This belief creation process, especially through new media and the internet, is a critical part of how simulacra are created in the context of 4GW – fourth generation warfare. Beliefs derived from the internet carry stronger weight at this time than beliefs drawn from television and radio. This is for many reasons, including the role of peer to peer information gathering, and that internet based information was pre-selected and ‘dug for’ by the consumer. This lends it a higher degree of value.
Russia has stated publicly that it is interested in both Iran and Israel’s strategic interests. How can this be, given that both countries are apparently in a proxy, and even recently direct, conflict with one another? In deciphering ‘Lavrovese‘, the language of Russian diplomacy, it must be understood that words have a certain meaning. In terms of Russia’s policy commitments to ‘strategic interests’, this doesn’t mean ‘as these countries view these themselves‘. In other words, Russia is committed to what it, itself, believes are Israel and Iran’s strategic interests, as opposed to what these two countries publicly state their interests are. In short, Russia is committed to Russia’s strategic interests; which do align with the general conception of deconfliction. The idea here is the most balanced compromises that deliver peace as a status quo. Instead of strategic interests, ‘security insurance’ is a better concept to separate this out from Israels irredentist goals or Iran’s foothold in Lebanon. It is neither a problem nor a criticism to state such. Russia has sandbagged its intentions with regard to Israel, and Israel is taking the bait.
Also, there is the fact that Russia is aware that both states, Israel and Iran, engage in a form of demagoguery and rhetorically politicize things beyond what may be the real strategic goal. A war between both countries may not be within either country’s strategic interests, given that Israel is a nuclear power and that Iran’s conventional response would be similarly effective. So all this rhetoric is in fact about containment, playing to their bases, not about mutual destruction, as it is sometimes understood each has called for the other.
Both Iran and Israel have strategic interests in Iraq, with Israel building strong ties with radical Sunni’s in Iraq who despise Iranian Shia’s growth of power. In essence, Iraq has become a proxy border between Israel and Iran. The government of Iraq today is increasingly, and more than nominally so, supportive of Iran. At the same time, through its parliament and private industry, Israel also has a vested interest in Iraq’s natural and mineral resources – oil and water. Moreover, and finally, what Iran and Israel publicly say their strategic interests are, may not match up with their own internal designs and discourse with regard to grand strategy and regional hegemony. Both states have benefited from the US-led invasion of Iraq. Recall at the time that both the US hand-picked ‘secular moderate’ government of Chalabi, and the ‘Shia resistance’ led by al-Sadr’s al-Mahdi Army, represented Iranian vested interest in the US’s campaign