You are right. But also wrong.
For the following I relied on the these books:
Alistair Horne - To Lose a Battle: France 1940; 2008, Penguin
Philip Warner - The Battle for France: Six Weeks That Changed the World; 2010, Pen & Sword Military
Robert Allan Doughty - The Seeds of Disaster: The Develompent of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939; 1985, Archon Books
For the Allied/French order of battle I consulted with Wikipee and an Osprey book from the Men-at_Arms Series (no. 315) by Ian Sumner, Francois Vaucillier and Mike Chappel; it's The French Army 1939-45, Vol. 1, The Army of 1939-40 & Vichy France.All available at Library Genesis: http://gen.lib.rus.ec
The French doctrine was a methodical maneuver based, they never calculated with mobile warfare, they believed the main tool to achieve breakthrough is the infantry and expected the tanks to add firepower to them, but not mobility. When they created armored divisions the usage they imagined for them was similar to what tank battalions were for regiments and divisions, only for higher level units (corps and army).
Beside the three armored divisions they organized (by the spring of 1940) three light mechanized divisions and five cavalry divisions which included tanks in their ranks. These divisions were divided between the armies of the First Army Group which was designated to move into Belgium as soon as the German invasion started. The amored ones however were kept in reserves, the 1st might have been the reserve of the 1st Army, the other two were surely of the GQG's (French high command) and they were stationed south west of Sedan in the Champagne area.
The French army all in all had 'bout 3100-3500 tanks (most likely closer to 3100) more than half of which was dispersed through the whole northeastern battlefield, another 800 were were divided between the armies with the cavalry and mechanized divisions, and all in all those three armoured divisions were summed up around 600 tanks.
On May 15th a new armored division "joined" the others tho. That's liek 200 more tanks.
So how the French amored divisions were used?
They stationed in a quite good area to make a concentrated effort with them. But instead they were sent to different parts of the front, the 1st against Rommel (north), the 2nd was scattered in the chaos at first then ripped in two by Reinhardt's Corps (middle), the 3rd took part in the counter-attack at Sedan against Guderian (south). The result is known.
Maybe the three grouped together could stop one Corps of the germans preventing the German plan fully bearing fruit, and slowing down their advance in meaningful way.
Maybe if all the divisions that had tanks in their composition were held together, they could have been used as an effective force to parry the german panzer's thrust over the Meuse. But with all the tanks collected, their chance would have been better, almost good. Ofc the German success was in the concentrated use of tanks, arty and air force. So the panzers were only one component to counter.
So as a conclusion: you are right, there were monolithic bodies of armor in the French army but you are wrong, because it would have mattered a lot if they would have kept together.
As you say it here: >>29076>it was in the wrong place in the wrong time.
Which I can translate to: they were dispersed, placed all the wrong places, and not concentrated in one right.
Btw, you wrote those posts about the Amazonas fires on sportschan? Will read it sometimes.