>>23450

Both of these points may be explained (at least partially) by few arguments:

First, it was obvious that war is near, and tensions of late 30s only grew higher and higher. We need to remember that in isn't 2000s, not even 70s, when armies became overly mobile (mass mechanization + better rail/road network) and more effective (less people, more heavy weapons). In 40s armies still need much time to move and deploy, and they all about manpower. First world war that had tremendous amounts of forces ended 20 years ago, and military theorists still believed that it may go in same route. So, moving forces closely to border and militarization is a obvious move in these times. Upgrading equipment is also a thing, especially when you are worse than your future opponent (and Germany had modern industry plus all of Europe as backup)

Second, Soviet leadership may be deluded by it's own ideas. They weren't idiots of course, but when ideologists constantly say that your political and economical system is more progressive and modern than other, it is easy to believe that you also couldn't lose. So, after initial enemy attack, brave communist forces would crush everyone and go into offensive to liberate struggling western proletariat. That is why it ended with more offensive than defensive doctrine. It is also logical that you need to do offenses even in defensive situations (i.e. counterattacks), because being only defensive and passive is a way to lose even with weaker enemy.
Success in conflict with Japan gave more confidence to USSR, then we had seen what happened with overconfident Soviets in Finnish war. That war also gave another reason to amass more forces and speed up equipment upgrades.

I also want to notice that all these doctrines and theories are less relevant than military theorists think (of course they care about it much, it is their work). In reality strategy is more opportunistic, it is obvious that you need to strike into weak spots and continue to increase successful army movement. Both sides know it and prevent enemy from gaining ground and using your weakness, so real operations are more messy and chaotic overall, more depending on situation than on predefined concepts from books.