>>43336
>Red Army could mass troops
How he sees it, during '41 summer to winter the Red Army suffered giant losses (from Wikipee I see numbers about 2,5 million Soviet POWs captured during Barbarossa, plus all the dead, and newspapers probably were flooded with news about the depletion of the enemy), and they needed the whole 1942 to recover, draining manpower even from Siberia. So I don't think he considered any more units could have been mustered after a Soviet defeat in the crisis-area.
>The Soviets did stage massive attacks in the central portion of the front in 1942, but they failed. It's understandable Szálasi didn't have sufficiently detailed frontline information to note this.
He says the Soviet must have recognized their attack would fail on the German lines if it was directed towards west. He attributes this partially to the limited resources available to the Soviet, the insufficient power of their units, but chiefly to the excellence of the German units, both in training and equipment. This is why they picked other Axis units, because they were sub par in comparison. He also points out, that after a quick and decisive reorganization, the Soviet was stopped by the Germans at the 2nd Kharkov battle.

I think Rusbernd could provide some maps or info about population density and industrial centers and such.
I'm also not sure during the evacuation where the people and the industry were settled.
And need to check out the Suvorov thread we might have something there already.