>>43754
In the Southern Theater the Axis had to have one goal: preventing the Brits using the sea lane at their leisure.
Szálasi saw a couple of questions regarding to the German plans. Why didn't Italy took control over the whole African shore by the start? Or at least the French Northern Africa? Why didn't the stronger Italian forces sent back the Allies into the water in Sicily (10 divisions against 6, the 10 Allied divisions only followed a week later)? Why didn't the Germans sent German reinforcement into Sicily?
At the French armistice he partially replied - in Africa the Axis had to play only for time, and they calculated with the possibility of giving it up - but now he completes the answer: Italy proved to be too weak for any of the tasks. Couldn't have pacify French Northern Africa, and even in Italy in the end the Germans had to take over the whole job. Specifically regarding to Sicily, Szálasi speculates that the Allies first wanted to see the reaction of the defenders, and with the 10 divisions held back they would have tried to establish another beachhead on the boot itself. The Germans calculated with this possibility and did not want to risk forces get trapped on Sicily.
Instead they put a "steel kernel" (how he calls it) into this soft nation, and now this kernel holds them in place.
Previously I mentioned the conditions that Szálasi saw in case of an joint Tripartite offensive against the Brits. These are the following:
- the Wehrmacht have to reach the Volga, preventing the Soviet interference (I assume not just at Stalingrad, but taking the whole aforementioned crisis-area);
- French Morocco needs to be in Axis hands, the Atlantic Wall needs to be expanded to Africa;
- the Muslim block from Morocco to Adra needs to be recruited on the side of the Axis, by assuring their freedom and independence;
- building up a secure way of resupply;
- include Turkey, Spain, and Portugal into the plan.
He did not say this, but we can see the impossibility of such action, based on these criterion (or any, really).