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Chapter 7:

Education and National Narratives: Changing Representations of the Armenian Genocide in History Textbooks in Turkey

Jennifer M. Dixon

Abstract:

Over the past several decades, Turkey's narrative of the Armenian genocide has come under increasing scrutiny, both domestically and internationally. In response, state officials have defended and adapted the official version of events, repeatedly turning to the educational system as one of a set of channels through which the state's narrative is disseminated. This article analyses changes in the official narrative of the 'Armenian question' in Turkish high school history textbooks over the past half-century, and identifies the domestic and international factors that have influenced these changes. The first part of the article sets up the context, briefly outlining the history of the genocide, highlighting institutional and ideational reasons for the silencing of this part of Turkey's past, and describing the role of education in the creation of Turkish citizens. The second section traces how the 'Armenian question' has been presented in Turkish history textbooks, describing the content of the narrative within four different historical phases, and highlighting the changes between each of these phases. Finally, the last section discusses the domestic and international pressures that account for these shifts in the narrative.

Introduction¹⁵⁸

In 2001, the Turkish government formed an interagency committee to coordinate state policies on the ‘Armenian question’, which is the Turkish phrase for the political issue of the Armenian genocide.¹⁵⁹ At the time of the formation of this committee, a leading Turkish politician, Devlet Bahçeli, stated that one of its purposes was to “ensure that young people are informed about the past, present, and future of unfounded allegations of genocide” (European Stability Initiative 2009, p. 7). This statement did not, however, signal a new response by national policymakers to criticisms of the state’s position on the ‘Armenian question’. Instead, this step was in line with the state’s long-standing approach to education and national narratives. Over the course of its eighty-seven year history, Turkish officials have relied on the national educational system to inculcate national narratives and official ideologies in each generation of Turkish citizens, especially on sensitive issues such as the Armenian genocide.

Over time, however, *what* the state has taught young citizens about the Armenian genocide has changed. In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, Turkish high school students did not learn anything about Armenians’ existence in the Ottoman Empire or about their deportation during World War I (WWI). Starting in the 1980s, however, high school history textbooks taught Turkish students that Armenians rose up and violently attacked the Ottoman government and innocent fellow citizens prior to and during WWI, and that the government forcibly relocated Armenians in order to protect and preserve the Turkish nation. A decade later, Turkish high school students were told that Armenians were traitors and propagandists who had tried to take advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and had ‘stabbed Turks in the back’. And more recently, high school history textbooks in Turkey described the ‘Turkish-Armenian War’ that took place between Turks and Armenians following the end of World War I,¹⁶⁰ and mentioned that recent research and excavations have documented the fact that Armenians committed genocide against Turks.

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159 The Turkish is ‘*Ermeni sorunu*’ or ‘*Ermeni meselesi*’, both of which mean ‘the Armenian question/problem/issue.’ These euphemisms date from approximately the last quarter of the 19th century. Since 1915, these phrases have come to focus on the controversy over the Armenian genocide. More recently, other phrases have also been used, such as ‘*sözde Ermeni iddiaları/soykırımı*’ (‘the so-called Armenian claims/genocide’) and ‘*1915 olayları*’ (‘the 1915 events’).

160 Although there was an Armeno-Turkish war in the autumn of 1920, this conflict was between the Turkish Nationalist armed forces and the Republic of Armenia, which had been formed in the Caucasus in mid-1918. The Turkish advance beyond the pre-World War I boundary culminated in the partition and Sovietisation of the Armenian republic. The Soviet-Turkish treaties of Moscow and Kars in 1921 awarded the entire province of Kars and part of the province of Yerevan to Turkey.

Over these past few decades, as representations of the ‘Armenian question’ in Turkish textbooks have shifted, there have been two important constants. First, Turkish officials have consistently rejected the term genocide for the events of 1915-17. And second, Turkish officials have continued to use the national educational system to shape citizens’ understanding of the ‘Armenian question’¹⁶¹ and to bolster domestic support for its official position. Given these basic constants, what factors account for the changing way in which this issue is presented in Turkish schoolbooks?

This article has two goals: to analyse changes in the narrative of the Armenian question in Turkish high school history textbooks over the past half-century, and to identify the domestic and international factors that have influenced these changes. In the first part of the article, I set up the context: briefly outlining the history of the genocide, highlighting institutional and ideational reasons for the silencing of this part of Turkey’s past, and describing the role of education in the creation of Turkish citizens. As the official narrative of the Armenian question has come under scrutiny and been challenged, state officials have defended and adapted the official version of events, repeatedly turning to the educational system as one of a set of channels through which its narrative is disseminated. In the second part, I trace how the Armenian question has been presented in Turkish history textbooks, describing the content of the narrative within four different historical phases, and highlighting the changes between each of these phases. In the third part, I discuss the domestic and international pressures that influenced these shifts in the narrative. In the conclusion, I argue that this analysis demonstrates the multivalent impact of external pressures on states’ historical narratives.

I. The context

a. Historical background

I begin by briefly sketching the events that underlie this narrative. The Armenian genocide took place between 1915 and 1917, when the majority of the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire were killed or forcibly deported from their homes to inhospitable locations in the Syrian desert and elsewhere within Ottoman territory.¹⁶² During and under the cover of this forced deportation, an estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed or died,¹⁶³ the vast majority of Armenian properties

161 For simplicity, I will mostly refer to the ‘Armenian question’ without using quotes.

162 A large body of evidence has documented the genocidal nature of these events. For political and legal evaluations, see: International Association of Genocide Scholars 2005; Whitaker 1985; International Center for Transitional Justice 2003. For an overview of scholarship on the genocide, see Hovannisian 2007. For an overview of the events preceding and during the genocide, see: Mann 2005. See also: Akçam 2004; Bloxham 2003; Dadrian 1995; Davis 1989; Hovannisian ed 2003; Naimark 2001. For a dissenting view, see: Lewy 2005.

163 The number of Armenians that died in the course of the genocide is difficult to accurately pinpoint and highly disputed. Estimates range from 1.5 million to a low of 200,000, with most scholars agreeing on at least 800,000 deaths. On this point, see: Bloxham 2005, p. 10; Dadrian 1992; Hovannisian 1999, pp. 217-219; Bloxham 2003, pp. 36-37; Naimark 2001, pp. 40-41; Mann 2005, pp. 140. For a lower estimate, see: McCarthy 1983.

were appropriated and redistributed by agents of the state, and the Armenian community that had lived for centuries in Anatolia was destroyed. The deportation and concomitant massacres were ordered and organised by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that governed the Ottoman Empire at the time, and occurred within the context of the widespread ethnic cleansing of Christian minorities living within the empire (Üngör 2008; Schaller and Zimmerer 2008; Khosroeva 2007).

Immediately after the end of the war, the Ottoman government was under internal and external pressure – especially from Britain – to punish the perpetrators of the Armenian massacres. In response, it established a military tribunal to try individuals accused of involvement in the Armenian massacres (Bass 2000; Kramer 2006). At the same time, there were internal investigations and debates over responsibility for the events within the Ottoman government, including a commission of investigation in the parliament (Aktar 2007). By late 1920, however, political exigencies prompted the leaders of the Turkish nationalist movement to turn away from these prosecutions and to disavow any responsibility for the events (Bass 2000; Dadrian 1995, pp. xix-xii).

Thus, while the massacres were acknowledged immediately after the war, the issue was made a taboo in the ensuing decades, and the documentary and physical evidence of Armenian existence in eastern Anatolia was gradually erased (Kouymjian 1985, p. 173; Foss 1992; Öktem 2008). At the same time, the Turkish government fought to suppress all references to the issue internationally (Minasian 1986-87; Bobelian 2009).

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b. The stakes of the ‘Armenian question’

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the denial of this part of the nation’s founding history has become a fundamental (if silent) part of Turkey’s national identity and is tied in with the legitimacy of its most powerful political institutions.

The narrative of Turkey’s founding and history up to the present emphasises that Turkey is a nation that is surrounded by enemies, both internally and externally, that Turks have no friends and can rely on no one but themselves (Akçam 2004, pp. 39, 50; Göçek forthcoming). Moreover, Turkish nationalism emphasises that it is the responsibility of Turkey’s citizens and leaders to protect Turkey from these threats to its sovereignty and security. One observer of Turkish politics (Jenkins 2001, p. 16) writes that ‘Turks are taught, and most believe, that their country is under continual external and internal threat, both from other countries plotting to divide or acquire Turkish territory and from internal forces seeking to change the constitutional status quo. The result is often a virtual siege mentality, riddled with impossibly intricate conspiracy theories.’ This element of Turkish nationalism would be undermined if it were admitted that Armenians were not enemies attempting to kill Turks and destroy the Turkish nation, but were instead victims of aggressive state policies. Moreover, admitting that Armenians were victims of state policies of ethnic cleansing might also reveal that the supposed enemies and threats to the Turkish nation are largely imagined or created by Turkish officials.

Relatedly, in so much as the creation of enemies by the military and state officials has allowed them to limit civil liberties and Turkey's democratic advancement over the course of the second half of the twentieth century (Keyder 1997, pp. 45-46), drastic changes in the narrative of the Armenian question could raise further questions about the quality of Turkey's democracy (Akçam 2004, pp. 11-38).

Another key element of the founding national narrative and of Turkish nationalism to-day is of the unity of the nation, which implies a duty for citizens and state institutions to protect Turkey from divisive threats (Akçam 2004, p. 22; Göçek forthcoming). Turkey was founded in the face of external attempts by Britain, Russia, Greece, Italy and France to carve up Ottoman territories in the wake of the Empire's defeat in WWI, and against the backdrop of the Empire's tremendous territorial losses in the nineteenth century (Mann 2005, pp. 112-119). The country's founding narrative emphasises that the military preserved the sovereignty and unity of Turkey's territories, especially in eastern Anatolia, for the creation of the new Republic (Onar 2009, p. 3). Admitting that the elimination of Armenians in this period was intentional could delegitimise this narrative of victimhood, national trauma, and national salvation (Akçam 2004, p. 35).

Relatedly, such an admission could threaten the legitimacy of state officials. First, it would reduce the valence of a powerful mobilisational frame used by Kemalist¹⁶⁴ and nationalist politicians (Göçek forthcoming). Second, it would be feared that Turkey would be pressured to surrender parts of its territory or properties to the Republic of Armenia or to Armenian descendants of victims and survivors of the genocide. In his study of national education and culture in the late 1980s, Kaplan commented (2006, p. 198) that 'there is a widespread fear among officials and policy makers that Armenians covet Turkey's southern and eastern provinces.'¹⁶⁵ This fear is real and persistent in Turkey today, despite having little chance of being realised. And finally, it would reveal that officials have been actively lying to Turkish citizens and to the rest of the world for decades (Bobelian 2009, p. 229), which could lead citizens to question the honesty and intentions of state actors on many other issues.

Finally, acknowledging that the destruction of Ottoman Armenians was the result of planned policies of CUP leaders, many of whom were military officers or civil servants, could challenge the legitimacy of the military, which has long been regarded as the most trusted political institution in Turkey. Indicative of the special place that the Turkish military has held in Turkey's political pantheon is a statement in 1999 by 'the

164 Kemalism is the official ideology developed and espoused by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Its six principles are: secularism, republicanism, populism, nationalism, statism and reformism.

165 Interestingly, Kaplan notes that in the Turkish village in which he conducted research in the late 1980s, 'a visceral fear of Armenians returning...and reclaiming their lands still gripped local imagination. To prevent such a possibility, townspeople had leveled Armenian homes to their foundations and uprooted the orchards....Fear of the Armenians' imminent return was equally present in the geography lesson I attended. At some point in the discussion about external enemies, some pupils wondered aloud whether I had come to spy on behalf of Armenian descendants or to unearth hidden treasures they may have left behind' (2006, p. 202).

minister of culture, İstemihan Talay, [who] declared: “The Turkish military is synonymous with the Turkish nation, ... and the embodiment of the most important values which make us what we are. The Turkish military has given us victories, glory and honour” (Jenkins 2001, p. 13). However, the military is also the institution in Turkey that ‘inherited’ most of the confiscated wealth and properties of the Armenians; that has played a central role in setting and perpetuating the state’s official position on the issue since the early years of the Republic; and that has legitimated its involvement in Turkish politics by securitising many internal political problems, most notably the so-called ‘Kurdish question’. Admittedly, public trust in the military and acceptance of its interventions in domestic politics are declining as a result of ongoing investigations into alleged coup plots and revelations of the military’s involvement in illicit activities and murders. Still, ending official dissimulations about the Armenian question and accepting the basic facts about the events could further undercut the legitimacy of the military’s moral authority, its public trust and its longstanding policy of intervening in domestic *political* problems.

c. National education in Turkey

Education has been a crucial arena in which officials have communicated the state’s position on the Armenian question to generations of Turkish children.¹⁶⁶ Throughout Turkey’s history, the national education system has been an important vehicle by which official ideologies, national identity and values have been taught to the nation (Çayır 2009, p. 40). The founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, placed great importance on and even gave his own attention to the writing of a triumphalist national history in the early years of the Republic (Vryonis 1991, pp. 57-78; Copeaux 2002, p. 398).¹⁶⁷ Since then, education and history have continued to be central to the formation of Turkish identity, and in the creation of a citizenry that reveres Atatürk, upholds the founding principles of the Republic, and trusts the military (Kaplan 2006, p. 8; Çayır 2009, p. 47; Kaya et al. 2001, p. 196).

Given the national importance placed on education in Turkey – and in a reflection of the strength of the Turkish state – textbooks, curricula and the entire school system are tightly controlled by the Ministry of National Education (MEB). As an illustration of this, a 2005 World Bank study, citing OECD data, reported that ‘94 percent of all education decisions in Turkey are currently made at the central level’ (p. 9). The processes of writing curricula, approving textbooks, and selecting and training teachers are all centralised at the national level, under the auspices of the Ministry of National Education and its sub-agency, the Instruction and Education Board (TTK), and the

166 Since 1997, eight years of primary education has been compulsory and free. Secondary education is available in several different types of (mostly public) schools and, since 2005, is four years (Ceylan and Irzik 2004, p. 4). As of 2009, overall enrollment in compulsory primary education had reached 97%, while enrollment in secondary education was much lower, albeit increasing, at 58% (Commission of the European Communities 2009, p. 37).

167 Atatürk presided over the First Historical Congress in 1932, which met ‘...to draw a framework for rewriting history textbooks for elementary and secondary schools’. In a reflection of the taboo which already surrounded discussion of the ethnic cleansing and massacres of Ottoman Christians, ‘in ten days the conference heard no mention of the ethnic diversity of the Ottoman Empire and no discussion of what had happened to its Christian subjects’ (Kasaba 1997, p. 29).

independent Council of Higher Education (YÖK). Furthermore, 'Directorates of National Education, working under the Ministry of National Education, are based in each province. The curriculum is unified and developed centrally, regardless of the demography and the cultural, social and economic situation in each province. Textbooks are approved [by the TTK] in Ankara and schools and directorates have no input' (Kaya 2009, p. 9). The only part of the process that is not completely handled by the MEB or YÖK is the actual writing of textbooks, some of which are written by the Ministry and others of which are written by private textbook publishers (Çayır 2009, p. 45). But, the content of textbook curricula are specified by the TTK in such detail that there is little variation between textbooks by different authors (Soysal and Antoniou 2002, p. 57; Kaya et al. 2001, p. 159). As a result, textbooks reflect official narratives, especially on sensitive topics such as the Armenian question.

II. The Armenian question in Turkish high school history textbooks

I have analysed two series of high school history textbooks: High School History III (*Tarih Lise III*) textbooks from 1951-1990, and The History of the Revolution of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*) textbooks from 1981-2007. The High School History III textbook was used (until the late 1990s) in 10th grade, and covered Ottoman and European political and social history from the 15th to the 20th centuries, generally stopping at World War II. The History of the Revolution of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism textbook addresses more contemporary political history and is used in 11th Grade. Its content covers the first part of the 20th century, focusing particularly on the creation of the Republic of Turkey and Atatürk's role in this process.

Over the course of the nearly sixty years covered in my analysis, I have identified four phases in the representation of the Armenian question in Turkish history textbooks. The first phase lasted from 1951 to 1980, the second phase was from 1981 until the early 1990s, the third phase was from 1994 through 2001, while the last phase began in 2002. In the next several sections, I will describe the content of the narrative in, and differences between, each of these four phases.

a. Phase 1: 1950 – 1980¹⁶⁸

There is not much to write about the narrative of the 'Armenian question' in this first phase, since it was a narrative that was communicated through its *absence*. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, Armenians were notably absent from history textbooks, and the 1915 deportation was not mentioned in *any* textbook in the period. Overall, the impression of Armenians that emerged from these textbooks was of their irrelevance and near non-existence within the Ottoman Empire. For example, one textbook

168 This is based on my analysis of eleven textbooks published between 1951 and 1980. The textbooks analysed are listed in Annex 1.

notes that in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres,¹⁶⁹ ‘Anatolia was partitioned into spheres of influence. Only a few provinces in Anatolia’s centre were left to Turks’ (Akşit 1951, p. 196). There is, however, no specific reference to *whom* these spheres of influence were for, despite the fact that this treaty recognised an independent Republic of Armenia and specified that parts of Ottoman territory in eastern Anatolia might be given to this new state.

b. Phase 2: 1981 – early 1990s¹⁷⁰

Starting in the early 1980s, the Armenian question was introduced in high school history (and other) textbooks.¹⁷¹ The decision to introduce the Armenian question in textbooks at this time was made by high-level officials in the MEB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military (Lütem 2008; Türkmen 2009), in conjunction with the development of a set of strategies by state officials to re-articulate Turkey’s official narrative of the Armenian question and defend it from international criticisms (Dixon forthcoming).

Armenians were mentioned for the first time in a two-page section in a Turkish history textbook that was published in 1979 (Aydın 2001, p. 62). After 1981, however, Turkish history textbooks’ narrative of the ‘Armenian question’ differed significantly from earlier textbooks.¹⁷² In contrast to the silence on these issues that had been the norm, some textbooks in the 1980s directly mentioned the 1915 deportation decision, and some included sections on the Armenian question and its roots, history and consequences.¹⁷³ Overall, the narrative acknowledged that something had happened to Ottoman Armenians in 1915, but argued that deportation was a decision that *had* to

169 This was the peace treaty that was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers at the end of WWI, but which was superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

170 For this section, I analyzed eight textbooks published between 1981 and 1991.

171 This change occurred at the same time that a broad curriculum revision was undertaken (Kaya et al. 2001, p. 161).

172 In 1982, ‘a government [MEB] circular instructed teachers to “point out that we [Turks] had no problems with *Armenians*, who had earlier lived under the Byzantine yoke in Anatolia. It must be explained that in recent times they have been supported by foreign powers and that bloody crimes have been perpetrated on our diplomatic representatives abroad. It must be made clear that the Turkish nation has been trapped into political intrigues with terrorist aims and that, as always, it patiently waits for the justice of its case to be accepted”’ (Kaplan 2006, p. 198).

173 A new curriculum for History of the Revolution of the Turkish Republic and Atatürkism course was announced by the TTK in the summer of 1981. Thus, in a textbook published in 1981, Armenians were mentioned more than in earlier textbooks, but much less frequently and with a different tone than in the textbooks published in subsequent years. By 1983, textbooks’ coverage was significantly different from previous decades.

be taken by the authorities, and that the deportation was incomparable to the violence of Armenians before, during and after the War.¹⁷⁴

Half of the eight textbooks that I analysed in this period referred directly to the 1915 deportation of Ottoman Armenians. However, when the deportation was mentioned directly, its description was very brief.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, when the 1915 deportation decision was mentioned, the textbooks implied or stated outright (Su and Mumcu 1983, p. 118; Şenünver et al. 1989, p. 89) that it was made to ensure the safety of the Ottoman army and Turks from marauding Armenian attackers,¹⁷⁶ and disavowed culpability for the results of the deportation. For example, a 1983 textbook argued: ‘This was a very appropriate decision. ... The Turkish Nation is definitely not responsible for the things that happened during the Armenians’ migration’ (Su and Mumcu 1983, p. 118).

Importantly, the violence of the deportation, the role of agents of the government in the deportation and outright massacres of Armenians were not mentioned at all in these passages. In referring to the treatment and fate of Armenians during the deportation, three of the four textbooks that mentioned the deportation briefly alluded to the fact that ‘some’ Armenians died, but such admissions were then followed by rationalisations of these deaths. For instance, a 1983 textbook stated: ‘During the migration, a portion of Armenians lost their lives because of lack of public security and from natural conditions. But this should also not be forgotten: At Sarıkamış¹⁷⁷ alone, almost 100,000 Turkish soldiers died because of natural conditions and neglect. ... In fact, thousands of Armenians reached Syria safe and sound and there continued their lives in the protection of the Turkish State’ (Su and Mumcu 1983, p. 118).¹⁷⁸ Along similar lines, a 1989 textbook stated that ‘During this migration some Armenians died from catching epidemic sicknesses. Some Armenians experienced attacks by highway robbers’ (Uğurlu and Balcı 1989, p. 229). Moreover, these textbooks did not present any information to indicate *how many* Armenians died during the deportation and through other measures against Armenians.

174 This issue was not limited to discussions in history textbooks or at the high school level. Kaplan (2006, pp. 198-199) writes: ‘the third-grade life sciences reader simply states that “the Armenians who for years had lived with Turks began to oppress and torture the Turks.” In eighth grade, pupils read graphic accounts of Armenian atrocities in their history textbook. They study, for example, the report a Turkish general submitted to his British colleague after World War I: “The massacre at Erzincan was horrible....They burned Muslim people inside buildings they set on fire; they filled the wells with corpses....All the children were bayoneted, the elderly and the women stuffed with hay and burned, the youth chopped up with axes. Livers and hearts were seen hung on nails.”

175 It usually comprised less than one paragraph within a 3-5-page section on the Armenian question.

176 It should be noted that the majority of Armenians living in the empire were deported and/or killed, not only those who were suspected of having allied with the Russians and/or organising nationalist activities.

177 This was a Turkish military campaign in World War I, during which the Ottoman army suffered great losses, mainly from poor planning and logistics, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths from starvation and frostbite.

178 While thousands of Armenians survived the deportation and ended up in the Syrian desert, the survivors were neither safe nor sound, nor were they protected by the Ottoman government (Bloxham 2003, pp. 36-37; Marshlian 1999; Mann 2005, p. 152).

In contrast to the limited amount that was written about the deportation itself, these textbooks dwelt on the nationalist activities and desires of Armenians, the uprising of Armenians during the war,¹⁷⁹ and the violent and ‘inhuman’ attacks of Armenians on innocent Turks and Turkish villages. Textbooks explained that once the Russians ‘incited’ nationalism among the Ottoman Armenians, they [Armenians] acted brutally and violently, massacring thousands of Turks before and/or after the war.¹⁸⁰ A 1983 textbook stated that ‘The Armenian Committees, blind with rage, attacked many Turkish cities, town and villages, and murdered tens of thousands of Turks, without distinguishing between children, the old and women’ (Su and Mumcu 1983, p. 118). Likewise, a 1989 textbook stated: ‘Murdering Turks [in eastern Anatolia] as a collective, they [the Armenians] began a movement to annihilate the Turks completely. They set fire to villages. They utterly destroyed towns and cities. They murdered tens of thousands of Turks with a brutality that has never been seen before. With these tragedies, some Armenians added dark and shameful pages to the history of humanity’ (Uğurlu and Balcı 1989, p. 229). Overall, the narrative portrayed Armenians as a disloyal minority group that violently rose up against the benign Ottoman government and killed innocent Turks.¹⁸¹

The Armenian presence in the Ottoman Empire was also downplayed in these textbooks. In the previous decades, Armenians had not been mentioned at all in textbooks, giving the impression that they either did not exist or were an insignificant minority group.¹⁸² In this phase, Armenians’ presence in the Ottoman Empire, and some of their contributions to the social, economic and political life of the empire were briefly mentioned, emphasising that they were well-treated and happy before Armenian nationalist aspirations arose. In addition, four of the textbooks from this phase included short passages noting that Armenians did not constitute a majority in any Ottoman province, so their claims to Ottoman territories were unfounded (Su and Mumcu 1983, pp. 117-118; Parmaksızoğlu 1988, p. 115; Şenünver et al. 1989, p. 89).

179 In contrast to this representation, Armenian uprisings during the war were rare and were primarily defensive reactions against repression and/or the deportation order (see, e.g., Bloxham 2003, pp. 42-43; Naimark 2001, pp. 29-30; Mann 2005, p. 146, 149).

180 *After* the end of the war, some Armenians in the Russian-occupied areas of eastern Anatolia did attack Turkish villages and commit massacres of innocent Turks (Naimark 2001, p. 39). These textbooks, however, portray these massacres as occurring at the same time as, and therefore justifying, the government’s deportation of Armenians. Moreover, Mann carefully notes: ‘While not wishing to minimize the extent of the sufferings endured by the Turkish people during this period, the number of Turks actually killed (or led to their deaths) by Armenians must have been a tiny proportion of the total Turkish dead [i.e., from disease and battle-related deaths] – and a tiny proportion of the number of Armenians killed by Turks’ (2005, p. 143).

181 To a large degree, Armenians are presented as others that were not part of the Turkish nation. On this, see: Göl 2005; Kaya et al. 2001, pp. 166-167; Copeaux 2002.

182 In a study of Turkish geography textbooks, Gemalmaz (2004, p. 35) notes: ‘It is astonishing to see that a geography textbook for high schools does not contain a single sentence about minorities, as if they do not exist’. For an extended discussion of this trend in Turkish history writing in general, see: Foss 1992.

c. Phase 3: from the mid-1990s to 2001¹⁸³

In history textbooks published from the mid-1990s to 2001, the narrative of the Armenian genocide did not dramatically differ from earlier textbooks. That said, there were several differences in the content of the narrative.

The deportation decision was mentioned in all three of the textbooks that I analysed from the late-1990s, in contrast to its being mentioned in only half of the textbooks from the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, the deportation was more strongly defended. For example, a 1995 textbook stated: 'The Turkish nation definitely cannot be and should not be held responsible for what happened in the course of the Armenians' migration' (Palazoğlu and Bircan 1995, p. 145).

In addition to the stronger outright defense of the deportation decision, these textbooks also bolstered the correctness of the decision with greater emphasis on both the violence and the territorial ambitions of Armenians. For instance, a 1995 textbook described the role of the Russians in inciting nationalism in Ottoman Armenians, but then noted the following: 'By then, it was very easy to incite the Armenians; as a matter of fact, this is what happened. The leaders of the "Armenian committees" that had been established were specially trained in Russia. With these armed gangs, which were so crazed that they attempted to assassinate the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Armenian problem grew and continued' (Kalecikli 1994, p. 134). Notably, in this passage Armenians were referred to as 'armed gangs'. This phrase appeared in these textbooks several times in reference to Armenian rebellions and attacks, and painted Armenians in a more treacherous manner than in earlier textbooks.

Relatedly, Armenians were represented in textbooks in the mid- to late-1990s as traitors, which was a change in kind from depictions in earlier textbooks. While in textbooks from the 1980s and early 1990s, Armenians were described as rising up against the Ottoman authorities and attacking Turks and Turkish villages, these actions were not typically identified as betrayal or treachery. In contrast, textbooks in this phase accused Armenians of betrayal, noting that they tried to take advantage of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and that they 'stabbed Turks in the back'. For example, a 1994 textbook declared that 'in the period of the National Struggle [i.e., in the post-WWI period], underground organisations cooperated with foreign states in order to stab the Turks in the back' (Kalecikli 1994, p. 48). Likewise, a 1995 textbook stated:

Greeks and Armenians, who for hundreds of years as Turkish citizens had lived in tranquility and had benefited from all kinds of opportunities from the state, took advantage of the bad situation into which the Ottoman State had fallen, cooperated with the occupying states and worked to break up our lands. ... The Armenian Revenge Regiment, which had been established in Adana with the help of the French, started large-scale massacres. The goal of these massacres was to establish an independent State of Armenia in Eastern Anatolia (Palazoğlu and Bircan 1995, p. 40).

183 This is based on my analysis of three textbooks published between 1994 and 2000.

Finally, the textbooks published in this phase characterised the Armenian question as part of a set of lies, games and propaganda used to weaken Turkey and undermine its sovereignty.¹⁸⁴ For example, a textbook published in 1994 prefaced a discussion of the Great Power states' post-war plans with this statement: 'Propaganda that had continued for hundreds of years in the world had shown Turks as cruel and lacking the qualities of civilised human beings, and as not being capable of self-government. The Entente States, profiting from this propaganda, while thinking of introducing an independent or autonomous area for the communities that had lived for ages under the Turks' administration, were preparing a future that could not be accepted by the Turks' (Kalecikli 1994, p. 47). Similarly, a 1995 textbook cautioned: 'it would probably be an appropriate thought and behavior to examine and consider with an unbiased eye the experience and situation of Armenians who lived here as Ottoman citizens. Because on this subject, there are baseless claims and propaganda directed against Turks and against the Turkish State' (Palazoğlu and Bircan 1995, p. 144). Finally, the claim that Armenians were playing a game intended to weaken Turkey was made explicitly in the following passage:

The Ottoman State, taking measures against this situation with the forced Migration Law, forced the Armenians to migrate to regions where they would not violate the security. The Armenian-Turkish wars showed how necessary this law, which went into effect on 14 May 1915, really was. The claims [about the deportation] perpetuated by powers that until recently did not want a powerful and peaceful Turkish Republic...were scenarios which have been refuted by many documents. Those who kept the Turks and Armenians as opposing enemies and incited the Armenian people, today want to break up Turkey with a new game. The game that is being played is the same. The territory is the same; the scenarists are the same imperialists; the only change is the players. It is an irrational explanation to see the immediate halt of Armenian terrorism – which began in the 1970s and developed with attacks directed against Turkish ambassadors abroad – and was immediately followed by the start of divisive terror [i.e., domestic terror attacks by the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK)], as an accident or coincidence. Imperialism again made a mistake. Moreover, Armenia's following a barbarous and expansionist political policy in Azerbaijan with the support of Russia should be seen as a recurrence of history. If the Turkish nation turns to itself, it is impossible for our enemies to "destroy our nation/country and our customs/ethical principles" (Kalecikli 1994, pp. 136-137).

This passage linked the Ottoman government's 1915 deportation decision to a series of imperialist provocations, games and terrorism; extending from Armenian attacks during WWI, to Armenian terrorism against Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and 1980s, to Kurdish nationalist terrorism within Turkey that started in the 1980s, and up to

184 On this theme in Turkish textbooks, see: Altınay 2004, pp. 135-136.

the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territorial enclave of Nagorno-Karabagh.¹⁸⁵

d. Phase 4: from 2002¹⁸⁶

Textbooks in this most recent phase reveal several notable differences from earlier textbooks. These changes follow the establishment of the aforementioned committee in mid-2001, the purpose of which was to more effectively set and coordinate state policies on the ‘Armenian question.’¹⁸⁷ Soon after the creation of this ‘Committee to Coordinate the Struggle with the Baseless Genocide Claims (ASİMKK),’ the Ministry of National Education issued several directives related to the teaching of the Armenian question and its coverage in textbooks.

In 2002,

The National Education Ministry...decided to teach issues related to so-called Armenian genocide claims as well as Greek-Pontus and Assyrians to elementary and high school pupils...The aim of the curriculum is to make students more aware of the issues and lobby activities related to “Armenian Genocide Claims”...The five grade pupils will be given information on “Armenian Genocide Claims” and will be taught the Armenians’ status in Turkey according to the Lausanne Treaty. More detailed information will be given to the seven grade pupils...“Why did the Armenians bring up the genocide claims to the attention of the world again?” and “What are the aims of the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA’s murders?” are the questions that are going to be answered during the lessons. In high schools, more detailed information on Armenians will be given along with issues relating to “Greek-Pontus and Assyrians” (*Turkish Daily News* 2002).¹⁸⁸

The following year, in 2003, the MEB required Turkish students in every grade to write an essay refuting the genocide claims of Armenians,¹⁸⁹ and also directed the heads of schools to invite experts to give lectures and organise conferences that counter Armenian genocide claims, and to hold ‘essay contests on the “Armenian rebellion and activities during the First World War”’ (Kaya 2009, p. 27; Zarif 2003). Moreover, the Ministry also began to organise mandatory seminars for teachers, to prepare them to

185 In a reflection of this new emphasis, in 1999, the MEB sent a letter to schools in Turkey indicating that the following groups wanted to divide the country: Pontic Greeks, ethnically Greek citizens of Turkey (*Rumlar*), Armenians and Assyrians (Interview no. 6 2008).

186 This is based on my analysis of two textbooks, published in 2005 and 2007.

187 The announced purpose of ASİMKK is ‘to dismiss – without causing negative effects on [the] country – efforts concerning the unjust and baseless genocide claims to which Turkey was exposed, and to eliminate their negative effects on [Turkey’s] national interest’ (T.C. Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü 2002).

188 These policies were announced in June 2002, and detailed in the July and August 2002 issues of the *Tebliğler Dergisi*.

189 This decision was made by the ‘National Education Working Group,’ which was one of three working groups formed under the aegis of ASİMKK (Zarif 2003). Apparently, ‘Armenian schools informed the Ministry of National Education that they would not apply this circular in their schools’ (Kaya 2009, p. 27).

answer questions about genocide claims, and distributed a brochure with guidelines about points that should and should not be used in trying to shape public opinion on this issue (*Ozgur Politika* 2003).

The coverage of the Armenian question in textbooks themselves also changed noticeably.¹⁹⁰ First, both textbooks that I analysed mentioned the passage of the Deportation Law, which is consistent with the previous period. In contrast, however, the necessity of the law was justified differently from in the previous period. Instead of asserting that Turkey was not responsible for the outcome of the deportation, these textbooks more indirectly and subtly rationalised the decision. For example, a 2005 textbook wrote: ‘The Ottoman Government, in response to this behaviour of the Armenians, passed the Deportation Law that made the Armenians undergo a forced migration as a precautionary measure. After the Armenian uprisings and massacres, this law, which had been passed with the goal of ensuring the security of the army and the state, came into effect on 14 May 1915’ (Akdin et al. 2005, p. 106). Interestingly, immediately after describing the Deportation Law, a 2007 textbook stated that the Ottoman Government also passed a Return Decree, which ‘arranged for Armenians’ return’ (Kara 2007, p. 130).¹⁹¹ There was no mention in either textbook of Armenian deaths or suffering in the deportation.

Another difference in these textbooks is that Armenians’ murder of Turks was mentioned more frequently (albeit in less graphic terms), and Armenians’ plans to rise up against the Ottoman Government were chronicled in greater detail. This created a stronger overall impression of Armenians’ disloyalty, without the textbooks using such strong language. This reflects a 2005 decision of the military’s powerful National Security Council to use more moderate language when referring to neighboring countries and to avoid expressions that would instigate animosity between peoples, which was then applied to the language used in textbooks (*Taraf* 2009).

The third difference in this phase is more remarkable. Both textbooks introduced the concept of genocide, referring to the passage of the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention in 1948 and outlining its definition of genocide (Kara 2007, p. 57; Akdin 2005, p. 39). Then, both textbooks asserted that Greek claims of a genocide committed by Turks against Pontic Greeks are, in the words of one of the textbooks, ‘completely invalid and wrong’ on definitional, historical and scientific grounds (Kara 2007, p. 57). Moreover, when the Deportation Law was discussed later in the 2005 textbook, the issue of genocide claims was again revisited. The textbook declared: ‘The Turkish Government is held to be responsible for these events, and there is talk of a so-called Armenian genocide. It should not be forgotten that, a genocide was committed by the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Mass graves and discoveries, which are emerging with

190 Because I have only been able to analyse two textbooks from this phase, my remarks are more limited and tentative.

191 This ‘Return Decree’ was a window-dressing. In reality, as Armenians were being deported and killed, an agency within the Interior Ministry was tasked with collecting, storing and selling Armenians properties for the benefit of the state and CUP loyalists; and relocating Muslim refugees (largely from the Balkans) to villages and homes vacated by Armenians (Mann 2005, p. 157, 170). Moreover, those surviving Armenians who returned to their homes and villages after the genocide were largely unable to reclaim their own homes and properties.

research and investigations that are being conducted today, document the massacres that Armenians carried out' (Akdin 2005, p. 106). This assertion was not present in earlier textbooks and is a striking claim. Moreover, both of these textbooks also addressed and dismissed claims of genocide of Pontic Greeks and Assyrians, which were not addressed as such in earlier phases.

In late 2003 the Ministry of National Education announced that it would begin a process of rewriting the curricula for textbooks used in primary and secondary schools throughout Turkey. This was decided in response to many criticisms of the curricula, which up until these reforms were based on rote learning. The writing of new curricula for primary schools was undertaken first, starting in 2003, and textbooks based on the new curricula were first used in the 2005-06 school year (Interview no. 18 2009). In contrast, the revised secondary school curricula, which I have not yet had the opportunity to analyse, were only recently introduced. That said, indications are that the *content* of the curricula is little changed, especially on sensitive topics such as the Armenian question (Koc et al. 2007, p. 37; Çayır 2009, pp. 41-42).¹⁹²

III. Explaining these changes

What factors have driven the changes chronicled in the preceding section? While none of the shifts in the representation of the 'Armenian question' in Turkish textbooks that I have outlined above constitutes a complete reversal in the official narrative, many of these changes are significant ones. In the next few pages, I outline the domestic and international factors that most strongly influenced these changes.

a. Moving from the first to the second phase

The emergence of a narrative about the 'Armenian question' in textbooks in the early 1980s was prompted by two new international trends, both of which began in the mid-1970s and brought attention to the Turkish government's silence about the Armenian genocide.

The first of these factors was terrorism. Between 1975 and 1983, radical Armenian terrorist groups targeted Turkish diplomats and other Turkish entities in a spate of deadly attacks that were intended to pressure Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian genocide. These attacks resulted in numerous deaths and had a very strong impact on Turkish officials and the Turkish public, as well as on Turkey's narrative itself.¹⁹³ In particular, the start of these attacks was the beginning of the Turkish public's awareness of this issue, which had been successfully erased from public discourse over the course of the previous decades.

192 One interviewee informed me that the National Security Council (via ASİMKK) rejected most of the proposed changes to sections about the Armenian question in primary school curricula (Interview no. 18 2009).

193 Interviewees repeatedly emphasised the impact of this terrorism on Turkish officials' and the Turkish public's views of this issue. See also: Bloxham 2005, p. 219; Foss 1992, pp. 269-270; Bayraktar 2005.

Aside from this terrorism, the 1970s also marked the first signs of political efforts by Armenians to get other states and international organisations to officially recognise the genocide (Bloxham 2005, p. 215; Bobelian 2009, pp. 164-206). In 1971, a subcommittee of the UN Committee on Human Rights commissioned a report on genocide. When the second draft of this report was submitted in 1973, the Armenian genocide was mentioned in one paragraph (Fine 1985). Turkish diplomats immediately mobilised to oppose this passage, and eventually succeeded in getting it removed from later drafts (Smith 1992, p. 11). Around the same time, in 1975, the US House of Representatives debated a resolution to commemorate the Armenian genocide. While this resolution only passed in the House of Representatives, it marked the beginning of an ongoing political struggle over this issue in the US, and one to which Turkey is particularly sensitive (Bobelian 2009, pp. 164-206).

In the late 1970s, as these pressures were beginning to accumulate, Turkish politicians and officials were preoccupied with the country's domestic political turmoil and issues related to the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. As a result, while diplomats continued to work to prevent any references to the Armenian genocide internationally (Bobelian 2009, pp. 127-134, 166-168), changes in the state's strategies and domestic narrative came only after 1980. Following the 1980 military coup, however, Turkish officials and bureaucrats turned their attention to these growing international criticisms and developed a set of strategies to actively respond to these challenges (Dixon forthcoming), which included the narrative that appeared in textbooks in the early 1980s.

118

b. Moving from the second to the third phase

In the 1990s, new factors – both international and domestic – put increased pressure on Turkey's narrative of the Armenian genocide, eventually leading to the changes in textbooks that I described in the second phase.

The end of the Cold War changed the international structural context, which had long supported Turkey's silence on and sensitivity to the Armenian genocide. In particular, the end of the Cold War altered the calculus for Turkey on the issue of the Armenian genocide in several ways. First, it diminished Turkey's geostrategic importance, since its role as a bulwark against the further spread of Soviet power and communism was no longer relevant. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a host of new states (and conflicts) in the world prompted major shifts in the foreign policy priorities of the US, which was Turkey's most important ally. Finally, the end of the Cold War introduced a new actor into the politics surrounding the Armenian genocide: the Republic of Armenia. Turkey recognised the new republic in 1991, but severed diplomatic relations and closed the shared border two years later, in response to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Since then, the normalisation of relations between Turkey and Armenia has become a part of the 'Armenian question', and Turkey has used the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict to rhetorically support its narrative of the genocide and to politically defend against pressures to re-evaluate its narrative.

In addition, the first cracks began to appear in the state's hegemonic control of this issue within Turkey. Starting in the early 1990s, a handful of civil society actors began to question and challenge the state's narrative of the Armenian question. A first critical book on the Armenian question was published in Turkey in 1992 (Akçam 1992), and since then, a handful of publishing houses have published books that challenge aspects of the official historiography of the Armenian genocide. Activism related to the Armenian question also started in 1992. Finally, in the Turkish media, the first critical coverage of the issue was in 1995. While these were initially isolated or limited challenges, the sole fact that the official narrative was being challenged from within Turkish society was significant, because it carried the potential to undermine belief in the official narrative among domestic audiences.

In particular, the influence of these international factors on the changes in textbooks can be read in the portrayal of Armenians in more strongly negative terms, and in the representation of this issue as one based in international propaganda and manipulations. Moreover, the emergence of domestic dissensions from the official narrative began to put pressure on government officials to better defend the official narrative to domestic audiences, which are the clear target of textbooks.

c. Moving from the third to the fourth phase

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the expansion of some of these earlier pressures – especially an explosion in the international recognition of the genocide and increased domestic discussion of the issue – prompted strategic and rhetorical changes in the way the Armenian genocide is taught to Turkish students.¹⁹⁴

On one hand, international recognition of the Armenian genocide increased, with a number of states recognising the genocide in 2000 and 2001. Of these, two particularly provoked the Turkish government and were the catalyst for the creation of the ASİMKK (Çiçek 2009): the consideration of a resolution (HRes 596) recognising the Armenian genocide in the US House of Representatives in the fall of 2000, and France's recognition of the Armenian genocide in January 2001.

Moreover, within the past ten years, the taboo on the discussion of the Armenian question in Turkey has gradually been lifted, and the official narrative is now challenged and actively debated *within* Turkish society. Thus, coverage of the Armenian question in the Turkish media has dramatically expanded, and today one can find a range of attitudes expressed on the topic in Turkish newspapers (Açar and Rüma 2007). In addition, a small group of academics in Turkey, most of whom work at private universities, has started to work on issues related to the Armenian genocide (Der Matossian 2007), leading to a growing body of critical, Turkish scholarship on various aspects of the Armenian question (Göçek 2006).

194 While Turkey's European Union candidacy and changes in Turkey's domestic politics have been consequential (Onar 2009), I will not delve into these factors here, since they do not account as much for the timing and content of the changes I have outlined in this article.

As a consequence of both the growing international consensus on the fact of the genocide, and the burgeoning domestic debate on this issue, it has become counterproductive for Turkish officials to continue to deny some of the basic facts of the deportation and deaths of Armenians. Given that it is widely recognised that hundreds of thousands of Armenians died, this fact is no longer denied in official Turkish sources. Instead, greater effort is devoted to rationalising the deaths of Armenians (especially by reframing the context as one of civil war and mutual massacre), arguing that the deportation of Armenians cannot be defined as genocide, and engaging with (rather than ignoring) certain elements of the emergent international consensus and domestic scholarship. This revised approach is reflected in the direct way in which the charge of genocide is addressed in the textbooks in this phase, the more neutral language used to describe Armenian activities, and the 'scientific' way in which counter-assertions (such as that Armenians committed a genocide of Turks) are made.

Conclusion

The analysis in this article yields two insights into the factors that have shaped Turkey's narrative of the Armenian genocide over the past several decades. First, external pressures on Turkey have elicited multifaceted and multivalent responses in both the content of the official narrative and in the strategies used to defend it. This is in contrast to the argument that foreign pressures on Turkey (Soyak 2009; Aktar 2007, pp. 242-243; Oran 2008) or on other states (Lind 2008) to apologise for or recognise past atrocities produce a uniformly negative reaction. In fact, of the three shifts that I have outlined in this article, only the shift from the second to the third phase (in the mid-1990s) fits with this argument, since in this period the narrative in textbooks moved to more strongly mythologise the events of the genocide. However, when looking at all three shifts in the official narrative described above, which have come in response to both international and domestic challenges, Turkey's responses to external pressures have been complex and would be difficult to characterise as univalent. In particular, in the shift from the first to the second phase in textbooks' coverage of the Armenian question, international terrorism motivated by Turkey's denial of the genocide, combined with international recognition of the events, eventually prompted Turkish officials to end their official domestic silence about the genocide. Thus the official narrative shifted from silencing of the issue, to mythmaking about and denying the events, along with the continued silencing of many aspects of the genocide. At the same time, state officials also developed a set of strategies to more effectively defend and disseminate the official narrative, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, in each shift discussed in this article, the narrative in textbooks also came to admit more about the genocide, even if these very basic admissions of the deportation and deaths of some Armenians were then relativised and rationalised.

Second, this analysis indicates that shifts in Turkey's narrative were at least partially motivated by the desire to preserve the legitimacy of the official narrative among *domestic* audiences. This is evidenced in the government's increasing concern with what Turkish schoolchildren know and learn about the Armenian genocide. Moreover, it is telling that officials reshaped the historical narratives communicated to Turkish

schoolchildren in response both to international pressures and politics, and also in response to the emergence of domestic discussion of the issue.

Annex 1. Textbooks Analysed

Phase 1 (1951 – 1980)

- İnal, E. and Ormancı, N. (1951), *Tarih: Lise III Yeni ve Yakın çağlar*, Ders Kitapları Türk Ltd. Şti., İstanbul.
- Akşit, N. (1951), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1952), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Akşit, N. (1956), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1956), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Akşit, N. (1961), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1961), *Tarih Lise III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Atlas Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1966), *Tarih Lise III Yeni ve Yakın Çağlar*, Atlas Yayınevi, İstanbul.
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- Akşit, N. (1970), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1971), *Tarih Lise: III*, Atlas Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- Akşit, N. (1980), *Lise Kitapları Tarih III Yeni ve Yakınçağlar*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.

Phase 2 (1981 – early 1990s)

- Ertürk, K. (1981), *Lise ve Dengi Okullar için Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi Dersleri Lise I*, Felma Yayınları, Ankara.
- Su, M.K. and Mumcu, A. (1983), *Lise Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul.
- Oktay, E. (1984), *Tarih Lise: III*, Atlas Yayınevi, İstanbul.
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- Uğurlu, N. and Balcı, E. (1989), *Tarih Lise 3*, Serhat Yayınları A.Ş./Örgün Yayınları Ltd., İstanbul.
- Akşit, N. (1990), *Tarih Lise III*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul.
- Su, M.K. and Mumcu, A. (1991), *Lise ve Dengi Okullar İçin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük*, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul.

Phase 3 (1994 – 2000)

- Kalecikli, K. (1994), *Ders Geçme ve Kredi Sistemine Göre Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük 1*, Gendaş A.Ş., İstanbul.
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Phase 4 (from 2002)

- Akđin, İ., akmak, M. and Gen, M. (2005), *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılâp Tarihi ve Atatürkü lük Lise 3*, Birinci Baskı, Devlet Kitapları, İlıcak Matbaacılık A. Ş., İstanbul.
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