲ πρώτως νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ νοήσει δευτέρως. ἔτι εἰ νοή-
 σει τὸ πρῶτον, ὑπάρξει τι αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πρῶτον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ οὐχ ἓν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἤδη καὶ
 20 πάντα ὅσα νοήσει· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον ἑαυτόν, πολλὰ
 ἔσται.

3. Εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲν κωλύειν φήσουσιν,
 ἐν τούτοις ὑποκείμενον ἔσται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ πολ-
 λὰ μὴ ἐνὸς ὄντος, ἀφ' οὗ ἢ ἐν ᾧ, ἢ ὅλως ἐνὸς καὶ
 τούτου πρῶτου τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμουμένου, ὃ αὐτὸ
 5 ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ λαβεῖν μόνον. εἰ δὲ ὁμοῦ εἴη μετὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων, δεῖ τοῦτο συλλαβόντα αὐτὸ μετὰ τῶν
 ἄλλων, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὄν, εἶαν ὡς μετ'
 ἄλλων, ζητεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς ἄλλοις
 μηκέτι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτό. τὸ
 γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτὸ ὅμοιον μὲν ἂν εἴη τούτῳ,
 10 οὐκ ἂν δὲ εἴη τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτὸ μόνον εἶναι, εἰ
 206

and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought. Is [the One], then, perfect when it has it? But it must, before thinking, have a perfection derived from its own reality. That, then, to which perfection belongs will exist before thinking; it will therefore have no need of thinking; for he is sufficient to himself before this; so he will not think. This, then, does not think, and the other is the primary thinking principle, and another again will think in a secondary way.¹ Again, if the First thinks, something will belong to it; it will then not be the First, but second, and not one, but already many things, that is all the things which it thinks; for even if it only thinks itself it will be many.

3. But if people are going to say that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being many, there will be a one underlying these many; for there can be no many if there is not a one from which or in which these are, or in general a one, and a one which is counted first before the others, which must be taken alone, itself by itself. But if it was together with the others, since it was taken with the others but all the same was different from the others, we should have to let it go because it was with the others and look for what underlies the others and is no longer with the others, but itself by itself. For that one and the same which was in the others would be like this One by itself, but would not be it.

¹ The other which thinks in a secondary way is Soul, the primary thinking principle Intellect: cp. the end of ch. 1.

μέλλοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὁράσθαι· εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῦ
λέγοι τὸ εἶναι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν·
οὐκ ἄρα ἀπλοῦν αὐτὸ ἔσται, οὐδὲ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ
πολλῶν ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ οὐ δυνάμενον ἀπλοῦν
εἶναι ὑπόστασιν οὐχ ἔξει, τό τε συγκείμενον ἐκ
15 πολλῶν ἀπλοῦ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδ' αὐτὸ ἔσται.
ἐκάστου γὰρ ἀπλοῦ οὐ δυναμένου εἶναι οὐχ¹
ὑφεστηκότος τινὸς ἐνὸς ἀπλοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ
συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν],² οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν ὑπόστασιν
ἔχειν καθ' ἑαυτὸ [οὔ]² δυναμένου οὐδὲ παρέχειν
αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι τῷ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, πῶς
20 ἂν τὸ <συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν>³ ἐκ πάντων εἴη
σύνθετον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γεγενημένον, οὐ τι μὴ ὄντων,
ἀλλ' ὅλως μὴ ὄντων; εἰ ἄρα πολλά τί ἐστι, δεῖ
πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐν εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τῷ νοῦντι
πλήθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ <μὴ>⁴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ
εἶναι. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον. ἐν ταῖς ὑστέροις
25 ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται.

4. Ἐτι εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀνευδεὲς δεῖ
εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ νοεῖν δεόιτο· οὐ δὲ μὴ δεῖ αὐτῷ,
οὐ παρέσται αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως οὐδὲν πάρεστιν
αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῖν. καὶ νοεῖ⁵
5 οὐδὲν, ὅτι μὴδὲ ἄλλο. ἔτι ἄλλο νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ·
ἀγαθοειδὴς γὰρ τῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν. ἔτι ὡς ἐν
τοῖς δυσὶν ὄντος ἐνὸς καὶ ἄλλου οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο τὸ
ἐν τὸ μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔδει ἐν ἑφ' ἑαυ-
τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐν φ'

¹ Kirchhoff*: οὐδ' Enn.² del. Kirchhoff*.³ Igal.⁴ F^{ss} (= Ficinus): om. Enn.⁵ Volkmann*: εἰ Enn.

But it must be alone by itself if it is also to be seen
in other things; unless someone is going to say that
its being depends on its co-existence with other
things; it will not then be simple, and the composite
of many parts will not exist either; for that which
is unable to be simple will have no existence, and
the composite of many parts will not exist itself if
the simple does not. For if each and every simple
thing cannot exist, since there is no simple one
coming into existence by its own agency, and no
one of the parts is able to have existence by itself,
or to give itself to be with another because it does
not exist at all, how then could the composite of
many parts be a compound of all [these parts] which
has come into being from non-existent things—not
from things that are not something particular, but
from things that do not exist at all? If, then, some-
thing is many, there must be a one before the many.
If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the thinking
principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not a
multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and
Intellect, then, will be in what comes after.

4. Again, if the Good must be simple and without
need, it will not need thinking; but what it has no
need of will not be present with it: since nothing at
all is present with it, thinking is not present with it.
And it thinks nothing, because it does not need
anything else. Again, Intellect is something other
than the Good; for it has the form of the Good by
thinking the Good. Again, just as in the number
two there is a one and another, and it is not possible
for this one with another to be the number one, but
it is necessary for there to be a one by itself before
the one with another; in the same way it is necessary

μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐνυπάρχον¹ ἀπλοῦν, καθ' αὐτὸ
 10 τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδέν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν
 ὅσα ἐν τῷ μετ' ἄλλων. πόθεν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο,
 μὴ πρότερον χωρὶς ὄντος ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἄλλο; τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ ἀπλοῦν οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἄλλου εἴη, ὃ δ' ἂν πολὺ
 ἦ ἢ δύο, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἀνηρτησθαι εἰς ἄλλο.

Καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς
 15 ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνης ἄστρω κομιζομένῳ
 τὸ φῶς παρ' ἡλίου. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν
 ἔχει ἐπιχρωονύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὐσαν, νοῦς δ' ἐν
 αὐτῷ οἰκείου ἔχει οὐ φῶς ἂν μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅ ἐστι
 20 πεφωτισμένον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον
 τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὃν φῶς ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν παρ-
 ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκεῖνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν
 αὐτὸ δέοιτό τινος; οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἐν
 ἄλλῳ ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθ'
 αὐτὸ ὄντος.

5. Ἔτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν
 συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ. ὃ δ' ἐστὶ
 πάντῃ ἐν, ποῦ χωρήσεται πρὸς αὐτό; ποῦ δ' ἂν
 δέοιτο συναισθήσεως; ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ συναισ-
 5 θήσεως καὶ πάσης κρεῖττον νοήσεως. τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν
 οὐ πρῶτον οὔτε τῷ εἶναι οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι,
 ἀλλὰ δεύτερον καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ <τὸ>² γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό,
 τὸ δ' ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἶδε. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν,
 κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκεῖνου. ἢ γὰρ

¹ Harder, Cilento, B-T: ἐν ὑπάρχον Enn.*, H-S¹.

² inseruimus.

that, when a thing has immanent in it something simple along with something else, the simple thing should be simple in and by itself, having nothing in itself of all that it has in its association with other things. For what could make it something else in something different, if there was not something before it from which this something else comes? For the simple could not derive from something else, but that which is many, or two, must itself depend on something else. The First, then, should be compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets its light from the sun. For Soul has intellect as an external addition which colours it when it is intellectual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is not only light but that which is enlightened in its own being; and that which gives it light is nothing else but is simple light giving Intellect the power to be what it is. Why then would it have need of anything? For it is not the same as that which is in something else: for that which is in something else is different from that which is in and by itself.

5. And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to converge on and be conscious of itself. But by what way will that which is altogether one go to itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is one and the same thing which is better than self-consciousness and better than all thinking. For thinking does not come first either in reality or in value, but is second and is what has come into being when the Good [already] existed and moved what had come into being to itself, and it was moved and saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good; for

10 ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ·
 ἔφεσις γὰρ ὁμίειος ὄρασις. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῆ,
 τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι νοεῖ καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἔχει πρὸς
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν αὐτῷ γενό-
 15 μενον νοεῖ καὶ οἶον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβά-
 νον. εἰ δ' αἰεὶ οὕτως, αἰεὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν τῇ
 νοήσει αὐτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ νοεῖ· πρὸς
 γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπων αὐτὸν¹ νοεῖ. ἐνεργοῦντα γὰρ
 αὖ ἐαυτὸν νοεῖ· ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ
 ἀγαθόν.

6. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι χώραν
 νοήσεως ἡντιοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἄλλο γὰρ δεῖ τῷ
 νοοῦντι τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀνερέργητον οὖν. καὶ
 τί δεῖ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν ἐνέργειαν; ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμία
 5 ἐνέργεια ἔχει αὖ πάλιν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ δέ γε ταῖς
 ἄλλαις ταῖς εἰς ἄλλο ἔχουσιν ἐπανενεγκεῖν, τὴν γε
 πρώτην ἀπασῶν, εἰς ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι ἀνήρτηνται,
 αὐτὸ εἶναι² δεῖ τοῦτο ὃ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ἔτι προστι-
 θέντας. ἢ οὖν τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια οὐ νόησις· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔχει ὃ νοήσει· αὐτὸ γὰρ πρῶτον. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἢ
 10 νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν
 αὖ ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίγνεται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῇ δύο.

¹ oenecimus: αὐτὸ Enn.

² oenecimus: εἶναι Enn.: εἶναι δεῖ <νομίζεν> Müller, Bréhier,
 B-T.

¹ Cp. Plato *Republic* VI 509A3 (knowledge and truth are
 "like the good" but not the Good).

² The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of "first and

the desire generates thought and establishes it in
 being along with itself: for desire of sight is seeing.
 The Good itself, then, must not think anything: for
 the Good is not other than itself. For when what is
 other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being
 "like the Good"¹ and having a resemblance to the
 Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by
 itself, and as if it had a mental image of the Good.
 And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for
 ever. And again, in thinking the Good it thinks
 itself incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good
 that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself in actual
 activity; and the actual activity of all things is
 directed to the Good.

6. If this is correctly said, the Good would cer-
 tainly not have any place for thinking: for the Good
 for the thinking principle must be something different
 [from itself]. So the Good is without activity. And
 why should actuality be active? For in general no
 active actuality has yet another actual activity.
 But even if some philosophers are able to attribute
 yet another activity to the other active actualities
 which are directed to something else,² yet the first
 one of all, on which the others depend, we must let
 be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So an
 actual activity of this kind is not thinking; for it
 has nothing to think: it is itself the first. And
 further, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has
 the thinking: so again there comes to be a two in

second actuality": cp. Aristotle *De Anima* B 412a-b. This
 applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of
 thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is
 always completely active and actual, and no distinction of
 "first and second actuality" can apply to it.

ἔτι δὲ μάλλον ἴδοι ἂν τις τοῦτο, εἰ λάβοι, πῶς ἐν
 παντὶ τὸ νοοῦν σαφέστερον ὑπάρχει, ἢ διπλὴ φύσις
 αὕτη. λέγομεν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον
 15 καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ εἶναι οὐ
 μόνον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μένει ὡσαύτως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ
 ῥεῖ καὶ οὐ μένει, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθήσει—τάχα γὰρ καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔστι τὰ μένοντα—ἀλλὰ μάλλον, ὅτι
 τὸ τέλεον τοῦ εἶναι παρ' αὐτῶν ἔχει. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν
 πρῶτως λεγομένην οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι σκιάν,
 20 ἀλλ' ἔχειν πλήρες τὸ εἶναι. πλήρες δὲ ἔστι τὸ εἶναι,
 ὅταν εἶδος τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ ζῆν λάβῃ. ὁμοῦ ἄρα τὸ
 νοεῖν, τὸ ζῆν, τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὄντι. εἰ ἄρα ὄν, καὶ
 νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὄν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὁμοῦ μετὰ τοῦ
 εἶναι. πολλὰ ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἐν τῷ νοεῖν. ἀνάγκη
 τοίνυν τῷ μὴ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι. καὶ
 25 καθέκαστα δὲ ἐπιούσιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ νόησις
 <ἀνθρώπου καὶ νόησις>¹ ἵππου καὶ ἵππος καὶ
 δικαίου νόησις καὶ δίκαιον. διπλᾶ τοίνυν ἅπαντα
 καὶ τὸ ἐν δύο, καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο εἰς ἐν ἔρχεται. ὁ δὲ
 οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐθ' ἐν² ἕκαστον, οὐδὲ ἐκ πάντων
 τῶν δύο οὐδ' ὅλως δύο. ὅπως δὲ τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός,

¹ Igal.

² Grenzer, Kirchoff, Müller, B-T: οὐθὲν Enn.: οὐδ' ἐν Volk-
 mann*.

the thinking principle; but this [Good] is in no way
 two. Again, one would see this better if one grasped
 how in all thinking this double nature is more clearly
 there. We maintain that the real beings as real
 beings, and each individual one of them, the ones
 which truly exist, are in the "intelligible region",¹
 and we do so not only because they abide the same
 in essence but the other things, all of them which
 are in the realm of sense-perception, flow and do not
 abide—for perhaps there are things which abide
 among those perceived by the senses—but rather
 because they have the perfection of existence from
 themselves. For that which is called essence in
 the primary sense must not be a shadow of being,
 but have the fulness of being. And being is ful-
 filled when it has the form of thinking and living.
 So thinking, living and being are all together in
 what is real. If then it is being, it is also intellect,
 and if it is intellect, it is also being, and the thinking
 and the being go together. Thinking therefore is
 many and one. That, then, which is not like this
 cannot be thinking. And as we go over things
 individually, there is man and thought of man, and
 thought of horse, and horse, and thought of righteous-
 ness, and righteousness. All things then are double,
 and the one is two, and again the two come together
 into one. But the Good is not one of all these things,
 nor is it the product of all the twos; it is not two at
 all. But how the twos come from the One has been
 discussed elsewhere.² But what is "beyond being"

¹ A phrase taken from Plato *Republic* VII 517B5.

² The question was discussed in the earlier treatise V. 4,
 ch. 2. Again a reference to the passage on the transcendence
 of the Good in Plato *Republic* VI 509B9 follows.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 6.

30 ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ὃν τι καὶ τοῦ
νοεῖν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο ἄτοπον,
εἰ μὴ οἶδεν ἑαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ ὃ μάθη,
εἰς ὧν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι·
κρεῖττον γάρ τι καὶ μείζον δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ
εἰδέναι αὐτά—ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων—ἀλλὰ μάλ-
35 λον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καθόσον δύναται, ἐφάπτεσθαι
ἐκείνου.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

must be beyond thinking; it is not then absurd if he does not know himself; for he has nothing in himself which he can learn about, since he is one. But other things need not know him either; for he gives them something better and greater than that they should know him—he is the Good of the others—he gives them rather to be in the same place with him and to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise, the eighteenth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the clearest statement in the *Enneads* that there are Platonic Ideas of particulars. (The general opinion of Platonists before Plotinus seems to have been that there were only Ideas of universals, not of particulars. The Stoics, though they did not believe in transcendent Ideas, held that no individual thing was exactly like any other; each had its own particular qualitative difference.) There has been much dispute about whether Plotinus held the doctrine expounded here, that there are Ideas or Forms of individuals, continually and consistently: there are a number of other passages in the *Enneads* which seem to deny it. Perhaps the safest conclusion is that he consistently held that there were Ideas of individual human selves in addition to (and included in) the Idea of Man. Socrates is something more than a mere instance of humanity (though he may be incarnate at various times as Pythagoras and many other empirical personalities). As regards Ideas of other individual things (including human bodies) his opinion may have varied: he was probably prepared to postulate them if and when he thought the facts required him to do so, but was not always sure that they did. In this treatise (especially in chapter 3) he goes further than anywhere else in the *Enneads* towards accepting the full Stoic position that each individual thing differs essentially from every other (acceptance of this by a Platonist would involve postulating a Form for each individual).

ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Synopsis

Is there an idea of each particular? It would seem so, in spite of all the difficulties which can be raised, at least in the case of individual men: this does not involve any objectionable kind of infinity in the intelligible world (ch. 1). Problems about differences between children of the same parents: if the children have different kinds of beauty this must be due to different forming principles (which are all present in the souls of the parents) (ch. 2). One needs to postulate different forming principles only where the individuals are really different; not perhaps therefore in cases where animals have litters of large numbers of apparently exactly similar offspring. But are two individuals ever really exactly the same? The Stoic doctrine of recurring world-periods, each exactly similar in every detail, will (as already suggested in ch. 1) make it unnecessary, even if there is a Form for every individual, to postulate an infinite number of Forms; but we must not be afraid of the infinity contained in a single intelligible reality (ch. 3).

V. 7. (18) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ
ΚΑΘΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΕΙΣΙΝ ΙΔΕΑΙ

1. Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστον ἔστιν ἰδέα; εἰ ἐγὼ καὶ
ἕκαστος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ
ἐκάστου ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖ. ἢ εἰ μὲν αἰεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ
ψυχὴ Σωκράτους, ἔσται Αὐτοσωκράτης, καθὼ
5 ἢ¹ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα καὶ <ὡς λέγεται>² ἐκεῖ [ὡς
λέγεται ἐκεῖ].² εἰ δ' οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλη
γίγνεται ὁ πρότερον Σωκράτης, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἢ
τις ἄλλος, οὐκέτι ὁ καθέκαστα οὗτος κακεῖ. ἀλλ' εἰ
ἢ ψυχὴ ἐκάστου ὧν διεξέρχεται τοὺς λόγους ἔχει
πάντων, πάντες αὖ ἐκεῖ· ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγομεν, ὅσους ὁ
10 κόσμος ἔχει λόγους, καὶ ἐκάστην ψυχὴν ἔχειν. εἰ
οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἀνθρώπου μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
καθέκαστα ζώων, καὶ ἢ ψυχὴ· ἀπειρον οὖν τὸ τῶν
λόγων ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει περιόδοις, καὶ
οὕτως ἢ ἀπειρία ἔσται πεπερασμένη, ὅταν ταῦτα
ἀποδιδῶται. εἰ οὖν ὅλως πλείω τὰ γινόμενα τοῦ
15 παραδείγματος, τί δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ

¹ scripsimus: ἢ Enn.

² transposuimus.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER
THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

1. Is there an idea of each particular thing? Yes, if I and each one of us have a way of ascent and return to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is there. If Socrates, that is the soul of Socrates, always exists, there will be an absolute Socrates in the sense that, in so far as they are soul, individuals are also said to exist in this way in the intelligible world. But if Socrates does not always exist, but the soul which was formerly Socrates becomes different people at different times, like Pythagoras or someone else, then there will not be this particular person Socrates also in the intelligible world. But if the soul of each individual possesses the rational forming principles of all the individuals which it animates in succession, then again on this assumption all will exist there; and we do say that each soul possesses all the forming principles in the universe. If then the universe possesses the forming principles, not only of man but of all individual animals, so does the soul; there will therefore be an infinity of forming principles, unless the universe returns on itself in regular periods; this will put a limit to the infinity of forming principles, because the same things in this case recur. Well, then, if the things which come into being in all the periods together are more numerous than the models, why should there have to be forming

πάντων γινομένων λόγους καὶ παραδείγματα; ἀρ-
 κεῖν γὰρ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ψυχὰς ὀρισμένας ἀνθρώπους ποιούσας ἀπεί-
 ρους. ἢ τῶν διαφόρων οὐκ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν
 20 λόγον, οὐδὲ ἀρκεῖ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς παράδειγμα τῶν
 τινῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τῇ ὕλη
 μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς μυρίαῖς· οὐ γὰρ
 ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες Σωκράτους πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἀλλὰ
 δεῖ τὴν διάφορον ποιήσιν ἐκ διαφορῶν λόγων. ἢ δὲ
 πᾶσα περίοδος πάντας ἔχει τοὺς λόγους, αὐθις δὲ
 25 τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους. τὴν δὲ
 ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπειρίαν οὐ δεῖ δεδιέναι· πᾶσα γὰρ
 ἐν ἀμερεῖ, καὶ οἶον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ.

2. Ἄλλ' εἰ αἱ μίξεις τῶν λόγων ἄρρενος καὶ
 θήλεος διαφορῶν ποιούσιν, οὐκέτι τοῦ γινομένου
 ἐκάστου λόγος τις ἔσται, ὃ τε ἐκάτερος γεννῶν,
 οἶον ὁ ἄρρην, οὐ κατὰ διαφορῶν λόγους ποιήσει,
 5 ἀλλὰ καθ' ἓνα τὸν αὐτοῦ ἢ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. ἢ οὐδὲν
 κωλύει καὶ κατὰ διαφορῶν τῷ τοὺς πάντας ἔχειν
 αὐτοῦς, ἄλλους δὲ αἰεὶ προχείρους. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῶν
 αὐτῶν γονέων διάφοροι; ἢ διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἴσην
 ἐπικράτησιν. ἀλλ' ἐκέينو, ὅτι οὐ, κἂν¹ εἰ ἐν τῷ
 φαίνεσθαι, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρην τὸ πλεῖστον, ὅτε

¹ οὐ, κἂν coniectimus: οὐκ Enn.

principles and models of all the things which come
 into being in one period? One man as model would
 do for all men, just as souls limited in number
 produce an infinity of men. No, there cannot be the
 same forming principle for different individuals, and
 one man will not serve as a model for several men
 differing from each other not only by reason of their
 matter but with a vast number of special differences
 of form. Men are not related to their form as por-
 traits of Socrates are to their original, but their
 different structures must result from different form-
 ing principles. The whole revolution of the universe
 contains all the forming principles, and when it
 repeats itself it produces the same things again
 according to the same forming principles. We ought
 not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces
 into the intelligible world: for it is all in an indivisi-
 ble unity and, we may say, comes forth when it
 acts.

2. But if the mixtures of the forming principles
 of male and female produce different children, there
 will no longer be a forming principle of every indi-
 vidual child that is born, but one of the parents, the
 male, for instance, will produce it, not according to
 different forming principles but according to one,
 his own or his father's. No, nothing prevents it
 from being according to different principles, because
 the parent has them all, but different ones are ready
 for use at different times. But what are we to say
 when different children come from the same parents?
 It is because of unequal dominance [of the two pa-
 rents]. But there is this further point, that it is not
 the case—even if it appears so—that sometimes the
 larger quantity of formative principle is on the male

10 δὲ κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον μέρος ἔδωκεν
 ἑκάτερος, ἀλλ' ὅλον μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ ἔγκειται, κρατεῖ
 δὲ τῆς ὕλης μέρος ἑκατέρου ἢ θύτερον. οἱ δὲ ἐν
 ἄλλῃ ὥρᾳ¹ πῶς διάφοροι; ἀρ' οὖν ἡ ὕλη τὸ διά-
 φορον οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατουμένη; πάντες ἄρα χωρὶς
 15 ἐνὸς παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάφορον πολλαχού
 καλόν, οὐχ ἐν τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰσχει μόνῳ
 ἀποδοτέον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τῶν τελείων
 λόγων κεκρυμμένων μὲν, δοθέντων δὲ ὅλων. ἀλλ'
 ἔστωσαν διάφοροι οἱ λόγοι· τί δεῖ τοσοῦτους, ὅσοι
 οἱ γινόμενοι ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ, εἴπερ ἐνὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 20 διδομένων διαφόρους ἔξωθεν φαίνεσθαι; ἢ συγκε-
 χύρηται τῶν ὅλων διδομένων, ζητεῖται δέ, εἰ τῶν
 αὐτῶν κρατούντων. ἀρ' οὖν, ὅτι τὸ ταύτων πάντη
 ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ περιόδῳ, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ οὐδὲν πάντη ταύ-
 τόν;

¹ Igal: χώρα Enn.

¹ This brings out clearly that matter for Plotinus is always a principle of resistance to nature (the immanent creative principle in the physical world which is the lowest form of soul). A child would be an unnatural creature if it owed its differences from the other members of its family to matter, not to the forms in nature.

² Plotinus is here considering as a possibility (not definitely accepting) the full Stoic doctrine of the *ιδίως ποιόν*, the unique individual characteristic of every entity in any one world-period: cp. *SVF* II 395; Seneca *Epistulae Morales CXIII*, 16. Here and in the following chapter he is inclined to think

side, sometimes on the female, or that each contributes in equal proportion, but each of them gives their whole forming principle and it is present as a whole in the offspring, but it is either the part belonging to one of them or the other part which dominates the matter. But how does it come about that children conceived in different seasons are different? Is it then the matter which makes the difference since it is not dominated in the same way [in the different seasons]? If that were so, then all the children but one would be contrary to nature.¹ But if the difference is a great diversity of beauty, the form is not one. Only ugliness is to be attributed to the influence of matter, and even there the perfect forming principles are present, hidden but given as wholes. But, granted that the forming principles are different, why do there need to be as many as the individual human beings born in one world-period, if it is possible that when the same principles are given, individuals appear externally different? No, it has [only] been granted that the principles are given as wholes, but the question now is whether individuals can be different when the same forming principles dominate. Are, then, different forming principles necessary because the absolutely identical occurs in the other world-period, and in this world period there is nothing absolutely identical²?

that acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of recurrent world-periods in which every detail repeats itself exactly might be a useful way of accepting Forms of individuals while rejecting the idea that there is an infinite number of Forms, as he normally does, though at the end of chs. 1 and 3 in this treatise he seems at least prepared to consider it, and it was held by his closest associate Amelius (Syrianus *In Metaph.* 147. 1ff).

3. Πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν διδύμων διαφόρους
 φήσομεν τοὺς λόγους; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῳά
 τις ἴοι καὶ τὰ πολύτκα μάλιστα; ἢ, ἐφ' ὧν ἀπαράλ-
 λακτα, εἰς λόγος. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐχ, ὅσα τὰ
 5 καθέκαστα, τοσοῦτοι καὶ οἱ λόγοι. ἢ ὅσα διάφορα
 τὰ καθέκαστα, καὶ διάφορα οὐ τῷ ἐλλείπειν κατὰ τὸ
 εἶδος. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιάφορα; εἴπερ τινὰ
 ὅλως ἐστὶ πάντη ἀδιάφορα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης,
 κἂν ἀδιάφορα ποιῇ, δεῖ ὁμως τὸ ταῦτόν διαφορᾶ
 λαμβάνειν λογικῇ, καθ' ἣν ἄλλο ποιήσει προσφέρων
 10 διάφορόν τι τῷ αὐτῷ. ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει μὴ λογισμῷ
 γινομένου τοῦ ἐτέρου, ἀλλὰ λόγοις μόνον, συνεζευχ-
 θαι δεῖ τῷ εἶδει τὸ διάφορον. ἡμεῖς δὲ λαμβάνειν τὴν
 διαφορὰν ἀδυνατοῦμεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ποίησις ἔχει
 τὸ εἰκῆ τοῦ ὀποσαοῦν, ἄλλος λόγος. εἰ δὲ μεμέτρ-
 15 ηται, ὀπόσα τινὰ εἴη, τὸ ποσὸν ὠρισμένον ἔσται τῇ
 τῶν λόγων ἀπάντων ἐξελεῖται καὶ ἀναπλώσει.
 ὥστε, ὅταν παύσηται πάντα, ἀρχὴ ἄλλη. ὀπόσον
 γὰρ δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, καὶ ὀπόσα ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ
 228

3. How, then, can we assert that the forming principles are different in the case of many children born at one birth¹? And suppose one also turns to the other living beings, and especially to the ones which have litters? Now in the cases where the offspring are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle. But if this is so, the forming principles are not equal in number to the individuals. Yes, they are equal to the number of individuals which are different, and different not by reason of failure [to dominate the matter] on the side of the form. Or what prevents [there being different forming principles] even when the individuals are not different? Supposing, that is, that there are any individuals at all totally without difference. For, as the craftsman, even if he is making things which do not differ from each other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a logical difference, according to which he will make the thing another by bringing some difference to its sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does not come into being by reasoning but only by rational forming principles, the difference must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the difference. And if [nature's production] contains a random number of individuals, that is a different story; but if it is precisely determined how many there are, the quantity will be defined by the unrolling and unfolding of all the forming principles; so that, when all things come to an end, there will be another beginning; for how large the universe ought to be, and all that it will pass through in its

¹ Cp. "Seven, Cousin Peter, and all of them twins!" (Beatrix Potter *The Tale of Mr. Tod* 23), which may do something to justify my translation of διδύμων here.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 7.

βίῳ διεξελεύσεται, κείται ἐξαρχῆς ἐν τῷ ἔχοντι τοὺς
λόγους. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ἐφ' ὧν
20 πλῆθος ἐκ μιᾶς γενέσεως, τοσοῦτους τοὺς λόγους;
ἢ οὐ φοβητέον τὸ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις
ἄπειρον ψυχῆς τὰ πάντα ἐχούσης. ἢ καὶ ἐν νῷ,
ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, τὸ ἄπειρον τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τῶν ἐκεῖ
προχείρων.

ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

life, is established from the beginning in that which contains the forming principles. Are we then in the case of the other living beings, which produce a great many offspring from one birth, to assume an equal number of forming principles? Now we have no need to be afraid of the infinity in seeds and forming principles, since Soul contains them all. Yes, in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of these principles which come out ready for use in Soul.

V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is the second section of the great work comprising III. 8 (30), V. 8 (31), V. 5 (32) and II. 9 (33) (see Introductory Notes to II. 9, III. 8 and V. 5). It should be read before V. 5, with which it is particularly closely linked (see Introductory Note to V. 5). Its purpose is to give us the most vivid and powerful understanding of the true nature of Intellect possible in a written work; not a merely external understanding but one which will enable us to become Intellect and see its world from inside. The two great linked themes by developing which Plotinus tries to bring us to this inner understanding are: (i) that all beauty and order, both of nature and art, here below are due to living form deriving immediately from Intellect: our material cosmos is an image or reflection of the world of Intellect; (ii) that both the creative activity of Intellect here below and its own inner life are totally non-discursive, an eternal productive life immediately aware of itself in a way which has nothing in common with the reasoning from premises to conclusions and planning which most people generally consider as thinking.

Synopsis

The beauty of art consists in living form, originating in the intelligible world, to which the mind of the artist has direct access (ch. 1). The beauty of nature is also due to form, and so to a still higher degree is moral beauty (ch. 2). How to rise to contemplation in Intellect, through the

ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

contemplation of the purified soul, or, better, of the gods (ch. 3). The heaven of the intelligible gods displayed in all its glory, its perfect unity and its endless living moving diversity, a universe of supremely real beings, not of theorems and propositions (chs. 3-4). The higher wisdom of Intellect which knows realities more like images than propositions (ch. 5). Egyptian hieroglyphics as an example of the expression of non-discursive thought (ch. 6). The unplanned immediate spontaneity with which Intellect creates its image, this visible cosmos (ch. 7). The beauty of the intelligible world (ch. 8). The method of dematerializing our contemplation of the visible cosmos so that we see the intelligible (ch. 9). The true, godlike contemplation of the intelligible world from within (chs. 10-11). Kronos and Zeus as symbols of the intelligible and sensible worlds; necessity of the eternal existence of the sensible image of the intelligible (ch. 12). Further exposition of the way in which Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus and Aphrodite symbolise the Three Hypostases. All beauty comes from the world of Intellect. Transition to V. 5 (ch. 13).

V. 8. (31) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΗΤΟΥ
ΚΑΛΛΟΥΣ

1. Ἐπειδὴ φαμεν τὸν ἐν θεῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου
γεγεννημένον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ νοῦ κατανοήσαντα
κάλλος τοῦτον δυνήσεσθαι καὶ τὸν τούτου πατέρα
καὶ τὸν ἐπέκεινα νοῦ εἰς ἔννοιαν βαλέσθαι, πει-
5 ραθῶμεν ἰδεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὡς οἶόν τε τὰ
τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν, πῶς ἂν τις τὸ κάλλος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ
τοῦ κόσμου ἐκείνου θεάσαιο. κειμένων τῶν
ἀλλήλων ἐγγύς, ἔστω δέ, εἰ βούλει, (δύο)¹ λίθων
ἐν ὄγκῳ, τοῦ μὲν ἀρρυθμίστου καὶ τέχνης ἀμοίρου,
τοῦ δὲ ἤδη τέχνη κεκρατημένου εἰς ἀγαλμα θεοῦ ἢ
10 καὶ τινος ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ μὲν Χάριτος ἢ τινος
Μούσης, ἀνθρώπου δὲ μὴ τινος, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐκ πάντων
καλῶν πεποίηκεν ἢ τέχνη, φανεῖν μὲν ἂν ὃ ὑπὸ τῆς
τέχνης γεγεννημένος εἰς εἶδους κάλλος καλὸς οὐ
παρὰ τὸ εἶναι λίθος—ἦν γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ὁμοίως
15 καλός—ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦ εἶδους, ὃ ἐνήκεν ἢ τέχνη.
τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὸ εἶδος οὐκ εἶχεν ἢ ὕλη, ἀλλ' ἦν
ἐν τῷ ἐννοήσαντι καὶ πρὶν ἔλθειν εἰς τὸν λίθον· ἦν
δ' ἐν τῷ δημιουργῶ οὐ καθόσον ὀφθαλμοὶ ἢ χεῖρες
ἦσαν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετείχε τῆς τέχνης. ἦν ἄρα

¹ Volkmann*, B-T, e Theol. IV. 4.

¹ There is a reference back here to the end of the first section
(in Porphyry's division) of this same treatise, III. 8 (30). 11—i.e.
the chapter in the original immediately preceding this one.

V. 8. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY

1. Since we maintain that the man who has
entered into contemplation of the intelligible world
and understood the beauty of the true Intellect will
be able also to bring into his mind its Father which
is beyond Intellect,¹ let us try to see and to say to
ourselves, as far as it is possible to say such things,
how it is possible for anyone to contemplate the
beauty of Intellect and of that higher world. Let us
suppose, if you like, a couple of great lumps of stone
lying side by side, one shapeless and untouched by
art, the other which has been already mastered by
art and turned into a statue of a god or of a man,
of a Grace or one of the Muses if of a god, and if of
a man not just of any man but of one whom art has
made up out of every sort of human beauty. The
stone which has been brought to beauty of form by
art will appear beautiful not because it is a stone—
for then the other would be just as beautiful—but as
a result of the form which art has put into it.² Now
the material did not have this form, but it was in the
man who had it in his mind even before it came into
the stone; but it was in the craftsman, not in so
far as he had hands and eyes, but because he had
some share of art. So this beauty was in the art,

² Compare and contrast the earlier treatise I. 6 (1). 2. 25-7,
where sometimes art gives beauty to a whole house with its
parts, and sometimes nature gives beauty to a single stone.

ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο ἄμεινον πολλῶ· οὐ
 20 γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν λίθον τὸ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλ'
 ἐκεῖνο μὲν μένει, ἄλλο δὲ ἀπ' ἐκεῖνης ἔλαττον ἐκεί-
 νου· καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔμεινε καθαρὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδέ
 οἶον ἐβούλετο, ἀλλ' ὅσον εἶξεν ὁ λίθος τῇ τέχνῃ.
 εἰ δ' ἡ τέχνη ὅ ἐστι καὶ ἔχει τοιοῦτο ποιεῖ—καλὸν δὲ
 ποιεῖ κατὰ λόγον οὐ ποιεῖ—μειζόνως καὶ ἀληθευτέ-
 25 ρως καλὴ ἐστι τὸ κάλλος ἔχουσα τὸ τέχνης μείζον
 μέντοι καὶ κάλλιον ἢ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἔξω. καὶ
 γὰρ ὅσω ἰὸν εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἐκτέταται, τόσω ἀσθενέ-
 τερον τοῦ ἐν ἐνὶ μένοντος. ἀφίσταται γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ
 πᾶν διυστάμενον, εἰ ἰσχύς, ἐν ἰσχύι, εἰ θερμότης,
 ἐν θερμότητι, εἰ ὄλως δύναμις, ἐν δυνάμει, εἰ
 30 κάλλος, ἐν κάλλει. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ποιῶν πᾶν καθ'
 αὐτὸ κρείττον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ ποιουμένου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ
 ἀμουσία μουσικόν, ἀλλ' ἡ μουσική, καὶ τὴν ἐν
 αἰσθητῷ ἢ πρὸ τούτου. εἰ δέ τις τὰς τέχνας
 ἀτιμάζει, ὅτι μιμούμεναι τὴν φύσιν ποιῶσι,
 πρῶτον μὲν φατέον καὶ τὰς φύσεις μιμῆσθαι ἄλλα.
 35 ἔπειτα δεῖ εἰδέναι, ὡς οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὸ ὁρώμενον
 μιμῶνται, ἀλλ' ἀνατρέχουσι ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἐξ
 ὧν ἡ φύσις. εἶτα καὶ ὅτι πολλὰ παρ' αὐτῶν ποιῶσι
 καὶ προστιθέασι δέ, ὅτω τι ἐλλείπει, ὡς ἔχουσαι
 τὸ κάλλος· ἐπεὶ καὶ¹ ὁ Φειδίας τὸν Δία πρὸς
 οὐδὲν αἰσθητὸν ποιήσας, ἀλλὰ λαβῶν οἶος ἂν

¹ Kirchoff*, testatur Theol. IV. 20: ἔπειτα Enn.

and it was far better there; for the beauty in the
 art did not come into the stone, but that beauty stays
 in the art and another comes from it into the stone
 which is derived from it and less than it. And even
 this does not stay pure and as it wants to be in the
 stone, but is only there as far as the stone has
 submitted to the art. If art makes its work like
 what it is and has—and it makes it beautiful accord-
 ing to the forming principle of what it is making—it
 is itself more, and more truly, beautiful since it has
 the beauty of art which is greater and more beautiful
 than anything in the external object. For a thing
 is weaker than that which abides in unity in propor-
 tion as it expands in its advance towards matter.
 Everything which is extended departs from itself:
 if it is bodily strength, it grows less strong, if heat,
 less hot, if power in general, less powerful, if beauty,
 less beautiful.¹ Every original maker must be in
 itself stronger than that which it makes; it is not
 lack of music which makes a man musical, but music,
 and music in the world of sense is made by the music
 prior to this world. But if anyone despises the arts
 because they produce their works by imitating nature,
 we must tell him, first, that natural things are imita-
 tions too. Then he must know that the arts do not
 simply imitate what they see, but they run back up
 to the forming principles from which nature derives;
 then also that they do a great deal by themselves,
 and, since they possess beauty, they make up what is
 defective in things. For Pheidias too did not make
 his Zeus from any model perceived by the senses,

¹ This is the normal doctrine of Plotinus: cp. especially III. 7. 11. 23-7 (on the soul's self-extension into time).

40 γένοιτο, εἰ ἡμῖν ὁ Ζεὺς δι' ὀμμάτων ἐθέλοι
φανῆναι.

2. Ἄλλ' ἡμῖν ἀφείσθωσαν αἱ τέχναι· ὧν δὲ λέ-
γονται τὰ ἔργα μιμείσθαι, τὰ φύσει κάλλη γινόμενα
καὶ λεγόμενα, θεωρῶμεν, λογικά τε ζῶα καὶ ἄλογα
πάντα καὶ μάλιστα ὅσα κατώρθωται αὐτῶν τοῦ
5 πλάσαντος αὐτὰ καὶ δημιουργήσαντος ἐπικρατή-
σαντος τῆς ὕλης καὶ εἶδος ὃ ἐβούλετο παρασχόντος.
τί οὖν τὸ κάλλος ἐστὶν ἐν τούτοις; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ
αἶμα καὶ τὰ καταμήνια· ἀλλὰ καὶ χροὰ ἄλλη τού-
των καὶ σχῆμα ἢ οὐδὲν ἢ τι ἄσχημον ἢ οἶον τὸ
περιέχον ἀπλοῦν τι [οἷα ὕλη].¹ πόθεν δὴ ἐξέλαμψε
10 τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης τῆς περιμαχῆτου κάλλος, ἢ ὅσα
γυναικῶν Ἀφροδίτης ὅμοιαι κάλλει; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
τῆς Ἀφροδίτης αὐτῆς πόθεν, ἢ εἴ τις ὄλως καλὸς

¹ del. Armstrong, ut ineptum simplicitatis exemplum.

¹ The "Pheidias commonplace", on the basis of which Plotinus develops his own view of the artist's direct access to the intelligible world, goes back at least to the age of Cicero (cp. Cicero *Orator* II. 8-9 and, for the continuance of its use down to the time of Plotinus, Philostratus *Life of Apollonius* VI. 19. 2). Plotinus is of course here in disagreement with Plato, for whom the artist is a mere copyist of the realities of the sense-world (cp. Plato *Republic* X 597Bff.). On the question of whether this disagreement was conscious and deliberate, see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus* (Cambridge 1967) 153-

but understood what Zeus would look like if he wanted to make himself visible.¹

2. But let us leave the arts; and let us contemplate those things whose works they are said to imitate, which come into existence naturally as beauties and are so called, all the rational and irrational living creatures and especially those among them which have succeeded since the craftsman who formed them dominated the matter and gave it the form he wished. What then is the beauty in these? Certainly not the blood and the menstrual fluid; rather, the colour of these is different and their shape is either no shape or a shapeless shape or like that which delimits something simple.² From what source, then, did the beauty of Helen whom men fought for shine out, or that of all the women like Aphrodite in beauty? Then again, what is the source of the beauty of Aphrodite herself, or of any

¹ and my paper "Tradition, Reason and Experience in the Thought of Plotinus" (in *Plotino e il Neoplatonismo*, Rome 1974) 179.

² The text and meaning of this passage must remain somewhat doubtful, but fairly good sense can be made of it in the way followed here, with the deletion of *οἷα ὕλη* as an inept gloss on *ἀπλοῦν τι* (matter cannot have an outline, even the simplest). *ἄσχημον* of course normally means "shapeless" in the sense of "misshapen", "ugly". Plotinus seems to correct himself twice in speaking of the shape of blood and menstrual fluid—first reflecting that if they are formed material realities, even of the most elementary kind, they cannot have *no* shape, and then finding an *ἄσχημον σχῆμα* somewhat too paradoxical. His final way of putting it, which seems to imply that a complex shape is necessary for beauty, again contrasts with the aesthetic perception of the beauty of simple things (light, a single stone) so strongly asserted in I. 6. 1-2 against the "good proportion" theory of beauty (see notes on ch. 1 there).

ἄνθρωπος ἢ θεὸς τῶν ἂν εἰς ὄψιν ἐλθόντων ἢ καὶ
 μὴ ἰόντων, ἐχόντων δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄραθ' ἂν κάλ-
 λος; ἄρ' οὐκ εἶδος μὲν πανταχοῦ τοῦτο, ἦκον δὲ
 15 ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς
 τέχναις ἐλέγετο ἐπὶ τὰ τεχνητὰ ἵεναι παρὰ τῶν
 τεχνῶν; τί οὖν; καλὰ μὲν τὰ ποιήματα καὶ ὁ
 ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης λόγος, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
 ποιῶντι λόγος οὐ κάλλος, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἄυλος
 [ἀλλ' εἰς ἐν]¹ οὗτος; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὁ ὄγκος ἦν
 20 καλός, καθόσον ὄγκος ἦν, ἐχρῆν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι μὴ
 ἦν ὄγκος, τὸν ποιήσαντα μὴ καλὸν εἶναι· εἰ δέ, εἴαν
 τε ἐν μικρῷ εἴαν τε ἐν μεγάλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἦ,
 ὁμοίως κινεῖ καὶ διατίθησι τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦ
 ὀρώντος τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει, τὸ κάλλος οὐ τῷ τοῦ
 ὄγκου μεγέθει ἀποδοτέον. τεκμήριον δὲ καὶ τόδε,
 25 ὅτι ἔξω μὲν ἕως ἐστίν, οὐπω εἶδομεν, ὅταν δὲ εἴσω
 γένηται, διέθηκεν. εἴσεισι δὲ δι' ὀμμάτων εἶδος
 ὄν μόνον· ἢ πῶς διὰ μικροῦ; συνεφέλλεται δὲ
 καὶ τὸ μέγεθος οὐ μέγα ἐν ὄγκῳ, ἀλλ' εἶδει γενομέ-
 νον μέγα. ἔπειτα ἢ αἰσχρὸν δεῖ τὸ ποιῶν ἢ
 ἀδιάφορον ἢ καλὸν εἶναι. αἰσχρὸν μὲν οὖν ὅν οὐκ
 30 ἂν τὸ ἐναντίον ποιήσειεν, ἀδιάφορον δὲ τί μᾶλλον
 καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἢ τὰ
 οὕτω καλὰ δημιουργοῦσα πολὺ πρότερον καλή,
 ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἐνδον οὐδὲν ὄραν εἰθισμένοι οὐδ'
 εἰδότες τὸ ἔξω διώκομεν ἀγνοοῦντες, ὅτι τὸ ἐνδον
 35 κινεῖ· ὡσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ βλέπων

¹ del. Kirchhoff, Müller, B-T, ut variam lectionem ad ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν.

other beautiful human being or of any god of those
 who appear visibly, or even of those who do not
 appear but have in themselves a beauty which could
 be seen? Is not this beauty everywhere form, which
 comes from the maker upon that which he has brought
 into being, as in the arts it was said to come from the
 arts upon their works? Well, then, are the things
 made and the forming principle in matter beautiful,
 but the forming principle which is not in matter but
 in the maker, the first immaterial one, is that not
 beauty? But if it was the mass which was beautiful
 in so far as it was mass, it would necessarily follow
 that the forming principle which was the maker,
 since it was not mass, was not beautiful; but if the
 same form, whether it is in something small or some-
 thing large, moves and influences the soul of one
 who sees it in the same way by its own power,
 beauty is not to be attributed to the size of the mass.
 It is further evidence of this that we do not yet see
 a thing while it is outside us, but when it comes
 within, it influences us. But it comes in through the
 eyes as form alone: or how could it get through
 something so small? But the size is drawn in along
 with it, since it has become not large in bulk but
 large in form. Further the maker must be either
 ugly or neutral or beautiful. Now if it was ugly it
 would not make the opposite, and if it was neutral
 why should it rather make something beautiful than
 something ugly? But certainly nature which pro-
 duces such beautiful works is far before them in
 beauty, but we, because we are not accustomed to
 see any of the things within and do not know them,
 pursue the external and do not know that it is that
 within which moves us: as if someone looking at

ἀγνοῶν ὅθεν ἦκει ἐκείνο διώκοι. δηλοῖ δέ,
 ὅτι τὸ διωκόμενον ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐν μεγέθει τὸ
 κάλλος, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι κάλλος καὶ τὸ ἐν
 τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς·
 οὐδὲ δὴ καὶ ἀληθεία μᾶλλον κάλλος, ὅταν τῷ
 40 φρόνησιν ἐνίδης καὶ ἀγασθῆς οὐκ εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον
 ἀφορῶν—εἴη γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο αἰσχος—ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν
 μορφήν ἀφείς διώκης τὸ εἶσω κάλλος αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ
 μήπω σε κινεῖ, ὡς καλὸν εἰπεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ
 σαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω βλέψας ἡσθήσῃ ὡς καλῷ.
 ὥστε μάτην ἂν οὕτως ἔχων ζητοῖς ἐκείνο· αἰσχυρῷ
 45 γὰρ καὶ οὐ καθαρῷ ζητήσεις· διὸ οὐδὲ πρὸς πάντας
 οἱ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγοι· εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ εἶδες
 σαυτὸν καλόν, ἀναμνήσθητι.

3. Ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος κάλλους
 ἀρχέτυπος τοῦ ἐν σώματι, τοῦ δ' ἐν τῇ φύσει ὁ
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλλίων, παρ' οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
 ἐναργέστατος γε μὴν ὁ ἐν σπουδαία ψυχῇ καὶ
 5 ἤδη προϊὼν κάλλει· κοσμήσας γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν
 καὶ φῶς παρασχὼν ἀπὸ φωτὸς μείζονος πρῶτως
 κάλλους ὄντος συλλογίζεσθαι ποιεῖ αὐτὸς ἐν
 ψυχῇ ὧν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὁ οὐκέτι ἐγ-
 γινόμενος οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. διὸ
 οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ποιητῆς τοῦ πρῶτου λόγου
 10 κάλλους ἐν ὕλη ψυχικῇ ὄντος· νοῦς δὲ οὗτος, ὁ

¹ A reference to the story of Narcissus: cp. I. 6. 8. 9-12.

² Cp. Plato *Symposium* 210B-C.

³ The relationship of soul and nature has been explained in the first chapters of this work, III. 8 (30). 1-4.

his image and not knowing where it came from should pursue it.¹ But the beauty also in studies and ways of life and generally in souls² makes clear that what is pursued is something else and that beauty does not lie in magnitude: it is truly a greater beauty than that when you see moral sense in someone and delight in it, not looking at his face—which might be ugly—but putting aside all shape and pursuing his inner beauty. But if it does not move you yet, so that you call someone like this beautiful, you will not when you look inward at yourself be pleased with your beauty. It would be in vain for you to seek beauty when you are in this state, for you will be seeking with something ugly and impure. This is why discussions about these sorts of things are not for everybody; but if you have seen yourself beautiful, remember them.

3. There is therefore in nature a rational forming principle which is the archetype of the beauty in body, and the rational principle in soul is more beautiful than that in nature, and is also the source of that in nature.³ It is clearest in a nobly good soul and is already advanced in beauty: for by adorning the soul and giving it light from a greater light which is primarily beauty it makes us deduce by its very presence in the soul what that before it is like, which is no longer in anything else but in itself. For this reason it is not an expressed forming principle at all, but is the maker of the first forming principle which is the beauty present in the matter which is soul⁴; but this [primary principle of beauty]

⁴ λόγος here must be taken in its special sense of "formative expression of a higher principle on a lower level of reality". For Soul as matter cp. II. 4. 3. 4-5.

αἰὲν νοῦς καὶ οὐ ποτὲ νοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἐπακτὸς αὐτῷ.
 τίνα ἂν οὖν εἰκόνα τις αὐτοῦ λάβοι; πᾶσα γὰρ
 ἔσται ἐκ χείρονος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ δεῖ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐκ
 νοῦ γενέσθαι, ὥστε μὴ δι' εἰκόνας, ἀλλ' οἶον χρυσοῦ
 παντὸς χρυσόν τινα δεῖγμα λαβεῖν, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ-
 15 ἀρὸς εἴη ὁ ληφθεὶς, καθαίρειν αὐτὸν ἢ ἔργῳ ἢ λόγῳ
 δεικνύντας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τοῦτό ἐστι χρυσός, ἀλλὰ
 τουτὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄγκῳ μόνον· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπὸ
 νοῦ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν κεκαθαυμένου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἀπὸ
 τῶν θεῶν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς. σεμνοὶ μὲν
 γὰρ πάντες θεοὶ καὶ καλοὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῶν
 20 ἀμήχανον· ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι δι' ὃ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν; ἢ
 νοῦς, καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον νοῦς ἐνεργῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε
 ὄρασθαι. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅτι αὐτῶν καλὰ τὰ σώματα.
 καὶ γὰρ οἷς ἔστι σώματα, οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ
 εἶναι θεοῖς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ οὗτοι θεοί.
 καλοὶ δὲ ἢ θεοί.¹ οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ μὲν φρονοῦσι,
 25 ποτὲ δὲ ἀφραίνουσιν, ἀλλ' αἰὲν φρονοῦσιν ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ
 τῷ νῷ καὶ στασίμῳ καὶ καθαρῷ καὶ ἴσασιν πάντα καὶ
 γινώσκουσιν οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ
 θεῖα, καὶ ὅσα νοῦς ὄρα. τῶν δὲ θεῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν
 οὐρανῷ ὄντες—σχολῇ γὰρ αὐτοῖς—θεῶνται αἰεὶ, οἶον
 δὲ πόρρωθεν, τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ αὖ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὑπεροχῇ
 30 τῇ ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῇ. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντες, ὅσοις ἢ

¹ MacKenna: καλοὶ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ Enn.*. H-S¹: καλοὶ δὲ ἢ θεοὶ
 Cilento, B-T: del. Müller, Harder.

is Intellect, always and not just sometimes Intellect,
 because it does not come to itself from outside.
 What image of it, then, could one take? For every
 image will be drawn from something worse. But the
 image must be taken from Intellect, so that one is
 not really apprehending it through an image, but it
 is like taking a piece of gold as a sample of all gold,
 and, if the piece taken is not pure, purifying it in
 act or word by showing that not all this sample is
 gold, but only this particular portion of the whole
 mass¹; here it is from the intellect in ourselves when
 it has been purified, or, if you like, from the gods,
 that we apprehend what the intellect in them is like.
 For all the gods are majestic and beautiful and their
 beauty is overwhelming²: but what is it which makes
 them like this? It is Intellect, and it is because
 Intellect is more intensely active in them, so as to be
 visible. They are certainly not like this because
 their bodies are beautiful. The godhead even of
 those who have bodies does not consist in this, but
 these too are gods because of their intellect. They
 are surely beautiful just because they are gods.
 For they certainly do not sometimes think rightly and
 sometimes perversely: their thinking is always right
 in the calm and stability and purity of Intellect, and
 they know all things and are acquainted, not with
 mortal matters, but with their own divine ones, with
 all which Intellect sees. The gods who are in heaven,
 since they are free for contemplation, continually
 contemplate, but as if at a distance, the things in
 that higher heaven into which they raise their

¹ Cp. the remarkable development of this image, where the
 "living gold" purifies itself, in IV. 7. 10. 47-52.

² Cp. Plato *Symposium* 218E5.

οἰκησις ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐν παντὶ οἰκοῦντες
τῷ ἐκεῖ οὐρανῷ—πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ
οὐρανὸς καὶ θάλασσα καὶ ζῶα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ἄνθρω-
ποι, πᾶν οὐράνιον ἐκείνου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ—οἱ δὲ θεοὶ
35 οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀπαξιοῦντες ἀνθρώπους οὐδ' ἄλλο τι
τῶν ἐκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἐκεῖ, πᾶσαν μὲν διεξίασιν τὴν
ἐκεῖ χώραν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἀναπαυόμενοι

4. —καὶ γὰρ τὸ βεῖτα ζῶειν ἐκεῖ, καὶ ἀλήθεια δὲ
αὐτοῖς καὶ γενέτετρα καὶ τροφὸς καὶ οὐσία καὶ τρο-
φή—καὶ ὄρωσι τὰ πάντα, οὐχ οἷς γέनेσις πρόσ-
εστιν, ἀλλ' οἷς οὐσία, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἄλλοις.
5 διαφανῆ γὰρ πάντα καὶ σκοπεῶν οὐδὲ ἀντίτυπον
οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶς παντὶ φανερός εἰς τὸ εἶσω καὶ πάν-
τα· φῶς γὰρ φωτὶ. καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν
αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐτὸ ὄρα ἐν ἄλλῳ πάντα, ὥστε πανταχοῦ
πάντα καὶ πᾶν πᾶν καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν καὶ ἄπειρος ἢ
αἴγλη· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν μέγα, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
10 μικρὸν μέγα· καὶ ἥλιος ἐκεῖ πάντα ἄστρα, καὶ
ἕκαστον ἥλιος αὐτὸ καὶ πάντα. ἐξέχει δ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ
ἄλλο, ἐμφαίνει δὲ καὶ πάντα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κίνησις
καθαρά· οὐ γὰρ συγχεῖ αὐτὴν ἰδοῦσαν ὃ κινεῖ ἕτερον
αὐτῆς ὑπάρχον· καὶ ἡ στάσις οὐ παρακινουμένη,
ὅτι μὴ μέμικται τῷ μὴ στασίμῳ· καὶ τὸ καλὸν
15 καλόν, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ <μῇ>¹ καλῷ. βέβηκε δὲ
ἕκαστος οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίας οἶον γῆς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν

¹ Bouillet, testatur Theologia.

¹ The starting-point here is, as so often, the *Phaedrus* myth (cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 247ff.); and what immediately follows may be influenced by the description of the "true heaven and earth" in Plato *Phaedo* 109Dff. But the whole of this amazing description of the intelligible world which continues through chapter 4 seems to express some kind of direct

heads¹: but the gods in that higher heaven, all those who dwell upon it and in it, contemplate through their abiding in the whole of that heaven. For all things there are heaven, and earth and sea and plants and animals and men are heaven, everything which belongs to that higher heaven is heavenly. The gods in it do not reject as unworthy men or anything else that is there; it is worthy because it is there, and they travel, always at rest, through all that higher country and region—

4. For it is "the easy life"² there, and truth is their mother and nurse and being and food—and they see all things, not those to which coming to be, but those to which real being belongs, and they see themselves in other things; for all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every one is all and the glory is unbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great; the sun there is all the stars, and each star is the sun and all the others. A different kind of being stands out in each, but in each all are manifest. Movement, too, is pure: the mover does not trouble it in its going by being different from it. Rest is not disturbed, for it is not mixed with that which is not at rest. Beauty is just beauty, because it is not in what is not beautiful. Each walks not as if on alien ground, but each one's place is its very self and when it

visionary experience of Plotinus himself (cp. VI. 7. 12-3).

² *θεοὶ βεῖτα ζῶοντες* is a stock Homeric phrase for the gods: cp. e.g. *Iliad* 6. 138.

ἐκάστῳ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι, καὶ συνθεῖ αὐτῶ
 οἷον πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἰόντι τὸ ὅθεν ἔστί, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς
 μὲν ἄλλο, ἢ χώρα δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο. καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 ὑποκείμενον νοῦς καὶ αὐτὸς νοῦς· οἷον εἴ τις κατὰ ¹
 20 τοῦτον τὸν οὐρανὸν τὸν ὁρώμενον φωτοειδῆ ὄντα
 τοῦτο τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φῦναι νοήσειε τὰ ἄστρα.
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἐκ μέρους ἄλλο ἄλλου
 γίνετο ἄν, καὶ εἴη ἄν μόνον ἕκαστον μέρος, ἐκεῖ
 δὲ ἐξ ὅλου αἰεὶ ἕκαστον καὶ ἅμα ἕκαστον καὶ ὅλου·
 φαντάζεται μὲν γὰρ μέρος, ἐνορᾶται δὲ τῷ ὄξει
 25 τὴν ὄψιν ὅλου, οἷον εἴ τις γένοιτο τὴν ὄψιν τοιοῦτος,
 οἷος ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἐλέγετο καὶ τὰ εἴσω τῆς γῆς ὄραν
 τοῦ μύθου τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἀνιπτομένους ὀφθαλμούς.
 τῆς δὲ ἐκεῖ θέας οὔτε κάματος ἔστιν οὔτ' ἔστι
 πλήρωσις εἰς τὸ παύσασθαι θεωμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ
 κένωσις ἦν, ἵνα ἦκων εἰς πλήρωσιν καὶ τέλος
 30 ἀρκεσθῆ, οὔτε τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο, ἵνα ἐτέρῳ
 τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ ἀρέσκοντα ἦ·
 ἀτρυνά τε τὰ ἐκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ ἀπλήρωτον τῷ
 μὴ τὴν πλήρωσιν καταφρονεῖν ποιεῖν τοῦ πεπλη-
 ρωκότος· ὄρων γὰρ μᾶλλον ὄρα, καὶ καθορῶν
 ἀπειρον αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συνέπεται
 35 φύσει. καὶ ἡ ζωὴ μὲν οὐδενὶ κάματον ἔχει,
 ὅταν ἦ καθαρά· τὸ δ' ἄριστα ζῶν τί ἄν κάμοι; ἡ
 δὲ ζωὴ σοφία, σοφία δὲ οὐ πορισθεῖσα λογισμοῖς,
 ὅτι αἰεὶ ἦν πᾶσα καὶ ἐλλείπουσα οὐδενί, ἵνα
 ζητήσεως δεηθῆ· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πρώτη καὶ οὐκ ἀπ'

¹ Dodds: καὶ Enn.

ascends (so to speak) the place it came from runs
 along with it, and it is not itself one thing and its
 place another. The thing itself is Intellect and its
 ground is Intellect; it is as if one were to suppose
 that in the case of this visible heaven of ours which is
 luminous that the light which comes from it was
 born to be the stars. Here, however, one part would
 not come from another, and each would be only a
 part; but there each comes only from the whole and
 is part and whole at once: it has the appearance of
 a part, but a penetrating look sees the whole in it,
 supposing that someone had the sort of sight which
 it is said that Lynceus ¹ had, who saw into the inside
 of the earth, a story which speaks in riddles of the
 eyes which they have there. They do not grow
 weary of contemplation there, or so filled with it as
 to cease contemplating: for there is no emptiness
 which would result in their being satisfied when they
 had filled it and reached their end; and things are
 not different from each other so as to make what
 belongs to one displeasing to another with different
 characteristics; and nothing there wears out or
 wearies. There is a lack of satisfaction there in the
 sense that fullness does not cause contempt for that
 which has produced it: for that which sees goes on
 seeing still more, and, perceiving its own infinity and
 that of what it sees, follows its own nature. Life
 holds no weariness for anyone when it is pure: and
 how should that which leads the best life grow
 weary? This life is wisdom, wisdom not acquired
 by reasonings, because it was always all present,
 without any failing which would make it need to be

¹ For the legend of Lynceus see *Cypria* XI Allen and Apollonius Rhodius I 151-5.

ἄλλης· καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτῆ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτός,
 40 εἶτα σοφός. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμία μείζων, καὶ ἡ
 αὐτοεπιστήμη ἐνταῦθα πάρεδρος τῷ νῷ τῷ συμπρο-
 φαίνεσθαι, οἷον λέγουσι κατὰ μίμησιν καὶ τῷ Διὶ
 τὴν Δίκην. πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐκεῖ οἷον
 ἀγάλματα παρ' αὐτῶν ἐνορώμενα, ὥστε θέαμα
 εἶναι ὑπερευδαιμόνων θεατῶν. τῆς μὲν οὖν
 45 σοφίας τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἂν τις κατίδοι,
 ὅτι μετ' αὐτῆς ἔχει καὶ πεποίηκε τὰ ὄντα, καὶ
 πάντα ἠκολούθησε, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῆ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ
 συνεγένετο αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐν ἄμφω, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἐκεῖ
 σοφία. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς εἰς σύνεσιν οὐκ ἤλθομεν, ὅτι
 καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας θεωρήματα καὶ συμφόρησιν
 50 νονομίκαμεν προτάσεων εἶναι. τὸ δὲ οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς
 ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστήμασι. εἰ δὲ τις περὶ τούτων
 ἀμφισβητεῖ, ἐατέον ταύτας ἐν τῷ παρόντι. περὶ
 δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμης, ἣν δὴ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων
 κατιδὼν φησιν· οὐδ' ἤτις ἐστὶν ἄλλη ἐν
 ἄλλῳ, ὅπως δέ, εἶασε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀνευρίσκειν,
 55 εἴπερ ἄξιοι τῆς προσηγορίας φάμεν εἶναι—ἴσως
 οὖν βέλτιον ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι.

5. Πάντα δὴ τὰ γινόμενα, εἴτε τεχνητὰ εἴτε
 φυσικὰ εἴη, σοφία τις ποιεῖ, καὶ ἡγείται τῆς
 ποιήσεως πανταχοῦ σοφία. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τις κατ' 1
 αὐτὴν τὴν σοφίαν ποιοῖ, ἔστωσαν μὲν αἱ τέχναι
 5 τοιαῦται. ἀλλ' ὁ τεχνίτης πάλιν αὖ εἰς σοφίαν

¹ Müller*: καὶ Enn.

¹ Justice is throned beside Zeus in Sophocles *Oedipus Coloneus* 1381-2 (in *Antigone* 451, for obvious dramatic reasons, she dwells with the gods below, in the world of the dead). In Plato *Lysis* IV 716A2 she is the constant follower of God. It is interesting that Plotinus distinguishes absolute

searched for; but it is the first, not derived from any other wisdom; the very being of Intellect is wisdom: it does not exist first and then become wise. For this reason there is no greater wisdom: absolute knowledge has its throne beside Intellect in their common revelation, as they say symbolically Justice is throned beside Zeus.¹ All things of this kind there are like images seen by their own light, to be beheld by "exceedingly blessed spectators".² The greatness and the power of this wisdom can be imagined if we consider that it has with it and has made all things, and all things follow it, and it is the real beings, and they came to be along with it, and both are one, and reality is wisdom there. But we have not arrived at understanding this, because we consider that the branches of knowledge are made up of theorems and a collection of proportions; but this is not true even of the sciences here below. But if someone wants to dispute about these, let them go for the present; but about the knowledge there—which Plato observed and said "that which is not a knowledge different from that in which it is", but how this is so, he left us to investigate and discover, if we claim to be worthy of our title [of Platonists]—perhaps it would be better to start from this point:

5. Some wisdom makes all the things which have come into being, whether they are products of art or nature, and everywhere it is a wisdom which is in charge of their making. But if anyone does really make according to wisdom itself, let us grant that the arts are like this. But the craftsman goes back

knowledge and Intellect even in their common revelation: they are clearly not quite the same thing for him.

² Cp. Plato *Phaedo* 111A3.

φυσικὴν ἔρχεται, καθ' ἣν γεγένηται, οὐκέτι συντε-
 θείσαν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, ἀλλ' ὅλην ἓν τι, οὐ τὴν
 συγκεκριμένην ἐκ πολλῶν εἰς ἓν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον
 ἀναλυομένην εἰς πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνός. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην
 τις πρώτην θήσεται, ἀρκεῖ· οὐκέτι γὰρ ἐξ ἄλλου
 10 οὐσα οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ. εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐν τῇ
 φύσει, τούτου δὲ ἀρχὴν φήσουσι τὴν φύσιν,
 πόθεν ἔξει φήσομεν καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἄλλου ἐκείνου. εἰ
 μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, στησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ εἰς νοῦν ἤξουσιν,
 ἐνταῦθα ὀπτέον, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἐγέννησε τὴν σοφίαν·
 καὶ εἰ φήσουσι, πόθεν; εἰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀδύνατον
 15 ἄλλως ἢ αὐτὸν ὄντα σοφίαν. ἢ ἀρα ἀληθινὴ σοφία
 οὐσία, καὶ ἡ ἀληθινὴ οὐσία σοφία, καὶ ἡ ἀξία καὶ
 τῇ οὐσίᾳ παρὰ τῆς σοφίας, καί, ὅτι παρὰ τῆς
 σοφίας, οὐσία ἀληθῆς. διὸ καὶ ὅσαι οὐσῖαι
 σοφίαν οὐκ ἔχουσι, τῷ μὲν διὰ σοφίαν τιὰ
 γεγονέναι οὐσία, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν ἐν αὐταῖς σοφίαν,
 20 οὐκ ἀληθινὰ οὐσῖαι. οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ νομίζειν ἐκεῖ
 ἀξιώματα ὄραν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπερευ-
 δαίμονας, ἀλλ' ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων ἐκεῖ καλὰ
 ἀγάλματα, οἷα ἐφαντάζτο τις ἐν τῇ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς
 ψυχῇ εἶναι, ἀγάλματα δὲ οὐ γεγραμμένα, ἀλλὰ
 ὄντα. διὸ καὶ τὰς ιδέας ὄντα ἔλεγον εἶναι οἱ
 25 παλαιοὶ καὶ οὐσίαις.

¹ The "images in the soul of the wise man" (and probably the "images" in ch. 4, line 43) come from the speech of Alcibiades in praise of Socrates at the end of the *Symposium*, where he speaks of the wonderful images which are concealed within his Silenus-like outside: Plato *Symposium* 215B1-3 and 216E3-217A1. The form of reference ("someone imagined") is curious for a reference by Plotinus to a Platonic passage, but Plotinus is probably attributing the imagination of the Silenus-figure containing divine images to Alcibiades himself rather than to Plato. It brings out excellently that

again to the wisdom of nature, according to which he has come into existence, a wisdom which is no longer composed of theorems, but is one thing as a whole, not the wisdom made into one out of many components, but rather resolved into multiplicity from one. If then one is going to make this the first, that is enough: for it no longer comes from another and is not in another. But if people are going to say that the rational forming principle is in nature, but its origin is nature, from where shall we say that nature has it—is it perhaps from that other? If it is from itself, we shall stop there; but if they are going on to Intellect, we must see at this point if Intellect generated wisdom; and if they assent to this, from where did it get it? If from itself, this is impossible unless it is wisdom itself. The true wisdom, then, is substance, and the true substance is wisdom; and the worth of substance comes from wisdom, and it is because it comes from wisdom that it is true substance. Therefore all the substances which do not possess wisdom, because they have become substance on account of some wisdom but do not possess wisdom in themselves, are not true substances. One must not then suppose that the gods or the "exceedingly blessed spectators" in the higher world contemplate propositions, but all the Forms we speak about are beautiful images in that world, of the kind which someone imagined to exist in the soul of the wise man, images not painted but real.¹ This is why the ancients said that the Ideas were realities and substances.

the Forms in Intellect are concrete living realities, not mental abstractions like propositions, a point on which Plotinus is much concerned to insist in this treatise.

6. Δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων σοφοί, εἴτε ἀκριβῆ ἐπιστήμη λαβόντες εἴτε καὶ συμφύτω, περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο διὰ σοφίας δεικνύναι, μὴ τύποις γραμμάτων διεξοδεύουσι λόγους καὶ προ-
 5 τάσεις μὴδὲ μιμουμένοις φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωματῶν κεχρηῆσθαι, ἀγάλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἐν ἑκαστῷ ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα ἐντυπώσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὴν ἐκείνου (οὐ)¹ διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι, ὡς ἄρα τις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶν ἄγαλμα καὶ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ οὐ διανόσεις οὐδὲ βούλευσις. ὕστερον
 10 δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀθρόας οὐσης εἶδωλον ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐξειλιγμένον ἤδη καὶ λέγον αὐτὸ ἐν διεξόδῳ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς οὕτω, ἐξεύρισκον, ὥστε² καλῶς οὕτως ἔχοντος τοῦ γεγενημένου θαυμάσαι εἴ τις οἶδε, θαυμάσαι ἔφη τὴν σοφίαν, πῶς αὐτῆ³ αἰτίας
 15 οὐκ ἔχουσα τῆς οὐσίας, δι' ἃς οὕτω, παρέχει τοῖς ποιουμένοις κατ' αὐτήν. τὸ καλῶς ἄρα οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἐκ ζητήσεως ἂν μόλις ἢ οὐδ' ὅλως φανέν, ὅτι δεῖ οὕτως, εἴπερ τις ἐξεύροι, πρὸ ζητήσεως καὶ πρὸ λογισμοῦ ὑπάρχειν οὕτως· οἷον—λάβωμεν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑνὸς μεγάλου ὃ λέγω, ὕπερ ἀρμόσει καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων—

7. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ πᾶν, ἐπεὶπερ συγχωροῦμεν παρ' ἄλλου αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἄρα οἰόμεθα

¹ ἐκείνου (sc. τοῦ ἀγάλματος) οὐ Igel: ἐκείνου Enn.: ἐκεῖ οὐ Theiler.

² coniectimus: ὡς τὸ Enn. ³ Theiler: αὕτη Enn.

¹ On the kind of images of which Plotinus is speaking here see E. de Keyser *La Signification de l'art dans les Ennéades de Plotin* (Louvain 1955) 60–2, who points out that Plotinus

6. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world,¹ that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and not discourse or deliberation. But [only] afterwards [others] discovered, starting from it in its concentrated unity, a representation in something else, already unfolded and speaking it discursively and giving the reasons why things are like this, so that, because what has come into existence is so beautifully disposed, if anyone knows how to admire it he expresses his admiration of how this wisdom, which does not itself possess the reasons why substance is as it is, gives them to the things which are made according to it. That, then, which is beautiful in this way, and which is with difficulty or not at all discovered by research to be necessarily like this, if one were to find it out, exists before research and before reasoning; for instance—for let us take one great example of what I am saying, which will also fit all other cases—

7. this All, if we agree that its being and its being what it is come to it from another, are we to think

speaks of temples, not of sacred writings, and is therefore not misunderstanding the semi-alphabetic hieroglyphics of the sacred books but speaking of the purely ideogrammatic symbols which do appear on the temple walls.

τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπινοῆσαι παρ' αὐτῷ γῆν καὶ
 ταύτην ἐν μέσῳ δεῖν στήναι, εἶτα ὕδωρ καὶ ἐπὶ
 5 τῇ γῆ τούτο, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τάξει μέχρι τοῦ
 οὐρανοῦ, εἶτα ζῶα πάντα καὶ τούτοις μορφὰς
 τοιαύτας ἐκάστω, ὅσαι νῦν εἰσι, καὶ τὰ ἔνδον
 ἐκάστοις σπλάγχνα καὶ τὰ ἔξω μέρη, εἶτα διατε-
 θέιτα ἕκαστα παρ' αὐτῷ οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖν τῷ
 ἔργῳ; ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ ἐπίνοια δυνατὴ ἢ τοιαύτη—
 10 πόθεν γὰρ ἐπήλθεν οὐπώποτε ἐωρακότι;—οὔτε ἔξ
 ἄλλου λαβόντι δυνατὸν ἦν ἐργάσασθαι, ὅπως νῦν οἱ
 δημιουργοὶ ποιοῦσι χερσὶ καὶ ὄργανοις χρώμενοι·
 ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ χεῖρες καὶ πόδες. λείπεται τοίνυν
 εἶναι μὲν πάντα ἐν ἄλλῳ, οἰδενὸς δὲ μεταξὺ ὄντος
 τῆ ἐν τῷ ὄντι πρὸς ἄλλο γειτονεία οἷον ἐξαίφνης
 15 ἀναφανῆναι ἰνδαλμα καὶ εἰκόνα ἐκείνου εἴτε αὐτόθεν
 εἴτε ψυχῆς διακονησαμένης—διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν
 ἐν τῷ παρόντι—ἢ ψυχῆς τινος. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐκεῖθεν
 ἦν σύμπαντα ταῦτα, καὶ καλλιόνως ἐκεῖ· τὰ γὰρ
 τῆδε καὶ μέμικται καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα μέμικται, ἀλλ'
 οὖν εἶδеси κατέσχηται ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος, πρῶτον
 20 μὲν ἡ ἕλη τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων εἶδесω, εἴτ' ἐπὶ
 εἶδесω εἶδη ἄλλα, εἶτα πάλιν ἕτερα· ὅθεν καὶ
 χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν τὴν ἕλην ὑπὸ πολλοῖς εἶδесι
 κρυφθεῖσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ αὕτη εἶδός τι ἔσχατον,

¹ The insistence on the immediate and intimate relationship of the intelligible and sensible universes and the comparative unimportance of the mediation of soul should be noted. Soul in Plotinus never has a world of its own intermediate between the intelligible and sensible worlds; it belongs to both worlds, and is normally thought of as linking them; but

that its maker conceived earth in his own mind, with its necessary place in the centre, and then water and its place upon earth, and then the other things in their order up to heaven, then all living things, each with the sort of shapes which they have now, and their particular internal organs and outward parts, and then when he had them all arranged in his mind proceeded to his work? Planning of this sort is quite impossible—for where could the ideas of all these things come from to one who had never seen them? And if he received them from someone else he could not carry them out as craftsmen do now, using their hands and tools; for hands and feet come later. The only possibility that remains, then, is that all things exist in something else, and, since there is nothing between, because of their closeness to something else in the realm of real being something like an imprint and image of that other suddenly appears, either by its direct action or through the assistance of soul—this makes no difference for the present discussion—or of a particular soul.¹ All that is here below comes from there, and exists in greater beauty there: for here it is adulterated, but there it is pure. All this universe is held fast by forms from beginning to end: matter first of all by the forms of the elements, and then other forms upon these, and then again others; so that it is difficult to find the matter hidden under so many forms. Then matter, too, is a sort of ultimate form²;

here it seems to be hardly necessary even as a link.

² This passing remark, which is very difficult to reconcile with Plotinus's normal view of ἕλη as the principle of evil (there are no evil Forms in Plotinus), is the nearest he ever comes to a totally positive valuation of matter.

πᾶν εἶδος τόδε¹ καὶ πάντα εἶδη· τὸ γὰρ παρά-
 δειγμα εἶδος ἦν· ἐποιεῖτο δὲ² ἀμοιφεῖν, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ
 25 ποιήσαν καὶ οὐσία καὶ εἶδος· διὸ καὶ ἄπονος [καὶ
 οὕτως]³ ἢ δημιουργία· καὶ παντὸς δὲ ἦν, ὡς ἂν
 πᾶν· οὐ τοίνυν ἦν τὸ ἐμποδίζον, καὶ νῦν δὲ
 ἐπικρατεῖ καίτοι ἄλλων ἄλλοις ἐμποδίων γινο-
 μένων· ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῇ οὐδὲ νῦν· μένει γὰρ ὡς
 πᾶν· ἐδόκει δέ μοι, ὅτι καί, εἰ ἡμεῖς ἀρχέτυπα καὶ
 30 οὐσία καὶ εἶδη ἅμα καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ποιοῦν ἐνταῦθα
 ἦν ἡμῶν οὐσία, ἐκράτησεν ἂν ἄνευ πόνων
 ἢ ἡμετέρα δημιουργία· καίτοι καὶ ἄνθρωπος
 δημιουργεῖ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ὃ ἔστι γενόμενος·
 ἀπέστη γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πᾶν νῦν ἄνθρωπος
 γενόμενος· παυσάμενος δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι
 35 μετεωροπορεῖ φησι καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον
 διοικεῖ· γενόμενος γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ.
 ἀλλ' οὐ χάριν ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἔχεις μὲν σὺ αἰτίαν
 εἰπεῖν δι' ἣν ἐν μέσῳ ἢ γῆ καὶ διὰ τί στρογγύλη
 καὶ ὁ λοξὸς διότι ὠδί· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐ, διότι οὕτως
 ἐχρῆν, διὰ τοῦτο οὕτω βεβούλευται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 40 οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἔστι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ταῦτα ἔχει
 καλῶς· οὐκ εἰ πρὸ τοῦ συλλυγισμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας τὸ
 συμπέρασμα, οὐ παρὰ τῶν προτάσεων· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ
 ἀκολουθίας οὐδ' ἐξ ἐπινοίας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀκολουθίας

¹ Ez. Perna, Kirchhoff*: εἶδος· τὸ δὲ ABR^{ac}JUC, Perna^{ms}: εἶδος τὸ δὲ Creuzer.

² suspic. H-S¹, scr. B-T: ἐποιεῖ τὸ δὲ Enn.: ἐποιεῖ τόδε Perna, Creuzer, Kirchhoff: ἐποιεῖ <δὲ> τόδε Müller*.

³ del. Theiler.

so this universe is all form, and all the things in it
 are forms; for its archetype is form; the making is
 done without noise and fuss, since that which makes
 is all real being and form. So this is another reason
 why the craftsmanship of Intellect is also without
 toil and trouble. And it is the fashioning of an All,
 so an All is the maker. There is nothing to hinder
 the making, and even now it has the mastery, and
 though one thing obstructs another, nothing ob-
 structs it; for it abides as an All. But I think also
 that if we were archetypes and real being and forms
 all at once, and if the form which makes things here
 below was our real being, our craftsmanship would
 have the mastery without toil and trouble. And
 even now, man also is a craftsman, of a form other
 than himself since he has become something else,
 what he is; for he has ceased to be the All now
 that he has become man; but when he ceases to be
 man he "walks on high and directs the whole
 universe"¹; for when he comes to belong to the
 whole he makes the whole. But to return to our
 main theme: you can explain the reason why the
 earth is in the middle, and round, and why the
 ecliptic slants as it does; but it is not because you
 can do this that things are so there; they were not
 planned like this because it was necessary for them
 to be like this, but because things There are disposed
 as they are, the things here are beautifully disposed:
 as if the conclusion was there before the syllogism
 which showed the cause, and did not follow from the
 premises; [the world-order] is not the result of
 following out a train of logical consequences and

¹ Cp. Plato *Phaedrus* 246C1-2.

καὶ πρὸ ἐπινοίας· ὑπερα γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα,
καὶ λόγος καὶ ἀπόδειξις καὶ πίστις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ
45 ἀρχή, αὐτόθεν πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ὤδε· καὶ τὸ μὴ
ζητεῖν αἰτίας ἀρχῆς οὕτω καλῶς λέγεται, καὶ τῆς
τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς τῆς τελείας, ἥτις ταυτὸν τῷ τέλει·
ἥτις δ' ἀρχή καὶ τέλος, αὕτη τὸ πᾶν ὁμοῦ καὶ
ἀνελλιπῆς.

8. Καλὸν οὖν πρώτως, καὶ ὅλον δὲ καὶ παν-
ταχοῦ ὅλον, ἵνα μὴδὲ μέρη ἀπολείπηται τῷ καλῷ
ἐλλείπειν, τίς οὖν οὐ φήσκει καλόν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ
μὴ ὅλον αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὁ μέρος ἔχον¹ ἢ μὴδέ τι αὐτοῦ
5 ἔχον.² ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐκείνο καλόν, τί ἂν ἄλλο; τὸ γὰρ
πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ καλὸν ἐθέλει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ πρώτως
εἰς θέαν παρελθὸν τῷ εἶδος εἶναι καὶ θέαμα νοῦ τοῦ-
το καὶ ἀγαστὸν ὀφθῆναι. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων, τοῦτο
σημῆναι θέλων εἰς τι τῶν ἐνεργεστέρων ὡς πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, ἀποδεξάμενον ποιεῖ τὸν δημιουργὸν τὸ ἀπο-
10 τελεσθέν, διὰ τούτου ἐνδείξασθαι θέλων τὸ τοῦ
παραδείγματος καὶ τῆς ιδέας κάλλος ὡς ἀγαστόν.
πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κατὰ ἄλλο ποιηθὲν ὅταν τις θαυμάση,
ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἔχει τὸ θαῦμα, καθ' ὃ ἐστι πεποιημέ-
νον. εἰ δ' ἄγνοεὶ ὁ πάσχει, θαῦμα οὐδέν· ἐπεὶ καὶ

¹ Kirchhoff*: ἔχων Enn., H-S¹.

² L, Kirchhoff*: ἔχων wBxUCQ.

¹ Cp. Aristotle *Physics* A 5. 188a27-30, though Plotinus is as usual very much adapting Aristotle's doctrine to his own system and his own purposes.

² The reference is to Plato *Timaeus* 37C7-D1. But there is nothing in Plato to suggest the interpretation given by Plotinus here, which is wholly based on his own doctrine that all perfect activity is contemplation, and that creation or

purposive thought: it is before consequential and purposive thinking; for all this comes later, reasoning and demonstration and the confidence [produced by them]. For since [the intelligible world-order] is a principle, all these follow immediately and just as they do; and in this sense it is well said that we should not enquire into the reason why of a principle,¹ and of a principle like this, the perfect one, which is the same as the goal; but that which is principle and goal is the whole all together and is without deficiency.

8. Who, then, will not call beautiful that which is beautiful primarily, and as a whole, and everywhere as a whole when no parts fail by falling short in beauty? Certainly [one would not call beautiful] that which is not as a whole beauty itself, but has a part of it, or not even any of it. Or if that is not beautiful, what else is? For that which is before it does not even want to be beautiful; for it is this which first presents itself to contemplation by being form and the contemplation of intellect which is also a delight to see. For this reason Plato, wishing to indicate this by reference to something which is clearer relatively to ourselves, represents the Craftsman approving his completed work, wishing to show by this how delightful is the beauty of the model, which is the Idea.² For whenever someone admires a thing modelled on something else, he directs his admiration to that on which the thing is modelled. But if he does not know what is happening to him, that is no wonder: since lovers also, and in general

action should be the spontaneous reflex of contemplation: this was fully expounded in the first part of the present work, III. 8, and applied to the creation of the universe in ch. 7 of this treatise.

οἱ ἐρώντες καὶ ὅλως οἱ τὸ τῆδε κάλλος τεθαυμα-
 15 κότες ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι δι' ἐκεῖνο· δι' ἐκεῖνο γάρ. ὅτι
 δεῖ εἰς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀνάγει τὸ "ἠγάσθη," δῆλον
 ποιεῖ ἐπίτηδες τὸ ἐξῆς τῆς λέξεως λαβῶν· εἶπε
 γάρ· ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ
 παράδειγμα αὐτὸ ἐβουλήθη ἀφομοιωσαί,
 20 τὸ κάλλος τοῦ παραδείγματος οἷόν ἐστιν ἐνδεικνύμε-
 νος διὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτου τὸ γενόμενον καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ
 ὡς εἰκόνα ἐκεῖνου εἶπεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐκεῖνο ἦν
 τὸ ὑπέρκαλον κάλλει ἀμηχάνω, τί ἂν τούτου τοῦ
 ὀρωμένου ἦν κάλλιον; ὅθεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ μεμφό-
 μενοι τούτῳ, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καθόσον μὴ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι.

9. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸν κόσμον, ἐκάστου τῶν μερῶν
 μένοντος ὃ ἐστι καὶ μὴ συγχεομένου, λάβωμεν τῆ
 5 διανοίᾳ, εἰς ἓν ὁμοῦ πάντα, ὡς οἷόν τε, ὥστε ἐνὸς
 ὁμοῦ προφαινομένου, οἷον τῆς ἕξω σφαίρας
 οὐσῆς, ἀκολουθεῖν εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ἡλίον καὶ ὁμοῦ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν τὴν φαντασίαν, καὶ γῆν καὶ
 θάλασσαν καὶ πάντα τὰ¹ ζῶα ὁρᾶσθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ
 σφαίρας διαφανοῦς καὶ ἔργῳ ἂν γένοιτο πάντα
 ἐνορᾶσθαι. ἔστω οὖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φωτεινὴ τις
 φαντασία σφαίρας ἔχουσα πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ, εἴτε
 10 κινούμενα εἴτε ἐστηκότα, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινούμενα, τὰ δ'
 ἐστηκότα. φυλάττων δὲ ταύτην ἄλλην παρὰ σαυτῷ
 ἀφελὼν τὸν ὄγκον λάβε· ἄφελε δὲ καὶ τοὺς τόπους
 καὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἐν σοὶ φάντασμα, καὶ μὴ πειρῶ
 αὐτῆς ἄλλην σμικροτέραν λαβεῖν τῷ ὄγκῳ, θεὸν δὲ
 καλέσας τὸν πεποιηκότα ἧς ἔχεις τὸ φάντασμα

¹ wQ, Perna: om. BxUCL, H-S¹.

all the admirers of beauty here below, do not know that this is because of the intelligible beauty: for it is because of the intelligible beauty. Plato deliberately makes it clear that he refers the "was delighted" to the model by the words which follow: for he says, "he was delighted, and wanted to make it still more like its model", showing what the beauty of the model is like by saying that what originates from it is itself, too, beautiful because it is an image of the intelligible beauty: for, if that was not transcendently beautiful with an overwhelming beauty, what would be more beautiful than this visible universe? Those who blame it, then, do not do so rightly, except perhaps in so far as it is not the intelligible world.

9. Let us then apprehend in our thought this visible universe, with each of its parts remaining what it is without confusion, gathering all of them together into one as far as we can, so that when any one part appears first, for instance the outside heavenly sphere, the imagination of the sun and, with it, the other heavenly bodies follows immediately, and the earth and sea and all the living creatures are seen, as they could in fact all be seen inside a transparent sphere. Let there be, then, in the soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything within it, either moving or standing still, or some things moving and others standing still. Keep this, and apprehend in your mind another, taking away the mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter in yourself, and do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the original one, but calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him to

15 εὔξαι ἔλθειν. ὁ δὲ ἦκοι τὸν αὐτοῦ κόσμον φέρων
 μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θεῶν εἰς ὧν καὶ πάντες,
 καὶ ἕκαστος πάντες συνόντες εἰς ἓν, καὶ ταῖς μὲν
 δυνάμεσιν ἄλλοι, τῇ δὲ μιᾷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ πολλῇ πάντες
 εἰς· μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ εἰς πάντες· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει
 αὐτός, ἦν πάντες ἐκείνοι γένωνται· ὁμοῦ δέ εἰσι
 20 καὶ ἕκαστος χωρὶς αὐτῶν ἐν στάσει ἀδιαστάτῳ οὐ
 μορφὴν αἰσθητὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔχων—ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ὁ
 μὲν ἄλλοθι, ὁ δὲ πού ἄλλαχόθι ἦν, καὶ ἕκαστος δὲ
 οὐ πᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ—οὐδὲ μέρη ἄλλα ἔχων ἄλλοις ἢ
 αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ ἕκαστον οἶον¹ δύναμις κερματισθεῖσα
 καὶ τοσαύτη οὔσα, ὅσα τὰ μέρη μετρούμενα. τὸ
 25 δέ ἐστι [τὸ πᾶν]² δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς ἄπειρον μὲν
 ἰοῦσα, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ δυναμένη· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν
 ἐκείνος μέγας, ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄπειρα γεγόνε-
 ναι. ποῦ γὰρ τι ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅπου μὴ φθάσει;
 μέγας μὲν οὖν καὶ ὅδε ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ
 30 πᾶσαι δυνάμεις ὁμοῦ, ἀλλὰ μείζων ἂν ἦν καὶ
 ὀπόσος οὐδ' ἂν ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτῷ συνῆν
 σώματος δύναμις μικρά. καίτοι μεγάλας ἂν τις
 φήσειε πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωματίων τὰς δυνά-
 μεις· ἀλλὰ ἤδη ἄπειρά δυνάμεως ἀληθινῆς φαντά-
 ζονται καίονσαι καὶ φθείρουσαι καὶ θλίβουσαι καὶ
 35 πρὸς γένεσιν τῶν ζώων ὑπουργοῦσαι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 μὲν φθείρει, ὅτι καὶ φθίρεται, καὶ συγγεννᾷ, ὅτι
 καὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται· ἢ δὲ δύναμις ἢ ἐκεῖ μόνον τὸ
 εἶναι ἔχει καὶ μόνον τὸ καλὸν εἶναι. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν
 εἶη τὸ καλὸν ἀποστερηθὲν τοῦ εἶναι; ποῦ δ' ἂν ἢ
 οὐσία τοῦ καλοῦ εἶναι ἐστερημένη; ἐν τῷ γὰρ

¹ Harder, B.T.: ὅλον Enn.*

² del. Kirchnerhoff*.

come. And may he come, bringing his own universe with him, with all the gods within him, he who is one and all, and each god is all the gods coming together into one; they are different in their powers, but by that one manifold power they are all one; or rather, the one god is all; for he does not fail if all become what he is; they are all together and each one again apart in a position without separation, possessing no perceptible shape—for if they did, one would be in one place and one in another, and each would no longer be all in himself—nor does each god have parts different from himself belonging to other gods than himself, nor is each whole like a power cut up which is as large as the measure of its parts. But this, the [intelligible] All, is universal power, extending to infinity and powerful to infinity; and that god is so great that his parts have become infinite. For what place can we speak of where he is not there before us? This [visible] heaven is indeed great, and so are all the powers together within it, but it would be greater, even indescribably great, if there was not present with it a petty power of body. One might certainly call the powers of fire and the other bodies great; but it is by mere inexperience of true power that they are imagined burning and destroying and crushing and working as servants for the production of living things. But these destroy, because they are destroyed, and help to generate because they are generated themselves; but the power in the intelligible world has nothing but its being and its being beautiful. For where would its beauty be if it was deprived of its being? And where would its reality be if it was stripped of its being beautiful?

40 ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ καλοῦ ἐλλείπει καὶ τῆ οὐσία.
 διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθεινόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτόν τῳ καλῳ̄,
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐράσμιον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι. πότερον δὲ
 ποτέρου αἴτιον τί χρῆ ζῆτεῖν οὐσης τῆς φύσεως
 μιᾶς; ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψευδῆς οὐσία δέεται ἐπακτοῦ
 45 εἰδώλου καλοῦ, ἔνα καὶ καλὸν φαίνεται καὶ ὅλως
 ἦ, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι, καθόσον μετείληφε
 κάλλους τοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ λαβοῦσα, ὅσω ἂν
 λάβῃ, μᾶλλον τελειότερα· μᾶλλον γὰρ οὐσία¹ ἦ²
 καλή.

10. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς καίπερ ὢν πρεσ-
 βύτατος τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν, ὧν αὐτὸς ἡγείται,
 πρῶτος πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὴν τούτου θέαν, οἱ δὲ
 5 ἔπονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι καὶ δαίμονες καὶ ψυχαί,
 αἱ ταῦτα ὄραν δύνανται. ὁ δὲ ἐκφαίνεται αὐτοῖς
 ἐκ τινος ἀοράτου τόπου καὶ ἀνατείλας ὑψοῦ ἐπ'
 αὐτῶν κατέλαμψε μὲν πάντα καὶ ἐπλησεν αὐγῆς
 καὶ ἐξέπληξε μὲν τοὺς κάτω, καὶ ἐστράφησαν
 ἰδεῖν οὐ δεδυνημένοι οἷα ἥλιον. οἱ μὲν ἄρ' ³ αὐτοῦ
 ἀνέχονταί τε καὶ βλέπουσιν· οἱ δὲ ταραττονται,
 10 ὅσω ἂν ἀφεστήκωσιν αὐτοῦ. ὄρωντες δὲ οἱ
 δυνηθέντες ἰδεῖν εἰς αὐτὸν μὲν πάντες βλέπουσι καὶ
 εἰς τὸ αὐτοῦ· οὐ ταῦτόν δὲ ἕκαστος αἰεὶ θέαμα
 κομίζεται, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀπενὲς ἰδὼν ἐκλάμπουσαν
 εἶδε τὴν τοῦ δικαίου πηγὴν καὶ φύσιν, ἄλλος δὲ τῆς
 σωφροσύνης ἐπλήσθη τοῦ θεάματος, οὐχ οἷαν
 15 ἄνθρωποι παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὅταν ἔχωσι· μιμείται γὰρ

¹ Theiler: οἰκεία Enn.*

² scripsimus: ἡ Enn.*: εἰ Theiler.

³ coniesimus: ἀπ' wBxUCz: ὑπ' SN Vat., Creuzer.

For in deficiency of beauty it would be defective also in reality. For this reason being is longed for because it is the same as beauty, and beauty is lovable because it is being. But why should we enquire which is the cause of the other when both are one nature? This reality here below, which is not genuine, does indeed require a phantasm of beauty brought in from outside in order to appear and in any way to be beautiful, and it is beautiful in proportion as it has a share in the beauty which is according to form, and when it has it it is more perfect the more of it it has: for it is more reality in so far as it is beautiful.

10. For this reason Zeus, although the oldest among the gods whom he himself leads, advances first to the contemplation of this god, and there follow him the other gods and spirits and the souls who are capable of seeing these things.¹ But he appears to them from some invisible place and dawning upon them from high illuminates everything and fills it with his rays, and dazzles those of them who are below, and they turn away unable to see him, as if he was the sun. Some endure him and gaze upon him, but others are troubled in proportion to their distance from him. But all those who are able to see look at him and what belongs to him when they see; but each does not always gain the same vision, but one, gazing intensely, sees the source and nature of justice, another is filled with the vision of moral integrity, not the kind which men have here below, when they do have it (for this is some sort of imitation

¹ Again a reference to the *Phaedrus* myth, which Plotinus continues to interpret in what follows: op. Plato *Phaedrus* 246E ff.

αὐτῆ ἀμυγγέπη ἐκείνην· ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι περὶ πᾶν τὸ
 οἶον μέγεθος αὐτοῦ ἐπιθέουσα <ἀγλαΐα> ¹ τελευταία
 ὀράται, οἷς πολλὰ ἤδη ὤφθη ἐναργῆ θεάματα, οἱ θεοὶ
 καθ' ἓνα καὶ πᾶς ὁμοῦ, αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ πάντα ἐκεῖ
 ὀρῶσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν πάντων γενόμεναι, ὥστε πάντα
 20 περιέχειν καὶ αὐταὶ ² ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος· καὶ
 εἰσιν ἐκεῖ καθόσον ³ ἂν αὐτῶν πεφύκη εἶναι ἐκεῖ,
 πολλάκις δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖ, ὅταν μὴ ὡσι
 διειλημμένοι. ταῦτα οὖν ὀρῶν ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ εἴ τις
 ἡμῶν αὐτῷ συνεραστής, τὸ τελευταῖον ὀρᾷ μένον
 25 ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὄλον τὸ κάλλος, καὶ κάλλους μετασχωῶν
 τοῦ ἐκεῖ· ἀποστίλβει γὰρ πάντα καὶ πληροὶ τοὺς
 ἐκεῖ γενομένους, οἷς καλοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς γενέσθαι,
 ὁποῖοι πολλάκις ἄνθρωποι εἰς ὑψηλοὺς ἀναβαίνοντες
 τόπους τὸ ξανθὸν χρῶμα ἐχούσης τῆς γῆς τῆς ἐκεῖ
 ἐπλήσθησαν ἐκείνης τῆς χροῆς ὁμοιωθέντες τῇ
 30 ἐφ' ἧς ἐβεβήκεσαν. ἐκεῖ δὲ χροῖα ἢ ἐπανθοῦσα κάλ-
 λος ἐστὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶν χροῖα καὶ κάλλος ἐκ βάθους·
 οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο τὸ καλὸν ὡς ἐπανθοῦν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὴ
 ὄλον ὀρῶσιν ἢ προσβολῇ μόνη ἐνομίσθη, τοῖς δὲ διὰ
 παντὸς οἶον οἰνωθείσι καὶ πληρωθείσι τοῦ νέκταρος,

¹ Page, cum ἡ δὲ (lin. 16) coniungendum.

² Kirchhoff*: αὐταὶ Ἐνν.

³ Theiler: καὶ ὅσον Ἐνν.: ὅσον Kirchhoff*.

¹ I follow Schwyzer here in supplying τοῦ καλοῦ φέσις with ἡ δὲ. After the soul has risen from the contemplation of the moral beauty in itself to that of the moral Forms (the starting-point of this contemplation in each individual case being different) it finally arrives at the vision of the beauty of the intelligible world as a whole.

² Here Plotinus seems to be thinking of men going up into the high desert which lies on each side of the valley of the

of that other), but that glory over all, playing upon what we may call the whole extension of that world,¹ is seen at the end by those who have already seen many clear visions, the gods individually and every one together, and the souls who see everything in the intelligible world and originate from everything, so as to include everything themselves from the beginning to the end; and they are there in the intelligible, in so far as they are naturally able to be there—but often the whole of them is there, when they are not divided. Zeus then sees these things, and with him any one of us who is his fellow-lover, and finally he sees, abiding over all, beauty as a whole, by his participation in the intelligible beauty; for it shines bright upon all and fills those who have come to be there so that they too become beautiful, as often men, when they go up into high places where the earth has a red-gold colour, are filled with that colour and made like that upon which they walked.² But there in the intelligible world the colour which blooms on the surface is beauty, or rather all is colour and beauty to its innermost part: for its beauty is not something different from itself, like a surface bloom. But those who do not see the whole only acknowledge the external impression, but those who are altogether, we may say, drunk and filled with the nectar,³ since the beauty has pene-

Nile and, as the *Theologia Aristotelis* (VIII. 146. 26–9) and Bréhier in his *Notice* to the treatise interpret it, becoming suffused with the intense light so that they look the same colour as the red hills on which they walk (a less romantic explanation in terms of being covered with desert dust might also be possible but would be less appropriate to the context).

³ Cp. Plato *Symposium* (the drunken Poros in the garden of Zeus, used for various allegorical purposes by Plotinus).

35 ἄτε δι' ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ κάλλους ἐλθόντος, οὐ θεα-
ταῖς μόνον ὑπάρχει γενέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τὸ μὲν
ἔξω, τὸ δ' αὖ τὸ θεώμενον ἔξω, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὸ ὁξέως
ὄρων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ὀρώμενον, καὶ ἔχων τὰ πολλὰ
ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἔξω ὃν βλέπει, ὅτι ὡς ὀρώ-
μενον βλέπει καὶ ὅτι θέλει βλέπειν. πᾶν δὲ ὁ τις ὡς
40 θεατὸν βλέπει ἔξω βλέπει. ἀλλὰ χρῆ εἰς αὐτὸν
ἦδη μεταφέρειν καὶ βλέπειν ὡς ἐν καὶ βλέπειν ὡς
αὐτόν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὑπὸ θεοῦ κατασχεθεὶς φοιβό-
ληπτος ἢ ὑπὸ τινος Μούσης ἐν αὐτῷ ἂν ποιεῖτο
τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν θέαν, εἰ δύνάμιν ἔχοι ἐν αὐτῷ θεὸν
βλέπειν.

11. Ἔτι¹ δὲ τις ἡμῶν ἀδυνατῶν ἑαυτὸν ὄραν
ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπὶ καταληφθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν
προφέρει τὸ θέαμα, ἑαυτὸν προφέρει καὶ εἰκόνα
αὐτοῦ καλλωπισθεῖσαν βλέπει. ἀφείδ' ἐκείνην εἰκόνα
5 καίπερ καλὴν οὖσαν εἰς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν καὶ μηκέτι
σχίσας ἐν ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐστὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ
ἀψοφητὶ παρόντος, καὶ ἔστι μετ' αὐτοῦ ὅσον
δύναται καὶ θέλει. εἰ δ' ἐπιστραφεῖ εἰς δύο, καθ-
αρὸς μένων ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ὥστε αὐτῷ παρῆ-
ναι ἐκείνως πάλιν, εἰ πάλιν ἐπ' αὐτὸν στρέφοι. ἐν
10 δὲ τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ κέρδος τοῦτ' ἔχει· ἀρχόμενος
αἰσθάνεται αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἑτεροῦ ἐστὶ· δραμῶν δὲ εἰς
τὸ εἶσω ἔχει πᾶν, καὶ ἀφείδ' τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς
τοῦπίσω τοῦ ἑτεροῦ εἶναι φόβῳ εἰς ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ-
κᾶν ἐπιθυμήσῃ ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ἰδεῖν, ἔξω αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.

¹ Gollwitzer: εἰ Enn.

trated through the whole of their soul, are not simply spectators. For there is no longer one thing outside and another outside which is looking at it, but the keen sighted has what is seen within, although having it he for the most part does not know that he has it, and looks at it as if it were outside because he looks at it as if it was something seen, and because he wants to look at it. But one looks from outside at everything one looks at as a spectacle. But one must transport what one sees into oneself, and look at it as one and look at it as oneself, as if someone possessed by a god, taken over by Phoebus or one of the Muses, could bring about the vision of the god in himself, if he had the power to look at the god in himself.

11. Further, one of us, being unable to see himself, when he is possessed by that god brings his contemplation to the point of vision, and presents himself to his own mind and looks at a beautified image of himself; but then he dismisses the image, beautiful though it is, and comes to unity with himself, and, making no more separation, is one and all together with that god silently present, and is with him as much as he wants to be and can be. But if he returns again to being two, while he remains pure he stays close to the god, so as to be present to him again in that other way if he turns again to him. In this turning he has the advantage that to begin with he sees himself, while he is different from the god; then he hastens inward and has everything, and leaves perception behind in his fear of being different, and is one in that higher world; and if he wants to see by being different, he puts himself outside. While he is coming to know

δεῖ δὲ καταμανθάνοντα μὲν ἐν τινὶ τύπῳ αὐτοῦ
 15 μένοντα μετὰ τοῦ ζητεῖν γνωματεύειν αὐτόν, εἰς
 οἷον δὲ εἰσεῖσιν, οὕτω μαθόντα κατὰ πίστιν,¹ ὡς
 ἐπὶ χρῆμα μακαριστὸν εἰσεῖσιν, ἥδη αὐτόν δοῦναι
 εἰς τὸ εἶσω καὶ γενέσθαι ἀντὶ ὄρωντος ἥδη
 θέαμα ἐτέρου θεωμένου, οἷοις ἐκεῖθεν ἦκει ἐκλάμ-
 20 ὄρων αὐτό; ἢ ὄρων αὐτὸ ὡς ἕτερον οὐδέπω ἐν
 καλῷ, γενόμενος δὲ αὐτὸ οὕτω μάλιστα ἐν καλῷ.
 εἰ οὖν ὄρασις τοῦ ἕξω, ὄρασις μὲν οὐ δεῖ εἶναι ἢ
 οὕτως, ὡς ταῦτὸν τῷ ὄρατῳ· τοῦτο δὲ οἷον σύνεσις
 καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτοῦ εὐλαβουμένου μὴ τῷ μάλ-
 25 λον αἰσθάνεσθαι θέλειν ἑαυτοῦ ἀποστῆναι. δεῖ δὲ
 κἀκείνο ἐνθυμῆσθαι, ὡς τῶν μὲν κακῶν αἰ αἰσθή-
 σεις τὰς πληγὰς ἔχουσι μείζους, ἥττους δὲ τὰς
 γνώσεις τῇ πληγῇ ἐκικρονομένας· νόσος γὰρ μάλ-
 λον ἐκπληξιν, ὑγίεια δὲ ἡρέμα συνοῦσα μᾶλλον ἂν
 30 ἐνοῦται· ἢ δ' ἔστιν ἀλλότριον καὶ οὐκ οἰκείον, καὶ ταύ-
 τη διάδηλος τῷ σφόδρα ἕτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι δοκεῖν.
 τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀναίσθητοι· οὕτω δ' ὄντες
 μάλιστα πάντων ἐσμὲν αὐτοῖς συνετοὶ τὴν ἐπιστ-
 ἡμην ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν πεποιηκότες. κἀκεῖ τοῖνυν,
 ὅτε μάλιστα ἴσμεν κατὰ νοῦν, ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦμεν,
 35 τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀναμένοντες τὸ πάθος, ἢ φησι μὴ
 ἑωρακέναι· οὐ γὰρ εἶδεν οὐδ' ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτά ποτε

¹ coniectimus: καὶ πίστιν Enn.: καὶ πιστεύσαντα Kirchhoff, Müller: καὶ πίστιν (ἔχοντα) Volkmann*: καὶ (λαβόντα) πίστιν Harder: καὶ πίστει Cilento.

² Theiler: προῖξει Enn.: παρίξει suspic. Volkmann.

the god he must keep to an impression of him and form distinct ideas of him as he seeks him and discern what he is entering into; and when he has learnt with confidence that it is into the highest blessedness, he must give himself up to what is within and become, instead of one who sees, an object of vision to another who contemplates him shining out with thoughts of the kind which come from that world. How then can anyone be in beauty without seeing it? If he sees it as something different, he is not yet in beauty, but he is in it most perfectly when he becomes it. If therefore sight is of something external we must not have sight, or only that which is identical with its object. This is a sort of intimate understanding and perception of a self which is careful not to depart from itself by wanting to perceive too much. We must consider this also, that the perceptions of evils have more violent impacts, but produce less knowledge because it is driven out by the impact; for illness strikes our consciousness harder, but the quiet companionship of health gives us a better understanding of it; for it comes and sits by us as something which belongs to us, and is united to us. Illness is alien and not our own, and therefore particularly obvious because it appears so very different from us. We have no perception of what is our own, and since we are like this we understand ourselves best when we have made our self-knowledge one with ourselves. In the higher world, then, when our knowledge is most perfectly conformed to Intellect, we think we know nothing because we are waiting for the experience of sense-perception, which says it has not yet seen: and it certainly has not seen, and never will see things

ἴδοι. τὸ οὖν ἀπιστοῦν ἢ αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος
 ἐστὶν ὁ ἰδῶν· ἢ, εἰ ἀπιστοῖ κάκεινος, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸν
 πιστεύσειεν εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' αὐτὸς δύναται ἕξω
 θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς αἰσθητὸν ὄντα ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῖς τοῦ
 40 σώματος βλέπειν.

12. Ἀλλὰ εἴρηται, πῶς ὡς ἕτερος δύναται τοῦτο
 ποιεῖν, καὶ πῶς ὡς αὐτός. ἰδὼν δὴ, εἴτε ὡς ἕτερος,
 εἴτε ὡς μείνας αὐτός, τί ἀπαγγέλλει; ἢ θεὸν
 ἑωρακέειν τόκον ὠδύοντα καλὸν καὶ πάντα δὴ ἐν
 5 αὐτῷ γεγεννηκότα καὶ ἄλυπον ἔχοντα τὴν ὠδύνα ἐν
 αὐτῷ· ἡσθεὶς γὰρ οἷς ἐγέννα καὶ ἀγασθεὶς τῶν
 τόκων κατέσχε πάντα παρ' αὐτῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ
 τὴν αὐτῶν ἀγλαΐαν ἀσμενίσας· ὁ δὲ καλῶν ὄντων
 καὶ καλλιόνων τῶν εἰς τὸ εἶσω μεμενηκότων μόνος
 ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ζεὺς παῖς ἐξεφάνη εἰς τὸ ἕξω.
 10 ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡστάτου παιδὸς ὄντος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἶον
 ἐξ εἰκότος τινὸς αὐτοῦ, ὅσος ὁ πατὴρ ἐκείνος καὶ οἱ
 μέιναντες παρ' αὐτῷ ἀδελφοί. ὁ δὲ οὗ φησι μάτην
 ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ αὐτοῦ ἄλλον
 κόσμον γεγονότα καλόν, ὡς εἰκόνα καλοῦ· μηδὲ
 γὰρ εἶναι θεμιτὸν εἰκόνα καλὴν μὴ εἶναι μήτε καλοῦ
 15 μήτε οὐσίας. μιμεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πανταχῆ·
 καὶ γὰρ ζωὴν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας, ὡς μίμημα,
 καὶ τὸ καλλος εἶναι, ὡς ἐκεῖθεν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰε

¹ In these last two chapters the myths of Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus are explained as symbolically referring to the Three Hypostases, the One, Intellect and Soul. Plotinus does not often indulge in this sort of allegorization, and when he does it is somewhat tortured and he finds it difficult to be consistent.

like these. It is sense-perception which disbelieves, but it is the other one who sees; and for him to disbelieve would be to disbelieve in his own existence: for he cannot after all put himself outside and make himself visible so as to look at himself with his bodily eyes.

12. We have explained how he can do this as another and how as himself. But when he sees, whether as another or as one who remains himself, what does he report? He reports that he has seen a god in labour with a beautiful offspring all of which he has brought to birth within him, and keeping the children of his painless birth-pangs within himself; for he is pleased with what he has borne and delighted with his offspring and so keeps all with him in his enjoyment of his and their glory; all the others who are beautiful, even more beautiful, have remained within and Zeus, one son alone of all, has appeared outside.¹ From him, even though he is the youngest son, one can see as if from a likeness of him how great his father is and the brothers who have remained with him. But he says that it was not without purpose that he came forth from his father; for his other universe must exist, which has come into being beautiful, since it is an image of beauty; for it is utterly unlawful that there should be no beautiful image of beauty and reality. This image imitates its archetype in every way: for it has life and what belongs to reality as a representation of it should, and it has its being beauty since it comes from that higher beauty; and it has its everlastingness in the way

For another rather confusing and fluctuating allegorization see III. 5 *On Love*.

αὐτοῦ, ὡς εἰκῶν· ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἔξει εἰκόνα, ποτὲ δὲ οὐ, οὐ τέχνη γενομένης τῆς εἰκόνας. πᾶσα δὲ φύσει εἰκῶν ἔστιν, ὅσον ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον μένη. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἳ φθείρουσι τοῦ νοητοῦ μένοντος καὶ γεννώσιν αὐτως, ὡς ποτὲ βουλευσαμένου τοῦ ποιούντος ποιεῖν. ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος ποιήσεως τοιαύτης οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι, ὅσον ἐκείνο ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήποτε τὰ ἄλλα ἐλείπη, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν· ἦν δ' αἰεὶ καὶ ἔσται. χρηστέον γὰρ τούτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τῆ τοῦ σημαίνεν ἐθέλειν ἀνάγκη.

13. Ὁ οὖν θεὸς ὁ εἰς τὸ μένειν ὡσαύτως δεδεμένος καὶ συγχωρήσας τῷ παιδί τούτῳ τοῦ παντός ἄρχειν—οὐ γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ πρὸς τρόπον τὴν ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν ἀφέντι νεωτέραν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑστέραν μεθέπειν 5 κόρον ἔχοντι τῶν καλῶν—ταῦτ' ἀφείς ἔστησέ τε τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα εἰς ἑαυτόν, καὶ μέχρις αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω· ἔστησε δ' αὖ καὶ τὰ εἰς θάτερα ἀπὸ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενα εἶναι μετ' αὐτόν, ὥστε μεταξὺ ἀμφοῖν γενέσθαι τῆ τε ἑτερότητι τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀποτομῆς καὶ τῷ ἀνέχοντι ἀπὸ τοῦ μετ' αὐτόν πρὸς 10 τὸ κάτω δεσμῶ, μεταξὺ ὧν πατρός τε ἀμείνωνος καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὁ πατήρ αὐτῷ μείζων ἢ κατὰ κάλλος ἦν, πρῶτως αὐτὸς ἔμεινε καλός, καίτοι καλῆς καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσης· ἀλλ' ἔστι καλλίων καὶ ταύτης, ὅτι ἔχνος αὐτῆ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τούτῳ 15 ἔστι καλῆ μὲν τὴν φύσιν, καλλίων δέ, ὅταν ἐκεῖ βλέπη. εἰ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τοῦ παντός, ἵνα γνωριμώ-

278

proper to an image; otherwise [the intelligible universe] will sometimes have an image and sometimes not—and this image is not the product of art, but every natural image exists as long as its archetype is there. For this reason those are not right who destroy the image-universe while the intelligible abides, and bring it into being as if its maker ever planned to make it. For they do not want to understand how this kind of making works, that as long as that higher reality gives its light, the rest of things can never fail: they are there as long as it is there; but it always was and will be. We must use these [temporal] words because we are compelled to want to signify our meaning.

13. The god therefore who is bound so that he abides the same, and has conceded the government of this universe to his son—for it would not have been in character for him to abandon his rule in the intelligible world and go seeking a later one because he had had enough of the beauties there—lets this world go and establishes his father in himself, extending as far as him on the upper side; and on the other side he has established what begins with his son in the place after himself, so that he comes to be between the two, by the otherness of his severance from what is above, and by the bond which keeps him from what comes after him on the lower side; he is between a better father and a worse son. But since his father was too great to be beauty, he remained primarily beautiful; soul is certainly beautiful, but he is more beautiful than soul, because soul has a trace of him and is naturally beautiful by reason of this, but still more beautiful when it looks to that which is above it. If then, to speak more

τερον λέγωμεν, καὶ ἢ Ἀφροδίτῃ αὐτὴ καλὴ, τίς
 ἐκεῖνος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτῆς, πόσον ἂν εἴη
 ἐκεῖνο; εἰ δὲ παρ' ἄλλου, παρὰ τίνος ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ
 ἐπακτὸν καὶ τὸ συμφυὲς τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς κάλλος
 20 ἔχει; ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν καὶ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ, τῷ αὐτῶν
 εἶναι, αἰσχροὶ δὲ ἐπ' ἄλλην μεταβαίνοντες φύσιν
 καὶ γινώσκοντες μὲν ἑαυτοὺς καλοὶ, αἰσχροὶ δὲ
 ἀγνοοῦντες. ἐκεῖ οὖν κακεῖθεν τὸ καλόν. ἄρ' οὖν
 ἀρκεῖ τὰ εἰρημένα εἰς ἐναργῆ σύνεσιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῦ
 νοητοῦ τόπου, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ὁδὸν πάλιν αὐτὸ δεῖ
 ἐπελθεῖν ὧδε;

plainly, the Soul of the All is beautiful, that is
 Aphrodite is beautiful, what is Intellect¹? For
 if Aphrodite's beauty comes from herself, how great
 must that higher beauty be? But if it comes from
 another, from whom does Soul have its beauty, that
 which comes to it from outside and that which
 belongs to its real nature? For when we ourselves
 are beautiful, it is by belonging to ourselves, but we
 are ugly when we change to another nature: when
 we know ourselves we are beautiful, but ugly when
 we are ignorant of ourselves. Beauty therefore is
 in that higher world and comes from there. Is what
 we have said, then, enough to lead to a clear under-
 standing of the "intelligible region", or must we
 go back and take another way, like this²?

¹ Plotinus likes to identify Aphrodite with Soul (cp. III. 5.
 2ff.). But so far in this treatise Zeus has been Soul, who
 leads the contemplation of Intellect (ch. 10) and comes out
 from the intelligible world to make the sense-world (ch. 12).
 Aphrodite manages to be daughter of Kronos as well as of
 Ouranos in III. 5. 2. 15-20, and perhaps Plotinus is also
 thinking of her as daughter of Kronos (Intellect) here, and has
 dropped Zeus out of the allegory for the moment.

² For the "intelligible region" cp. Plato *Republic* VII
 517B5. This sentence leads straight into the beginning of V.
 5 and makes it clear that the two treatises are parts of a single
 work.

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, the fifth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first of Plotinus's "ascents of the mind" from the material world to Intellect; the One or Good is only mentioned incidentally in this treatise and the subject of its relation to Intellect is left for future development (chs. 2 and 14). The object of the treatise is to display the true nature of Intellect, and to show how Soul and the material world in which our souls find themselves depend on it, and so to teach us to live in it as our true home. It stays fairly close to the traditional school-Platonism which Plotinus had inherited, but already shows clear evidence of his original development of the tradition, especially in his insistence throughout on the living unity of thought and the Forms in the Intellect which is also Being, and the clear indication in ch. 13 that souls and their virtues here below continue to belong to the higher world of Intellect which is everywhere, not spatially separated or cut off from the lower world. The treatise gives the impression of having been rather hurriedly written: the later chapters are very summary in their treatment of the contents of the world of Intellect, and the last (ch. 14) is little more than a series of notes for further discussion.

ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Synopsis

Three kinds of philosopher, Epicurean, Stoic and Platonist: only the Platonist is capable of seeing and rising to the world of Intellect (ch. 1). The Platonic ascent of the mind from the derived beauty below to the original beauty above: should it stop at Intellect? (ch. 2). The nature of Intellect and the Forms in Intellect, and the necessity that they must exist, argued from the works of human and divine art here below (ch. 3). Superiority of Intellect to Soul, and Soul's dependence on Intellect (ch. 4). The unity of thought and Forms in the living reality of Intellect (chs. 5-8). The contents of the world of Intellect: it is a true intelligible universe containing everything which exists as form in the world of sense (but not, therefore, any defect or evil) (chs. 9-10). The arts considered and distinguished according to the degree to which they exist in the intelligible world or derive their principles from it (ch. 11). If the Form of man and the intellectual arts are in the intelligible, then so must the universal Forms be which are the subject-matter of those arts; a quick glance at the problem of physical individuality (ch. 12). Soul and its excellences exist in both worlds: so everything which exists in the intelligible world is also here below (ch. 13). Notes on a variety of problems about the intelligible world—the origin of its multiplicity, the question of Forms of casual compounds and products of putrefaction etc. (ch. 14).

V. 9. (5) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ
ΙΔΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ

1. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐξαρχῆς γενόμενοι αἰσθήσει
πρὸ νοῦ χρησάμενοι καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσβαλόν-
τες πρῶτοις ἐξανάγκης οἱ μὲν ἐνταυτοῖ καταμείναν-
τες διέζησαν ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ ἔσχατα νομίσαντες,
5 καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδὺν τὸ μὲν κακόν,
τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαβόντες ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισαν, καὶ τὸ
μὲν διώκοντες, τὸ δ' ἀποικονομοῦμενοι διεγέροντο.
καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην οἷ γε λόγου μεταποιούμενοι
αὐτῶν ἔθεντο, οἷα οἱ βαρεῖς τῶν ὀρνίθων, οἱ πολλὰ
ἐκ γῆς λαβόντες καὶ βαρυνθέντες ὑψοῦ πτήναι
10 ἀδυνατοῦσι καίπερ πτερὰ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβόν-
τες. οἱ δὲ ἤρθησαν μὲν ὀλίγον ἐκ τῶν κάτω κιν-
οῦντος αὐτοῦς πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡδέος τοῦ
τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονος, ἀδυνατήσαντες δὲ ἰδεῖν τὸ
ἄνω, ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἄλλο, ὅπου στήσονται, κατ-
ηγέχθησαν σὺν τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ πράξεις
15 καὶ ἐκλογὰς τῶν κάτω, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπεχείρησαν τὸ
πρῶτον αἰρεσθαι. τρίτον δὲ γένος θεῶν ἀνθρώπων
δυνάμει τε κρείττονι καὶ ὀξύτητι ὀμμάτων εἶδέ τε

¹ This is a piece of stock Platonic school-polemics against Epicureans and Stoics, those lumpish fowl the Epicureans being as usual dismissed casually and scornfully, and the Stoics treated rather more respectfully. The "greater beauty" to which the Stoics have been urged on is of course

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS,
AND BEING

1. All men from the beginning, as soon as they are born, employ sense-perception before intellect and sense-objects are necessarily the first which they encounter. Some of them stay here and live through their lives considering these to be primary and ultimate, and since they consider what is painful and pleasant in them to be evil and good respectively, they think this is enough, and pass their lives pursuing the one and contriving to get rid of the other. And those of them who claim rationality make this their philosophy, like the heavy sort of birds who have taken much from the earth and are weighed down by it and so are unable to fly high although nature has given them wings. Others have risen a little from the things below because the better part of their soul has urged them on from the pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were unable to see what is above, as they have no other ground to stand on they are brought down, with the name of virtue, to practical actions and choices of the things below from which they tried to raise themselves at first.¹ But there is a third kind of godlike men who by their greater power and the sharpness of their eyes as if by a special keen-

virtue. For the Stoic doctrines of choice referred to here cp. *SVF* III 64 and 118.

ὡσπερ ὑπὸ δξυδορκίας τὴν ἄνω αἴγλην καὶ ἤρθη τε
 ἐκεῖ ὄιον ὑπὲρ νεφῶν καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀχλύος καὶ
 20 ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖ τὰ τῆδε ὑπεριδὸν πάντα ἡσθὲν τῷ τόπῳ
 ἀληθινῶ καὶ οἰκείῳ ὄντι, ὡσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πλάνης
 εἰς πατρίδα εὐνομον ἀφικόμενος ἄνθρωπος.

2. Τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ τόπος; καὶ πῶς ἂν τις εἰς
 αὐτὸν ἀφίκοιτο; ἀφίκοιτο μὲν ἂν ὁ φύσει ἐρωτικὸς
 καὶ ὄντως τὴν διάθεσιν ἐξαρχῆς φιλόσοφος, ὠδίνων
 μὲν, ἅτε ἐρωτικὸς, περὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος
 5 δὲ τοῦ ἐν σώματι κάλλους, ἀλλ' ἐνθεν ἀναφυ-
 γῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλη, ἀρετὰς καὶ
 ἐπιστήμας καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμους,
 πάλιν αὖ ἐπαναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ καλῶν
 αἰτίαν, καὶ εἴ τι πάλιν αὖ πρὸ τούτου, ἕως ἐπ' ἔσχα-
 10 τὸν ἦκη τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ παρ' αὐτοῦ καλόν. ἐνθα καὶ
 πῶς ἀναβήσεται, καὶ πόθεν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ, καὶ τίς
 λόγος τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα παιδαγωγῆσεται; ἢ ὅδε
 τοῦτο τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπακτόν
 ἐστὶ τοῖς σώμασι· μορφαὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ σωματίων ὡς
 15 ἐπὶ ὕλη αὐτοῖς. μεταβάλλει γοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον
 καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦν γίνεται. μεθέξει ἄρα, φησὶν
 ὁ λόγος. τί οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαν σῶμα καλόν; ἄλλως
 μὲν κάλλους παρουσία, ἄλλως δὲ ψυχῆ, ἢ ἐπλάσέ τε
 καὶ μορφῆν τοιάνδε ἐνῆκε. τί οὖν; ψυχῆ παρ'
 αὐτῆς καλόν; ἢ οὐ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἦν φρόνιμός τε

¹ For the Homeric allusions here and their significance see I. 6. 8, n. 1.

² Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* are here, as often, combined: cp. *Phaedrus* 248D3-4 and *Symposium* 210B3-C6. For the possible passage from musician to lover and lover to

sightedness see the glory above and are raised to it as if above the clouds and the mist of this lower world and remain there, overlooking all things here below and delighting in the true region which is their own, like a man who has come home after long wandering to his own well-ordered country.¹

2. What, then, is this region? And how could one reach it? The man could reach it who is by nature a lover and truly disposed to philosophy from the beginning, in travail over beauty, since he is a lover, not enduring the "beauty of body" but escaping from it up to the "beauties of soul, virtues and kinds of knowledge and ways of life and laws"²; and again he ascends to the cause of the beauties in soul, and again to anything there may be beyond this, till he comes to the ultimate which is the first, which is beautiful of itself. When he has arrived there he ceases from his travail, but not before. But how will he ascend, and where will his power come from, and what reasoning will guide this Love on his way? This one: this beauty which rests on bodies comes to the bodies from elsewhere; for these beauties are forms of bodies which rest upon them as if on their matter. At any rate what underlies them changes, and becomes ugly instead of beautiful. Its beauty comes by participation, then, our reasoning says. What then is it which makes a body beautiful? In one way it is the presence of beauty, in another the soul, which moulded it and put this particular form in it. Well, then, is the soul beautiful of itself? No, it is not. For [if it was] one soul would

philosopher in Plotinus op. I. 3. 1-2 (Plotinus in these chapters does not simply identify the lover and the philosopher as he does in this earlier treatise).

20 καὶ καλή, ἣ δὲ ἄφρων τε καὶ αἰσχροῦ. φρονήσει
 ἄρα τὸ καλὸν περὶ ψυχῆν. καὶ τίς οὖν ὁ φρόνησιν
 δοῦς ψυχῆ; ἢ νοῦς ἐξανάγκης, νοῦς δὲ οὐ ποτὲ
 μὲν νοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄνοος, ὅ γὰρ ἀληθινός. παρ'
 αὐτοῦ ἄρα καλός. καὶ πρότερον δὴ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ
 25 στήναι ὡς πρῶτον, ἢ καὶ νοῦ ἐπέκεινα δεῖ ἵέναι,
 νοῦς δὲ προσέστηκε μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης ὡς πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς, ὡσπερ ἐν προθύροις τὰγαθοῦ ἀπαγγέλλων
 ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὡσπερ ἐκείνου τύπος μαλ-
 λον ἐν πλήθει ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἐνί;

3. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ ταύτην τὴν νοῦ φύσιν, ἣν
 ἐπαγγέλλεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι τὸ ὄν ὄντως καὶ τὴν
 ἀληθῆ οὐσίαν, πρότερον βεβαιωσαμένους κατ'
 ἄλλην ὁδὸν ἰόντας, ὅτι δεῖ εἶναι τινα τοιαύτην.
 5 ἴσως μὲν οὖν γλοιοῖον ζητεῖν, εἰ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς
 οὐνοῖς. τάχα δ' ἂν τινες καὶ περὶ τούτου διαμφισ-
 βητοῖεν. μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ τοιοῦτος, οὐκ ἔστιν, καὶ εἰ
 χωριστός τις, καὶ εἰ οὗτος τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τῶν
 εἰδῶν φύσις ἐνταῦθα, περὶ οὗ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰπεῖν
 πρόκειται. ὁρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα
 10 σύνθετα καὶ ἀπλοῦν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἓν, ἃ τε τέχνη
 ἐργάζεται ἕκαστα, ἃ τε συνέστηκε φύσει. τὰ τε
 γὰρ τεχνητὰ ἔχει χαλκὸν ἢ ξύλον ἢ λίθον καὶ παρὰ
 τούτων οὐπω τετέλεσται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τέχνη ἐκάστη
 ἢ μὲν ἀνδριάντα, ἢ δὲ κλίνην, ἢ δὲ οἰκίαν ἐργάσῃται
 εἶδους τοῦ παρ' αὐτῆς ἐνθέσει. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ φύσει
 290

not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. So beauty in the soul comes by wisdom. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the soul? Intellect, necessarily, an intellect which is not sometimes intellect and sometimes unintelligent, but the true Intellect. This, then, is beautiful of itself. Should we then stop at Intellect as the First, or must we go beyond Intellect, and does Intellect stand from our point of view in front of the first principle, as if in the porch of the Good,¹ proclaiming to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in greater multiplicity while the Good remains altogether in one?

3. We must consider the nature of this Intellect, which our reasoning tells us is the genuine reality and true substance, when we have first confirmed by following a different course that something of the sort must exist. It is perhaps ridiculous to enquire whether there is intellect in the world; though there are, it may be, people who would dispute even this. But it is more disputable if it is the sort of Intellect we say it is, and if it is a separate one, and if it is the real beings and if the nature of the Forms is there: this is our present subject. We certainly see that all the things that are said to exist are compounds, and not a single one of them is simple; [this applies to] each and every work of art, and all things compounded by nature. For the works of art have bronze or wood or stone, and they are not brought to completion from these until each art makes one a statue, another a bed, and another a house by putting the form which it has in them.

¹ Cp. Plato *Philebus* 64C1.

15 *συνεστῶτα τὰ μὲν πολυσύνθετα αὐτῶν καὶ συγκρί-
ματα καλούμενα ἀναλύσεις εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
συγκριθεῖσιν εἶδος· οἷον ἄνθρωπον εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ
σῶμα, καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα. ἕκαστον δὲ
τούτων σύνθετον εὐρῶν ἕξ ὕλης καὶ τοῦ μορφοῦντος*
20 *—ὕλη γὰρ παρ' αὐτῆς ἢ τῶν στοιχείων ἄμορφος—
ζητήσεις τὸ εἶδος ὅθεν τῇ ὕλει. ζητήσεις δ' αὖ καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν πότερα τῶν ἀπλῶν ἤδη, ἢ ἐνι τι ἐν αὐτῇ
τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁ μὲν
ὡς ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ χαλκῷ μορφῆς, ὁ δὲ οἶος ὁ τὴν μορφὴν
ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ποιήσας. τὰ αἰτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ*
25 *τοῦ παιτὸς μεταφέρων τις ἀναβήσεται καὶ ἐνταῦθα
ἐπὶ νοῦν ποιητὴν ὄντως καὶ δημιουργὸν τιθέμενος,
καὶ φήσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον δεξάμενον μορφὰς τὸ
μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι,
τὰς δὲ μορφὰς ταύτας παρ' ἄλλου ἦκειν. τοῦτο*
30 *δὲ εἶναι ψυχὴν· ψυχὴν δὲ αὖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτρασι
τὴν κόσμον μορφῆν δοῦναι· ταύτη δὲ νοῦν χορηγὸν
τῶν λόγων γεγονέναι, ὡσπερ καὶ ταῖς τῶν τεχνιτῶν
ψυχαῖς παρὰ τῶν τεχνῶν τοὺς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν
λόγους· νοῦν δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν
κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν, τὸν δὲ τὸν τὴν μορφὴν παρέχοντα*
35 *ὡς τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ᾧ πάντα ἐνυπάρχει,
ἃ δίδωσιν. ἐγγὺς μὲν ἀληθείας, ἃ δίδωσι ψυχῇ· ἃ
δὲ τὸ σῶμα δέχεται, εἶδωλα ἤδη καὶ μιμήματα.*

¹ Plotinus seems to have left out the matter which is informed or the elements brought together under the form in this phrase, though they appear in the example which follows.

And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them which are multiple compounds and are called compositions, into the form imposed on all the elements of the composition¹: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you have found that each of the elements is a compound of matter and what forms it—for the matter of the elements is in itself formless—you will enquire from where the form comes to the matter. And then again you will enquire whether the soul is one of the simple entities, or whether there is something in it like matter and something like form, the intellect in it, one intellect being like the shape on the bronze, and the other like the man who makes the shape in the bronze. And one will transfer these same observations to the whole universe, and will ascend there also to Intellect and suppose it to be the true maker and craftsman, and will say that the underlying matter receives the forms, and part of it becomes fire, and part water, and part air and earth, but that these forms come from another: and this other is soul; then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principles for their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape, like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are already images and imitations.

Some editors supply a phrase to make up the deficiency, but Plotinus is quite capable of such an omission.

4. Διὰ τί οὖν δεῖ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ ἀνιέναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὴν εἶναι τίθεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν νοῦς ψυχῆς ἕτερον καὶ κρείττον· τὸ δὲ κρείττον φύσει πρῶτον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς οἴονται, ψυχὴ νοῦν
 5 τελεωθεῖσα γεννᾷ· πόθεν γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἐνεργεία ἔσται, μὴ τοῦ εἰς ἐνεργεῖαν ἄγοντος αἰτίου ὄντος; εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τύχην, ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἔλθειν εἰς ἐνεργεῖαν. διὸ δεῖ τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργεία τίθεσθαι καὶ ἀπροσδεᾶ καὶ τέλεια· τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ὕστερα ἀπ' ἐκείνων, τελειούμενα δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν
 10 γεγεννηκότων δίκην πατέρων τελειούντων, ἃ καταρχὰς ἀτελῆ ἐγέννησαν· καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὕλην πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαν τὸ πρῶτον, εἴτ' αὐτὴν ἔμμορφον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐμπαθὲς ψυχὴ, δεῖ δέ τι ἀπαθὲς εἶναι—ἢ πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπολείται—δεῖ τι πρὸ
 15 ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ἐν κόσμῳ ψυχὴ, ἐκτὸς δὲ δεῖ τι κόσμου εἶναι, καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ ψυχῆς δεῖ τι εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ τὸ ἐν σώματι καὶ ὕλη, οὐδὲν ταῦτὸν μενεῖ.¹ ὥστε ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντες λόγοι οὐκ αἰδίοι οὐδὲ οἱ αὐτοί. καὶ ὅτι μὲν νοῦν πρὸ ψυχῆς εἶναι δεῖ, ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἂν τις θεωρήσειε.

¹ Dodds (Select Passages 15), Harder: μένει Enn.*

4. Why, then, must we go on up when we have reached the level of soul, and not suppose that it is the first reality? First of all, Intellect is other and better than soul: but the better is naturally the first. For certainly soul does not when it is made perfect generate intellect, as they think¹; for in what way will the potential become actual, if there is no cause to bring it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, there is a possibility of its not coming to actuality. So we must assume that the first realities are actual and without deficiencies and perfect; but the imperfect ones come after and derive from the first, being perfected by their begetters as fathers perfect their originally imperfect offspring: and we must assume that soul is matter to the first reality which makes it and is afterwards given shape and perfected. • But certainly if soul is a thing subject to affections, but there must be something not subject to being affected—otherwise everything will be destroyed by time—there must be something before soul. And if soul is in the universe, but there must be something outside the universe, in this way too there must be something before soul. For if what is in the universe is what is in body and matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be eternal or the same. One can see then from these and many other arguments that there must be an intellect before soul.

¹ "They" are the Stoics: cp. IV. 7. 8³. 8-9 and for the Stoic doctrine attacked here *S/V* 1, 374, 377; 11, 835-7, 839.

5. Δεῖ δὲ νοῦν λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ἐπαληθεύσομεν
 τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ τὸν δυνάμει μηδὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης
 εἰς νοῦν ἐλθόντα—εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον πάλιν αὖ πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ ζητήσομεν—ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῦν
 5 ὄντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπακτὸν τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχει, εἴ τι
 νοεῖ, παρ' αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, καὶ εἴ τι ἔχει, παρ' αὐτοῦ
 ἔχει. εἰ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτός
 ἐστὶν ἂ νοεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἄλλη, ἂ δὲ
 νοεῖ ἕτερα αὐτοῦ, αὐτὴ ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἀνόητος ἔσται·
 καὶ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐ. οὐ χωριστέον οὖν
 10 οὐδέτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου. ἔθος δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν παρ'
 ἡμῶν κἀκεῖνα ταῖς ἐπινοίαις χωρίζειν. τί οὖν
 ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τί νοεῖ, ἵνα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸν ἂ νοεῖ θώμεθα;
 ἢ δῆλον ὅτι νοῦς ὢν ὄντως νοεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ
 ὑφίστησιν. ἔστιν ἄρα ὄντα. ἢ γὰρ ἐτέρωθι ὄντα
 15 αὐτὰ νοήσει, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα. ἐτέρωθι μὲν
 οὖν ἀδύνατον· ποῦ γάρ; αὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.
 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ὥσπερ οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ
 πρῶτον ἕκαστον οὐ τὸ αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς
 εἶδος ἐπὶ ὕλη εἶδωλον ὄντος, πᾶν τε εἶδος ἐν ἄλλω
 παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἔρχεται καὶ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν
 20 ἐκεῖνου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ

5. But if we are to use the word in its true sense,
 we must take this intellect to be, not that in poten-
 tiality or that which passes from stupidity to intelli-
 gence—otherwise we shall have to look for another
 intellect before it but that which is actually and
 always intellect. But if it does not have its thinking
 from outside, then if it thinks anything it thinks it
 from itself and if it has anything it has it from itself.
 But if it thinks from itself and derives the content
 of its thought from itself, it is itself what it thinks.
 For if its substance was other [than its thinking] and
 the things which it thought were other than itself,
 its substance would itself be unintellectual: and,
 again, potential, not actual. Therefore one must
 not be separated from the other. But it is our
 habit, derived from the things in our world, to
 separate the things of that higher world in our
 conceptions of them. What then is its active
 actuality and its thinking, that we may assume it
 itself to be what it thinks? It is clear that, being
 Intellect, it really thinks the real beings and estab-
 lishes them in existence. It is, then, the real beings.
 For it will either think them as being somewhere
 else, or in itself as being itself. Now elsewhere is
 impossible: for where could it be? It thinks, there-
 fore, itself and in itself. For what it thinks is
 certainly not in the realm of sense-perception, as
 they suppose.¹ For each and every primary reality
 is not what is perceived by the senses: for the form
 on the matter in the things of sense is an image of
 the real form, and every form which is in something
 else comes to it from something else and is a like-
 ness of that from which it comes. But also, if there

¹ The Stoics again: cp. *SVF* II 88.

παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ μήπω ὄντι οὗτος νοήσει, ἵνα
 αὐτὸ ποιῇ. πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα,
 οὐ τύπους ἀφ' ἐτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶ-
 τα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν,
 αἰδίους δῆλον· εἰ δὲ αἰδίους καὶ ἀπαθείς, ἐν νῷ
 25 δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τιοιούτω καὶ προτέρω ἕξεως καὶ φύσ-
 εως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα. ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ
 ὄντα ὄντως, οὐχ οἷά ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γάρ
 ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὔτε μετ' αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ οἶον
 νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ
 εἶναι. ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε
 30 καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἐπιστήμη
 ταυτὸν τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὸ ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιζη-
 σάμην ὡς ἐν τῶν ὄντων· καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις δέ-
 οὔδεν γὰρ ἔξω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἐν τόπῳ, μένει δὲ
 αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ φθορὰν δεχόμενα· διὸ
 35 καὶ ὄντως ὄντα. ἢ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα
 ἐπακτῷ χρήσεται τῷ ὄντι, καὶ οἰκέτ' ἐκεῖνα
 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄν ἔσται. τὰ μὲν δὴ αἰσθητὰ
 μεθέξει ἐστὶν ἃ λέγεται τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως
 μορφήν ἰσχύσης ἄλλοθεν· οἶον χαλκὸς παρὰ

¹ Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 28C3-4 (the famous and much used text about the difficulty of finding "the maker and father of this All").

² Again a Platonic criticism of Stoic doctrine: cp. *SVF* II 1013 p. 302, 36-7 Arnim.

³ The name "lawgiver" for Intellect may be taken from Numenius: cp. fr. 13 Des Places (22 Leemans), where it is used of his Second God or Demiurge, whom Numenius by the use of this name may be consciously trying to identify with the God of the Jews.

⁴ An excellent example of how Plotinus collects texts from

must be a "maker of this All",¹ he will not think what is in the not yet existent universe in order to make it. The objects of his thought must exist before the universe, not impressions from other things but archetypes and primary and the substance of Intellect. But if they are going to say that rational forming principles are enough, they must clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not subject to affections, they must be in Intellect, and in an intellect of this kind, one which is prior to condition and nature and soul: for these are potential.² Intellect therefore really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the primary lawgiver,³ or rather is itself the law of being. So the statements are correct that "thinking and being are the same thing" and "knowledge of immaterial things is the same as its object" and "I searched myself" (as one of the real beings); so also are "recollections"⁴; for no one of the real beings is outside, or in place, but they remain always in themselves and undergo no alteration or destruction: that is why they are truly real. If they come into being and perish, they will have their being from outside themselves, and it will not any more be they, but that being which will be reality. The objects of sense are what they are called by participation, since their underlying nature receives its shape from elsewhere: bronze, for instance, from

earlier philosophers of very varied significance in their original contexts to support his own doctrine: cp. Parmenides fr. B 3 Diels; Aristotle *De Anima* I 4. 430a3-4 and 7. 431a1-2; Heraclitus fr. B 101 Diels; and (e.g.) Plato *Phaedo* 72E5-6.

ἀνδριαντοποιικῆς καὶ ξύλου παρὰ τεκτονικῆς διὰ
 40 εἰδώλου τῆς τέχνης εἰς αὐτὰ ἰούσης, τῆς δὲ
 τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔξω ὕλης ἐν ταυτότητι μενούσης καὶ
 τὸν ἀληθῆ ἀνδριάντα καὶ κλίνην ἐχούσης. οὕτω δὴ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων· καὶ τόδε πᾶν ἰνδαλμάτων
 μετέχον ἕτερα αὐτῶν δείκνυσι τὰ ὄντα, ἄτρεπτα μὲν
 ὄντα ἐκεῖνα, αὐτὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα, ἰδρυμένα τε ἐφ'
 45 ἑαυτῶν, οὐ τόπου δεόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μεγέθη· νοερὰν
 δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκη ἑαυτοῖς ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα. σωμά-
 των γὰρ φύσις σφύζεσθαι παρ' ἄλλου θέλει, νοῦς δὲ
 ἀνέχων θαυμαστῆ φύσει τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν πίπτοντα,
 ὅπου ἰδρυθῆ αὐτὸς οὐ ζητεῖ.

6. Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν
 αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων
 καὶ ἐν ὧν αὐτοῖς. πάντα δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἦττον διακεκριμένα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα
 5 πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲν ἔχει συγκεχυμέ-
 νον, καὶ ἐκάστη πράττει τὸ αὐτῆς, ὅταν δέη, οὐ
 συνεφέλκουσα τὰς ἄλλας, νόημα δὲ ἕκαστον καθα-
 ρὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἔνδον αὐ νοημάτων κειμένων.
 οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἔστιν ὁμοῦ
 πάντα καὶ αὐ οὐχ ὁμοῦ, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἰδία.
 10 ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς περιέχει ὡσπερ γένος εἶδη καὶ ὡσπερ

¹ An interesting combination of Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus's own views on art. Examples of craftsmen, especially sculptors, are frequently used by Aristotle when discussing causation: cp. e.g. *Physics* B 1-3. The "true bed" (the Form of bed) comes from Plato *Republic* X 597C3. But

the art of sculpture and wood from the art of carpentry, the art passing into them through an image, but itself remaining in self-identity outside matter and possessing the true statue or bed.¹ This is also true of [natural] bodies; and this All shows by its participation in appearances that the real beings are other than they; the real beings are unchanging, but the appearances change, the real beings are set firm on themselves and need no place: for they are not magnitudes; they have an intelligent existence sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else, but Intellect upholds by its wonderful nature the things which fall down by themselves, and does not look for a place to be set in.

6. Let it be granted, then, that Intellect is the real beings, possessing them all not as if [they were in it] as in a place, but as possessing itself and being one with them. "All things are together"² there, and none the less they are separate. For even soul has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not contain any confusion, and each kind of knowledge does its own work³ when the need arises without dragging in the others along with it, and each individual thought is clear of the other thoughts which remain within the mind when it comes into activity. In this way, and much more than this, Intellect is all things together and also not together, because each is a special power. But the whole Intellect

it is only in Plotinus that the art of the human artist possesses the true Forms: cp. V. 3. 1, n. 1 (p. 241).

² The phrase is taken from Anaxagoras fr. B 1 Diels.

³ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν is Plato's concise definition of justice (in city and soul): cp. *Republic* IV 433A-B.

ὄλον μέρος. καὶ αἱ τῶν σπερμάτων δὲ δυνάμεις
 εἰκόνα φέρουσι τοῦ λεγομένου· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὄλω
 ἀδιάκριτα πάντα, καὶ οἱ λόγοι ὡς περ ἐν ἐνὶ κέντρῳ·
 καὶ ὡς¹ ἐστὶν ἄλλος ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἄλλος δὲ χειρῶν
 λόγος τὸ ἕτερος εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ γενομένου ὑπ'
 15 αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γνωσθεῖς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς
 σπέρμασι δυνάμεις ἐκάστη αὐτῶν λόγος εἰς ὄλον
 μετὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμπεριεχομένων μερῶν τὸ μὲν
 σωματικὸν ἕλην ἔχει, οἷον ὅσον ὑγρόν, αὐτὸς δὲ
 εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ὄλον καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ψυχῆς
 εἶδει τῷ γενῶντι, ἢ ἐστὶν ἵδαλμα ψυχῆς ἄλλης
 20 κρείττονος. φύσιν δὲ τινες αὐτὴν ὀνομάζουσιν τὴν
 ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν, ἢ ἐκεῖθεν ὀρμηθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῶν
 πρὸ αὐτῆς, ὡς περ ἐκ πυρὸς φῶς, ἥστραπέ τε καὶ
 ἐμόρφωσε τὴν ἕλην οὐκ ἄθουσα οὐδὲ ταῖς πολυ-
 θρυλλήτοις μοχλείαις χρωμένη, δοῦσα δὲ τῶν
 λόγων.

7. Αἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ οὐσαι αἱ μὲν
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν—εἰ δὲ ἐπιστήμας τούτων λέγειν,
 πρέπει δὲ αὐταῖς τὸ τῆς δόξης ὄνομα—ἕστεραι τῶν
 πραγμάτων οὐσαι εἰκόνας εἰς τούτων· τῶν δὲ
 5 νοητῶν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστήμαι, παρὰ νοῦ εἰς
 λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὐδὲν νοοῦσι·
 καθόσον δὲ εἰσω ἐπιστήμαι, εἰσὶν αὐτὰ ἕκαστα ἃ

¹ καὶ ὡς (*nihilominus*) coniecimus: καὶ ὡς περ Enn.: καὶ Kirchhoff*.

² An allusion to the Stoic doctrine from which Plotinus develops his own view of nature, the lowest immanent form of soul, fully expounded in the first chapters of III. 8; cp. SVF II 743.

encompasses them as a genus does its species and a whole its parts. The powers of seeds give a likeness of what we are talking about: for all the parts are undistinguished in the whole, and their rational forming principles are as if in one central point; and all the same there is one principle of the eye and another of the hand, known from the sense-object which is produced by it to be distinct. As for the powers in the seeds, then, each of them is one whole formative principle with the parts included in it; it has the corporeal as its matter, for instance all which is moist in the seed, but is itself form as a whole and a formative principle which is the same as the form of soul which produced it, which is the likeness of another better soul. Some people call the soul in the seed "nature",¹ which starts from above, from the principles before it, like light from fire, and flashes out and shapes the matter, not pushing it or using all that levering they keep on talking about,² but giving it a share in its forming principles.

7. But as for the kinds of knowledge which exist in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects—if one ought to speak of "kinds of knowledge" of these; "opinion" is really the suitable name for them—are posterior to their objects and likenesses of them; but those which are of intelligible objects, which are certainly the genuine kinds of knowledge, come from Intellect to rational soul and do not think any sense-object; but in so far as they are kinds of knowledge, they are each and all of the active objects

² This seems to be an allusion to stock and often repeated Epicurean objections to the divine creation of the physical universe, for an example of which see Cicero *De Natura Deorum* I 8. 19, which may be paraphrased "Where did God get his construction machinery and labour force from?"

νοῦσι, καὶ ἔνδοθεν τό τε νοητὸν τῆν τε νόησιν
 ἔχουσιν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἔνδον—ὃ ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα—
 συνὼν αὐτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐνεργεῖα ὑπάρχων καὶ οὐκ
 10 ἐπιβάλλον ὡς οὐκ ἔχων ἢ ἐπικτώμενος ἢ διεξοδεύ-
 ων οὐ προκεχειρισμένα—ψυχῆς γὰρ ταῦτα πάθη—
 ἀλλ' ἔστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμοῦ πάντα ὢν, οὐ νοήσας,
 ἕν' ὑποστήσῃ ἕκαστα. οὐ γάρ, ὅτ' ἐνόησε θεόν,
 θεὸς ἐγένετο, οὐδέ, ὅτε ἐνόησε κίνησιν, κίνησις
 ἐγένετο. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις, τὰ εἶδη, εἰ
 15 οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε, τότε ἐγένετο ἢ
 ἔστι τόδε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς· ταύτης γὰρ τῆς νοήσεως
 πρότερον δεῖ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔλθοι
 ἐπὶ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτό; οὐ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν
 οὐδὲ ἐπέβαλεν εἰκῆ.

8. Εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις ἐνόητος, ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος τὸ
 ἐνόν· καὶ ἡ ἰδέα αὕτη. τί οὖν τοῦτο; νοῦς καὶ ἡ
 νοερά οὐσία, οὐχ ἕτερα τοῦ νοῦ ἐκάστη ἰδέα, ἀλλ'
 ἐκάστη νοῦς. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ πάντα εἶδη,
 5 ἕκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη ἐπιστήμη
 τὰ πάντα θεωρήματα, ἕκαστον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης
 οὐχ ὡς διακεκρμένον τόπῳ, ἔχον δὲ δύναμιν ἕκασ-

304

which they think, and they have from within them the object of thought and the thought, because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to hand before any discursive process—these are experiences of soul—but it stands firm in itself, being all things together, and does not think each thing in order to bring it into existence. For it is not true that when it thought a god, a god came into existence or when it thought motion, motion came into existence. It is, then, incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it happen on it casually.¹

8. If, then, the thought [of Intellect] is of what is within it, that which is within it is its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the intelligent substance; each individual Idea is not other than Intellect, but each is Intellect. And Intellect as a whole is all the Forms, and each individual Form is an individual intellect, as the whole body of knowledge is all its theorems, but each theorem is a part of the whole, not as being spatially distinct, but as having its particular power

¹ An important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the "thoughts of God".

τον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστιν οὖν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ
καὶ ἔχων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ κόρος αἰεί. εἰ μὲν
οὖν προεπεινοεῖτο ὁ νοῦς πρότερος τοῦ ὄντος, ἔδει
10 τὸν νοῦν λέγειν ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτε-
λέσαι καὶ γεννήσαι τὰ ὄντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν τοῦ νοῦ
προεπεινοεῖν ἀνάγκη, ἐγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ
νοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν
ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πῦρ ἤδη τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς
15 ἐνέργειαν, ἢ ἐν ὄντα τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔχῃ
ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἐνέργεια· μία
οὖν ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἀμφω ἓν. μία
μὲν οὖν φύσις τό τε ὄν ὅ τε νοῦς· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὄντα
καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ
αἰ οὕτω νοήσεις τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή τοῦ ὄντος καὶ
20 ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἐπεινοεῖται γὰρ μὴν μεριζομένων ὑφ'
ἡμῶν θάτερα πρὸ τῶν ἐτέρων. ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ
μερίζων νοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ
ὄν καὶ τὰ πάντα.

9. Τίνα οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἐν ἐνὶ νῷ, ἃ νοοῦντες μερί-
ζομεν ἡμεῖς; δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἡρεμοῦντα προσφέρειν,
οἷον ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἐνὶ οὖσης ἐπιθεωρεῖν τὰ
ἐνόητα. κόσμον δὲ τοῦδε ὄντος ζώου περιεκτικῶ
5 ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι καὶ
τοῖωδε εἶναι, παρ' οὗ δὲ ἔστιν εἰς νοῦν ἀναγομένου,
306

in the whole. This Intellect therefore is in itself, and since it possesses itself in peace is everlasting fullness.¹ If then Intellect was thought of as preceding being, we should have to say that Intellect by coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected and produced the real beings; but since we must think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that the real beings have their place in the thinking subject, and that the active actuality of thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they may have Intellect in its unity in them as their active actuality. But being is active actuality: so both have one active actuality, or rather both are one thing. Being and Intellect are therefore one nature; so therefore are the real beings and the active actuality of being and Intellect of this kind; and the thoughts of this kind are the form and shape of being and its active actuality. But they are thought of by us as one before the other because they are divided by our thinking. For the dividing intellect is a different one, but the undivided Intellect which does not divide is being and all things.

9. What then are the things in the one Intellect which we divide in our thinking? For they are in repose, but we must bring them forward, as one examines in order the contents of a unified body of knowledge. Since this universe is certainly a living being containing all living beings and deriving its being and its being as it is from another, and the origin of that from which it derives is traced back to

¹ For the curious mythological etymology implied here and the Platonic reminiscence which lies behind it see V. 1. 4, n. 1 (p. 23).

ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν νῶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πᾶν εἶναι, καὶ
 κόσμον νοητὸν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ὃν φησὶν ὁ
 Πλάτων "ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῶον." ὡς γὰρ ὄντος
 λόγου ζῶου τιός, οὔσης δὲ καὶ ὕλης τῆς τὸν λόγον
 10 τὸν υπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῶον γενέσθαι,
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως νοερᾶς καὶ πανδυν-
 άμου οὔσης καὶ οὐδενὸς διεύργοντος, μηδενὸς
 ὄντος μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι δυναμένου,
 ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν κοσμηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κοσμηθῆναι. καὶ τὸ
 15 μὲν κοσμηθῆναι ἔχει τὸ εἶδος μεμερισμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ
 ἀνθρωπον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα.

10. "Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς εἶδη ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐστὶ,
 ταῦτα ἐκεῖθεν· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐ. διὸ τῶν παρὰ
 φύσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ
 τέχνην ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι
 5 χωλεία. ποδῶν δὲ χωλεία ἢ δὴ ἐν τῇ γενέσει οὐ
 κρατήσαντος λόγου, ἢ δὲ ἐκ τύχης λύμη τοῦ εἶδους.
 καὶ ποιότητες δὴ σύμφωνοι καὶ ποσότητες, ἀριθμοί

¹ Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 39E8; there is an allusion above (line 4) to 33B2-3.

² The doctrine of Plotinus in this chapter differs from that of Plato, whose dialogues contain many allusions to Forms of negation, defect and evil (see the full discussion in W. D. Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 167-9, where references are given to the passages where Forms of this kind are mentioned). What Plato meant by asserting their existence, and how they are to be fitted in with other aspects of his Theory of Forms, are questions which have often puzzled ancient and modern commentators. J. N. Findlay makes most interesting philosophical sense of Forms of this kind, and contrasts Plato's doctrine on this point with that of Plotinus, to Plato's

Intellect, its whole archetype must necessarily be in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelligible universe, which Plato says exists in "the absolute living being".¹ For just as, if there exists the rational forming principle of a living creature, and the matter which receives the seminal forming principle, the living creature must necessarily come into being, in the same way also when an intelligent and all-powerful nature exists and nothing hinders it, since there is nothing between it and what is able to receive it, it is necessary that one should be formed into the order and beauty of the universe and the other should form it. And that which is formed into the universe has its form divided, man in one place and the sun in another; but the forming nature has all things in one.

10. All the things, then, which exist as forms in the world of sense come from that intelligible world; those which do not, do not. Therefore none of the things which are contrary to nature are there, just as there are none of the things which are contrary to art in the arts, and there is no lameness in seeds.² (Congenital lameness of the feet occurs when the forming principle does not master [the matter], accidental lameness by damage to the form.) There are certainly [in the intelligible world] qualities which harmonize [with nature] and quantities, and numbers and dimensions and relations, and actions

advantage: Plato: *The Written and Unwritten Doctrines* (London 1974) 41-5 and 374-5. The Middle Platonists generally denied the existence of such Forms (cp. Alcinous [Albinus] *Didaskalikos* IX), and Plotinus is simply following the common opinion of the school (which he very often does not).

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD V. 9.

τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχέσεις, ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις
αἱ κατὰ φύσιν, κινήσεις τε καὶ στάσεις καθόλου τε
καὶ ἐν μέρει τῶν ἐκεῖ. ἀντὶ δὲ χρόνου αἰών. ὁ δὲ
10 τόπος ἐκεῖ νοερῶς τὸ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν
ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων, ὃ τι ἂν λάβῃς αὐτῶν, οὐσία καὶ
νοερά, καὶ ζωῆς ἕκαστον μετέχον, καὶ ταῦτόν καὶ
θάτερον, καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ κινούμενον
καὶ ἐστῶς, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιόν, καὶ πάντα οὐσία.
15 καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεία, οὐ δυνάμει τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον· ὥστε
οὐ κενώριται τὸ ποιὸν ἐκάστης οὐσίας. ἀρ' οὖν
μόνα τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω;
ἀλλὰ πρότερον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην σκεπτέον·
κακοῦ γὰρ οὐδενός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐξ
ἐνδείας καὶ στερήσεως καὶ ἐλλείψεως, καὶ ὕλης
20 ἀτυχούσης πάθος καὶ τοῦ ὕλη ὡμοιωμένου.

11. Τὰ οὖν κατὰ τέχνην καὶ αἱ τέχναι; τῶν δὴ
τεχνῶν ὅσαι μιμητικάι, γραφικὴ μὲν καὶ ἀνδριαντο-
ποιία, ὄρχησις τε καὶ χειρονομία, ἐνταῦθά που
τὴν σύστασιν λαβοῦσαι καὶ αἰσθητῷ προσχρώμεναι
5 παραδείγματι καὶ μιμούμεναι εἶδη τε καὶ κινήσεις
τάς τε συμμετρίας ἃς ὁρῶσι μεταθιβεῖσαι οὐκ
ἂν εἰκότως ἐκεῖ ἀνάγιντο, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ.
εἰ δέ τις ἕξις ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῶα συμμετρίας ὅλως¹

¹ Harder: ὅλων wBUCz: ὄρον R: ὄρων J.

ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

and experiences which are according to nature, and both universal motion and rest and the motion and rest of parts of the intelligible. But there is eternity instead of time. And place there exists in the intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in another. There, then, since all things are together, whichever you take of them is substance and intelligent, and each shares in life, and is same and other, and motion and rest, and in motion and at rest, and substance and quality, and all of them are substance. For each real being is actual, not potential: so that the quality of each substance is not separated from it.¹ Are there, then, in the intelligible world only the things which are in the sense-world or are there others over and above them? But we must first enquire about works of art: for there is no Form of Evil; since evil here is the result of want and deprivation and failure and is a misfortune of matter and of that which becomes like matter.

11. Are the works of art and the arts there, then? As for all the imitative arts, painting and sculpture, dancing and mime, which are in some way composed of elements from this world and use a model perceived by sense and imitate the forms and movements and transpose into their own terms the proportions which they see, it would not be reasonable to trace them back to the intelligible world except as included in the forming principle of man. But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living

¹ On substance and quality in the intelligible world see the much fuller discussion in the treatise *On Substance, or on Quality* (II. 6); cp. also VI. 2. 14 and the very thorough investigation of the whole subject in Klaus Wurm *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin-New York 1973).

ζώων ἐπισκοποῦτο, μόνιον ἂν εἴη δυνάμεως τῆς κα-
 κεί ἐπισκοπούσης καὶ θεωρούσης τὴν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ
 10 περὶ πάντα συμμετρίαν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μουσικὴ πᾶσα
 [περὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσα καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἢ μὲν]¹ περὶ
 ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν ἔχουσα τὰ νοήματα τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον ἂν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν νοητὸν ἀριθ-
 μὸν ἔχουσα. ὅσαι δὲ ποιητικαὶ αἰσθητῶν τῶν
 κατὰ τέχνην, οἶον οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ τεκτονικὴ,
 15 καθόσον συμμετρίαις προσαχρῶνται, ἀρχὰς ἂν ἐκεί-
 θεν ἔχοιεν καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ φρονήσεων· τῷ δὲ αἰσ-
 θητῷ ταῦτα συγκερασάμεναι τὸ ὄλον οὐκ ἂν εἰεν
 ἐκεῖ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γεωργία
 συλλαμβάνουσα αἰσθητῷ φυτῷ, ἰατρικὴ τε τὴν
 ἐνταῦθα ὑγίειαν θεωροῦσα ἢ τε περὶ ἰσχὺν τήνδε
 20 καὶ εὐεξίαν· ἄλλη γὰρ ἐκεῖ δύναμις καὶ ὑγίεια, καθ'
 ἣν ἀπρεμῆ πάντα καὶ ἰκανά, ὅσα ζῶα. ῥητορεία δὲ
 καὶ στρατηγία, οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλική, εἴ τινας
 αὐτῶν τὸ καλὸν κοινωνοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, εἰ
 ἐκείνο θεωροῦεν, μοῖραν ἐκεῖθεν εἰς ἐπιστήμην

¹ *delevimus*: ἢ μὲν *legendum*, nam *exorditur* *variam* *lectionem*: ἢ μὲν *Kirchhoff* (*quatenus* *Ficinus*).

¹ On art in the intelligible world and the access of the artist's mind to the Forms cp. V. 8. 1. There is no reason to suppose that Plotinus intends to abandon there the distinction which he makes here between art which is simply unintelligent copying of sense-objects and the truly intellectual visual art and music which has its origin in the intelligible world.

² Forms of artefacts are mentioned several times in the Dialogues, but the question whether Plato really believed in their existence (or changed his mind about them) has been

things and goes on from there to consider the proportions of living things in general, it would be a part of the power which also in the higher world considers and contemplates universal proportion in the intelligible. And certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is concerned with intelligible number.¹ And as for the arts which produce artificial sense-objects, for instance building and carpentry, in so far as they make use of proportions, they would have their principles from the intelligible world and the practical thinking there; but since they mix these up with what is perceived by the senses they would not be altogether in the intelligible world, except in the [Form of] man.² There would certainly not be farming there which helps the plants of the sense-world to grow, or medicine which has as its object of contemplation health here below, or the art which is concerned with strength and good bodily condition; for power in the intelligible world is different, and so is the health by which all living things there are undisturbed and adequate. And rhetoric and generalship, and the arts of administration and kingship, if any of them communicate excellence in the field of action, supposing that they contemplate that intelligible excellence, they have some part for their knowledge derived from the

vigorously discussed since Aristotle: see the good summary of the discussion (with full references) in Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* 171-5 (cp. ch. 10, n. 2, p. 309). Most Middle Platonists rejected them: see the passage from Alcinous [Albinus] cited in ch. 10, n. 1. Plotinus is here again following school tradition in this rather summary early treatise.

25 ἔχουσι ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ἐκεῖ. γεωμετρία δὲ νοητῶν οὐσα τακτέα ἐκεῖ, σοφία τε ἀνωτάτω περὶ τὸ ὄν οὐσα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνας ταῦτα.

12. Εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἐκεῖ καὶ λογικοῦ ἐκεῖ καὶ τεχνικοῦ καὶ αἱ τέχναι νοῦ γεννήματα οὔσαι, χρῆ δὲ καὶ τῶν καθόλου λέγειν τὰ εἶδη εἶναι, οὐ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπου. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ ὁ¹ καθέκαστα· τὸ δὲ καθέκαστον, ὅτι [μῆ]² τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλω· οἷον ὅτι ὁ μὲν σιμός, ὁ δὲ γρυπός, γρυπότητα μὲν καὶ σιμότητα διαφορὰς ἐν εἶδει θετέον ἀνθρώπου, ὡσπερ ζήου διαφοραὶ εἰσιν· ἦκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τὸν μὲν τοιάνδε γρυπότητα, τὸν δὲ τοιάνδε. καὶ χρωμάτων 10 διαφορὰς τὰς μὲν ἐν λόγῳ οὔσας, τὰς δὲ καὶ ὕλην καὶ τόπον διάφρον ὄντα ποιεῖν.

¹ Blumenthal: ὁ Enn.*
² del. Müller.

¹ With the older punctuation of Perna and Creuzer, to which Henry-Schwyzler have now returned, the sense of this passage and its relevance to its context is clear, as Igal has pointed out (he has kindly communicated his conclusions to Schwyzler and me by letter, and published them in Spanish in *Emerita* XLI, 1973, 92-8). The subject of discussion is still intellectual and artistic man and his arts and sciences: Plotinus is pointing out that if they are there the universal Forms which intellectual and artistic man thinks about must necessarily be there also, but no necessary conclusion follows about individual Forms. We cannot assert their existence because the intellectual arts and sciences exist in the intelligi-

knowledge there. And since geometry is concerned with intelligibles, it must be placed there, and wisdom, which is on the highest level and concerned with being. This is enough about the arts and their works.

12. But if the Form of man is there, and of rational and artistic man, and the arts which are products of Intellect, then one must say that the Forms of universals are there, not of Socrates but of man.¹ But we must enquire about man whether the form of the individual is there; there is individuality, because the same [individual feature] is different in different people: for instance, because one man has a snub nose and the other an aquiline nose, one must assume aquilinity and snubness to be specific differences in the form of man, just as there are different species of animal; but one must also assume that the fact that one man has one kind of aquiline nose and one another comes from their matter. And some differences of colour are contained in the formative principle but others are produced by matter and by different places of abode.

ble, but the question of their existence is left open. Plotinus is free to assert the existence of individual Forms on different grounds, as he did later in V. 7 (18), without any inconsistency with the present passage. It should be noted that in what immediately follows Plotinus is not considering men's souls, selves or personalities but the bodily differences between individuals, exemplified as usual by Socrates's snub nose. But in the next chapter he reminds us that, whether there are Forms of individual selves in the intelligible world (a question he does not raise here) or not, our souls have a permanent footing in the intelligible world. On the whole subject of Forms of individuals in Plotinus see my article "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" (*Dionysius* 1, 1977, 49-68) and the references to other literature there given.

13. Λοιπὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ μόνα τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ
 ἐκεῖ, ἢ καὶ, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος¹
 ἕτερος, εἰ καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοψυχὴ ἐκεῖ ἕτέρα καὶ νοῦ
 αὐτονοῦς. λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα
 5 δεῖ, ὅσα ἐνταῦθα, εἶδωλα νομίζεσθαι ἀρχετύπων, οὐδὲ
 ψυχὴν εἶδωλον εἶναι αὐτοψυχῆς, τιμιότητι δὲ
 ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα,
 ἴσως δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐνταῦθα, αὐτοψυχὴν. εἶναι δὲ
 ψυχῆς ὄντως οὔσης ἐκάστης καὶ δικαιοσύνην δεῖ
 τινα καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ' ἡμῶν
 10 ψυχαῖς ἐπιστήμην ἀληθινήν, οὐκ εἶδωλα οὐδὲ
 εἰκόνας ἐκείνων ὡς ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 ἐκεῖνα ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντα ἐνταῦθα. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τινι
 τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένα ἐκείνου. ὥστε, ὅπου ψυχῆ
 σώματος ἐξανέδου, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐκεῖνα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μοναχοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοητὸς πανταχοῦ.
 15 ὅσα μὲν οὖν ψυχὴ ἔχει² ἢ τοιαύτη ἐνταῦθα, ταῦτα
 ἐκεῖ. ὥστε, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμέ-
 νοις λαμβάνοιτο, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείω. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λέγοιτο
 συμπεριλαμβανομένων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν
 ψυχῇ, πάντα ἐνταῦθα, ὅσα καὶ ἐκεῖ.

14. Τὴν οὖν τὰ πάντα περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ
 φύσιν ταύτην ἀρχὴν θετέον. καὶ πῶς, τῆς μὲν
 ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως ἐνός καὶ ἀπλοῦ πάντη οὔσης,
 πλήθους δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὔσιν ὄντος; πῶς παρὰ τὸ ἐν,

¹ R^{smg}, Kirchoff*: αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος Enn.

² R²⁸ (habet Ficinus): ἐκεῖ A¹⁸ (nunc erasum) EBxUCz: om. A.

13. It remains to say whether only the Forms of things in the sense-world exist in the intelligible, or if also, just as there is an Absolute Man different from man, there is an Absolute Soul different from soul and an Absolute Intellect different from intellect. It must be said first that not all things which are here below ought to be considered as images of archetypes, and soul should not be considered as an image of Absolute Soul, but one soul differs from another in honour, and there is Absolute Soul here below, though perhaps not as if here below. And there must belong to an individual soul that is really a soul some kind of righteousness and moral integrity, and there must be true knowledge in the souls which are in us, and these are not images or likenesses of their Forms as things are in the sense-world, but those very Forms themselves existing here in a different mode: for they are not separated off in a particular place; so that when the soul emerges from the body, those virtues too are in the higher world. For the sense-world is in one place, but the intelligible world is everywhere. Everything then which a soul of this kind has here below is there in the intelligible world; so that if one takes "things in the sense-world" to mean "things in the visible realm", there are not only the things in the sense-world there, but more; but if one means "things in the universe", including soul and the things in soul, all the things are here below which are in the intelligible world.

14. This nature, therefore, which includes all things in the intelligible is to be taken as the principle. But how is this possible, when the real principle is one and altogether simple, but there is

5 καὶ πῶς πλήθος, καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ
τί νοῦς ταῦτα καὶ πόθεν, λεκτέον ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς
ἀρχομένοις.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ σήψεως καὶ τῶν χαλεπῶν, εἰ
καῖκεῖ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ ῥύπου καὶ πηλοῦ, λεκτέον, ὡς,
ὅσα κομίζεται νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, πάντα ἄριστα.
10 ἐν οἷς εἶδεν οὐ ταῦτα· οὐδ' ἐκ τούτων νοῦς,
ἀλλὰ ψυχὴ παρὰ νοῦ, λαβοῦσα παρὰ ὕλης ἄλλα, ἐν
οἷς ταῦτα.

Περὶ δὲ τούτων σαφέστερον λεχθήσεται ἐπαυελ-
θοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐξ ἐνὸς πλήθος.

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ σύνθετα εἰκῆ ὄντα, οὐκ ἐν εἶδει· ἀλλ' ἐφ'
15 ἑαυτῶν αἰσθητὰ συνελθόντα, οὐκ ἐν εἶδει· τά τε
ἐκ σήψεως ψυχῆς ἄλλο τι ἴσως ἀδυνατούσης· εἰ
δὲ μή, ἐποίησεν ἂν τι τῶν φύσει· ποιεῖ γοῦν,
ὅπου δύναται.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτοανθρώπῳ περι-
έχονται, ὅσα τέχνη ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὰ κατὰ
φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ.

20 Πρότερον δὲ ἄλλην καθόλου, καὶ τῆς καθόλου
αὐτοψυχῆν ἤτοι τὴν ζωὴν; ἢ ἐν νῶ πρὶν γενέσθαι
ψυχῆν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται, αὐτοψυχῆν ἐκείνην λέγειν.

¹ The references forward here and at lines 12-13 may well be to V. 4 (7)—not that Plotinus thought that what he said in this little treatise by any means exhausted the subject, which he deals with again and again in later treatises.

² Here again Plotinus is following Middle Platonist school tradition, probably against Plato's real thought: cp. ch. 10, n. (p. 309) and ch. 11, n. 2. The much fuller and profounder discussion of Forms of animals in the intelligible world in VI. 7. 7-10 should be contrasted with the casual dismissal of "savage beasts" from that world here.

multiplicity on the level of the real beings? We must begin from another starting point our explanation of how there is anything besides the One, and how it is a multiplicity, and how it is all these [intelligible] beings, and why Intellect is all these beings and where it comes from.¹

But about the creatures which originate from putrefaction and savage beasts, whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible, and if there is one of dirt and mud, we must say that all things which Intellect gets from the First are the best; and among these Forms there are not the things we have just mentioned²; nor does Intellect take them from these Forms, but Soul which derives from Intellect, which takes other things, including these, from matter.

We shall speak more clearly about these questions when we return to the problem of how multiplicity comes from one.

But we must say that casual composites, which are not produced by Intellect but are things of sense coming together by themselves, are not among the Forms; and the products of putrefaction occur, perhaps, because the soul was unable to produce anything else; if it had been it would have produced something natural; it does so, at any rate, wherever it can.

About the arts we must say that all the arts are included in the Absolute Man whose subject-matter is in accordance with human nature.

But is there, before the individual soul, another universal soul, and before the universal soul the Absolute Soul or Life? [We must] say that Absolute Soul must be in Intellect before Soul comes to be in order that it may come to be.