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DNI Pulte @DNIPulte - Redacted Document: NIC
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
(U) Definitions of Cyber Terms
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Attack. A cyber actor attempts to degrade, destroy, disrupt, manipulate, or otherwise hinder the operation of a system or network. Manipulation or deletion of data solely to hide an intrusion is not considered an attack.
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Compromise. A cyber actor gains unauthorized access to collect data or execute demands or installs malware linked to a malicious Internet protocol address.
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Exploit. A malicious actor collects data, deploys additional malware, or establishes persistent access on a compromised system. Cyber actors may compromise more accounts and systems than they exploit, in part because of the availability of tools that automate the process of compromising vulnerable systems.
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Scan. A cyber actor sends a system specific network traffic and observes its responses to identify security vulnerabilities. Internet scanning is very common but may have only a modest success rate, meaning cyber actors scan far more systems than they actually affect.
Centralized Data Repositories Most Vulnerable
We assess that adversaries could most easily exploit centralized election-related data repositories because of their ease of access and comparative lack of security. These systems, which are used to collect, update, and store voter information, are designed for regular access, commonly through web portals, which makes them vulnerable to a range of malicious cyber activities. A committed adversary could exploit access to these systems to disrupt election processes across the country.
• Voter Registration Databases. States house their voter registration databases predominantly on Internet-connected systems that are designed for easy access because maintaining up-to-date voter registration records is a nearly continuous process. Adversaries could alter data to potentially prevent individual voters or groups of voters from voting, causing delays on election day or forcing voters to use provisional ballots. Adversaries could also use the registration data— which in some cases is also available publicly or for purchase—to tailor other interference or influence efforts.
• Pollbooks. Registration databases transfer voter registration information to e-pollbook devices or paper pollbooks used to check in voters at the precinct level. Some pollbooks are tied to Internet- connected databases that adversaries probably would be able to easily exploit to manipulate data, with effects similar to those from manipulation of registration databases.
• State and Local Election Officials' Websites. These sites provide public information about voting locations or, in some states, are used to report voting results. Attacks on or compromises of these sites could deter individuals from voting or cast doubt on election results.