Bernd
01/14/2026 (Wed) 20:50
No.55017
del
01/14/2026 (Wed) 20:50
No.55017
del
Check this quote
These concepts were developed in the 1970s and early 1980s when tactical nuclear weapons posed the greatest potential threat on the battlefield. In the mid-1980s the Soviets have recognized the growing threat of high precision weaponry and other high technological weapons systems. Their initial response has been to accentuate those trends of the 1970s by stressing heavier single echelons, more rapid tactical and operational maneuver, and greater tactical flexibility by small units. One author has noted that, although basic offensive principles still apply, greater premium would have to be placed on the importance of surprise actions, maneuver of subunits and fires, sharp and continuous cooperation, skill in concealing from the enemy one's intentions, and firm continuous command and control.50 Another has added "the revived capabilities of the battalion, and the increased significance of independent operations of subunits, naturally places great demands on the commander."51 These and similar assertions indicate an increased Soviet concern for tailoring more carefully at the battalion and regimental level and a concomitant concern for more initiative and flexibility on the part of their commanders at these levels.
These concepts were developed in the 1970s and early 1980s when tactical nuclear weapons posed the greatest potential threat on the battlefield. In the mid-1980s the Soviets have recognized the growing threat of high precision weaponry and other high technological weapons systems. Their initial response has been to accentuate those trends of the 1970s by stressing heavier single echelons, more rapid tactical and operational maneuver, and greater tactical flexibility by small units. One author has noted that, although basic offensive principles still apply, greater premium would have to be placed on the importance of surprise actions, maneuver of subunits and fires, sharp and continuous cooperation, skill in concealing from the enemy one's intentions, and firm continuous command and control.50 Another has added "the revived capabilities of the battalion, and the increased significance of independent operations of subunits, naturally places great demands on the commander."51 These and similar assertions indicate an increased Soviet concern for tailoring more carefully at the battalion and regimental level and a concomitant concern for more initiative and flexibility on the part of their commanders at these levels.