https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Samson_Option:_Israel%27s_Nuclear_Arsenal_and_American_Foreign_Policy

The Samson Option also revealed:

Israel saw the Soviet Union as its number one threat; that Israeli nuclear missiles targeted the Soviet Union from 1971 onwards; that the Soviets had added four Israeli cities to their target list; that the Soviets had threatened Israel after the 1973 Yom Kippur War because Israel kept breaking ceasefires with Egypt.
The White House under Kennedy was determined to prevent Israel from possessing nuclear weapons. However, none of the prominent Kennedy biographers, including Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore C. Sorensen mentioned this fact.
In December 1960, United States Atomic Energy Commission chairman John A. McCone revealed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) information about Israel's Dimona nuclear weapons facility to the New York Times. Hersh writes that Kennedy appointed McCone Director of Central Intelligence in part because of his willingness to deal with Israeli nuclear weapons and other nuclear issues - and despite the fact that McCone was a Republican. McCone resigned as CIA director in 1965, feeling unappreciated by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who he complained would not read his reports, including on the need for full-fledged inspections of Israeli nuclear facilities.
President Johnson suppressed the January 1965 Gilpatric report, which called for tough anti-proliferation efforts against nuclear weapons, including against Israeli nuclear weapons, because he feared retaliation from American Jews. In June 1965, Senator Robert F. Kennedy publicly called for many of the report's recommendations, invoking his assassinated brother's name, thus provoking Johnson to further bury the report. Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1968.
Menachem Begin’s Israeli conservative party coalition, which took power in 1977, was more committed to “the Samson Option” than the Israeli Labor Party. Begin, who hated the Soviet Union, immediately targeted more Soviet cities with nuclear weapons.
Hersh includes two quotations from Israeli leaders. He quotes then Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon as saying: We are much more important than (Americans) think. We can take the Middle East with us whenever we go. Further, he writes that a "former Israeli government official" with "first hand knowledge of his government’s nuclear weapons program" told him: We can still remember the smell of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Next time we’ll take all of you with us.