>>191174, >>191175, >>191176, >>191177, >>191178, >>191179, >>191180, >>191181, >>191182, >>191183, >>191184, >>191185, >>191186, >>191187, >>191188, >>191189, >>191190, >>191191, >>191192, >>191193, >>191194, >>191195, >>191196, >>191197, >>191198, >>191199, >>191200, >>191201, >>191202, >>191203, >>191204, >>191205, >>191206, >>191207, >>191208, >>191209, >>191210, >>191211, >>191212, >>191213, >>191214, >>191215, >>191217, >>191218, >>191219, >>191220, >>191221, >>191222, >>191223, >>191224, >>191225, >>191226, >>191227, >>191228, >>191229, >>191230, >>191231, >>191232, >>191233, >>191234, >>191235, >>191236, >>191237, >>191238, >>191239, >>191240, >>191241, >>191242, >>191243, >>191244, >>191245, >>191246, >>191247, >>191248, >>191249, >>191250, >>191251, >>191252, >>191253, >>191254, >>191255, >>191256, >>191257, >>191258, >>191259, >>191260, >>191261, >>191262, >>191263, >>191264, >>191265, >>191266, >>191267, >>191268, >>191269, >>191270, >>191271, >>191272, >>191273, >>191274, >>191275, >>191276, >>191277, >>191278, >>191279, >>191280, >>191281, >>191282, >>191283, >>191284, >>191285, >>191286, >>191287, >>191288, >>191289, >>191290, >>191291, >>191292, >>191293, >>191294, >>191295, >>191296, >>191297
These analyses use different data, screens and definitions, but they all point to huge losses for U.S. manufacturers as well as huge losses for the U.S. Treasury. The human toll is even more stark.
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A Chinese motor that leaves the Guanajuato-Querétaro corridor labeled as Mexican is a motor not built in Detroit, Grand Rapids or Indianapolis. A Chinese switch that leaves Ho Chi Minh City as Vietnamese is a switch not made in Chicago, Milwaukee or Rockford. A Chinese pump that leaves Pune as Indian is a pump not machined in Cincinnati, Dayton or Columbus. And all the jobs making those products in all those other countries represent missed livelihoods for workers across the United States.
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Motors, switches, pumps, transformers and the minerals behind them may not sound as important as the latest digital technology, but wait until a pandemic breaks a supply chain, a war interrupts shipping or a foreign government turns commercial dependence into strategic leverage.
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That's why our newest trade agreements go beyond the traditional country- of-origin question. The agreements prevent a country that wins lower tariffs from the United States from renting that advantage out to a third country's exports. And unlike some prior agreements, the new ones are backed with real muscle.
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A recent executive order from President Trump targets the weaknesses transshippers exploit: shell companies with no U.S. assets, opaque ownership structures, importers that post too little collateral to cover tariffs, and repeat violators that dissolve and reopen under a new name.
In addition, Customs and Border Protection is establishing a new artificial intelligence-enabled inspection system, called Detective Border, that will soon be able to assess transshipment risk in every ship leaving every port carrying cargo bound for the United States.
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The message to higher-tariff countries is straightforward: Do not conceal a product's nation of origin or create a fraudulent paper trail through a lower-tariff country. The way to pay lower tariffs is to fix the conduct that earned you high tariffs in the first place - reduce the trade barriers you have erected against U.S. products; stop dumping your state-subsidized excess manufacturing capacity on our shores; respect intellectual property; and move toward reciprocity.
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The message to lower-tariff countries is equally clear: Preferential access to the American market is not a license to launder somebody else's exports.
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Unscrupulous foreign exporters are always going to try to evade high tariffs, if detection is slow and penalties are manageable. The calculus changes, however, when shipments are risk-scored at machine speed, when importers have real assets and bonds on the line, when repeat offenders can lose access to the market, and when stronger rules of origin close the back door.