Bernd 03/19/2019 (Tue) 23:13:23 No.23903 del
>>23877
>I see a problem here, look. An object can only exist, because if it doesn't exist, there is no object we could perceive directly. This misunderstanding arises from our believe into equality of object and our recollection of that object.
If existence requires perception, what about that which is perceived yet does not exist (I'm thinking of illusions, hallucinations, or even phantom limb syndrome because the brain registers a limb but reality doesn't)?

>What is an object? Would you agree that it's some amount of matter configured in some specific way? Thus, we can tell two objects are differ if they have different configuration of matter. Talking about existence I meant rather that matter than fleeting objects formed with it. And of course, once matter exists, it configuration is constantly changes, that's why we experience causality of events. But what about the matter itself? Where it came from?
Note that in the argument the word used was things not objects. The definition of object as some amount of matter configured in some specific way could be debated, but this is avoided here since "things" generally encompasses more than what is material. The argument implies that everything, except God, is contingent; this includes matter, energy, and even abstract things like truth, beauty, value. "God does not depend on anything, but everything other than Him depends on Him." And God's existence is an integral part of the casuality principle. Casuality requires a first mover, a cause which is "put in motion by no other", otherwise we would have a infinite regress of causes:

"It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God."

Sidenote: Motion as understood in this argument means any kind of change (motion), not just material change.