Last July there were intense clashes between security forces and "El Coqui"'s mega-gang in the Cota 905 area.

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2021/08/11/this-is-the-venezuela-thats-heading-into-a-new-negotiation-cycle/
>The sense that crime has declined began to dissipate with the constant challenge of the mega gangs in the northeastern and southwestern tips of Caracas: Petare and the Cota 905. The State has been dealing with these mega gangs for years; how they affect the regime is something that could only be estimated on a local basis. Depending on the place, those criminal organizations are the government’s ally or foe. But the gang led by a.k.a. El Koki is unique as a symbol of the paradox: the Maduro regime is able to suffocate protest and subjugate the opposition, but is unable to neutralize an adversary that insists on defying security forces not far from Miraflores Palace.
>Even if—as the Colombian police suspects—the gang leader crossed to Colombia after escaping the two-day battle with FAES in Caracas, his story shows that the Venezuelan dictatorship isn’t identical to its Cuban counterpart, which preserves a solid control over its entire territory. Besides the power such heavily armed gangs have over entire slums in Caracas and other cities, even after the increasingly violent battles with security forces, different kinds of criminal organizations are the de facto ruling entities in several parts of the Venezuelan mainland, a phenomenon that doesn’t exist in Cuba but is present in other failing states in Africa, Central America, and Asia.
>The explanation for this resides in the logic of criminal enterprises. In a sort of return to the violent and chaotic past of Venezuela, the border regions became porous spaces of unraveling state governance and intense irregular activity, where Colombian guerrillas and paramilitary, and Venezuelan gangs, colectivos, police and the military compete for the lucrative traffic of minerals, drugs, fuel, food, and migrants. You don’t have to travel that far to see those gangs working, of course; a big part of Aragua, for instance, is under extortion, and some critical roads that connect the farms to the cities are controlled by pirates.

How did the gangs get so powerful? In the past decade security forces left them alone, hoping to reduce violence, and this allowed them to consolidate their power.
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/11/04/mega-gangs-a-closer-look/
>Nothing has helped mega-gangs in becoming what they are more than “peace zones,” according to Izquiel. In 2013, Internal Relations, Justice and Peace vice-minister José Vicente Rangel Ávalos sat down with 280 gangs (in 80 of the most violent municipalities of Venezuela) to coordinate their disarmament and social reinsertion. They came to an agreement in which they established certain “peace zones” where law enforcement agents couldn’t enter and criminals would abandon their activities willingly. The result was that organizations that controlled large areas had the opportunity to see each other face to face and joined forces.

Quite an interesting mention at the end of the article:
>Luis Izquiel explains that firepower is key to their survival and, as evidenced in the Cota 905 incident, it’s stronger than what most Venezuelan security forces have at hand. He also suspects of government complacency, pointing at the gangs who control some of the mines at Bolívar State. “These gangs can’t be touched, not even with silk gloves,” he says, “and no one knows why.”