The armistice with France he treats as a moral question: the French were perfidious who did not want to keep their word, because they saw weakness in the magnanimousness, and he sees the fall of the moral of the French people, they should have accepted honorably the defeat in what was a fair fight. But now that the French tested the German patience, the latter gained the moral authority to act with iron fist if necessary.
The most interesting part of the Armistice for him seems to be the part that is missing: the fate of North Africa, in a military sense (for the curiosity's sake, here's the full text of it https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Franco-German_Armistice ). These parts were simply treated zusammen with all the other colonies in the agreement, however with Italy in the war they gained importance in the warfare. With the "widening" the war (as the Soviet, Japan, and USA entered) this importance just grew. It would have made sense if the Axis had secured French Morocco, Algeir, Tunis, Corsica.
Szálasi try to find the reasoning behind this omission. He concludes that the Axis wanted to give up Africa and only continued fighting there to gain time, maybe even to the end of the war depending how events unfold. Meanwhile they would force the English convoys to sail around Africa. However leaving Northern Africa would be temporary anyway since the fate of the war is decided on Europe's East and West. So in this sense - he says - this wasn't an omission, but forethought.