>>43397
>Szálasi saw that differently. He considered the constant German defense as part of their attrition warfare they were forcing onto the Soviet. And when he tried to figure out the Strategic Plans of the participants behind the events of '43, this was the other cornerstone of his thought process, next to the buildup for a total war.

Manstein thought that the war was not lost until '44 and that they could have held the soviets back at that point and forced them into a stale mate if not for Hitler(and the high command in General) and his antics. The Soviets suffered horrendous losses in the war, if the Germans had somehow managed to hold the line the Soviets may eventually have been forced to sue for peace particularly if they had managed to fend of the landings at d-day as well which may have been more likely if the eastern front had not been so dire(he also criticises Rommel's handling of Normandy).