>>76Not how it works. People seed the content they themselves have uploaded, but you can opt in to mirror the entire content of the site, including what everyone else has posted. What you seed is what you download unless you do that.
>>83Do you even know what bitcoin even is? Try googling it sometime.
1 month later, here's my assessment:
Stay away from zeronet, it's virtually unusable. Oh sure it has full-fledged sites and it's super fast, great. But it has critical flaws that are deeply tied to the whole design of zeronet.
For one, you cannot see any site without fully enabling javascript.
Additionally, you can't submit content without using an ID, even for anonymous submission.
That ID is actually a public/private key pair that you use to sign the content you post. You sign it so that you can later modify it at will. This is the first issue: you can bypass all sanitation and all automatic content generation that a site "suggests". This means you can inject arbitrary malign javascript (remember: you MUST have javascript enabled to see the site at all, so you will infect 100% of site users), change submission date, any part of the text, inject arbitrary images and videos at any time, force other clients to make requests to arbitrary addresses on the clearnet by injecting <img> tags, etc.
Next, to generate an ID, you cannot have generated an ID within 6 hours of the new request... per IP. This means that there is an ID-IP assoc table that anyone can download at any time and grep through.
To add to that, any site on which you can submit any content needs to log your ID, meaning that you can track someone by ID across posts, across sites (even if the site displays the user as "anonymous", like 0chan does), and as we've already established, you can tie that all to an IP.
Then there's the fact that it's based on torrents, but recommends using tor. Tor over torrents DoS's the network, it's a horrible idea and shows that the authors have no clue what they're doing, privacy or security-wise. Beside, IDs track you across tunnels.
There's also the issue of not enough encryption: site-private info should only be readable by the site admin whereas site-public info (i.e. user submitted content, which should be processed using a series of encryption-preserving operations, thus keeping the site-private info private) should be encrypted on the disk (even though everyone can have the key required to decrypt it).
There's also nothing like a friend-to-friend system to mitigate some of the issues like spam and "bad" content: only disruptors are free to operate on the network, whereas legitimate users have to jump through hoops and still end up in a bind simply to use the network as "intended".