Bernd
01/14/2026 (Wed) 21:15
No.55018
del
Now this one. This is interesting for a hypothetical war against NATO.
Based upon these conclusions, in the event of war the Soviets would seek to achieve surprise by using deception to a maximum extent while politically trying to undermine the unity and resolve of the coalition itself. They would attempt to preempt or disrupt strategic (theater) defenses and preempt the use or limit the effectiveness of enemy nuclear weapons and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) by launching a massive ground offensive, by emphasizing early neutralization of enemy nuclear delivery means, and by attacking, using operational and tactical techniques designed to disrupt enemy command and control and produce paralysis and confusion in enemy ranks. A clear Soviet focus would be to force the capitulation of one or more of the weaker members of the enemy coalition. To accomplish these ambitious aims the Soviets must keep forward-area forces in a high state of readiness, furnished with first-rate equipment. Combat forces must be backed up by a logistical capability sufficient to sustain operations for the duration of the initial strategic and - because the potential for protracted operations is recognized — until the defense industrial sector is fully mobilized and producing key materiel and equipment (i.e., 60-90 days). The Soviets must achieve parity or superiority in the strategic and tactical nuclear realm, and because of the necessity to effect speed and surprise, they must abandon large-scale advanced mobilization and reinforcement of forward area forces prior to war. Forward area forces must be capable of attacking on short notice with only limited redeployment and regrouping. Maximum use of cover and deception is essential, and forces must be structured for and capable of conducting high speed deep operations. The Soviets feel they have achieved the bulk of these prerequisites.There are some details.
>force the capitulation of one or more of the weaker members of the enemy coalition.Sounds like the Baltics today.
>until the defense industrial sector is fully mobilized and producing key materiel and equipmentI think Russia's industry now already at this level - at least suitable for the war ongoing. But further on?
And this is the thing. After hearing Western officials that Russia will attack NATO and can march into Paris... does current year Russia sounds like that would be capable to do what Soviet theoreticians drew up?
Especially current year's technological environment? There is a reason why they are slogging and using micro-unit tactics, attack columns just aren't suitable.
Lots of good details in this book
>>54959. Worth a read. Supplements Baud's book as well.