wonder if russia is gonna deploy troops?

So the US decided to send troops and send the bill to Venezuela after the conflict destroyed the country? I'm sure some alternative paying methods can be found, liek extract the oil with American companies.
The live feed is still going btw.

>>25390
>So the US decided to send troops
America hasn't decided anything yet.

Guaidó left the airbase and joined a new round of massive street demonstrations across Caracas and the country. That's exactly how it has been for months, with the sole difference that he now has some policemen and soldiers marching with the demonstrators.
Maduro fortified the presidential palace, shut off the metro and the media and set his hounds loose. They suceeded in getting dozens wounded and compelled some oppositionists to seek refuge in the Brazilian and Chilean embassies.
Armored vehicles rammed protesters right in front of the airbase where oppositionist troops are stationed and they had no reaction. So far no attempt has been made to militarily take over key infrastructure and government buildings and only sporadic exchanges of fire have taken place.
In short, a violent takeover of power hasn't yet been tried; Venezuela is still stuck at the protest phase. The only new fact is that sections of the military and police have openly defected to the opposition, forcing Maduro to increasingly rely on his political militias and paramilitaries aswell as foreign mercenaries.
I believe Guaidó is trying to accelerate/escalate the crisis and force the hand of his allies and enemies, hoping that Maduro will go too far in his crackdown and/or that America will provide more support. This is a risky strategy, as one possible outcome is a successful crackdown with no American response. So far the regime has given out its usual ration of violence and Trump is threatening Cuba.

I started the day smiling and wondering how long it'll take until Maduro is on a one-way flight to Moscow, but now it seems his fall is still far away. Bolsonaro's military advisers have voiced bleak predictions and said Guaidó doesn't have enough support in the Armed Forces.

There are claims that the opposition had just found that Maduro was about to order Guaidó's arrest and that made them set their plans in motion before they were fully prepared.

>>25414
thanks for the summary
Do you have any info about Russian and/or Chinese troops on the ground? I remember the Russians being confirmed by the major news agencies and Russian foreign agency itself while the Chinese denied any involvent and it was mostly happening-sites which reported it.

Guaido should hire Ukrainian mercs just for the lols

>>25417
I haven't heard any recent information. Russians are likely still around. The Chinese may not have arrived at all. And America has accused Cuba of stationing troops, which is plausible and has precedents.
Wheter they'll act is an open question. Russians can act as a deterrent protecting Maduro's installations, but they're likely unwilling to commit to real fighting -Russia has sank resources into maintaining the status quo, but knows it has no power projection to sustain an intervention. Cubans, on the other hand, are much closer and ideologically motivated, and could thus be willing to shoot at Venezuelans.

news says it was a failure.

>>25414
>>25419
Knew you would give some news. Thanks.

its weird that they havent rebelled before, an empty stomach is the best motivation.

>>25424
Guaidó failed to achieve his goals but Maduro couldn't bring it to the conclusion of a failed coup and imprison those involved. Guaidó and his followers are still on the loose and will go on another wave of demonstrations today. It's a stalemate.

>>25437
Chavéz and Maduro went to great lengths to keep the military loyal. They dispersed it away from the capital, repeatedly purged it and stacked upper ranks with loyalists, bribed it, gave it control of food distribution, dilluted its powers by forming paramilitaries and kept it on a tight leash through the intelligence services and Cuban agents.

>>25438
I won't go as far to call it a coup. Those are kept in secrecy so those in power cannot counter it. This thing goes in the open. Venezuela is balancing on the edge of a civil war.

>>25439
which is logical. when you are hungry you do anything for food really. when I was a student I was shit at handling a budget and went hungry sometimes, it changes your perception no doubt.

>>25473
Effort was taken.

has anything happened with the happening?

>>25520
It happened. It's history, such as it was.

The principals who could have ejected Maduro were too slow on the draw, thus getting themselves cashiered. Others said "Oh hell no!" from the get go. Much fun was had by the traditional media showing us scene after scene of lackadaisical non-military regular folks "rioting," all the while chanting "Coup! Coup!" throughout the commentary.

As the South Americans expand tent city accommodations for scads of refugees, they look north for a solution. "Hey there Mr. Monroe Gringo? Hint-hint, nudge nudge!"

Meanwhile, the United States sees an epic economic sink hole blame game in the making. "No can do, Paco. We gots plenty of oil. Besides, you guys have your own armies an stuff. OAS? Rise and shine! Hint-hint, nudge-nudge."

The Russians strive to make headlines, but the Americans ain't playing fair. All the Americans do is make noise, take pseudo-private notes as jokes for later public purview, and hope the Russian will keep sending and spending. More power to you, Ivan!

Only the Chinese are investing sensibly, and only in the ramshackle oil industry. They don't care who runs what, does what, says what. As long as what little oil flow there is keeps flowing in their direction, China's on your, their, whichever side.

Check back in another five to ten years.

>>25522
I get the feeling venezuela is a big test bed for the future of the world. But thats just my humble little opinion.

>>25522
I've similar impression.
It seems the habbening is postponed to an uncertain date. It's like they wanted to make a civil change, a "velvet revolution" but those in power didn't even have to say no, just wave a little.

Some facts I didn't mention:

-Our foreign service was informed by the opposition of their plans on Friday prior to the uprising
-Several high ranking officers were on board the plot, but due to it happening before the planned date they waivered. Maduro has now begun a purge, starting with the head of Sebin.
-Maduro was on the airport and about to run off from the country when Russia intervened and ordered him to stay
-Russian planes have recently landed in Caracas

Caracas Chronicles has daily information on what's going on.
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/04/30/the-few-known-facts-of-april-30th/

Report on Cuban boots on the ground in Venezuela:
https://panampost.com/josefina-blanco/2019/02/20/proof-of-extensive-cuban-military-presence-in-the-venezuelan-armed-forces/
tl;dr- at least a hundred thousand Cubans have been deployed by their government to Venezuela. Besides aid workers they include 9 battalions of infantry, special forces and a number of high-ranking officers. They are embedded within the military hierarchy and enforce loyalty towards the regime. This presence dates back to the times of Chávez.

Refugee inflows into Roraima have doubled since the uprising. Though the border is closed, hundreds still cross trails in the jungle every day. Bolsonaro assigned R$ 224 million to shelter them.

Five loyalists (one aviation officer, two soldiers and two policemen) were killed in an ambush today, and an army helicopter crashed with seven deaths.

>>25565
Everyone in Venezuela is extremely incompetent?
For the sake of her people we could only wish that a foreign power steps in and make some order and correct the economical mistakes of Maduro and creates a country with such rudimentary conditions we can call livable.

>>25565
>hundred thousand Cubans
thats alot

>>25570
>Everyone in Venezuela is extremely incompetent?
Cowardice and miscalculation are common in history.

>a foreign power steps in and make some order
Russia has already stepped in to preserve the status quo. America could try an intervention, and it'd actually be a lot easier than Iraq.
Venezuela has a functioning oppositionist Presidency, Supreme Court and Parliament backed by legal arguments justifying their legitimacy. It's a full paralell state that simply needs to be given power, like governments in exile at the last World War. In Iraq America had to rebuild all institutions from scratch.
Chavismo's popular support is microscopic. There would be no insurgency to repress, just a short conventional battle at the end of which Americans would be greeted as liberators. And unlike Iraq, there are no lingering ethnoreligious resentments that'd explode into sectarian violence in a power vacuum.
Venezuela is right within America's traditional sphere of influence and is logistically easy to access.
The disadvantages are more on America's side than Venezuela's, as the financial burden of conducting regime change and then rebuilding the country would be heavy. But all things considered it'd proceed a lot smoother than Middle Eastern operations.

>>25586
They've always had extensive civilian and military deployments all across the world. They've even put troops in Africa in the past. Aside from direct deployments, they also coordinate leftist activity across South America. Pink Tide parties share resources (e.g. Caracas metro and the Mariel port in Cuba were built with Brazilian money), support each other and look towards Cuba for a higher voice. They're like different mushrooms of the same fungus.

>>25587
How can cuba afford all these civilian and military developments? arent they a poor country? doesnt make sense to me.

and also, I dont think usa will intervene in venezuela. maybe it could happen when bush was president but not today. but that is just my two pesos.

>>25593
>How can cuba afford all these civilian and military developments?
As an ideologically motivated dictatorship it can focus a dispropotionate fraction of its budget into military buildup and foreign adventures at the expense of internal concerns. It's like the Soviet Union with its oversized military and space program kept alive while its civilian economy rotted away.

>>25593
It's a paradox. Those who can't afford military are the developed first world countries. Banana republics with low standard of living can spend more, since they spend less on everything else.
They don't need flashy gadgets in education, computers and projectors and whateverpads for kids to poke, or even whiteboard with black markers. They only need mudhuts with banana leaf roofing, some cheap chairs a blackboard and chalk. Education: check.
Etc.

>>25587
I mean
Here's that Guido guy making half-assed attempts to remove Maduro, but it's clear he doesn't want a coup, a revolution, a civil war, he just wants that people with power change their way and support a democratical regime, while the generals and such expecting him going Pinochet on Maduro. Which he won't. They want a strongman (or at least a semblance of one) whom they can stand behind.
Then there's Maduro who is ready to bail despite nothing happens. He is a corrupt idiot who can't even recognize the sheep needs to be fed if one wants to shear them.
Then there are all the officers, who can't just remove this incompetent fool and put one from among them forward. Those who could were probable dismissed long time ago, maybe executed too. They say a smart boss surround himself with even smarter subordinates. So I guess an idiot will hire even bigger idiots.

I wonder what will happen now that Russians start to influence things more directly.

im reading up on cuba

some things that struck me as interesting

Population
• 2017 census
Decrease 11,221,060[5

During the 1970s, Fidel Castro dispatched tens of thousands of troops in support of Soviet-supported wars in Africa. He supported the MPLA in Angola and Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia.[112]

The standard of living in the 1970s was "extremely spartan" and discontent was rife.[113] Fidel Castro admitted the failures of economic policies in a 1970 speech.[113] In 1975 the OAS lifted its sanctions against Cuba, with the approval of 16 member states, including the U.S. The U.S., however, maintained its own sanctions.[110]

The country faced a severe economic downturn following the withdrawal of Soviet subsidies worth $4 billion to $6 billion annually, resulting in effects such as food and fuel shortages.[114][115] The government did not accept American donations of food, medicines, and cash until 1993.[114] On 5 August 1994, state security dispersed protesters in a spontaneous protest in Havana

Cuba had the second-highest number of imprisoned journalists of any nation in 2008 (for a country of 11 million thats a shitton isnt it)

Cuban dissidents face arrest and imprisonment. In the 1990s, Human Rights Watch reported that Cuba's extensive prison system, one of the largest in Latin America, consists of 40 maximum-security prisons, 30 minimum-security prisons, and over 200 work camps.[152] According to Human Rights Watch, Cuba's prison population is confined in "substandard and unhealthy conditions, where prisoners face physical and sexual abuse".[152]

The average monthly wage as of July 2013 is 466 Cuban pesos—about US$19

Before Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution, Cuba was one of the most advanced and successful countries in Latin America.[194] Cuba's capital, Havana, was a "glittering and dynamic city".[194] The country's economy in the early part of the century, fuelled by the sale of sugar to the United States, had grown wealthy. Cuba ranked 5th in the hemisphere in per capita income, 3rd in life expectancy, 2nd in per capita ownership of automobiles and telephones, and 1st in the number of television sets per inhabitant.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuba

>>25598
its like tropico but irl lol

>>25601
It is. They even export cement. In Tropico 4 you can build cement factory for boosting building speed and export cement.

>>25598
At least in Maduro's case his incompetence is understandable. He was probably handpicked by Chavez as his successor because of his loyalty and ideological fervor rather than his talent to rule.
Guaidó is probably a naive idealist.

>>25599
Some Brazilians have a mythicized picture of Cuba as a developed state and speak highly of its healthcare. In reality Cuba was already ahead of the rest of Latin America by the time of the Revolution (and stagnated since, unlike some Caribbean states which are now not far from being First World) and its medical system has quantity but not quality, which can raise it above the usual Third World level but not to a proper developed healthcare system.

>>25603
>cement
Sounds a lot like Victoria II.

One curious Cuban export is blood. During the 1960s it was sourced from political prisoners who were about to be executed.

>>25610
east germany did the same

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29992447

>>25613
What does Google have to do with this?

>>25613
Thank you for being so magnanimous and sharing that wealth of information with us

>>25613
We have threads where we discuss the danger what Google (and Facebook) represents. This is about Venezuela and - as it happens - her socialist regime, supported by the also communist Cuba.
It's just we cannot plaster everything with your favourite topic. You are like some typical Jews who notice a discussion about some tragedy, be it people dying or the Notre Dame burning and can't prevent themselves stuttering in: b-but muh Holocaust. Yes, very sad and tragic, but it's not the fucking topic.

>>25616
this x1453 times

test

Maduro is making moves. His gunmen have taken over private airports around Caracas and surrounded the oppositionist National Assembly, blocking off journalists. His Supreme Court is now revoking the mandates of Congressmen and may move to arrest them. And he loosened currency controls set in 2003, allowing private financial institutions to deal in foreign currency but still at the exchange rates set by the central bank, which are far different from the more realistic black market rates. Currency controls are considered one of the main factors in Chavismo's collapse because it attempted to have an "impossible trinity" (free capital flow, fixed exchange rate and sovereign monetary policy); it's considered possible to have two, but unsustainable to have all three at the same time.

There was also a meeting in Finland lasting less than an hour between Lavrov and Pompeo over Venezuela. If any significant diplomatic breakthroughs were made, they were not made public. More meetings are expected. Moscow Times speculates Russia is willing to sell Maduro in exchange for concessions in Ukraine.

>>25674
what will happen to the oil and massive mineral deposits if maduro gets taken down?

>>25677
Based on that speculation I assume the extraction rights of those oil and mineral deposits would go to American businessmen.
But maybe the agreement will be a little late and in the meantime Maduro could secure his positions and there would be noone to put into his place by the time the US could intervene.

>>25716
they have the biggest oil reserves in the world and also huuuuuuuuge mineral deposits (enormous gold veins) so its a pretty big deal

>>25718
>its a pretty big deal
It is.

I honestly doubt anything is happening. At least I wish nothing was happening

>>25677
Return to status quo.

Oil reserves were nationalized decades before Chavéz so they're not getting privatized.
America remained the main buyer of oil even under Chavéz, and this only changed very recently with some sanctions. Oil exports would once again flow to America, with China, Turkey and other markets getting less.
PDVSA was staffed with cronies whose mismanagement drove production to the ground. A change in power may bring in a normal leadership which will slowly repair the damage.
Because Venezuela is nearly a Somalia-level failed state, mining of gold and other minerals has grown to resemble the Congo. Paramilitaries and criminal gangs now share control of this sector of the economy (see https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/04/21/inside-ciudad-guayanas-illegal-gold-retail/). If the power vacuum is filled and normal governance returns, those mafias will act more discreetly and at least superficially mining will once again be a normal and legal activity.

People seem to be stuck in a 1960's-1970's realpolitik predictive mindset. Sure, if Nixon were if office, we'd have seen a hundred thousand or so American army dudes storm in over the beaches by now. Along with a bit of firebombing to disperse the "Pinko! Commie! Terrorist!" refugee camps for good measure. I.T.T. would be all over rebuilding the infrastructure, Larry Hagman would be shanghaied as the on-the-spot smiling friendly front-man for the American oil industry, and every company with a million dollars or more in sales would be scrambling to open an office down there.

Today, too many benefit from the Venezuelan situation.

1. Venezuela's share of global oil output is decreasing. Bad for them but ...

2. Too many countries were relying on higher oil prices and can't pump more fast enough to make up their budget shortfalls. Cutting competition is a godsend for almost all.

3. The Chinese gained a semi-reliable source of oil. But, only the small part they care to invest in, and maintain control over. The greater remainder of the Venezuelan oil industry can go to hell for all they care.

4. The American fracking industry benefits. They got nothing but room to expand. Sky's the limit if only oil prices would rise a bit.

5. American foreign policy benefits as they can point to how the Chinese do business. The Chinese ship in their own people to run things and steer output only to themselves. Colonialism ain't dead amigos! Just this time it ain't the northern gringos.

6. Trump can point to all the refugee camps in neighboring countries and laugh at the OAS. "Border crisis, guys? Can't contain it? Yeah, tell me all about it. Wall it to me!"

7. Russia gets to thumb their noses at the Monroe doctrine. "Ukraine motherfuckers! How do you like it?" Russia would also benefit from higher oil prices.

8. America can afford to let Russia play games because the Russians ain't fixing anything. Whatsoever the bear cares to throw into this sinkhole, all's the better.

9. Likewise, Cuba gets to do its thing. Keeps 'em busy.

10. Instead of seeing investment opportunities, neighboring countries think they're dodging a bullet by staying out of it.

>>25523
>>25524
The whole thing might be our generation's version of the Spanish civil war. Except, nobody really cares who wins this as long as the Venezuelans do it all by themselves.

The way out for Venezuela is most probably a 20 year run of Peronism to get their society functionally stable again. On the bad side of things, they're on their own. On the good side of things, well, their on their own.

>>25733
Besides the international drug trade (of which even Maduro's relatives take part in) and the regime's Cuban, Chinese and Russian masters, nobody benefits from this. Certainly not ourselves, who have previously committed taxpayer money to sustaining Chavez and his allies and now suffer under the refugee burden. But you've shown some good reasons for how even those who lose still aren't willing to commit to an invasion.

>20 year run of Peronism
Péronism is just another strand of the Latin American populist virus. Sure, it is nowhere as damaging as Chavismo and has achievements to take pride in, but it's no miracle. I don't understand a lot specifically about Peronism but do know Varguism and its successors, which are very similar.

Peronismo/Varguismo have a fixation on dependency theory and import substitution industrialization as the road to becoming First World. They are, after all, a product of the heyday of the New Deal, five year plans and the like, when such ideas were the norm. Their narrative centers on the undeveloped global South exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods from the developed global North. This pattern is deemed parasitical and destructive, with foreign investment in particular being hated with a passion, and must be broken away from by shutting off foreign imports and developing sheltered local industries which feed the internal demand for consumer goods.

Several Latin American countries followed this course, some of them growing sizable national industries. When neoliberals later lifted their state support and trade barriers, some industries remained -Brazil still exports plenty of manufactured goods, even cars, to less developed neighbors- while others collapsed because they couldn't stand to foreign competition: awful infrastructure, unreliable institutions, red tape, corruption and an expensive and yet unqualified workforce meant their products were more expensive and even lesser in quality than foreign imports. Such was the case with the Brazilian homegrown computer industry, which provided awful overpriced products and only survived due to lavish protectionism. Once tariffs were lifted it collapsed. For the native capitalists owning those industries, this was a tragedy (and hence they bitterly opposed changes to the system), but consumers had cheaper and better products at their disposal.

These industries were artificial, only survived because they were being propped up by the state and secured profits for their owners without offering a clear advantage to consumers. As for the ones which still survived and thrived without protectionism, perhaps they could still have come into existence without all this effort. Long before there was ever a directed state effort towards industrialization coffee oligarchs were already reinvesting their profits into railways and embryonic industries. The Soviet Union's rapid industrialization is often praised by those people, but the late Russian Empire was already industrializing. That is not to say there is no virtue to ISI and there are arguments for its advantages and need in certain situations, like the need to develop local know-how prior to being able to compete with foreigners on the market.

The problem is a cargo cult mentality. The idea is that the First World is developed because it has factories, and simply building factories will make the nation developed. But successful industrializations are only successful because they're competitive, and this model made Latin America only partially competitive and skirted this whole problem of competitiveness by just indefinitively propping up inefficiency. In fact, it even reduced competitiveness in some ways.
The point of having industries is the products they make, but to those people simply having assembly lines staffed with workers is an end unto itself. If foreigners can make better and cheaper products, then one should either surpass their quality or consider buying from them. This line of thought needs to be given consideration.

And some of the more hardliners even believe in autarky and that it's the optimal mechanism for material prosperity. In reality autarky is economically suboptimal (I can elaborate on this). It must be seen as a way to acquire geopolitical advantages at an economic cost, just like having a military.

Then there's corporatism. Vargas nakedly copied Mussolini in this regard and compiled labor legislation based on the Carta del Lavoro. All, from factory workers to their employees banded into thousands of corporations, all of whom used political pressure to acquire public subsidies and favorable regulation.

But there's a catch. Unions and the like are indifferent to society as a whole, they only act to serve their own immediate interests. Whenever one of them makes gains, there are cheers. They talk of "rights", but those can just as well be called "privileges". Few ask the question: at what cost? Someone else had to lose, because they follow a rent-seeking logic, capturing state funds (which are finite) and using bureaucratic obstructions to block off access to new competitors, make it harder for newcomers to enter the profession and propping up the cost of their services. Sure, they may get wealthier, but the youngest workers have difficulties, consumers have more expensive services and national innovation and progress are slowed down. Perhaps every consumer is already part of his own corporation who also pushes for its interest. But that is not always the case, and even if it is not every corporation has the same power and the whole game is zero-sum.
It's destructive competition.

This became obvious when taxi drivers opposed the introduction of Uber and other alternatives. They used pompous rhetoric, but behind it lay the self-interest of a small group wishing to preserve a monopoly even though this limited options for costumers.

And since it is heavily bureaucratic in nature, it is prone to becoming ossified over time, obstructing any change and even technological advancement. Such was the case with the old guilds of Europe, which by the eve of the Industrial Revolution were already seen as obstacles to development and died out or were abolished from the French Revolution and onwards.
Across Latin America this system was fed and expanded, and its negative side had an impact.

As it existed, the Latin American populist model had a tendency towards political radicalization. In the 40s and 50s Varguismo had a centrist moderate party (the PSD), but towards the 60s the system was collapsing under the weight of uncontrolled spending in infrastructure and Brasília's construction and both left and right grew increasingly radical, leading to the 1964 coup d'etat. It's responsibility in large part ultimately lies in the contradictions of the structure set up by Vargas.

And as a strand of populism, Peronismo/Varguismo tend to overlook the importance of institutions to development. The formation of contracts and other interactions between strangers relies on the security provided by impartial courts, a government that doesn't act unpredictably and the like. Vargas and other dictators didn't care about this or the whole theory behind it and in fact degraded institutions by basing their power on a cult of personality, which naturally becomes a negative factor after the ruler's death. Rather than Péron or Vargas or random tin-pot African or Arab dictators, Botswana's case should be studied as an example of Third World development.

Ultimately it's a product of another time, another continent (e.g. Latin America is now heavily urbanized, there is no peasantry to speak of) and another stage of capitalism. A decades-old idea only boomers subscribe to (I know quite a few who enthusiastically repeat rusty old Third Worldist rhetoric and rage against international capital), mired in nostalgia for a dreams of a future that never came to be. To demand classical Peronism in this day and age is to look towards the past. It had its run, it made its achievements and suffered under its contradictions, but now it can at most serve as an inspiration rather than a ready-made model.

>>25733
good post. I will comment on the things I know about

>>25733
>2. Too many countries were relying on higher oil prices and can't pump more fast enough to make up their budget shortfalls. Cutting competition is a godsend for almost all.

well both yes and no. lets say venezuela gets democracy and private companies start pumping oil. pumping oil is expensive as fuck and very infrastructure consuming. venezuela has had a state monopoly on oil since the 70's thus we can presume that the refineries, oil pumps etc havent been maintained that good. so it would take many years, minimum 4-5 to just get it running smoothly again.

its more complicated than people might think. its way easier to mine gold.

>>25733
>3. The Chinese gained a semi-reliable source of oil. But, only the small part they care to invest in, and maintain control over. The greater remainder of the Venezuelan oil industry can go to hell for all they care.

I dont think china cares that much. they have better sources more closely, indonesia, Kazakhstan, russia etc. venezuela is far away.

>>25733
>7. Russia gets to thumb their noses at the Monroe doctrine. "Ukraine motherfuckers! How do you like it?" Russia would also benefit from higher oil prices.

ukraine is far more important than venezuela from a geopolitical standpoint.

>>25733
>The whole thing might be our generation's version of the Spanish civil war. Except, nobody really cares who wins this as long as the Venezuelans do it all by themselves.

the example with spain is a good one. my take on it was more of the social situation in venezuela. worldwide we are seeing food prices going higher and higher, wages stagnating, if we are going into a recession, or depression this year or next it could very well be venezuela 2.0.

it is easy to shit on venezuela but I see the blueprint for the world there. austerity will come im sure of it.

>>25735
>>25736
fascinating. it seems latin america looks up to europe. the politics of europe the last 100-150 years is a warning how not to behave from an economical standpoint.

>>25735
Creating internal market for internal industry was a standard way to go in catching up with the big guys (well, the big guy, UK). That's how France, Prussia, USA, Japan did it. Can't really blame them wanting to follow the successful examples.
Ofc it takes more than just protectionism and forced industrialization. Liek infrastructure and education.

>>25853
except real life isnt a tropico game.

>>25866
Maybe it takes you as a surprise but games oftentimes based on reality. And I did refer to reality. The standard model of industrialization and "catching up" had four bastion.
1. Creation of national market: abolishing internal tariffs (this probably had more importance in federated countries, like the US, Argentina or Brazil) and creating the infrastructure, roads, railways so raw materials and goods can be transported their destination of use
2. Preventing foreign goods penetrating the market, going protectionist with introducing external tariffs.
3. Forming the monetary basis for the development, creating and regulating banks and secure loans for the buildup of the industry.
4. The appliance of new technology (industrial machinery and such) needs workers with proper training so mass education had to be introduced.

As Brazil Bernd pointed out in his synthesis South American leaders picked certain elements of the list and ignored others, or injected other ideas into the mix which weren't really suitable tools for the job.

So many clueless posts about economy, closing down trade (protectionism) is always bad, it benefits some companies that don't have to compete at the expense of the consumer.
Sure large countries can cope with it for some time (possibly several decades like the Soviet Union) but small countries are very quickly destroyed if they are not able to freely trade with as many countries as possible.

>>28622
Since the last post was mine about this and I doubt you read the whole thread it feels as if you referred to me indirectly.
Protectionism was one of the major tools for the big economies which tried the catch up with Britain in the 19th/early 20th century, the most notable example was the US itself. So the one who is actually talking green is you. Maybe for trolling purposes, which fits into the haughty tone of your post.

>>28622
>>28622
> closing down trade (protectionism) is always bad
there is no always bad irl. this is an ideological view.

imagine not having cocacola and macdonalds in your country

whoa

>>28627
Careful, don't cause panic. Tho in Venezuela the situation is actually more serious.

>>25738
Thanks. I think we're mostly on the same page, but my comments may not have been clearly stated.

>so it would take many years, minimum 4-5 to just get it running smoothly again.
>its more complicated than people might think. its way easier to mine gold.
Agreed, they're screwed. It will be cheaper to repair the infrastructure than to start from scratch. It's still going to be expensive to get the oil moving again.
But, my point was almost all other nations don't want to see Venezuela recover its oil industry any time soon at all. The world is flooded with oil at the moment.

>I dont think china cares that much. they have better sources more closely, indonesia, Kazakhstan, russia etc. Venezuela is far away.
Agreed, it's not their primary source. They view Venezuela as a nice little opportunity for an extra source on top of all those other places. Competition is good! Also good to diversify and have some backup too. China will not go to war for Venezuela, nor invest more than the absolute minimum to suck up a wee bit more oil for a better price than they might otherwise be forced to occasionally pay elsewhere.

>ukraine is far more important than venezuela from a geopolitical standpoint.
Also agreed. But, it's nice to fuck around with the other guy on his own turf when you can. Venezuela's an opportunity to repay the USA for its support of Ukraine, sanctions, etc. Russia's not going to go to war over it, although it's hard to see what they could do to provoke a war here. Hilariously, America's not interested. The American attitude has the Russians spilling and slipping over their vodka in astonishment! Where has Monroe buggered off to?

>it is easy to shit on venezuela but I see the blueprint for the world there. austerity will come im sure of it.
Yeah, it's a nightmare. Everyone is willing to put in tiniest efforts only to the extent of what they can first absolutely prove to profit from. It's not all about money exactly, but it's like everyone's foreign policy here is being run by short term accounting firms.
As for this being a model of the future of the world, I'm not sure what it portends. I am sure I can hear the ghost of Nixon screaming at us all: "THE FUCK IS WRONG WITH YOU PEOPLE?"

Maduro's regime, besides no longer providing day-to-day services like law enforcement and healthcare, doesn't even have a true monopoly on violence: though he is the nominal highest authority of his "Holy Roman Empire" he is in fact very weak, not only in the sense that he relies on foreign puppetmasters (of which Cuba can nearly boast of running an occupation force) but also that he has to delegate power to a myriad of entities: coletivos, paramilitaries (including Colombian militias), cartels, local police and army units which largely fund themselves through drug trade (though even Maduro's family members take part in that) and extortion of the population. As they can find resources of their own they're not fully reliant on Maduro. The forces which do rely on Caracas and are directly subordinate to it in an official, bureaucratic hierarchy can't supress the population on their own. But they can harass lesser forces and Maduro can give or retract the state's blessing. So an arrangement develops in which those local entities are given a free hand but help Maduro remain in power. This has a lot in common with feudalism. It's also what happened in Syria to a large extent, where Assad is little more than a figurehead over a patchwork of militias.
In everyday life, too, Venezuela strides towards the past. Electrified, consumerist, interconnected society is gone. Internal trade has shrunk to a minimum, barter is common and production methods become ever more primitive. If anything, Maduro, like Mugabe, should be an idol to primitivists.

Chavismo doesn't rule like Lee Kuan Yew or Macron and its mindset completely breaks with the centrist consensus in the power centers of the West. It rejects any pretension to technocracy, careful consideration of long-term effects and following experts; el Presidente improvises, based on his nonexistant culture and knowledge, measures to save the people on the spot and that's it. Westerners say private actors should be assured of the safety of their property and contracts, while Chavismo seizes lands, encourages invaders, acts erratically and doesn't care about contracts. Westerners say extensive price controls are a recipe for disaster, Chavismo does them anyway. Westerners say a combination of a fixed foreign exchange rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary policy are an "impossible trinity", Chavez had them as his mainstay. And so on. For the future to resemble Venezuela leaders must embrace Venezuelan policies, but thankfully that seems unlikely.
Chavismo is classical South American autocratic demagoguery combined with moldy old Third Worldist, anti-imperialist and Marxist rhetoric. It doesn't look like a blueprint for what will happen in the future, but just another point in the long line of tinpot Third World autocracies.

>>28642
Oh god, that sounds liek the universe of Atom RPG...
I got the impression that the Assad regime has more control over their subordinates. On the other hand if I was a Syrian and see that Russia and to some extent Iranians run the show how much of a respect I would have toward our great leader.
>Maduro, like Mugabe, should be an idol to primitivists.
Kek. As a minarchist (of some sort) I welcome localities having larger say in their own affairs governing... oh, wait.

>>28644
Assad is nowhere as incompetent as Maduro and did some important reforms upon taking power. Syria's feudalization reflects its own lack of modernization, where surnames, connections and even tribes still matter, but mostly the immense strain the war placed on the structure of power. The army and police were overstretched, the state's ability to fund them collapsed and forces motivated by connections, ethnicity and religion proved to have far better morale than conscripts. So he had to rely on self-funding local militias of a sectarian character and his side became a lot like the rebels in the process. Of course he had a lot of responsibility for the war but without it he'd be in a much stronger position. His case isn't even the only in the region, with Yemen having an even worse power vacuum.
Maduro and Chavez, on the other hand, achieved all of this in peacetime within a relatively stable neighborhood.
>Russia and to some extent Iranians run the show
Russia was the gamechanger in the UN and from 2015 onwards but Iran was there earlier and has deeper connections and its own networks of influence and patronage within the country.

I'm quite emotionally invested in Maduro's downfall.
This isn't Syria. Constant news of catastrophe there aren't just something I read about on my daily routine. Information on the human geography, factions and background of the conflict doesn't simply satisfy my curiosity. It isn't an exotic, far-away land of people I'll never meet with a completely different way of life.

Venezuela is Andine, and that's already culturally a leap from Platine America, which is in turn different from Brazil. But as much as I like to distance myself from the Hispanophones, I can't help but see my own society in theirs. The megalopolis in the mountains close to the sea, the sprawling plains with proud cowboys, the jungles, the church, America, the former colonial master, the Miami-loving upper class, the middle class, the slums, the races, telenovelas, cassava, the consumer goods, in all sorts of aspects there are strong parallels. The whole continent underwent more or less the same phases of history since the 19th century, and the Pink Tide and its aftermath are the latest. Lula and Chávez were of the same archetype with just different degrees of radicalism, "herbivore" and "carnivore" as it was used to be said. They behaved alike, ruled alike, coordinated their actions in a hemisphere-spanning network centered in Cuba and supported each other. To this day some people here vouch for Maduro.
Moreover, the crisis has gone beyond international news to directly impact my country, even if that has no day-to-day impact on my life. I know someone who knows someone else who interacts with refugees; that's a distant connection, but there is an impact nonetheless. That neighbor has cost us a lot, right now with the burden of migrants and previously in the billions of public money "invested" there by previous governments.
The crisis is, to some degree, our fault for putting in place a friendly Pink Tide party and letting it give moral, diplomatic and political support to Chavismo until just a few years ago.

This means I empathize with Venezuelans, particularly those of a similar social position to mine, in a way I never could with Syrians. And it means I live with the chilling thought that it could have happened here. Realistically I know it wouldn't because the balance of political forces wouldn't have allowed it but seeing all of that happening in a similar society to similar people is unnerving.

News on Venezuela frequently appeared here since the 00s so I've followed it earlier than those on the First World. Its collapse wasn't a sudden event because of low oil prices or sanctions, ever since the first years of Chavéz in power there were voices warning that the system he created was doomed to implode. And what makes it sad is that there was no need to build that system in the first place, and the catastrophe was completely preventable. Venezuela was once in line with the rest of the continent. All countries were in their mediocrity, full of flaws but following a standard of normality, some doing better than others. They proceeded to get mostly mediocre leaders and normality remained, with some advancement across the board.

What Venezuela got wasn't mediocrity, the middle of the distribution, but the left end of the distribution of administrative competency -an uniquely inept ruling clique producing a situation far worse than the rest of the continent. If it had gotten mediocre, average leadership it'd be in a similar position to the rest of the continent -normality, not collapse.
And this is also why I'm optimistic about toppling Maduro. Statistically he's already an improbably failed ruler. It is unlikely that any successor will be even worse than him; probably it'd be mediocre. And Venezuela needs mediocrity, because it means converging with Colombia, Peru, Brazil, etc. all of whom are full of issues but in a much better position. Guaidó has already proved himself mediocre. Under his rule the tendency would be to approach the South American average. And that'd be a good thing, because the average South American country isn't under hyperinflation, starvation and mass emigration; Venezuela's natural tendency is to converge to that, and only the rotten ruling caste stops it.

>>28726
>>28727
Was interesting and funny to read, my friend. I laughed by the second post. When things are so low that mediocrity is something desirable.
I can relate somewhat due to the Yugo Wars and to lesser extent the Romanian coup, even tho I was way younger than you. But it in our backyard (and Hungarians were effected directly by the events, sometimes they played important parts too) in very similar countries and felt emotional impact from both. While the late stage of The Troubles in Ireland and GB went down about the same time, it had very little impact.

>>28726
>>28727
>>28730
>Events tend to regress towards the mean.

This, in a nutshell. Don't let flashy headlines fool you as it's never the whole story. Day to day averages almost never get mentioned for comparison, nor published at all.

A good essay, and an enjoyable read. There is both wisdom and humor in such an analysis, that hope lies in a return to grinding normalcy.

>>28820
But a regression towards the mean is still completely impossible as long as Chavismo's system of exchange controls, price-setting, unprecedented cronyism, etc. is in place. Someone will do away with it, but that can happen now or in twenty years. Maduro is a stubborn mule and won't do it unless he's evicted or forced to share power, so if the status quo remains he'll rule until his death, a Gorbachev figure takes over and only then allows a return to mediocrity.

>Day to day averages almost never get mentioned for comparison, nor published at all.
Information on the country itself is published a lot, it just isn't compared to the rest of the continent as often. And that comparison is necessary because it shows how completely preventable all of this was.

A few days ago some dissident FARC leaders announced they'll return to armed struggle and seek an alliance with the ELN, another insurgent group. They are in Venezuela and have been to Cuba recently. For a long time Venezuela has backed those groups and allowed them to operate and make money in their territory.
If anyone should invade Venezuela it's Colombia. Chavismo has directly or indirectly interferred with internal Colombian affairs, always for the worse, supporting terrorism and creating a heavy refugee burden.

don't lefties in LATAM call Colombia "the Israel of South America"?

For more information:
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/09/03/the-meaning-of-farcs-sort-of-comeback/
https://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2019/09/03/maduros-fundamental-role-in-the-farcs-affluence-and-power/?cn-reloaded=1

>>28928
I've never heard the term, but now that I googled it I can find some references. What I do remember hearing in the past was that it was the last trench of reaction on the continent.
It's just butthurt that Colombia didn't join the Pink Tide ride and repressed their FARC friends.

>>28930
I've heard the term from an "expert" dug up by RT France.

>>28928
If we had to relate cunts to cunts I at least could compare Brazil to the US of A and Argentina with Canada and Sweden. Bolivia could be related to Albania due to being the haven for drug trafficking, but it could also be compared to Belarus due to being a socialist nation.

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/09/11/the-hypothesis-of-the-decline-of-crime/
Violent crime has declined because everyone left the country, those who are left are too poor to be robbed, guns are too expensive and gangs have already entrenched themselves in their territories.

>>29177
There was a good comedy scene on Radio Cabaret I dunno if the show itself still exist, it was on every Thursday I think on one of the Hungarian radio channels, maybe on Petőfi or Kossuth I can't remember anymore, Bartók was for chiefly classical music back then for sure about the problem how to solve crime, or at least burglary. It used the radicalness of the solutions to create humour and mocked the usual ways of prevention, liek iron bars at windows and installing alarms. Such solutions were the abolishment of living standards where's nothing to steal there won't be robbery, or the wiping out the population so noone can commit crime, nowhere to break in.
Venezuela truly became a joke country.

Bump since anything can happen in Venezuela any time.

https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/12/30/2019-gave-us-a-new-kind-of-country/
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/12/01/what-is-happening-in-venezuelas-protected-capital/
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/09/25/the-access-denied-economy/
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2020/01/28/dollars-in-barrios-are-not-a-privilege-anymore/

Caracas has superficially recovered from the state of near societal collapse the country was last year, or at least isn't declining as fast as it did. Empty shelves have been filled with extremely expensive imported goods. Activity returned to the streets and the local private sector thrives. This is mainly in the capital, where remaining infrastructure is prioritized, and even then electricity and water aren't abundant; in the hinterland it is worse. The reasons for this "recovery" are:

-Massive depopulation from emigration, so remaining economic activity is better scaled to the population.
-Widespread dollarization, providing a usable medium of exchange in place of the bolívar.
-Relaxation of price controls and other regulations.
-Unenforcement of still overwhelming remaining regulations, such as labor legislation, by simple lack of administrative capacity but tacitly accepted by the regime.

Maduro's power structure has morphed into something completely different from that built by Chavez. The extremely weak state has given up on exerting its power, either on the capital's economics or on the country's geography: only in Caracas and some resource-producing areas it makes any attempt to rule, and the rest is left to fend for itself. The state itself is no longer the ruling clique's sole means of exerting control as many functions have been transferred to colectivos, gangs and the like.

>>34936
Ancap Pole would be proud.

Was thinking this situation in Venezuela is actually that which preppers prep for...
Except the Western (American) prepping fantasy is centered around themselves being self-reliant individuals (or at best on the level of the family) an insulated island of civilization surrounded a sea of barbarism, fending off hordes of roving raiders and all that shit from Fallout. This image comes from the totally fragmented society, where the individual is alone (well the law abiding citizen, for those in organized crime is different) don't belong anywhere, mobile, moves easily around in the country if a new workplace or anything demands, rootless, noone to count on, the perfect exploitable individual for the big economic players (oh he get payed well, no doubt, abundantly enough to pay loans and mortgages until the coffin). Also the too much media, movies, everyone thinks he is the hero in the Movie of Life, when in reality every role is just a walk-on.
Granted this Venezuelan situation also isn't really about healthy communities, and their members working together, taking the control - appropriated by the state up until now - into their hands. It's more like a tribalism.

Bit of a thread necro, but it be a good thread nevertheless. New news via Bloomberg:
------------------
By Fabiola Zerpa
and Peter Millard
September 11, 2020, 11:56 AM EDT
------------------
Venezuela’s capacity to produce some much-needed gasoline and diesel of its own hinges on a single oil play. To tap it, the Nicolas Maduro regime is willing to cannibalize the country’s crumbling energy infrastructure to pay contractors with scrap metal.

Unlike the tar-like crude from Venezuela’s Orinoco region, the light oil from Monagas state is the only kind that’s easy to process into fuel at the country’s aging refineries. It’s also the only area where production doesn’t require the help of sanction-wary partners.

So, with the U.S. considering further steps to curb the country’s fuel imports, cash-strapped state producer Petroleos de Venezuela SA is offering to pay for major repairs at pumping stations and compression plants in Monagas with scrap metal and parts from idled oil facilities, people familiar with the situation said, asking not to be named because the information isn’t public.

The move follows failed attempts to obtain $800 million in financing from suppliers, payable with crude and fuel, the people said. PDVSA is still offering to pay in crude or fuel, they said, but sanctions complicate such transactions and nothing has been decided.

The country so far has relied on shipments from Iran to ease a fuel shortage that often forces Venezuelans to queue for hours and even days to fill up, with many gas stations in Caracas shutting or rationing fuel.

The prospect of worsening shortages, increasing international isolation and growing social unrest has PDVSA grappling to revive a refining network crippled by years of mismanagement and pillage by criminal gangs. Boosting production and processing of light crude from Monagas is the country’s best shot at securing some measure of domestic fuel supplies.

The producer has already started dismantling some facilities to try to sell scrap, one of the people said, but it’s unclear what and how much has been sold.

PDVSA declined to comment on discussions with contractors.

Output from Monagas could become even more important for Maduro in the coming months if further U.S. sanctions target Venezuela’s barter for gasoline and diesel with its remaining clients in Asia and Europe. Without those suppliers, Venezuela will rely almost entirely on a dwindling group of sanctions-dodging traders for any gasoline imports.

The Trump administration has gradually tightened sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry to facilitate regime change, a prospect that has become more elusive with Venezuela’s opposition divided on whether to participate in congressional elections in December. Any success in reviving -- or simply stabilizing -- oil fields and refineries will give Maduro additional leverage to remain in power.

From a high of almost 1 million barrels a day in 2008, Monagas’s output has slumped to 114,000 barrels at the end of August. It accounts for about a third of the country’s output. While Chinese and Russian partners continue to help with extraction in the Orinoco region, the crude in Monagas is so easy to produce that PDVSA has never sought help from foreign companies.

Sanctions have forced Venezuela to take steep discounts when selling or bartering its remaining crude production. Diosdado Cabello, the vice president of the ruling party, said the country hasn’t gotten any actual cash payments from oil since late 2019.

“You have a government that got almost $100 billion from oil, and now only gets $1 billion,” said Francisco Monaldi, a lecturer in energy economics at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, and an expert on Venezuela’s oil industry. “I expect production to continue to fall, but it could go up when enforcement of sanctions isn’t as tough.”

>>39974
Largest oil deposits on the Earth, can't produce enough fuel for herself. Clown world.

>>39974
>To tap it, the Nicolas Maduro regime is willing to cannibalize the country’s crumbling energy infrastructure to pay contractors with scrap metal.

wtf.....

>>34941
Yeah, there is always going to be some kind of structure left behind. We aren't complete savages after all.

>>45405
Criminal organizations are states in the state. And they take over when they have the chance.
By sitting down with them to negotiate, the govt. acknowledged their power and legitimacy.
I bet the whole thing went sideways before Maduro, probably even before Chavez.
Some groups must have foreign backing (of various sources) too.

>>45406
They are mini-states in competition with the larger state. The wider state withdrew from the competition, removing any checks on the buildup and consolidation of their power.

>>45658
Living the ancap dream.

>>47397
They should have go with a fat lion.
Maybe these changes that certain regimes do with national symbols have some merit. They want to distance themselves from previous regimes, start something anew. These flags are always in front of people, they see them, and belongs to their identity, and forming a new identity cannot be done with the old symbolism. Shove them into the museums.

>>47399
The problem is that it's a bad regime with a bad identity, plus the new symbols is ugly. Even the liberals in Caracas Chronicle condemned them, calling the emphasis on Amerindians hypocritical and criticizing the lack of popular input.

>>47406
It could be worse. They could have made it into a circle like commies did.
What each feature represents?

>>47439
>What each feature represents?
1810-1811 was the independence struggle, 1989 the Caracazo riots and 2002 the failed coup against Chávez. According to Wikipedia the three people, from left to right, are Guaicaipuro (a 16th century chief), a black woman (just a random black woman, they couldn't even remember a relevant one) and Bolívar.

>>47470
Somehow I missed that giant red star in the lower center.
And the new flag?

>>47472
>And the new flag?
Not much, the mountain is El Ávila and the star and red color have generic vexillological meanings (rebellion, blood, etc.)

Maduro pretended to hold elections and the foolish opposition is now demonstrating in the streets because they took this ritual seriously.

What I find notable is the reluctance shown by several left-wing LatAm governments in recognizing the results:
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2024/07/29/most-of-the-world-is-challenging-maduro-to-prove-he-won/
>Brazil: A government’s communique and special envoy Celso Amorin demanded a detailed account, “tally by tally”, before pronouncing a winner.
>Chile: President Gabriel Boric opened the reactions on the side that is not recognizing, demanding detailed account. [Note: he even called the results "difficult to believe"].
>Mexico: President AM Lopez Obrador, a lukewarm ally of Maduro, said he will wait for a complete account of all votes. Mexico will probably launch an emergency mediation group with Brasilia and Washington D.C.

>>52245
There was a thread on /b/ yesterday that begged someone to kill him.
>and the foolish opposition is now demonstrating in the streets because they took this ritual seriously.
I do not believe this is true. I think they are demonstrating because The Screenplay of Modern Democracy says this is how it's done.
>Maduro Prove
Can he prove his rule up to this day was legitimate to begin with?
These fake elections, seriously...

I like his hoodie.

>>52246
This might go down as one of the laziest vote riggings in history. All percentages in the official results are suspiciously round:
>Maduro: 51,199997136828%
>Edmundo: 44,1999989263105%
>Others: 4,60000393686149%
It's so baffling anyone can check with Excel. It's all made up. Maduro must've told the head of the electoral council "I want 51,2% of the vote" and they simply multiplied the vote count by 0,512.

>>52248
>GREAT PATRIOTIC POLE
Polan! What did you do?!
Also I'm not familiar with Venezuelan election system, but I expect Maduro's party getting 100% of the seats in the parliament with that 51,2% of the votes.

>>52270
>Furthermore, once again the regime's results are not broken down by state and municipality
Hearing the same here at DPA (he takes it from somewhere else):
https://invidious.privacyredirect.com/watch?v=3A0lQSwGQi8
https://youtube.com/watch?v=3A0lQSwGQi8 [Embed]
There is no breakdown of the results to constituencies, just one result.

What if the numbers should add up to 100% if the voting is clean, but everywhere else in the world they doing voting fraud they really do actually.

>>52280
They claimed their computer infrastructure was under cyberattack.
Perhaps US really did that but team Maduro had to say soemthing so they just came up with these bogus numbers based on some data.

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/venezuela-politics-hatelaw/
Older news: this regime also relies on "hate speech" to suppress certain kinds of discussion, much like advanced Western democracies. The big difference is that in Venezuela, it's hate speech against individual authorities.

>>52325
Sounds like Lula had to pick between two seats, and he chose sitting on the floor. Vaguely I remember him doing another failure of a balancing act some time ago, no?
>Maduro's rhetoric
He obviously has to refuse fascism. That is always a good move. Then has to claim he is democratic despite not fulfilling the liberal-democratic expectations of the West. Then have to ponder to the Catholic traditions of Hispanics, South Americans; they were always faithful, even commies. Then have to place himself within the geopolitical trends, USA is unfriendly, means have to align against Israel. etc etc. At least that's my impression from your sketch.

>>52326
Hatespeech is ofc silly to begin with. And really if we say can do hatespeech against group X, then surely can be done against group Y. Since it's nonsense there are no rules where to apply.