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15th of November - Republic Day Bernd 11/16/2018 (Fri) 01:56:56 [Preview] No. 20613
Today we celebrate and glorify Pedro II's overthrow in a military coup 129 years ago, marking our transformation into a banana republic. The strongman who led the coup is even in every 25 cent coin.
As typical, Temer spoke about the virtues and strength of liberal democracy even though the Braganza were more liberally democratic than the following regimes.

Bernd 11/16/2018 (Fri) 06:31:38 [Preview] No.20615 del
Happy Republic Day! May you experience many more merry coups, Brazil!
>As typical, Temer spoke about the virtues and strength of liberal democracy even though the Braganza were more liberally democratic than the following regimes.
This is what you get when people mix up republic with democracy, monarchy with dictatorship.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 11:32:28 [Preview] No.21021 del
Numismatic thread?
curious ones >>>/librejp/136119

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 13:21:57 [Preview] No.21023 del
I don't have much experience with rare coins myself, but a friend of mine who worked in a supermarket once found one of these in his register, swapped it for a coin of his own and then later sold it online for like £100. I'm still jelly to this day.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 17:00:14 [Preview] No.21028 del
I had some hyperinflated Hungarian banknote from the end of WWII, before they changed to HUF. Also some good pre-war ones. I should still have them somewhere I dunno where tho.
I'm not much of numismatic enthusiast.
These >>21021 seem clever but kitsch.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 17:26:52 [Preview] No.21029 del
it's murrican, checks out
Although I would think those are 'pop' coins not state minted (still the one with the sword and the Graal graving is nice, kitsch and all)

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 17:42:58 [Preview] No.21030 del
Maybe they were ordered by a lodge or something. Especially the second one have such symbols but the grail on the first one could also be considered as a sign.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 18:18:52 [Preview] No.21032 del
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Let's get some more obscure ones in here.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 20:46:33 [Preview] No.21036 del
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Truly the predecessor of the pure-blooded Daco-Romanians.
Wikipedia says those coins were discovered in stashes which means we can't be sure when they were minted, by whom and how they found their way to their place of rest. No wonder several theories exist for their origin.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 20:47:44 [Preview] No.21037 del
gold is valuable commodity indeed.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 21:02:40 [Preview] No.21039 del
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Howdy, new-germanic servant! Check it out, I'm made of döner!

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 21:05:13 [Preview] No.21040 del
>Check it out, I'm made of döner!
Speaking of that, I'm suprised we still didnt make a statue made of döner.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 21:09:13 [Preview] No.21041 del
Wouldn't be too hard to whittle one from that stack of meat. But then, it would go rancid fast, not a good material for sculpting.

Bernd 12/05/2018 (Wed) 21:44:30 [Preview] No.21043 del
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Oh, coins. I have some, although they aren't really rare.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 06:31:20 [Preview] No.21048 del
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Rushka using rubble as currency. How fitting.
A well traveled gentleman I see.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 08:24:08 [Preview] No.21049 del
in long gone days I used to keep a small collection of coins from countries our family visited on vacation
if I recall correctly (doubtful) it may now lie in a box my brother and I use to keep buried in a sekrit location in the back of the old family house now sold

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 10:07:41 [Preview] No.21050 del

Yeah, it has relatively same value.

Main theory says that word "ruble" is related to "rubit'" (рубить, to chop). Like it was chopped part of grivna (old Russian money, that name remained in Ukraine). Ruble also have folk name "wooden".


I've never been in countries where these coins are made, except Bulgaria (and Russia of course). That's from old times of family.

Most coins are not rare souvenir rubles from USSR times though, only these on photo are relatively rare.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 13:11:19 [Preview] No.21051 del
>When, long ago, the gods created Earth
>In Jove's fair image Man was shaped at birth.
>The beasts for lesser parts were next designed;
>Yet were they too remote from humankind.
>To fill the gap, and join the rest to Man,
>Th'Olympian host conceiv'd a clever plan.
>A beast they wrought, in semi-human figure,
>Filled it with vice, and called the thing a Nigger.
What did he mean by this?

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 15:01:39 [Preview] No.21052 del
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>Maybe they were ordered by a lodge
/horror/ would surely have things to say about those
>the grail on the first one could also be considered as a sign
could also? it is probably among the original ones, if eco's pendulum is anything to go by

coin unrelated

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 15:12:24 [Preview] No.21053 del
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>It is a mistake to allow Jews to mingle with Aryans as social equals. I have
>never been forced to do this, & at high school I drew the colour line at Jews as
>well as negroes, though of course there is no racial comparison between the two
>classes of undesirables.

>But I, thank the Gods, am an Aryan, & can rejoice in the glorious victory of T.
>Flavius Vespasianus, under whose legions the Jewish race & their capital were
>trodden out of national existence! I am an anti-Semitic by nature, but thought
>I had concealed my prejudice in my remarks concerning Isaacson. I showed him
>every consideration in my article, carefully saying that I attacked not the man,
>but the ideas. However, if Jerusalem wishes to start trouble, he will find in me
>a new Titus, eager to inscribe on my eagles the triumphant legend IVDAEA CAPTA!

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 15:41:35 [Preview] No.21054 del
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>But I, thank the Gods, am an Aryan
Kek, classic American

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 16:48:32 [Preview] No.21055 del
He meant negers should sit at the back of the bus.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 16:50:45 [Preview] No.21056 del
Do you have the Mexican version of picrel?

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 17:16:41 [Preview] No.21059 del
Isn't this it already? :^)

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 17:24:41 [Preview] No.21064 del
There was another version of that meme right there, but instead of an American LARPing as a "Wiking" and worshipping Thor, it's a Mexican LARPing as an Aztec and worshipping Huitzilopochtli.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 18:48:11 [Preview] No.21065 del
And there's another version with a Turk attempting to worship Tengri.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 19:05:04 [Preview] No.21067 del
I haven't seen that one. Maybe you'd have more luck asking on one of the other more populated KC boards or something.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 21:06:01 [Preview] No.21076 del
Speaking of that, it's ironic that Americans always LARP as "Wikings" and sperg about "my ancestors!" all the time, even though the reason they're in America is that they're literally descended from the puritans.

Bernd 12/06/2018 (Thu) 22:38:00 [Preview] No.21082 del
Well assuming that's true, a mistake going on for a few hundred years won't going to erase the thousands of years tradition and belief. homewer neo-paganisms are flawed mainly because they are neo, european paganism tradition mainly die out.

It would be very logical to assume, paganisms and their splitoff local beliefs were represantor of the peoples lifestyles, by lifestyle I mean pretty much everything not glamour and fashion. So when you revive a thing you must both interconnect with your ancestors(assuming the person is into it) also it has to fit the present age as paganisms were mostly not dogmatic.

This is for neo paganisms of course, people dont show attention to already existing paganisms simply because they are not hype and holywood don't bastardized praised them for their own likings, made them another buyable tool, it's kinda similar to new age buddhism hype actually.

Bernd 12/09/2018 (Sun) 07:41:02 [Preview] No.21113 del
Oh, where did the fillér go? It's the change of the HU Forint they retracted (or how you call it) it years ago. And then the 1 and 2 HUF. Now the smallest denomination is 5 HUF. Shamefur dispray.
I've never seen this type of coin. When I was a kid we had 10, 20 and 50 fillér.

Bernd 12/09/2018 (Sun) 23:25:36 [Preview] No.21137 del
>european paganism tradition mainly die out.

They didn't die, but pretty much incorporated into Christianity nowadays. Even concept of saints is more pagan than Christian (considering original Christianity), although church already fixed all problems with theological works and transformed itself. Superstitions and folk traditions also are pretty pagan things.

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 01:10:03 [Preview] No.21139 del
>(considering original Christianity)
it's an original christian concept

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 06:47:10 [Preview] No.21140 del
By dying out I mean their tradition mostly archieved by christian priests and nowadays paganism as paganism, not as tradition dieded out. I want to mean that, not saying it vanished out of nowhere.

And saintdom I think more related with ancestor worhsip/veneration, arguably even older than paganisms, if not the oldest concept in paganism.

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 07:09:19 [Preview] No.21143 del
>it's an original christian concept

It depends on form and scale. Some protestants considering this as idolatry for reasons.

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 19:05:32 [Preview] No.21164 del
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Got that one.

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 19:08:47 [Preview] No.21165 del
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Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 19:42:35 [Preview] No.21170 del
Fun. Had a giggle.

Well, the coming up of the idea of saints is original thought of Christians. But I think it was a way of accommodating pagan practices and wasn't part of the core ideas of the early Christians (I think in the Apostolic Age). Might be wrong. When was St. Peter canonized?

Bernd 12/10/2018 (Mon) 20:54:29 [Preview] No.21173 del
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ebin xDDD. we don't call call it tengri btw, we call it tanrı. the 'g' in tengri is not actually 'g' it's 'ng' the stress is on n not g, so the g has fallen out in western Turkic languages.

Bernd 12/13/2018 (Thu) 23:54:34 [Preview] No.21257 del
I'll still use this thread for important historical dates.

Exactly 50 years ago, on the 13th of November, 1968, General Costa e Silva, elected President by Congress two years earlier, decreed the fifth and last of the military regime's Institutional Acts, legally establishing press censorship, arbitrary arrests, federal intervention in state and municipal administration, the temporary dissolution of Congress, a ban on unauthorized political public meetings and a presidential right to sack disloyal public officials.
After four years of dictatorship with most civil liberties intact, this act cemented central power and the position of hardliners.
It was passed amidst a crackdown on a wave of opposition activity. Although most of the population passively endorsed the regime, dissidents were getting very vocal.
What followed was the zenith of military rule: although hundreds (on both sides) died in political violence, hardline dictatorial rule was strong and stable, with a successful propaganda machine and sky-high economic growth. Only by 1974 did this wear off and the existing political and economic model begin to show its contradictions, with the opposition making major gains within elections for the (powerless) Legislative which also shows elections weren't rigged and government victories in 1966 and 1970 were genuine. Moderates won back power in the same year and commenced a very slow thaw, revoking all five Institutional Acts in 1978.

Journalists and intellectuals are all talking unanimously about how this event was a massive setback for the nation and we need to revoke amnesty and hunt down and arrest every senile officer involved in political repression.

Bernd 12/27/2018 (Thu) 23:50:34 [Preview] No.21686 del
I want to shoot anyone who claims certain Turkish foods are foreign. Even if their origin and name %100 Turkish they just claim it, I don't get it, why cant they just come up with their own shit? I hate them and I hate their media power and I hate people believe anything as long as it's repeated enough.

god damn motherfuckers.

Bernd 12/31/2018 (Mon) 07:52:53 [Preview] No.21779 del
Your post looks strangely off topic. Considering you posted the sarma on the same day coincidentally... I wonder what's the background of this.

Bernd 03/31/2019 (Sun) 17:52:57 [Preview] No.24146 del
Precisely 55 years ago General Olímpio Mourão Filho (former Integralist intelligence agent) ordered the 4th Infantry Division to march south towards Rio de Janeiro. Forces initially loyal to the government refused to fight their brothers. The 1st Division moved from the city for a clash, but instead joined forces with them. (My father witnessed the moving columns and mentions there was talk of civil war). The 3rd Division considered fighting but gave up. Naval and aviation elements wanted to fight but the loyalist leadership did not want a standoff against the U.S. Navy which was ready to support the insurrection.
High ranking officers intended to act a few days later, but Mourão Filho was hasty. Newspapers ran articles against President Goulart. He fled to Uruguay, and even before he had left the country, the head of the Lower House had temporarily taken over the Executive. Congress then elected Chief of staff Castello Branco as President. The Democratic Revolution of 1964 (or coup, if you wish to call it so) was complete.

Bolsonaro has a glorified view of the events and ordered the Armed Forces to organize celebrations of the events. The military itself never called for anything of the kind and would rather keep quiet, it was the Presidency's initiative. After a lot of controversy and legal objections only some events were held.
Bolsonaro has been accused of attempting to rewrite history. But history is written by the winners and he happens to be the loser: vengeful oppositionists created the current image of what happened back then and Bolsonaro is a nostalgic, frustrated representative of the other side.
I could be called a 64 apologist but not from Bolsonaro's mythicized perspective.
And politically this is a stupid move and needlessly creates friction. He should change the image of the past in more subtle ways.

Bernd 03/31/2019 (Sun) 17:56:44 [Preview] No.24147 del
Newspapers have devoted several pages to tell readers what they're supposed to believe and that it was a very sad day. Other news are about how streets named after the period still exist. This is a bit hypocritical given that the 1930 military coup is politically correct and acceptable (every city has an avenue celebrating Getúlio Vargas, who also brutalized dissidents, and eminent institutions are named after him) and the 1889 coup is even celebrated as a national holiday.

Bernd 04/09/2019 (Tue) 04:53:33 [Preview] No.24621 del
Is this a one time thing or they are making it an official celebration repeated every year (not necessarily a national holiday)?

Maybe 1930 and 1889 counts as long time ago in Brasil and for many people these events are now politically neutral habbenings. I can't see how but maybe it is.

Bernd 04/09/2019 (Tue) 22:42:54 [Preview] No.24650 del
>Is this a one time thing or they are making it an official celebration repeated every year (not necessarily a national holiday)?
Given the negative repercussion and the fact that the Armed Forces themselves never asked for it, it won't happen again.

>Maybe 1930 and 1889 counts as long time ago in Brasil and for many people these events are now politically neutral habbenings. I can't see how but maybe it is.
To a large extent, yes, 1964 is still seen through emotional lens of vengefulness or nostalgia. But 1889 and 1930 are more than politically neutral, they're politically positive or mixed. Each event's remembrance depends on the propaganda of political regimes and the size of the old regime's followers after the fact.

On 1889 Pedro II had broad popular support but elites were united against him. The nation's entire symbology with aesthetics dating back to pre-colonial times was replaced with Republican symbology and the Republic was worshipped unyieldingly in public rhetoric. Monarchists were just fringe far right groups with no signifance. The new generations gradually assimilated this and came to see the Empire as a "wrong" state of affairs.

1930 has both positive and negative images. Vargas was charismatic and had a brilliant propaganda machine. On 1945 he was pushed out of power by liberal officers and civilians but politics in the next 20 years were defined by the conflict between his supporters and detractors. Both the main populist party and the main centrist elitist party were in his camp, and he was still hugely popular and managed to win the Presidency through the popular vote. At the end, facing a crisis, he left behind a pompous note ("I leave life to enter history") and killed himself, making him a martyr. So a positive image of Vargas lingered on, though it's not unanimous.

1964 was initially popular and had its own propaganda, but the regime began to lose support. Most importantly, despite censorship oppositionists slowly expanded their presence in the intelligentsia. The government itself didn't notice or didn't act on this, and one general working in the intelligence service had a "boiling pot" theory that opposition sentiment should be allowed to vent out through peaceful means so it doesn't grow explosive. So now the intelligentsia overwhelmingly hates the military and in the new democratic political climate only fringe elements like one unknown Rio de Janeiro alderman with a military background defend the regime.

Bernd 04/22/2019 (Mon) 21:14:27 [Preview] No.25061 del
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Bernd 07/04/2019 (Thu) 02:30:16 [Preview] No.27825 del
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Two anniversaries on the 1st of July:

25 years ago, on 1994, the Real entered the market. Though unpopular at the time, its introduction was part of wider reforms bringing a definitive end to hyperinflation and the "lost decade" of the 80s, opening the road to the prosperous 2000s. Previously several new currencies and hyperinflation-killing plans were devised over the span of just a few years and all of them failed. Now the 2010s have been another lost decade and the BRL has lost most of its original value; in the 90s 1 USD was worth around 1 BRL, at times even less, then for a long time 1 USD ~ 2 BRL was a good measure and nowadays 1 USD ~ 4 BRL is the norm. That's still better than other currencies on the continent and hyperinflation never returned.

Bernd 07/04/2019 (Thu) 03:05:08 [Preview] No.27826 del
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51 years ago, on 1968, Cuba and far left insurgents through the continent were on a manhunt against those responsible for killing Che Guevara, among them Bolivian captain Gary Prado Salmón. Prado was pursuing a few months of military education in Rio de Janeiro and his presence had been made public and fell into the sights of COLINA (National Liberation Command), one of the insurgent groups active at the time. A recruit stalked Prado and informed the group. Two killers, a driver and a manifesto writer prepared an assassination at the Botanical Garden. The two executors awaited for him to appear in a specific hour and place. A man did pass by and received 10 shots at point blank range. His briefcase was picked up and the assassins hurried out of the scene.
Upon opening their victim's case they were disappointed to find they had just murdered not Prado, but a German national -Eduard Ernest Thilo Otto Maximilian von Westernhagen. It's a bit hard to find information on him, but from what I gathered he was a Wehrmacht artillery officer on the Eastern Front, got commended during the battle of France, was seriously wounded in Berlin, spent some time in Soviet captivity, lived as a farmer in Argentina, returned to Germany to work with artillery in the Bundeswehr and found himself in Rio de Janeiro as an exchange student representing his country in the Command and General Staff School (ECEME). He was the first German officer in this course.

His death was a mystery and was speculated to have been the work of the KGB or Mossad at the time. He was fondly remembered in the School. All culprits were arrested over charges unrelated to this event. Only in 1987 the truth came to light.

Now the Army made an official statement in memory of this former ECEME student. He is called "a survivor of the Second World War and the Soviet totalitarian prisons whose life was shortened by an insane and cowardly terrorist act" and "had the mission to show the world the valour of Germany's army [i.e. the Bundeswehr], doing away with the negative image left by the Second World War".
This story is well known and I've read it years ago. Nobody ever made a fuss about Otto and his past, and the focus laid on COLINA and Gary Prado; Otto was just an unlucky bystander and many accounts don't even mention he was in the military. But in our hair-trigger environment the Army's statement drew much controversy and media attention, with "ARMY CELEBRATES NAZI OFFICER" headlines.

Bernd 07/04/2019 (Thu) 03:44:07 [Preview] No.27828 del
I'm incensed about this. As if neocon nursery rhymes about left wing Hitler weren't enough the opposition is also making noise about Nazies and now we have single digit IQ debates about war crimes and responsibility. The Army is celebrating a LITERAL NAZI; the Army is celebrating the NAZI ARMY.

Rio de Janeiro's Israelite Federation "laments and vehemently rejects" the homage to an officer "who was part of the Nazi troops, responsible for the deaths of 20 million people, among them blacks, Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, the physically handicapped and Brazilian soldiers".

The homage is said to be "ironic" and an insult to our troops who fought in Italy. Veterans were still in the ranks in the 60s and didn't feel bothered at the time, because they weren't petty to want to ostracize their vanquished enemies forever. He was invited by the Army itself and civilians half a century later think they know better.
The event is said to be a "gaffe" or a "defeat" for Bolsonaro. Yet the message was issued by the Army, an apolitical institution, and not the President, his cabinet, aides or party. Bolsonaro has been a civilian for decades.
As expected, much was said of the Wehrmacht's war crimes. None are known to have been committed by Maximilian, who was received back in Germany with open arms. The FRG was full of veterans in positions of importance.
Not a lot is said of the fact that a communist guerilla was conducting assassinations.

One news site cites a historian and university professor who asks why the Army didn't pay homage to a dead Red Army soldier and goes on about "the brillianece of Germans doesn't fit in reality" and Soviet "brilliance freeing the world of Nazism". A historian and yet he can't understand the context. The Army isn't running a wartime military strength comparison or paying homage to war machines. It's remembering a murdered student in one of its courses, just that. There are no murdered Red Army students to be remembered in ECEME. A murdered student from the Bundeswehr, not the Wehrmacht.

Much scrutiny has fallen on the Army's description of Germany as a Friendly Nation (capitalized, as it's one of their formal terms). Of course it was. Otto represented the Bundeswehr and the Federal Republic of Germany, a Friendly Nation and part of the same side in the Cold War. That's the point, the Army is just remembering its friendship with the Bundeswehr and the FRG.
He was remembered well and had his name on a room and a bronze plaque at ECEME. In 1968 nobody knew local communists were responsible for his death, so it wasn't out of political exploitation.

The Army refuses to retract their message and it's still up:

Bernd 07/06/2019 (Sat) 09:41:00 [Preview] No.27859 del
That's a very unfortunate fate that German officer suffered. He survived WWII and the following years just to get killed by some petty thugs on the other side of the world where he thought to be safe.

Applied double standards and namecalling, used to smear shit all around in daily politics. Tl;dr Bolsonaro is a Nazi.
We have this shit too all the time, practically the integral part of public speech. This is one of the lowliest tools despite those who use it imagine themselves the most intelligent and educated people.

Bernd 10/12/2019 (Sat) 09:30:21 [Preview] No.30331 del
To the front.

Bernd 04/01/2020 (Wed) 03:38:25 [Preview] No.35592 del
The 31st of March is a relevant date as at 3:00 in the morning in 1964, General Olímpio Mourão Filho mobilized the 4th Division and moved towards Rio de Janeiro, setting in motion the military-civilian plot to overthrow President João Goulart (a.k.a. Jango). The plans were for the 4th of April but Mourão Filho was hotheaded and, once his action was in progress, could not be reversed. But it would have been funny if he had made this on the 1st of April.
The military at the time was as confused as the rest of the country and divided on loyalty and ideology, thus splitting into rebel and legalist camps. Before midnight legalists in Rio de Janeiro state were already moving towards Mourão Filho's column. Note that Rio de Janeiro was no longer the capital but still very important as Brasília was very new. In the days that followed units from both camps moved to seize key positions, almost came into conflict and there was a specter of civil war, but ultimately the legalists chickened out and were defeated without any shots fired. Jango's overthrow happened in both military and civilian fields, and in the latter legalists also folded. In a handful of days Jango had fled to Uruguay and Congress -the same Congress, it was not dissolved- began the transfer of power.
I'm trying to make sense of the allegiance of specific units, their movements and the importance of the ground they sought. However I can't even find an order of battle for the whole military at the time, it seems such a thing only exists for the 21st century. For figuring out an order of battle it's easier to read the historical material published by the present successors of old units. The historical record registers important units through the crisis but not the whole hierarchy. Additionally information on some states and the units in them is only found when specifically searching for that state, with wider histories only covering Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.

From what I gather the higher level was of Military Commands/Armies -presently only the former is used, and probably only the latter then- with the most important being the Ist (eastern), II ("central", now southeastern) and IIIrd (southern). Below those were Military Regions/Infantry Divisions:
The Ist Army had the 1st Division in Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo, strong and with plenty of legalists, and Mourão Filho's 4th Division in Minas Gerais. In Rio de Janeiro cadets at the Agulhas Negras academy also played a role and count as a unit for this context.
The IInd Army had the 2nd Division in São Paulo. It took the rebel side.
The IIIrd Army had the 3rd Division in Rio Grande do Sul. It was a legalist bulwark. It also had the 5th Division in Paraná and Santa Catarina, but it was much weaker. I just found an article about it and it had a complex situation ultimately won by the rebels.

Among governors there were also legalists and rebels. They didn't necessarily share the allegiance of the military in their states: in Rio Grande do Sul Ildo Meneghetti transferred the state's administration to the hinterland to evade legalists in the capital, while Guanabara (a single-municipality state comprising Rio de Janeiro proper, a legacy of its capital status) also had an anti-Jango governor. Minas Gerais and São Paulo's governors also sided against the national government. Rebels arrested governors in Pernambuco and Sergipe.
There's a lot of reading to do, I'll look into it place by place and try to draft a map of the situation with what I find.

Bernd 04/01/2020 (Wed) 04:54:43 [Preview] No.35595 del
Olímpio had previously been relevant in the 30s, when he was part of the Integralist intelligence service. By forging a communist insurrection plot - the Cohen Plan - in 1937 he gave Vargas a pretext to suspend the next year's elections and create an authoritarian Constitution. In 1938 Integralists and other groups would then try to overthrow Vargas, fail and get repressed. Olímpio and other Integralists were rehabilitated and he fought in Europe in the 40s.

Bernd 04/01/2020 (Wed) 18:21:54 [Preview] No.35601 del
>Brazilian order of battle
Sounds interesting. I wonder what's behind the lack of info. The changes the Hungarian army went through the 20th century is very well documented.
Those Roman numbers sounds like military districts or corps. Or military districts that convert into corps in case of mobilization. Armies traditionally signaled by Arabic numbers, similar to divisions.
>legalist and rebel
What was the ideological split? Since it's Cold War era I can guess.
>There's a lot of reading to do, I'll look into it place by place and try to draft a map of the situation with what I find.
So continuation is expected?
Btw, you showed interest in my Görgey writing, I'm not sure you noticed I completed the whole thing a while ago.

Bernd 04/06/2020 (Mon) 00:07:53 [Preview] No.35669 del
>Sounds interesting. I wonder what's behind the lack of info
The information is out there, buried in some library with no way to access from Libgen or Google Books. There's just not enough interest. Usually a comprehensive description of a past hierarchy is only compiled in case of a formal war, which hasn't been the case since the 1860s. In peacetime fragmented information about the hierarchy shows up when scholars dig up the military's history, but I've found few information in those cases as civilian and military historians are mostly concentrated in either the social and political context or the development of doctrine and commanders' biographies.
>Those Roman numbers sounds like military districts or corps. Or military districts that convert into corps in case of mobilization. Armies traditionally signaled by Arabic numbers, similar to divisions.
The sources I've found call them by Roman numbers.

>What was the ideological split? Since it's Cold War era I can guess.
Some factors were unique to the military. It already had a tradition of insubordination as insubordination was what had brought the Republic into existence in the first place. The existing (Fourth) Republic by then was also brought about by a military-civilian movement which toppled Vargas. Attempts at military interference in politics, with civilian backing, continued through the 50s. Then in 1961 there was once again an institutional crisis. The elected President, Jânio Quadros, published a cryptic resignation letter in a bungled move to return to power with popular support. Nobody moved in his favor. Though backed by the right, he was more of a meme President than anything and doesn't fit neatly into the ongoing power struggle. The real problem was a peculiarity in the existing electoral system: the offices of President and Vice-President were elected separately. Jânio's VP was a leftist of the more confrontational kind and would now step in. A military-civilian movement to prevent his accession to power was thwarted by a strong civilian reaction and, within the military, by widespread legalism (Mourão Filho himself and other 1964 rebels were legalists in 1961), specially among sergeants. The crisis was resolved by transitioning to a parliamentary system which emptied Jango's power.

This crisis had a lasting impact in the military. Sergeants and sailors had become politicized in Jango's favor. Hierarchy was giving way to anarchy.
Some units lived in a kind of double command. Hundreds of officers withstood embarrassing situations. In a unit at the Vila Militar there were sergeants who disregarded timetables and held private depots. One of them threatened the "reactionary sirs": "the instrument of labor of military men is the rifle". Another, elected a Deputy, spoke of the "hanging of those responsible for the tyranny of economic powers". In 1963 leftist general Osvino Ferreira Alves, the foremost "general of the people", celebrated his birthday with a party attended by eight hundred sub-lieutenants and sergeants. Sailors used the ships' transmission network to communicate their slogans, and, at least once, opened the Admiralty Council's safe to copy minutes from a secret meeting.
(Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada)

Bernd 04/06/2020 (Mon) 00:08:21 [Preview] No.35670 del
This had backing from above:
His (Osvino's) association received 8 million Cr$ from the Presidency's Chief of Staff, of which five had to be given to a group of sergeants in São Paulo. This anarchy was protected by a few officers loyal to the government and tolerated by many others fearful of clashing with the "apparatus" [Jango's control of the higher echelons, this is an important point for later] and thus, risk the liquidation of their career.
The final days of March were the nadir. First came the Sailors' Revolt on the 25th. The Minister of the Navy ordered the arrest of 12 graduates who had made an Association of Sailors and Marines into a trade union-like organization with communist ties. In reaction sergeants, corporals and sailors headed by Corporal Anselmo barricaded themselves at the HQ of a communist-tied trade union and demanded freedom for the twelve. They were joined by civilian activists and declared their wider political positions. 23 soldiers sent in repression joined the mutiny. After negotiations the protesters were arrested in Army, not Navy quarters and then freed, which they did in triumph, cheering with two leftist admirals.
Then on the 30th he spoke to thousands of sergeants at the Automobile Club in Rio de Janeiro. His subordinates had pleaded him not to speak, but he did. His action was deemed an escalation of the crisis in the military, and his words, politically explosive as he asked his audience to back his radical reforms. A friend had chosen for him the most moderate of three possible texts for his speech; its writer was in fact Luís Carlos Prestes, head of the Communist Party.
Officers worried about military anarchy saw the past days as the last straw, and now believed the President was attacking the Armed Forces as an institution; this was fundamental in their decision to rebel.
On the other hand legalists were also motivated by the feeling that they still owed loyalty to the President as their formal superior. This had been important in previous crises but could not determine fate now. Many more were indecisive and stayed legalist until switching sides when they saw where the wind was blowing.
There was also an ideological factor concentrated in the military, a tradition of Positivist authoritarianism which had already played out in 1889 and Vargas' time. Positivism was also in the roots of Varguism which was part of the legalist political base. But many of the rebels had themselves previously fought for Vargas.

>So continuation is expected?
Yes, I'll casually read into this subject.

Bernd 04/06/2020 (Mon) 02:13:36 [Preview] No.35675 del
Now that I look at it, the 1930 Revolution is a richer military topic. It lasted a couple weeks and was a multi-front civil war with the rebels taking large swathes of territory from the legalists, but right before a major battle was to take place a coup within the legalist side interrupted fighting and handed power to the rebels. The death toll was probably still very low, but not as much as the 1964 revolution which left only 7 dead, all of them civilians.
However it's even harder to find information on actual military movements in 1930.
There's also 1932, but that was lopsided with only a single state being in rebellion. Way earlier there's the Rio Grande do Sul independence war which lasted ten years and had the separatists invade and declare a republic in another state, build a navy and enlist Garibaldi to their side.

Bernd 04/10/2020 (Fri) 20:30:25 [Preview] No.35826 del
I hope I won't forget to read this tomorrow.

Bernd 04/11/2020 (Sat) 17:49:02 [Preview] No.35836 del
So basically the military became over-politicized, and despite the notable communist ties and unionized low ranking officers and rank and file troops, they turned against the leftist President, because they felt he tries to push them out of power, while they were now quite used to exercising it?

Bernd 04/11/2020 (Sat) 18:51:11 [Preview] No.35837 del
There was a war in the 19th with the Argentine. Maybe with Argiebernd you guys could provide the two sides viewpoint of the conflict. Well, if you guys are willing.
I dunno how much enmity is between the two nations, I know in football rivalry is not little, but otherwise no.

Bernd 04/15/2020 (Wed) 01:00:30 [Preview] No.35934 del
Several wars, and more with Uruguay and Paraguay, as well as times Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires were allied. Foreign policy was fully directed towards the Platine region and its borders were contested over decades. They had already been relatively fluid in colonial times, when some wars also took place. It's the only densely populated border region between Hispanophone and Lusophone America, easy to access by its rivers and flat terrain and economically valuable because of the same rivers. In that respect it's like the Volga or Mississipi-Missouri.

>they turned against the leftist President, because they felt he tries to push them out of power, while they were now quite used to exercising it
They weren't in power in the first place, military crises in 1945-1961 were just attempts to replace one civilian regime with another. The rebels were concerned about the military's institutional decay but were just as politicized as the leftists, and both wanted to use their power to preserve a regime or discard it for another. It was expected, and many of the rebels wished for, that a coup d'état would just get rid of Goulart and renew the civilian political leadership.
Political divisions in the military mirrored those among civilians, so first those must be described.
The existing democratic order was established after the ouster of Vargas after WWII. His opponents gathered in the National Democratic Union (UDN), which was a big tent but after leftists moved away it became right-wing. UDN favored alignment with America, laissez-faire economics and foreign investment. In turn, the Varguist base went to Labor (PTB) and the Social Democrats (PSD). PSD was formed from the former regime's elites and their electoral base in each state. It was thus moderate and tied to power. It wanted to develop the country through mass investment in public works, disregarding inflation, and accepted foreign capital. PTB was based on trade unions and militants. It was similar to the PSD but rejected foreign capital and, by 1964, embraced radical social measures such as land reform. Their positions after 1964 are easy to discern as existing parties were disbanded and replaced with just two, the ruling Arena and oppositionist MDB; most of the UDN and PSD migrated to Arena, and most of PTB to MDB.
Communists were few but had a lot of ties among trade unions and the like. The main pro-Soviet wing wanted to achieve their means through cooperation with the existing order. Among farmers they controlled ULTAB and used to be allied with the much better-known Peasant Leagues, but the latter got in bad terms as by the 60s they had grown too radicalized, had Cuban ties and wanted land reform by law or by force.

Bernd 04/15/2020 (Wed) 01:03:09 [Preview] No.35935 del
In elections PSD/PTB ran together against UDN and continually won. PSD had taken power in 1945 and 1955, and PTB in 1950. Because of this UDN sided with any officers with rebellious intents. In 1960 UDN allied with the minor PTN and managed to elect Jânio Quadros, a populist wildcard, who did not rule in the UDN's style. In any case he was quickly out and PTB got in power, but castrated by the parliamentary system. In 1963 a plebiscite restored presidentialism and Goulart embarked on a radical agenda of fiscal, electoral, urban and land reform.
At the same time the existing economic model had run into its contradictions. In part because of the heavy spending of the 50s there was uncontrolled inflation and budget and foreign exchange deficits. Foreign investment diminished and per capita wealth had just begun to contract. Strikes doubled from 1962 to 1963. There was land conflict in the hinterland. The middle class was also restless and opposed the government. There was an atmosphere of radicalism.
Goulart's reforms enraged elites and were blocked by the conservative Congress. The majority of media and the Church as well as the American embassy would later back the coup. Goulart was limited to his political base, with most stakeholders in society against him. In 1965 there'd be elections and PTB would join as a junior partner to PSD, with opinion polls indicating they'd win, but Goulart now wanted to steamroll the political system to get his reforms ahead, possibly implementing re-election or even a Constituent Assembly.
This required rousing up radicals to put pressure on Congress, essentially doing his own coup, and so in the early months of 1964 he was on a busy sequence of rallies with unionists, activists and the like. Rallying supporters in the military was an important part of that, which motivated his leniency with the sailors' revolt and his speech at the Automobile Club. He also counted on having stacked the upper echelons of the military with apparently loyal men. Communists were not directly part of his circle but also backed him.

Communists in the military formed the "Setor Mil". The party could count on about 100 active officers, 20-30 in higher ranks. They had feet in the National Security Council and the Military Cabinet. In the Air Force they had 20 officers, including 2 brigadiers and 3 colonels. Most important was brigadier Francisco Teixeira, who commanded the powerful IIIrd Air Zone in Rio de Janeiro.
Jango's most important support base among sergeants was of leftist nationalists. High-ranking legalists also included moderate PSD types.
The rebels, in turn, were on the right, but not necessarily liberals like the UDN. Their governments would later embrace strong spending with massive public works (even repeating 60s inflation in the 80s, now even greater) and a strong state with a number of public companies and directed national policy towards rural and industrial settlement on the hinterland, reducing dependence on hydrocarbons through nuclear power and biofuels and so on. They'd find themselves divided among moderates, who wanted to set things in order and return power to civilians, and hardliners who had a broad interpretation of setting things in order and thought it would take many years. The first ones to rule were the moderates.

Bernd 04/18/2020 (Sat) 14:36:50 [Preview] No.36018 del
>They weren't in power in the first place
I didn't mean they had a junta, but they had great influence on who is in charge in the country, the repeated coups show that.

>UDN and PSD migrated to Arena
>most of PTB to MDB
Then >>35935
In elections PSD/PTB ran together against UDN
These seems to be contradictory statements and are confusing. And I think I still confused. Will reread the whole stuff from the beginning.

Bernd 04/18/2020 (Sat) 14:37:24 [Preview] No.36019 del
>In elections PSD/PTB ran together against UDN
Forgot the meme arrow.

Bernd 04/19/2020 (Sun) 00:45:54 [Preview] No.36026 del
PSD were centrists, they weren't all that enthusiastic about Goulart's radicalism. They were also close to power and focused on keeping it, much like present centrists who form the largest bloc in Congress and side with any government, left or right. When the situation changed, with the right having brute force and almost full support in the middle and upper classes (and in time, the entire population), PSD was forced to pick a side and its priorities were clear, power above all else. It's not like it was an alien situation; the party's core were the governors named by Vargas during his dictatorial rule. Vargas would later become a PTB president but his 1937-45 autocracy wasn't like the 1964 PTB; as a dictator he had sought America's favor and directed all his corporatism to urban workers, never thinking of land reform and the like. The 1964-85 military administration was then closer to the former PSD than to the former UDN in several aspects, such as a fondness for public works and letting the country fall into inflation.

Bernd 04/22/2020 (Wed) 02:35:43 [Preview] No.36138 del
While doing some reading I found Mourão Filho's brainchild, the Cohen plan, which infamously gave Vargas a reason for his self-coup, was originally intended not as a forged communist plan but a thought experiment. It was originally signed "Bela Kun", but once Mourão Filho remembered another Integralist called Bela Kun "Bela Cohen", he scratched over the last name and wrote Cohen. His typist didn't understand and just left it as "Cohen", giving it the name. Plínio Salgado didn't like it but Mourão Filho left a copy with another military contact and it spread. When Vargas used the document Integralists did not protest as they already wanted a dictatorship anyways.
Part of Mourão's hastiness was because, without a promotion, he'd have to retire on the 9th of May. Indeed, he was promptly promoted after the rebel victory. His partner Guedes was about to be replaced.
The actual course of events was farcical. There was mostly inertia on both sides. Civilian and military legalists and rebels were on buildings across each other, in different levels of the same buildings or even in the same levels; many continued to carry out their bureaucratic work during and after the coup, and some "arrests" consisted of not being allowed to leave the building. Aside from the 7 dead civilians the only violence was in some verbal confrontations and jostles.

Some sources I'm using are isolated pieces of news, biographic summaries, brief military papers, a long study on Mourão Filho, a pro-rebel/revolutionary site which goes very in-depth no some topics and Gaspari's book. There is a primary source detailing the march from Minas Gerais to Rio de Janeiro but it isn't available anywhere on the Internet. Gaspari doesn't cover everything I want but it's a strong source and he was personally in contact with many of the key figures, which at times allows him to say that "he confirmed to me". He often gives precise hours for events.

Bernd 04/22/2020 (Wed) 13:40:40 [Preview] No.36146 del
>"Bela Kun"
The Hungarian Soviet in 1919 was led by Kun Béla, originally Kohn, which has a few versions, such as Cohen.
His grandson, Kun Miklós is quite good historian. His field of research is the Soviet Union and communism, due to his relation (and his moms was "Soviet") he had/have access to Soviet, then Russian archives (and in them, documents) which no other Hungarian had to. This makes his works invaluable.

academia.edu might have some articles.

Bernd 04/22/2020 (Wed) 16:11:53 [Preview] No.36148 del
>bela kun
these damn Hungarian weebs

Bernd 04/22/2020 (Wed) 16:46:49 [Preview] No.36149 del
They kept it real.

Bernd 04/23/2020 (Thu) 00:31:55 [Preview] No.36153 del
João Goulart was fully aware he could be overthrown by the military and took measures to contain potential officer conspiracies. From below he had leftist sergeants, and from above, the "military apparatus": upper echelons had been stacked with generals deemed loyal, the work of his ally Assis Brasil in the Military Cabinet. Goulart's subordinates had bold ideas in 1963, after the return of presidentialism, when he attempted to declare a state of emergency and unseat the rightist governors of Guanabara and São Paulo (and potentially, the leftist governor of Pernambuco). They had planned a paratrooper abduction in Guanabara, but the need to find a colonel who'd do it without written orders delayed it until it could no longer be carried. But the state of emergency could not be declared due to opposition from the left. This scheme's failure was a factor in Goulart's turn to the left in 1964.
Potential enemies were left in powerless positions or bureaucratic limbo. Mourão Filho was an important exception, but even he formally responded to a legalist superior.
Each branches of the Armed Forces had its own Minister. The War (i.e. Army) Ministry was under Jair Dantas Ribeiro. Paulo Mário da Cunha Rodrigues commanded the Ministry of the Navy after his predecessor resigned in the wake of the sailors' revolt; he was close to the communists. The Air Force was under the unremarkable Anísio Botelho. All three had to be sacked after the rebels took over as they did not switch sides.

Within the Army the higher level was armies and military commands, both under four-star army generals. They were deemed to be under safe hands but that was proven not fully correct. They commanded Military Regions and Divisions, both under three-star division generals whose loyalty varied. In Minas Gerais the divisional and Military Region commands functioned as one. Not all states had divisions. There were 6 of infantry and 3 of cavalry. Rio Grande do Sul alone had the 3rd and 6th Infantry and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry; this disproportionate concentration is a legacy of the military's historical Platine focus. However the garrison in Rio de Janeiro/Guanabara was arguably just as strong as it was well-staffed, heavily armed and could count on paratroopers, marines and a lot of air/naval support. A level below were two-star brigade generals who commanded important units (like the paratrooper brigade) and the Divisional Infantry and Divisional Artillery Commands. Fighting strength was in the three-battalion regiments, three by infantry division, as well as in apparently separate caçadores (light infantry) battalions.

Bernd 04/23/2020 (Thu) 00:58:16 [Preview] No.36154 del
(7.69 MB 4800x2933 Minas Gerais.jpg)
(2.65 MB 1600x724 Juiz de Fora.png)
Minas Gerais was the best possible launch pad for a coup d'état. Rio Grande do Sul had too many units, which would require a large conspiracy, Rio de Janeiro was under a tight oversight, São Paulo had an apparently legalist army general and a distinct Military Region/Infantry division and elsewhere was too weak and too far away from power. Minas Gerais had none of that. Mourão Filho was at the helm at both the division and Military Region. UDN governor Magalhães Pinto hoped to overthrow Goulart and run for President in 1965. Colonel José Geraldo of the police was on board. Together with retired marshal (being retired was a prerequisite for marshal rank) Odylio Denis and a number of subordinates they formed a kind of "revolutionary staff". One of their most important meetings was at 17:00, 28th of March on the Juiz de Fora airport. They had good contacts elsewhere. Mourão knew IPÊS, a think tank which also served as a medium of conspiratorial thoughts, and brigade-general Muricy, who at the time was powerless, occupying the Reserve Subdirectory in Rio de Janeiro. Muricy was called to Juiz de Fora and commanded the actual vanguard of the march.
In addition to this political advantage as the only state where a cohesive military-civilian conspiracy was possible, it was also blessed in its geography as it was in striking range of not one but two centers of power, Brasília and Rio de Janeiro. Brasília turned out to be a sideshow but the highest tension was in the Rio axis.

The state's geographical peculiarity is that, rather than a strip of land reaching into the interior from the coast, it is a much longer north-south stretch, almost reaching the coast but landlocked by two thin coastal states. The other states had their shape determined by the distribution of feudal-like plots bound by latitude, the sea and the Tordesillas longitude (in some of the northeast this was vertical, not horizontal). Such was the case for what would become the coastal states, but upon discovery of gold in the late 17th century, one of the measures to choke off and control the mines was to split off a wide expanse of inner land into another division, leaving two coastal territories. One was left thinly populated to serve as a "green wall", preventing any trade, and Rio de Janeiro with its natural ports became the export route for the gold.
The result of this was that in 1964 there was only a short stretch between Rio and a state border with another division's troops on the other side. Highlands were on the way but not insurmountable and they had roads for a long time. The course towards São Paulo is a straight line on easy terrain -the Paraíba do Sul valley- but it's longer. To make it even easier, the Military Region HQ was not on the state capital (Belo Horizonte) but on the major city closest to the border, Juiz de Fora, along with a regiment.

Forces in the state included:
20 thousand police, many of which took part in the rebel expeditions;
Sergeants' School in Três Corações, which refused to partake in the rebellion;
10th Infantry Regiment, Juiz de Fora;
11th "Tiradentes" Infantry Regiment, São João Del Rei;
12th Infantry Regiment, Belo Horizonte.

The plotters had different opinions on how to make their move. Mourão Filho wanted to march on Rio de Janeiro. He thought he could even just load the 10th on trucks in a Saturday night and pop up in Rio on a Sunday morning, occupy the army HQ and publish a manifesto signed by several governors. On the other hand, Magalhães Pinto and Guedes thought they could rise the whole state in rebellion (some sources even suggest a declaration of independence, and bizarrely he had named a secretary of Foreign Relations) to enter a standoff with Jango and lead other states to follow the example. This would probably backfired and the state would be defeated. In the past São Paulo, a much stronger state, had tried to take on the rest of the country alone and failed. The actual course of events was closer to Mourão Filho's vision.

Bernd 04/23/2020 (Thu) 01:09:02 [Preview] No.36155 del
It's worth noting that the present sucessors of the 10th and 11th (their first battalions, other one or other two either sent away or disbanded) are bound together with the former 1st Caçadores battalion of Petrópolis (now 32nd Light Infantry) in the 4th Light Infantry (Mountain) Brigade of the 1st, not 4th division, and are thus under tight oversight from Rio de Janeiro. I can't find this said anywhere but it seems the security threat of having forces so close to the metropolis but not commanded from within it was realized.

Bernd 04/27/2020 (Mon) 03:51:38 [Preview] No.36308 del
(8.43 MB 4800x2933 Planalto.jpg)
(9.24 MB 4800x2933 Brasília.jpg)
The Planalto Military Command comprised the Federal District with the capital and the outlying state (now two). Brasília doesn't have much non-political importance, and its position as capital mattered less than today in 1964 as much of the bureaucratic machinery (military and civilian) was still in Rio de Janeiro, which was the target of rebels from São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Nonetheless Goulart did pass through the city, his chief of staff Darcy Ribeiro was diligent in trying to shore up the legalist position and a column would move from Minas Gerais to the capital.

The Military Command and the 11th Military Region were held by the same commander, brigade general Nicolau Fico, a coward who played both sides. Obeying Darcy and against requests from president of the Senate Auro de Moura Andrade, he did not repress legalist radio nor occupied key points in the city. But by the end he was calling Costa e Silva, rebel lynchpin in São Paulo, "my chief" and also taking orders from him. Darcy intercepted this and called him a "treasonous monkey". His duplicity did not save him and the new regime removed him from his post.
Below him were only a handful of units:
-6 Caçadores battalion, Ipameri;
-One MP battalion, Brasília;
-11th Mechanized Recon Squadron, Brasília, with M-41 tanks;

Darcy gathered a thousand Goulart supporters in the National Theater to occupy Congress and even form into armed resistance, but they were left unused by Goulart and never given weapons.

Congress had 6 SMGs and 12 rifles, but politically it and other civilian institutions were a central rebel power. The Presidents of the Senate, Andrade, of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzili, and of the Supreme Court rallied to the rebel side. Mazzili was particularly important as he was first in the presidential line of succession, and after Goulart's position was usurped he briefly occupied it.

Bernd 04/30/2020 (Thu) 17:21:27 [Preview] No.36404 del
On some things I can find incredibly detailed information: the name of the son of the landowner in whose property the rebels from Minas Gerais stayed overnight, the hill they pointed their artillery at (findable on Google), and the hour and name of the gas station on which the commander of the legalist troops had a phone call which changed his heart. The station can't be found, though. Some battalion histories list the exact address of their former regiment's HQ. For finding military units I'm combing through:
-Decrees, which have a lot of information on unit establishment/disbandment/reassignment all the way back to the 19th century, but a lot of that happens through ministerial documents. They may also be available online but I have yet to dig for that.
-A document listing where the destination of unit archives. Some ancient ones with remote deployments are simply listed as "not located". What's more important to me is that the unit existed. Also curious are the archives of paper or rapidly disbanded formations such as the 14th Infantry and 2nd and 3rd Expeditionary Infantry (the 1st was the one in Italy) divisions. However some potentially relevant caçadores battalions existed but searching their name reveals nothing.
-A lengthy thesis on the army's reorganization in the late 60s and 70s. It lists divisions and brigades in 1960 and describes what took place once the regiments were disbanded and their battalions distributed to newly-formed brigades. Also mentions how far away the regiments were from their paper strength and armament, some only had a single battalion. Now that I've looked at it again, it has a real order of battle in 1960 down to the battalion level! I think I've hit the jackpot. Further, the sources might be very helpful if I need further research, but a great number of them are probably unavailable online.
Now I already see I missed a caçadores battalion in the Planalto Military Command, the 10th in Brasília.

Bernd 04/30/2020 (Thu) 17:30:16 [Preview] No.36405 del
I missed one infantry division (the 7th), one cavalry (the 4th), one armored (no number) and one aero-terrestrial (one number and a division core, not a division). There was also a mixed brigade. That said there are some contradictions with the historical accounts. I can find such accounts of troop movements from Itu towards two opposite directions, but there was only one unit stationed there and one account doesn't mention the other. There's also an account of a column from Curitiba toward Porto Alegre but the order of battle doesn't even list troops at the starting point.

Regiments were meant to have 3 battalions but only a single one of them had this number, the Infantry School Regiment. It was also the only properly equipped regiment.

Bernd 04/30/2020 (Thu) 17:38:04 [Preview] No.36407 del
Costa e Silva was in Rio de Janeiro, how did I miss this?
The communication was via telegraph.

Bernd 05/01/2020 (Fri) 10:54:19 [Preview] No.36413 del
>paratrooper abduction
Ala Skorzeny. Kek
>find a colonel who'd do it
No Skorzeny then.

Bernd 05/01/2020 (Fri) 13:52:05 [Preview] No.36415 del
This is what I was looking for. More curiosities were found. In the former 4th Cavalry Division mechanization was very late and horses were last used for transport in the mid-80s. Infantry in 1960 still used bolt-action rifles. There's a table comparing how many battalions and other formations should have existed according to the official division formation and how many were actually formed. There were supposed to be 63 infantry battalions but only 33 were in existence.

Bernd 05/01/2020 (Fri) 14:14:07 [Preview] No.36416 del
Filho's idea was better, it reserved the acting role for them. Otherwise it would have been giving away the decision over their own fate to the other states. That's stupid.

According to the first table, the 4th inf. div looks very much underpowered compared to the 1st in Rio. Not to mention the armor over there.

Bernd 05/01/2020 (Fri) 14:43:08 [Preview] No.36417 del
>the 4th inf. div looks very much underpowered compared to the 1st in Rio
Not only in the number of formations, the 4th was also undermanned, poorly armed, Muricy's column only had ammunition for a few hours of combat and the state would run out of fuel very fast. If troops in Rio de Janeiro kept their cohesiveness they would wipe the floor with Minas Gerais. Mourão Filho's calculation was political, not military, he knew that in such rebellions the boldest and most aggressive would win over the faint-hearted and that's what happened, the columns sent after him disintegrated midway.

Bernd 05/01/2020 (Fri) 14:45:33 [Preview] No.36418 del
The table is only for the Army, the Navy had marines in Rio de Janeiro and the Air Force had a strong base. As a legacy of its capital status it had all of the fancy stuff including the ministries, headquarters, education institutions, etc.

Bernd 05/04/2020 (Mon) 14:01:21 [Preview] No.36527 del
(8.13 MB 4800x2933 São Paulo.jpg)
(7.84 MB 4800x2933 São Paulo 2.jpg)
(29.64 KB 552x415 Goulart e Kruel.jpg)
São Paulo is the strongest state but not militarily and to achieve political success a local rebellion had to march down the Paraíba valley to Rio de Janeiro. It also had to protect itself frp, a possible attack from legalists in the south.

The order of battle in São Paulo state consisted of:
Commanded by Amaury Kruel, who was one of Goulart's most trusted men. He had supported the return of presidentialism and Goulart had helped get his son a job and finance his acquisition of a plot of land. The estate still exists and you can find its name. However he was also anticommunist, opposed to leftism among sergeants and didn't like Goulart's ideological turn; his wish was that the President would turn away from the left so he could remain loyal to him. He was aware of conspirators plotting a military revolution and at times was in contact with them, but refused to join. Some conspirators hoped to arrest him. In the course of events he kept silent and ambiguous, had everything prepared to join the rebels and only joined them late. Afterwards he continued his career and for a few years was a MDB Congressman.
2nd Caçadores Battalion, São Vicente
4th Caçadores Battalion, Lins
1st Light Tank Battalion, Campinas
Light tank battalions were considered infantry and followed the old French concept of tanks as infantry support. There were 3 of them which together had over a hundred M3 and M3A1 Stuarts.
17th Cavalry Regiment, Pirassununga
Commanded by Antônio Bandeira, who also took time to join the rebel side.
2nd 90 mm AA gun Group, Quitaúna
5th 90 mm AA gun Group, Campinas
2nd Automatic 40 mm AA gun Group, Barueri
5th Automatic 40 mm AA gun Group, Santos
Commanded by Aluizio Mendes, at first a key legalist who even threatened to arrest Kruel if he defected, but later joined the rebels as well. The Divisional Infantry command was in Caçapava under brigade general Euryale de Jesus Zerbini, a legalist until the end, who used his power with some success to prevent the regiments from moving to Rio de Janeiro.
Note how the regiments are all aligned on the road to Rio de Janeiro.
4th Infantry Regiment "Raposo Tavares" , Quitaúna, x2 battalions
Colonel Cabral Ribeiro aligned with the rebels early. This regiment dispatched troops in both eastward and southward directions.
5th Infantry Regiment "Itororó", Lorena, x1 battalion
6th Infantry Regiment, Caçapava, x1 battalion
2nd 105 mm Howitzer Regiment "Deodoro", Itu, x1 group
Because of Zerbini's interference this was the earliest unit to arrive in Rio de Janeiro, and would have fought against the legalists if they moved on the opposite direction.
2nd Engineering Battalion, Pindamonhagaba
2nd Health Battalion, São Paulo

São Paulo's governor, Ademar de Barros, was on the rebel side and could count on his police forces.

Bernd 05/05/2020 (Tue) 14:56:43 [Preview] No.36547 del
So as power went, the real one was in the hands of those, who had sure control over their subordinates. The commander of an army couldn't do much with his army detachments, if the division commanders thought otherwise. But then they also relied on the loyalty of the regiments.

Bernd 05/12/2020 (Tue) 23:51:46 [Preview] No.36701 del
The backwater state of Espírito Santo had a single army formation, the 3rd Caçadores battalion in Vila Velha, directly under the Ist Army in Rio de Janeiro, and it did not take part in any operation. The governor had a neutral stance and allies in both the left and right, allowing him to survive in the new regime though he later fell to a political crisis. The local political atmosphere was parochial, distant from the radicalization in the core.
This state was irrelevant to Goulart's overthrow, but it leads to a controversial topic, that of American intervention.
The state's history and location >>36154 at once determined its irrelevancy and relevancy. The relevancy lies in being an alternative outlet to the sea for landlocked Minas Gerais, and thus a potential flashpoint if it entered a war with the primary sea route (Rio de Janeiro). This had already been the case in 1930, when it was invaded from Minas Gerais, and was even more now that there was a railway leading to the port in Vitória. A few months before March the governors of MG and ES had settled that in the event of a war troops would gather in Governador Valadares and supplies would be sent, allowing the coastal state to defend itself if it joined the rebel side. None of this happened. There was a police battalion in Governador Valadares but it moved to Juiz de Fora to join the column heading to Rio de Janeiro.

Darcy Ribeiro makes two claims, that the United States Navy was, in the 31 March- 1 April period, already in 12-50 nautical miles off Vitória, and that this included a land contingent which would land in the port and open a connection to Minas Gerais. Those are bold claims. As documents have been made public a clear picture of American intervention can be made.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm has the most relevant pieces of evidence.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d198 is of particular interest. Quoting it with the corrections made on the same day:
>Washington, March 31, 1964, 2:29 p.m.
>1301. For your personal information only, the following decisions have been taken in order be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done.
>1. Dispatch of US Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos April 13; following three tankers at one day intervals.2
>2. Immediate dispatch of naval task force for overt exercises off Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier and two guided missile destroyers (expected arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later).
>3. Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light equipment including CS agent for mob control for air lift to São Paulo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon issuance final orders and would involve 6 cargo planes, 6 tankers, and 6 fighters.
>Unloading of POL by US Navy tankers (item 1) and dispatch of airlift (item 3) would require further development politico-military situation to point where some group having reasonable claim to legitimacy could formally request recognition and aid from us and if possible from other American Republics. Dispatch of tankers from Aruba and of naval task force does not immediately involve us in Brazilian situation and is regarded by us as normal naval exercise.

Bernd 05/13/2020 (Wed) 00:32:48 [Preview] No.36702 del
The tl;dr of American intervention is that
-American leadership was to the highest levels favorable to Goulart's overthrow
-A prolonged rebellion was likely to face logistical difficulties
-Americans had preparations for sending a task force and oil tankers to provide logistical support
-America was worried about legitimacy and wanted a rebellion to have overt civilian support and a legalistic basis
-It was also reluctant to commit to a failed rebellion
-The ships did set sail
-Goulart's camp had a notion that something was going on, but very vague and second-hand through connections to the Minas Gerais state government.
-Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and military attaché Vernon Walters kept track of what was going on
-As the rebellion seized power on its own the ships turned around and the topic was forgotten until the files were dug up

Gaspari covers this in detail. He states clearly that the ships were never in Brazilian waters. The claim that they were 12-50 nmi off Vitória does not hold to scrutiny. It is in contradiction with the quoted American document, which besides speaking of immediate dispatch and that the ships were not in the area, gives the destination as Santos (i.e. to supply a rebellion in São Paulo, nothing for Vitória) and the dates of arrival as after the 10th of April. If only the timetables are taken as valid and the other points disregarded, it still doesn't click.
It takes 1 day and a half for a cruise ship to set sail from Vitória and arrive in Santos. For the slowest option considered, a sail ship, that is 4 days. The timetables, if assumed to be for a ship off Vitória, give a travel time of 10+ days, which would mean a speed lower than that of sail ships!

Gaspari is also explicit that there was no plan to send troops, and that doesn't show in the documents. Yet Darcy Ribeiro is no random source: as Goulart's most powerful advisor he was directly involved in the power struggle within the two days of rebellion. What I do assume is that, despite stating his claims are based on American documents, his statements on how precisely American intervention took place are second-hand. He doesn't go into detail about this while Gaspari even starts paragraphs with sentences such as "At 17:38 Lyndon Johnson's telephone had rang again on his ranch in Texas". Gaspari looked up sources by himself and one of his sources was Darcy Ribeiro himself; in one case an incident was written vaguely in Darcy's memoirs but expanded on Gaspari's writing by what the former had confided to the latter. Furthermore despite being a central source Darcy may be biased.

Bernd 05/13/2020 (Wed) 00:57:23 [Preview] No.36703 del
Darcy also suggests, and elsewhere it may be taken for granted, that Americans called for the coup, or at least were ultimately responsible for it. Mourão Filho kickstarted the movement without even coordinating with conspiring officers in other states and the American embassy was trying to keep track of a movement it did not control, but the wider question of whether Goulart would fall without American hostility is important. I'm of the opinion that he still would.
For a few years there had been a degree of American subversive activity (I've even found the claim that corporal Anselmo of the sailors' revolt was part of subversion) and support for right-wing organizations. Through training courses America had also fostered anticommunism in the officer corps.
But none of this was fundamental. Political divisions were so deep because of society's internal development -as the Marxists say, of the economic situation and the state of class struggle. Internal societal conflict was what caused the coups in 1889, 1930 and so on, not external interference. Maybe Cold War polarization helped but something on the line of "reactionary landowners act to prevent land reform" is internal.
On execution, too, internal forces managed to overthrow the old regime by themselves. Knowledge of American opposition did influence Goulart's decision to fly to Brasília, and ultimately to exile, but it was still possible for the rebels to put enough pressure on him to do that without the American factor.

Bernd 05/14/2020 (Thu) 20:03:38 [Preview] No.36735 del
>having reasonable claim to legitimacy
This is a fun thing, allowing quite the room to move around.

I concur ,US involvement is questionable. Ofc they wanted and supported any friendly turn all over the globe, South America in those years probably wasn't regarded the highest priority. After the Cuban takeover, in the early 60's the communist movements just started to rise, they didn't mean immediate threat, but what's more important the US was busy escalate the war in Vietnam. As I quickly checked around I saw a coup d'etat happened in Bolivia in '64, and many suspected CIA involvement there too, but for now it seems it's largely baseless.

Bernd 05/24/2020 (Sun) 03:05:22 [Preview] No.36936 del
I've made huge progress in my sources and went to the point of spending R$ 24 on an e-book, which was fully worth it. At present I'm compiling my research elsewhere in Portuguese but I'll post more here later on, and maybe even write for Kohlzine - I already have the title, How to overthrow a government in your pajamas.
Now I do have the order of battle of the combat groups that almost went into combat with each other and decent information on dates and locations. I've also found a very important tidbit that only came to light 50 years after the fact: Amaury Kruel received a million-dollar bribe to defect to the rebel side.

Bernd 05/24/2020 (Sun) 09:50:37 [Preview] No.36939 del
>spending R$ 24 on an e-book, which was fully worth it.
Sometimes it does.
>I'm compiling my research elsewhere in Portuguese
Sounds wise.
>I'll post more here later on
I'm counting on it.
>How to overthrow a government in your pajamas.
You also need some million-dollars to bribe key figures, as I read it in your psst. But that can be done in pajamas as well.

Bernd 05/29/2020 (Fri) 01:36:18 [Preview] No.37046 del
I'm greedy enough for sources on some additional minutiae that I'm starting to salivate for the Oral History of the Army - 1964 collection which spans over three thousand pages. But even if I tried I wouldn't get my hands on all of it, only some volumes are available for physical purchase.

Bernd 05/31/2020 (Sun) 17:26:46 [Preview] No.37082 del
Now you are hooked. Your best bet is to visit a Sourcereaders Anonymous meeting and participate in a twelve step program.

Bernd 06/01/2020 (Mon) 05:42:56 [Preview] No.37093 del
I've satisfied some of that desire after finding a first-hand account by Muricy narrating his march.
Some things I've realized:

-Trade unions were a net asset to the right-wing. They declared a nationwide strike but it only properly took place in Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, preventing the mobilization of militants from the suburbs to the city center and not interferring with the rebel states. I've found one source claiming fifth-column activity but the call was for a general strike, it didn't go far (though it did reach Santos in São Paulo) because of limited communications. It's also worth noting Minas Gerais began its wave of leftist arrests early on so it was in no condition to be hampered by a strike.
-Common soldiers in the legalist side had no idea what they were doing and some thought it was an exercise or a civil disorder.
-The problem of military indiscipline transcended ideology -indeed, the right's conspiracies were part of it- and continued unabated once the right took over and purged the left from the institution.
-Whoever won, the normal democratic order was no longer in place at least in the immediate future. Both legalists and rebels censored the media, one oppositionist newspaper had marines waving their guns inside its offices and wasn't allowed to circulate. Goulart would have to name appointed governors for several states.
-As soon as the 'revolution' was victorious everyone tried to claim responsibility for it.
-Goulart was in 3 different occasions over the coup offered to break with the left and win over the military. It was the same decision as in 1961, it was his political agenda and not his person that was the concern.

I've got sufficient sources to map one of the battles that almost took place. At night in the 31st Kruel was in conference with his officers while Zerbini ordered the troops in the Paraíba valley into recon missions towards the rebellion in Minas Gerais. He was promised reinforcements, the general Anfrísio da Rocha Lima's School-Unit Group, the Army's only fully staffed, equipped and trained unit. In 23:00-00:00 Kruel exchanged his last words with the President, demanding him to part ways with the left. Goulart answered that he was lonely and isolated and couldn't abandon the only allies he had, and then said "Put your troops in the streets and betray me openly" which he promptly did.
Through dawn authority slipped out of Zerbini's fingers and forces in the Paraíba valley joined up with the rest of the IInd Army on an eastward march to Rio de Janeiro through the Dutra highway. Anfrísio's forces were still coming on the same route westwards, packing up in the morning, and the two were on a collision course.
In the middle of the road in Resende was Agulhas Negras, the Military Academy, which any civilian can name. It was under Emílio Garrastazu Médici, future hardliner President who'd witness the apex of the military regime. Médici was part of the Ist Army but sided with the IInd, mobilized his cadets and entrenched them on the road.

Bernd 06/01/2020 (Mon) 06:06:18 [Preview] No.37095 del
Just noticed a misplaced position.

The Academy is the large slashed red area in the west and its units are in green. A motorized cavalry squadron of 70-80 men would fight a delaying action, including obstructing the road with heavy vehicles from a construction company. An engineer platoon would detonate two highway bridges, I've positively identified one of them, it's this. A reinforced infantry company of 250 men would hold out, backed by an artillery battery. A guard company from the Command and Service Battalion protected fuel stocks through the road. Médici relied on the psychological barrier of holding out with "kids", his cadets. I have their exact locations in km of the highway and reference points, though as my maps don't show where each km is the marked location is approximate. All the other forces are less exact.

In red are the IInd Army's forces. Some of its reserve force in São Paulo would later be dispatched to the south.

In blue is the School-Unit group, the battalion at the vanguard had 800 men. At 13:00 it was at the entrance of Barra Mansa, the last city before Resende.

In yellow is the 1st Armored Infantry Battalion. It shows up right in the middle of the road if you look at the formal hierarchy, but sources are completely silent on it. Only the Oral History, volume I (available online) clarifies that it allied with Médici, was with a very reduced structure and stayed in Volta Redonda. Why didn't it bolster the cadets along the highway? I can only speculate, as there's very little information in the only source. I've looked at the battalion's logs, available online, and they just mention that it entered readiness on the 31st with no information on the 1st.

Like elsewhere the rebels won a "moral" victory over the legalist military, a mortar platoon refused to fire and those two extra artillery batteries didn't mount to fire but instead, upon arrival at 14:00, raced at maximum speed and defected. Elsewhere at the same time Muricy's column was about to enter battle. In both cases there was not a single shot as the Ist Army's commander, Âncora, decided to visit the academy and negotiate with Kruel. This was after Goulart's had set flight from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília and the legalist hierarchy and position in the city began to melt, and at the suggestion of both Goulart and Costa e Silva, one of the two rebel masterminds. At 15:00 a truce was declared. Âncora arrived a devastated man, being received by Médici with full military honors despite calling himself defeated; Médici replied that only the fatherland's enemies were defeated. Then Âncora surrendered the Ist Army.

Bernd 06/01/2020 (Mon) 18:35:41 [Preview] No.37104 del
It's looking great.

Bernd 06/09/2020 (Tue) 04:01:51 [Preview] No.37573 del
I've got enough information to lay out the whole story except for the south, where some important events took place but late and militarily not as intense. It's exciting with stormy weather and two climaxes, late at night on the 31st of March and early in the afternoon on the 1st of April; there were 3-4 battles that almost took place and would've been bloody. It'd make an excellent movie.
One of those is well covered in the literature but is only mentioned very indirectly in the main literature -I did not realize it would've been a battle- as it was almost ignored even as it took place. To sum it up, at night on the 31st a heavily armed legalist battalion from Brasília invaded Minas Gerais, the 10th police battalion was sent against it and covered an immense stretch of road in amazing speed, and as its commander realized he couldn't win in a fair fight he told the citizens of the city in the middle of the way, Paracatu, that he'd entrench there and there'd be a bloodbath. They were intimidated and begged the legalists not to attack, which they never did.
My orders of battle are detailed enough I've even found a Maintenance Company. For the legalists they are vaguer. I've also got a good grasp of what took place in Rio de Janeiro proper, it had a lot of gimmicks like dumping oil on hills to prevent artillery from going up or peeking on a garrison by sending a truck full of human remains with the claim of retrieving a corpse, but ultimately there were no meaningful attacks even though the legalists could've tried.
I've found the entire Oral History of the Army for sale and it weighs 10 kilograms and costs R$ 500, no way I can swallow all of that. I have, however, ordered volumes 3 and 14 for R$ 70. I'm full of juvenile excitement - in a few weeks I'll find minutiae on some critical moments and clarify some contradictions in my sources.

Bernd 06/09/2020 (Tue) 04:30:29 [Preview] No.37575 del
Do you have winter in brazil or how is your weather

Bernd 06/09/2020 (Tue) 14:51:11 [Preview] No.37586 del
(28.66 KB 815x611 Rio de Janeiro.jpg)
(28.59 KB 815x611 São Paulo.jpg)
Two towns in the southern highlands have flurries on a yearly basis and in some years real snow. The rest of the south has snowfall in rare years. See:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=YQBKDbCBXD0 [Embed]
https://youtube.com/watch?v=KFoGY7Lbocw [Embed]
The southeast has snowfall in the highlands on rare years, possibly it took place in São Paulo in 1918. But the southeast has a winter, most of it is made of highlands but even the tropical lowlands have a noticeably colder middle of the year.

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 04:25:04 [Preview] No.37787 del
(58.35 KB 498x354 rio de janeiro.png)
(733.54 KB 1054x1574 Castelobranco.jpg)
(86.51 KB 635x466 Carlos Lacerda.jpeg)
I'll leave Mourão Filho's part for after I get the books but in the meanwhile I can already give a rundown on Rio de Janeiro and then narrate what happened in São Paulo, the almost-battle in Resende and events in Rio city.

Rio de Janeiro city was by far the highest-value target in the entire country. Most of the federal administrative machinery was still there much of it still is, in contrast all Brasília had was symbolic value and Congress. To win the rebels would have to seize it or at the very least lay siege to it and negotiate. Among this administrative machinery was the Army's supreme headquarters in the Duque de Caxias Palace, housing the Minister of War (Jair Dantas Ribeiro, who was hospitalized at the time rendering legalism acephalous), the commander of the Ist Army and the Chief of Staff.
There were two other key palaces just a short distance from each other: Laranjeiras, a Presidential residence, and Guanabara, the gubernatorial office. On the 31st of March both were occupied, the former by Goulart and the latter by Carlos Lacerda. Lacerda was a famous liberal-conservative whose name is still remembered by anyone with a minimum of historical literacy today, a politically engaged journalist who made the most drama out of his struggles, and took part in the downfall of Vargas in 1954 (when an assassination attempt against him led in a chain of events to the President's suicide) and Jânio Quadros in 1961 and was now in public office. He was set to run as the leading right-wing presidential candidate in 1965. Rhetorically he was Goulart's greatest enemy, a fiery oppositionist. Despite this he was of little importance in the conspiracy to overthrow the President, partly because the governor of Minas Gerais was a competitor within his party for the presidential run and partly out of his own decision as the city's garrison was too strong and he was too obvious of an enemy. But he did know in advance there'd be a coup d'état. At his disposal was the city's gendarmerie.

The city also housed a huge number of conspirators. Most important among them was the Chief of Staff division-general Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. Old and very prestigious, he was a veteran of the Italian Front and once commanded the IVth Army. His present position was a great honor and second only to the War Minister, but toothless - he commanded no troops. He was reluctant to join the conspiracy but once he did was accepted as its natural leader. He kept a low profile to take advantage of the "apparatus" not noticing his subversive intent as well as to gain more credibility among his peers when, as someone seen as a legalist, he opposed the government. He set up an informal "staff" for the revolutionary movement and helped tie together the several different plots across the country. As the most prestigious member of the movement he'd succeed Goulart as President.
Among his allies were Ernesto Geisel, President 1974-79, and Golberi do Couto e Silva, mastermind of the surveillance state and personal friend and source of Gaspari. He was a chief example of the "modernizer" wing of the military, who were tied to international capital and the most dynamic elites and had a comprehensive project of social and economic change. He was proud to be part of the "free world" and followed the "National Security Doctrine" which stated the need for the military to preempt a communist revolution with a counterrevolution and then to use capitalist development to fund a strong military (guns over butter) and defeat the internal threat of revolutionary war.

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 04:45:34 [Preview] No.37788 del
The other prominent conspirator was Artur da Costa e Silva, also a division-general and former commander of the IVth Army, who now only had an irrelevant bureaucratic post. He wasn't as influential but proved himself ambitious in the post-coup power struggle, winning himself the Presidency a few years later. He represented the "traditionalists", who were tied to less dynamic elites, such as landowners, had no complex socioeconomic project and saw the coup only as a reaction against communism, land reform and so on. Mourão Filho, Kruel and Justino, commander of the IVth Army, were all "traditionalists".
There was a third faction, the right-wing extremists, but those are of little note.

Yet despite this the coup d'état could not begin from Rio de Janeiro. Not only did the government's "apparatus" reserve higher posts for loyal commanders, but those were concentrated in Rio de Janeiro (with the unfortunate side-effect that in other places commanders were sometimes untrustworthy). The regime's grip was too strong. So they could only coordinate with another state to come from the outside.

There might be a bit of administrative confusion here. Prior to 1975 Rio de Janeiro state encompassed everything but Rio de Janeiro itself, which formed Guanabara state. Rio de Janeiro state was ruled from Niterói, on the other side of the bay.
The Ist Army's order of battle for Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara was:
FIRST ARMY, Rio de Janeiro
-Âncora, a reliable legalist but in fact had no will to quell the uprising
1st Automatic AA Gun Group, Rio de Janeiro
1st Caçadores Battalion, Petrópolis
-Kerensky, a legalist to the end, almost fought Mourão Filho's troops. However his officers were rebel sympathizers which would prove very important.
4th AA Gun Group, Niterói
1st Tank Battalion, Rio de Janeiro
2nd Tank Battalion, Rio de Janeiro
3rd Tank Battalion, Rio de Janeiro
1st Armored Infantry Battalion, Barra Mansa
-Joined the rebels
2nd Armored Infantry Battalion, Rio de Janeiro
-Refused to join the rebels
1st Mechanized Recon Regiment, Rio de Janeiro
-Refused to join the rebels
Maintenance Battalion
1st INFANTRY DIVISION, Rio de Janeiro
-Oromar Osório, legalist. Divisional Infantry commander, Cunha Melo, was also legalist.
1st Infantry Regiment "Sampaio", Vila Militar (x2 Battalions)
-Raymundo, a rebel sympathizer, defected with his whole regiment right at the frontline
2nd Infantry Regiment, Vila Militar (x2 battalions)
3rd Infantry Regiment "Araribóia", São Gonçalo (x2 battalions)
1st 105 mm Howitzer Regiment "Floriano", Vila Militar (x2 groups)
2nd Group had a legalist commander but one of his batteries defected, I'll list their names later.
1st 155 mm Howitzer Group, Deodoro
1st Combat Engineering Battalion, Santa Cruz
1st Health Battalion, Rio de Janeiro

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 04:58:05 [Preview] No.37789 del
Those were fully staffed and had the best American equipment available. They served as models for the rest to follow. Commander was Anfrísio, a reliable legalist.
Infantry School Regiment, Vila Militar (x2 battalions)
Cavalry School Regiment, Vila Militar
-Refused to join the rebels
Artillery School Regiment, Vila Militar (x1 group)
-Several batteries defected
Engineering School Battalion, Vila Militar
1st 90 mm AA Gun Group, Vila Militar
-One of the batteries was under Ustra, who'd later torture Dilma Rousseff and write one of my sources, "The Suffocated Truth:The story the left doesn't want you to know". Guess which side he took.
Maintenance School Battalion, Vila Militar
Aeroterrestrial Infantry Regiment (battalion-sized)
Aeroterrestrial Howitzers Group

There are several formations absent from my source in >>36415. Those are the 1st "Dragoons of Independence" Guard Cavalry Regiment, which refused to join the rebels, two very reliable commands, Army Police and the Presidential Guard Battalion, and the Agulhas Negras Academy. In addition the Navy had two marine battalions, Humaitá and Riachuelo, with both their men and their commander, Aragão, the "People's Admiral", being very legalist. They were neutralized by rebel activity higher up in the Navy's chain of command. The Air Force had the powerful Santa Cruz Airbase under a communist sympathizer.

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 07:32:29 [Preview] No.37796 del
Brasil bernd, if you were president/dictator of brazil what reforms would you implement?

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 14:10:12 [Preview] No.37799 del
Merge smaller municipalities to save money on mayors/aldermen
Neutral foreign policy
Overhaul the pension system with a radical technical (like each cohort entering the workforce in a given year paying into a fund and then getting their retirement from it), left-wing (everyone gets the same pension which is a few minimum wages) or right-wing (privatization) solution just as long as I get rid of the normal system which completely ignores demography and inherently produces wasteful political struggle from time to time
Expand the civil service and police into the hinterland to prevent environmental and land abuse and at the same time loosen environmental legislation into something adequate for the hinterland's reality and which can be tightly enforced without creating resentment
Remove most of affirmative action
Abolish most of the legal privileges natives in reserves have, end their illegal road tolls, promote settlement and assimilation with the ultimate goal of full integration into the nation and abolishment of legal difference
Expand nuclear energy and biofuels
Suppress upper class consumption (e.g. Miami and Disney) and redirect it to investment
Deregulate to give small business owners more freedom but build a support base in capital which would involve some bureaucratization but would be easy
Don't know the economic model, several grandiose systems were built and fell, import substitution had its run. Maybe in the spirit of a common suggestion the focus would be on aggregating value to exports, such as selling finished steel instead of iron ore. To assure this focus capital would be strong-armed to funnel its investment into it.
I really don't know how I'd guarantee internal security but it'd be a necessity to last long.
With no internal threats and several foreign allies (maybe impossible with a neutral foreign policy) I'd acquire nuclear weapons.

Bernd 06/14/2020 (Sun) 18:01:39 [Preview] No.37815 del
>Trade unions were a net asset to the right-wing. They declared a nationwide strike but it only properly took place in Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro
Less permissive systems have the advantage to deal with the bs promptly, and can deny the circus to make chaos, and will be less hampered by their own citizens.

I'm gonna try to catch up. I find this interesting, even tho not much military action was involved, just some marching around.

Bernd 06/17/2020 (Wed) 02:58:18 [Preview] No.37895 del
Volume 14 will take a little longer than I expected to arrive.

The Minister of War wasn't hospitalized due to an emergency, he was recovering from a scheduled surgery made in the last days of March. At that point the President had suggested him to delay the surgery given the heavy political crisis in the air, to no avail. It is possible this was deliberate and the minister made sure he was incapacitated at the moment of decision so he would neither have to betray the President nor face Castelo Branco.

>even tho not much military action was involved
Nobody knew for sure it'd end up like, so those were moments of extreme tension, particularly when entrenched troops were facing each other off in the would-be frontline and would've opened fire within a few hours if not for new events. Mourão Filho expected a bloody four month civil war and was willing to do a scorched earth retreat of at least 600 km. Civilians in the small towns occupied by the marching columns were terrified, they barely even knew what was going on, the country was 40% illiterate and the news were scattered and confused e.g. some reports claimed there was ongoing seccession. In one case a family bought a huge stock of candles in the expectation of electricity shortages, and another one fled their town.

Bernd 06/17/2020 (Wed) 05:13:27 [Preview] No.37896 del
>23:00-00:00 Kruel exchanged his last words with the President [...] Goulart answered [...] "Put your troops in the streets and betray me openly" which he promptly did.
>At 15:00 a truce was declared.
So the whole conflict was resolved in about 15 hours?
I'm still not finished btw, but the map you put together >>37104 looks solid.
One of the highway bridges that were mined was Viaduto da ferrovia, which you ware able positively identify? How many other possible locations are there?

Bernd 06/17/2020 (Wed) 10:54:37 [Preview] No.37900 del
>So the whole conflict was resolved in about 15 hours?
There were some troop movements in the preceding hours and Kruel only arrived to negotiate Âncora's surrender at 18:00.
Minas Gerais was partially in rebellion as early as 14:30 on the 30th of March and its expedition resolved the retreat of its last enemy at 16:00-17:00 on the first of April but was still expecting combat as it rode down the mountains at dawn on the 2nd of April.
In Brasília legalism became meaningless also at dawn on the 2nd of April.
In the south events continued well into the 4th, when Goulart finally arrived in exile in Uruguay.
>One of the highway bridges that were mined was Viaduto da ferrovia, which you ware able positively identify?
Yes, you can find the factory in Google Maps as "Cilbrás", it's mentioned on Ustra's book. The reference point for the other bridge is too vague and there are a couple of possibilities for it. Ustra doesn't say the infantry company was specifically behind the bridge and doesn't even connect the two but their simultaneous presence showed up when I placed both on the map. It is logical the company was behind the bridge as they intended to detonate it.

Bernd 06/17/2020 (Wed) 19:51:15 [Preview] No.37921 del
Grossman points it out that civil wars tend to exceptionally bloody, with large emotional upheaval. For an event like that to erupt one party has to break some taboo to provoke a reaction. It seems in Brazil they wanted to avoid that, it sounds like all business.

Bernd 06/18/2020 (Thu) 14:55:28 [Preview] No.37924 del
Volume 3 arrived quickly and 14 is on its way. In my excitement I have ordered volumes 9,10, 11 and 13 as well as a book about power transitions 1964-1984 in general which has some minutiae I can use.
There are several other Oral Histories: the Italian front, peacekeeping and military engineering. They're collections of interviews. The questions are not only about what happened but about the country's situation in the 60s, the necessity of overthrowing Goulart, the position of the media and the Church, the following regime having lasted too much, enough or not enough and so on. Scholars have several papers on those.
Volume 3 has several first-hand accounts from men on the expeditions, including from the commander of the very first company Mourão Filho dispatched to the border as well as one of his subordinates. They have very important details but there are still gaps and apparent contradictions in the sources which can only be resolved with additional information and a lot of thinking.

That's exactly what the legalist officers wanted to avoid. More specifically, they did not want any bloodshed between brothers in arms. The unity of the Armed Forces was more important than loyalty to the civilian government. Many of them agreed with the rebel cause and only a handful were willing to die for the existing regime. The rebels embraced defections with open arms and counted on them to win. With their side's civilian forces working since the very beginning they got a swift victory and the left's civilian forces were too slow to mobilize and got crushed.

Bernd 06/23/2020 (Tue) 00:22:24 [Preview] No.38032 del
The relative lightness of the following regime's violence is also remarkable. Out of a population of 95 million in 1970 official institutions caused 400+ political deaths, of which a large part were in violent organizations, with that number including the Araguaia guerrila war's casualties. Political violence went both ways and outside that number are 100+ killed by the other side. In relative and absolute terms that's a lot less bloody than the Argentine or Chilean regimes which on smaller populations had tens of thousands of deaths.

I'm finding more sources on the 1930 Revolution which I'll study after this. It had urban combat with a lot of civilian casualties and proper field battles with trenches and brutal artillery bombardments.

Bernd 06/24/2020 (Wed) 20:07:49 [Preview] No.38062 del
>1930 Revolution which I'll study after this
>roper field battles with trenches and brutal artillery bombardments.
Sounds great. I still haven't finished with everything here. And again it's late today too.

Bernd 06/26/2020 (Fri) 16:24:18 [Preview] No.38097 del
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The 1932 civil war, though mostly restricted to a single state and its border regions, is even more exciting. It lasted longer than 1930, had a few thousand deaths, a total mobilized strength of at least 100-200 thousand men, armored trains, air combat, aerial bombardment of cities, a naval blockade and alpine warfare. The region around this tunnel was bitterly contested.

Bernd 06/26/2020 (Fri) 16:30:23 [Preview] No.38098 del
Places like brazil makes for great civil wars/guerillas since its so big and has lots of woods

Brazil is bigger than australia for example

Bernd 06/28/2020 (Sun) 11:10:33 [Preview] No.38120 del
>armored division
>3 tank battalions
>2 armored infantry battalion
>a whole regiment of mech. recons
>no artillery
Interesting structure. Is it know what kind of equipment they had?

>was imprisoned and tortured
I'm impressed. Looks like one of those low level office ladies who didn't do anything worth of the slightest interest in their whole lives.,
Means air mobile?

Bernd 06/28/2020 (Sun) 20:53:11 [Preview] No.38130 del
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>Interesting structure.
It's a WWII American tank division, but incomplete, much like the rest of the army. Military doctrine was mostly French until WWII, then mostly American. Cavalry was still organized on French lines. Its formal structure was:
Tactical Group Command x3
Mechanized Recon Regiment
Tank Battalion x3
Heavy Tank Battalion (Missing)
Armored Infantry Battalion x3 (1 was missing)
Communications Company (no data)
Divisional Artillery (Entirely missing)
---Armored 105 mm Howitzer Group x3 (All 3 missing)
---Armored 155 mm Howitzer Group (Missing)
---Self-Propelled AA Group (Missing)
Armored Combat Engineering Battalion (Missing)
Army Police Company [i.e. provosts, but the state gendarmeries call themselves "Military Police"] (no data)
Intendancy Company (no data)
Maintenance Battalion
Health Company (no data)
Compare with the American organization.
>Is it know what kind of equipment they had?
Surplus American WW2 equipment. In the 60s the Army had in store:
437 M3 and M3A1 Stuart light tanks;
50 M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks;
83 M4, M4A1 and M4 Composite Hull Stuart medium tanks;
150 M8 Greyhound armored cars;
20 M20 Deerhound command cars;
400 M2, M2A1, M3, M3A1 and M5 half-tracks;
20 M59 APCs;
84 M3A1 Scout Cars.

>Means air mobile?
It'd develop into a paratrooper force with airmobile heavier elements.

>I'm impressed. Looks like one of those low level office ladies who didn't do anything worth of the slightest interest in their whole lives.,
Her organization conducted assassinations, kidnappings and a famous plane hijacking. But by most accounts her participation was only in the "rear guard".

Bernd 06/29/2020 (Mon) 18:28:17 [Preview] No.38157 del
>WWII American tank division
They do have recognizable similarities, chiefly with that "3 battalions of a type" organization rule.
Ofc, the theoretical and the de facto strength, and subordinate units will differ, so the lack of artillery is understandable. What blows my mind is that regiment sized recon unit. Which mayhaps was regiment sized only on paper.

Bernd 06/29/2020 (Mon) 20:34:15 [Preview] No.38158 del
>>no artillery
>Military doctrine was mostly French
That makes no sense at all

Bernd 06/29/2020 (Mon) 20:42:14 [Preview] No.38159 del
Mechanized Recon was part of the Cavalry arm, so I guess like other cavalry "regiments" they're equivalent to a battalion in the Infantry arm and would be marked with a (II), not a (III) in NATO symbology.

Bernd 06/29/2020 (Mon) 20:44:04 [Preview] No.38160 del
Why did south america had all these rebels all over the place? Was it usa stirring it up to control the geopolitical situation better or what is the reason?

Bernd 06/30/2020 (Tue) 19:45:02 [Preview] No.38188 del
>>>no artillery
Turned out they had it in the composition table, they just didn't get any.

Bernd 06/30/2020 (Tue) 20:02:35 [Preview] No.38193 del
In most cases, endogenous societal/class struggle which, given weak democratic institutions and a tradition of a politically engaged military, were resolved through revolutions and coups.

Bernd 06/30/2020 (Tue) 20:35:35 [Preview] No.38197 del
Has the rebellions subsied or is there always a latent threat?

Bernd 07/02/2020 (Thu) 03:47:16 [Preview] No.38266 del
On most countries subsided, struggle is resolved through political channels. Venezuela stands out as there this process of removing violent means as an option in societal struggle was reversed over the past twenty years.

I've found something funny: on the 29th of March, two days before the right-wing coup d'état, Prestes, head of the Communist Party, declared there were no favorable conditions for a right-wing coup d'état, but if it happened, "the coupists would have their heads cut off".

Bernd 07/02/2020 (Thu) 19:18:13 [Preview] No.38286 del
>In 23:00-00:00 Kruel exchanged his last words with the President, demanding him to part ways with the left. Goulart answered that he was lonely and isolated and couldn't abandon the only allies he had, and then said "Put your troops in the streets and betray me openly" which he promptly did.
Goulart basically gave up the initiative to Kruel and the rebels. He knew what's going on, he could have arrested a couple of the troublemakers - let's say - on the day before. He didn't do. Did he thought, they will do nothing? Clearly >>38266 there were people who saw no threat.

Bernd 07/04/2020 (Sat) 22:52:14 [Preview] No.38354 del
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>Goulart basically gave up the initiative to Kruel and the rebels.
On the grand scale, yes. The only reason he didn't put up a fight was he didn't want to. It would involve both radicalization and bloodshed and he wasn't willing to pursue either.
Not in this specific moment, though, because at the same time as this conversation he had dispatched an elite force to the Paraíba valley.
>He knew what's going on
Not so much, his apparatus was lacking in intelligence. If they had paid attention they'd have noticed in the preceding week huge troop movements by the Minas Gerais police and a suspicious meeting of high-ranking figures in the Juiz de Fora Airport.
>there were people who saw no threat.
The communists were among the "popular forces", which the military called the "Fifth Army". They boasted of their immense strength and, like the right, had a degree of paramilitary organization which could be formed into militias in wartime -this process briefly began in Brasília. This only helped convince the right they were a threat and had to be neutralized with a coup. Once the time came they were unable to use this force because of Goulart's indecisiveness, their own incompetence and simply because they were not as tough as they boasted. Prestes even told Kruschev he had two generals in the high command, which was pure nonsense.

So on to São Paulo. Through March political temperature rose including on the state. On the 16th a conference on land reform saw rowdy confrontations between left- and right-wing students and police. On the 19th, in a show of force the right made a 300 to 500 thousand-man demonstration, the March of the Family with God for Liberty.
It is Holy Friday, 28th of March. The sailors' mutiny has dragged the political crisis to it apex. At 03:00, two emissaries from the governor of Minas Gerais knock on Amauri Kruel’s home in Groenlândia street. They get him up to date on the conspiracy's buildup on their state, but he cannot confirm he’ll be on their side. He is in angst, divided between his loyalty to his friend and superior, the President, and his rage against the political situation.

At 19:30 42 of his subordinates come to his home. The conversation topic are rumors on the news that he's set to be replaced. He declares he'll refuse to hand over his post, and his officers declare their full support. A few of them suggest him to immediately rise up in revolt. He refuses: "the hour must be exact" and it's set for the next week. At about the same moment the conspiratorial staff in Minas Gerais was meeting to set the date, and chose an earlier day but did not inform anyone else. Like Castelo Branco, Kruel was expecting a rebellion on the 2nd of April or later.
Monday, 30th, 19:00. Through his brother in Rio de Janeiro, Riograndino, he gives Castelo Branco his “OK” for the operation.

Bernd 07/04/2020 (Sat) 22:54:14 [Preview] No.38355 del
And finally, Tuesday, 31st. As usual he gets to work on the IInd Army HQ early. At 07:00 his Divisional Artillery commander, on vacation in Minas Gerais, phones him to note on abnormal military movement. He realizes the uprising has broken out, and Riograndino confirms it.

São Paulo is rigorously quiet on the 31st. Governor Ademar, on a phone call with Governor Lacerda of Guanabara, denies being part of the rebellion. Some commanders already have their forces in marching order. Cabral Ribeiro, of the 4th Infantry Regiment, has already clearly sided with the rebels. In the IInd Army’s backwater beyond São Paulo, near the Bolivian border, home to the 9th Military Region, 4th Cavalry Division and 2nd Mixed Brigade, the 4th Cavalry and the 16th Caçadores Battalion are also of known alignment. Some industrialists and officers are already handling the logistics of shipping war material for a confrontation against Rio de Janeiro. Given the lack of suitable trucks they had to use the railways, but some officers were against as a single grenade could ruin a whole convoy; after they accepted, some of this material had already reached the Paraíba valley by 22:00. The legalists, however, are nervously still in control.
Everyone else is quiet, too -the federal government and Minas Gerais. The latter formally announces it is in rebellion at 17:00. And Kruel, too, doesn’t say a word. He does, however, call his generals to a conference and move his HQ to the Military Region and Infantry Division HQ, whose generals Bandeira and Aluísio opposed switching sides as they considered Mourão Filho’s movement too early and isolated. This helps to change their mind.

Then early in the night he moves back to his original HQ, where he finds a group of officers willing to lock him in the suburbs and hand the Army to Cabral Ribeiro if he didn’t join their side. At around the same time, on 18:00, he met with Noschese, President of the São Paulo Industries Federation (Fiesp), on a military hospital, and received his million-dollar bribe.
The conference was finally held at 20:00, I think back on the IInd Army HQ. Present were Bandeira, Aluísio, and Buck Júnior (Santos Garrison). Absent were Ferraz, who was minding his vacations and only came days later when all was over, and Zerbini.

The latter had indeed come to São Paulo, but on 18:30-19:00 a major on the Military Region/Infantry Division HQ had interrupted him at the door and told him to meet Aluísio. When he did, his superior asked his position. Both confirmed they were legalists. When asked what he’d do if Kruel defected, Aluísio said he’d arrest him. He gave Zerbini a mission: return to his Divisional Infantry HQ in Caçapava, assume command in the Paraíba valley, where the 5th and 6th Infantry and the 2nd Engineers were, and secure it for the government.
Zerbini’s home was surrounded by the gendarmerie. He got to Caçapava at 21:00. He was a brand-new commander, only arriving in the 9th of January, as a key piece of the government’s apparatus in São Paulo. Cabral Ribeiro once mocked him: “’’You don’t command anything’’”, “’’Why’’?”, “’’Nobody follows your orders’’”. He did, however, know the two regimental commanders in the valley and they briefly obeyed: Colonels Lacerda (5th, Lorena, former student) and Sousa Lobo (6th, Caçapava, fighting companion in 1932).

Bernd 07/04/2020 (Sat) 22:58:05 [Preview] No.38356 del
Sousa Lobo he met in person, and Lacerda, through the telephone. He repeated his position as a legalist, to which Sousa Lobo agreed, and gave them orders. The regiments conducted recon and, I’m mostly sure, remained in their quarters. There is a vague mention that there was a force moving towards São Paulo which later had to reverse course, it might have been the 6th. On 11:00-11:30 he was phoned by the military cabinet chief, Assis Brasil, and Goulart himself. He stated his situation: in control, but on a disadvantage if the rest of the IInd Army defected and marched against him. He was promised reinforcements: the School-Unit Group and a tank battalion, which he considered good enough to mount a stand.

Such was the situation at night:
4th Infantry Division in rebellion against the government, moved towards Rio de Janeiro. To be exact, it only moved the Tiradentes detachment while fractions went north to Brasília.
Muricy (w/the Tiradentes detachment) on the Rio/Minas Gerais border with a bridgehead, facing a company of the 1st Caçadores Battalion
1st Caçadores Battalion and infantry and artillery of the 1st Infantry Division mobilized against Mourão Filho
School-Unit Group directed to the Paraíba valley to reinforce Zerbini
IInd Army formations in the Paraíba valley under Zerbini. Conduct reconnaissance.
IInd Army undecided, parts already moved towards the Paraíba valley.

Minas Gerais had around 4.000 men on the Army and 18.000 police, and its Tiradentes detachment had 2.714 men. The force moved to Brasília was ~2.000 men.
Rio de Janeiro had 30.000 men on the Army plus more in the marines. I’ve got no numbers on São Paulo.

As you can see 3 of Zerbini’s orders are northwards, to the rebellion in Minas Gerais, over the Mantiqueira range which is a strong defensive position with a handful of chokepoints, including the tunnel. The 6th Infantry’s recon made contact with the engineering battalion in Itajubá and found nothing out of the ordinary. There were two other potential threats, from a police battalion in the general region (but Zerbini wouldn’t know) and from an artillery group in Pouso Alegre. This group was, beyond Zerbini’s knowledge, moving to Belo Horizonte as part of the group that would advance on Brasília, and, without any knowledge of Zerbini, feared what could happen in São Paulo to their rear.
The other order was towards the rest of the IInd Army, on the Dutra’s bridge in Jacareí.

Bernd 07/04/2020 (Sat) 23:01:56 [Preview] No.38357 del
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There is also a mention of Zerbini promising to mount resistance on Jundiaí. It is north of São Paulo, where the legend is. Doesn't make a lot of sense, might be a confusion with Jacareí. The tunnel was the same bitterly contested in 1932 >>38097.

Governor Ademar made his proclamation at 22:30, but it was weak. A group entered his Palace and argued with him. He asked of one of them, a figure who “’’looks like a Mexican bandit, with a long mustache, who stared at me’’”, smoking a straw pipe in the back: it was Colonel Serpa, who told him to take a definition “’’or else’’”, and he made a stronger statetement.

Meanwhile Kruel met with his generals. On his orders, outside the room his S4 staff Colonel waited, ready to arrest his subordinates if they refused to join. Both this and his HQ relocation were already moves in the direction of joining the coup d’état, he had to be in control of his subordinates, but was still neutral.

As the undecided third party to the confrontation between the Ist Army and the 4th Infantry Division, the IInd Army was the kingmaker. Though much weaker than either the Ist or the IIIrd Armies -and the IIIrd was still legalist and a threat on its southern flank- it could still shake the balance of power. Castelo Branco had already made it clear that the coup’s only chance of success was with the IInd Army on their side.

Late at night, surrounded by his officers, he phoned the President and had their final conversations. There’s a confusion on the number of conversations they had but the final were in this hour. Kruel’s ultimatum:
-Part with the communists and “’’take concrete measures in this respect’’”
-Shut down the General Workers’ Command (CGT)
-Fire his most radical Ministers, Abelardo Jurema (Labor) and Darcy Ribeiro (Civil cabinet)
“’’Or else you might find yourself left to your own luck’’”.

The response: Goulart would not break his commitment to parties and popular forces. “’’I’ve never had the support of neither the political forces, nor the Armed Forces during my government. I’ve only had difficulties. If now, in this excruciating hour, I get rid of those who surround me, it’s like a suicide’’”.
For Goulart, accepting would mean something akin to the 1961 arrangement but with even less power. And he was interested in rulership, not the honors of the Presidential post. Being a figurehead ruler was not on his plans. Others besides Kruel also made similar offers.

In light of this negative, Kruel issued his manifesto, which railed generically against the reds but at no point mentioned Goulart or the Presidency; even at this point he still hoped he could just force him to negotiate without deposing him. This also reflected on his battle plan, activated in his movement, which had the options of marching into Rio de Janeiro or just laying siege to it. Besides it he also ordered the 16th Caçadores Battalion to head to Brasília.

The manifesto and battle plan were already ready early in the day, if not in the days before. Why did it take so long for him to decide ? It could be:
-The need to convince Aluísio and Bandeira
-His divided loyalty
-Waiting for news from Rio de Janeiro, which came with Colonel Restell in the afternoon
-Waiting for the official declaration from Minas Gerais, on 17:00
-Gaspari writes he and the IVth Army were waiting to see which way the wind was blowing

Bernd 07/05/2020 (Sun) 07:02:19 [Preview] No.38361 del
Ah, the next batch. I'm gonna read this later. Due to the rainy weather I rarely went for a walk, and I want to exploit the day for a stroll.

Bernd 07/07/2020 (Tue) 04:04:38 [Preview] No.38415 del
>easy to access by its rivers and flat terrain and economically valuable because of the same rivers. In that respect it's like the Volga or Mississipi-Missouri.
More than that, it means access to some of the most fertile lands in the world.

Bernd 07/07/2020 (Tue) 20:17:43 [Preview] No.38457 del
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>Prestes even told Kruschev he had two generals in the high command, which was pure nonsense.
Maybe "having" those generals was just knowing two who could remain if a radical left turn would happen.
>Ferraz, who was minding his vacations and only came days later
A vacation to remember. I bet he got infos, at least some vague ones, what's going on at home, and was anxious what's gonna happen.
So partially the chances of confrontation was depended on how the Zerbini's underlings followed orders?
>looks like a Mexican bandit, with a long mustache,

Bernd 07/08/2020 (Wed) 01:02:08 [Preview] No.38483 del
>A vacation to remember. I bet he got infos, at least some vague ones, what's going on at home, and was anxious what's gonna happen.
Kruel was less than happy when he returned.
>So partially the chances of confrontation was depended on how the Zerbini's underlings followed orders?
Yes, he could mount a stand against the rest of the IInd Army and give a large buffer to the legalists in Rio de Janeiro.
I doubt his forces would need a northwards movement, Mourão Filho's forces on the other side of the Mantiqueira were very thin and wouldn't do anything, just the engineer battalion and the 8th police battalion in Lavras, almost halfway from the distance to their capital. Zerbini could cross the range unopposed but what would he do on the other side? He could link up with the Sergeants' School in Três Corações, with hundreds of men who refused to join the uprising, defeat whatever the other side threw against him and threaten the enemy's rear. The coupists were gathering a detachment in Belo Horizonte but would not be able to send all of it against Zerbini as they were threatened by Brasília (and Brasília, in turn, was threatened by the 16th Caçadores marching on its rear). Yet all of this would be pointless as he had to fight off the rest of the IInd Army.
The reinforcements coming to his rear would have the Agulhas Negras Academy as their obstacle. On military terms they could force through but psychologically it didn't go like that.

Bernd 08/11/2020 (Tue) 03:50:53 [Preview] No.39191 del
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Backtracking, still on the 31st, some stuff happened on the Santos lowland, São Paulo's outlet to the sea. Since the afternoon the vital steel factory and refinery were controlled by the striking unionists, and Kruel had ordered their takeover. However most commanders - of the 2nd Caçadores Battalion, which I missed, the air and naval bases, the 6th Motorized Coastal Artillery Group - were unwilling to act. The General in charge of the garrison was in a fort, quiet. Only the 3rd Coastal Battery's commander wanted to do something, but with his General's inaction he couldn't employ his own troops. So he grabbed one officer and the Maritime Police and broke into the refinery. The "red caps" were ready to detonate two tankers with ammonia at the entrance, but offered only verbal resistance.

According to Mourão Filho, during the final Kruel-Goulart talks the former had offered to crush the rebellion at the Rio/Minas border if his demands were satisfied, while the latter wanted to first crush it himself and then negotiate. Logically the President wanted to negotiate from a stronger position. He may have heard it from incorrect hearsay as Goulart never gave attack orders and distinctly lacked the will to fight. Explanations may be that he was more confident and planning to attack earlier on, or, more likely, that the defensive battle alone would give him the stronger hand - he had a larger and better armed force with several excellent natural defensive positions.

Once around midnight Kruel switched sides, São Paulo entered into war gear. Its vast economic power would be vital in a protracted civil war and it could within a few weeks count on fuel shipments from abroad. The war economy part was jointly coordinated by the Army, state government and productive classes (e.g. prominent industrialists). It included:
-Orders for thousands of blankets and mattresses
-Requisitioning of drugs, gauze and cotton
-Donation of vehicles, including 90 jeeps straight off the factory
-Requisitioning of fuel stocks
-Radios lended to the HQ
-Calling volunteers; 5 thousand enlisted
The security part consisted of:
-Mass arrests of leftist and unionist figures
-The 4th Infantry's "Operation X", already ready days before, placing machine guns and explosives through bridges in the capital
-Checkpoints and inspections of vehicles around the capital
-Police and antiair assets surrounding the Cumbica and campo de Marte airfields in the capital; the Navy was expected to help but not the Air Force
-Occupation of rail stations, where the strike was underway
-Control of one of the border posts to the south in Registro

The battle plan was to keep a reserve in São Paulo and move the rest, led by the 2nd Infantry Division's commander, to march first to Barra Mansa and then either to Guanabara proper, steamrolling the government, or to Viúva Graça. The latter is where the Dutra road, having taken a right turn towards leaving the Paraíba valley (downstream is the Minas border with Mourão Filho's regiments), crosses near the Araras hills and is right in front of the coastal plain. From there Kruel, in striking range of Rio de Janeiro, would have his boot on the government's neck and could perhaps, as he intended, bend it to his will rather than deposing it.
The IInd Army's decision changed the balance of power, though in theory the government was still stronger. Importantly it introduced a new political dimension to the power struggle between the rebels. Firstly, Mourão Filho had to rush to Rio de Janeiro - he wanted civilian government and thought a Kruel dictatorship would be equal or worse to the current government; to him, it was a race. Secondly, it'd play a role in the Costa e Silva/Castelo Branco struggle as Kruel and Castelo Branco were mortal enemies.

Bernd 08/11/2020 (Tue) 21:59:58 [Preview] No.39212 del
At dawn on the 1st of April Zerbini's power slipped through his fingers as Kruel's direct orders to the 5th and 6th Regiments, core of the invasion force, overrid his. At 01:00 he phoned the 5th and heard everyone had got on trucks and left, leaving their quarters empty. He sent a motorized patrol to find out but never got any news from them. At 06:00 the 6th Infantry informed him they were marching east. After unsuccessful attempts at contact he finally phoned his commander, Aluísio, who was coming with a Mechanized Recon squadron and was now a turncoat. Zerbini convinced him to give him a lift. His only hope now as to delay the IInd Army and wait the legalist reinforcements.

A light tank company went by rail and the rest on the highway. Infantry Regiments were still foot infantry. The 5th had its trucks but still had to use 3 private buses. The 6th went on private trucks and a company's buses. At the Governor's orders, fuel was requisitioned on gas stations on the way just by leaving behind a note.

The best-covered unit movement was that of the artillery component, the 2nd 105 mm Howitzer Regiment "Floriano". It was in readiness since the 30th and had an incident at night on the 31st: a subliutenant tried to convince the soldiers not to fight against the government and the "worker's movement" as they, too, were workers. He was arrested. Such cases of legalists within rebel units and vice versa are ubiquitous.
The Regiment's most forward unit, the 1st Battery headed to São Paulo at 07:30. Part of its convoy were 4 donated civilian trucks (4 other were with the other batteries). 2 visibly carried munitions, and 2 were each covered with a canvas and the words "AMMUNITION - DANGER". Beneath, camping material. It was a weak Regiment, with a single Group of howitzers, on a weak Army.
Passing through Jundiaí they feared a reaction from the Divisional Artillery and 2nd 155 Howitzer Group commanders, whose loyalties were dubious. That Group's HQ had a clear view of the road and could block it. They phoned reliable officers and had them keep these commanders the Divisional Artillery's wasn't even there but in vacation at the Divisional Artillery HQ, far from the highway.
Curiously enough, though the 4th Infantry was part of the reserve, they were to meet with it. It was nowhere to be found and they went on.
"The march in Rio's direction was harsh. The first warm meal was served at 21:00. We all got our soup, and I went to my jeep, as it was starting to drizzle. The canvas had holes, a water funnel formed and fell over my dish; the potato soup was icy and tasted like canvas."

All of this happened with traffic still open on the road. Civilians shared the lanes with huge columns of trucks.

Bernd 08/12/2020 (Wed) 03:16:29 [Preview] No.39214 del
On the legalist side, the Artillery School-Group (GEsA) is well covered. The 31st was a tense day with no information from superiors - this is a common theme, soldiers not having the slightest clue of what was going on. Finally, at night they received a telephone order to attach a battery of howitzers to the Infantry School-Regiment (REsI). Every week one of the three batteries was ready to act, and this time it was the 2nd under 1st Liutenant Sanches.
Sanches was dispatched to the Dutra to join with a battalion of the REsI already on the road. This order came from the REsI's Colonel Abner, even though the GEsA's Colonel Aldo was in the same quarters. Sanches did previously consult with Aldo - he was sleeping. "They called you, you go"; he seemed completely disinterested in what one of his subordinates was doing attached to another formation. The 2nd Battery left after midnight and did not bring food.
Abner had complained of one thing - Sanches had presented himself without his troops. This was a deliberate delay, as he and the two other battery leaders already disliked the government. On the other hand Abner and Aldo were Goulart loyalists, the latter poorly regarded by his subordinates.
Abner's subordinates, his battalion commanders - at the vanguard, Major Simon - and the captain of his organic tank company were likewise rebel-sympathizing.
The 1st and 3rd Batteries were under Captains da Silveira and Graça, respectively. They left a bit later, under an agreement with staff officers & captains Seixas and Brunner that, as they could not rise up isolated and get besieged, they'd move and wherever they went they'd join up with the rebels.

None of the batteries knew who they'd face on the road.

Another GUEs formation was the 1st 90 mm AA Gun Group. It had 2 "blue" and 2 "red" ("communist") batteries. The pieces were for point defense, taking hours to deploy; asphalt would ruin the tractors' treads. Nonetheless Captain Ustra, of the "blue" 4th, was ordered to cover the column. Not with the 4th but with the "red". This made no sense, and under protest he was allowed to use his pieces, soldiers and corporals. Under him were still "red" sergeants and officers including a "red" Captain Ustra still praises him as a professional; there are such cases of recognizing the enemy's value in this aspect, importantly older than him. He saw through the trap: they were ready to arrest and replace him in the field. With his soldiers and corporals he organized his own conspiracy including arresting the "reds" if necessary.
The battery left without medical support or the food train, but not in a hurry. Leaving at 09:00, it barely moved as tires were emptied and vehicles died off. At 20:00, when they had to return it was far away from the destination. Ustra successfully prevented himself from being a legalist piece on the board, though his battery would've never been useful in the first place.

Ustra's battery was followed by a company of the Engineering School-Battalion, which likewise got nowhere.

Bernd 08/12/2020 (Wed) 13:00:53 [Preview] No.39226 del
The "red" 2nd Battery.

Bernd 08/16/2020 (Sun) 19:19:31 [Preview] No.39332 del
>Mass arrests of leftist and unionist figures
Are numbers known? What was their fate?
>power struggle between the rebels
It is expected that every movement has internal divisions. Some could collapse the movements itself. In this case it proved to be advantageous as it introduced a competition and give incentive to push on.

That dude with the newspaper reminds me of Telly Savalas from any WWII themed movie.
>At 01:00 he phoned the 5th and heard everyone had got on trucks and left, leaving their quarters empty. He sent a motorized patrol to find out but never got any news from them.
>wanna check on dudes
>they disappear like grey donkey in the fog
>send other dudes to see what's what
>they disappear too
Must have been a heatenings moment. Poor Zerbini.
>the potato soup was icy and tasted like canvas.
War is hell.

>he and the two other battery leaders already disliked the government. On the other hand Abner and Aldo were Goulart loyalist
>Abner's subordinates, his battalion commanders - at the vanguard, Major Simon - and the captain of his organic tank company were likewise rebel-sympathizing.
Another example how the cards were shuffled. Everyone reacted to the changing circumstances as the domino rolled on. As I see Goulart gave the initiative away, Filho pushed the dominos, then Kruel too, and those fell in line.

Bernd 08/18/2020 (Tue) 04:18:09 [Preview] No.39341 del
>Are numbers known?
Single-digit thousands in the whole country, the American embassy estimated circa 5000.
Also 500 asylees, a few thousand refugees in the southern border, 2 thousand civil servants purged, 10 thousand union directory members deposed, 386 individuals impeached or deprived of political rights and ~621 officers retired including 24 out of 91 generals. And 13 political deaths in the next nine months.
>What was their fate?
Released soon, in the individual cases I've seen always in a weeks or months. Pernambuco's governor, one of the highest-profile arrests, got out after a year with a habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. Before 1968 the dictatorship's legal means to conduct repression were limited and Castelo Branco, who assumed the Presidency a couple weeks after the coup d'état, thought he'd be the only military ruler and preferred a more velvet-gloved approach.
>Everyone reacted to the changing circumstances as the domino rolled on
Particularly the IInd and IVth armies just waiting for the situation to develop before oportunistically taking their side, and many lower commanders with the same attitude. In theory it was a rebel minority against a legalist majority but a lot of those legalists were just neutral.

Bernd 08/18/2020 (Tue) 05:34:13 [Preview] No.39343 del
The whole thing smells like that noone wanted to do anything. Just cover their asses until they see where the chips fall. Ofc bitching, moaning, complaining, with a little conspiring is ok that's what they would call politics while waiting for other people burn themselves by digging out the potato from the coals. A handful against a handful but even their effort seem lukewarm and barely existent, or worse, passive (what I see on Goulart's part).
Maybe it's the curse of the situation South Am. countries are in, when even mediocre would be good - as you proposed and we discussed elsewhere.
But a coup is a coup, and it worked well, what they did was enough. It doesn't need to be flashy, that's the point. I'm curious now how all the others in history went down.

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 02:08:03 [Preview] No.39506 del
(1.95 MB 2433x1573 resende.jpeg)
>while waiting for other people burn themselves by digging out the potato from the coals
i.e. Mourão Filho, who was willing to fight and die in a failed rebellion. Instead he triggered the government's collapse. The conspirators in Rio then got out of their rat holes, waltzed into the abandoned edifice of power and ruthlessly sidelined Mourão Filho even before he marched in with his troops. He could've used them to attack the other coupists but chose not to and came back empty-handed, disappearing from history books on this point onward. It seems he genuinely wanted elections in 1965 and civilian government. His memoirs, published posthumously, devastate the military elite and were offensive enough to get briefly banned. All he ever finds in other officers is cowardice and selfishness, his closest allies were very incompetent.

The third power in the Paraíba Valley, between the GUEs and the IInd Army, was General Médici with his Agulhas Negras Academy. It had cadets and a Command and Service Battalion with a company of guards. The Battalion was already in readiness on the 31st, by the Ist Army's orders. As soon as Médici learned of Mourão Filho's movement, he was convinced of its righteousness.
Hence he picked a side and chose to block the road with his meager military strength. One reason he might have done this was that he hadn't partaken in the coup process until the very end and now had to win prestige with the other generals. He was successful as his action gained mythological status in the future.
Another, cited by one of his officers, was that the Academy couldn't just watch as eunuchs while the two Armies turned its home into a battleground.
At 17:30 he had activated his Staff to draft a war plan. At 02-03:00 he received calls from Costa e Silva and the Ist and IInd Armies, letting the IInd know his position, and then made his final decision known to the rest of the Academy.
Morale was high, if the decision hadn't been made some officers were willing to cross the mountains and join the rebels in Minas Gerais. Nevertheless a few cadets were arrested, some leftists, others just worried about legality.

As the day began the Academy dominated Resende. All fuel was in its hands. The mayor was arrested. Professors were embedded in the media.
Kruel asked Médici to mount a defense with the Paraíba Valley regiments underway (5th and 6th), the 1st Armored Infantry in Barra Mansa and the Command and Service Battalion. But he had other ideas, and outright rejected having Kruel's troops in the frontline. The cadets themselves were his fighting force. Nobody wanted to shoot at cadets, much less those of the greatest military academy: it was a psychological strategy, using a vulnerable group as a meat shield. Hence his manifesto pleaded: "Do not try to cut at the nest so many vocations".

By 09:30 morning in the 1st of April, the bulk of the cadets had left. The infantry entrenched perpendicular to the road. The communications teams worked tirelessly on telephone lines.
In the Oral History most interviewees praise them as an "elite" force, but those who actually served there are more pessimistic. The professors were competent commanders, of course, but the cadets were just students, with incomplete instruction. A GUEs soldier recounts seeing a whole group of infantrymen in line, easily mowed down by anyone with a machine gun.
In the artillery the lack of training and equipment was starkest. It was towed by underpowered Engineering vehicles, with no maps or radios. It had 250 shells, versus 35.000 brought by just two batteries of the GEsA. The hilly terrain demanded vertical fire which the cadets didn't know yet; they received some instruction in the field but it's not something that can be just improvised.

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 02:34:14 [Preview] No.39507 del
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Cavalry Captain Correa had a phone call with Colonel Lima of the 1st Armored Infantry. He still thought it'd be dead ahead of them, the first line of defense against the GUEs, but Lima clarified they had moved to Volta Redonda to quell labor unrest.
From Médici's perspective this didn't matter as he needed the psychological barrier. For Lima it might seem overkill to employ an entire battalion for that, but he didn't know the scale of the threat (the unionists did ponder on acts such as detonating rail lines, which would have even military value) and it was a particularly sensitive city.
Volta Redonda houses Latin America's largest steel works, a vital pillar in the national security strategy. Its management was strongly tied to the military. Once unionists prepared to strike, it activated its contingency. The military-technocratic response was proactive and finely coordinated whereas the strike was reactive and dysfunctional. Management rapidly cut off communications and arrested the ringleaders. Work was only partially paralyzed. The 1st Armored Infantry shut down a radio after 06:30, dispersed pickets at the factory entrance at 07:00 and after 17:15 invaded the union headquarters.

This battalion had an indirect impact on the Minas Gerais front as it stood upstream of that other battleground, with a clear route. The 2nd Tank Battalion was also nearby, between the two theaters - since 1962 it was not in Rio de Janeiro but in Valença. Hence the Tiradentes Detachment, lacking any information and not knowing the 1st Armored Infantry was on their side (the books are completely silent on the 2nd Tank Battalion) sent a battalion of police and an antitank company to guard their flank against a possible attack from this side.

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 02:48:05 [Preview] No.39508 del
The order of battle was thus:
Command and Service Battalion

Cadet Corps
Two teams from the Communications Course
Motorized Cavalry Squadron
Infantry Company
x3 Fusilier platoon
106 gun platoon
Mortar platoon
x2 Mortar section
x2 recoilless gun section
Machine gun section
Howitzer Battery
Engineering Platoon

Reserve in São Paulo
4th Infantry Regiment
4th Caçadores Battalion
17th Cavalry Regiment
1st Light Tank Battalion (-)
Sent to Rio de Janeiro
5th Infantry Regiment
6th Infantry Regiment
2nd Combat Engineering Battalion
2nd Mechanized Recon Squadron
2nd Howitzer Regiment
Howitzer Battery of the CPOR (Reserve Officer Preparation Center)
1st Company of the 1st Light Tank Battalion

Isolated part of the Armored Division
1st Armored Infantry Battalion

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 02:55:47 [Preview] No.39509 del
On the legalist side:
One Infantry Battalion of the REsI
REsI organic medium tank company
2nd Howitzer Battery of the GEsA
Engineering Company of the BEsE
Artillery School-Group
1st Battery
3rd Battery
Command Battery
Services Battery
2nd Battery of the 1st AA Group
Possibly one further infantry battalion, but my sources elude me. My main on army organization says the School-Regiment only had two, but one interviewee in the Oral History says it was still three. Then from a very trustworthy source I have the information that at around 12:30 one battalion was possibly at quarters.

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 04:11:37 [Preview] No.39510 del
Between 11:30 and 12:45 IInd Army units cross the border. Meanwhile the GUEs vanguard arrived at 13:00. Reporters found a 10 km stretch littered with vehicles from ambulances to tanks and machine gun nests on the hills. The 1st and 3rd Batteries of the GEsA arrived at 14:00. There were more legalist forces in the highway further away.

Zerbini came with Aluísio and the the 2nd Mech Recon. The squadron was poorly employed, kept in the back instead of forward. At the Academy Zerbini was called for coffee, dragged to the elevator, brought before Médici and forbidden from leaving the building.

The frontline was established. The cadets were entrenched on the almost bottleneck between Resende and Barra Mansa. The surrounding land is hilly, with poor roads.
Captain Ferrari, of the AMAN's infantry, thought the enemy's advance would be delayed by all the obstacles and the bridge destruction would force it into the surrounding terrain. Captain Ferraz of the artillery thought he'd be massacred. All his artillery was expecting to do was to lob shells at whatever came immediately in front of him on the road.

Colonel Aldo stops his artillery group and conferences with his commanders. They are finally informed of their enemy - the Academy - and their mission - support the Infantry School-Regiment against it. Seixas or Brunner is astonished:
-You'll fire at cadets?
-We're soldiers and received an order. It is legal, the mission exists, and we must fulfill it. It's a bitter mission, but that must be fulfilled.

Instead, Seixas, Brunner, da Silveira and Graça decide to defect under Seixas' leadership. It bears noting that he and the two battery commanders studied at the Academy.
It'd have to be a fast and unannounced movement as they'd pass right through the infantry and the 2nd Battery, which from high ground could easily mow them down from behind. There was no coordination with those. Further, they could face opposition from within their batteries.
In the 3rd Battery Captain Graça asked his Firing Line commander, 2nd Liutenant Pizzoti, if his officers would follow him. "I drag them". The sergeants, however, were politically unreliable and had to be kept without ammunition. In each vehicle, besides the driver and sergeant there'd be an officer. And finally, the sergeants would have to be told it was a reconnaissance.
"But that'd be hard to hide, recon with all personnel! They'll suspect."
"Your problem, figure it out."

Bernd 08/26/2020 (Wed) 04:12:06 [Preview] No.39511 del
When they set off some sergeants did begin to see through it, but Pizzoti insisted they follow the orders and clarified it was a "different recon" presumably with a smirk. Some ultimately had to be arrested.
But the batteries crossed legalist positions completely unharmed. In fact, they were joined by ammunition trucks from the Services Battery.
Captain Sanches saw Colonel Aldo coming his way and ordered the telephone line cut. Aldo saw the defecting convoy and, beside the road, tears in his eyes, shouted "Traitors! Traitors". He pulled his gun to commit suicide but Major Simon held his arm.

The Academy's cavalry welcomed them, but by a communications failure did not inform the others. Captain Ferraz, moving his infantry to another position, pointed his binoculars and saw a convoy clearly not belonging to the Academy. He immediately had his convoy stop. Troops climbed the hill and got in position. There was a sudden possibility of friendly fire. But through his binoculars he could see an Academy captain in the first jeep ahead of the convoy, and ordered not to shoot. The convoy stopped, cheered, and moved on.
The same chance of friendly fire happened with the artillery, but it saw men waving white shirts. Inside the vehicles, the sergeants were kept at the pistol sights of liutenants.

The defection shifted the balance of power, and it's not like the rest of the GUEs was any better. The 6th Infantry was at Queluz, just on the other side of the border. Colonel Sousa Lobo speculated to the press on the infantry's defection and then that it could mount a defense around Viúva Graça. But by this point the truce already began.

Bernd 08/27/2020 (Thu) 19:28:53 [Preview] No.39543 del
What is the difference between DI and ID?

Bernd 08/27/2020 (Thu) 20:52:56 [Preview] No.39545 del
DI = Divisão de Infantaria (Infantry Division)
ID = Infantaria Divisionária (Divisional Infantry)
Each division's 3 infantry regiments were under a brigade-level Divisional Infantry command. Likewise there was Divisional Artillery (AD).

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 01:54:38 [Preview] No.39547 del
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The Minas Gerais/Rio de Janeiro theater is more exciting and closer to a proper war campaign, all of it happening in a scenic landscape. It had not one but two "battles", the first decided not just by politics but also by conventional military intimidation.

The state was easily defensible, within reach of Rio de Janeiro and Brasília and with fully committed and integrated military and political elites. It was, however, militarily weak. Several ways were thought up to square the circle:

-Through negotiations with Espírito Santo, securing a port to funnel in weapons in wartime

-Expanding, training for war and integrating into the Army the police force to acquire muscle. It doubled in size in the decade and in 64 had 17.880 men. Training collaborated with the Army and focused on defensive warfare in the state's terrain. Weapons were purchased from Czechoslovakia, received from Army stores and mounted in workshops. This was a reversion to what the state gendarmerie always was, a state army; though they no longer fielded aircraft, artillery and the like they still had rifles, machine guns, mortars and a cavalry regiment.
Pictured are police convoys, marked with the state's triangle

-Accelerated training within the Army itself, as Mourão Filho conducted; the regiment within his reach was of servicemen with only a few months of service when the time came, and he made up for it with intense training. Anyone could've noticed he was up to no good, but they just thought he was mad.

-Mourão Filho's original draft for Operation Popeye, using surprise to make up for the lack of muscle. Specifically it envisioned:
-Moving what he had on hand in the city, the 10th Infantry, 2nd Police, 4th Mech Recon and 1st/4th Howitzers and sneakily entering Guanabara by daybreak
-Seizing the first obstacle on the way, the 1st Tank Battalion in Avenida Brasil
-Detach a force to arrest the President in his palace
-Storm the Army HQ
-If the garrison counterattacks, fight to the death

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 02:52:46 [Preview] No.39548 del
-In the meantime, the rest of the state's forces would follow behind and stay at the southern edge of the mountains which stand in the middle of the route
-The bulk would be under a Brigade General
-He'd follow the vanguard along with another Brigade General

He already had two such generals in his Divisional Infantry and Artillery. Neither were trustworthy, particularly Guedes who wanted to entrench at the border and negotiate, and whom he just hated in general. He hated him enough he was willing to grab a Colonel, promote him to General on the spot and send him off. But in December 1963 he found a willing General in Muricy. He'd later come to regret it as Muricy was part of Castelo Branco's clique and carried out his agenda, but Muricy it was.

As for the workarounds:
#1: Diplomatic success but never had to come into play.
#2: Despite extensive efforts the police was still a subpar fighting force. This might not be incompetence, and just the state's material limitations.
#3: Muricy didn't like the quality of the troops he found.
#4: The timing was completely off, botched by his allies, and the plan wasn't implemented. Muricy was of the opinion that it'd have failed. It was foolish to expect he could just waltz into Rio de Janeiro with two battalions without anyone batting an eye, shout to the country "I'm the boss!" and everyone going along with it. Even if he got inside the huge garrison would just leave their quarters and swat him like a fly.

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 02:53:22 [Preview] No.39549 del
How was the timeline botched? It started with the last summit, on the 28th of March, between the big 3: Mourão Filho, military chief of the revolution, and the 2 based in Belo Horizonte, his subordinate Guedes and the civilian chief, Magalhães Pinto. It'd been decided that the governor would write a manifesto, hand a copy to him and then at his green light it could be broadcast. No manifesto was brought. Mourão Filho wanted to enact his plan that very night as the meeting itself was eyebrow-raising, but couldn't without a manifesto. Then for the following days he waits and waits for it but the governor makes no contact.
According to himself he was willing to start at any moment and just waited. Other sources clash and state that after failing to start on the 28th he now wanted time to prepare. There's also the fact Guedes was superstitious and wanted an earlier date because of the Moon phases. And allegedly it was Marshal Odílio Denys, veteran conspirator present as a guest, who gave out the proper date (31st), knowing in advance Goulart's speech at night on the 30th would be explosive. Denys isn't very trustworthy.

The conspirators tripped on themselves on the 30th. In the afternoon Magalhães made a manifesto in solidarity to the navy, in light of the sailors' mutiny, and Guedes told his officers he was in rebellion. Both were meaningless. The governor's manifesto was only some vague words about democracy, allegedly it reached the President and he agreed with it! And Guedes' "rebellion" wasn't even known to the commander of the regiment stationed in Belo Horizonte (12th); he was in Juiz de Fora. Mourão Filho was only informed by telephone, when these events were a fait accompli.
By doing this the two won the political laurels of kickstarting the revolution and handed the hot potato to Mourão Filho who'd have to do the actual military work. Further, by writing a weak manifesto the governor even had an "exit strategy".
Yet it also compromised everything. By broadcasting their intentions before military preparations were made, they'd lose the element of surprise and have to mobilize under hostile conditions. If simultaneously telephone contact failed -that did happen with 60s communications- and the federal government took the rebellion seriously, then in the blink of an eye the Armored Division would be in Juiz de Fora while paratroopers fell on Belo Horizonte. And what if, on a whim, Mourão Filho chose to side with the government? With the Ist Army's support he'd march and crush Guedes & Magalhães.

However the federal government's intelligence failure and the weakness of the proclamations of rebellion meant nothing real happened. It was just enough to enrage Mourão Filho, who, after still waiting for a copy, by dinner made the fateful decision to act. He'd use a manifesto of his own.
He didn't want to watch the President at night as he'd commence his overthrow for before daybreak. His wife convinced him to watch because he'd overthrow him.
After that at dawn the governor's emissaries came with the manifesto. It was as bad as he expected and such was his rage they left in a few minutes.
At 04-05:00 he has the police occupy the telephone station and still wearing his pajamas and red silk robe sent a number of calls through the country, setting the coup d'état in motion. This is considered its beginning.

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 03:28:06 [Preview] No.39550 del
Mourão Filho's diary entries at dawn were contemplative of his past life and somber, expecting defeat with death in the air. "The whole Army comes after me".
The phone calls included:
-Putting his troops in readiness
-To Guedes, calling a battalion of the 12th Infantry
-To politician Falcão to inform Carlos Lacerda
-Informing São Paulo

Falcão also informed Castelo Branco, who helped push along the rebellion by also contacting the paulistas, but chiefly tried to stop it. He sought contact with Guedes and Magalhães. The former handed a fait accompli, "our troops are moving in all direction", and the latter said he could demobilize the police but for the army that'd be a lost cause.

"I'm not inviting anyone for honors, decorations or promotions. I invite you to die with me."
And Mourão Filho received overwhelming, overt support from his men. The most notable resistance was in the Sergeants' School, which declared itself neutral, and 10th Infantry's commander, recently-installed and tied to the Minister of War; when he heard the Minister wasn't on board, he had to be given vacations and replaced by a staff officer, Liutenant Colonel Everaldo. Two other colonels didn't want to act, either, and were ordered to stay home, "neither intervening nor bothering".

His first act was to dispatch as a vanguard the 3rd Company of Fusiliers of the 10th Infantry Regiment, under Captain Mandarino, to seize and hold at all costs the bridge over the Paraibuna, at the border with Rio de Janeiro, the first vital bottleneck in the road. It was reinforced with MGs and mortars from the Heavy Weapons Company and a fraction of light tanks from the Mech Recon. Mandarino left at 09-10:00, approached in combat order -the enemy was expected to have occupied it by noon- found it unguarded and crossed it at 14:00. Soldiers dug in, MGs and mortars got in position and two platoons plus tanks stayed in the right (Rio) bank with another one in the left.

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 03:56:44 [Preview] No.39554 del
The home front was secured by the state government and police to ensure months of war fighting ability and prevent any political mobilization by the "internal enemy". It consisted of:

-Sending an emissary to Espírito Santo in the morning, which guaranteed the state's support
-Telephone calls to other governors. Goiás and Mato Grosso could be counted on.
-Rationing fuel supplies.
-Accepting volunteers, 10 thousand showed up. Existing right-wing militias were to be put to use.
-Shutting off the borders.
-Heavy police coverage of sensitive points, all surveyed in advace.
-Shutting off bus traffic between the capital and hinterland. At morning policemen with machine guns and hand grenades occupied the bus station, returned tickets to passengers and requisitioned 108 buses.
-At least 50 arrests of leftists and unionist figures. The Labor Secretary resigned in protest.
-Total control of communications and the press.

Note the similarities with São Paulo's mobilization, but in this case there is little mention of the private sector springing to help on its own initiative.

The police was brought into the field. An infantry battalion's "wartime" formation was:
x3 company of fusiliers, 170 men each
x1 machine gun company, 134 men
Battalions were formed into detachments. Besides the mixed army/police formations sent to Rio (Tiradentes) and Brasília (Caicó) they were:

Triângulo Detachment
4th Battalion
12th Battalion
Would defend against legalists coming from Goiás and hence technically part of the Brasília theater.

Eastern Detachment
6th Battalion
11th Battalion
Would secure the rail line to the port in Vitória. If it sprung into action it'd logically join up with the Espírito Santo police and the 3rd Caçadores Battalion and maybe even elements to the north.

Southern Detachment
8th Battalion
Redeployed to Belo Horizonte.

Belo Horizonte Detachment
Instruction Department
Auxiliary Service Corps
Cavalry Regiment
3rd Battalion
5th Battalion
7th Battalion

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 04:02:54 [Preview] No.39555 del
There was no published manifesto yet. Outside the state nobody knew for sure what was going on, only a storm of rumors of rebellion. Quite importantly, while its regiments did not reach the border (excluding the single vanguard company) the policy was denial and obfuscation. When called, the activities were described as "preventative measures, to prevent agitation"; the occupation of gas stations was only "to control the exit of fuel and not hamper the state's supply". Mourão Filho was phoned in the late morning on what was going on, and in his words cynically denied there was anything out of the ordinary.

Bernd 08/28/2020 (Fri) 05:22:10 [Preview] No.39560 del
Oh so ID just means it is part of a division level formation, so it's not a detachment/attachment of any other formation (e.g. army).

Bernd 09/10/2020 (Thu) 18:50:17 [Preview] No.39939 del
Oh I've some reading to do here.

Bernd 09/13/2020 (Sun) 12:18:46 [Preview] No.40041 del
>In the Oral History most interviewees praise them as an "elite" force
Maybe their greenness made them careless which could seem recklessness from the outside. And recklessness is just enough on many occasions. From the options:
1. fight;
2. pretend to fight;
3. flee;
4. surrender;
... most soldiers opt with pretending and those who posture better oftentimes will be the winner of the confrontation. Fighting SS units are also considered elite and while they supposedly got more thorough training (did they get more than Wehrmacht?) their real use was in their perceived fanaticism and bravery when they fought when others might knew better. Well, ofc maybe they also had more killers, or those who were able to kill easier due to dehumanization of opponents.
And maybe since they were in training they might have obeyed orders more readily. And with quality officers to follow this part can play out for their advantage.

>who actually served there are more pessimistic
Looking back one notice it easier his own inexperience, "yeah, we were so clueless rookies we wouldn't have found our own dicks"

Bernd 09/13/2020 (Sun) 20:02:09 [Preview] No.40048 del
Still lot to read but I have questions.
I see that there's a School-Unit Group which was subordinated to I. Army HQ. and was basically a division level unit, a model one, properly equipped. Did this serve as actual training unit and the crew was rotated? Liek conscripts were assigned to this unit for a while after base training, but then moved to their final unit? Or this was just a name?
And there's the Academy, or more properly the Agulhas Negras Military Academy where commissioned officers of the Brazilian army are trained. Now, you wrote here >>39510
>It bears noting that he and the two battery commanders studied at the Academy.
Which means others didn't. Were those non-commissioned officers, or other higher education facilities for the military exist?

Bernd 09/14/2020 (Mon) 02:19:22 [Preview] No.40056 del
>Maybe their greenness made them careless which could seem recklessness from the outside
This opinion is from interviewees who weren't even in the theater, they were just inspired by the Academy's prestige. But certainly the cadets could be reckless as their morale was high. They also had competent officers i.e. their professors.
>basically a division level unit
Commanded by brigade generals. But it was one of the "Great Units".
>Did this serve as actual training unit and the crew was rotated? Liek conscripts were assigned to this unit for a while after base training, but then moved to their final unit? Or this was just a name?
It seems for the conscripts it was a normal unit, they served their whole time there, but it was used for training officers and demonstrating them how things were supposed to function.
>Which means others didn't
It's just not mentioned. But in the batteries which switched sides there were officers who personally knew officers manning the Academy's defenses, or knew Ustra and shared his mindset.
>or other higher education facilities for the military exist?
It's mostly just Agulhas Negras. Other institutions are for some specific branches and services. Then higher up in the ladder there's the Command and General Staff School and the like.

Bernd 09/14/2020 (Mon) 11:21:44 [Preview] No.40069 del
Bought some nice meat from brazil today. Thank you brazil.

Bernd 09/15/2020 (Tue) 00:51:52 [Preview] No.40083 del
Do they sell it in a local store or something?

Bernd 09/15/2020 (Tue) 05:58:07 [Preview] No.40096 del
Argentinian and brazilian meat are usually on sale in supermarkets here. Usually good quality, grassfed.

Perhaps meat is cheaper in southamerica, I heard the meat consumption are much higher than elsewhere in the world.

Bernd 09/16/2020 (Wed) 02:51:32 [Preview] No.40115 del
Congratulations Sweden.

Bernd 09/16/2020 (Wed) 04:20:32 [Preview] No.40118 del
(82.72 KB 640x708 not me I swear.jpg)
Thank you. Do you know anything about cia involvement in brazil

Bernd 09/16/2020 (Wed) 19:06:02 [Preview] No.40136 del
>It was, however, militarily weak.
Now that I started to browse the Luttwak book, it made me wonder if the units all over were kept low on crew and war material partially as an anti-coup measure (beside economical considerations) - with the exception of the School-Unit Group, which might have kept as a unit to counter the others if necessary (beside the training considerations).
>Weapons were purchased from Czechoslovakia
This big independence the states enjoy in Brazil? They can negotiate deals with foreign actors? Especially arm deals?

Bernd 09/18/2020 (Fri) 17:00:52 [Preview] No.40171 del
In this time period when they investigated the subject in 1963 they found several conspiracies already underway. Later they helped organized the dispatch of fuel tankers.
From the other side the Czechoslovak secret service had some activity in the same period.

>if the units all over were kept low on crew and war material partially as an anti-coup measure (beside economical considerations)
Up to the 60s the logic was to concentrate firepower in the south and in Rio. The former as it bordered the Argentine Army. The latter because it was the capital, and reining in the military must've been a component of that. Goulart's apparatus concentrated reliable officers in Rio, too, and it's not unsafe to assume previous governments had a similar policy.
But Minas Gerais was unreliable because it was weak, not weak because it was unreliable. Mourão Filho was the least trustworthy general and hence given the weakest Division.
>with the exception of the School-Unit Group, which might have kept as a unit to counter the others if necessary
The "anti-coup unit" would probably be the 1st Infantry Division itself. Once it was committed and a second front appeared the School-Unit Group was dispatched. In Sergeants' Revolt in 63 paratroopers were employed when an immediate iron-fisted reaction was needed. And within Rio itself marines were the regime's muscle.
>This big independence the states enjoy in Brazil? They can negotiate deals with foreign actors? Especially arm deals?
It's one author that mentions it. Might be vestigial state independence from the pre-1930 time, when São Paulo could even train its state army with French advisors.

>And your topic is a very successful putsch, and now I'm thinking those Brazilian officers really did know what they were doing (in a theoretical sense; they might had very incomplete information what is going on out in the field about them and as a consequence they might were very unsure what their next step should be)
What was really decisive wasn't a meticulously planned conspiracy but that the political climate developed to a point where the uninvolved would all either defect or retreat with no resistance. In Minas Gerais the plot was tightly woven allowing a swift takeover but it was just an island in an "archipelago" of regional conspiracies which were only connected near the very end. In some garrisons, notably the 5th Infantry Division, the rebels weren't just off on the date by a few days (as in Rio de Janeiro) but very aloof and caught by surprise. A rebellion was already what they wanted so they switched sides as soon as conditions were favorable (it was a weak garrison). This was in part from many efforts to legitimize an action against the government, and from the government itself ruining its image with the officer class. In this field the action of organizations such as IPES, which besides influencing public opinion opened covert channels of contact between oppositionist elites and officers, played the years-long game of preparing the ground.
>and avoiding bloodshed was a top priority.
Certainly in the Minas Gerais theater, in which the rebel commander realized in advance he'd have to rely on defections.

There's a psychological dimension to Mourão Filho's argument that a weak rebellion should launch a surprise attack on the capital (de facto capital) rather than entrench: as they only had young and lightly-trained soldiers they could only be used on a reckless assault. In static defense their morale would dissolve.

Bernd 09/18/2020 (Fri) 18:20:57 [Preview] No.40173 del
Since I found Luttwak's book I'm trying to view this topic from other angle. Granted since I have read barely anything right now I'm reading another book, but will finish it soon and start this one this new perspective is lacking a bit.
By the 1964 coup, Brazil already went through 6 or 7, some was successful, some were foiled. At least Wikipee list that many, and one when Vargas couped himself somehow, funny notion. They had experience with this and preparing against could have been as natural as thinking it as a normal way of changing power. Do any of your sources - especially the Oral History - reflect anything about how they thought about coup as a tool?

Bernd 09/18/2020 (Fri) 22:55:19 [Preview] No.40181 del
>By the 1964 coup, Brazil already went through 6 or 7, some was successful, some were foiled
Then two more in the following years: Costa e Silva pressuring Castelo Branco to accept him as his successor in 1965, and the moderate President's countercoup on the hardliner Minister of the Army in 1977. Both successful.
The latter was less of a countercoup against a mounting coup, and more of triggering a coup when the countercoup was already in place, ensuring its failure. There'd been for a while but the Minister wasn't really constructing a proper conspiracy. He was called by the President and fired; in the next 12 hours he tried to improvise a coup, launching a manifesto against the process of thaw, invoking the reds, and summoning commanders. As the moderates had planned this in advance and had all their pieces in place, it was immediate checkmate and by nighttime the Minister gave up.
>Do any of your sources - especially the Oral History - reflect anything about how they thought about coup as a tool?
Legitimacy - There was an interesting exchange between a legalist commander and a rebel emissary, the former insisted on his legal duties and the latter, with the example of previous coups and revolutions, arguing that such duties become void with an illegitimate government. Other times this is framed as between legal duty and duty to the fatherland. One interviewee mentions how a coup d'état is the military's way of expressing discontent. And there's a strong emphasis on popular support as necessary for a legitimate coup.
Luck - the balance of power is influenced by the random fluctuations of military life. Commanders might be away on vacation leaving subordinates from the other side in charge. In some units conscripts will be well trained, deep into their cycle, while in others they'll be recently incorporated. To some extent can be addressed. Commanders with recent troops can subject them to accelerated training. If they keep their sharp they'll have the advantage when the crisis comes.
Cohesion - if a general is undecided or on the other side, his subordinates can arrest him or take over, but this will leave scars in military discipline and unity in the year to come - this was the case in the 30s. Ideally subordinates should apply pressure to commanders and units should pick a side as a whole.
Distributing information - an untrustworthy regiment can be dispatched without information. Within one's own garrison, however, not taking a public stand will just create confusion and division. One can make the stand, let the opposition speak and arrest it, make the stand and not leave any room for the opposition to appear, or ask everyone from the lowest to the highest rank (the order can matter).

Bernd 09/19/2020 (Sat) 17:07:44 [Preview] No.40188 del
Is it known that from the general staff how many/who participated in previous coups?

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