A hierarchy was set up. At the top was the Ministry of Economic Affairs (RWM), and then Reich Groups, Business Groups, Branch Groups and the firms themselves, whose participation was compulsory. The Groups were staffed by men suggested by the industry and vetted at the top. Standardized book-keeping and compulsory reports produced a lot of statistics now useful for historians. Like the RNS, guidelines and recommendations for production methods were distributed. And this bureaucracy was part of the trade system, providing staff for the import supervisory agencies and managing the export subsidy tax.
New regulations were inspired in measures taken in the Great War and ideas discussed since the 20s. But now the state was more powerful and independent than ever before. Bureaucrats no longer faced the formula “technically right but politically impossible”.
Cartelization was encouraged. It was already happening for decades, forming giants, but industries like printing were still divided among thousands of local producers. The pace of consolidation heightened and the RWM even imposed a few compulsory cartels. Cartels set prices and could pursue independent firms in court to enforce them.
Foreign investors –American, British, Dutch and Luxembourgish- could succeed if they cooperated with the state, but sending back profits was difficult.
Jewish-owned companies gradually passed to gentile hands as part of “Aryanisation”, but only in some sectors like retail, textiles and private banking Jewish presence was strong enough to mean a major change in ownership.
Synthetic production useful for autarky was expanded under state guidance. Typically funding would come from half-coerced industries, the state would block non-synthetic foreign competition, guarantee a modest rate of profit for the company involved and keep the rest of the income. Later on it’d provide funding of its own and direct more resources through the Four Year Plan.

In banking, the “Great Banks” (Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank) never fully recovered from the Depression and made profit, but not as much as other businesses.
In electricity, the market was shared (“Elektrofrieden”) between the RWE in the west and 3 state holdings. They competed with local producers, which were taken over by local NSDAP organizations. Those were in turn outmaneuvered, with the sector consolidated and the RWM given powers of oversight.
The steel sector had a number of powers. Vestag and Krupp should be familiar but five others are cited. They had different niches and political proclivities, some old guard conservatives and others fascist reformists. They fared well, Krupp reviving its military shipbuilding at the Germaniawerft (kept afloat specifically expecting a future rearmament) and Vestag landing positions in the industrial bureaucracy. Along with coal, production didn’t grow as much as one would expect for fears of overinvestment, which had previously happened in the Great War. The Reich technologically excelled at cutting-edge electrically melted steel. A curious figure is Walter Rohland, who besides an industrialist served in the 11th Panzer Regiment to have first-hand experience of what he was producing.
Textile industries were losers in the 30s, but received attention in a drive to replace American cotton with synthetic fibers. Four regional syndicates were set up and textile producers, some voluntarily and some under pressure, provided capital for IG Farben and Vereinigte Glanztofffabriken (VGF) to produce rayon.