10/31/2020 (Sat) 05:15:41
We have to appreciate what tor is doing, and isn't doing.
In tor, <browsing clearnet> you route through your likely persistent entry node, through a few other tor users who probably can't do much to you,
then you route through a short-duration persistent exit node which could be anyone and who can log and inspect everything about (and fiddle with) your traffic.
Assuming your traffic doesn't in any way identify you, while your (each) exit node host is maintaining a record of your exact browsing actions (and fiddling with them), he can't obviously relate them to you (unless he also owned your entry node, which is conjectured to be unlikely).
So in the event that you personally relate to any of the web content you are visiting, using tor is probably obviously damaging you.
It's a hard problem.
Do I run a proxy in another country, since that's harder to get to even if I paid for it, and thence connect to tor, so I'm telling my company that I'm using an off-shore proxy, and I'm telling my proxy I'm using tor?
Do I use tor to reach a proxy I paid for conventionally in another country, and then browse the internet from that proxy without tor nodes dabbling and logging?
tor is historically glowy, and is now (((not-for-profit))), and is unreasonably linked to (in exchange for (((donations)))) mozilla who are (((good))) guys.
If tor is honest (I didn't verify) then the model of connecting to hidden services seems safer from exit node meddling.